Given widespread use of noncompete agreements (NCAs) and substantial impact on both employees and the overall economy, it is worth investigating more closely the various implications of NCA use. There remain three big questions about NCAs. First, even though existing studies have focused on state law differences in NCA enforcement, ironically not many have paid attention to how U.S. state laws governing NCAs have developed in different states. Second, in contrast to growing research on the consequences of NCAs, no studies have examined how NCAs have diffused or what caused organizations to use NCAs. Last, studies that investigated the consequences of NCAs rather relied on the proxy measure of different state NCA laws, but a dearth of research has looked into organizations and their employees that actually have NCAs (c.f. Marx, 2011). In the three chapters of my dissertation, I attempt to answers each of the above questions, respectively. I begin by introducing briefly the history of NCAs and variation in NCA enforceability across states with an emphasis on how existing research on NCAs have utilized such variation to investigate various phenomena related to organizational NCA use. I indicate limitations of prior studies and suggest ways to improve understanding of NCAs. Then, I move on to investigate what factors facilitated or slowed down the organizational NCA adoptions by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms with their CEOs. I present predictors at different levels in and outside the organization. Finally, I examine changes to CEO compensation and tenure due to having NCAs. The moderating effects of employment pathway of CEOs and state NCA laws are also discussed in detail.