
CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE¹

The Editors

The current listing identifies the holders of key positions at TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Military) Headquarters, as well as at the army's central and regional commands between March 1, 2003 and August 31, 2005. As noted in the last update of current military data in 2003, we have had difficulty in systematically updating personnel changes at the Korem (Military Resort Command), largely due to the absence of the TNI-owned daily newspaper, *Angkatan Bersenjata*, since the financial crisis of 1997.² We now rely mainly on the official letters of TNI Commander-in-Chief and general newspapers, both national and local, in collecting data regarding officer corps and their posts. Although the information on Korem commanders is not very satisfactory, it is still possible to analyze macro-trends in leadership transformation at the local level.

The period covered in this update, i.e., from March 2003 to August 2005, has seen significant developments in post-*reformasi* civil-military relations. We have seen: 1) the all-out war in Aceh under martial law (May 2003–May 2004); 2) parliamentary elections in April 2004; 3) direct presidential elections in July and September 2004 for the first time in Indonesian history; and 4) the birth of a new government led by a retired army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in October 2004. How did they shape Indonesia's civil-military relations? The war in Aceh greatly empowered those TNI officers who had demanded that the military take on a larger role in internal security. The post-Suharto attempt by reformers to limit the military function to the defense field stalled in this process. The elections in 2004 also boosted the political bargaining power of TNI leadership vis-à-vis party politicians and contributed to the

¹ We would like to thank Dr. Jun Honna of Ritsumeikan University for his invaluable contribution to this military update.

² The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," *Indonesia* 75 (April 2003): 9-59.

decline in civilian initiatives to curb TNI's institutional political autonomy. Clearly, the post-Suharto military reform was in deadlock, casting a deep shadow over Indonesia's future democracy. It is against this backdrop that a new civilian initiative has emerged under the new government led by President Yudhoyono. However, the extent to which this initiative suspends efforts to reform the TNI and enhances the powers of the civilian leadership to control the political autonomy of TNI is still unknown. In what follows, we will examine these developments.

Below, we start with the analysis of personnel changes during the period covered by this report. We then look at the ascendancy of TNI hard-liners under the Megawati government in engaging war in Aceh. We next examine the civil-military relations during the 2004 elections. Finally, the initiative of military reform under the Yudhoyono administration will be examined.

A. Ethnic-Regional and Academy Backgrounds

The present listing (see cutoff data below) involves seventy-two leading positions for general-ranking officers. Table 1 shows that the ethnic distribution has continued in the general pattern, as Javanese officers constitute about a half of the total. Their share is now 56.9 percent, which is substantially higher than the 45.8 percent of the previous listing. Apart from Javanese, Sundanese officers are well represented (increased from the previous five to nine) in the present listing; it is not clear what accounts for this change.

Table 1
Ethnic Regional Distribution of the Military Elite Ethnicity Number

Javanese	41
Sundanese	9
Batak	4
Buginese	2
Menadonese	2
Jambinese	1
Minangkabau	1
Ambonese	1
Acehnese	1
Unknown	10
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Total	72

Table 2 shows the timing of personnel changes during the period of this listing. It involves officeholders of seventy-two general-ranking positions in the TNI Headquarters and the army's central and regional structure, but excludes Korem commanders who are colonels. One remarkable feature we notice about the pattern of rotation is that there was only one big "wave" of personnel changes, which affected more than one hundred men in the officer corps, between March 2003 and August 2005. In our previous listing, there were four significant turnovers within two years.

In the present listing, the personnel change in October 2003 is the only one that can be identified as a big wave.³ A clear ramification of this development is the stagnation of the pace of generational change within TNI, as we will discuss below. Nevertheless, some of the middle-scale personnel changes in the last two and one half years are significant enough to help us understand developments inside the TNI.

Table 2: Timing of Personnel Changes

		TNI HQ	Army	Total	
2003	March	-	1	1	
	April	-	-	-	
	May	-	1	1	
	June	2	3	5	
	July	1	3	4	
	August	-	-	-	
	September	-	4	4	
	October	6	10	16	
	November	-	-	-	
	December	-	2	2	
	2004	January	-	1	1
		February	3	-	3
March		-	-	-	
April		-	-	-	
May		2	5	7	
June		-	-	-	
July		-	-	-	
August		-	-	-	
September		-	1	1	
October		-	2	2	
November		1	-	1	
December		-	1	1	
2005	January	-	7	7	
	February	-	1	1	
	March	-	8	8	
	April	2	-	2	
	May	6	9	15	
	June	-	-	-	
	July	-	-	-	
	August	1	-	1	
Totals		24	59	83	

The May 2003 reshuffle took place just before the collapse of the peace process between the government and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh

³ The reshuffle in May 2005 affected fifteen positions in the listing, but its total impact was limited to seventy-eight officers.

Merdeka, GAM), which was followed by the introduction of martial law in Aceh. Maj. Gen. Djali Jusuf, who was the commander of Kodam Iskandar Muda responsible for overseeing Aceh, was replaced by Brig. Gen. Endang Suwaryo. The official explanation for the replacement was that Djali Jusuf would retire soon. But military insiders saw Djali, an Acehnese, as incapable of conducting counterinsurgency warfare against his fellow Acehnese "professionally," which indicated that he should be replaced. Endang was trusted by the TNI leadership because of his reputation as an "Aceh expert" who had commanded Korem 012 (Banda Aceh) and supported Djali as the Chief of Staff of Kodam Iskandar Muda. The May reshuffle was followed by the personnel change in June 2003 with the appointment of Maj. Gen. (Marines) Luthfie Witto (previously assistant for intelligence to the Chief of General Staff) as the Head of Military Strategic Intelligence Body (BAIS, Badan Intelijen Strategis); the appointment of Brig. Gen. Dadi Sutanto (formerly assistant for security to Army Chief of Staff) as assistant for intelligence to the Chief of General Staff; and the appointment of Brig. Gen. Lilik Sumaryo (formerly deputy assistant for intelligence to Army Chief of Staff) as Chief of Staff at Kodam I/Bukit Barisan. This led to the strengthening of the wartime intelligence function available for Commander-in-Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu.

Then a large turnover took place in October 2003, affecting 123 officers.⁴ It involved personnel changes in some vital positions, among others, including: Deputy Army Chief of Staff and the positions of four Kodam commanders in Jakarta, Ambon, Central Java, and South Sumatra. The promotion of Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso, Kodam Jaya Commander, to a new role as Deputy Army Chief of Staff made him the strongest candidate to become the next Army Chief of Staff, while his successor as Kodam Jaya Commander, Maj. Gen. Agustadi, appeared to follow Djoko. As the most successful graduates of the military academy in Class 1975 and 1974, respectively, Djoko Santoso and Agustadi have long been regarded as officers who will lead the military one day. It is important also to note that the reshuffle paved the way for a Class 1977 officer to become a general for the first time, with the promotion of Col. Hotma Marbun (Korem Commander in Balikpapan) to the Deputy Commander of Army "elite" Special Forces (Kopassus).⁵

The February 2004 reshuffle resulted in two notable developments.⁶ First, there was a replacement involving TNI's number two position when the Chief of General Staff (Kasum TNI), Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, retired from the service and was replaced by Air Rear-Marshal Wartoyo. This was the first time in the history of the Indonesian military that an air force general occupied this strategic position. Second, the reshuffle paved the way for the first "non-army" general to be the Commander of Military Staff and Command School (Sesko TNI). It should also be noted that another

⁴ The reshuffle is usually announced in the form of an official order from the TNI commander. This time, the order came in the form of the Surat Keputusan Panglima TNI (Skep) No.342/X/2003, dated October 24, 2003.

⁵ Hotma Marbun built his reputation in the early 1990s when he commanded the Indonesian contingent for the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. He graduated at the top of his class from the Army Staff and Command School.

⁶ See Skep No.43/II/2004, signed on February 16, 2004.

Class 1977 graduate was promoted to the rank of general when an intelligence officer, Col. Hotmangradja Panjaitan, was named the Head of Army Information Center.⁷

The reshuffle in May 2004 took place one year after the imposition of martial law in Aceh.⁸ Brig. Gen. George Toisutta, a noted intelligence officer who had served as the head of Military Operations Command in Aceh since December 2003, was promoted to become the Commander of the First Infantry Division of Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), no doubt a reward for his service in Aceh. Such a trend was evident in the reshuffle in January 2005 as well, when two Korem Commanders in Aceh obtained promotions and were posted to Kostrad: Col. Gerhan Lantara (Commander of Banda Aceh Korem) and Col. A. Y. Nasution (Commander of Lho Seumawe Korem) became Chiefs of Staff of the First and Second Infantry Divisions of Kostrad, respectively.⁹ All these illustrate that command experience in Aceh has become a stepping stone for the current generation of officers who wish to rise in the military hierarchy, just as East Timor had been for the older-generation officers in the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. In this regard, Papua will possibly follow Aceh as the proving ground for the selection of new “elites” from the next generation of officers. The TNI’s plan—announced in March 2005—to create a third infantry division of Kostrad in Papua clearly indicates the development.

The reshuffle in February–March 2005 had the most significant impact during the period covered by this listing, as it involved the replacement of all three service chiefs.¹⁰ When he was inaugurated as president on October 20, 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono most likely planned to rectify the legacy of the Megawati administration by removing Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu and promoting Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso as his successor. But because of Megawati’s midnight appointment of Ryamizard as Commander-in-Chief, replacing Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, Yudhoyono’s plans were delayed, as we will discuss in the following sections. But it is useful to note that because of Megawati’s last minute maneuver, hardly any significant reshuffle took place in the first three months of the new administration, with the notable exception of the appointment of Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo as Commander of Kostrad, the post that had been held by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu since Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo’s retirement in September.

⁷ Hotmangradja was the former Commander of Group-3 (covert operations) in Kopassus. He was master of ceremonies at the TNI anniversary celebration in 2001 and later became Korem Commander in Denpasar. It is unusual for an intelligence officer—soaked in the culture of secrecy—to be appointed as spokesman for the army.

⁸ See Skep No.170/V2004, dated May 25, 2004. This reshuffle affected eighty-two officers. Martial law in Aceh was downgraded to a civil emergency on May 19, 2004, but the scale of military operations remained unchanged.

⁹ With this rotation, Gerhan and Nasution became brigadier generals. Gerhan is the first general among the Class 1978 graduates, while Nasution, a graduate of Class 1977, joined Hotma Marbun and Hotmangradja in becoming a general. President Yudhoyono is said to favor Gerhan and Nasution, both of whom handled international aid in post-tsunami Aceh. But to the international community, Gerhan is known for his brutal shooting of demonstrators in the Santa Cruz incident of November 1991 in East Timor. It should also be noted that Nasution’s successor as Commander of Korem Lho Seumawe is Col. Chairawan, the former Commander of Group-4 in Kopassus, who was removed from his post due to his involvement in the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in the last days of Suharto.

¹⁰ See Presidential Order (Surat Keputusan Presiden No.6/TNI/2005) signed on February 16, 2005, and TNI Commander’s Order (Skep No.122/III/2005) dated March 30, 2005.

Yudhoyono also withdrew Ryamizard's appointment as Military Commander-in-Chief.

In this context, Djoko Santoso's appointment as Army Chief of Staff signified the first major effort of the new president to shape the military leadership in his favor. Yudhoyono has known Djoko since the former was the Korem Commander in Yogyakarta in the mid-1990s. It was Yudhoyono who recruited Djoko as his deputy when he was the Military Chief of Social and Political Staff and made him a brigadier general in the late 1990s.¹¹ Apart from Djoko, the new Chiefs of Navy and Air Force are Yudhoyono's classmates in the military academy (the Class 1973), and they have known each other for more than three decades. These leadership changes were followed by another rotation in the following month, which affected twenty-three officers, including three Kodam Commanders (Iskandar Muda, Udayana, and Tanjungpura). The Aceh Commander, Maj. Gen. Endang Suwaryo, became Deputy Army Chief of Staff and Djoko Santoso's successor.¹² Yudhoyono's brothers-in-law—Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono and Brig. Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo—were also promoted.¹³ In this way, the reshuffle in February–March 2005 laid the foundations for Yudhoyono's control over the TNI. The rise of Pramono Edhie Wibowo was also noteworthy, not only because he represented the first Class 1980 officer who was promoted to a general's rank, but, and more importantly, because he was promoted to become the Deputy Commander-General of Kopassus, replacing Brig. Gen. Hotma Marbun, a Class 1977 rising star.

Finally, the reshuffle in May 2005 affected seventy-eight officers and replaced another three Commanders in Kodam Trikora, Wirabuana, and Brawijaya.¹⁴ Consequently, six out of twelve Kodam Commanders were replaced in the rotation of March and May 2005, with Djoko Santoso, the new Army Chief of Staff, consolidating his leadership position in the army. The prominence of Aceh-related generals was also evident this time, as Maj. Gen. George Toisutta was appointed as Commander of Kodam Trikora overseeing Papua, and Maj. Gen. Bambang Darmono, who had commanded Aceh Operations Command during the first six months of the martial law (and was subsequently replaced by Toisutta), was appointed as Commander of Army Infantry Weapons Center.¹⁵ In sum, personnel changes during the period from

¹¹ Yudhoyono was the only military officer who attended the symposium organized by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) in Tokyo, in August 1999, which sought to identify key players in the incoming administration (as yet undetermined) to be inaugurated in October 1999. Five years later, a similar conference was held in Tokyo in August 2004. When Yudhoyono was consulted in July 2004 about who should be invited to the conference to represent the future of TNI, he suggested Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso.

