Institute for Compensation Studies
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The Institute for Compensation StudiesTM (ICS) in the ILR School at Cornell University is a vehicle for interdisciplinary research on compensation, compensation design and compensation strategy.
All aspects of compensation are explored by the Institute including (but not limited to) compensation design, compensation in for-profit and nonprofit organizations, executive compensation, benefits and pensions, total compensation, forms of pay and pay “mix”, the relationship between pay and “performance”, compensation in labor unions, public policy, regulation and legal issues, minimum wages and compensation internationally.
The Institute also strives to be the central repository for academic research on compensation worldwide. Interested researchers can submit their papers to the ICS for possible inclusion by sending a message to: linda.barrington@cornell.edu.
Recent Submissions
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Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets (CRI 2009-013)
(2008-05-01)A number of branches of the literature on internal labor markets have matured to the point that there is now a healthy two-way interaction between theory and empirical work. In this survey I consider two of these branches: ... -
CEO Turnover and Firm Performance in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-012)
(2008-11-05)Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in China’s listed firms. The study examines how the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm ... -
Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006)
(2008-08-31)This study investigates the economic, ownership and governance determinants of executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that executive compensation ... -
CEO Pay-for-Performance Heterogeneity Using Quantile Regression (CRI 2009-002)
(2008-07-29)We provide some examples of how quantile regression can be used to investigate heterogeneity in pay–firm size and pay-performance relationships for U.S. CEOs. For example, do conditionally (predicted) high-wage managers ... -
Performance Pay and the White-Black Wage Gap
(2009-08-01)We show that the reported tendency for performance pay to be associated with greater wage inequality at the top of the earnings distribution applies only to white workers. This results in the white-black wage differential ... -
Negative Hedging: Performance Sensitive Debt and CEOs’ Equity Incentives (CRI 2009-014)
(2009-01-01)We examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower's performance deteriorates or ... -
Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church (CRI 2009-011)
(2009-11-11)We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing ... -
Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay (CRI 2009-010)
(2009-01-01)This chapter provides a review of the recent literature on compensation consultants and executive pay. Six major pay consulting firms dominate the market. These firms advise client firms about executive pay and frequently ... -
The Relative Effects of Merit Pay, Bonuses, and Long-Term Incentives on Future Job Performance (CRI 2009-009)
(2009-01-01)Extant compensation literature has indicated that pay-for-performance can influence employee performance. There is little research, however, that differentiates the effects of certain forms of pay-for-performance plans on ... -
The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (CRI 2009-008)
(2009-06-01)An extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. In this paper we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with a worker’s education ...
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