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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Gorokh, Artur</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember">Iyer, Krishnamurthy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2020-08-10T20:23:45Z</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract">The subject of this thesis is the problem of allocating goods to people without using monetary payments. Specifically, I concentrate on the case of repeated allocation of goods, a common problem in practice, as many resources are allocated to recipients on monthly or daily basis. Throughout this work, we show how repeated nature of allocation can be leveraged to achieve strong efficiency, fairness and incentive guarantees via well-chosen mechanisms. The work presented here is based on three papers on the topic written by me and my collaborators. When taken together, these works also outline the theoretical trade-off between various assumptions on the allocation setting and the strength of the resulting guarantees.</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject">game theory</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title">Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods&lt;/Title>
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    &lt;Keyword>game theory&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>mechanism design&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>online allocation&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>The subject of this thesis is the problem of allocating goods to people without using monetary payments. Specifically, I concentrate on the case of repeated allocation of goods, a common problem in practice, as many resources are allocated to recipients on monthly or daily basis. Throughout this work, we show how repeated nature of allocation can be leveraged to achieve strong efficiency, fairness and incentive guarantees via well-chosen mechanisms. The work presented here is based on three papers on the topic written by me and my collaborators. When taken together, these works also outline the theoretical trade-off between various assumptions on the allocation setting and the strength of the resulting guarantees.&lt;/Abstract>
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