¹² Some TNI insiders criticize this appointment as lacking in objectivity and professionalism. Endang had served only in the Aceh Command as a two-star general, while other officers—such as Cornelis Simbolon, Agustadi, and Hadi Waluyo—had undertaken several assignments while they were two-star generals. Again, the "Aceh factor" seems to have influenced Endang's promotion. It should be noted that Endang is also an academy classmate of Yudhoyono's.

¹³ See Section D below for more discussions about them.

¹⁴ There were two reshuffles in this month. See Skep No.191/V/2005 dated May 16, 2005 and Skep No.200/V/2005 dated May 25, 2005.

¹⁵ Apart from these changes, Yudhoyono recruited Col. Kurdi Mustofa, an expert staff at Lemhannas, as his private secretary. Kurdi had served Yudhoyono under the Megawati government as deputy assistant to Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. Kurdi also joined Yudhoyono's presidential election campaign team. Prior to this, Yudhoyono also handpicked his long-time friend, whom he had

March 2003 to August 2005 were, it seems, influenced by three major factors, namely Aceh, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the coming of age of Class 1977 officers.

Tables 3 and 4 below show the distribution of officers according to Class. Within the two and half years, the dominant force shifted from the Classes 1971-72 to the Classes 1973-74 in the TNI Headquarters, and from the Classes 1973-74 to the Classes 1974-75 in the army. The Class 1974 maintained its presence in both the TNI HQ and the army, thanks largely to their leader, Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu. But following his departure in February 2005, the Class 1974 officers will have to share strategic positions at the TNI headquarters and at the army central and regional commands with Classes 1975 and 1976 officers. It is too early to say how fast Djoko Santoso will promote officers from Classes 1977 and after who are expecting to obtain their own share of responsibilities and promotions. Many of the members of Classes 1977 and after are already colonels supplying most of the current Korem commanders and expecting to be promoted to brigadier generals in the near future.

Table 3: Academy Class Distribution of Officers in Strategic Positions

Class of	(Feb. 28, 2003)		(August 2005)	
	TNI HQ	Army	TNI HQ	Army
1971	5	4	2	-
1972	5	10	2	3
1973	2	8	3	12
1974	2	12	4	13
1975	-	5	-	11
1976	-	1	-	2
1977	-	-	-	-
1978	-	-	-	-
1980	-	-	-	1
Unknown	2	3	-	2
Navy	2	-	4	-
Air Force	3	-	1	-
Marines	1	-	1	-

known since his academy years, Maj. Gen. Bambang Sutedjo, Assistant for Logistics to Army Chief of Staff, as presidential military secretary.

Table 4: Academy Class Distribution in Regional Commands

	Kodam Commander & Chief	Korem Commander	Total
1973	7	-	7 (10.6%)
1974	7	1	8 (12.1%)
1975	7	7	14 (21.2%)
1976	2	9	11 (16.6%)
1977	-	5	5 (7.5%)
1978	-	7	7 (10.6%)
1980	-	8	8 (12.1%)
Unknown	1	5	6 (9.%)
Total	24	42	66

B. Megawati and her Generals: The Hard-line Trend

For the post-*reformasi* TNI leadership, the presidencies of B. J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid were times of confusion. During the Habibie era, TNI “failed” to stop his policy of allowing a voters’ referendum in East Timor, which resulted in the separation of the territory from Indonesia. Wiranto, the TNI Commander-in-Chief at that time, has been blamed by his seniors for his failure to protect TNI’s interests in East Timor and for disgracing TNI as an institution, as its covert operations produced nothing but a dirty war. The Abdurrahman Wahid presidency was also a difficult time for TNI, which was haunted by the institutional memory of being trapped by a fight between intra-military factions, as demonstrated publicly in the case of Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah.¹⁶ Now, under the Megawati administration, Endriartono’s TNI was well aware of previous lessons. As if to avoid a repeat of East Timor, TNI seized the initiative in the Aceh conflict, with a clear hope of overthrowing the fragile peace accord.¹⁷

TNI’s maneuvers escalated in March 2003, just three months after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Indonesian government and GAM. In early March, the army-mobilized “residents” in Central Aceh, who were mostly Javanese, protested against the peace process and attacked the office of the Joint Security Council (JSC) that had monitored the ceasefire between TNI and GAM. This movement spread to other areas, as seen in East Aceh and Pidie, where similar residential groups of more than one hundred people protested JSC in mid-March and called for its dissolution. As if to provoke these movements, the army opened its annual leadership meeting (Rapim) in late March in Aceh, the first time it has ever been held in the region. Soldiers of Kodam Iskandar Muda forcefully mobilized thousands of residents to stage a welcoming show for the Rapim, during which they

¹⁶ See our previous analysis in *Indonesia* 75 (April 2003).

¹⁷ Many TNI elites were frustrated with the internationally mediated peace negotiation between the government and the separatist GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement), since they felt that it only helped internationalize the issue and invite sympathy for GAM. See Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, “Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed?” report (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2003).

announced a demand that the number of army troops stationed in Aceh be increased. Backed by the “spontaneous” action of residents, Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu claimed that “the people in Aceh wish to close down the JSC.”¹⁸ The Rapim in Aceh in effect encouraged TNI-backed militia groups in the region to conduct campaigns against the peace process. In South Aceh, East Aceh, and West Aceh, trucks carrying hundreds, even thousands, of people arrived at JSC offices and violently demanded JSC’s withdrawal from Aceh, without being stopped by security forces. As a result, a major evacuation of JSC staff took place in early April.

The military-orchestrated anti-peace movements were clearly acts of sabotage against Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, who was handling the peace process. One of his staff recalled that “Yudhoyono, as the caretaker of CoHA, should have moved to prevent Ryamizard and his circles from openly challenging the government policy, but he had no guts to do so.”¹⁹ With no alternative option to save the peace process, the Megawati government, on the recommendation of the TNI top brass, finally decided to end peace negotiations with GAM and declared martial law in Aceh in May 2003. The government dispatched around 35,000 troops to conduct an all-out counterinsurgency war against GAM, which was estimated to have five thousand rebels. This was the largest military operation the TNI had undertaken in its history. Having controlled the flow of information from the field under martial law, the TNI used this advantage vis-à-vis the government to shape public discourse, stoking nationalistic sentiment and disseminating the idea that the imposition of martial law would preserve the territorial integrity of Indonesia. Here, “defending NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary Republic of Indonesia)” became a slogan, and it was perhaps Ryamizard who basked most comfortably in this nationalist chauvinism, which effectively conflated nationalism and TNI “heroism.”

His hawkish stance was evident not only in Aceh, but also in the drafting of the TNI bill. The bill, which was supposed to be drafted by a working group (Pokja) consisting of academics and military representatives, was virtually deadlocked in March 2003, as the civilians protested against the army’s insistence on including the so-called Article 19 authorizing TNI to dispatch troops without presidential approval in the event of an emergency. This article was widely criticized by the public for opening a loophole that might allow a military coup, and those who participated in the working group soon learned that it was Ryamizard who was campaigning for the article despite his public denial.²⁰ In light of the strong public criticism of TNI’s resistance toward the institutionalization of civilian supremacy and civilian control of the military, TNI headquarters finally capitulated by admitting that the article could contradict the National Defense Law of 2002 and that the controversial article should be dropped from the draft bill.²¹

¹⁸ “Jenderal Ryamizard Ryacudu: Rakyat Bilang, Bubarkan Saja JSC,” *Tempo*, April 7-13, 2003.

¹⁹ Interview with a Ministerial Assistant at the Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs, May 2004.

²⁰ “More Analysts Give Thumbs-down to Military Bill,” *Jakarta Post*, February 25, 2003; “Ryamizard Ryacudu: Kudeta itu Binatang Apa, Sih?” *Tempo*, March 10-16, 2003.

²¹ See, for example, “Mayor Jenderal Sudradjat: Pasal 19 itu Memang Rawan,” *Tempo*, March 10-16, 2003; “TNI Tidak Serius Kembali ke Barak,” *Suara Pembaruan*, March 18, 2003. Maj. Gen. Sudradjat

Despite the withdrawal of the “coup article,” many critics believed that Ryamizard would not change his old-fashioned approach to civil-military relations.²² Just this February, he had hosted a closed-door meeting with hundreds of active and retired top officers, during which he argued that the army was entitled to play a greater role in security affairs.²³ For many, Ryamizard’s statement sent a clear signal that the current army leadership wanted to derail the TNI reform that had managed to take one step forward after the passage of the National Defense Law (UU No.3/2002 tentang Pertahanan Nasional) in 2002, a law that limited the role of the military to defense. Ryamizard had repeatedly insisted that the role of the TNI should be different from that of “Western” militaries, which were not facing the threat of national disintegration. The military’s old guard invoked the “non-Western” nature of the TNI to oppose the principle of the National Defense Law.

However, when the Defense Department issued its first White Paper in March 2003, it was clear that TNI was deploying a more powerful “Western” concept to justify its broader security function. Here, the idea of Military Operation Other than War (MOOTW) was described as a standard military function in the post-Cold War environment, where nontraditional threats, such as terrorism and transnational crimes, increasingly became the object of military response in the global arena. Indonesia’s Defense White Paper insisted that MOOTW, or Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP), is within the TNI’s proper domain and argued that the army is responsible for internal security.²⁴ Simultaneously invoking both the nationalist discourse of NKRI and the globalist discourse of OMSP, TNI became more assertive in opposing civilian demands that would limit the TNI’s role to external defense.

The clear risk of granting the TNI a free hand in handling internal security was evident in November 2003, when the government tried to review the martial law status of Aceh after the initial period of six months. Since the beginning of martial law, Yudhoyono had asked his personal advisors, a group that included civilian defense experts and human rights activists, to formulate an “exit strategy” for military operations in Aceh based on the assessment that the conflict in Aceh could never be solved by the military approach and should therefore be addressed by civilians spearheading nonmilitary approaches. Megawati herself also wanted the war to end

(Director-General of Defense Strategy, Department of Defense) was involved in the drafting process and recognized the need to accommodate social criticism. Finally, Endriartono instructed that the article be removed from the draft law.

²² When he was Kodam Jaya commander, Ryamizard once told one of the Editors that he saw nothing wrong with the military under Suharto and that no military reform was necessary.

²³ See, for example, “Army Wants Power Again,” *Jakarta Post*, February 21, 2003; “TNI Led by Antireformists,” *Jakarta Post*, March 1, 2003. Those who attended the meeting included Yudhoyono, Lt. Gen. (ret) Hari Sabarno (Minister of Home Affairs), Lt. Gen. (ret) Sutiyoso (Jakarta Governor), Gen. (ret) Wiranto, Gen. (ret) R. Hartono (former Army Chief of Staff), Gen. (ret) Subagyo Hadisiswoyo (former Army Chief of Staff), and Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo (former Kostrad Commander and a son-in-law of Suharto). Yudhoyono’s close friends advised him against attending the meeting because the meeting—arranged by Ryamizard—might serve as an occasion for blaming Yudhoyono’s “soft” approach to GAM.

²⁴ The White Paper we refer to here is Departmen Pertahanan, *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21* (Jakarta: Dephan, 2003). MOOTW is a US military doctrine adopted in 1995. Cf. Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War* (The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf>.

quickly, as she stated in her presidential speech on October 5.²⁵ Moreover, the National Commission of Human Rights, a government body that actually has some independence, also called for an end to martial law after its fact-finding team uncovered evidence of human rights abuses by the military against civilians in Aceh.²⁶ In order to lift martial law, Yudhoyono needed to find an alternative model of governance in Aceh, an action necessitated by the fact that the TNI had effectively hijacked the local administration since May 2003. Aceh needed capable administration of its local political economy, and Yudhoyono found the corrupt Governor Abdullah Puteh unsuitable for the task of rebuilding the local government. Yudhoyono attempted to remove Puteh from his position.

The army was quick to slap down the initiative to end martial law. A mere six days after Megawati's October 5 speech, "spontaneous" demonstrations broke out in Bireun. It is hard to believe that such rallies could have been organized without the backing of local army troops. Demonstrators who claimed to represent Aceh's citizens were calling for the extension of martial law in a bid to maintain stability in their communities. This rally became a model and was repeated in other areas in the following weeks. Political analysts widely believed that these actions were part of a larger effort to stigmatize opposition to martial law and limit public debate.²⁷ Whether Martial Law Administrator Maj. Gen. Endang Suwarya had a role in directing the mobilization of mass rallies, or if he simply allowed them, cannot be determined, but local reports stated that field troops, with the help of army-organized militias, orchestrated the demonstrations. For ordinary citizens, failure to join the rally meant being accused of disloyalty to "NKRI" at best and of being a "GAM member" at worse.²⁸ Armed with so-called public support, the army then "proposed" the extension of martial law for another six months.²⁹ This move effectively stymied Yudhoyono's initiative to formulate an exit strategy for the war in Aceh. Moreover, he failed to replace Puteh in mid-October.³⁰ Yudhoyono thus lost his leadership in

²⁵ "Konflik di Aceh Segera Diselesaikan," *Media Indonesia*, October 6, 2003.

