THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA AND CUBAN EDUCATION:
TECHNOLOGY’S ROLE IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

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by
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ABSTRACT

The U.S. embargo against Cuba is an economic sanctions regime. Through multiple policies passed since the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. has unreasonably prohibited Cuba from equitable opportunity to grow and perform with other sovereign nations in the global economy. However, while the U.S. now intervenes in and interferes with Cuban affairs via the economic sanctions regime, before the embargo, the U.S. did so via education policy and a U.S.-backed Cuban dictator. This research explores this unique Cuban situation rife with U.S. interventionist strategy. Chapter 1 explores the economic sanctions regime’s impact on Cuba’s unique situation, while Chapter 2 explores that of the education policy and U.S.-backed Cuban dictator. Since I cannot lift the embargo myself, Chapter 3 concludes with discussion of an alternative resolution to lifting the embargo, so that Cuba might become more educationally and economically developed, despite the embargo. The alternative resolution emphasizes international collaboration and technological change.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jesse Fowler holds a B.A. (’17) in English (manga cum laude), with a concentration in Literature and a minor in Biblical and Theological Studies, from Biola University in La Mirada, California. At Biola University, he presented a paper at the 2017 Zeitgeist Paper Conference and was published in *Inkslinger*, the on-campus literary journal. In 2017, Fowler was inducted into Sigma Tau Delta, the international honor society for English.

Fowler also holds an M.P.A. (’22) in Public Management from the Paul H. O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Bloomington. At the O’Neill School, Fowler had the distinction of being the Drs. Lois Recascino Wise and Charles R. Wise O’Neill Public Management Fellow, as well as the O’Neill Fellow for the City of Bloomington’s Office of the Common Council, the O’Neill Alumni Association Fellow, the O’Neill International Equal Opportunity Fellow, the O’Neill M.P.A. Internship Fellow, the Paul D. Coverdell Fellow, and the Steven Eisenach Memorial Fellow, among other honors, including the M.P.A. Scholar Award and the fall 2020 Graduate and Professional Student Organization Travel Grant.

Also at the O’Neill School, Fowler was named the Master’s At-Large Representative on the Graduate and Professional Student Government’s Covid Task Force (f.k.a. COVID-19 Ad Hoc Committee). In this peri-pandemic role from fall 2020 up to spring 2022, he collected and analyzed data from master’s students across campus and, in collaboration with the Ph.D. and Professional-Student At-Large Representatives, cowrote COVID-19 policy recommendations for Indiana University administrators to consider.

While serving as the Paul H. O’Neill School Representative from District MPA-01, Fowler was also a committeeman on the Graduate and Professional Student Government’s
Diversity Committee. As Diversity Committeeeman, he helped to create the Diversity Summit Initiative, or Diversity Dialogue Series, to promote the importance of diversity at Indiana University Bloomington. Fowler’s cosponsored resolutions include the Resolution on the COVID-19 Vaccine (passed 04/02/2021), the Resolution for Effective Use of Wellness Days (passed 02/05/2021), and the Resolution to Encourage Graduate Student Prioritization in Vaccination (passed 02/05/2021).

What is more, still at the O’Neill School, Fowler was also an O’Neill Mentor Collective Ambassador, sat as the Master’s Ambassador on the Students for Equity in Public Affairs (SEPA) Executive Board, cocreated the SEPA Town Hall, co-moderated the Graduate Student COVID Town Hall, and met with the M.P.A. program’s NASPAA reaccreditation site visit team, among other extracurricular activities, including certifications from the Dimensions of Diversity Certificate Series; the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Series; the Intercultural Competence Certificate Series; the “In This Together: Community Conversations to Reduce the Stigma of Substance Use Disorder” course; and the Leadership Seminar Series. In 2022, Fowler was inducted into Pi Alpha Alpha, the global honor society for public affairs and administration.

At Cornell University, Fowler is again the Paul D. Coverdell Fellow, as well as a cowinner of the spring 2023 Peace Puzzle Hackathon at the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies. He is also a student member of the Chesterton House, a Christian study center at Cornell University; Foreign Policy Analyst for the Roosevelt Institute at Cornell University; and Vice Chair of Finance for the Graduate and Professional Student Assembly Finance Commission.

Outside the role of student, Fowler has also been invited to serve as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Mexico. In the State of Puebla, he was Professor of English for Technical and
Academic Purposes at Universidad Tecnológica de Xicotepec de Juárez, where he taught over 700 interested individuals. Additionally, during his time at the O’Neill School, Fowler interned at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). More specifically, for NASA’s Convergent Aeronautics Solutions project team, he designed a framework with systems thinking on how to define, identify, and approach wicked problems from a public-management perspective. As a result of his professional experience with NASA, Fowler’s research, arguably including the research herein, now considers systems thinking and wicked problems. For example, at the University of Cambridge (U.K.) in July 2022, Fowler discussed what theoretical physics says of how to better understand wicked problems, including the COVID-19 pandemic as a wicked problem of health.

Last, Fowler enjoys fun facts. For one, he is a published poet in both English and Spanish. Domestically and internationally, Fowler has been invited to read his poetry, most notably at the University of Oxford (U.K.) in March 2022. In 2021, for his poetry in both English and Spanish, Fowler was named an inaugural Arts Matter Artist by the Pacific Ancient and Modern Language Association (PAMLA). PAMLA is the Western regional Modern Language Association, or MLA. Additionally, Fowler has a pet Goldendoodle named Cuba Bella, whom he adores; is a retired national athlete; and, as a child, dreamed of becoming an animator because he admires both the arts and culture.
For God, family, and country
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I would like to acknowledge and sincerely thank for admission the Department of Global Development in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, as well as the Cornell University Graduate School. I would especially like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Terry Tucker, Professor of the Practice and Director of the M.P.S. Program in Global Development, for his unwavering support and encouragement throughout my time in the Department, as well as for his naming me the Paul D. Coverdell Fellow, which has been a great financial help. Thank you, Dr. Tucker, for your leadership.

Second, I would especially like to acknowledge and sincerely thank my advisor, Dr. Julie Ficarra, Associate Professor of the Practice. Without her great attention to detail, I question whether I would have been able to complete this research as well as I have, though there of course always remains room for improvement. Dr. Ficarra’s feedback, especially her excellent questions, has forced me to think more critically about what it is that I care to explore and discuss in this research. She has helped me to fill in the gaps in my own research, which is crucial because my own research largely attempts to fill in any observable gaps in the preexisting literature at large. Thank you, Dr. Ficarra, for your believing in me and for your continued guidance.

Third, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank all professors and administrators from across the various colleges, schools, and departments at Cornell University, with whom I have spent many wonderful hours talking about this research and from whom I have learned far more than ever imagined. Similarly, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank the various seminar speakers and guests invited to speak at the University, who, whether directly or indirectly, have benefited this research in some way, including former Costa
Rican President Carlos Alvarado Quesada. Thank you, all, for your words, which have added to my own thoughts, forcing me to think evermore critically.

Fourth, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank the fellow members of my cohort. We have grown close over the course of only one year, and it is in that closeness that this research and I have benefited greatly. This research and I have benefited from the countless hours spent talking about global development with the many members of my cohort, who come from very diverse backgrounds and every corner of the globe. From my cohort and in no particular order, I would particularly like to acknowledge and sincerely thank Mr. Mend-Amar Biniye, Ms. Rashmi Kanthi, and Mr. Addis Ahera Ayalew. To Mend, I have greatly enjoyed our conversations on public finance, sustainable development, and foreign service. I look forward to visiting you in Mongolia, China, or wherever else your fascinating career may take you and yours. To Rashmi, I have greatly enjoyed our conversations on a wide variety of topics too vast to list here, but seemingly always rooted in our diverse international experiences, which has helped me to see the world more clearly and more honestly. To Addis, I have greatly enjoyed our conversations on economics, especially econometrics, and African development, including Cuba’s historic role in African development. If any of you should ever be in New Jersey, or wherever else I may be at the time, remember that ¡mi casa es su casa, amigos! Thank you, all, for your wisdom bestowed upon me. I hope to have benefited you and your research in some way, as well. I foresee great futures for each one of you, my friends.

Fifth, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank my mentors and former professors from my undergraduate alma mater, Biola University; from my M.P.A. alma mater, the Paul H. O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Bloomington; from the City of Bloomington, Indiana; from the Peace Corps; and from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Out of respect for Cornell University, I will hold myself back from naming any individuals at these other distinguished institutions, but I trust that you all know who you are. Thank you for your wisdom, added perspective, and guidance, which have ultimately lead me to Cornell University.

Sixth, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank my friends and former colleagues at Universidad Tecnológica de Xicotepec de Juárez (UTXJ) in the State of Puebla, Mexico, where I completed my Peace Corps service. Again, out of respect for Cornell University, I will hold myself back from naming any individuals at UTXJ, but I trust that you all know who you are. However, in addition to my friends and former colleagues at UTXJ, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank my former UTXJ students, many of whom have stayed in touch with me over the years and have helped me to see Latin America and the Caribbean, especially Mexico, from an ever less American perspective, which I have no doubt has benefited this research on Mexico’s neighbor, Cuba.

Seventh, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank my friends and family around the world, including my beloved pet dog, Cuba Bella, who, as usual, lies lovingly beside me as I write this very sentence. They have helped me to persevere during such a taxing year, a year during which we, as a global society, have finally come out of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the World Health Organization (2023). While an absolutely fun experience to improve myself and grow as an individual, completing the requirements for a master’s degree in one year’s time has nevertheless proven to be a challenging feat at times, and it is at those times that my friends and family have especially offered me great support. For that and much more, thank you to my friends and family, especially my mother and Cuba Bella.

Last, but certainly not least, I would also like to acknowledge and sincerely thank God
for His continued guidance over my life, especially during my time at Cornell University. It is ultimately for Him that I chose to attend not simply the Ivy League, but this wonderful institution of higher learning. Time will tell why.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ........................................................................................................ iii
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................... vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................... vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. xiii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...................................................................................................... xiv
LIST OF EQUATIONS ............................................................................................................ xv
PREFACE ............................................................................................................................... xvi

CHAPTER 1. WITHIN EMBARGOED REASON: THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA AND INTERNATIONAL ETHICS IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE’S POST-PANDEMIC PERIOD ................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba .................................................................................... 2
1.3. U.S. Technology .............................................................................................................. 14
1.4. U.S. Technology’s Importance for a Stronger Economy ................................................. 22
1.5. A Stronger Economy’s Importance for Increased Happiness and Maximized Pleasure on Average ................................................................................................................................................. 50
1.6. Conclusion with an Alternative Resolution to Lifting the Embargo at the Current Time $t_n$ ......................................................................................................................................................... 57

CHAPTER 2. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY EDUCATION AND CUBANOMICS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBAN EDUCATION AND CUBAN SUCCESS, BUT FROM A SOCIOECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE AND THE AVERAGE CUBAN’S POINT OF VIEW ................................................................................................................................. 65

2.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 66
2.2. Why Cubans Value Education: An Introduction to Cuban Revolutionary Education ...... 71
2.3. How Cubans Measure Success: “Success” for the Average Cuban ............................... 80
2.4. How Cuban Success Relates to Cuban Revolutionary Education .................................. 89
   2.4.1. Cuban Education Before, Versus Since, the Cuban Revolution ............................... 90
   2.4.2. Cuban Revolutionary Education Versus Education in Spaces with Latinidades Similar to the Cuban Revolutionary Space’s Own Latinidad ................................................................. 99
   2.4.3. Cuban Education Compared in Sum ......................................................................... 102
2.5. Conclusion with Areas for Further Research in This Chapter’s Interdisciplinary Space ........................................................................................................................................................................ 104

CHAPTER 3. CUBA, ACCORDING TO CUBANS: DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY, AND VIABILITY AT THE CURRENT TIME $t_n$ ................................................................................................................................. 107

3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 108
3.2. Desirability, Feasibility, and Viability (DFV) Analysis ......................................................... 109
  3.2.1. D: Desirability .................................................................................................................. 111
  3.2.2. F: Feasibility .................................................................................................................. 122
  3.2.3. V: Viability ...................................................................................................................... 123
  3.2.4. The Latent E: Ethicality ................................................................................................. 125
3.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 127

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 130
FIGURE P.1. THE POINT OF THIS RESEARCH AT THE INTERSECTION OF ECONOMICS, EDUCATION, AND TECHNOLOGY ............................................ xviii

FIGURE 1.1. THE POST-PANDEMIC EQUILIBRIUM, WITH THE PANDEMIC AS PUNCTUATION OBSERVABLE IN HISTORY ........................................ 17

FIGURE 1.2. OE AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING .......................................................................................... 27

FIGURE 1.3. THE HYPOTHEtical POSITIONINGS OF DIFFERENT BUSINESSES AT THE SAME TIME $t_H$, PART 1 OF 2 ........................................ 33

FIGURE 1.4. THE HYPOTHEtical POSITIONINGS OF DIFFERENT BUSINESSES AT THE SAME TIME $t_H$, PART 2 OF 2 ........................................ 35

FIGURE 1.5. CUBA'S ESTIMATED POSITIONING, RELATIVE TO THE U.S.'S OWN, AT THE CURRENT TIME $t_n$ .................................................................................. 41

FIGURE 1.6. CUBA'S ESTIMATED POSITIONING AT THE CURRENT TIME $t_n$ ON THE POST-PANDEMIC EQUILIBRIUM .................................................................. 45

FIGURE 2.1. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION TAUGHT VIA GARCÍANIST ACCIÓN AND IDEAS REVOLUCIONARIAS .................................................. 77

FIGURE 2.2. COVID-19 VACCINES SERVED AT INSTITUTO PREUNIVERSITARIO URBANO EDUARDO GARCÍA LAVANDERO ................................................................................... 88

FIGURE 3.1. INITIAL TARGET AREAS RECOMMENDED WITH THE MOST DIRECT IMPACTS EXPECTED .................................................................................. 113

FIGURE 3.2. FITZPATRICK'S (1968) FAMOUS SILK SCREENING OF GUEVARA .................................................................................. 119

FIGURE 3.3. THE MAXIMUM IMPACT POSSIBLE LOCATED WITHIN THE THREE LENSES' OVERLAPPING AREA OF ETHICALITY ........................................ 127
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

ILLUSTRATION 3.1. AN EXAMPLE OF A CREATIVE WAY TO PERFORM DESIRABILITY ASSESSMENT WITHIN A TARGET AREA .............................................118
LIST OF EQUATIONS

EQUATION 1. TERM FREQUENCY–INVERSE DOCUMENT FREQUENCY.............122
PREFACE

Dear Reader:

It is often said that one ought to write what he knows, and so, I have done just that. I began this research by first writing what I already knew, which happens to be found at the heart of Chapter 2. At the heart of Chapter 2 are the Garciénist schools that teach Cuban Revolutionary education. I, then, dared to explore deeper, beyond what I already knew, including in Chapter 2. In my exploring the depths of the unknown, it has felt as though I might drown at times, but I have nevertheless persisted and my knowledge has expanded manyfold for it, as evidenced by Chapters 1 and 3, which expand out from the heart of Chapter 2.

