Farrow, Alexander2024-04-112024-04-112015-11-01Farrow, Alexander. "Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining Model." Cornell International Affairs Review Vol. 9, Iss. 1 (Fall 2015). https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v9i1.471.https://hdl.handle.net/1813/114970From the Ku Klux Klan’s lynchings to al Qaeda’s World Trade Center attacks, terrorist organizations have historically exploited fear and destruction to achieve their end goals. Attacking both a nation’s government and population, terrorist organizations inflict damage on their intended audiences, or targets. This paper explores how terrorist organizations interact with their targets. In my analysis, I assume complete rationality and build an infinite bargaining model of political concession between both actors. I claim that terrorist organizations bargain with targets in the long run by increasing the payoffs for cooperation and decreasing the payoffs for noncooperation.en-USarticlehttps://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v9i1.471