²⁶ The imposition of martial law effectively restricted freedom of association and movement in Aceh and sparked a secret war against GAM. Many credible reports suggest that systematic atrocity was widely and openly conducted by TNI troops under the martial law. Consult, for example, the following reports: International Crisis Group, "Aceh: How Not to Win Hearts and Minds" (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG), July 23, 2003; KontraS, "Martial Law in Aceh After Two Months: The Sufferings of Aceh, the Burden of Indonesians" (Jakarta: KontraS), July 2003; Teuku Samsel Bahri, "Aceh Province: Dirty War Uncovered" (KontraS-Aceh), September 30, 2003; "Civil War in Aceh Stoked by Wealth, Corruption," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 9, 2003; and "Aceh Under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War," *Human Rights Watch* 15,10, December 2003.

²⁷ Rodd McGibbon, "Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?" report (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004), p. 52.

²⁸ Personal communication with Acehese activists in Kuala Lumpur, September 2003.

²⁹ The proposal of the army was virtually a demand. The martial law spokesman, Colonel Ditya Sudarsono, actually insisted that the government should respect the voice of the people who demanded the extension of martial law in early November.

³⁰ Yudhoyono was said to have requested Endang, via Endriartono, to "impeach" Puteh as governor of Aceh in mid-October. Yudhoyono sought to organize an anti-Puteh coalition in the provincial parliament (DPRD/NAD) in the hope that it would reject Puteh's annual accountability report (Laporan Pertanggungjawaban, LPj) submitted to the DPRD/NAD. Yudhoyono was shocked when even TNI members in the parliament ignored the order and approved Puteh's LPj. As a result, Puteh was allowed to continue his term of office as governor, and Yudhoyono's post-martial-law vision was completely stymied.

solving the conflict in Aceh. In mid-November, Megawati declared a six-month extension of the military emergency. Encouraged by this action, the outspoken Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard brazenly asserted that those who opposed martial law were in league with GAM.³¹ Large anti-GAM fronts were established in Aceh with some ten thousand citizens “voluntarily” registering their membership.³² The public demand throughout Indonesia to end the military operation and audit the martial law expenditures, which lacked transparency, was ignored by Jakarta’s political elite.

In sum, civil-military relations in 2003 were significantly conditioned by the drafting of the TNI bill and the war in Aceh. The TNI, as an institution, actively expanded the domain of the military. TNI’s desire to include Article 19 in the draft bill indicated a New Order mindset that viewed the military’s praetorian mission as being above—and independent from—political authority. The article was withdrawn only when TNI capitulated to public pressure. In the war in Aceh, however, TNI enjoyed relative autonomy in manipulating information on the battlefield, and its control of information allowed the military elites to manufacture reality, orchestrate public discourse, and shape the direction of government policy. Such an institutional power was clearly generated from TNI’s territorial structure, which had persistently worked to control local politico-economic-human resources. The power of civilian leaders and media critics to monitor and curb TNI’s hard-line trend was very limited during the Megawati era, largely due to the absence of political will on the part of the president and the parliament.

C. TNI in the 2004 Elections: “Star Wars” and the Politics of Neutrality

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, national elections have provided TNI with an opportunity to state its commitment to “reform,” i.e., non-intervention in party and electoral politics. In the 1999 elections, the TNI as an institution declined to support any political parties, including its long-time partner, Golkar. However, TNI’s purported electoral “neutrality” did not mean that individual generals were uniformly apathetic about securing political benefits from civilian competitions for power. In 1999, the army top brass was actively involved in brokering post-election political deals that paved the way for the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency. Such a practice was repeated in 2004, but with different players and under different circumstances, as we will see below.

In late January 2004, TNI held its annual leadership meeting (Rapim TNI). At that meeting, Endriartono was prepared to read his statement regarding TNI’s position on

³¹ “You’re Either With Us or Against Us,” Laksamana.net, December 8, 2003.

³² As seen above, the militia-like groups had been active even before martial law was instituted, but their number dramatically increased after the declaration of martial law. Especially since December 2003, various district-based anti-GAM fronts were formed and integrated into the umbrella organization called Front Perlawanan Separatis GAM (FPSG). See International Crisis Group report, “Aceh: A Chance for Peace” (Jakarta/Brussels), August 15, 2005. See also the detailed report written by an NGO, Eye on Aceh, “Fear in the Shadows: Militia in Aceh” (July 2004), available at <<http://www.acheh-eye.org>>. Importantly, these “fronts” not only assisted TNI operations, but also actively sabotaged civilian efforts to promote transparency in martial law management. In fact, KomnasHAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, National Human Rights Commission) was repeatedly subjected to pressure from these fronts to discontinue its investigations in Aceh.

the general election, which would be held in April, and the presidential election, which would take place in July. In his statement, the Commander-in-Chief not only emphasized, as anticipated, that TNI would be a neutral party in the upcoming elections, but he also declared that soldiers who violated the order would suffer the maximum penalty of discharge from the military.³³ His comment was expected to neutralize the controversial statement of Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard who, in October of the previous year, had asked the families of TNI members to vote for candidates representing the interests of the TNI, and, in December, warned that "his" army would deploy troops if elections turned bloody or chaotic.³⁴ Both statements provoked strong public criticism. Needless to say, sending TNI troops to deal with political disorder should be the decision of the government, not of the Army Chief of Staff. Clearly Ryamizard had been a thorn in Endriartono's flesh, since Ryamizard's public comments not only damaged the image of TNI, but also repeatedly trespassed on the authority of the Military Commander-in-Chief, as was most evident in the controversy over Article 19 in the TNI bill and the extension of martial law in Aceh. Another source of irritation to Endriartono was Ryamizard's personal connections to Taufik Kiemas, Megawati's husband and a small-time businessman turned power-broker.³⁶ Many TNI elites still believed that Ryamizard could not have been appointed Army Chief of Staff without Taufik's backing and without bypassing Wanjakti (the military council that determines high-ranking promotions and duty rotations). Against this background, TNI headquarters perceived a potential danger: that Ryamizard might well become embroiled in electoral politics, a situation that would no doubt undermine the institutional autonomy of TNI.³⁷

Endriartono was more concerned about the presidential election in July than legislative elections in April. As nationwide independent polls had all predicted, Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) lost to Golkar in the parliamentary elections, largely due to the

³³ "TNI Tugaskan Lagi Netralitasnya: Pelanggar Dikenai Sanksi," *Kompas*, January 23, 2004. Following the Rapim, a working team was established to formulate guidelines for neutrality that were far more detailed than ones issued for the 1999 elections. Guidelines can be found in "Buku Pedoman Tentang Netralitas TNI Pada Pemilu 2004" (Mabes TNI, 2004).

³⁴ "Military Kin Told to Vote for Pro-TNI Candidates," *Jakarta Post*, October 17, 2003; "TNI AD Akan Turun Jika Pemilu Berdarah," *Kompas*, December 23, 2003.

³⁶ Ryamizard is the son-in-law of former vice president Try Sutrisno, who is a close friend of Megawati and Taufik. Therefore, Megawati's inner circle was confident that the TNI's political loyalty could be secured by embracing Ryamizard.

³⁷ Interviews with general-rank active officers, May 2003, January 2004. Endriartono's personal dislike of Taufik also fed his suspicion of Ryamizard. In mid-2003, Endriartono was put in the unenviable position of defending TNI against a scandal involving the procurement of four Sukhoi jet fighters from Russia. Military insiders suggest that he was angered by the revelation that the so-called "Sukhoigate" exposé implicated the business activities of Taufik Kiemas and that the Defense Department had been pressured to cover up the business deal, resulting in widespread public criticism of the TNI. In fact, this scandal spurred public investigation into the problems involved in military procurement, and strengthened reform pressures on TNI. On the scandal, see, for example, "Sukhoi Berselimut Kabut," *Tempo*, July 21-27, 2003. On the wider problem of military procurement, see Munir, "Corruption Threatens Indonesia's Defense System," *Jakarta Post*, March 1, 2004; and an essay in the newsletter of human rights NGO, Imparsial, "Regional Budget for TNI: A Threat for Civilian Control over the Military (A Case Study of Ship Provision by Region)," *Catatan Imparsial* 1 (March 2004).

widespread negative image of PDI-P as corrupt and inept. PDI-P strategists, faced with the public distrust of their party, decided to lean on their political machines and mobilized local bureaucrats, businessmen, and local informal leaders, such as *kiai* (Islamic teachers) and ethnic association bosses, to gather votes for the party. When this strategy failed to produce satisfactory results in April, Megawati's inner circle approached the Police and TNI, demanding their support for Megawati's re-election. Ironically, Ryamizard all but alluded to this PDI-P approach when he carelessly commented that he had already rejected a request from Theo Syafei, ex-military-officer-turned-Megawati-confidant, to support her campaign.³⁸ Ryamizard also privately told his assistant about a request he had received from senior retired army generals now working for Megawati, asking him to instruct local commanders to assist Megawati's campaign through intelligence assessments of her rivals' strategies and through disinformation campaigns aimed at her rivals at the local level.³⁹ In exchange, Taufik Kiemas promised Ryamizard the position of incoming TNI Commander-in-Chief. Clearly these developments concerned Endriartono, who had no particular enthusiasm for Megawati.⁴⁰

Endriartono's concern deepened when Yudhoyono emerged as a challenger to Megawati. Endriartono quickly announced his decision to withdraw all TNI members seconded to government departments. The decision targeted bodyguards of ministers as well as directors-general and directors in departments other than the Defense Department.⁴¹ Endriartono demonstrated his intention to prevent soldiers from working for either Megawati or Yudhoyono, who as the incumbent president and the newly resigned minister of defense, respectively, had substantial influence within government organizations.

Despite Endriartono's move, some retired officers were concerned about the danger that TNI's intelligence community would become involved in the election. This community has a distinctive culture that does not distinguish between retired officers and active-duty officers, and its old-boys' network had long had exclusive access to intelligence information regarding politicians, business managers, religious leaders, and so on. Long-retired intelligence officers who had gone into business might still be called upon to do work for the intelligence agency. There was, thus, reasonable anxiety among military elites about a possible "war" within the military intelligence community as rival factions competed to engage in clandestine field operations as "invisible hands." Endriartono, TNI Commander-in-Chief, would not have been able to control this war.

³⁸ "Benar-Benar Netral," *Media Indonesia*, April 16, 2004. Theo Syafei was a retired Maj. Gen. who had long been associated with Megawati as her political advisor. He was also a good friend of Gen. (ret) Try Sutrisno, a father-in-law of Ryamizard and Megawati's trusted man.

³⁹ Interview with Yudhoyono's election advisor, April and September 2004.

⁴⁰ Endriartono himself was initially offered the vice-presidential candidacy by Amien Rais, the Chairman of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) who led his political party, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party). The offer was, however, immediately rejected by Endriartono.

⁴¹ "TNI Ditarik dari Departemen," *Suara Pembaruan*, April 15, 2004. Endriartono's instructions were sent to TNI bodies via his telegram (Surat Telegram Rahasia No. STR/527/2004). However, it is not clear who was actually affected by his instructions and forced to leave their offices.

Megawati's inner circle included Lt. Gen. (ret) Hendropriyono, her intelligence chief (Head of BIN, Badan Intelijen Negara, National Intelligence Body), who was responsible for the massacre of Islamist activists in Lampung under Suharto in the late 1980s, as well as his deputy, Maj. Gen. (ret) Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto (Fifth Deputy of BIN), the former right-hand man of Prabowo, who was once expelled from the military for the alleged kidnapping of anti-Suharto activists, and Theo Syafei. All of them had once worked for Kopassus. On the other hand, Yudhoyono's campaign team (*tim sukses*) included a larger number of retired officers, such as Lt. Gen. (ret) Syamsir Siregar, former Head of Military Intelligence Body (Badan Intelijen ABRI, or BIA) and Maj. Gen. (ret) Achdari, former Deputy Head of BIA.⁴² The fact that these people had joined the Yudhoyono camp dismayed his civilian political advisors and long-time military friends. Some advised Yudhoyono to sever relations with these generals who seemed more interested in pushing their own agenda than in supporting the candidate, and warned that Yudhoyono's indebtedness to them would jeopardize his reform agenda if he became president. Yudhoyono ignored their advice.

In late April 2004, Gen. Wiranto, Suharto's former confidant, joined the presidential race as Golkar candidate. Cash-rich Wiranto's *tim sukses* geared up its electoral campaign in preparation for July, under the management of his long-time military aides, Lt. Gen. (ret) Fachrul Razi, Maj. Gen. (ret) Suaidi Marasabessy, and Maj. Gen. (ret) Tulus Sihombing.⁴³ Although he was the official candidate of Golkar, Wiranto could not count on party chairman Akbar Tanjung's cooperation nor the active support of the party machinery in conducting his campaigns. Wiranto had to rely heavily on his own personal staff.

Megawati's, Yudhoyono's, and Wiranto's campaigns were dubbed *perang bintang*, star wars, since they involved so many retired generals who had chosen to support the respective candidates.

