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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Vladicic, Aleksandar</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="chair" lang="en_US">Way, Christopher</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Katzenstein, Peter</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2026-08-26T19:52:48Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2026-05</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="doi">https://doi.org/10.7298/ekv7-k377</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">197 pages</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Economic sanctions are among the most frequently deployed instruments of statecraft, yet fundamental questions about their politics and effects remain unresolved. This dissertation argues that progress requires solving a prior methodological problem: existing research studies only sanctioned states, obscuring both why some violations are punished and others are not, and whether sanctions actually change target behavior. I address these challenges by introducing the Sanctionable Behavior Dataset (SBD), which tracks behaviors that recurrently trigger sanctions and records, for each state-year between 1989 and 2015, whether a given state engaged in that behavior and whether it was sanctioned by the United Nations, United States, or European Union. I deploy this framework to advance two substantive theories. First, I show that states heavily import-reliant on a dominant partner systematically escape its sanctions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, economic vulnerability reduces likelihood of coercion because hierarchical lock-in makes enforcement costly. Second, I advance research on credible commitment, showing that sanctions compel behavioral change only when a sender has both reputation for resolve and enforcement history specific to the targeted behavior. Together, these findings reframe the politics of sanctions enforcement and provide answers to long-standing puzzles in the literature on initiation and effectiveness of sanctions.</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">credible commitment</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">economic coercion</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">economic sanctions</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">weaponized interdependence</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Sanctionable Behavior and Selective Enforcement: Explaining Forbearance from and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Sanctionable Behavior and Selective Enforcement: Explaining Forbearance from and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2026-05&lt;/PublicationDate>
   	&lt;DOI>https://doi.org/10.7298/ekv7-k377&lt;/DOI>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Vladicic, Aleksandar&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>credible commitment&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>economic coercion&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>economic sanctions&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>norm enforcement&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>sanctions effectiveness&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>weaponized interdependence&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>Economic sanctions are among the most frequently deployed instruments of statecraft, yet fundamental questions about their politics and effects remain unresolved. This dissertation argues that progress requires solving a prior methodological problem: existing research studies only sanctioned states, obscuring both why some violations are punished and others are not, and whether sanctions actually change target behavior. I address these challenges by introducing the Sanctionable Behavior Dataset (SBD), which tracks behaviors that recurrently trigger sanctions and records, for each state-year between 1989 and 2015, whether a given state engaged in that behavior and whether it was sanctioned by the United Nations, United States, or European Union. I deploy this framework to advance two substantive theories. First, I show that states heavily import-reliant on a dominant partner systematically escape its sanctions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, economic vulnerability reduces likelihood of coercion because hierarchical lock-in makes enforcement costly. Second, I advance research on credible commitment, showing that sanctions compel behavioral change only when a sender has both reputation for resolve and enforcement history specific to the targeted behavior. Together, these findings reframe the politics of sanctions enforcement and provide answers to long-standing puzzles in the literature on initiation and effectiveness of sanctions.&lt;/Abstract>
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