<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href='static/style.xsl' type='text/xsl'?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T09:51:10Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/121009" metadataPrefix="dim">https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/121009</identifier><datestamp>2026-05-15T17:52:58Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1813_35</setSpec><setSpec>col_1813_47</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Bearman, Reuben</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="chair" lang="en_US">Blume, Lawrence</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Lamba, Rohit</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2026-04-02T19:05:40Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2026-04-02T19:05:40Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2025-12</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other">ProQuest Publication ID: 32241725</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://hdl.handle.net/1813/121009</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="doi">https://doi.org/10.7298/pqzw-qj27</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="bibid">17423281</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">43 pages</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">When applying for a job, a worker faces two possible options: to tell the truth or to lie. Most models treat lying ability as innate; however, like all abilities, the ability to lie can be developed over time. If a worker has finite time to allocate between developing skills and lies, how will they choose to split their time, and how will this affect a firm's decision to hire? This paper develops an education signaling model with the two-dimensional ability for an applicant to develop skills and lies. The different distributions of costs to develop these abilities will provide insight into how firms react to uncertainty.</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">education models</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">lying costs</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Signaling games</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">skill costs</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Signaling Games with Lying Costs</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="discipline">Economics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="grantor">Cornell University</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="level">Master of Arts</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="name">M.A., Economics</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="cris" element="virtual" qualifier="author">Bearman, Reuben</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Signaling Games with Lying Costs&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2025-12&lt;/PublicationDate>
   	&lt;DOI>https://doi.org/10.7298/pqzw-qj27&lt;/DOI>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Bearman, Reuben&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>education models&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>lying costs&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Signaling games&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>skill costs&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>When applying for a job, a worker faces two possible options: to tell the truth or to lie. Most models treat lying ability as innate; however, like all abilities, the ability to lie can be developed over time. If a worker has finite time to allocate between developing skills and lies, how will they choose to split their time, and how will this affect a firm&amp;apos;s decision to hire? This paper develops an education signaling model with the two-dimensional ability for an applicant to develop skills and lies. The different distributions of costs to develop these abilities will provide insight into how firms react to uncertainty.&lt;/Abstract>
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