Cornell University
Library
Cornell UniversityLibrary

eCommons

Help
Log In(current)
DigitalCollections@ILR
ILR School
  1. Home
  2. ILR School
  3. ILR Collection
  4. ILR Articles and Chapters
  5. Franchisor Power as Employment Control

Franchisor Power as Employment Control

File(s)
Griffith33_FranshisorPower.pdf (878.86 KB)
Permanent Link(s)
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/110928
Collections
Faculty Publications - Labor Relations, Law, and History
ILR Articles and Chapters
Author
Elmore, Andrew
Griffith, Kati L.
Abstract

Labor and employment laws are systematically underenforced in low-wage, franchised workplaces. Union contracts, and the benefits and protections they provide, are nonexistent. The Fight for Fifteen movement has brought attention to the low wages, systemic violations of workers’ rights, and lack of collective representation in fast-food franchises. Given that franchisees can be judgment-proof and cannot set industry standards, the deterrence, remedial, and collective bargaining goals of labor and employment laws can depend on holding the franchisor (the brand) responsible under the joint employer doctrine. In a series of cases, however, a dominant approach has emerged that essentially foreclosed the possibility that franchisors and their subordinate companies (franchisees) are joint employers. Recent political developments mirror this foreclosure and pose a historic narrowing of the scope of joint employer liability. This Article challenges courts, administrative agencies, and legislators to take more seriously franchisors’ power over their franchisees and the working conditions of low-wage fast-food workers. To advance this argument, we rely on insights from an original empirical data set of (1) forty-four contracts between leading fast-food franchisors and franchisees in 2016 and (2) comprehensive documentation provided in joint employer legal proceedings against two major fast-food franchisors in the United States: McDonald’s and Domino’s Pizza. Our proposed “power as employment control” construct considers, within the confines of existing doctrines, the cumulative effects of lead franchisor firms’ reserved (unexercised) and exercised influence over the working conditions in their subordinate businesses. By giving power more consideration in analyses of joint employer liability, courts, administrative agencies, and policy-makers can bring more justice and consistency to this hotly contested area.

Date Issued
2021-08
Publisher
University of California Berkeley School of Law
Keywords
franchised workplaces
•
labor and employment law
•
worker rights
•
joint employer liability
Related DOI
https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38QJ77Z9J
Previously Published as
California Law Review, Vol. 109(4), pp. 1317-1372.
Type
article
Accessibility Feature
alternativeText
bookmarks
highContractDisplay
readingOrder
structuralNavigation
taggedPDF
Accessibility Hazard
none
Accessibility Summary
Accessible pdf

Site Statistics | Help

About eCommons | Policies | Terms of use | Contact Us

copyright © 2002-2026 Cornell University Library | Privacy | Web Accessibility Assistance