It was in the context of these "star wars" that Endriartono convened a special meeting with three Chiefs of Staff on May 31, the day before the start of the presidential election campaign. The meeting resulted in Endriartono's public statement which, among other things, criticized certain candidates for attempting to use TNI for their own political gains, although Endriartono did not name names. Endriartono issued five prohibitions: (1) TNI personnel, troops, and facilities were not

⁴² Yudhoyono's camp also had two former military commanders, namely Gen. (ret) Edi Sudrajat and Admiral (ret) Widodo A. S. Others included Lt. Gen. (ret) T. B. Silalahi, former Minister of Administrative Reform, but more commonly known as a patron of Tommy Winata, a king of underworld business; Lt. Gen. (ret) Muhammad Ma'ruf, former Armed Forces Chief of Social and Political Staff (Kassospol ABRI); Lt. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, former East Java Commander and secretary of Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. (ret) E. E. Mangindaan, former Commander of Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) and subsequently North Sulawesi Governor; Maj. Gen. (ret) Djali Jusuf, the first Commander of Kodam Iskandar Muda who was replaced just before the implementation of martial law in Aceh; and Col. Kurdi Mustofa, former deputy assistant to Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs. Later, the Yudhoyono government appointed Siregar as Head of BIN, Widodo as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, T. B. Silalahi as presidential envoy for the post-tsunami reconstruction of Aceh, Ma'ruf as Minister of Home Affairs, Sudi as Cabinet Secretary, and Kurdi as personal secretary of the president.

⁴³ Fachrul was former Deputy Commander of TNI and served under Wiranto. Suaidi, former Wirabuana Commander, and Sihombing, former Deputy Head of BIA, both worked under Wiranto when he was Commander-in-Chief of TNI.

to be conscripted for election purposes; (2) TNI personnel and troops were not allowed to campaign for candidates; (3) TNI members were not to talk about candidates in public places, at their workplace, and even at home; (4) TNI members were not allowed to display campaign materials at their workplace; and (5) TNI members were not allowed to accompany or welcome electoral contestants.⁴⁴ These prohibitions were meant to demonstrate publicly the military's commitment to the policy of maintaining institutional neutrality in electoral politics.

TNI's stated neutrality, however, did nothing to reduce its bargaining power in politics. In fact, the military was able to make more demands precisely when civilian leaders were engaged in political competition during elections. Yudhoyono faced this sort of pressure. After he had won the first round of the presidential election in July and was preparing for the head-on battle with Megawati in September, he was requested to make a speech in front of FKPP (Forum Komunikasi Putri-Putra TNI, Armed Forces Sons and Daughters' Communication Forum), a nationwide youth group widely perceived as an assembly of hooligans, in August 2004. Since the FKPP, though discredited by many, was still understood to represent military families, Yudhoyono in his speech said that he disagreed with the civilian demand to liquidate the army territorial structure.⁴⁵ This statement was applauded by the FKPP community, but criticized by the public, which deplored Yudhoyono's rejection of territorial reform. Yudhoyono's political party, Partai Demokrat, had made its policy platform available on the Internet, and that platform clearly stated that the party would work for the reform of TNI's territorial structure.⁴⁶ Yet the reform agenda would seem to have been undermined by Yudhoyono's subsequent declaration that he had consulted both with Endriartono and Ryamizard about his "ignorance" of the party agenda to abolish territorial commands.⁴⁷ The fact that Yudhoyono felt it necessary to fudge on his campaign promises clearly demonstrated that the military continued to play a substantial role in electoral politics.

Megawati's electoral campaign also annoyed the TNI. First, her campaign encouraged some NGOs to identify Yudhoyono as a TNI officer and to push for national unity under the banner of anti-militarism.⁴⁸ Megawati's campaign therefore exploited the TNI, not by pulling soldiers out of barracks and into the political arena, but by invoking the specter of militarism and military dictatorship. Second, the

⁴⁴ "Capres Purnawirawan Jangan Pengaruhi TNI," *Kompas*, June 1, 2004.

⁴⁵ "SBY Minta TNI dan Polri Netral," *Media Indonesia*, August 2, 2004.

⁴⁶ The reference was subsequently deleted from the homepage.

⁴⁷ "Yudhoyono Bantah Akan Bubarkan Koter," *Kompas*, August 2, 2004. Before this event, Yudhoyono's *tim sukses* was contacted by the staff of Ryamizard and was informed that Ryamizard had been annoyed by Yudhoyono's plan to appoint his long-time friend, Lt. Gen. (ret) Agus Widjojo, to draft defense policies that would lead to military reform. The *tim sukses* immediately sent one of its members to Ryamizard to deny that Agus Widjojo would be appointed. The *tim sukses* was also apprised of Ryamizard's concern about the possible promotion of Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso (then Deputy Army Chief of Staff) to become the next TNI Commander-in-Chief. Having consulted with Yudhoyono, the *tim sukses* assured Ryamizard that this would never happen. Interviews, July 2004.

⁴⁸ For further information about the movement, see, for example, "Lagu Sumbang Soal Militerisme," *Tempo*, May 31-June 6, 2004. A PDI-P politician privately argued that the best timing of the anti-militarism campaign was July 27, the anniversary of the military suppression of Megawati supporters in 1996. But this strategy proved ineffective, since Megawati, who had subsequently protected the generals responsible for the violence, was ultimately branded a traitor to her own cause.

Megawati campaign attempted to create a rift between the TNI and the Police by arguing that if Yudhoyono won, he would cave in under TNI pressure to shift the Police under the control of the Department of Interior, while allowing the TNI to be directly answerable to the president. This claim in effect goaded the police community into supporting Megawati in many areas. The TNI was again used as a strawman for defining Megawati's agenda, and this strategy served to deepen the division between the TNI and the Police.

In sum, TNI's stated commitment to neutrality did nothing to promote its leaders being "apolitical" in electoral politics. It is true that the post-Suharto TNI has no intention to support any particular political parties and has no capacity to directly mobilize votes or affect voter preferences. However, we wish to stress the significance of the process by which electoral politics—to some extent shaped by "star wars"—amplified suspicions, frictions, and cleavages within the military.

D. Yudhoyono Administration: Signals of Change

Yudhoyono's victory in the second round of the presidential election in September 2004 marked the beginning of change for the TNI. His victory led to some breakthroughs in solving the serious problems that had plagued the military and the country during the Megawati era. These problems were, namely: the problem of Ryamizard, the war in Aceh, and TNI reform.

Just before the inauguration of Yudhoyono, outgoing president Megawati dropped a bombshell by announcing the resignation of Endriartono and her nomination of Ryamizard as TNI Commander-in-Chief.⁴⁹ She justified her decision by referring to Endriartono's letter dated September 24, which allegedly tendered his resignation.⁵⁰ Thanks to Megawati and Taufik Kiemas, Ryamizard had finally come one step closer to becoming Commander-in-Chief. But since the replacement of TNI Commander-in-Chief needed parliamentary approval by law, Ryamizard had to await the endorsement of the parliament.

This surprise nomination by the lame-duck president was, of course, not acceptable to the president-elect, who was expected to form a new government. Upon assuming the presidency on October 21, Yudhoyono promptly moved to block Ryamizard by sending a letter to the parliament on October 25 revoking Megawati's

⁴⁹ "Panglima TNI Mundur," *Koran Tempo*, October 9, 2004. Megawati's decision was conveyed in her official letter to the parliament (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) (No.R32/PRES/X/2004 tg1 8 Oktober 2004 tentang Pemberhentian dan Pengangkatan Panglima TNI).

⁵⁰ TNI spokesman Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsuddin soon announced that Endriartono had sent the letter for three reasons: first, he wanted to promote reorganization within TNI; second, he had passed the mandatory retirement age of fifty-five years; and third, he wanted one of the current service chiefs to be selected as the next TNI commander. "Sutarto Munder Dengan Tiga Alasan," *Koran Tempo*, October 12, 2004. However, political watchers voiced their skepticism of the TNI explanation. They knew that Endriartono was angered by Megawati's decision to award an "honorary star" to her loyal cabinet members, Hendropriyono and Hari Sabarno, on October 1, making them four-star generals. News of Endriartono's reaction reached Megawati, and she responded by using his letter of September 24 to announce his replacement. By the way, Sjafrie, a long-time ally of Prawono, who switched sides to join Wiranto's camp in the final days of Suharto's regime, was transferred to the Defense Department as secretary-general in April 2005.

decision. Endriartono lent his support to this action by stating that he himself had been surprised by Megawati's announcement of his resignation. Endriartono said that the letter he had submitted to Megawati was not a resignation letter, but a response to her query about regenerating the military.⁵¹ Although his announcement created some confusion among the public, it would appear that Endriartono decided to support Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono argued that any change in the TNI leadership at this point was not timely because he needed to ensure stability, and therefore he instructed Endriartono to stay at his post for the time being. This effectively delayed Yudhoyono's plans for the leadership change in the TNI.

Yudhoyono's next step was to neutralize Ryamizard. Yudhoyono's inner circle envisioned the following scenario.⁵² First, the three current service chiefs would be replaced by new ones in a bid to promote the "regeneration" of TNI leadership, while sidelining Ryamizard. Then, the post of TNI Commander would be open to competition among generals who had served as service chiefs, including Ryamizard. If he abandoned Megawati and switched his loyalty to Yudhoyono, he would still have a chance to become the Commander. If he failed to do so, the chances are that the new TNI commander would come from the air force, which had never produced a TNI Commander in the past. After a year or so, he would be replaced again by the man who was army chief at that time.

Although the scenario sketched above did not foreclose the possibility of Ryamizard's promotion, his chances were extremely slim, given the fact that Yudhoyono disliked him. It was also said that Yudhoyono listened to his wife and brothers-in-law—namely Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono (Commander of First Infantry Division, Kostrad) and Col. Pramono Edhie Wibowo (officer seconded to TNI headquarters)—who were all opposed to the promotion of Ryamizard.⁵³ When Yudhoyono announced the replacement of three service chiefs in mid-February, he elevated Deputy Army Chief of Staff Gen. Djoko Santoso to Army Chief of Staff, marginalizing Ryamizard. A month later, another reshuffle resulted in the promotion of officers, among others his in-laws, Erwin Sujono (to become Tanjungpura Commander overseeing Kalimantan) and Pramono Edhie Wibowo (promoted to become Deputy Commander-General of Kopassus).⁵⁴ Djoko Santoso, trusted by Yudhoyono, is expected to remain Army Chief of Staff for at least one more year to

⁵¹ "TNI Sides with Susilo in Chief Dispute," *Jakarta Post*, November 2, 2004.

⁵² Interviews, January and March 2005.

⁵³ Yudhoyono's wife, Kristiani, is the daughter of Lt. Gen. (ret) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, Army Special Force Commander in the transition from Soekarno to Suharto and architect of the New Order regime. Her eldest sister married Erwin. Pramono Edhie Wibowo is the younger brother of Kristiani. A rising star of Class 1980, Wibowo commanded Kopassus Group-1 (special combat forces) in 1998 and Group-5 (anti-terrorism) in 1999. Then he became an adjutant of Megawati when she was vice president, and he continued to serve her as presidential adjutant until the end of her term in October 2004. It is said that Megawati personally liked this young "professional" officer, in spite of his family link with Yudhoyono, so that she never replaced him. Wibowo was said to have been annoyed by Ryamizard, who suspected him of being Yudhoyono's "eyes" in the presidential palace. About Wibowo's experience in Kopassus, see, for example, Hamish McDonald, Desmond Ball, James Dunn, Gerry van Klinken, David Bourchier, Douglas Kammen, and Richard Tanter, eds., *Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002).

⁵⁴ With this reshuffle, Erwin was given the opportunity to command a Kodam, a necessary qualification to becoming a potential candidate for Army Chief of Staff. Wibowo, on the other hand, became the first officer from the Class of 1980 to be promoted to general.

hone his leadership. At just fifty-three-years-old, Djoko is in no hurry to be TNI Commander this year.⁵⁵

Yudhoyono's decision regarding the appointment of the next TNI Commander seems to have been influenced by two other factors as well. First, Ryamizard is viewed by the US as a radical xenophobe, a staunch nationalist, anti-reformist, and war-freak who prefers heavy-handed tactics in dealing with secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua. The United States' reservations about Ryamizard were conveyed by Paul Wolfowitz to the president and most likely influenced his decision.

Second, the historic tsunami that hit Aceh on December 26, 2004 also influenced Yudhoyono. The immense tragedy of the tsunami worked a miracle by reopening the peace dialogue between the government and GAM, resulting in the historic peace accord in mid-August 2005.⁵⁶ Yudhoyono, who had long been incapable of achieving a breakthrough in the war, now reaps the benefit of the peace accord. The success of the accord now depends on his ability to keep a tight rein on the local army, which has repeatedly sabotaged his previous Aceh initiatives. Understandably, Yudhoyono is hesitant to work with Ryamizard, a forceful proponent of the war in Aceh. Moreover, given that the future reconstruction of Aceh would be carefully monitored by the international community, Yudhoyono could not risk seeing his government humiliated by Ryamizard's machinations. This may be a compelling reason for Yudhoyono to choose Djoko Santoso over an air force general as the next TNI Commander, since an air force officer may be unable to deal with the problems of the army.

By making Ryamizard a lame duck general, Yudhoyono attempted to close the gap between the government and the TNI regarding political and security issues. The new peace deal in Aceh has so far not been sabotaged by the local army. Djoko has maintained a low public profile and is not likely to jeopardize his career by defying the president. The ever pragmatic Endriartono also has less incentive to challenge the government policy, because the smooth transition in Aceh is his main task before his retirement. Bungling this task might invite comparison with Wiranto, whose reputation was damaged by his handling of East Timor in 1999.

