<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href='static/style.xsl' type='text/xsl'?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T11:25:44Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/114173" metadataPrefix="dim">https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/114173</identifier><datestamp>2026-05-15T19:49:56Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1813_35</setSpec><setSpec>col_1813_47</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Watson, Frederick</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="chair" lang="en_US">Marmor, Andres</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Markovits, Julia</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember" lang="en_US">Atiq, Emad</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2024-01-31T21:20:11Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2023-05</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other">ProQuest Submission ID: 13467</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other">ProQuest Publication ID: 30247966</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://hdl.handle.net/1813/114173</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="doi">https://doi.org/10.7298/fv8b-2s25</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="bibid">16176400</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Why do lawyers and judges agree on what the law directs in particular cases as often as they do? Why do they sometimes disagree? And what can this agreement and disagreement teach us about the nature of law—about the sort of thing that law is, wherever and whenever it is found? This dissertation develops a version of Hartian Positivism and shows how it straightforwardly explains legal practitioners’ agreement, as well as their disagreement, with respect to the law. Indeed, Hartian Positivism better accounts for these facts than rival theories, such as Ronald Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity, Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory, and Mark Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">General jurisprudence</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Legal agreement</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Legal disagreement</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Legal positivism</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Metalinguistic negotiation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Theoretical disagreement</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Explaining Legal Agreement and Disagreement</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">dissertation or thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="relation" qualifier="localuri">https://newcatalog.library.cornell.edu/catalog/16176400</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="mimetype">application/pdf</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="discipline">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="grantor">Cornell University</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="level">Doctor of Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="thesis" element="degree" qualifier="name">Ph. D., Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dcterms" element="license">https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59810.2</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dspace" element="entity" qualifier="type">Publication</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="cris" element="virtual" qualifier="collection" authority="https://cornell-ecommons.eks.prod.4science.cloud/handle/1813/47" confidence="600">Cornell Theses and Dissertations</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="cris" element="virtual" qualifier="author">Watson, Frederick</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="cris" element="virtualsource" qualifier="collection">5893a6ea-7af3-41d7-abc6-04bcd26ab5df</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="cerif" element="openaire" authority="" confidence="-1">&lt;Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="681ea797-fcb4-43ec-b94b-f34c5f375e3d">
	&lt;Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843&lt;/Type>
	&lt;Language>en&lt;/Language>
   	&lt;Title>Explaining Legal Agreement and Disagreement&lt;/Title>
   	&lt;PublishedIn>
    	&lt;Publication>
      	&lt;/Publication>
   	&lt;/PublishedIn>
   	&lt;PublicationDate>2023-05&lt;/PublicationDate>
   	&lt;DOI>https://doi.org/10.7298/fv8b-2s25&lt;/DOI>
   	&lt;Authors&gt;
      	&lt;Author>
        	&lt;DisplayName>Watson, Frederick&lt;/DisplayName>
         	&lt;Affiliation>
         		&lt;OrgUnit>
         		&lt;/OrgUnit>
         	&lt;/Affiliation>
      	&lt;/Author>
	&lt;/Authors>
   	&lt;Editors>
	&lt;/Editors>
    &lt;Publishers>
        &lt;Publisher>
            &lt;OrgUnit />
        &lt;/Publisher>
    &lt;/Publishers>
    &lt;Keyword>General jurisprudence&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Legal agreement&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Legal disagreement&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Legal positivism&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Metalinguistic negotiation&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Theoretical disagreement&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>Why do lawyers and judges agree on what the law directs in particular cases as often as they do? Why do they sometimes disagree? And what can this agreement and disagreement teach us about the nature of law—about the sort of thing that law is, wherever and whenever it is found? This dissertation develops a version of Hartian Positivism and shows how it straightforwardly explains legal practitioners’ agreement, as well as their disagreement, with respect to the law. Indeed, Hartian Positivism better accounts for these facts than rival theories, such as Ronald Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity, Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory, and Mark Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory.&lt;/Abstract>
	&lt;Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right" 
    >
    &lt;/Access>
&lt;/Publication>
</dim:field>
</dim:dim>
</metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>