Messer, Kent D. Poe, Gregory L.Rondeau, DanielSchulze, William D.Vossler, Christian A.2018-08-212018-08-212008-03-01https://hdl.handle.net/1813/57868WP 2008-12 March 2008JEL Classification Codes: C91; C92; D64; D72; H41Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented.en-USarticle