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  4. Provably Correct Compilation for Distributed Cryptographic Applications

Provably Correct Compilation for Distributed Cryptographic Applications

File(s)
Acay_cornellgrad_0058F_13829.pdf (899.6 KB)
Permanent Link(s)
https://doi.org/10.7298/11w3-ye33
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/114556
Collections
Cornell Theses and Dissertations
Author
Acay, Coşku
Abstract

Developing secure distributed systems is difficult, and even harder when advanced cryptography must be used to achieve security goals. We present Viaduct, a compiler that transforms high-level programs into secure, efficient distributed realizations. Instead of implementing a system of communicating processes, the Viaduct programmer implements a centralized, sequential program which is automatically compiled into a secure distributed version that uses cryptography. Viaduct programs specify security policies declaratively using information-flow labels, and need not mention cryptographic primitives. Unlike prior compilers for cryptographic libraries, Viaduct is general and extensible: it can efficiently and automatically combine local computation with multiple advanced cryptographic primitives such as commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, secure multiparty computation, and fully homomorphic encryption. We develop a modular security proof for Viaduct that abstracts away from the details of cryptographic mechanisms. Our proof relies on a novel unification of simulation-based security, information-flow control, choreographic programming, and sequentialization techniques for concurrent programs. To our knowledge, this is the first security proof that simultaneously addresses subtleties essential for robust, performant applications, such as multiple cryptographic mechanisms, malicious corruption, and asynchronous communication. Our approach offers a clear path toward leveraging Universal Composability to obtain end-to-end security with fully instantiated cryptographic mechanisms.

Description
147 pages
Date Issued
2023-08
Keywords
Compilers
•
Cryptography
•
Distributed Systems
•
Information Flow Control
•
Secure Program Partitioning
•
Security and Privacy
Committee Chair
Myers, Andrew
Committee Member
Shi, Runting
Kozen, Dexter
Degree Discipline
Computer Science
Degree Name
Ph. D., Computer Science
Degree Level
Doctor of Philosophy
Rights
Attribution 4.0 International
Rights URI
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Type
dissertation or thesis
Link(s) to Catalog Record
https://newcatalog.library.cornell.edu/catalog/16219269

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