<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href='static/style.xsl' type='text/xsl'?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T10:54:38Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/109826" metadataPrefix="dim">https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/109826</identifier><datestamp>2026-05-15T19:49:33Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1813_35</setSpec><setSpec>col_1813_47</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Yeung, Kelvin Kwok Shing</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember">Yeung, Eric</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember">Forman, Chris</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="committeeMember">Campello, Murillo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2021-09-09T17:41:11Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2021-05</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract">I investigate the real effects of Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires that firms disclose the ratio of total CEO compensation to the median employee compensation. Using a difference-in-differences framework and granular data at the establishment-level, I document that Section 953(b) leads to employment cuts. Employment cuts are particularly severe in firms that have high CEO pay, in states that have weak labor protection laws, and in establishments that are part of the firm’s noncentral operations. These employment cuts are accompanied by an increase in spending on information technology, suggesting that firms are changing their mixture of inputs rather than downscaling their operations.</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject">CEO Pay Ratio</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title">Real Effects of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Mandate</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Real Effects of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Mandate&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2021-05&lt;/PublicationDate>
   	&lt;DOI>https://doi.org/10.7298/gjys-8t86&lt;/DOI>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Yeung, Kelvin Kwok Shing&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>CEO Pay Ratio&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>CSR&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Disclosure Mandate&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Dodd-Frank Act&lt;/Keyword>
    &lt;Keyword>Employment&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>I investigate the real effects of Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires that firms disclose the ratio of total CEO compensation to the median employee compensation. Using a difference-in-differences framework and granular data at the establishment-level, I document that Section 953(b) leads to employment cuts. Employment cuts are particularly severe in firms that have high CEO pay, in states that have weak labor protection laws, and in establishments that are part of the firm’s noncentral operations. These employment cuts are accompanied by an increase in spending on information technology, suggesting that firms are changing their mixture of inputs rather than downscaling their operations.&lt;/Abstract>
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