Cryptographic Support for Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing
| dc.contributor.author | Minsky, Yaron | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Johansen, Dag | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | van Renesse, Robbert | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Schneider, Fred B. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-04-23T18:07:44Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-04-23T18:07:44Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1996-07 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | In an open distributed system, agents comprising an application must not only survive (possibly malicious) failures of the hosts they visit, but they must also be resilient to the potentially hostile actions of other hosts. In particular, faulty hosts that are not visited by agents can confound a naive replica-management scheme by spoofing. Cryptographic protocols to solve this problem are summarized, as well as some experiments that show how replication can actually speed up some applications. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 139581 bytes | |
| dc.format.extent | 296695 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/postscript | |
| dc.identifier.citation | http://techreports.library.cornell.edu:8081/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/cul.cs/TR96-1600 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1813/7255 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Cornell University | en_US |
| dc.subject | computer science | en_US |
| dc.subject | technical report | en_US |
| dc.title | Cryptographic Support for Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing | en_US |
| dc.type | technical report | en_US |