However, you may be wondering how I already knew about the Garciénist schools that teach Cuban Revolutionary education. That is a fair ask. Let us zoom in on the Garciénist schools, as Cuban Revolutionary education is a concept that I only coined during my time at Cornell University and is more evidence of how my knowledge has expanded, even in Chapter 2. As you will undoubtedly discover in Chapter 2’s exploration of Cuban education, Garciénist schools are named after the late Eduardo García Lavandero, a man often considered a Cuban Revolutionary War hero and patriotic martyr on the island. García Lavandero is my great-uncle, my tío abuelo.

Still, I have sought to remain as unbiased as possible in this research, despite my rather unique familial ties to not only Cuba, but also the Cuban Revolution. I believe that I have succeeded in remaining unbiased, as evidenced by the fact that all who have read this research, whether in part or in full, have never supposed my rather unique familial ties, or they have at least never made known to me any such supposition.
Regardless, while seeking to remain unbiased, this is the research for which I ultimately came to Cornell University. I arrived at the University with an interest in global development for not only the greater, but greatest, good—i.e., a good that I have determined to find at the intersection of international development economics and policy (IDE&P) and education and development (E&D), but with technological change running through it. At this intersection of economics, education, and technology, there is the point of this research.

However, this intersection occurs specifically within the U.S.–Cuban foreign affairs space explored throughout this research—i.e., a space that includes, for example, Chapter 1’s U.S. embargo against Cuba (economics); Chapter 2’s Cuban Revolutionary education taught at Garcíaist schools (education); and Chapter 3’s awareness of a lack of U.S. technology needed for optimal development, growth, and opportunity today (technology). See Figure P.1 immediately below for an illustration of where to find the point of this research.

***
Figure P.1

*The Point of this Research at the Intersection of Economics, Education, and Technology*

Note. Figure P.1 illustrates the point of this research, which is found at the complex and multifaceted intersection of IDE&P, E&D, and technological change within the U.S.–Cuban foreign affairs space.

***

Before letting you bravely venture out into the wild unknown of this research, as I once did myself, I would like to let you first know that you will encounter a fair amount of Spanish. If you are unfamiliar with Spanish, I recommend that you attempt to embrace it as part of the unknown. If you are already familiar with Spanish, you may question my translations, but I have done my best to try for cross-cultural translation over direct, or literal, translation. I favor cross-cultural
translation because I believe that a language exists for the language’s people to express the people’s own culture. As it seems to me, a direct translation would rudely favor my own use of language and, in turn, my own American culture, instead of the Cuban’s own use of language and, in turn, his own Cuban culture explored herein. Still, not all Spanish is translated in this research, but that which remains untranslated is considered comprehensible (e.g., cognates), even without prior knowledge of the Spanish language and/or how the Cuban uses the Spanish language to express his own culture.

Have fun exploring the unknown and thank you for reading,

Jesse W. Fowler
August 17, 2023
Manasquan, New Jersey
CHAPTER 1

Within Embargoed Reason:
The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and International Ethics in the New Media Age’s Post-Pandemic Period¹

¹ Chapter 1 is adapted from my term paper, “The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: Ethics in the New Media Age,” for Professor Dawn Schrader’s course, “COMM 5300: Ethics in New Media, Technology, and Communication,” taken during the 2023 winter session at Cornell University. Additionally, part of Chapter 1 is borrowed from my other term paper, “The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Cuban Revolutionary Surrealism: What Cuban Surrealists Might Reasonably Say of the Embargo and Its Negative Impact on Cuban Education and Economy Today,” for Professor Kevin Duong’s course, “SHUM 6677: Freud in the Tropics: Psychoanalysis, Surrealism, and Colonialism,” taken during the 2023 spring semester at Cornell University.
1.1. Introduction

This chapter considers the ethics surrounding the U.S. embargo against Cuba (“embargo”). First is a brief introduction to the embargo, with policy explorations from the U.S., Cuban, and international standpoint views (cf. § 1.2). After is further exploration of U.S. technology’s role within more ethical U.S.–Cuban foreign affairs in the future (cf. § 1.3), while focusing on a stronger economy (cf. § 1.4) with increased happiness and maximized pleasure (cf. § 1.5). Last is the conclusion to this chapter (cf. § 1.6). The conclusion includes the introduction to an alternative resolution to lifting the embargo. The alternative resolution is proposed as hypothetically reasonable in the short term, with U.S. subject-matter experts (SMEs) for improved utilization of Americanesque technology in the Cuban classroom and beyond. Chapter 3 further explores the alternative resolution, diving into how it, as a proposition, may be tested as a set of hypotheses, especially from a public-administration perspective that is forward-looking.

1.2. The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba

The embargo is an economic sanctions regime that dates to the Eisenhower administration’s Arms Embargo of 1958, during the Cuban Revolution of 1953–1959 between U.S.-backed then-Dictator Fulgencio Batista and then-Rebel Leader Fidel Castro (Prevost, 2007). Former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ceased arms shipments to Cuba because U.S. arms sales in Cuba at that time would have violated U.S. policy made against such sales in Latin American signatory countries of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, of 1947 (Wiskari, 1958). According to the U.S. Department of State, the Rio Treaty of 1947 states that U.S. arms should not be shipped to “areas where political tensions have developed” with “aggressive purposes” that deny the Treaty’s mutual security agreement for peace in the Americas’ post-World War II space (Wiskari, 1958, p. 1). Less complexly and, perhaps, more
honestly, the U.S. Government desired neither to permit U.S. arms to fall into the hands of the rebel alliance nor, in turn, to assist Castro in his winning wage against U.S.-backed Batista (Morley, 2003). Eisenhower considered Castro, who was politically distant from the U.S., to be a “madman” worthy of U.S.-backed deposition with the help of anti-Castro Cuban exiles trained in Guatemala by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (Pach, 2023, n.p.)—i.e., what eventually led to the U.S. Government’s embarrassing Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, under the Kennedy administration (JFK Library, 2017; John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d.; Stone, 1991).

Regardless of such embarrassment, the economic sanctions regime still continues today, under the Biden administration, despite all other U.S. presidential administrations’ policy changes between the Eisenhower and Biden administrations (Gordon, 2012; Lamrani, 2013). An economic sanctions regime is a policy collective that works toward negative development on the part of a federal government, but in another sovereign nation (Gordon, 2016). For example, the U.S. embargo against Cuba, as an economic sanctions regime, is a policy collective that works toward negative development, especially negative economic development, on the part of the U.S. Government, but in Cuba.

However, with extraterritorial effects, the economic sanctions regime harms not only Cuba’s development. It also harms third-party nations’ developments. As a result, the economic sanctions regime denies the Cuban marketplace all U.S. goods and services exported with economic gain possible, save select foodstuffs and medicines (American Association for World Health, 1997). This ban on U.S. goods and services exported is especially significant during the New Media Age of today, as U.S. technology—like Zoom Video Communications, Inc., its video communications application, Zoom, during the COVID-19 pandemic (Nasdaq, 2023), as
well as OpenAI’s generative artificial intelligence (A.I.) application, ChatGPT, more recently in 2023 (De Witte, 2023), both of which are further explored below—leads and determines what is possible for economic growth and opportunity in the global marketplace of free trade.\(^2\) This is, in part, what it means for the U.S. to be the Leader of the Free World, or the leading nation of the world’s marketplace with free trade, especially technology transfer, between countries and across most global sectors and industries indexed by S&P Dow Jones Indices and referenced by the World Economic Forum (Preston, 2020; Ross, 2020). For example, thanks to Silicon Valley, U.S.-based businesses and their U.S. goods and services comprise 73% of the information-technology sector, which includes Zoom and ChatGPT utilized and utilizable for economic gain and opportunity in sovereign nations throughout the world (Preston, 2020; Ross, 2020).

What is more, while the embargo denies the Cuban marketplace all U.S. trade goods, all third-party nations and their respective multinationals also suffer from an economic tradeoff (Lamrani, 2013). This tradeoff limits reasonable growth and opportunity possible, as well as strategic benefit and potential value added, from economic exchanges with Cuba, that is, if the trade goods are at least 10% associated with the U.S. (e.g., a Toyota automobile made by the Japanese multinational, but either entirely in the U.S.—like the Toyota Highlander, nearly all of which are made in Princeton, Indiana [Toyota USA, 2018]—or partly with U.S. goods [Sanger, 1990]) (A/77/358, 2022; Lamrani, 2013). For example, the U.S. Government fined financial institutions Australia and New Zealand Bank Group, Ltd., (Australia) and Credit Suisse AG (Switzerland) US$5.75M and US$536M, respectively, for conducting Cuban transactions in the U.S. dollar, a U.S. good with obvious economic gain possible (Office of Foreign Assets Control,

\(^2\) Associated with the Digital Revolution, the New Media Age of today, in very brief, is based on “a high-tech global economy” with new-media/Web 2.0, communications, computer, and information technology utilized, and experiences a shift with each evolution of such technology utilized (Sehovic, 2017, n.p.), as characterized by the outward-shifting post-pandemic productivity frontier illustrated in Figure 1.6 below.
2009a; Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2009b). For another example closer to home, Cuban citizens are not permitted to dine at McDonald’s restaurants, a U.S. multinational that provides U.S. goods and services, where the goods are served foodstuffs that the U.S. Government does not directly export to the Cuban citizenry (Griffith, 1995/2003; Prieto, 2012).

According to the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly’s most recent resolution available for the embargo, A/RES/77/7 (2022), such policymaking is U.S. behavior that the U.N. deems unethical and that 98.396% (=184/187) of voting third-party nations, or 96.335% (=184/191) of all third-party nations, democratically condemn in U.N. draft resolution A/77/L.5’s (2022) vote count for policy adoption as resolution, citing violation of international law that permits, among other allowances, free trade and technology transfer between sovereign nations in the global marketplace (A/77/358, 2022; Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, 2022; United Nations, 2022). Nonintervention and noninterference in other sovereign nations’ affairs, including Cuba’s economic affairs, remain normative for sovereign equality between U.N. member states (A/77/358, 2022; Carothers, 1999). In foreign affairs, sovereign equality is a fundamental principle of international law. It declares that all U.N. member states remain unsubordinated to one another in a sustainable and post-neocolonial future that encourages development, including economic development, between, but also within, each sovereign nation, including the U.S. and Cuba (Koskenniemi & Kari, 2020).

Such is the U.N.’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (A/RES/2625(XXV)), or, for short, the Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970 (cf. Mani, 1979). The Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970 echoes U.S. foreign policy, including former U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 10924 (1961) for global development
and friendly relations between sovereign nations, but on the part of the U.S. Government, via the Peace Corps Act of 1961 (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2021). The Peace Corps Act of 1961 was introduced and passed “[t]o provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower,” such that, as the Leader of the Free World, the U.S.’s behavior might be appropriately exampled for other sovereign nations to follow with mutual agreement between countries for peace in the post-World War II space (cf. Footnote 17 below) (Peace Corps, 2009).

Despite what the above U.S. law—and the international law that isomorphically mimics the U.S. law with Kennedyan behavior—affirms is ethical foreign-relations behavior, the U.S. Government still considers ethical its antonymous economic sanctions regime. There is one main reason for this consideration: While seeking to bend the communist Cuban Government (“Havana”) to “Washington’s will [for a neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics in Cuba]” by starving the fellow sovereign nation of key resources needed for economic development over time (LeoGrande, 2015, p. 939), the economic sanctions regime still permits Cuban citizens’ access to select U.S. foodstuffs and medicines, consumer staples that the U.S. Government directly exports to Cuba. That is, while the U.S. Government intends to neglect the Cuban Government of what used to be 70% of its exports and 76% of its imports, all between the U.S. and Cuba (Warner, 1999), the U.S. Government does not also intend to neglect the Cuban citizenry of quality life, at least within embargoed reason.

For example, in 2022, the U.S. Government exported “freely” (i.e., at the U.S. taxpayers’ expense) to the Cuban citizenry—not to the Cuban Government—the following top 10 U.S. foodstuffs, according to the Agricultural Trade Office’s (2023) data recorded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agriculture Service:
(1) US$295.83M in poultry meat and products, excluding eggs;
(2) US$11.09M in soybeans;
(3) US$8.22M in corn;
(4) US$957,855 in nonalcoholic beverages, excluding juices;
(5) US$379,680 in beef and beef products;
(6) US$349,291 in rice;
(7) US$263,279 in beer;
(8) US$259,531 in baked goods; and
(9) US$225,299 in condiments and sauces; as well as an additional
(10) US$323,335 in other consumer-oriented foodstuffs.

Therefore, in 2022, the U.S. Government exported to the Cuban citizenry a total value of US$317,368,270 for the top 10 U.S. foodstuffs (Agricultural Trade Office, 2023), which is up from US$298,551,147 in 2021 (+6.303%) (Agricultural Trade Office, 2022). However, including all other U.S. foodstuffs, not only the top 10, exported to the Cuban citizenry in 2022, the total value increases from US$317,368,270 up to a rounded US$319.53M (+0.681%) (Agricultural Trade Office, 2023), which is itself +6.941% to the year prior with a rounded US$298.79M in 2021 (Agricultural Trade Office, 2022).

For another example, incumbent U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., has expressed his willingness to send to Cuba the U.S.’s COVID-19 vaccines, if and only if the Cuban Government is not the one to give the U.S. vaccines to the Cuban citizenry, such that, as with the above foodstuffs, the citizenry do not associate the vaccines with Havanese communism, but with Washingtonian neoliberalism and capitalist socioeconomics (Walsh, 2021). During such a turbulent time of peri-pandemic chaos in 2021, the Cuban Government rejected the U.S. vaccines
on this condition that encourages further chaos in Cuba and that denies the Cuban Government’s ability to participate in its own sovereign personhood, which the U.N. recognizes via sovereign equality (Gámez Torres, 2021). Still, in 2021, the Cuban citizenry echoed its desire for increased happiness and maximized pleasure from the U.S. vaccines offered, with simultaneously reduced harm from COVID-19 (de Córdoba, 2021a; de Córdoba, 2021b). Such is an example of how the U.S. Government historically desires to bend Havana to Washington’s will: by identifying the island’s medicine shortage of a consumer staple at the then-current time $t_{2021}$ rife with turbulence, with growing division between the Cuban Government and citizenry (e.g., via public protests in Havana) because the Cuban Government rejected the U.S. Government’s egoist condition, while, at the same time $t_{2021}$, only 30% of Cubans were immunized to harm from COVID-19 (Walsh, 2021).³⁴

Therefore, the U.S. Government expresses ethical egoism, regarding its desire to bend

³ Herein, time $t_{2021}$ is the 2,021st year of the Common Era (CE). Time $t$ subscript any number is the year CE considered in context. If the time is $t_n$, then the year is the current, or $n^{th}$, year CE, which, depending upon the context, is either the specific year of this writing (i.e., 2023 CE) or the general year of the reading. Such an expression of time is especially beneficial when using Baumgartner et al.’s (2018) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory in this chapter (cf. Figures 1.1 and 1.6 below).

