This work concerns the nature of moral responsibility, and in particular the conditions under which blame and praise may be appropriate. Each chapter focuses on a different kind of condition for moral responsibility—responsiveness to reasons, the ability to do otherwise, or having the right motivation for action. In Chapter 1, I argue that reasons-responsiveness is neither necessary nor explanatory as a control condition for moral responsibility. I present a counterexample to this proposed condition involving an agent who’s willfully impulsive and show that responsiveness to reasons cannot be the explanation for his blameworthiness. Instead, I suggest that blameworthiness is explained by his ability to settle on a particular action, which is a condition that can be met with or without satisfying reasons-responsiveness conditions. In Chapter 2, I defend the “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (PAP) against a certain kind of Frankfurt-style case—buffered alternatives. I develop a new dilemma for buffered alternatives cases which shows that they fail to constitute counterexamples to the PAP. I argue that the introduction of the buffer, though it may remove certain alternative possibilities, shifts the locus of responsibility to earlier provisional or character-forming decisions. In Chapter 3, I assess accounts of positive moral worth that take doing the right thing for the right reason to be necessary, and perhaps sufficient, for praiseworthiness. I evaluate these accounts by applying them to several challenging cases, with the goal of determining whether they accord with intuitive judgments. This involves varying either the nature of the action itself or the motivations for action and then determining what the accounts would and ought to say about praiseworthiness. While I conclude that the accounts do well at explaining our intuitions about difficult cases, I argue that some right thing for the right reason accounts have advantages over others in certain contexts.