Cornell International Affairs Review - Volume 09, Number 1 (Fall 2015)
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Item Norm or Necessity? The Non-Interference Principle in ASEANNguyen, Tram-Anh (Cornell University Library, 2015-11-01)Item A Silent Dissonance: LGBT+ Rights & Geopolitics in Maidan and Post-Maidan UkraineSanchez, Jesse (Cornell University Library, 2015-11-01)Item Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining ModelFarrow, Alexander (Cornell University Library, 2015-11-01)From the Ku Klux Klan’s lynchings to al Qaeda’s World Trade Center attacks, terrorist organizations have historically exploited fear and destruction to achieve their end goals. Attacking both a nation’s government and population, terrorist organizations inflict damage on their intended audiences, or targets. This paper explores how terrorist organizations interact with their targets. In my analysis, I assume complete rationality and build an infinite bargaining model of political concession between both actors. I claim that terrorist organizations bargain with targets in the long run by increasing the payoffs for cooperation and decreasing the payoffs for noncooperation.Item A New Silk Road: Assessing Prospects for "Win-Win" Cooperation in Central AsiaLi, Siyao (Cornell University Library, 2015-11-01)Item Cornell International Affairs Review: Fall 2015Cornell International Affairs Review, Editorial Board (Cornell University Library, 2015-11-01)Item United States-India Defense Relations: A Strategic Partnership for the 21st CenturyPedro, John (Cornell University Library, 2015-11-01)