⁴ The Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba (MEDICC) is a U.S.-based nonprofit organization that works to improve health equity by preventing medical and public-health information asymmetries between the U.S., Cuba, and global citizens elsewhere who suffer from medical and public-health issues (MEDICC, n.d.; MEDICC, 2009). As of 2022, MEDICC noteworthy reports that Cuba has produced and deployed its own COVID-19 vaccines, with an efficacy rate greater than 95% (MEDICC, 2022). Further, at the same time $t_{2022}$, Cuba had vaccinated 90% of the Cuban citizenry (up from the aforementioned 30% at time $t_{2021}$), including 97.5% of children older than two years, whereas the rest of the global citizenry, including the U.S. citizenry, had remained at only 60% vaccinated (MEDICC, 2022). Put another way, at the same time $t_{2022}$, Cuba experienced zero COVID-related deaths per day, whereas the rest of the world experienced 1,874 COVID-related deaths per day (MEDICC, 2022). Such data are facts that are not only supported by Harvard University (Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, 2022), but that also aptly introduce the notion that the U.S. Government’s unwillingness to cooperate directly with the Cuban Government creates more possible harm for the U.S. citizenry it serves than the Cuban Government it intends to bend. With normalized relations, fewer U.S. citizens might have lost their pre-pandemic qualities of life, that is, with the Cuban Government’s assistance as a Kennedyan friend against COVID-19.
Havana to Washington’s will, but also conditional utilitarianism, regarding Cuban citizens’ access to select U.S. foodstuffs and medicines. Ethical egoism has to do with acting on one’s own self-interest, regardless of possible consequences for other actors, whether intended or unintended (Regis, 1979). Conditional utilitarianism has to do with acting in a way that benefits as much of the target population as possible with a good state of affairs “no worse than the effects of the alternatives open” (utilitarianism) (Lyons, 1965, p. vii), but only upon a particular condition related to one’s own self-interest expressed through self-justified use of political power to compel (conditional utilitarianism) (Buksiński, 2018).

As a result, the U.S. Government seeks to increase ethical discourse between the Cuban Government and citizenry (e.g., via public protests on the island), but toward the U.S.’s own neocolonial end rife with neoliberal intent (Chomsky, 1999), instead of toward Cuba’s own post-neocolonial end rife with an intent of its own choosing in self-governance sans embargo and extraterritorial effects. For all intents and purposes, such U.S. behavior is the ethical equivalent to the Russian Government’s intended interference in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections (McFaul & Kass, 2019; National Intelligence Council, 2021; S. Rep. No. 116–290, 2020)—as well as the Mexican Government’s threat to interfere in Republicans’ upcoming 2024 U.S. elections with “una campaña de información a los mexicanos que viven y trabajan en Estados Unidos y a todos los hispanos” (Gobierno de México, 2023, 30:13),5 such that the U.S.

5 This is a Spanish quote from incumbent Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador at his March 9, 2023, press conference. Translated to English, López Obrador threatens that the Mexican Government will launch “an information campaign targeted at Mexicans and all other Hispanics who live and work in the U.S.” (translated by me). López Obrador’s threat is against certain U.S. politicians who want the U.S. Government to intervene in Mexican affairs by sending the U.S. military to combat the Mexican cartels in sovereign Mexico, a U.N. member state, and without authority granted by the Mexican Government entitled to self-governance (Gobierno de México, 2023). Whether consciously or subconsciously, such is the Mexican Government’s way of isomorphically mimicking the U.S.’s embargo behavior, which acts as legally unreasonable precedent for interventionist strategy that interferes with U.S. domestic affairs (cf. below). Instead of intending to grow division between the Cuban Government and citizenry, which is
citizenry might not reelect certain incumbent Republicans, like Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-TX), who currently propose that the U.S. Government challenge Mexican sovereignty with uncooperative U.S. warfare against Mexican cartels on Mexican territory (Reuters, 2023)—both of which are actions that the U.S. Government hypocritically condemns because such Russian and Mexican behaviors favor Russia’s and Mexico’s own ends, while also denying the U.S. its sovereign equality and self-governance at past and future times $t_{2016}$ (Russia), $t_{2020}$ (Russia), and $t_{2024}$ (Mexico). Still, through increased ethical discourse toward the U.S.’s own end, the U.S. Government inappropriately hopes that the Cuban Government might engage in self-reflection with an ethical awareness that favors an anti-communist and a pro-neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics in Cuba, like in the U.S.

However, the Cuban Government does not consider ethical the U.S.’s behavior and economic sanctions regime because, at the regime’s core, it denies Cuba its own sovereign personhood that is legally granted to all sovereign nations with sovereign equality in the post-World War II space rife with international human rights for peace (Hernández-Truyol, 2009). Cuba has its own character independent of the U.S.’s—and all other sovereign nations’—own character. With Cuba’s own sovereign personhood and character also come the sovereign nation’s own moral norms and autonomy, including moral autonomy, exercised through self-governance (Skorupski, 2010).

That is, in its sovereign personhood within sovereign equality, the U.S. ought to permit Cuba to freely and independently exercise its own ethical relativism, while creating its own moral standards with the Cuban citizenry’s approval of Cuban, not U.S., policymaking. Also, the what the U.S. Government intends to do for a Cuban Government kneeling before it, the Mexican Government instead intends to grow division between the U.S. Government and citizenry, but toward Mexico’s own end. See, also, González (2023) and Presidencia de la República (2023).
U.S. ought to permit Cuba to exercise its own autonomy, including moral autonomy, such that Cuba might self-govern without U.S. interventionist strategy in Cuban economic (and other) affairs, and such that Cuba might make sense of the world through foreign relations with third-party nations that can negotiate without U.S. policymaking’s extraterritorial effects. While encouraging the aforementioned government–citizenry division in Cuba, U.S. policymaking and its extraterritorial effects currently prevent Cuban normative ethics for Cuba’s own and self-determined morally right and wrong ways to conduct economic affairs with other sovereign nations in the global marketplace (e.g., the aforementioned Australia, Japan, and Switzerland).

In protection of Cuba’s sovereign personhood—as well as in protection of all other sovereign nations’ respective personhoods from legally unreasonable and internationally condemned U.S. precedent that may illegally excuse another nation’s behavior (e.g., Russia’s) to intervene in and interfere with other sovereign nations’ economic (e.g., Ukraine’s [Hanlon et al., 2022; Menon, 2022]) and other (e.g., the U.S.’s domestic [elections]) affairs (Chand & Stilwell, 2023)—the U.N. affirms that the embargo is unethical (A/RES/77/7, 2022). For example, in isomorphically mimicking the Peace Corps Act of 1961, the Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970 encourages global development, including economic development, and friendly relations between sovereign nations, including the U.S. and Cuba, through economic affairs that work toward a sustainable and post-neocolonial future in the post-pandemic period.6 As discussed

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6 Regardless of (1) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (2023b) declaring an end to the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S., and (2) the World Health Organization’s (2023) declaring an end to the same pandemic, but globally, this chapter nevertheless argues the following: The current time \( t_n \) is the “post-pandemic period” because, while the COVID-19 virus still exists, similar to how the influenza still exists, sociocultural indicators of a pandemic have ceased (e.g., social distancing at large), such that, “[i]n general, [even the] Chinese people [who suffered first and, therefore, the longest from COVID-19 and the pandemic] are moving on with their lives” in a new, post-pandemic normalcy (“Death and Denial,” 2023, p. 37). In this post-pandemic normalcy, the world observes a general shift in global politics, which focuses on economic recovery from the peri-pandemic Great Lockdown of 2020 (cf. below) (“The
below, U.S. technology may play an important role toward this ethical end for economic growth and opportunity that the U.N. policy supports, but within the Cuban Government’s own reasoning, not within embargoed reason made through U.S. policy.

That is, the U.S. Government ought to care about its own behavior and economic sanctions regime because, as determined by nearly all other U.N. member states with sovereign equality (A/RES/77/7, 2022), such behavior and policymaking set an unethical, a legally

Tsunami,” 2023). The private sector, according to Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jamie Dimon (2023) of JPMorgan Chase, agrees with the public sector’s shift in focus for a new world order:

Nevertheless, [at the current time $t_n$] this is the moment when we should put aside our differences […] to come together in defense of […] enterprise [without, for example, embargoed reason] […] with other countries around the globe, unite[d] for a [post-pandemic] common cause [of economic recovery]. (n.p.)

Regardless, in the post-pandemic period, global development is politically considered for economic recovery from peri-pandemic issues (e.g., in China) (“The Tsunami,” 2023).

While such economic recovery focuses on a top-down approach according to bottom-up needs at the local level (“The Tsunami,” 2023), what is more noteworthy is that, on the international stage, the global development politically considered disagrees with the U.S. Government’s economic sanctions regime for negative economic development in Cuba. Still, the economic sanctions regime is further inappropriate in the post-pandemic period because of its focus on a top-down approach without bottom-up data to support the approach. This notion relates to the U.S.’s ethical egoism, desiring to bend Havana to Washington’s will. At the current time $t_n$, the economic sanctions regime’s inappropriate behavior in the post-pandemic period is well-highlighted by the fact that, first and foremost, the local level in Cuba seeks better economic, not political, conditions, according to bottom-up data that the Cuban Government considers with “a little more space in the [highly nationalized, mixed command] economy for the private sector” (Birke, 2022, p. 40): “In 2023 economic hardship [from peri-pandemic issues], not political freedom [which the U.S. Government presupposes without collecting and analyzing the appropriate bottom-up data from the peri- and post-pandemic periods in Cuba], is likely to be at the forefront of the [average] Cuban mind [at the local level],” according to the Economist (Birke, 2022, p. 40).

In fact, in the post-pandemic period, even the Chinese Government, the U.S. Government’s greatest competitor at the current time $t_n$ (“It’s Worse Than You Think,” 2023), extends “even to America” an olive branch that “cherish[es] peace and development and value[s] [public-sector] friends and [private-sector] partners [for the global economy],” according to incumbent Chinese President Xi Jinping (“Data, Diplomacy and Disease,” 2023, p. 35). President Xi appears to be focused on local-level data collected within China, though this news should be taken with a grain of salt because the Chinese Government’s within-country data may be misleading, given President Xi’s recent history with “exerting new extraterritorial power over global data flows” (Pottinger & Feith, 2021, n.p.), which is a Chinese behavior that might unintendedly consider the economic sanctions regime’s extraterritorial effects as acceptable precedent to indirectly intervene in and interfere with other sovereign nations’ affairs, even if the U.S. behavior is already internationally condemned, including by China (GA/12465, 2022). Such is the nature of ethical egoism, even if President Xi does “promote the [global] development of an open world economy […] so as to add more stability [during the stasis of the post-pandemic equilibrium {cf. Figures 1.1 and 1.6 below}]” (Xi, 2023, n.p.).
unreasonable, and an internationally condemned precedent, while also harming the U.S.’s own economic development without improved economic affairs for growth and opportunity via Cuban utilization of U.S. technology in the New Media Age’s post-pandemic period (e.g., video communication through utilization of Zoom) (Leyva De Varona, 1994).7

The U.S. Government also ought to care because such behavior and policymaking run counter to U.S. legal norm via Executive Order 10924 (1961) and the Peace Corps Act of 1961. To boot, Father of Public Administration and former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who served in the Oval Office before Eisenhower and his administration’s foundational Arms Embargo of 1958, first established the U.S.’s moral norm for noninterventionist strategy in foreign affairs, which the U.N. echoes today (Lamrani, 2013). In 1916, Wilson ethically reaffirmed the foreign-affairs principle that the U.N. echoes today and that had been previously affirmed at the London Naval Conference of 1908–1909:

The United States does not recognize the right of any foreign power [including the U.S.] to impose barriers to the exercise of the commercial [and economic] rights of any non-interested nations, by using the blockage [or bloqueo, what Cubans call the embargo] when there is no time [or reasonable threat] of war [as with post-Cold War Cuba {Defense Intelligence Agency et al., 1997; Kramer, 2013}]. (Chapman, 2018, p. 34)

In fact, the U.S. has never been in a time of war with Cuba, “including the military intervention in the island in 1898,” during the Spanish-American War, “because the enemy at that time was Spain” (Lamrani, 2013, p. 56), nor has there ever been a reasonable threat of war with Cuba, including the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, during the Cold War, because the enemy at that other time was the Soviet Union, while Cuba remained elsewhere in foreign-affairs limbo between the two Cold War adversaries (Sherwin, 2012). What is more, according to declassified correspondence internal to the U.S. Department of State, “[former Cuban President Fidel] Castro

7 Per regulatory reasons related to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (2023) list of sanctioned nations, Cuba is unpermitted access to Zoom (Zoom Support, 2022).
[had] professe[d] an admiration for the American ‘people’ and a desire for good [U.S.–Cuban foreign] relations” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959–1960/2003, p. 530). Still, an argument may be made that Cuba has been in a time of war with the U.S., especially during the aforementioned Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, which, as a plot twist, would have rather anomalously given Cuba the right to embargo the U.S. at that time.

1.3. U.S. Technology

While it may yet be too soon to say definitively that the COVID-19 pandemic (“pandemic”) behaves as punctuation for a new equilibrium of stability and stasis, the consensus seems to trend toward the idea that it is, or rather will be recognized one day as, a crisis punctuated in history (e.g., Hogan et al., 2022; Marsden & Docherty, 2021). Still, a fair counterargument may be made that, together with the Great Recession of 2007, the pandemic, largely because of its significant and global economic impact with the Great Lockdown of 2020, is dual-punctuation, where the pre-pandemic Great Recession might behave as a foreshock to the later earthquake of a peri-pandemic Great Lockdown (Gopinath, 2020).

Regardless, within reason, this chapter argues that the pandemic may become an observable moment in history, when, in some years’ time, 20/20 hindsight shows that (1) this moment incrementally builds upon past moments, and (2) this change leads toward a new status quo for a post-pandemic quality of life dependent upon, among other artifacts but especially, U.S. technology, like Zoom and ChatGPT (Baumgartner et al., 2018).