There are also encouraging signs of reform. As discussed earlier, Article 19 of the TNI bill provoked strong criticism in early 2003. Although it was dropped from the final version of the bill, there remained many legal ambiguities and loopholes that could potentially undermine civilian authority over the TNI. The public, concerned over the defense-security sector reform, demanded the postponement of the enactment of the draft law by the parliament. But military elites pressured the

⁵⁵ For these arguments, see, for example, "Skenario yang berubah," *Tempo*, February 21-27, 2005. Djoko Santoso was deputy assistant for social and political affairs (Wassospol Kassospol) to Yudhoyono who served as TNI's chief of social and political staff (Kassospol TNI) and chief of territorial staff (Kaster TNI) from 1998 to 1999. TNI insiders allege that Djoko, like Ryamizard, is purely a "domestic product," but unlike Ryamizard, Djoko can communicate well with civilians, perhaps due to his experience in the social and political section headed by Yudhoyono.

⁵⁶ The peace accord produced a seven-page Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed by the government representative and the GAM leader on August 15, 2005, in Helsinki. Under the MoU, GAM agreed, among other things, to give up its long-standing demand for independence and to disarm and demobilize its three thousand fighters, while the government agreed to withdraw TNI's reinforcement troops by December 2005 and to offer general amnesty to GAM members.

Megawati government to pass the bill. In effect, the military exploited Megawati's lack of political will and the legislators' preoccupation with the electoral campaign and consequent lack of interest in scrutinizing the bill in order to have its way. Ryamizard, then Army Chief of Staff, stoked the fires of controversy by claiming that those who stood against the legislation of the TNI bill were aiding foreigners to divide the country.⁵⁷ In the face of TNI lobbying, the DPR discussed the bill in August 2004, made minor revisions, and finally enacted it at the end of September. The public criticized the legislators' half-heartedness and failure to hear the public's concerns.⁵⁸ Consequently, the new law failed to bring about crucial reforms, such as the assertion of civilian supremacy, reform of the territorial command, and revision of the functional relationship between TNI and the Defense Department. Immediately after the enactment of the TNI law, the military spokesman gave his comment that TNI would not change its territorial structure because it was not demanded by the law.⁵⁹

The roll-back initiative was born soon after Yudhoyono became the president. The civilian Minister of Defense and a professor of international relations, Juwono Sudarsono, invited civilian defense experts to help formulate the institutional reform of the TNI and, in November, announced the establishment of two working groups (Pokja) directly under the president: one designed to bring TNI under the authority of the Defense Department and the other to liquidate TNI's businesses. Endriartono immediately raised his objection to the plan to place the TNI under the authority of the Defense Department, since this would undermine TNI's political autonomy in civil-military relations; his protest was read as a warning to Juwono not to meddle in TNI's affairs.⁶⁰ Juwono, however, remained unfazed. Since placing the TNI under the Defense Department required some amendments in the national defense law and the TNI law, he proceeded to work to strengthen the legal basis of military reform.

First, Juwono's Pokja sought to revise the duties of TNI. In the TNI law, the basic duties (*tugas pokok*) of the TNI are classified under two headings: (1) military operations for war; and (2) military operations other than war (OMSP, Operasi Militer Selain Perang). The latter includes, among other things, operations aimed at combating armed separatist movements, armed insurgencies, and terrorist activities, as well as aiding the police in maintaining security and order.⁶¹ TNI's "dual function" of engaging in conventional warfare and OMSP is problematic, since the

⁵⁷ "Pihak Asing Intervensi RI Melalui Penolakan RUU TNI," *Media Indonesia*, July 27, 2004.

⁵⁸ An alliance of NGOs, for example, condemned the DPR for limiting their participation in the law-making process. See the report by Koalisi untuk Kibijakan Partisipatif (KKP), "Siaran Press: RUU TNI Tidak Partisipatif," August 19, 2005.

⁵⁹ "UU TNI Tak Ubah Struktur TNI," *Suara Pembaruan*, October 2, 2004.

⁶⁰ "Panglima Minta Dephan Batas Diri Bicara TNI," *Media Indonesia*, November 9, 2004; "Panglima TNI Keberatan TNI Diletakkan di Bawah Dephan," *Kompas*, November 9, 2004. Under the TNI law (i.e., UU No.43/2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia), the TNI continues to be directly responsible to the president when performing its chief duties, while its administrative function is coordinated with the Defense Department. Regarding TNI business, the TNI law (article 76) stipulates that the government take over all military businesses either directly or indirectly within five years. Inclusion of this article in the law was one of a few real achievements, as it was not mentioned in the draft bill submitted by the government. Clearly it was part of a TNI compromise, accepted in return for the exclusion of other articles that would have reshaped the TNI, such as liquidation of territorial commands and the establishment of civilian supremacy.

⁶¹ See Article 7 (clause 2) of the TNI law.

OMSP, without proper checks and balances, can be used to legitimize permanent military engagement in nonmilitary fields and provide opportunities for the TNI to expand its political power. Therefore, the working group is preparing an amendment to delete the OMSP from TNI's basic duties and thereby limit TNI's basic duty to conventional warfare. This legal framework will downgrade the OMSP to a "supporting task" (*tugas bantuan*), which consists of four categories: civic mission, humanitarian relief, UN peace-keeping operation and assistance to the police in maintaining security and public order. Moreover, a separate bill, aimed at regulating *tugas bantuan*—especially TNI's collaborations with the police—is now in preparation.⁶² Such an attempt to limit TNI's autonomy in conducting OMSP is meant to control the institutional power of the military.

Second, regarding the issue of the territorial command, it has been suggested that the traditional army-dominated system should be revised to integrate all three services for territorial defense. To this end, a proposal has been advanced by the Pokja for the establishment of a Regional Defense Command (Komando Daerah Pertahanan, or Kodahan), in which all services will jointly operate. This plan calls for organizing five Kodahans, each consisting of an army division, an air force squadron, and a navy fleet.⁶³ This plan is not meant to dismantle the territorial command of the TNI, but rather to neutralize army power by merging all three services into a single territorial structure and "embedding" the local army in the wider command authority. This innovation is expected to reduce the political autonomy of the local army.

Finally, on the relationship between TNI and the Defense Department (Dephan), there is proposal to add a clause to Article 12 of the TNI law, placing the military organization under Dephan. This proposal seeks to promote the principle of civilian supremacy and accountability in the administrative, operational, and financial affairs of the TNI. The concept of "TNI under Dephan" is also expected to wrest a degree of political autonomy away from the TNI, whose role will be strictly limited to the execution of defense policies formulated by the government.

All these initiatives reflect the Yudhoyono administration's attempt to reformulate civil-military relations. With Endriartono remaining loyal, Ryamizard out in the cold, and Djoko adopting a low profile, Aceh now faces the prospect of demilitarization, despite the danger of a possible backlash, and some reform drives have been initiated to bring about a new equilibrium in civil-military relations. Yet, clearly the legacy of the past continues to cast a long shadow over the Yudhoyono government, which must strive to overcome the TNI's institutional inertia in other problem areas, such as the escalating violence in Papua (and West Irian Jaya) and the perpetuation of TNI illegal business. Among the alarming developments are the beefing up of troop strength and the mobilizing of military-backed militias in preparation for "civil war" in Papua.⁶⁴ Papua's "special autonomy" budget has been untransparantly consumed

⁶² The bill that is now drafted is RUU Tentang Tugas Perbantuan Tentara Nasional Indonesia. This bill also requires some amendments in the Police Law of 2002.

⁶³ Five Kodahans and their overseeing areas are as follows. Kodahan I/ Sumatra, Kodahan II/Java and Bali, Kodahan III/Kalimantan, Kodahan IV/Sulawesi, NTT and NTB, and Kodahan V/Maluku and Papua. This plan targets the amendment of Article 11 (on defense posture) of the TNI law.

⁶⁴ "Stirring Up Conflict in West Papua," *Tapol Bulletin*, March 2005; "West Papua Military Build-up Threatens Land of Peace Campaign," *Tapol Briefing Paper*, June 25, 2005.

by local military elites who have also benefited from the Freeport-Moran protection business.⁶⁵ Concerned Indonesians have called for an end to TNI's involvement in underground businesses, such as illegal logging and human, drug, and arms trafficking, all illegal activities that frequently end up in the news. To show his commitment to *reformasi*, Yudhoyono officially launched his "war on illegal logging," which, if seriously conducted, could be a real threat to military officers involved in the crime. Whether the current reform drive under Yudhoyono will be able to solve these problems remains to be seen.

⁶⁵ Global Witness, "Paying for Protection: The Freeport Mine and the Indonesian Security Forces" (Washington, DC: Global Witness Publication, July 2005); "Indonesian Military Using Aid Funds for Military Operations: Australian Report," *Agence France Presse*, March 16, 2005.

*****	- Air Vice-Marshal Wartoyo
Cutoff Data: August 2005	Javanese
Office	Navy Academy 1971
Officeholder	16 ii 04 -
Date and Place of Birth, Ethnic Origin	Deputy Chief, Air Force
Class and date of graduation	Inspector-General (Irjen TNI)
Divisional or Service Background	- Vice-Admiral Stanny Fofied
Date of Installation	Minahasanese
Officeholder's previous post	Navy Academy
	Navy
	1 v 02 – 24 x 03 (retire)
	- Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman
	b. Dec. 11, 1949, in Sukabumi,
	Sundanese
Armed Forces Headquarters	Akmil 1972
Commander-in-Chief of the TNI	Infantry
- Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto	24 x 03 -
b. Aug. 1, 1944, Boyolali	Commander, Military Staff and
(Central Java), Javanese	Command School
Navy Academy 1968	Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) to
Navy	TNI Commander-in-Chief
5 xi 99 - 7 vi 02	- Vice-Admiral Djoko Sumarjono
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TNI	Javanese
- Gen. Endriartono Sutarto	Navy Academy 1973
b. Apr. 29, 1947, Purworejo	Navy
(Central Java), Javanese	3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
Akmil 1971	Assistant for Security to Navy
Infantry	Chief of Staff
7 vi 02 – (38 months)	- Vice-Admiral Yuwendi
Army Chief of Staff	Navy Academy ?
Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)	Navy
- Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago	24 x 03 – 2 viii 05
b. April 8, 1949, in Palembang,	not yet announced
Minangkabau	Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) to Chief
Akmil 1971	of the General Staff
Infantry	- Maj. Gen. (Marines) Mochammad
8 iii 2000 – 16 ii 04	Luthfie Witto
Deputy Army Chief of Staff	Navy Academy 1972
retired	

- Marines
1 vii 02 – 24 vi 03
Director, Directorate "C," BAIS
- Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto⁶⁶
Javanese
Akmil 1972
24 vi 03 – 12 iv 05
Assistant for Security to Army
Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zaenal
b. May 4, 1950, Bandung,
Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
16 v 05 -
Commander, Kodam Trikora
- Assistant for Operations (Asops) to Chief of
the General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri
Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 -
Commander, Kodam XI
Udayana
- Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster) to
Chief of the General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. Mar. 10, 1949, Balinese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 20 vi 01 – 21 vii 03
- Maj. Gen. Arnold Radjaguguk
Toba Batak
Akmil 1972
Infantry
21 vii 03 - 16 v 05
Commander, Kodam
Tanjungpura
- Maj. Gen. Symsul Ma'arif
b. Sept. 27, 1950, Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
16 v 05 -
Assistant for Social
Communication to Military
Chief of General Staff
- Assistant for Personnel (Aspers) to Chief of
General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Sutardjo
Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
15 vi 01 - 3 ii 03
Commander, Kodam II
Sriwijaya
- Maj. Gen. Prabowo Suharto
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Artillery
3 ii 03 – (30 months)
Director of Education, Army
Education and Training
Command
- Assistant for Logistics (Aslog) to Chief of
General Staff
- Air Vice-Marshal Mburak Ginting
Karo Batak
Air Force
1 vii 02- 3 xi 04
Assistant for Communications
and Electronics to Military
Chief of General Staff
- Air Vice-Marshal K. Inugroho
Air Force
3 xi 04 -
- Assistant for Social Communications
(Askomsos) to Chief of General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Djibut Hindartono
Javanese
Akabri 1971
Infantry
15 ii 01 – ? 03
Deputy Assistant for Territorial
Affairs to Military Chief of
Territorial Staff
- Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma'arif
b. September 27, 1950, Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
? 03 – 16 v 05
not yet announced
- Head, BAIS TNI (Military Strategic
Intelligence Body)
- Air Vice Marshall Ian Santoso
Perdanakusuma
b. July 17, 1948, Madurese
Air Force Academy 1970
Air Force
12 i 2000 – 24 vi 03 (36.5 months)
Commander, Air Force 2nd
Operational Command
- Lt. Gen. (Marines) Mochammad Luthfie
Witto
Navy Academy 1972
24 vi 03 –
Assistant for Intelligence to
Military Chief of General Staff
- Deputy Head, BAIS TNI (Military Strategic
Intelligence Body)
- Maj. Gen. R. Eddy Firmanto
Javanese
Akabri 1972
Infantry

⁶⁶ Former military attaché to the United States.

