How do autocratic states in the Global South develop liberalizing migration policy reforms despite their 'illiberal' regime orientations? Traditional scholarly works tend to emphasize the centrality of autocratic states in shaping domestic labor migration policies in the Global South. Yet, scholars have not geopolitically examined how autocratic states instrumentalize autocratic policy tools through co-optation with international organizations to implement 'liberalizing' migration policies (i.e., removal of exit permits and pro-migrant rights reforms) linked to their domestic and geopolitical objectives. Drawing from two comparative cases in the Gulf, namely the UAE-ILO (2015-2017) and Qatar-ILO (2018-present), I argue that autocratic states employ a diverse range of autocratic policy tools (i.e., joint technical agreements, ministerial decrees, and resolutions) not only to liberalize their labor migration reforms through institutional cooptation with international organizations but also in reaction to existing geopolitical threats. Rather than viewing such institutional co-optation as a form of political concession, I contend that these political economy dynamics reflect the structural capacities of autocratic Gulf states to rule despite extensive geopolitical pressures within the international community. Methodologically, I draw on primary and secondary sources, including field observations, process tracing, secondary analysis of government/public policy reports, and newspapers. Ultimately, this study advances debates on political regimes and South-South migration politics by demonstrating the structural capacity of Gulf states via autocratic policy tools to co-opt international organizations as part of their global legitimization strategies in the Global South and beyond.