Autocrats Keeping Peace? An Analysis of the Impact of Autocratic T/PCCs on UN Peace Operations
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Since the early 2000s, the relative share of peacekeepers provided by non-democracies to United Nations (UN) peace operations has increased. At the same time, peacekeepers are involved in more and more tasks that aim to help mission host countries avert further violence. But what happens to mission host countries when the tasks of democracy-building and strengthening human rights are increasingly carried out by peacekeepers from countries that are deficient in either of both? What impact does the increased participation of autocratic contributors have on UN peace operations? My dissertation seeks to answer these questions through a multi-method approach that combines quantitative data analysis with qualitative case studies, as well as the results of an original survey experiment conducted with the Zambia Police Service. While the quantitative evidence points to the negative consequences of missions more largely composed of peacekeepers from autocratic regimes, the qualitative findings demonstrate that there is nuance in when and where peacekeepers underperform.