1 x 01 – still in the post as of viii
04
Director, Directorate “A,” BAIS

Central Executive Organs

Commander-General, Military Academy
(Danjen Akademi TNI)

- Air Rear-Marshal Suprihadi
Javanese
Air Force
? vi 02 - ? ii 03

- Vice-Admiral Wahyu Sasongko
Javanese
Navy
? ii 03 – 16 ii 04

Governor, Navy Academy

- Vice-Admiral Heru Srijanto

Javanese
Navy
16 ii 04 –
Assistant for Personnel Affairs to
Navy Chief of Staff

Commander, Military Staff and Command
School (Sesko TNI)

- Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman
b. Dec. 11, 1949, in Sukabumi,
Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 iii 2000 – 24 x 03
Commander, Army Strategic
Reserve

Irjen TNI

- Air Rear-Marshal Herman Prayitno
b. January 9, 1951, Javanese
Air Force Academy 1973
24 x 03 – 16 ii 04

- Rear-Admiral Sumardjono
Javanese
Navy Academy 1973
16 ii 04 -
Assistant for General Planning to
Navy Chief of Staff

Head, Military Mental Upbuilding Center
(Pusbintal)

- Brig. Gen. Machfud H.W.
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
? xii 02 – (3.5 months) still in the
post
Chief of Staff, Kodam
Tanjungpura

Head, Military Research and Development
Center (Puslitbang)

- Brig. Gen. Idi Sanwardi
Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Artillery

15 ii 01 – (24.5 months)
Expert Staff for Economics and
Finance to the TNI
Commander-in-Chief

Head, Military Center of History and
Tradition (Pusjarah)

- Brig. Gen. Busri Boer
Akmil 1971
Engineers
15 ii 2001 - ?

Head, Army Mental Upbuilding
Service (Kadisbintalad)

- Brig. Gen. M. Fahlevi
Akmil 1974
Infantry
? - as of ix 04

Head, Military Police Center (Puspom)

- Maj. Gen. Sulaiman Ahmad Bakri
Acehnese
Akmil 1974
Military Police
c. 14 iii 02 – 25 v 04
staff, Lemhannas

- Maj. Gen. Ruchiyan
Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Military Police
21 v 04 -
Deputy Assistant for Security to
Army Chief of Staff

Head, Military Information Center (Puspen)

- Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsuddin
b. Oct. 30, 1952, in Makassar,
Makassarese
Akmil 1974
Infantry (Special Forces)
c. 15 ii 02 – 12 iv 05
Expert Staff Coordinator for the
TNI Commander-in-Chief

- Temporary held by Brig. Gen. Suhartono
Suratman (Deputy Head, Military
Information Center)

- Maj. Gen. Kohirin Suganda
Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Engineer
16 v 05 -
Expert Staff Coordinator for the
TNI Commander-in-Chief

Head, Military Legal Upbuilding Body
(Babinkum)

- Maj. Gen. Timor P. Manurung
Batak
Akmil 1971
Ordonance
15 vi 98 – 1 vii 02 (48.5 months)
Auditor General of the TNI

- Maj. Gen. F.X. J. Sukiman
Javanese
Akmil 1973
1 vii 02 – still in the post
Deputy Head, Military Legal
Upbuilding Body
25 v 05 –
Commander, Western Fleet
- Head, Military Supply Body (Babek)
- Brig. Gen. Amari
Akmil 1973
Ordnance
c. 15 ii 02 – 25 v 04
Officer seconded to Logistics Staff,
TNI Headquarters (Paban
II/Bekum Slog TNI)
- Brig. Gen. Abi Kusno
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
25 v 04 –
- Commander, Western Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Djoko Sumaryono
b. July 14, 1951, in Bandung,
Javanese
Navy Military Academy 1973
Navy
15 vi 01 – 3 ii 03 (19.5 months)
Assistant for Security to Navy
of Staff
- Rear-Admiral Ali Mualimin Santoso
Javanese
Navy Academy
Navy
3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
- Rear-Admiral Didik Heru Purnomo
Javanese
Navy Academy
Navy
24 x 03 – 25 v 05
Chief of Staff, Western Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno
Javanese
Navy Academy
Navy
25 v 05 –
attached to Lemhannas
- Commander, Eastern Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Slamet Subiyanto
Javanese
Navy
3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
Assistant for General Planning to
Military Chief of General Staff
- Rear-Admiral Sosialisman
Javanese
Navy
24 x 03 – 25 v 05
Waasops KSAL
- Rear-Admiral Y. Didik Heru Purnomo
Javanese
Navy
- Head, National Air Defense Command
(Kohanudnas)
- Air-Vice Marshal Wresniwiro S.E.
Javanese
Air Force Academy
12 xi 02 – 24 x 03
- Air-Vice Marshal F. Djojo Poerwoko
Javanese
Air Force Academy
24 x 03 – v 05
- Air-Vice Marshal Sonny Rizani
Air Force Academy
V 05 –
- Service Heads and Army Hierarchy**
- Army Chief of Staff
- Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
b. June 21, 1950, in Palembang,
Palembanger
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 vi 02 – 16 ii 05
Commander, Kostrad
- Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8, 1952, in Solo, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
16 ii 05 -
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
- Navy Chief of Staff
- Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh
b. July 9, 1948, Minahasa, North
Sulawesi, Menadonese
Navy Academy 1970
Navy
1 v 02 – 16 ii 05
Navy Inspector-General of the
TNI
- Admiral Slamet Soebijanto
b. June 4, 1951, in Mojokerto,
Javanese
Navy
Navy Academy 1973
16 ii 05 –
Deputy Governor, Lemhannas
- Air Force Chief of Staff
- Air Marshal Chappy Hakim
b. December 17, 1947, Yogyakarta,
Javanese
Air Force Academy 1971
29 iv 02- 16 ii 05
Commander-General, TNI
Academy
- Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto
b. Dec. 2, 1950, in Madiun,
Javanese
Air Force Academy 1973

- Air Force
16 ii 05 –
Assistant for Operations to Air
Force Chief of Staff
- Commander of Marine Corps
- Maj. Gen. TNI (Mars) Achmad Rifai
b. August 22, 1950, Javanese
Navy Academy 1972
Marines
15 xi 02 – 25 x 04
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
- Maj. Gen. (Mars) Safzen Noerdin
Acehnese
Navy Academy 1975
Marines
25 x 04 –
Commander, Navy Education
and Training Command (Dan
Kodiklatal)
- Deputy Army Chief of Staff
- Lt. Gen. Darsono
b. Dec. 29, 1948, in Tuban,
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
Commander, TNI's Education
and Training Command (Dan
Kodiklat TNI)
- Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8, 1952, in Solo, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
24 x 03 – 15 ii 05
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Lt. Gen. Endang Suwarya
b. Dec. 11, 1950, Bandung,
Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 30 iii 05 –
Commander, Kodam Iskandar
Muda
- Army Inspector General
- Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya
b. Oct. 11, 1948, Bangkalan,
Madurese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon
b. 1951 in Samosir, North Sumatra,
Toba Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry (Special Forces)
24 x 03 –
Commander, Army Territorial
Center (Danpusterad)
- Assistant for Security (Aspam)
- Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto
Javanese
Akmil 1972
3 ii 03-24 vi 03
- Maj. Gen. Yogi (Yudhi) Magio Yusuf
Javanese
Akmil 1973
24 vi 03 -
- Assistant for Operations (Asops)
- Maj. Gen. Cornelis Simbolon
b. July 14, 1951, Pangurunan, N.
Sumatra, Toba Batak
Akmil 1973
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 25 x 04
Commander, Kodam
IV / Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Iwan Ridwan Sulandjana
b. March 1, 1951, in Bogor,
Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
31 i 05 -
Commander, Kodam Siliwangi
- Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)
- Maj. Gen. Mohamad Husni Thamrin Razak
Akmil 1972
Infantry
15 vi 01 – ? 03
Expert Staff Coordinator for
Army Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Tanri Bali Lamo
? 03 –
- Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)
- Maj. Gen. Maruto W.S.
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Engineer
15 vi 01 - ? 03
Director for Planning and Budget,
Department of Defense
- Maj. Gen. Kiswantara P.
Akmil 1972
Engineers
? 03 -
- Assistant for Planning and Budget (Asrena)
- Maj. Gen. Bambang Sutedjo
Javanese
Akmil 1973
3 v 02 – 9 xii 04
- Maj. Gen. G.R. Situmeang
Akmil 1974
Infantry
9 xii 04 –
Coordinator of Expert Staff for
Army Chief of Staff

Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)

- Maj. Gen. Sudibyo Tjiptonegoro
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1972
 - Artillery
 - 14 xi 02 – 25 v 04
 - Commander, Kodam Sriwijaya
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno
 - b. March 23, 1951, in Bojonegoro,
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - 25 v 04 -
 - Commander, Army Territorial Center (Danpuster AD)

Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)

- Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo
 - b. August 5, 1949, in Klaten,
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1972
 - Infantry
 - c. 1 vii 02 – 24 ix 04
 - Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Temporarily held by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard

- Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
 - b. Apr 3, 1950, in Malang,
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1972
 - Infantry
 - 25 x 04 -
 - Commander, Army Education and Training Command

Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)

- Maj. Gen. Andi Sjamsul Mappareppa
 - Buginese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - c. 1 vii 02 – 25 v 04
 - Commander, First Infantry Division, Army Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Asril Hamzah Tandjung
 - Mandailing Batak
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - 25 v 04-
 - Commander, Infantry Weapons Center

Commander, First Infantry Division, Army Strategic Reserve

- Maj. Gen. Rudjiono
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - c. 1 vii 02 – ? ix 03

Deputy Army Inspector-General to the Army Chief of Staff

- Maj. Gen. Arief Budi Sampurno
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - ? ix 03 – 25 v 04
- Maj. Gen. George Toisutta
 - b. 1953, Ambonese
 - Akmil 1976
 - Infantry
 - 25 v 04 – 16 v 05
 - Commander, TNI Operation Command in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Pangkoops NAD)
- Maj. Gen. Bambang Suranto
 - b. Oct. 6, 1952, Javanese
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry
 - 16 v 05 -
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam Sriwijaya

Commander, Second Infantry Division, Army Strategic Reserve

- Maj. Gen. Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry
 - c. 1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months)
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono
 - b. Feb. 5, 1951, Bandung, Javanese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry
 - c. 3 ii 03 – 30 iii 05
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam Siliwangi
- Maj. Gen. Lilik A.S. Sumaryo
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry
 - 30 iii 05 -
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam Bukit Barisan

Governor, General and Army Division, Military Academy (Akmil)

- Maj. Gen. Prabowo Suharto
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1972
 - Artillery
 - c. 15 ii 02 - 3 ii 03 (11.5 months) with Lemhannas
- Maj. Gen. Yunus Palar
 - Menadonese
 - Akabri 1972
 - Infantry
 - 3 ii 03 -
 - Deputy Commander, Army Staff and Command School

Commander, Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad)

- Maj. Gen. Willem Da Costa
 - b. Apr 13, 1949, in Kupang, West Timorese
 - Akmil 1971
 - Infantry
 - c. 1 vii 02 – 9 vii 03
- Commander, Kodam Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Syariffudin Tippe
 - b. June 7, 1953, Sinjai, S. Sulawesi, Buginese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Engineers
 - 9 vii 03 –
 - Deputy Commander, Seskoad

Commander, Education and Training Command (Kodiklat)

- Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
 - b. Apr 3, 1950, in Malang, Javanese
 - Akmil 1972
 - Infantry
 - c. 3 ii 03 – 25 x 04
 - Infantry Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of Staff
- Lt. Gen. Cornelis Simbolon
 - b. July 14, 1951, Pangurunan, N. Sumatra, Toba Batak
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - 25 x 04 -
 - Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of Staff

Commander, Army Infantry Weapons Center (Pussenif TNI-AD)

- Maj. Gen. Songko Purnomo
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1971
 - Infantry
 - c. 15 ii 02 - ? 03
 - Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)
- Maj. Gen. Asril Tandjung
 - Mandailing Batak
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - ? 03 – 25 v 04
- Maj. Gen. Arif Budi Sampurno
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - 25 v 04 – 16 v 05
 - Previously Pangdiv I Kostrad
- Maj. Gen. Bambang Darmono
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry
 - 16 v 05 -
 - Expert Staff to TNI
 - Commander-in-Chief

Commander, Army Territorial Center (Puster TNI-AD)

- Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon
 - b. 1951 in Samosir, North Sumatra, Toba Batak
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry (Special Forces)
 - c. 3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
 - Commander, Kodam XI/ Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno
 - b. March 23, 1951, in Bojonegoro, Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - 24 x 03 – 25 v 04
 - Commander, Kodam Deponegoro (only for temporary)
- Maj. Gen. Sjamsul Mappareppa
 - Buginese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - 25 v 04 – 16 v 05
 - Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve Command
- Maj. Gen. Suprpto
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry
 - 16 v 05 -
 - Commander, Kodam Wirabuana

Commander-General, Special Forces Command (Kopassus)

- Maj. Gen. Sriyanto
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry (Special Forces)
 - c. 1 vii 02 – 31 i 05
 - Deputy Commander-General, Kopassus
- Maj. Gen. Syaiful Rizal
 - Jambinese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry (Special Forces)
 - 31 i 05 -
 - Chief of Staff, Kasdam Tanjungpura

