Theories of coup-proofing and counterinsurgency have received increased attention in recent years. However, minimal research has been conducted to determine if a causal relationship exists between the two theories. Therefore, this dissertation endeavors to broaden both theories by drawing insights into how coup-proofing measures impact strategic approaches and operational efficacy in counterinsurgency campaigns. To accomplish this task, this dissertation analyzes the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its counterinsurgency campaign in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan. This case tests the hypothesis that coup proofing has caused Iran to adopt a coercive-repressive approach to counterinsurgency, and diminished its operational performance. Following a case study analysis and conclusions regarding the hypothesis, I further outline these findings and discuss their applicability to other cases. I also place my research within the context of broader coup-proofing and counterinsurgency theory, linking it to ongoing debates in each field. Though the conclusions drawn are in the context of Iran, the case provides a jumping-of point for further research.