<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href='static/style.xsl' type='text/xsl'?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T10:43:18Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/39346" metadataPrefix="dim">https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/39346</identifier><datestamp>2026-05-14T13:53:26Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1813_35</setSpec><setSpec>col_1813_47</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Zhang, Hao</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="chair" lang="en_US">Kuruvilla, Sarosh C</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Friedman, Elias David</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2015-04-06T20:13:54Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2020-01-27T07:01:06Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2015-01-26</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://hdl.handle.net/1813/39346</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="bibid">9154434</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">I argue, in this case study of Tianjin's auto industry, that informal institutions and processes result in effective negotiations and substantial outcomes, even though formal institutions - employers' associations, industrial unions, autonomous unions in workplaces, and a legal basis for strikes - are either absent or not providing favorable conditions for collective bargaining in China. In particular, I have found that spontaneous wage coordination amongst employers and amongst unions have occurred and imposed wage constraints to individual firms on the one hand, and on the other, some firm unions have actively engaged in informal negotiations to challenge the wage constraints as well as appease discontented workers. I also discuss causes, mechanisms, and effects for each of the two levels of informality.</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">collective bargaining</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">informal institutions</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">China</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Informality In China'S Collective Bargaining</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="discipline">Industrial and Labor Relations</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="grantor" lang="en_US">Cornell University</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="level">Master of Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="name">M.S., Industrial and Labor Relations</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="cris" element="virtual" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Zhang, Hao</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Informality In China&amp;apos;S Collective Bargaining&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2015-01-26&lt;/PublicationDate>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Zhang, Hao&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>collective bargaining&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>informal institutions&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>China&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>I argue, in this case study of Tianjin&amp;apos;s auto industry, that informal institutions and processes result in effective negotiations and substantial outcomes, even though formal institutions - employers&amp;apos; associations, industrial unions, autonomous unions in workplaces, and a legal basis for strikes - are either absent or not providing favorable conditions for collective bargaining in China. In particular, I have found that spontaneous wage coordination amongst employers and amongst unions have occurred and imposed wage constraints to individual firms on the one hand, and on the other, some firm unions have actively engaged in informal negotiations to challenge the wage constraints as well as appease discontented workers. I also discuss causes, mechanisms, and effects for each of the two levels of informality.&lt;/Abstract>
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