Cryptographic Support for Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing
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Author
Minsky, Yaron
Johansen, Dag
van Renesse, Robbert
Schneider, Fred B.
Abstract
In an open distributed system, agents comprising an application must not only survive (possibly malicious) failures of the hosts they visit, but they must also be resilient to the potentially hostile actions of other hosts. In particular, faulty hosts that are not visited by agents can confound a naive replica-management scheme by spoofing. Cryptographic protocols to solve this problem are summarized, as well as some experiments that show how replication can actually speed up some applications.
Date Issued
1996-07
Publisher
Cornell University
Keywords
Previously Published as
http://techreports.library.cornell.edu:8081/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/cul.cs/TR96-1600
Type
technical report