While in favor of Baumgartner et al.’s (2018) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, this chapter reasons that the new status quo may be strengthened by post-pandemic U.S. policy change, that is, by lifting the embargo today. With this policy change for a new status quo in U.S. foreign affairs and in U.S. behavior toward Cuba, the average Cuban citizen’s quality of life
should increase with more economic growth and opportunity possible in the post-pandemic period. As explored below, with more economic growth and opportunity possible in the post-pandemic period, the average Cuban citizen may experience a “higher level[.] of overall happiness [with maximized pleasure]” (Sotgiu, 2016, p. 85).

For example, an equal and a deontological approach might add to Cuba’s overall net happiness and maximize Cuban pleasure, such as through improved education with utilization of U.S. technology. Deontologically, post pandemic U.S. policy change ought to morally prescribe an obligation on the part of the U.S. Government, similar to Executive Order 10924 (1961) and the Peace Corps Act of 1961 (Cortina, 2022). These two U.S. policies morally prescribe an obligation for the U.S. Government to help other interested sovereign nations to become more developed, including economically, in the post-World War II space, which now includes the post-pandemic space (cf. Figure 1.1 below). World War II, especially at its end, is prior punctuation that led to the establishment of a prior status quo on a prior equilibrium with reduced harm to the average quality of life considered—i.e., an average quality of life still intended to be improved by these two U.S. policies made for peace in the post-World War II, and now also post-pandemic, space.

That is, U.S. policy was made to prevent possible harm from a hypothetical World War III at the hands of a world leader akin to former German Führer und Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler, especially a Cold War communist, like Castro, whom the U.S. Government claims behaved as a “madman” against the same or similar U.S. legal and moral norms that Hitler disregarded (Pach, 2023, n.p.). However, such U.S. legal and moral norms are the same legal and moral norms that have helped to shape Wilsonian international law, including law that ironically prohibits interventionist strategy via a legally unreasonable embargo against a fellow nation with
sovereign equality recognized by the U.N. (e.g., the Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970) (Cobbs, 1996; Pérez, 2002).

For the post-pandemic period, the pandemic, like World War II for the post-World War II period, may reasonably behave as punctuation that leads to the establishment of a new status quo on a new equilibrium—i.e., an even newer status quo with further reduced harm to the average quality of life considered, including the Cuban’s, because, as Biden affirms as the Leader of the Free World:

We’re all in this together [as Wilsonian friends at war with not one another, but the pandemic, including pandemic-related, or peri-pandemic, issues that prevent global, especially economic, development at the current time $t_n$, like the Great Lockdown of 2020 {World Bank Group, 2022}]. (Reuters, 2020, 4:36)

That is, post-pandemic U.S. policy change should duly war against and blockade the pandemic, not other sovereign nations without due reason. It should prevent U.S. (and other) behavior that runs counter to the legal and moral norms of Kantian deontology and hedonistic utilitarianism found in Executive Order 10924 (1961), the Peace Corps Act of 1961, and the Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970. Kantian deontology has to do with an agent’s behaving “for the sake of obligation” to create a change for the greater good, as in the international space of the post-World War II, and now also post-pandemic, period (emphasis omitted) (Donaldson, 1992, p. 137). Hedonistic utilitarianism has to do with performing an act—including a political act, like the Peace Corps Act of 1961—“if and only if, and because, it produces at least as much [but ideally more, even if only marginally more] pleasure minus pain as any alternative act available to the agent [at the time],” according to Simon Rosenqvist (2020, pp. 15, 21) of Uppsala Universitet. Regardless, see Figure 1.1 immediately below for the new, post-pandemic equilibrium’s general location within 20th- and 21st-century world history.

* * *
Figure 1.1

The Post-Pandemic Equilibrium, with the Pandemic as Punctuation Observable in History
Note. Figure 1.1 illustrates the pandemic’s punctuation, followed by the post-pandemic equilibrium with a new, Bidenian status quo of Wilsonian affirmation.

* * *

Post-pandemic U.S. policy change should deontologically respect Cuba’s autonomy and rationality to behave within its own normative ethics for morally right and wrong ways to conduct economic affairs with other sovereign nations, including the U.S., at each future time $t$, but beginning at the current time $t_n$. Post-pandemic U.S. policy change should also morally prescribe U.S. obligation for hedonistic utilitarianism in favor of not only the greater, but greatest, good (Cortina, 2022). As reasoned herein, the greatest good is the greatest net happiness with maximized pleasure possible for the greatest number of people considered, especially Cubans, but also Americans and third-party nationals, who, on average, currently experience unduly increased burden and a lesser quality of life because of the economic sanctions regime and its extraterritorial effects compounded by the pandemic and peri-pandemic issues. In this way toward Kantian deontology and hedonistic utilitarianism, post-pandemic U.S. policy change should (1) abolish the U.S. Government’s ethical egoism, regarding its desire to bend Havana to Washington’s will, and (2) make unconditional the aforementioned conditional utilitarianism.

With less ethical egoism, post-pandemic U.S. policy change should encourage improved dialogical ethics between the U.S. and Cuban Governments, as formerly witnessed during the Obama administration. In 2016, then-U.S. President Barrack H. Obama famously met with then-Cuban President Raúl Castro (The Obama White House, 2016). This meeting was an honest sign of Kennedyan friendship intended between the U.S. and Cuba at past time $t_{2016}$, and it remains a positive sign of the times—i.e., an honest reminder that, as the incumbent U.S. president, Obama’s then-Vice President Biden has appropriate precedential behavior to follow for
diplomatic relations at the current time $t_n$ with incumbent Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel.

Regardless, through improved ethical discourse between the two federal governments, post-pandemic U.S. policy change may prescribe an obligatory approach for the U.S. to reduce harm from the aforementioned, worsened division between the Cuban Government and citizenry—i.e., the division encouraged by, for example, the above medicine shortage compounded by the Cuban citizenry’s peri-pandemic fear of harm from COVID-19. With ethical awareness of its own role in the worsened government–citizenry division, the U.S. Government should enter into intergovernmental dialogue with the Cuban Government, in order to work together as two federal governments concerned with prescriptive morality. Prescriptive morality has to do with “positive outcomes” from government, but for value added to the citizenry, where government behaves as an agent of change with “positive behaviors [or political acts]” because of its “positive obligations […] to proactively [and strategically] regulate and promote […] benefit[t] [across society and according to what society desires, or prescribes for itself, from its government at the time]” (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009, pp. 531, 532, 535).

With special attention given to prescriptive morality, the Cuban Government may help the U.S. Government to ascertain (1) how to reduce harm to the average Cuban’s quality of life in the new, post-pandemic status quo of being “all in this together” as Bidenian comrades at war against the pandemic and not each other (e.g., unconditional utilitarianism that would have permitted the Cuban Government to supply the U.S. vaccines to the Cuban citizenry when demanded), as well as (2) how to identify and prevent future U.S. (and other) behavior that runs counter to the U.S. legal and moral norms found in international law’s Kantian deontology and hedonistic utilitarianism for Wilsonian foreign affairs between Kennedyan friends in favor of Bidenian global development in the post-pandemic period.
In the New Media Age’s post-pandemic period rife with U.S. technology (e.g., Zoom), post-pandemic U.S. policy change should permit Cuban utilization of not only U.S. foodstuffs and medicines, but also U.S. technology, assuming initial Cuban agreement in the intergovernmental dialogue for discourse ethics. When looking at, for example, Zoom’s share price history across time, ascertainable is U.S. technology’s valued importance for success in the post-pandemic period. On March 13, 2020, when the Trump administration “declare[d] a nationwide emergency” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2023a, n.p.), Zoom’s share price was at US$107.47 (Aboulezz, 2021). At its peri-pandemic peak, Zoom’s share price was instead at US$559.00 (+420.145%) on October 16, 2020 (Nasdaq, 2023). Still, Zoom’s share price has since decreased with less pandemic influence in the post-pandemic period (e.g., fewer schoolchildren needing to learn from home [Camera, 2021]). As of January 13, 2023, the most recently archived share price is US$69.49, which might seem like a large loss, but the share price is still +US$7.49 (+12.08%) over a five-year market summary that includes pre-, peri-, and post-pandemic data (Nasdaq, 2023). In other words, because of less demand out of necessity at the current time \( t_n \) of the post-pandemic period, the value of Zoom is trending less upward than it was during the pandemic, but still upward in the big picture because of the former demand out of necessity.

While the global citizenry utilized U.S. technology, as exampled through Zoom’s share price history, during the peri-pandemic moral development of a new status quo, post-pandemic utilization of U.S. technology has remained important for the citizenry’s average quality of life on the new equilibrium. That is, as evidenced by Zoom’s 383% increase in value added during the pandemic (>US$100B), meeting participants have increased by 2,900%, with 213,000 enterprise customers now communicating through Zoom (Iqbal, 2023). In these numbers of
Zoom’s growth (i.e., from US$0.33B in 2018 up to US$4.39B in 2022 \([+1,230.3\%]\) for annual revenue over five years’ time [Iqbal, 2023]), opportunity exists for businesses and schools, both of whom continue to take the opportunity to improve either their own growth rates (businesses) or the economy (schools) (Morson, 2022; Pelosi, 2021; Swaminathan & Wade, 2020).

For example, worldwide, greater than 50% of Fortune 500 companies (>250), 70% of Fortune 100 companies (=70), and 85% of Forbes Cloud 100 companies (=85) all now utilize Zoom because of the pandemic of a punctuation’s new, post-pandemic equilibrium (Pelosi, 2021). That is, Zoom was not utilized as significantly in the pre-pandemic period as now. Regardless, noteworthy is that these businesses include multinationals burdened by the embargo and extraterritorial effects.

Similarly, 88% of the 25 largest U.S. K-12 school districts (=22), 92% of the top 50 global universities (=46), and 98% of the top 50 U.S. universities (=49) now utilize Zoom to communicate and learn at the current time \(t_n\), but beginning during the peri-pandemic period (Pelosi, 2021). For example, in Professor N’Dri Thérèse Assié-Lumumba’s course, “GDEV 6770: Seminar on Issues in African Development,” at Cornell University, which I took during the fall 2022 semester, Cornell University (U.S.) and the University of Ghana (Ghana) efficiently collaborated together in real time, as global universities with shared access to Zoom because of initial demand out of necessity during the pandemic. Without access to U.S. technology, like Zoom, Cuban students cannot be reasonably expected to learn—including from others (e.g., those at Cornell University and the University of Ghana) who might already have an idea of—how to help Cuba to perform like the other sovereign nations that are already able to utilize U.S. technology without embargoed reason on the new, post-pandemic equilibrium (e.g., Ghana). Cuba remains unable to perform on a level playing field, which is unethical without due cause.
For this reason of economic growth and opportunity possible with business’ and schools’ shared utilization of U.S. technology exampled by, but not limited to, poster child Zoom (cf. below for more information), post-pandemic U.S. policy change should prescribe ethical discourse between the U.S. and Cuban Governments, so that the two federal governments might agree in peaceful unison how to best strengthen the Cuban and global economies with future utilization of U.S. technology that the economic sanctions regime currently and unduly prohibits. That is, at Cuba’s discretion, post-pandemic U.S. policy change ought to obligate the U.S. Government to assist Cuba in how to join the U.S. and other sovereign nations already coexisting with economic growth and opportunity possible on the post-pandemic equilibrium largely powered by Zoom and other U.S. technology—like ChatGPT, another poster child discussed more below—but toward Cuba’s own strategic end (Cortina, 2022).

1.4. U.S. Technology’s Importance for a Stronger Economy

Taking from § 1.3’s above example of businesses that continue to take the opportunity to improve their own growth rates, for consistency’s sake, this section continues with the example of Zoom. Regarding Big Business, but also small and medium-sized enterprises, the return on investment (ROI) for Zoom is 261% “for a composite model organization with a payback in less than six months” (Morris, 2022, n.p.). A 261% ROI means that, for every US$1.00 invested in utilization of Zoom, the business receives a returned amount of US$3.61 (=(US$1.00×261%)+US$1.00) for a net gain of +US$2.61 (=US$3.61−US$1.00) within the payback period (Birken, 2022). Additionally, the business receives (1) a weekly gain of +52 minutes of employee efficiency per employee, (2) a sales-cycle gain of +70% of employee effectiveness for time-to-value of sales, and (3) reduced redundancy for operational effectiveness (OE) that saves the business up to millions of U.S. dollars per fiscal year (i.e., at each yearly time
In global strategy, OE is a management tool that focuses on a business’s ideal efficiency to operate, with the business’s own limited resources (i.e., inputs) available to it at the time, similar activities (i.e., outputs) better than, or at least as well as, its competitors with their own limited resources available to them at the same time, according to Bishop William Lawrence University Professor Michael E. Porter (1996) of Harvard Business School. The total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for a business’s resource utilization determines its respective level of OE possible—and, in turn, its strategic positioning (“positioning”) possible, wherefrom it performs its strategy—at any given time (Marks, 2022; Miller & Ross, 2003).

Resources are human (e.g., an analyst), tangible (e.g., a computer), and intangible (e.g., image) (ADP, 2023; Berman et al., 2020; Kennedy, 2020; Perry, 2021), which is to say that they are “any factor that’s necessary to accomplish a goal or carry out an activity” (Koehler, 2019, n.p.). Quantity has to do with the limited number of different resources available and accessible for the business to utilize for as much gain as possible at the time (North Dakota State University Agriculture Law and Management, n.d.). How limited the number is depends upon the total amount of resources available for businesses in the marketplace and accessible for the given business at the time (Rai, 2015). A business with access to, say, 87 of the 100 different resources available in the marketplace at the time would have a current limit of 87/100 different resources available for resource utilization, unless the business can somehow gain access to more of the 100 different resources available. Therefore, 87/100 would be the business’s total quantity at the time.

Quality has to do with the levels of advancement and modernity of the quantity available and accessible for the business to utilize toward the gain possible at the time (Carpintero et al.,
2021). How limited the quality is depends upon the quantity’s ability to become more advanced and more modern. The more limited, or more advanced (i.e., of a higher quality, especially technologically), a quantity’s quality is, the more modern it is (Palmer, 2021). There is more of a limit on how more advanced and more modern it may become. Generally speaking, a higher total quantity and quality is preferred over a lower total quantity and quality because that which is “higher” provides a greater ability for gain, or developmental improvement, toward one’s own strategic end.

For example, for whatever reason, assume that a business must compute statistical analyses. For this assumed business, a lower total quantity and quality might include one piece of chalk for resource utilization, such that an employee computes the statistical analyses by hand, which, while fun, can be time-consuming work, to which I can personally attest. On the other hand, a higher total quantity and quality might include resource utilization of a programming language for statistical computing, like R, as well as a trained analyst to utilize R for less time-consuming, or more efficient and more productive, work, to which I can also personally attest.