Deputy Commander General, Special Forces Command (Kopassus)

- Brig. Gen. Syaiful Rizal
 - Jambinese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry (Special Forces)
 - ? – 24 x 03
- Brig. Gen. Hotma Marbun
 - Toba Batak
 - Akmil 1977
 - Infantry

- 24 x 03 – 30 iii 05
Commander, Korem
91 / Samarinda,
East Kalimantan
- Brig. Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo
Javanese
Akmil 1980
Infantry (Special Forces)
30 iii 05 –
Presidential adjutant to Megawati
- Commander, Presidential Security Guard
(Paspampres)
- Maj. Gen. (Mars) Nono Sampono
Javanese
Navy Academy 1976
Marines
20 viii 01 – 28 iii 03
Deputy Commander, Presidential
Security Guard
- Maj. Gen. (Mars) Agung Wijayadi
(Widjajadi)
Javanese
Navy Academy
Marines
28 iii 03 -
- Regional Military Leaders [Commanders]**
- Kodam (Military Region Command) I/Bukit
Barisan (North Sumatra)*
Commander, Kodam I/ Bukit Barisan
- Maj. Gen. Tri Tamtomo Panggabean
b. Feb 15, 1951, in Bogor,
Javanese?
Akmil 1974
Infantry
7 x 02 – still in the post
Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya
- Chief of Staff, Kodam I/ Bukit Barisan
- Brig. Gen. Zamroni
Sundanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry (Special Forces)
1 x 01 – 24 vi 03 (21 months)
Commander, Operations
Implementation Command
(Kolakops) in Aceh
- Brig. Gen. Lilik A.S. Sumaryo
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
24 vi 03- 30 iii 05
Deputy Assistant for Security to
Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Wilono Jati Wiyono
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
30 iii 05 -
Deputy Assistant for Security to
Army Chief of Staff
- Korem 022 Pantai Timur (Pematang Siantar)
- Col. Zulkarnaen Pane
Toba Batak
Akmil 1975
Infantry
27 iv 02 – ?
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam
Siliwangi
- Col. Ilyas
Akmil 1978
Infantry
? (as of 17 viii 05) -
- Korem 023 Kawal Samudera (Sibolga)
- Col. Markus Kusnowo
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
24 iv 01 –
Commander, Core Regiment,
Kodam Siliwangi
- Col. Agung Revulton
Akmil 1977
? (as of 29 vii 02) – xi 04 - ?
Commander, 18th Infantry
Brigade, Army Strategic
Reserve Command
- Col. Eddy (Edi) Hartanto
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? (as of 27 vii 05) -
- Korem 031 Wirabima (Pekanbaru)
- Col. Darmawi Chaidir
Akabri 1974
Infantry
3 v 01 – ? ix 03
- Col. Karseno
Akmil 1976
Infantry
? ix 03 – 4 iii 05
- Col. Hambali Hanafiah
Akmil 1978
Infantry
4 iii 05 -
- Korem 032 Wirabraja (Padang)
- Col. Soeprijanto
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
26 ix 2000 – 10 iv 03
Director for Functional
Development, Army
Intelligence Center
- Col. Karsidi
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Engineer
10 iv 03 – (as of ii 05) -

Kodam II/Sriwijaya (South Sumatra)

Commander Kodam II/Sriwijaya

- Maj. Gen. Sunarso

Javanese
Akmil 1973Artillery
? xii 02 – 24 x 03

Chief of Staff, Kodam Sriwijaya

- Maj. Gen. Sjahrial Peliung

b. June 6, 1950, Minangkabau
Akmil 1973

Infantry

24 x 03 -

Chief of Staff, Kodam Sriwijaya

Chief of Staff, Kodam II/Sriwijaya

- Brig. Gen. Sjahrial B.P. Peliung

b. June 6, 1950, Minangkabau

Akmil 1973

Infantry

? xii 02 – 24 x 03

Officer seconded to Army

Education and Training

Command (Pabanlat Kodiklat
AD)

- Brig. Gen. Bambang Suranto

Javanese
Akmil 1974

Infantry

24 x 03 – 16 v 05

- Brig. Gen. Karsadi

b. March 17, 1952, in Pematang,
Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

16 v 05 –

Deputy Assistant for Territorial
Affairs to Army Chief of Staff

Korem 041 Garuda Mas (Bengkulu)

- Col. Poerwanto

Javanese
Akmil 1976

Artillery

13 xi 02 – ?

- Col. Sutan Lubis

Akmil 1975

Infantry

? (as of viii 05) -

Korem 042 Garuda Putih (Jambi)

- Col. Juktayana Tjitra Wasita

Akmil 1973

Infantry

30 x 00 – 13 xi 02 (25 months)

Coordinating Officer, Expert Staff,

Army Information Service

- Col. Mulhim Asyraf

Akmil 1976

Engineers

13 xi 02 – (as of xii 03) -

Commander, Korem Bengkulu

- Col. Poerwanto

Akmil 1976

Artillery

? - 1 vi 05

- Col. Sutrisno

Javanese

Akmil 1978

Infantry

1 vi 05 -

Korem 043 Garuda Hitam (Lampung)

- Col. Chairuddin Azis

b. Jun. 8, 1951, Padang,

Minangkabau

Akmil 1975

Infantry

23 iv 02 – 15 ii 05

Assistant for Territorial Affairs,

Army Strategic Reserve

Command

- Col. Bambang Gandhi Baroto

Javanese

Akmil 1980

Infantry

15 ii 05 -

Assistant for Personnel Affairs,

Kodam Jaya

Korem 044 Garuda Dempo (Palembang)

- Col. Djafar Sofyan

Akmil 1975

Engineers

12 iv 02 – (? ix 04) -

Assistant for Planning, Kodam,

Brawijaya

- Col. Ali Yusuf Susanto

Javanese

Akmil 1976

Engineers

? (as of iii 05) -

Kodam III/Siliwangi (West Java)

Commander, Kodam III/Siliwangi

- Maj. Gen. Iwan Ridwan Sulandjana

b. March 1, 1951, in Bogor,

Sundanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

c. 1 vii 02 – 31 i 05

Chief of Staff, Kodam

III/Siliwangi

- Maj. Gen. Sriyanto

b. Oct. 26, 1950, Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry (Special Forces)

31 i 05 -

Commander-General, Army

Special Forces

Chief of Staff Kodam III/Siliwangi

- Brig. Gen. Erwin Sujono

b. Feb. 5, 1951, in Bandung,

Javanese

- Akabri 1975
 Infantry
 1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months)
 Chief of Staff, First Infantry
 Division, Army Strategic
 Reserve
- Brig. Gen. Mulyono
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 c. 3 ii 03 - (as of vii 05) -
 Commander, Korem 061 Bogor
- Korem 061 Suriakencana (Bogor)
 - Col. Mulyono
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 16 i 01 - c. 6 ii 03 (25 months)
 Commander, Core Regiment,
 Kodam III/Siliwangi
- Col. Budiman
 Javanese
 Akmil 1978
 Engineers
 3 xii 03 - (ii 05) -
- Col. Edhi Riyanto
 Javanese
 Akmil 1980
 Infantry
 ? 05 -
- Korem 062 Tarumanegara (Garut)
 - Col. Osaka Meliala
 b. Mar. 7, 1953, North Sumatra,
 Karo Batak
 Akabri 1976
 Artillery
 ? iv 02 - 18 vi 05
 Assistant for Planning, First
 Infantry Division, Army
 Strategic Reserve Command
- Col. Nana Sudjana
 Akmil 1978
 b. in Kuningan, Javanese
 Engineers
 18 vi 05 -
- Korem 063 Sunan Gunung Jati (Cirebon)
 - Col. Imam Santoso
 Javanese
 Akmil 1975
 Infantry
 6 xi 02 - (ii 05) -
- Col. Asman Yusri Yusuf
 Javanese
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 ? 05 -
- Korem 064 Maulana Yusuf (Serang)
 - Col. Bambang Sukresna
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 c. 26 ix 2000 - (vi 03) - ?
 Assistant for Planning, Kodam
 Sriwijaya
- Col. Agus Gunaedi (Gunadi) Pribadi
 Javanese
 Akmil 1977
 Infantry
 ? (by iii 04) - (iv 05) -
- Kodam IV/Diponegoro (Central Java)*
 Commander, Kodam IV/Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Amirul Isaeni
 b. March 29, 1951, in Malang,
 Madurese
 Akmil 1975
 Infantry (Special Forces)
 c. 3 ii 03 - vi 03 (died)
 Commander, Kodam Wirabuana
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno
 b. March 23, 1951, in Bojonegoro,
 Javanese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 21 ix 03 - 24 x 03 (1 month:
 temporary)
 Commander, Kodam Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Sunarso
 Javanese
 Akmil 1973
 Artillery
 24 x 03 -
 Commander, Kodam Sriwijaya
- Chief of Staff, Kodam IV/Diponegoro
- Brig. Gen. Salim Mengga
 Akmil 1974
 Cavalry
 c. 3 ii 03 - 6 i 04
 Commander, Army Cavalry
 Weapons Center (Dan
 Pussenkav)
- Brig. Gen. Mochamad Sochib
 Akmil 1975
 Artillery
 6 i 04 - 25 v 05
 Commander, Army Artillery
 Weapons Center (Danpussenart)
- Brig. Gen. Rasyid Qurnuen
 Akmil 1975
 25 v 05 -
 attached to Lemhannas
- Korem 071 Wijayakusuma (Purwokerto)
 - Col. Mufad Santoso
 Akmil 1973
 Engineers
 12 v 01 - ? viii 03
 Staff, Kodam Diponegoro

- Col. Sudirman
 Javanese
 Akmil 1977
 Engineers
 ? viii 03 – 3 iv 05
 Asren Kodam I/BB
- Col. Siswondo
 Javanese
 Akmil 1977
 Infantry
 3 iv 05 –
- Korem 072 Pamungkas (Yogyakarta)
 - Col. Suwarno
 Javanese
 Akmil 1977
 Cavalry
 17 v 02 – 5 iii 05
 Personal Secretary, Army Chief of Staff
- Col. Langgeng Sulistyono
 Javanese
 Akmil 1980
 Engineers
 5 iii 05 -
- Korem 073 Makutarama (Salatiga)
 - Col. Adji Wijono
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 26 ix 2000 – (v 03) - ?
 Assistant for Territorial Affairs,
- Kodam Diponegoro ?
 - Col. Endang Sutrisno
 Javanese
 Akmil 1975
 Engineers
 ? – (xii 03) -
- Korem 074 Warastratama (Solo)
 - Col. Sarining Setyo Utomo
 Javanese
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 ? v 02 – 28 i 05
- Col. Tisna Komara
 Javanese
 Infantry
 28 i 05 -
- Kodam V/Brawijaya (East Java)*
 Commander, Kodam V/Brawijaya
 - Maj. Gen. Achmad Djunaedi Sikki
 b. Aug. 27, 1950, in Bone, S.
 Sulawesi, Buginese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 1 x 01 – 16 v 05
 Commander, Second Infantry
 Division, Army Strategic
 Reserve Command
- Maj. Gen. Andi Syamsul Mappareppa
 Buginese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 16 v 05 -
 Commander, Army Territorial
 Center
- Chief of Staff, Kodam V/Brawijaya
 - Brig. Gen. Suhartono
 Javanese
 Akmil 1975
 Infantry
 1 vii 02 – (37 months, as of viii 05)
- Korem 081 Dhirot Saha Jaya (Madiun)
 - Col. Djamhur Suhana
 Sundanese
 Akmil 1975
 Cavalry
 c. 9 v 01 – ? (by ix 04)
 Commander, Cavalry Education
 Center
- Col. Sukimin
 Javanese
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 ? (by ix 04) –
- Korem 082 Citra Panca Yudha Jaya
 (Mojokerto)
 - Col. Sukasmono
 Javanese
 Akmil 1976
 Engineers
 7 v 02 – 4 iii 05
 Assistant for Logistics, Kodam
 Brawijaya
- Col. Sentot Maksum
 Javanese
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 4 iii 05 –
 Inspector, Kodam Udayana
- Korem 083 Baladhika Jaya (Malang)
 - Col. Hadi Lukmono
 b. October 9, 1954, in Pati,
 Javanese
 Akabri 1977
 Artillery
 10 ix 02 - ?
 Commander, Artillery Education
 Center (Komandan Pusdik
 Artileri TNI AD)
- Col. Budiardjo
 Javanese
 Akmil 1980
 Infantry
 23 iii 05 -

Korem 084 Bhaskara Jaya (Surabaya)

- Col. Soedarsono
 - b. Aug. 18, 1949, Yogyakarta,
 - Javanese
 - Akabri 1973
 - Infantry
 - 13 ix 01 – (as of ii 02) ?
 - Assistant for Territorial Affairs,
 - Kodam Brawijaya
- Col. Bambang Sugarmas
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry
 - ? (by i 04) – vii 05
- Col. Wahid Hidayat
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1978
 - Infantry
 - ? vii 05 -

Kodam VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan)

