The Department of Computer Science at Cornell University, which was organized in 1965, is one of the oldest departments of its kind in the country. It has a full-time faculty of 36, approximately 110 resident Ph.D. graduate students, 100 M.Eng students, and the undergraduate program graduates about 200 C.S. majors each year. The department is typically ranked as one of the top five in the country.

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  • Flow-Limited Authorization 

    Arden, Owen (2017-01)
    Enforcing the confidentiality and integrity of information is critical in distributed applications. Production systems typically use some form of authorization mechanism to protect information, but these mechanisms do ...
  • Lightweight Verification of Secure Hardware Isolation Through Static Information Flow Analysis (Technical Report) 

    Ferraiuolo, Andrew; Xu, Rui; Zhang, Danfeng; Myers, Andrew C.; Suh, G. Edward (2017-01-29)
    Hardware-based mechanisms for software isolation are becoming increasingly popular, but implementing these mechanisms correctly has proved difficult, undermining the root of security. This work introduces an effective ...
  • On Free ω-Continuous and Regular Ordered Algebras 

    Esik, Zoltan; Kozen, Dexter (2016)
    Let E be a set of inequalities between finite Σ-terms. Let V_ω and V_r denote the varieties of all ω-continuous ordered Σ-algebras and regular ordered Σ-algebras satisfying E, respectively. We prove that the free V_r-algebra ...
  • A Calculus for Flow-Limited Authorization: Technical Report 

    Arden, Owen; Myers, Andrew C. (2016-09-13)
    Real-world applications routinely make authorization decisions based on dynamic computation. Reasoning about dynamically computed authority is challenging. Integrity of the system might be compromised if attackers can ...
  • Block-safe Information Flow Control 

    Kozyri, Elisavet; Desharnais, Josée; Tawbi, Nadia (2016-08-09)
    Flow-sensitive dynamic enforcement mechanisms for information flow labels offer increased permissiveness. However, these mechanisms may leak sensitive information when deciding to block insecure executions. When enforcing ...

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