Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining Model
| dc.contributor.author | Farrow, Alexander | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-04-11T23:33:57Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-04-11T23:33:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-11-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | From the Ku Klux Klan’s lynchings to al Qaeda’s World Trade Center attacks, terrorist organizations have historically exploited fear and destruction to achieve their end goals. Attacking both a nation’s government and population, terrorist organizations inflict damage on their intended audiences, or targets. This paper explores how terrorist organizations interact with their targets. In my analysis, I assume complete rationality and build an infinite bargaining model of political concession between both actors. I claim that terrorist organizations bargain with targets in the long run by increasing the payoffs for cooperation and decreasing the payoffs for noncooperation. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Farrow, Alexander. "Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining Model." Cornell International Affairs Review Vol. 9, Iss. 1 (Fall 2015). https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v9i1.471. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v9i1.471 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/114970 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Cornell University Library | en_US |
| dc.title | Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining Model | en_US |
| dc.type | article | en_US |
| schema.issueNumber | Vol. 9, Iss. 1 (Fall 2015) | en_US |
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