Regardless, as its OE possible becomes greater with an increase in the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for resource utilization over time, the business becomes better able to improve its positioning possible for its own strategy, that is, toward its own strategic end. With this improved positioning possible, the business may better execute its strategy from a greater positioning with more benefit and more value (i.e., outcomes) addable because of the greater OE possible from the higher total quantity and quality at time \( t_n \), that is, when compared to the same business’s lesser positioning possible with less benefit and less value addable because of a lesser OE possible from a lower total quantity and quality at time \( t_{(n-1)} \).

Still, efficiency involves getting as much gain, or ROI, as possible from the business’s
limited resources available for a higher-quality and more developed product, or deliverable, that is producible because of the resource utilization over time (Daniel Elfenbein, 2014; Porter, 1996). This gain incrementally increases in time, as the positioning possible becomes incrementally greater with each increase in the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for (1) resource utilization and, ultimately, (2) strategic benefit and potential value addable from the business’s positioning afforded by its level of OE possible (Porter, 1996).

Further, while OE involves the business’s ideally performing similar activities better than, or at least as well as, its competitors, strategic positioning involves the same business’s performing different activities than its competitors’, but with the limited resources available at the time (Porter, 1996). From the positioning afforded by the level of OE possible, a business may perform its strategy, which is to say that the business may utilize its limited resources available at the time, but toward its own end for strategic benefit and potential value added over time. With ability to utilize more and higher-quality resources available at the time, greater OE helps the business to get into a greater positioning closer to, and ideally along, the productivity, or efficiency, frontier. As discussed below, along the productivity frontier is where best practice is achieved (Porter, 1996), as resource quantity reaches, say, 100/100, instead of the above 87/100, and the quantity’s quality becomes most limited, or most unable to become more advanced and more modern at the current time $t_n$.

That is, in its improved positioning gained from greater OE, the business can uniquely utilize the limited resources newly available to it for more strategic benefit toward its own end with potential value added for the business, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to its customer base, or target population. Benefit and value involve not only the product delivered, but also the deliverable’s level of quality on average, as well as how timely the product is delivered
to the target population with that average level of quality sustained and with a quantity that meets the target population’s demand over time (Porter, 1996). The total amounts of benefit and value addable depend upon (1) the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for resource utilization at the time, (2) the same business’s level of OE possible at the same time because of the total quantity and quality, and (3) the business’s positioning possible along that level of OE possible. In other words, as illustrated on Figure 1.2’s graph immediately below, a business’s OE occurs between point (0,0) and the productivity frontier, while its strategy is performed from the positioning afforded at any point chosen along the leveled distance given from the origin at point (0,0), but between the $x$- and $y$-axes and never beyond the productivity frontier at the current time $t_n$ (Daniel Elfenbein, 2014). The $x$- and $y$-axes are, respectively, “[r]elative cost position” and “[n]onprice buyer value delivered,” per Porter (1996, p. 62).

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26
**Figure 1.2**

OE and Strategic Positioning

Note. As stated above, on Figure 1.2’s graph, a business’s OE occurs between point (0,0) and the productivity frontier, while its strategy is performed from the positioning afforded at any point chosen along the leveled distance given from the origin at point (0,0), but between the x- and y-axes and never beyond the productivity frontier at the current time $t_n$ (Daniel Elfenbein,
2014). It may help to think of the “[s]trategic positioning” line as movable, up and down the “OE” line, depending upon the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for greater or lesser OE possible and, in turn, a greater or lesser positioning possible at the time (Daniel Elfenbein, 2014).

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Still, continuous practice of ever-greater OE is especially relevant in the New Media Age of dynamic markets with ever-changing technology—especially U.S. technology, like Zoom—as businesses (1) do not want to remain relatively static and left in the dust without the limited resources newly available for advancement in the marketplace, and (2) need to respond rapidly to and more efficiently mimic competitors who become better able to utilize the newly available technology for an improved market position over time (i.e., “rapid diffusion of best practices” [Porter, 1996, p. 63]). In turn, each business must continuously differentiate itself from its competitors by using strategy, or a relatively unique utilization of the limited resources available to the business in the marketplace at the time, but from the greater positioning newly afforded by the business’s greater (level of) OE possible with the ever-changing technology, ideally at low cost.

That is, in due time, each business must not merely perform similar activities better than, or at least as well as, its competitors. It must utilize its increase in the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available at the time, especially technology as a tangible resource in the New Media Age, to strategically and continuously “perform[] different activities from [competitors’] or perform[] similar activities in different ways [relative to those competitors’]” (emphasis omitted), such that the business can potentially and continuously “deliver greater value to customers or create comparable value at a lower cost [with cost advantage], or do both,”
in its strategic market positioning closer to, and ideally along, the productivity frontier (Porter, 1996, p. 62).

In other words, greater OE—with its improved ability for strategic benefit and potential value added because of strategy performed from a greater positioning gained from the greater OE with the new limited resources available and utilized—helps the business to close the gap between its own performance, or behavior, and the behaviors of competitors, namely those closer to and along the productivity frontier, but ultimately toward the business’s own strategic end (Porter, 1996).

Further, with the ever-changing technology and its utilization, the productivity frontier continuously shifts outward: “The productivity frontier is constantly shifting outward [toward future time \( t_{(n+1)} \)] as new technologies […] are developed and as [these] new inputs become available [for resource utilization]” (Porter, 1996, p. 62). Therefore, OE must be continuously improved, as the outward-facing curve of a frontier continuously shifts with each introduction of the ever-changing technology available for resource utilization in the marketplace and across that marketplace’s time, that is, in order for the business to sustain and improve its relative positioning for long-term strategy with potential benefit and value deliverable to the target population. If a business cannot or does not access and utilize the limited resources newly available in the marketplace, for whatever reason, then, relative to the other businesses, the business may become left in the dust, without the limited resources newly available and needed for appropriate performance in the marketplace, which is typically bad for business.

Regardless, important to remember is that, unless the business is already and continuously using best-practice efficiency of the limited resources available with the highest total quantity and quality possible along the productivity frontier, between the business and the
ever-shifting frontier exists a gap because of the business’s lesser OE for a lesser positioning possible, relative to the other businesses closer to, and especially along, the frontier. The lesser the gap, the greater the business’s competitive advantage may be in the marketplace, and if along the productivity frontier, the business obtains competitive advantage as best practice (Porter, 1996). To lessen the gap, the business requires greater OE from an increase in the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for resource utilization, or a sustainable way for the business to better mimic and threaten, or challenge, competitors’ behaviors, but, ultimately, for a greater positioning possible with strategic benefit and potential value added toward its own end closer to, and ideally along, the productivity frontier (Porter, 1996).

For all intents and purposes, the private sector’s OE is equivalent to the public sector’s isomorphic mimicry, as it regards each business’s respective ability to behave as competitors behave, ideally with best practice copied at low cost (as with technology transfer in the public sector that may avoid unnecessary redundancy in developing the same or similar technology required for the current Bidenian status quo’s average quality of life [e.g., Bender & Colias, 2020]), but for each business’s respective strategy to equitably benefit and add value from a positioning afforded, ultimately, along the productivity frontier and toward each business’s own end. According to American development economist Lant Pritchett of the University of Oxford, in conversation with the Center for Global Development, isomorphic mimicry is:

building institutions [including governmental institutions] and processes [including with policy change via policy diffusion, which is akin to the above rapid diffusion of best practices] in weak states [and emerging markets, like Cuba’s] that look like those found in functional states [and developed markets, like the U.S.’s]. (emphasis omitted) (MacDonald, 2011, n.p.)

Elsewhere, Pritchett and contemporaries define isomorphic mimicry as:

the tendency of governments to mimic [or copy with reduced redundancy] other governments’ successes, [more equitably] replicating [or diffusing, or transferring]
processes, systems, and even products of the “best practice” examples [for the intent of improved functionality with best-practice, or at least incrementally better-practice, efficiency gained within-country because of, say, technology transfer between countries]. (Andrews et al., 2017, abstract)

Still, a nation’s ability to isomorphically mimic for a net efficiency gain depends largely upon the current development ecosystem (Andrews et al., 2017). In Cuba’s unique situation, the current development ecosystem is negatively impacted by (1) the economic sanctions regime and, more specifically, (2) the severely low total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for a less equitable economic viability because of the economic sanctions regime’s negative development. In fact, by October 1959, within his first year as President of Cuba, Castro (1959/2003) had already identified the severely low total quantity and quality of the limited resources available in Cuba’s embargoed development ecosystem.

Therefore, supported, as further explored beneath Figures 1.3 and 1.4 below, is the notion that, within embargoed reason that inequitably denies Cuba the ability to isomorphically mimic other sovereign nations with utilization of higher total quantity and quality resources available in the global marketplace at the current time $t_n$ (as with technology transfer), Cuba cannot be reasonably expected to achieve the greatest OE possible for the greatest positioning possible toward its own strategic end with potential benefit and value added to those within the Cuban space over time.

Regardless, important to remember is that, along the productivity frontier, a business develops the greatest OE, or best-practice efficiency, possible for the greatest positioning possible toward its own strategic end for potential benefit and value added to the target population at the given time. With incremental improvement before ultimately reaching the productivity frontier, the business instead develops greater OE, or better-practice efficiency, possible for a greater positioning possible toward its own strategic end for potential benefit and
value added to the target population at the given time. Once ideally positioned along the productivity frontier, the business can then best strategize how to utilize its limited resources available, to strategically benefit its customer base of a target population with maximum potential value added over time, long-term, and sustainably.

In other words, if not yet along the productivity frontier with a “state of best practice” (Porter, 1996, p. 62), as the business incrementally inches closer to the frontier’s ever-shifting, outward-facing curve, the business gains greater OE, even if with only marginal gain in growth and opportunity possible, but it is lesser OE than the greatest, or best-practice, OE that could be gained along the productivity frontier. In kind, while best-practice OE permits the greatest positioning possible for how the business might strategically benefit its customer base with maximized potential value added over time, so does lesser OE with better, but not yet best, practice permit a greater, but not yet the greatest, positioning possible for how the business might strategically benefit its customer base with more, but not yet maximized, potential value added over time.

See Figures 1.3 and 1.4 immediately below for the productivity frontier illustrated with the strategic positioning of hypothetical Businesses A, B, and C at the same hypothetical time $t_H$. While Businesses A, B, and C have different positions in Figure 1.4 than in Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4 builds off Figure 1.3 and includes Porter’s (1996) aforementioned “productivity frontier […] constantly shifting outward [toward future time $t_{(H+1)}$] as new technologies […] are developed and as [these] new inputs become available [for resource utilization]” (p. 62).

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Figure 1.3

The Hypothetical Positionings of Different Businesses at the Same Time $t_H$, Part 1 of 2

Note. Business $A$ has lesser OE, such that, in turn, Business $A$ has a lesser positioning possible, relative to both Businesses $B$ and $C$. Business $B$ has lesser OE than Business $C$, but greater OE than Business $A$, such that, in turn, Business $B$ has a lesser positioning possible, relative to Business $C$, but a greater positioning possible, relative to Business $A$. This notion means that
Business $B$ has a lesser gain in growth and opportunity possible, relative to Business $C$, but a greater gain in growth and opportunity possible, relative to Business $A$. As such, Business $A$ has the least, and essentially nil, gain in growth and opportunity possible, relative to both Businesses $B$ and $C$.

Meanwhile, Business $C$ has greater OE than both Businesses $A$ and $B$. Additionally, Business $C$ has the greatest positioning possible along the productivity frontier. This other notion means that Business $C$ has the greatest gain in growth and opportunity possible, relative to both Businesses $A$ and $B$. As is, Business $A$ is at the greatest risk of being left behind at point $(0,0)$ in Figure 1.3’s hypothetical, dynamic global marketplace. Business $A$ is especially so, if its behavior is too relatively static to equitably mimic the competitors’ behaviors with more and higher-quality technology utilized for better, and ultimately best, practice possible closer to, and ultimately along, the productivity frontier.

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34
The Hypothetical Positionings of Different Businesses at the Same Time \( t_H \), Part 2 of 2

Note. Compared to Figure 1.3 immediately above, added to Figure 1.4 is a dashed productivity frontier outside the solid productivity frontier. The solid productivity frontier exists with the technology that is currently the most advanced and most modern for input and resource utilization at the current time \( t_H \). With the onset of a newer, more advanced, and more modern technology introduced at the current time \( t_H \), but for input and resource utilization at future time
t_{(H+1)}$, the current, solid productivity frontier is in the process of shifting outward, to the new, dashed productivity frontier, which is ever-farther from the origin at point (0,0). Along the solid productivity frontier in Figure 1.4, Businesses $B$ and $C$ are able to ideally perform similar activities better than Business $A$ not along the solid productivity frontier, but as well as each other, whereas Businesses $A$, $B$, and $C$ are all able to perform different activities than one another.

Further, in Figure 1.4, Business $A$ is getting as much gain as possible out of its limited resources available, but according to the greatest OE possible at past time $t_{(H-3)}$, not according to the greatest OE possible at the current time $t_H$. Therefore, Business $A$’s OE possible is a lesser OE possible than the greatest OE possible at the current time $t_H$, which both Businesses $B$ and $C$ have in this hypothetical instance. In this unique way, Business $A$ is living in the past, relative to both Businesses $B$ and $C$, who are living in the present, as Business $A$ is limited to less advanced and less modern resources than those available today. For example, let time $t_{(H-3)}$ be three decades prior to today at time $t_H$; in this example, Business $A$ is able to perform with inputted technology only as advanced and modern as it was 30 years ago, which is typically bad for Business $A$’s business today.

* * *

Regarding this chapter’s public-sector subject matter and continuing with the brief discussion surrounding Cuba’s ability, or rather lack thereof, for the isomorphic mimicry introduced above, discussed next is application of OE, but in the public, not private, sector. Also discussed next is Cuba’s ability for strategic benefit and potential value added to those within the Cuban space over time (i.e., the Cuban citizenry in the now and future), that is, because of strategy performable from a desired positioning afforded by the level of OE possible with the total
quantity and quality of the limited resources available for resource utilization at the time, especially technology (as with between-country technology transfer), but still in the public, not private, sector.

The U.S., especially with its technology leading the way (Preston, 2020; Ross, 2020), is considered the current leader on the post-pandemic equilibrium of the New Media Age’s post-pandemic period. In this unique way, the U.S. retains its status as the Leader of the Free World in the post-pandemic period. That is, other sovereign nations reasonably strive to behave like the U.S., ultimately with the highest total quantity and quality of the limited U.S. technology available and utilizable for best practice along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, but toward each sovereign nation’s own strategic end, at the given time (cf. Preston, 2020; Ross, 2020).

