This paper investigates rent seeking behavior in Fiji's sugar industry, which was historically dependent on preferential access to European sugar markets through the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol (1975--2009). Characterized by a monopolist miller and a perverse grower payment system, the industry provides a natural setting for investigating how domestic market structures mediate the distribution and dissipation of discriminatory export preferences. The free trade losses faced by Fiji and other African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) members---through dissipating economic rents, falling preferential margins, and lowered export revenues---are well documented, but existing studies often overlook the role of these domestic structures. Through an analytical model, this paper demonstrates that Fiji's pro rata revenue sharing structure incentivizes systematic overproduction, dissipating between 36% and 48% of European quota rents annually on average. When the Sugar Protocol was terminated and these rents eroded, the underlying inefficiencies were exposed. Like Mozambique's cashew industry, Fiji's sugar sector collapsed under liberalization. The Fijian government has since substituted fiscal transfers to producers for quota rents. These transfers are found to be of similar magnitude to Sugar Protocol transfer benefits, suggesting the industry has shifted from preferential rents to public subsidization without resolving the underlying inefficiency.