The Nature Of Predication
| dc.contributor.author | Liebesman, DavidF | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-10-14T20:12:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-10-14T06:24:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-10-14T20:12:47Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for an occurrence of a term to function semantically as a predicate. The condition is that the term occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its denotation, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view on predication has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favor the ascription view. I then develop the ascription view and elicit a number of its virtues. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | bibid: 6714469 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/14067 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.subject | sematic relation | en_US |
| dc.title | The Nature Of Predication | en_US |
| dc.type | dissertation or thesis | en_US |
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