Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism
| dc.contributor.author | Messer, Kent D. Poe, Gregory L. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Rondeau, Daniel | |
| dc.contributor.author | Schulze, William D. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Vossler, Christian A. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-21T17:09:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-08-21T17:09:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-03-01 | |
| dc.description | WP 2008-12 March 2008 | |
| dc.description | JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/57868 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University | |
| dc.title | Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism | |
| dc.type | article | |
| dcterms.license | http://hdl.handle.net/1813/57595 |
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