2026-09-21T09:58:04Zhttps://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/requestoai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/595172026-05-15T19:48:42Zcom_1813_57466com_1813_57353com_1813_11653com_1813_35col_1813_57467col_1813_47
Otto, Steven
Just, David R.
Schulze, William D.
Ortiz Bobea, Ariel
Messer, Kent Donald
2018-10-23T13:33:01Z
2019-02-22T07:00:32Z
2018-08-30
ProQuest Submission ID: 10942
ProQuest Publication ID: 10840538
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59517
https://doi.org/10.7298/X4H993D2
10489613
This dissertation includes two chapters. The first presents a new auction mechanism designed for conservation programs. Individuals compensated for conserving their land often extract substantial profits from the government or non-governmental agency funding the conservation program. These rents limit the amount of land which can be conserved, which decreases total surplus for society. The new auction mechanism, the Provision Point Reverse Auction, was designed to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. This paper presents both theoretical and experimental evidence to substantiate the efficacy of the mechanism. The second chapter considers the effect that preference uncertainty may have on two commonly observed behavioral anomalies: exchange asymmetries and the willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity. This paper provides both theoretical and experimental evidence which suggests that uncertainty in preferences can explain at least part of these behavioral anomalies. The experiments rely on chocolate and a ``taste'' treatment, where individuals in a treatment group are allowed to taste a small amount of chocolate before making their trade or valuation decisions.
en_US
Economics
Agriculture economics
Auction
Experimental
conservation
uncertainty
Essays on Conservation Auctions and Uncertainty in Preferences
dissertation or thesis
application/pdf
Applied Economics and Management
Cornell University
Doctor of Philosophy
Ph. D., Applied Economics and Management
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59810
Publication
Applied Economics and Management PhD Dissertations
Cornell Theses and Dissertations
Otto, Steven
cdf997a8-0b54-4bd8-bb4f-15522783f4d6
5893a6ea-7af3-41d7-abc6-04bcd26ab5df
open.access
open.access
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<Keyword>Economics</Keyword>
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<Keyword>Auction</Keyword>
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<Keyword>conservation</Keyword>
<Keyword>uncertainty</Keyword>
<Abstract>This dissertation includes two chapters. The first presents a new auction mechanism designed for conservation programs. Individuals compensated for conserving their land often extract substantial profits from the government or non-governmental agency funding the conservation program. These rents limit the amount of land which can be conserved, which decreases total surplus for society. The new auction mechanism, the Provision Point Reverse Auction, was designed to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. This paper presents both theoretical and experimental evidence to substantiate the efficacy of the mechanism. The second chapter considers the effect that preference uncertainty may have on two commonly observed behavioral anomalies: exchange asymmetries and the willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity. This paper provides both theoretical and experimental evidence which suggests that uncertainty in preferences can explain at least part of these behavioral anomalies. The experiments rely on chocolate and a ``taste'' treatment, where individuals in a treatment group are allowed to taste a small amount of chocolate before making their trade or valuation decisions.</Abstract>
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