Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006)
| dc.contributor.author | Conyon, Martin J. | |
| dc.contributor.author | He, Lerong | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-12T19:47:58Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-11-12T19:47:58Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-08-31 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the economic, ownership and governance determinants of executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated with firm size, performance, and growth opportunities. CEO incentives are negatively associated with firm size, positively linked with firm performance and growth opportunity. Firm risk has a negative effect on pay and incentives. Compensation and CEO incentives are significantly greater in privately-controlled firms compared to state-run firms and are lower in firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important: firms with compensation committees or a greater fraction of independent directors on the board have higher executive pay and greater CEO equity incentives. | |
| dc.description.legacydownloads | cri_2009_006.pdf: 926 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020. | |
| dc.identifier.other | 1041139 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73201 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.subject | China | |
| dc.subject | Executive Compensation | |
| dc.subject | CEO Equity Incentives | |
| dc.title | Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006) | |
| dc.type | preprint | |
| local.authorAffiliation | Conyon, Martin J.: University of Pennsylvania | |
| local.authorAffiliation | He, Lerong: SUNY Brockport |
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