Cornell University
Library
Cornell UniversityLibrary

eCommons

Help
Log In(current)
  1. Home
  2. Cornell SC Johnson College of Business
  3. Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management
  4. Applied Economics Research
  5. Dyson School Research Bulletins
  6. Optimal institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis

Optimal institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis

File(s)
Cornell_Dyson_rb0412.pdf (1.54 MB)
Permanent Link(s)
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/65058
Collections
Dyson School Research Bulletins
Author
Messer, Kent D.
Schmit, Todd M.
Kaiser, Harry M.
Abstract

Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated hat could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggests that producer referendum play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a Provision Point Mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.

Description
NICPRE 04-05; R.B. 2004-12
Date Issued
2004-12
Publisher
Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
Keywords
Applied Economics
Type
report

Site Statistics | Help

About eCommons | Policies | Terms of use | Contact Us

copyright © 2002-2026 Cornell University Library | Privacy | Web Accessibility Assistance