Confidentiality and Integrity with Untrusted Hosts: Technical Report
Zdancewic, Steve; Myers, Andrew C.
Several security-typed languages have recently been proposed to enforce security properties such as confidentiality or integrity by type checking. We propose a new security-typed language, SPL@, that addresses two important limitations of previous approaches. First, existing languages assume that the underlying execution platform is trusted; this assumption does not scale to distributed computation in which a variety of differently trusted hosts are available to execute programs. Our new approach, secure program partitioning, translates programs written assuming complete trust in a single executing host into programs that execute using a collection of variously trusted hosts to perform computation. As the trust configuration of a distributed system evolves, this translation can be performed as necessary for security. Second, many common program transformations do not work in existing security-typed languages; although they produce equivalent programs, these programs are rejected because of apparent information flows. SPL@ uses a novel mechanism based on ordered linear continuations to permit a richer class of program transformations, including secure program partitioning. This report is the technical companion to [ZM00]. It contains expanded discussion and extensive proofs of both the soundness and noninterference theorems mentioned in Section 3.3 of that work.
computer science; technical report
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