Competitive Pricing with Dynamic Asymmetric Price Effects

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We model the temporal pricing strategies for two firms with asymmetric costs and differing market power (i.e. big-box retailer versus smaller local merchant). A firm’s demand is a function of its price, a reference price and its competitor’s price. Price effects may be asymmetric, i.e. consumers respond differently if they perceive a good to be over-priced versus underpriced. We derive analytical results for optimal prices. We show through a series of numerical examples under what settings firms choose various pricing strategies as well as profit implications for firms with differing costs.
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2005-09-01
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pricing; retailing
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Required Publisher Statement: © Wiley. Final version published as: Anderson, C. K., Rasmussen, H., & MacDonald, L. (2005). Competitive pricing with dynamic asymmetric price effects. International Transactions in Operational Research, 12(5), 509-525.
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