Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology

Petterson, Jeffrey M.; Boisvert, Richard N.

Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology

File(s)

Cornell_Dyson_wp0113.pdf (266.4 KB)

Permanent Link(s)

https://hdl.handle.net/1813/57705

Collections

Dyson School Working Papers

Author

Petterson, Jeffrey M.

Boisvert, Richard N.

Abstract

A pollution reduction program is designed where information about both techno logy and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for selfselection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.

Description

WP 2001-13 July 2001

Sponsorship

This research was supported in part by the Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station federal formula funds, Projects NYC -121444 and 121490, received from Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Additional funding was provided by USDA-ERS Cooperative Agreement 43-3-AEM-2-800900 and Hatch Project NY(C) 121444.

Date Issued

2001-07

Publisher

Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University

Type

article