Commander, Kodam VI/ Tanjungpura

- Maj. Gen. Arnold Rajagukguk
 - Toba Batak
 - Akmil 1972
 - Infantry
 - 14 xi 02 – 21 vii 03
 - Assistant for Territorial Affairs to
 - Army Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Herry Tjahyana
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - 21 vii 03 – 30 iii 05
 - Chief of Staff, Kodam
 - Tanjungpura
- Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono
 - b. Feb. 5, 1951, in Bandung,
 - Javanese
 - Akabri 1975
 - Infantry
 - 30 iii 05 -
 - Commander, Second Infantry
 - Division, Army Strategic
 - Reserve Command

Chief of Staff, Kodam VI/ Tanjungpura

- Brig. Gen. Machfud H.W.
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1972
 - Infantry
 - 1 x 01 - ?
 - Deputy Assistant for Personnel
 - Affairs to Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. TNI Herry Tjahyana
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Infantry
 - ? – 16 vii 03
- Brig. Gen. Supiadin Yusus A.S.
 - Sundanese
 - Akmil 1975

Infantry

- 16 vii 03 – 21 ix 03
- Brig. Gen. Syaiful Rizal
 - Jambinese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry (special forces)
 - c. 24 x 03 – 31 i 05
 - Deputy Commander-General,
 - Army Special Forces
- Brig. Gen. Djoko Susilo Utomo
 - b. Nov. 9, 1952, in Bandung,
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry
 - 31 i 05 –
 - Chief of Staff, Second Infantry
 - Division, Army Strategic
 - Reserve Command

Korem 091 Aji Suryanatakusuma
(Balikpapan)

- Col. Hotma Marbun
 - Toba Batak
 - Akmil 1977
 - Infantry
 - 3 v 02 – 24 x 03
- Col. Amreyza Anwar
 - Akmil 1975
 - Infantry
 - 24 x 03 -

Korem 101 Antasari (Banjarmasin)

- Col. Sudarmaidy S.
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry
 - c. 20 iv 01 – ? (by ix 03)
- Col. Junianto Haroen
 - Akmil 1976
 - Infantry
 - ? (by ix 03) -

Korem 102 Panju Panjung (Palangka Raya)

- Col. Hatta Syafrudin
 - Akmil 1976
 - Infantry
 - ? (by 8 viii 02) – ? (between i and
 - x 04)
- Col. Suharsono
 - Infantry
 - ? (by 5 x 04) - ? 05
- Col. L.Sigers
 - Infantry
 - ? (by vii 05) -

Korem 121 Alambhana Wana Wai
(Pontianak)

- Col. Marciano Norman Sasono
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1978
 - Cavalry
 - ? (by 3 v 02) – 3 ii 05
- Col. Bambang Budi
 - Javanese

- Akmil 1975
Infantry
3 ii 05 -
- Kodam VII/Wirabuana (Sulawesi)*
Commander, Kodam VII/ Wirabuana
- Maj. Gen. Suprpto
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 16 v 05
Chief of Staff, Kodam Wirabuana
- Maj. Gen. Arief Budi Sampurno
Javanese
Akmil 1973
16 v 05 -
Commander, Army Infantry
Weapons Center
- Chief of Staff, Kodam VII/ Wirabuana
- Brig. Gen. Supiadin Yusuf
Sundanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry (special forces)
3 ii 03 – c. 31 xii 03
Deputy Assistant for Territorial
Affairs to Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Muslihan Sulchan
Akmil 1974
Artillery
31 xii 03– 31 i 05
Deputy Commander, Army
Territorial Center (Wadan
Pusterad)
- Brig. Gen. Sabar Yudo Suroso
Javanese
Akmil ?
Artillery
31 i 05 -
- Korem 131 Santiago (Manado)
- Col. Manahan Rumahorbo
Toba Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - ? 03
Commander, Core Regiment,
Kodam Wirabuana
- Col. Darpito P
Akmil 1975
Cavalry
? (by iii 03) – 30 iii 05
- Col. Hotma Sibarani
Batak ?
Akmil 1976
Infantry
30 iii 05 –
- Korem 132 Tadulako (Palu)
- Col. Suwahyuhadji
Akmil 1976
Infantry
? (by 9 vi 01) – ? 03
- Col. Moch Slamet
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? (by x 03) -
- Korem 141 Toddopuli (Watambone)
- Col. Rahmat Budiman
Javanese
Akmil 1976 ?
Infantry
c. 1 v 02 – as of 9 iv 04
Assistant for Operations, Kodam
Brawijaya
- Korem 142 Taroada Tarogaru (Pare Pare)
- Col. Bambang Sugito
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
? (by i 02) - ?
- Col. Agus Suharyanto
Javanese
Akmil 1977
Infantry
? – as of x 03
- Korem 143 Haluoleo (Kendari)
- Col. Nanang Djuana Priyadi
Sundanese
Akabri 1977
Infantry
c. 7 i 03 – ?
- Col. Tan Aspan
Akmil 1976
Infantry
? (by 24 viii 04) - 4 viii 05
- Col. Moch. Wachju Rijanto (Riayanto)
Akmil 1977
Cavalry
4 viii 05 -
- Kodam XVII/Trikora (Irian Barat)*
Commander, Kodam XVII/ Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zaenal
b. May 4, 1950, Bandung,
Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 16 v 05
Chief of Staff, Kodam Trikora
- Maj. Gen. George Toisutta
b. 1953, Ambonese
Akabri 1976
Infantry
16 v 05 -
Commander, First Infantry
Division, Army Strategic
Reserve Command
- Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII/ Trikora
- Brig. Gen. Getson Manurung
b. January 4, 1951, Batak

- Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 31 i 05
Officer seconded to Operations
Staff, Army Headquarters
(Paban II/Bintal Sopsad)
- Brig. Gen. Sudarmaidy (Sudarmaidji) S.
Javanese
Akmil 1974
31 i 05 -
Deputy Assistant for Operations
to Army Chief of Staff
- Korem 171 Praja Vira Tana (Sorong)
- Col. Mangasa R. Saragih
b. in Medan, Simalungun Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 1 xi 00 – ? 03
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam
Trikora
- Col. Halasan Simanjuntak
Infantry
Akmil 1974
? (by ix 03) - ? 04
- Col. Christian Zebu (Zebua)
Akmil 1980
Cavalry
? (as of i 05) -
- Korem 172 Praja Vira Yakthi (Abepura)
- Col. Agus Muljadi
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? (by 3 vii 02) – (after 31 i 05)
- Col. Asis Wanto
Akmil 1980
Infantry
? (by vi 05) -
- Korem 173 Praja Vira Braja (Biak)
- Col. Tri Usadi Setyoko
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
15 viii 02 – (as of 25 i 05) - ?
Commander, Core Regiment,
Kodeam Siliwangi
- Col. Erfi Triassunu
Infantry
Akmil 1978
? (by vi 05) -
- Korem 174 Anim Ti Waninggap (Merauke)⁶⁷
- Col. Kitaran Joy Sihotang
Infantry
1 vi 05 –
- Kodam XVI/Pattimura (Maluccas and North
Maluccas)*
Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura
- Maj. Gen. Agustadi S. Purnomo
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
Commander, Second Infantry
Division, Army Strategic
Reserve Command
- Maj. Gen. Syarifuddin Suma (Sumah)
b. Mar. 16, 1950, Manado,
Gorontaloonese?
Akmil 1973
Infantry
24 x 03 –
Chief of Staff, Kodam Pattimura,
then Deputy Commander,
Army Territorial Center
- Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI/Pattimura
- Brig. Gen. Syarifuddin Sumah
b. Mar. 16, 1950, Manado,
Gorontaloonese?
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 xi 2000 - 3 ii 03 (27 months)
Commander, Korem 041
Bengkulu
- Brig. Gen. S.K. Ginting Munthe
Karo Batak
Akmil 1973
Infantry
3 ii 03 –
- Korem 151 Maluku (Ambon)⁶⁸
- Col. Tony Husodo
Javanese
Infantry
18 iii 03 –
- Korem 152 Maluku Utara (Ternate)⁶⁹
- Col. Thomas Edy Widagdo
Javanese
Akmil 1978
Artillery
18 iii 03 -
- Kodam IX/Udayana (Bali, East and West
Nusatenggara)*
Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno
b. March 23, 1951, in Bojonegoro,
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – 21 ix 03
Chief of Staff, Kodam Udayana

⁶⁷ Newly established on June 1, 2005.⁶⁸ Newly established on March 18, 2003.⁶⁹ Newly established on March 18, 2003.

- Maj. Gen. Supiadin Yusus A.S.
Sundanese
Akmil 1975
21 ix 03 – 30 iii 05
Chief of Staff, Kodam
Tanjungpura
- Maj. Gen. Herry Tjahyana
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
30 iii 05 -
Commander, Kodam
Tanjungpura

- Chief of Staff, Kodam IX/Udayana
- Brig. Gen. T.H. Sinambela
b. in Medan, Toba Batak
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – 26 ix 03
Officer seconded to Territorial
Staff, Army Headquarters
- Brig. Gen. Soeseno Yudoprawiro
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
26 ix 03– 31 i 05
- Brig. Gen. Baharudin (Burhanudin) Amin
Akmil 1976
Infantry
31 i 05 –
Chief of Staff, First Infantry
Division, Army Strategic
Reserve Command

- Korem 161 Wirasakti (Kupang)
- Col. Muswarno Moesanip
Akmil 1975
Infantry
2 x 01- 4 iii 05
- Col. Amir Hamka Manan
Akmil 1976
Infantry
4 iii 05 - ? vii 05
- Col. AJP Noch Bola
Infantry
? (by 18 vii 05) -

- Korem 162 Wirabhakti (Mataram)
- Col. Suseno Yudoprawiro
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
30 x 00 – 28 vii 03
Inspector of Personnel, Army
Inspectorate-General
- Col. Suparto Sukowati
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Engineers
28 vii 03 -

- Korem 163 Worasatya (Denpasar)
- Col. Hotmangradja Pandjaitan
Toba Batak
Akmil 1977
Infantry
14 v 02 – 2 viii 03
Commander, Group-2, Army
Special Forces (Kopassus)
- Col. I Gusti Putu Buana
Balinese
Akmil 1977
Engineers
2 viii 03 – (as of 1 v 05) -

- Kodam X/Jaya (Greater Jakarta)*
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8, 1952, in Solo, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 24 x 03
Commander, Kodam Pattimura
- Maj. Gen. Agustadi S. Purnomo
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
24 x 03 –
Commander, Kodam Pattimura

- Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya
- Brig. Gen. George Toisutta
b. 1953, Ambonese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
3 ii 03 – 8 xii 03
Chief of Staff, Second Infantry
Division, Army Strategic
Reserve Command
- Brig. Gen. Mochamad Irianto
b. Jan. 31, 1951, in Sumenep,
Madurese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
8 xii 03 – 16 v 05
Chief of Staff, Garrison I/Jakarta
- Brig. Gen. Prijanto
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Artillery
16 v 05 –
Chief of Staff, Garrison I/Jakarta

- Korem 051 Wijayakarta (Jakarta Timur)
- Col. Eddy [Edi] Sunadi D.
Javanese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
9 iv 02 – (as of 29 x 04) -
Staff, Army Intelligence Center

- Korem 052 Wijayakrama (Jakarta Barat)
 - Col. Koesnadi
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 c. 1 x 00 – ?
 Commander, Core Regiment,
 Kodam Sriwijaya
- Col. Jul Effendi Sjarief
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 ? (As of 29 x 04) -
- Kodam Iskandar Muda (Aceh)*
 Commander, Kodam Iskandar Muda
- Maj. Gen. Djali Jusuf
 b. 1949, Pidie, Aceh, Acehnese
 Akmil 1972
 5 v 02 – 13 v 03
 Deputy Commander, Military
 Operations Command in
 Nangroe Aceh Darussalam
- Maj. Gen. Endang Suwaryo
 b. Dec. 11, 1950, Bandung,
 Sundanese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 13 v 03 – 30 iii 05
 Chief of Staff, Kodam Iskandar
 Muda
- Maj. Gen. Supiadin Yusuf
 Sundanese
 Akmil 1975
 Infantry
 30 iii 05 -
 Pangdam Udayana
- Chief of Staff, Kodam Iskandar Muda
- Brig. Gen. Endang Suwaryo
 b. Dec. 11, 1950, Bandung,
 Sundanese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 3 ii 03 – 13 v 03
 Deputy Assistant for Operations
 to Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Muhammad Yahya (Jahja)
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 24 vi 03 – 30 iii 05
- Brig. Gen. TNI Kuswa
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 30 iii 05 –
 Deputy Commander, Army Staff
 and Command School
- Korem 011 Lilawangsa (Lho Seumawe)
 - Col. H. Azmyn Yusri Nasution
 b. 1954, Medan, Mandaling Batak
 Akmil 1977
 Infantry
 4 v 02 – 31 i 05
- Assistant for Operations, Army
 Strategic Reserve Command
- Col. Chairawan K. Nusyirwan
 Sundanese
 Akmil 1980
 Infantry
 31 i 05 -
- Korem 012 Teuku Umar (Banda Aceh)
 - Col. Gerhan (Geerhan) Lantara
 b. Bone, South Sulawesi, Bugis
 Akmil 1978
 Infantry
 2 v 02 – 31 i 05
 Assistant for Operations, Kodam
 III/Siliwangi
- Col. Zahri Siregar
 Batak
 Akmil 1980
 Infantry
 31 i 05 -