This dissertation is comprised of three papers: two on the metaphysics of grounding, laws, and properties, and one on the metaphysics of social groups. In Chapter 2, I argue that there are no fundamental laws of metaphysics and that metaphysical laws are not required for grounding. I offer a new view: the natures of properties explain grounding. Chapter 3 develops this idea. First, properties play their roles in grounding necessarily, so a Humean-quidditist-like view can be rejected. Next, a primitive-laws account of grounding can be rejected for not being sufficiently explanatory. Instead, we should embrace my proposal that there are "grounding powers." I show that properties can be individuated by their powers to ground and argue for a kind of structuralism, according to which non-fundamental properties just are powers to ground. Shifting gears, Chapter 4 asks: how do groups of people persist through time? Social groups can change their members, locations, and structure. I first argue that four-dimensionalism better explains the context sensitivity found in some cases. I then exploit two unique features of the social to argue for the stage theory, a type of four-dimensionalism. First, puzzle cases involving social groups actually happen, and so cannot be ignored. Second, only the stage theory can explain fission cases because pre-fission spatial coincidence is implausible for many kinds of groups and only the stage theory does not require spatial coincidence to explain these cases.