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  6. Using Ownership as an Incentive: Does the "Too Many Chiefs" Rule Apply in Initial Public Offering Firms?

Using Ownership as an Incentive: Does the "Too Many Chiefs" Rule Apply in Initial Public Offering Firms?

File(s)
Using_Ownership_as_an_IncentiveWP96_04.pdf (103.39 KB)
Permanent Link(s)
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/77032
Collections
CAHRS Working Paper Series
Faculty Publications - Human Resource Studies
ILR Working Papers
Author
Welbourne, Theresa M.
Abstract

Agency theory is used to study the effectiveness of ownership proliferation throughout entrepreneurial organizations. Hypotheses are developed to understand the effect of CEO, top management, and all employee ownership on firm performance. The research is conducted with a sample of IPO firms followed for five years to study ownership and firm performance (survival and stock performance). The results indicate that all employee ownership has a positive effect on survival, while CEO and management ownership have no effect. However, CEO and top management ownership do affect stock price. Ownership significantly interacts with firm risk, indicating riskier firms benefit less from ownership.

Date Issued
1996-02-01
Keywords
work
•
business
•
organization
•
company
•
ownership
•
incentive
•
team
•
executive
•
employee
•
performance
•
CEO
•
stock
•
price
Type
preprint

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