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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Oh, Jun</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Bloomfield, Robert</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Campello, Murillo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2024-04-05T18:47:26Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2023-08</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">This study examines whether and how antitrust risk affects firms’ disclosure of mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;As). Due to regulatory exemptions, deals that fall below a size threshold escape formal antitrust scrutiny at the time of the merger. These “non-reported” deals can have important implications for the firm’s pricing power of its products in segmented and localized markets. I hypothesize that firms face a trade-off between the benefits of disclosing these deals to capital markets (i.e., capitalize the product market benefits into stock prices in a timely manner) and the potential antitrust scrutiny the voluntary disclosure can invite, which increases the probability of agencies challenging the merger. Exploiting two quasi-exogenous variations in antitrust enforcement that affect the level of antitrust risk, I find evidence of acquirers strategically managing their disclosure of horizontal and intrastate deals according to the level of antitrust risk. My findings shed light on a new determinant of voluntary disclosure: the risk of costly antitrust enforcement.</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Antitrust Risk and Voluntary M&amp;A Disclosure</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Antitrust Risk and Voluntary M&amp;amp;A Disclosure&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2023-08&lt;/PublicationDate>
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   	&lt;Abstract>This study examines whether and how antitrust risk affects firms’ disclosure of mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;amp;As). Due to regulatory exemptions, deals that fall below a size threshold escape formal antitrust scrutiny at the time of the merger. These “non-reported” deals can have important implications for the firm’s pricing power of its products in segmented and localized markets. I hypothesize that firms face a trade-off between the benefits of disclosing these deals to capital markets (i.e., capitalize the product market benefits into stock prices in a timely manner) and the potential antitrust scrutiny the voluntary disclosure can invite, which increases the probability of agencies challenging the merger. Exploiting two quasi-exogenous variations in antitrust enforcement that affect the level of antitrust risk, I find evidence of acquirers strategically managing their disclosure of horizontal and intrastate deals according to the level of antitrust risk. My findings shed light on a new determinant of voluntary disclosure: the risk of costly antitrust enforcement.&lt;/Abstract>
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