As explained above, if a business cannot or does not access and utilize the limited resources newly available in the marketplace, for whatever reason, then, relative to the other businesses, the business may become left in the dust, without the limited resources newly available and needed for appropriate performance in the marketplace, which is typically bad for business. The same reasoning holds true at the country level. If a country cannot or does not access and utilize the limited resources newly available in the global marketplace (as with between-country technology transfer), for whatever reason (e.g., the economic sanctions regime), then, relative to the other countries, the country may become left in the dust, without the limited resources newly available and needed for appropriate performance in the global marketplace, which is typically bad for government and citizenry alike, regardless of, say, the U.S. Government’s intent to only make it bad for government, not citizenry, in Cuba. In brief, while a business ultimately operates along the productivity frontier with a “state of best practice” (Porter,
1996, p. 62), a country ultimately operates along the post-pandemic productivity frontier as a (nation-)state of best practice.

Each sovereign nation’s own end should be to strategically benefit and add value to its customer base, which is its citizenry of a macro-target population—i.e., to behave as deemed ethical within the sovereign nation’s own political system of right and wrong, sans internationally illegal embargo and extraterritorial effects. In Cuba’s unique situation, the U.S.’s interventionist strategy preformed from the U.S.’s own positioning along the post-pandemic productivity frontier should not burden another sovereign nation’s ability to behave closer to its own strategic end, which is ultimately along the frontier at the current time $t_n$.

Still, Cuba’s current distance from the U.S. suggests lesser OE possible for a lesser positioning possible for Cuba, relative to the U.S. along the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier. What is more, due to the post-pandemic productivity frontier’s outward-shifting curve—like at the current time $t_n$ with the popular and rapid onset of generative A.I. applications, namely ChatGPT leading the way (Fleischman, 2023), which OpenAI operates out of Silicon Valley (De Witte, 2023), or like during the pandemic with the popular and rapid onset of “communication technologies [namely Zoom, which is also operated out of Silicon Valley] in the [then-]latest wave of globalization” (Martinez Machain et al., 2022, p. 7)\(^8\)—Cuba’s current

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\(^8\) As reported by Cuban journalist Vladia Rubio (2023) of CubaSí out of Havana, when attempting to access ChatGPT in Cuba, even with a virtual private network (VPN), OpenAI sends the following message: «No disponible. Los servicios de OpenAI no están disponibles en su país [i.e., Cuba]» (n.p.), which is to say in English, “Unavailable. OpenAI services are unavailable in your country [i.e., Cuba]” (emphasis added; translated by me). The keyword is “services,” which suggests that ChatGPT falls within the economic sanctions regime’s aforementioned U.S. goods and services banned from the Cuban marketplace because of economic gain possible therein.

See, also, American journalist Vera Bergengruen (2021) of TIME, who states, “As Internet access has exploded on the island, an increasing number of Cuban journalists [like Rubio (2023)], activists, dissidents and artists find themselves locked out of the online platforms and services [like Zoom and ChatGPT] used by the rest of the world [without embargoed reason]—not by their communist
distance from the U.S. grows at each future time \( t \) still without access to the U.S. technology available and utilized closer to, and ultimately along, the post-pandemic productivity frontier: According to the *Economist*, “America remains the world’s richest, most productive and most innovative big economy [in the post-pandemic period]. By an impressive number of measures, it is leaving its [sovereign] peers [including Cuba] even farther in the dust” (emphasis added) (“The Lessons from America’s Astonishing Economic Record,” 2023, n.p.), leading the global economy with 58% “of the nominal GDP [or gross domestic product] of the G7, a group of the world’s seven biggest advanced [and modern] economies” (emphasis added) (“From Strength to Strength,” 2023, p. 17). That is, as the current leader on the post-pandemic equilibrium (i.e., as the incumbent Leader of the Free World), the U.S. is leading the post-pandemic productivity frontier’s shift ever-farther outward toward future time \( t_{(n+1)} \), with the greatest innovation, or most advanced and most modern technology, available for resource utilization at the time. As aforementioned, this impending shift toward a newer frontier at future time \( t_{(n+1)} \) is evidenced by generative A.I., namely ChatGPT, its popular and rapid onset at the current time \( t_n \) (cf. Figure 1.6 below).

As such, Cuba is not only unable to gain best-practice efficiency of the limited U.S. resources available for utilization along the post-pandemic productivity frontier (as with between-country technology transfer), which would be a progressive behavior toward the outward-shifting curve and Cuba’s own strategic end along it. Cuba also gains neutral-practice efficiency of the limited U.S. resources yet unavailable for utilization on the island, which is a relatively static behavior neither toward nor away from the outward-shifting curve. Cuba is

\[\text{government, but due to restrictions imposed on American companies [like Zoom Video Communications, Inc., and OpenAI] by the 60-year-old U.S. embargo} \] (n.p.).
standing relatively still in the dust, watching the U.S. and the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier fade ever-farther into the dynamic distance. Cuba is being left behind.9

Regardless, the lesser Cuba’s OE and positioning possible, the farther Cuba’s distance from the U.S. The farther Cuba’s distance from the U.S. (i.e., the greater the gap between the U.S. and Cuba in the post-pandemic period), the less well-positioned for economic development from resource utilization Cuba is (i.e., the less possible economic growth and opportunity for Cuba are) at the current time $t_n$. As the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier continuously shifts outward with the ever-changing U.S. technology in the post-pandemic period, as seen from Zoom at time $t_n$ to ChatGPT at time $t_{(n+1)}$, it stands to reason that, relative to the U.S., Cuba’s OE and positioning possible will only lessen over time with neutral-practice efficiency because of the economic sanctions regime and extraterritorial effects that discourage more dynamic behavior (as with between-country technology transfer). See Figure 1.5 immediately below for Cuba’s estimated positioning (i.e., Business $A$), relative to the U.S.’s estimated positioning along the post-pandemic productivity frontier (i.e., Business $B$), at the current time $t_n$.

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9 Chapter 2 further explores how the U.S. has left Cuba behind.
Figure 1.5

*Cuba’s Estimated Positioning, Relative to the U.S. ’s Own, at the Current Time* $t_n$

*Note.* As Business *A*, Cuba has lesser OE, such that, in turn, Cuba has a lesser positioning possible to strategically benefit and add value to the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population at the current time $t_n$, relative to the U.S. as Business *B* along the post-pandemic productivity frontier with best-practice efficiency. Cuba’s placement at point $(0,0)$ *might be* a bit
exaggerated, but nevertheless succeeds in indicating (1) a relatively static behavior with neutral-practice efficiency, and (2) the importance and urgency of the unique Cuban situation today. As Business B along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, the U.S. has access to the highest total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for resource utilization, with the greatest OE possible and, in turn, the greatest positioning possible to most strategically benefit and add maximum value to the U.S. citizenry of a macro-target population at the current time $t_n$. Relative to the U.S. as Business B, Cuba, as Business A, is left in the dust, without anywhere near as high a total quantity and quality of the limited resources available and accessible for resource utilization to strategically benefit and add value to the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population.

The arrow from Business A leads to Business A'. Business A' is located at the estimated placement between the x- and y-axes, where a hypothetical Cuba-prime might be able to behave without relatively static behavior and neutral-practice efficiency, but only assuming U.S. policy change in the post-pandemic period. As such, along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, Cuba-prime might be able to best position itself, to most strategically benefit and add maximum value to the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population, with best-practice efficiency of the limited U.S. resources available and utilizable for a long-term and sustainable net efficiency gain.

Also, take note that the x-axis’ label has changed from “[r]elative cost position” to “[r]elative cost position at the country level,” and that the y-axis’ label has changed from “[n]onprice buyer value delivered” to “[n]onprice taxpayer/target-population value delivered.”

* * * 

Since Cuba is currently unable to behave like most other sovereign nations along, or at least
closer to, the post-pandemic productivity frontier on the post-pandemic equilibrium, this chapter reasons that Cuba’s OE and positioning possible are among the least of these at point (0,0); Cuba is not getting as much gain as possible from the limited resources available in the global marketplace at the current time $t_n$—such as through economic exchanges for reasonable growth and opportunity possible with strategic benefit and potential value added—largely because of the negative economic development illegally encouraged by the economic sanctions regime and extraterritorial effects.

Resources matter because they are what the Sovereign ultimately utilize to design and build the community, including the colectivo community found in the Cuban Revolutionary space (cf. Chapter 2), and the community’s economy over time (e.g., Capuzzo, 2023; Oglesby, 2023) (Georgia Department of Community Affairs, 2018). With greater ability for improved strategy (i.e., a greater positioning possible) from greater OE possible—such as from resource utilization of U.S. technology and certain third-party nations’ trade goods made available sans embargo and extraterritorial effects—this chapter hypothesizes that Cuba would be better able to position itself closer to, and ideally along, the post-pandemic productivity frontier for long-term, sustainable growth and opportunity possible, with strategic benefit and potential value added throughout the post-pandemic period (e.g., at point $A'$ in Figure 1.5 above).

However, with one of the farthest distances from the dynamically distant U.S. (and unembargoed others) in the post-pandemic period, the urgent threat is that Cuba—including the Cuban citizenry, whose average quality of life the U.S. Government does not desire to harm within its own ethical egoism and embargoed reason—will continue to be unethically left in the dust at point (0,0) on the post-pandemic equilibrium, that is, without important post-pandemic U.S. policy change for stronger Cuban economic development and viability through future
resource utilization of U.S. technology, like Zoom and ChatGPT.\(^\text{10}\) As such, post-pandemic U.S. policy change ought to permit greater Cuban economic growth and opportunity possible, with strategic benefit and potential value added from resource utilization of U.S. technology, so that Cuba may more strategically position itself with greater OE possible for more ethical participation in its own sovereign personhood (i.e., autonomy, or self-governance) discussed above. See Figure 1.6 immediately below for an illustration of Cuba’s estimated positioning at the current time \(t_n\), where Cuba remains unable to behave like other sovereign nations, especially the U.S., without embargoed reason on the post-pandemic equilibrium, but within the post-pandemic productivity frontier’s umbrella of a curve.

\* \* \*

\(^{10}\) For regulatory reasons related to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (2023) list of sanctioned nations, sovereign nations currently unable to behave without embargoed, or sanctioned, reason on the post-pandemic equilibrium with U.S. technology include Cuba; Iran; North Korea; Syria; and Ukraine’s Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions (Zoom Support, 2022).
Figure 1.6

Cuba’s Estimated Positioning at the Current Time \( t_n \) on the Post-Pandemic Equilibrium

Note. Figure 1.6 combines Figures 1.1 and 1.5 above, so that the post-pandemic productivity frontier is observable on the post-pandemic equilibrium of Baumgartner et al.’s (2018)
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. However, added to Figure 1.6 is a dashed post-pandemic productivity frontier outside the solid post-pandemic productivity frontier, like in Figure 1.4 above. Along the dashed post-pandemic productivity frontier at future time $t_{(n+1)}$, points $A''$ and $B'$ are located at where, respectively, a future Cuba without embargoed reason and a future U.S. might hypothetically position themselves. Still, points $A$, $A'$, and $B$ are as they are in Figure 1.5 above.

The solid post-pandemic productivity frontier exists with the Zoom technology exampled above, among other U.S. technology that is also the most advanced and most modern, at the current time $t_n$. With the onset of a newer, more advanced, and more modern U.S. technology, namely ChatGPT, introduced at the current time $t_n$, but for input and resource utilization at future time $t_{(n+1)}$, as discussed above in Figure 1.4, the current, solid post-pandemic productivity frontier is in the process of shifting outward, to the new, dashed post-pandemic productivity frontier, which is ever-farther from the least of these at point $(0,0)$.

Anders (2023) confirms this chapter’s affirmation of an outward-shifting curve because of U.S. generative A.I. applications, namely ChatGPT:

When asked to assess AI’s impact, 68% of Top Company [i.e., Big Business] respondents agreed with the statement [that] “[the U.S.’s] AI is already helping us [to] be[come] faster [in dynamically moving with the frontier’s outward-shifting curve ever-farther from point $(0,0)$], smarter [with how to efficiently gain a greater positioning possible for strategic benefit and potential value added at future time $t_{(n+1)}$] and more.” Another 32% said [that] “[the same] AI’s current impact is small, but we expect larger [efficiency] gains [from our utilizing it toward our own strategic end with potential value added] over the next five years [of a market summary]” [which, for the time being, suggests lesser OE for a lesser positioning possible for strategic benefit and potential value added, relative to the other 68% of Big Business surveyed]. Not a single respondent picked the skeptics’ alternative: “[The U.S.’s] AI is not a major factor on our horizon [of a newer frontier at future time $t_{(n+1)}$].” (n.p.)

What is more, for schools, not only businesses, the *Chronicle of Higher Education* also confirms
this chapter’s affirmation of an outward-shifting curve because of U.S. generative A.I.

applications, namely ChatGPT:

[The CEO of OpenAI […] has] predicted that [the U.S. technology’s] significance “will
eclipse the [A]gricultural [R]evolution, the [I]ndustrial [R]evolution, the Internet
[R]evolution all put together.” Even discounting for hyperbole, the release of ChatGPT
suggests that [at the current time ] we’re at the dawn of an era marked by [a popular
and] rapid [onset of] advance[ment] in artificial intelligence, with far-reaching
consequences for nearly every facet of society, including […] education. From
admissions to assessment, academic integrity to scholarly research, university operations
to [job shift and] disappearing jobs [inside and outside academe], […] professors,
administrators, and writers […] question: How will [generative] AI change […]
education [beginning at future time ] of the post-pandemic period)? (Caplan et al.,
2023, n.p.)

However, those within academe are asking how generative A.I. will change not only education,
but also the world that honest education seeks to make more efficient and more productive, or
developmentally improved. Those within academe include those at Cornell University because
the Ivy League institution recognizes that generative A.I. is “poised to assist in profound [global
development] […] that will change the world [at future time ],” according to the Cornell
Chronicle (Kacapyr, 2023, n.p.). For example, on May 19, 2023, John L. Wetherill Professor and
Cornell Brooks School Tech Policy Institute Director Sarah Kreps of academe’s Cornell
University advised the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, as she
discussed “AI’s impact on society [outside academe, or rather beginning with academe and based
on her own perspective from inside academe]” (Dean, 2023b, n.p.).

For another and more recent example of how generative A.I. will change not only
education, but also the world, consider U.S.-based EduGPT available at https://edugpt.com/
(accessed July 26, 2023): With “[o]ver 50 pretrained ChatGPT bots curated for educators,”

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11 For more information on the Agricultural Revolution, see Abbo et al. (2022). For more information on the Industrial Revolution, see Huston and Dastrup (2020). For more information on the Internet Revolution, see Altman et al. (2001).
“EduGPT has hundreds of pre-crafted prompts to maximize the results of the OpenAI GPT3.5 and GPT4 language models,” which “mak[es] it easy for […] educators [across the world] to take advantage of the world’s most sophisticated [i.e., the most advanced and most modern] language models [introduced at the current time $t_n$]” (EduGPT, n.d., n.p.). In other words, whereas ChatGPT “can produce toxic and biased output, falsify facts, and generate unambiguous and violent content without explicit prompting,” EduGPT “address[es] these issues [with an intelligent redesign of ChatGPT]” and “safely outputs useful and credible content for students [and educators alike]” (edugpt pi, 2023, 0:18). In this way, U.S.-based EduGPT assists with utilizing other U.S.-based educational technology (e.g., Canvas, Chegg, Google Classroom, Microsoft Office, Quizlet, YouTube, and of course Zoom) and foreign-based educational technology (e.g., Australia-based Canva, Norway-based Kahoot!, and U.K.-based Twinkl), but also teaching assistance for various subjects and methodologies (EduGPT, n.d.).

