2026-09-18T18:39:58Zhttps://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/requestoai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/1104632026-05-15T19:41:20Zcom_1813_57466com_1813_57353com_1813_11653com_1813_35col_1813_57468col_1813_47
Su, Xingbang
Turvey, Calum G.
Gomes, Carla P.
2021-12-20T20:34:39Z
2021-12-20T20:34:39Z
2021-08
ProQuest Submission ID: 11267
ProQuest Publication ID: 28652622
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/110463
https://doi.org/10.7298/zvjr-af48
15160147
46 pages
Earnings manipulation has perplexed many investors and regulators for decades. Factors such as CEO’s characteristics, macro environment, behavioral biases, and regulation rules are discussed in the literature. In this paper, corporate strategy aggressiveness is proposed to be one of the factors that leads to earnings manipulation. Short interest ratio is used to indicate how the market perceive and react to company’s earnings manipulation probability. Based on the data from Russell 2000 constituents during 2015 to 2019, my hierarchical regression results indicate that firms with the aggressive strategy are more likely to be engaged in earnings manipulation activities, resulting in a higher short interest ratio. The findings are significant when the model uses a binary variable instead of a continuous variable to measure the corporate strategy aggressiveness in the robust test. This paper will interest investors that focus on fundamental investing and researchers who study accounting, corporate strategy, and financial market.
en
accounting quality
corporate strategy
short selling
CORPORATE STRATEGY, EARNINGS MANIPULATION, AND SHORT SELLING
dissertation or thesis
https://newcatalog.library.cornell.edu/catalog/15160147
application/pdf
Applied Economics and Management
Cornell University
Master of Science
M.S., Applied Economics and Management
https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59810
Publication
Applied Economics and Management MS Theses
Cornell Theses and Dissertations
Su, Xingbang
47601f18-d3de-4171-9187-8e5283cf3a8f
5893a6ea-7af3-41d7-abc6-04bcd26ab5df
open.access
open.access
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<Abstract>Earnings manipulation has perplexed many investors and regulators for decades. Factors such as CEO’s characteristics, macro environment, behavioral biases, and regulation rules are discussed in the literature. In this paper, corporate strategy aggressiveness is proposed to be one of the factors that leads to earnings manipulation. Short interest ratio is used to indicate how the market perceive and react to company’s earnings manipulation probability. Based on the data from Russell 2000 constituents during 2015 to 2019, my hierarchical regression results indicate that firms with the aggressive strategy are more likely to be engaged in earnings manipulation activities, resulting in a higher short interest ratio. The findings are significant when the model uses a binary variable instead of a continuous variable to measure the corporate strategy aggressiveness in the robust test. This paper will interest investors that focus on fundamental investing and researchers who study accounting, corporate strategy, and financial market.</Abstract>
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