Political Economy of Chinese State-owned Enterprises' Investment in the Developing World
This dissertation analyzes the political economy of Chinese outward investment in the developing world, in particular those conducted by the central state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A puzzle in international political economy and Chinese investment literature is: why some state-controlled commercial actors engage in risky business that harms the home state’s broader goal of increasing political and economic influence abroad, while others not? In order to explain this variation, this dissertation investigates how the Party-state’s control over SOEs, overseas market share and ranking, and financing source affect the degree of Chinese SOEs’ risk acceptance in overseas activities in the power and infrastructure sector. Under the centralized power model, through tight political control, the Party-state directly orders Chinese SOEs to run risky but strategic projects. Under the fragmented power model, central SOEs with shrinking overseas market share and without state concessional finance are more likely to pursue riskier projects with more significant political, social and/or environmental impacts.
developing world; foreign direct investment; International relations; china; political economy
Chen Weiss, Jessica
Katzenstein, Peter Joachim; Mertha, Andrew; Pepinsky, Thomas
Doctor of Philosophy
dissertation or thesis