Further, while introduced at the current time $t_n$, EduGPT is only in its “soft beta launch” announced on July 26, 2023, with more assistance to come for resource utilization of additional educational technology (e.g., U.S.-based Koala), according to the U.S.-based technology’s inventor, Ian Barkley (2023, n.p.), on Facebook. In other words, with EduGPT’s soft beta launch at the current time $t_n$, Barkley (2023) recognizes that generative A.I., namely ChatGPT with which EduGPT operates, is only introduced at the current time $t_n$, but for input and resource utilization at future time $t_{(n+1)}$. Still, even in its soft beta launch, EduGPT is already being tested as a U.S. resource utilizable in primary, secondary, and tertiary schools in the U.S. and other sovereign nations without embargoed reason. As of the day of EduGPT’s soft beta launch, other sovereign nations without embargoed reason include Argentina, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, per public comments made to Barkley’s (2023)
Facebook announcement of EduGPT’s soft beta launch. As told to me, since EduGPT requires access to ChatGPT, EduGPT is currently unavailable in Cuba because ChatGPT is currently unavailable in Cuba (cf. Footnote 8 above) (Barkley, 2023).

All considered, as it transitions with a dynamic distance ever-farther away from the least of these at point (0,0) on the post-pandemic equilibrium, from the current frontier with the U.S.’s Zoom technology toward the future frontier with the U.S.’s ChatGPT technology, the world is beginning to observe an outward shift of the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier in the post-pandemic period (Ripani & Serrate, 2023). The McKinsey Global Institute confirms this outward shift in its recent June 2023 publication, The Economic Potential of Generative AI: The Next Productivity Frontier (Chui et al., 2023). Even more recently in August 2023, TIME further confirms this outward shift, as Waxman (2023) acknowledges educators’ shared utilization of ChatGPT, which they are test-driving for teacher training and AY23–24 lesson plans workshopped over, interestingly enough, Zoom.\(^\text{12}\)\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) AY23–24 is academic year 2023–2024.

\(^{13}\) When lesson-planning, educators may creatively utilize ChatGPT, similar to how I myself, as a poet, have utilized the revolutionary technology. On RADIO Sunnyside 101.5 FM, I gave a poetry reading on July 21, 2023 (Wells, 2023). With the introduction of ChatGPT at the current time \(t_n\), I decided to test the U.S. technology’s capabilities, but as a poet. Before reading my generative-A.I. poetry, I briefly describe my creative process to the radio audience:

I have utilized ChatGPT to write the poetry that I will read for you. I provided ChatGPT the following prompt: “Write me a poem about ‘question.’” The first response generated is what I went with; I did not ask ChatGPT to regenerate its response. After reading through ChatGPT’s response of a poem, I created a found poem within ChatGPT’s poem. (Jesse Fowler, 2023a, 1:07) To listen to my poetry reading, see Jesse Fowler (2023a).

Regardless, ChatGPT itself recommends to creatively utilize ChatGPT for educational purposes. ChatGPT recommends to “[u]se [t]echnology” and “[t]echnology [i]ntegration” in the classroom (Jesse Fowler, 2023b, 5:05). ChatGPT also recommends to incorporate “[c]ultural [a]wareness” when “[u]s[ing] [t]echnology” with “[t]echnology [i]ntegration,” which suggests that even ChatGPT is somehow aware of its own significance in the current cultural shift that goes hand in hand with the outward shift of the post-pandemic productivity frontier (Jesse Fowler, 2023b, 8:42). EduGPT expresses a similar self-awareness when it also recommends to “[u]tilize technological resources,” which include ChatGPT and EduGPT, in a school environment: «Utiliza recursos tecnológicos» (translated by me) (Jesse Fowler, 2023c, 7:09).
Still, Cuba remains relatively static and left in the dust with neutral-practice efficiency of the limited U.S. resources yet unavailable for utilization on the island (as with technology transfer), including Zoom at time $t_n$ and ChatGPT at time $t_{(n+1)}$. That is, Cuba remains not only with lesser OE for a lesser positioning possible for strategic benefit and potential value added to its citizenry, relative to the dynamic others, but also among those with, expectedly, the worst OE for the worst positioning possible at future time $t_{(n+1)}$ (cf. Footnote 10 above).

* * *

1.5. **A Stronger Economy’s Importance for Increased Happiness and Maximized Pleasure on Average**

Next, taking from § 1.3’s above example of schools that continue to take the opportunity to improve the economy, for consistency’s sake, this section further continues with the example of Zoom, but also considers ChatGPT as relevant. As aforementioned, with more economic growth and opportunity possible for strategic benefit and potential value added in the post-pandemic period, the average Cuban citizen may experience a “higher level[] of overall happiness [with maximized pleasure]” (Sotgiu, 2016, p. 85). This experience is possible, beginning with education in the post-pandemic period. For a post-neocolonial future sans embargo and extraterritorial effects, but also with sustainable economic development and viability in Cuba, post-pandemic U.S. policy change should permit Cuban resource utilization of U.S. technology for businesses, but also schools, because sustainable economic viability for Cuban development begins with education that includes how businesses (and others) may lessen Cuba’s dynamic distance from the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier, such that Cuba is ethically able to equitably perform on a more level playing field.

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14 Chapter 2 further explores the increased happiness and maximized pleasure introduced in this chapter.
Education is an investment, with a so-called “educational productivity [alias dictus educational efficiency],” or an “academic-ROI [sic],” dependent upon quality gains expected per unit of cost over time of investment (Frank & Hovey, 2014, p. 2). For each year that a student is retained with high-quality education (unit of cost over time of investment) on, for example, how to develop Cuban performance with the U.S. technology already utilized by other, unembargoed sovereign nations along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, but toward Cuba’s own strategic end, the student’s earnings reasonably grow at a rate of 10% on average, cross-economy (quality gains expected) (Montenegro & Patrinos, 2014; Patrinos, 2016). According to the World Bank, this growth at a rate of 10% per year is typically greater than the growth rates possible with all other investments at the individual level, including Treasury bills at a growth rate of 1.4% per year, Treasury bonds at a growth rate of 5.7% per year, and even physical assets at a growth rate of 7.4% per year (Patrinos, 2016). Such educational opportunity is expected to grow the student’s household income upon graduation, when he enters the marketplace as an employee with valuable knowledge and skills desired for socioeconomic development over time (Becker, 1993).

However, at the country, not only household, level, opportunity is also expected to grow Cuba’s competitive advantage with greater OE and a greater positioning possible, even if only marginally or incrementally, in the global marketplace, as each employee, from respective standpoint views within the unique Cuban situation, applies his own higher-quality education of, for example, how to utilize Zoom and ChatGPT for a Cuba that is more economically developed and viable at each yearly time $t$. In kind, Cuba’s greater positioning possible for strategic benefit and potential value added because of greater OE begins with education of a higher quality than currently experienced without Cuban access to Zoom, ChatGPT, and other high-quality U.S.
technology available and utilizable for gain and development. Higher-quality education includes, for example, how good it is for the individual, with household-level gain, to help his society and country to improve with the limited U.S. technology already utilized by the most powerful and successful sovereign nations along the post-pandemic productivity frontier at the current time $t_n$ (Strenze, 2007). This notion is especially apt within the Cuban’s socio-centric, or collectivistic, culture, wherein the average Cuban “experiences [himself] in relation to the social environment” (Nohr et al., 2021, p. 4).

In keeping with the above example of becoming more educated on how to behave more like those with the limited U.S. technology already utilized toward their own strategic ends along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, while the individual gains 10% in earnings per year of schooling added, the intent is that Cuba also gains U.S. technology-related OE that incrementally saves the Cuban economy a yet-undeterminable percent of costs (e.g., opportunity cost with reduced redundancy from between-country technology transfer) at each yearly time $t$ on the post-pandemic equilibrium largely powered by the limited U.S. technology (Patrinos, 2016). This expected annual savings of a quality gain over time is similar to how Zoom-related OE saves businesses up to millions of U.S. dollars per fiscal year (i.e., at each yearly time $t$) (Forrester, 2022).

As the Cuban marketplace further develops with incrementally more growth and opportunity possible for the collective via growth and opportunity possible for the individual through the higher-quality education gained with resource utilization of the limited U.S. technology, intended are a more competitive advantage and smaller gap, with greater OE and a

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15 Determining Cuba’s expected percent of costs saved, or savings gained, at each yearly time $t$ on the post-pandemic equilibrium, and ultimately along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, is a worthy exploration, but such an exploration, unfortunately, remains outside the scope of this chapter.
greater positioning possible closer to, and ultimately along, the post-pandemic productivity frontier, where the limited U.S. technology leads the way ever-farther into the dynamic distance (e.g., toward Figure 1.6’s above, dashed post-pandemic productivity frontier at future time \( t_{(n+1)} \) with ChatGPT), but toward Cuba’s own strategic end.

The intent is that the individual’s household income incrementally grows with reasonable increase in opportunity, over time and with each increase in the total quantity and quality of the limited U.S. technology made available to Cuba. With household-level growth and greater opportunity at each yearly time \( t \), the socio-centric and more educated Cuban with 10% value added per year of schooling added might happily consume more domestically produced staples (e.g., this chapter’s foodstuffs and Chapter 2’s black-market medicines) afforded by an increase in business opportunity for the limited U.S. technology utilizable within Cuba’s mixed command economy with heavy, albeit shrinking, nationalization (Baer, 2019).\(^{16}\) Afforded with post-pandemic U.S. policy change that works with Díaz-Canel’s peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed below, this increase in business opportunity may come with the average Cuban’s top desire being met. At the current time \( t_n \), the average Cuban’s top desire is for reduced “economic hardship” (i.e., economic growth and opportunity possible without the economic sanctions regime of embargoed reason; cf. Footnote 6 above) (Birke, 2022, p. 40), such as with reduced redundancy from technology transfer between the U.S. and Cuba, but especially after the

\(^{16}\) According to the most recent literature available, Cuba has a mixed command economy (Crnogorac, 2022), which is primarily a command economy, but with some elements of a market economy to help to meet the people’s needs (e.g., government-limited opportunity for private enterprise) (Lane, n.d.; Quinlan et al., 2024). Also, as termed herein, the term “nationalization” includes both Cuba’s history of transferring privately-owned assets to the state (Domke & Baade, 1963), as well as the establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominant on the island (Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Havana, 2021). As such, Cuba’s shrinking nationalization has to do with Cuba’s new Constitution of 2019 that now “formally recognizes private property as a form of ownership” with a lesser percentage of SOEs (Monzon, 2020, p. 667), which paves the way for the government-limited opportunity for private enterprise found in Díaz-Canel’s peri-pandemic economic policies passed below.
limited U.S. technology is first taught in the Cuban classroom that teaches resource utilization to deliver strategic benefit and potential value addable outside the classroom.

Still, as the Cuban economy shrunk by 11% in 2020 with the worst numbers in ~30 years, and with the onset of the Great Lockdown of 2020, Díaz-Canel urgently increased opportunity for important growth in Cuba’s private sector (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021; de Córdoba & Pérez, 2021). He did so with peri-pandemic economic policies passed to curb Cuba’s peri-pandemic economic issues (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021):

Under pressure from the economic impact of [the] COVID-19 [pandemic] and [the] U.S. [economic] sanctions [regime] [i.e., without access to U.S. technology for resource utilization, especially during the pandemic], Cuba scrapped a ban on most private businesses on Saturday [February 6, 2021], the latest in a flurry of long-awaited reforms to its Communist system triggered by the government in recent weeks, and a sign that the state’s grip on the economy is loosening [largely because of the peri-pandemic economic issues]. (Nugent, 2021, n.p.)

However, while the economic sanctions regime has reportedly influenced Díaz-Canel’s peri-pandemic economic policies passed, which include “a shift in economic activity in the next few years [i.e., since 2021] with the [mixed command economy’s] private sector growing and accounting for an increasing proportion of [Cuban] employment [opportunity] and GDP,” the Cuban Government is still not shifting toward a neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics (Nugent, 2021, n.p.). Even despite Díaz-Canel’s post-pandemic economic policies passed to curb post-pandemic impact from Cuba’s peri-pandemic economic issues, which include a 2023 reversal of a 2021 ban on U.S.-dollar, or USD, deposits in Cuba, per Nasdaq (Acosta, 2023) and the Central Banking Institute (Margulies, 2023), the Cuban Government is still not shifting toward a neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics, but remains heavily nationalized, even if less so.

In other words, beginning in the peri-pandemic period, but continuing into the post-
pandemic period, Díaz-Canel has been “helping [to] free the [sovereign nation’s] productive forces” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021, n.p.), or attempting to achieve greater OE for a greater positioning possible closer to the post-pandemic productivity frontier, despite the economic sanctions regime’s negative development. Without ability to access the limited U.S. technology utilized along, or even closer to, the post-pandemic productivity frontier, however, Díaz-Canel cannot reasonably obtain OE great enough for the greatest positioning possible toward Cuba’s own strategic end, no matter his level of willingness, because the policy-ball remains in Biden’s court. In fact, it is not necessarily expected herein that Díaz-Canel can even obtain greater OE for only a greater positioning possible toward Cuba’s own strategic end, that is, without Biden’s help. Such is an appropriate example of why intergovernmental dialogue between the U.S. and Cuban Governments matters for not only the discourse ethics above, but also developmental improvement via U.S. and Cuban federal policies that work together.

Still, according to experts on Cuba’s mixed command economy, Díaz-Canel’s doing so has “open[ed] up [opportunities for growth in] almost all economic activity on the island to some form of private enterprise,” which helps the average, socio-centric Cuban’s ability to consume more made-in-Cuba staples in the post-pandemic period (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021, n.p.). This increase in ability to endogenously consume in a culturally appropriate way socio-centric Cuba’s domestic goods and services is thanks in large part to the Great Lockdown of 2020, as well as pre- and post-pandemic uncertainties in the Cuban and global economies, not simply the economic sanctions regime (Baer, 2019). Not all turbulences are created equal, even if they each contribute to the impact felt.

