Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or The value of altruism
Loading...
No Access Until
Permanent Link(s)
Other Titles
Author(s)
Abstract
We study the problem of determining the minimum amount of flow required to be centrally controlled in a Stackelberg routing game in order to improve the social cost of a Nash equilibrium. We consider the special case of routing on a parallel link graph with linear delays and give a closed form expression for the above quantity.
Journal / Series
Volume & Issue
Description
Sponsorship
Date Issued
2006-08-22
Publisher
Cornell University
Keywords
computer science; technical report
Location
Effective Date
Expiration Date
Sector
Employer
Union
Union Local
NAICS
Number of Workers
Committee Chair
Committee Co-Chair
Committee Member
Degree Discipline
Degree Name
Degree Level
Related Version
Related DOI
Related To
Related Part
Based on Related Item
Has Other Format(s)
Part of Related Item
Related To
Related Publication(s)
Link(s) to Related Publication(s)
References
Link(s) to Reference(s)
Previously Published As
http://techreports.library.cornell.edu:8081/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/cul.cis/TR2006-2042
Government Document
ISBN
ISMN
ISSN
Other Identifiers
Rights
Rights URI
Types
technical report