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  6. Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy

Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy

File(s)
No1_14_ResearchLink_Belogolovsky_031014b.pdf (662.9 KB)
Permanent Link(s)
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/73672
Collections
CAHRS ResearchLink
Author
Belogolovsky, Elena
Bamberger, Peter A.
Abstract

Key Findings: Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens the perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase in pay; Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention in pay-for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., peer-ranked) criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for- performance perceptions; There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can influence employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact their performance and turnover intentions; and When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introducing partial pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and retention.

Date Issued
2014-03-01
Keywords
pay-for-performance
•
incentives
•
job performance
•
pay secrecy
Type
article

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