The Nature Of Predication
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I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for an occurrence of a term to function semantically as a predicate. The condition is that the term occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its denotation, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view on predication has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favor the ascription view. I then develop the ascription view and elicit a number of its virtues.
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2009-10-14T20:12:47Z
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sematic relation
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dissertation or thesis