This dissertation examines international law and cooperation to combat bribery in international business, specifically the OECD’s 1997 Anti-Bribery Convention and the criminalization of foreign bribery—the bribery of government officials of other states to obtain a business advantage. Moving away from questions of compliance with international law that focus on conformity with a prescribed obligation, the project examines the influence of the Convention through its national implementation in four prominent OECD states—Canada, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The dissertation draws on extensive documentary and interview data to catalogue the varied national anti-foreign bribery policy paradigms that these states have developed in response to their shared international obligation. These range from a traditional criminal law paradigm to a regulatory policy paradigm, which demonstrate marked differences from enforcement practices to policy goals. The dissertation shows how international law necessarily moves through—and is shaped by—pre-existing institutions and practices within the state. Bridging historical institutionalism and international relations literature on state socialization, I argue that distinct national policy legacies in governing business produce these particular national anti-foreign bribery policy paradigms. Further, the dissertation documents the continued significance of these national policy paradigms as they mediate efforts by norm promoters to improve adherence to the OECD Convention. This research has important implications for how we assess the OECD Convention and international law more generally, and it highlights the multiple pathways of influence and ongoing engagement of international law. Ultimately, It raises questions about the degree of equivalence that we can expect in the application of international law in domestic legal orders, even among similarly situated states with significant regulatory capacity.