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  6. Static and dynamic impacts of venture capital shareholding on stock price crash risk

Static and dynamic impacts of venture capital shareholding on stock price crash risk

File(s)
VentureCapital_201805_YZFGYCH.pdf (510.18 KB)
Permanent Link(s)
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/60169
Collections
Applied Economics and Management
Author
Yang, Bin
Zhou, Yuefan
Fang, Chuangtao
Guo, Xinmei
Yang, Xuan
Chen, Mengni
He, Dawn
Abstract

With the rapid development of venture capital industry in China, venture capital firms are playing an increasingly active role in funding startups. As more and more companies with venture capital shareholders go public, venture capital firms become an important group of institutional investors that can bring significant influence on companies’ stock price. In the past decade, extremely high exit returns from IPO of venture capital firms raised the public and Chinese scholars’ attention. However, few researches inspected the venture capital’s post-IPO influence. In this paper, we examine whether venture capital shareholding will lead to companies’ higher stock crash risk, and whether different venture capital shareholders’ different behavior of holding and selling after lockup period will have different impacts on companies’ crash risk. The research used descriptive statistics and regression analysis to analyze the quarterly data of Chinese A-share companies from 2005-2016. We found that: (1) Companies with venture capital shareholders in a specific quarter will have greater incentive of earnings management (exaggerating revenue and profit) and greater stock price crash risk in the next quarter then companies without venture capital shareholders. (2) Venture capital shareholders continuing to hold non-restricted shares after lockup period is considered as a positive signal, thus reduce the crash risk. Venture capital shareholders selling shares is considered as a negative signal, thus increase the crash risk.

Date Issued
2018-05
Degree Discipline
Applied Economics and Management
Degree Name
M.P.S., Applied Economics and Management
Degree Level
Master of Professional Studies
Type
dissertation or thesis

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