Assuming willingness, the average, socio-centric Cuban’s ability to endogenously consume more made-in-Cuba staples in the post-pandemic period, while having the same
Cuban’s top desire met with less economic hardship (as with between-country technology transfer), should (1) encourage job growth for continued production in Cuba’s mixed command economy with growing opportunity from economic policies passed for shrinking nationalization, as well as (2) lessen the amount and total cost of the U.S. foodstuffs and medicines currently exported to the Cuban citizenry by the U.S. Government because of lessened demand out of necessity, which should, in turn, (3) satisfy the average U.S. taxpayer with fewer or nil tax dollars paid for the future exportations of U.S. foodstuffs and medicines to the island. As explained above, higher-quality education for greater U.S. technology-related OE can help to expedite these three (3) assumed outcomes in the post-pandemic period, and so, in the classroom is where developmental improvement may best begin on the island with technological change because of post-pandemic U.S. policy change.

Therefore, without embargoed reason and with post-pandemic U.S. policy change, expected is that Cuban happiness incrementally increases with higher-quality education for greater U.S. technology-related OE, as evidenced by culturally appropriate production and consumption expected within a sustainable and greater positioning possible toward Cuba’s own strategic end. Greater OE and a greater positioning possible may be expected, but not necessarily herein, with Díaz-Canel’s peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed, that is, without Biden’s help. However, without incrementally greater U.S. technology-related OE for, ultimately, the greatest positioning possible along the post-pandemic productivity frontier, the average Cuban’s pleasure has yet to be maximized, and cannot be maximized. Even if he self-identifies as happy within embargoed reason (cf. Chapter 2), the average Cuban remains not yet well-positioned enough to be as happy as possible, with Cuban economic development and viability gained from resource utilization of the limited U.S. technology available at the current
time $t_n$. With ethical discourse between the U.S. and Cuban Governments, and with post-pandemic U.S. policy change that works with, not against, Díaz-Canel’s peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed (cf. § 1.6’s Chinese call for “peaceful co-existence and win-win co-operation” [“The World According to Xi,” 2023, p. 7]), such is how Cuba may better participate in its own sovereign personhood without the unethical and internationally condemned behavior of negative economic development on the part of the U.S. Government, and such is how the U.S. Government may begin to right its tired wrong.

1.6. Conclusion with an Alternative Resolution to Lifting the Embargo at the Current Time $t_n$

Overall, post-pandemic U.S. policy change for Cuban economic growth and opportunity possible with resource utilization of U.S. technology is both important and urgent because, with the embargo not yet lifted, Cuban economic loss has been inequitably compounded by the pandemic and peri-pandemic issues, like contraction during the Great Lockdown of 2020 (Gourinchas, 2022), as well as the peri-pandemic issues’ diffusion of effect in the post-pandemic period, despite Díaz-Canel’s attempt to “free the [sovereign nation’s] productive forces [with peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed]” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021, n.p.).

With the peri-pandemic U.S. notion of being “all in this together” as Bidenian friends at war with the pandemic and not one another—as well as with Kennedyan friendship desired once more in Washington, like during the Obama administration, but now, during the Biden administration, with the post-pandemic Peace Corps Reauthorization Act of 2023, which, when first introduced in 2022, was “the most sweeping [bipartisan] legislation in a generation” (National Peace Corps Association, 2023, cover page)—a policy window has arguably opened for more ethical, post-pandemic U.S. policy change to better permit Cuba’s sovereign
personhood and coexistence with economic growth and opportunity possible closer to, and ultimately along, the post-pandemic productivity frontier on the post-pandemic equilibrium in the New Media Age’s post-pandemic period rife with U.S. technology ready for resource utilization at the current time $t_n$.¹⁷

Such policy change also aligns with the post-pandemic period’s new world order shifting toward the above Chinese call—and U.S. call, per the Peace Corps Reauthorization Act’s 2023 reintroduction (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2023)—for greater peacemaking initiatives (i.e., “peaceful co-existence and win-win co-operation” [“The World According to Xi,” 2023, p. 7]), global development (viz., economic development because of the Great Lockdown of 2020), international friendship (e.g., intergovernmental dialogue between the U.S. and Cuban Governments), and public–private partnership (e.g., between Havana and Silicon Valley’s [potential] Big Tech multinationals, like Zoom Video Communications, Inc., and OpenAI) (cf. Footnote 6 above).

Important action must be urgently taken before this policy window closes, but without the policy change ending up in the policy swamp. Still, policy change may begin at a lower level than the federal level, that is, incrementally. For example, it may begin at the university level, which is a relatively gray level between the state and local levels, especially when considering

¹⁷ “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,” the Peace Corps Reauthorization Act of 2023 amends the Peace Corps Act of 1961, such as to continue “[t]o provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower [per Kennedy’s call for friendship between sovereign nations in the post-World War II space],” but now also per Biden’s call to be “all in this together” in the post-pandemic period of that space.

In March 2020, all Peace Corps operations were paused with global evacuation and repatriation of all Peace Corps Trainees, Volunteers, and Response Volunteers (Brown, 2021; Fowler, 2020). Then-U.S. President Donald J. Trump ordered the safe return of all Peace Corps Trainees, Volunteers, and Response Volunteers, as all sovereign nations, including the U.S., closed their borders with the pandemic’s rapid onset (Brown, 2021; Fowler, 2020).
public universities, like Indiana University Bloomington, whose University Government intergovernmentally dialogues with both the Indiana State and Bloomington City Governments, according to my own personal and professional experiences with the University, City, and their respective governments.

At this gray level, universities, especially those with strong political power (e.g., the Ivy League), may offer an ability to incrementally shift the U.S. national mood toward a more significant willingness to change. That is, over time, the U.S. citizenry (e.g., Ivy League students, professors, and administrators) may voice enough concern in the media and elsewhere, as I myself do here in this Ivy League research—i.e., concern about the economic sanctions regime’s negative economic development for Cuba and third-party nations alike, including U.S. allies, like the aforementioned Australia, Japan, and Switzerland—such that We the People become better positioned to bend Washington’s own representative knee to the Sovereign’s will for strategic policy change to lift the embargo.¹⁸

For incremental change to begin, such a bottom-up approach should reasonably provide (1) proof of potential for policy change higher up (i.e., scalability, such that university voices encourage the passages of local, then state, and finally federal legislations), and (2) legitimate reason to listen to the university-level narratives with strong political power and positive social construction to change the policy (i.e., practicality; e.g., international condemnation, undue harm to the U.S.’s intangible resource of image, stronger economic development and viability, fewer

¹⁸ Please note that this paragraph states “a more significant willingness to change” with “enough concern” (emphasis added). The problem is not that there is no concern, but that the concern is not significant enough. In fact, most American (64%–72%) and Cuban-American (69%) taxpayers desire détente (Grenier, 2017; Lamrani, 2013). However, their concern is not significant enough, in that their collective narrative remains too weak of a cry to be heard in Washington. As such, Washington fails to notice the Sovereign’s will to change the policy at the current time \( t_n \). Involving more politically powerful voices may help to make the yet unheard cry of a collective narrative become more democratically heard, and may make post-pandemic U.S. policy change all the more likely.
or nil tax dollars paid for the exportations of select U.S. foodstuffs and medicines, improved education in a sovereign nation with a history of U.S. interest in its educational system [cf. Chapter 2]).

Still, before policy change occurs higher up because of more politically powerful and positively constructed voices lower down, such incremental change may begin with the universities. For example, for strategic benefit and potential value added from incremental gain in growth and opportunity possible in Cuba, that is, from a greater positioning possible closer to, but not yet along, the post-pandemic productivity frontier, within embargoed reason, universities may send to Cuba their respective SMEs (e.g., select professors at Cornell University, like the aforementioned Professor Kreps). These SMEs would be sent to Cuban universities as Peace Corpsesque “skilled manpower” for Kennedyan friendship between Bidenian friends (H.R.7500, 1961), a post-World War II ideal still popularly, not only politically (H.R.1273, 2023; S.1203, 2023), valued in the U.S. and world today, according to the *Asbury Park Press* (Carino, 2023) and National Peace Corps Association President and CEO Dan Baker (2023). Similar to how Peace Corps Volunteers are paid by the U.S. Government, but volunteer for the foreign government (Fowler, 2020), the SMEs would remain under U.S. employment with U.S. pay from

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19 According to the Office of Research Services at the University of Pennsylvania (n.d.) and in compliance with the U.S. Government’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations (1963), U.S. universities may send faculty to Cuba for professional research activities (e.g., meetings), under a General License from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Similarly, U.S. universities may also send faculty to Cuba for educational activities (e.g., teaching), while remaining under U.S. employment and pay (Office of Research Services at the University of Pennsylvania, n.d.).

Through professional research activities, American SMEs may reasonably meet with Cuban counterparts in Cuba, to discuss within-country, endogenous limited resource availability for possible technological development and greater OE, but still within embargoed reason. Similarly, through educational activities, SMEs may reasonably offer Cuban students higher-quality education of, for example, how to utilize video communications and generative A.I. applications, to make Cuba more economically developed and viable at each yearly time $t$, once the students enter the marketplace as employees (cf. § 1.5 above). Such behavior is not deemed a reasonable threat to the neoliberal U.S.’s private sector, growth, or opportunity because the economic sanctions regime uniquely prohibits reasonable growth and opportunity for the U.S.’s private sector in Cuba.
the U.S. universities, but collaborate with and teach interested individuals (i.e., Cuban counterparts and students) at the Cuban universities that desire higher-quality education with greater U.S. technology-related OE.

Such a program does not currently exist. For example, the U.S. Department of State’s Fulbright U.S. Student Program operates neither in nor with Cuba (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a). The Fulbright U.S. Student Program includes opportunities to “pursue graduate study, conduct research, or teach English abroad” for “academic and professional advancement” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b, n.p.). It does not, for example, focus on technological change, but the English language, in the foreign classroom.

However, until the embargo is lifted, within reason, the U.S. technology-related OE gained through the Peace Corpsesque collaboration and teaching must be Americanesque, not U.S., technology-related OE. Americanesque technology-related OE utilizes technology that is similar to U.S. technology, but that also is not U.S. technology by law. Americanesque technology, therefore, does not comprise U.S., but Cuban, resources readily available in the Cuban marketplace at the current time $t_n$, though in a way that attempts to legally mimic the U.S. technology yet untransferable for strategic benefit and potential value addable with economic growth and opportunity possible in Cuba. Other sovereign nations with similar political distances from the U.S. as Cuba, like communist China (Mourdoukoutas, 2018), have already invented Americanesque technology for resource utilization toward their own ends for strategic benefit and potential value added over time.20

Still, the Americanesque technology is neither to make Cuba behave like the U.S. nor to neocolonize the island in a new and post-embargo way. Instead, at Cuba’s discretion, the

20Chapter 3 further explores China’s Americanesque technology, especially as it is utilized and utilizable in Cuba at the current time $t_n$. 

61
Americanesque technology is to ethically assist Cuba with a reasonable, even if only marginal, increase in opportunity and growth possible. As such, Cuba may gain the ability to operate on a more level playing field—i.e., to behave and perform more like, but not exactly like, the other sovereign nations without embargoed reason closer to and along the post-pandemic productivity frontier at the current time $t_n$—but beginning in the Cuban classroom, where such opportunity and growth possible may first be taught.

However, as touched upon above, without access to the limited U.S. technology, Cuba remains unable to perform on a truly level playing field because there exists no guarantee that the other sovereign nations closer to and along the post-pandemic productivity frontier will suddenly utilize and/or change behavior to work with the Americanesque technology, which is really Cuban technology attempting to mimic U.S. technology. There exists no such guarantee because the U.S. remains the Leader of the Free World, and to turn away from the U.S. and/or toward the U.S.’s rival would likely have unintended consequences too costly for many sovereign nations’ governments to risk. As such, Americanesque technology might not be able to reasonably lessen neutral-practice efficiency of the limited U.S. resources yet unavailable in Cuba. That is, without the limited U.S. technology permitted in Cuba sans embargo and extraterritorial effects, Americanesque technology might not be able to provide greater OE and positioning possible for Cuba, though it attempts to, similar to Díaz-Canel’s attempting to “free the [sovereign nation’s] productive forces” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021, n.p.).

Nevertheless, independent of Cuba’s positioning as a U.N. member state of the global society that behaves within the global economy, Americanesque technology might be able to help to strengthen the Cuban economy—i.e., to provide greater OE for Cuba, but within the Cuban economy relatively independent of the global economy, or within point $A$ of Figure 1.6.
above (as with within-country technology transfer independent of between-country technology transfer). For example, it may do so with partnerships between Cuban businesses and schools that would have equitable access to the same Americansque technology for resource utilization in the Cuban economy, as done between Cornell University and the University of Ghana that currently have equitable access to the same U.S. technology for resource utilization in the global economy (i.e., Zoom). The partnered Cuban businesses and schools could utilize the same Americansque technology to strategically benefit and add value to the Cuban space over time, that is, within-country and between Cuban institutions (as with within-country technology transfer).

For example, instead of with Zoom at the current time \( t_n \), Cuban businesses and schools may be able to strategically benefit and add value with an Americansque Zoom of similar quality to the U.S. technology, but only intended for within-country utilization between Cuban institutions that desire to improve the Cuban economy within embargoed reason. An Americansque Zoom might be called, for example, Zumbido. For the English term “zoom,” the Spanish term zumbido is one possible cross-cultural translation, which, to the English-speaker’s untrained ear, may sound similar to “Zoom video” (translated by me). Similarly and for another example, instead of with ChatGPT at future time \( t_{(n+1)} \), Cuban businesses and schools may be able to strategically benefit and add value with an Americansque ChatGPT of similar quality to the U.S. technology, but also only intended for within-country utilization between Cuban institutions that desire to improve the Cuban economy within embargoed reason. An Americansque ChatGPT might be called, for example, CubaGPT.

In other words, to Cuban sister schools, U.S. universities—especially private, not public, universities without strong government influence and leadership, but still with strong political
power and positive social construction, like Cornell University—may reasonably send their own SMEs, such as those with expertise on video communications applications, namely Zoom, and generative A.I. applications, namely ChatGPT.\textsuperscript{21} With, for example, within-country technology transfer of SME-assisted, Americanesque technology, the Peace Corpsesque SMEs may reasonably help Cuba to learn how to strengthen its own economy from within, that is, despite the current inability to reasonably lessen Cuba’s dynamic distance from the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier, until the embargo is lifted and Cuba can most efficiently and best position itself for productivity along the frontier with future resource utilization of the limited U.S. technology.

In Chapter 3, this alternative resolution is further considered from a public-administration perspective that is forward-looking. That is, from the perspective of someone with knowledge of the public sector, namely me, Chapter 3 introduces how the alternative resolution’s desirability (D), feasibility (F), and viability (V) may be altogether analyzed with DFV analysis. As such, Chapter 3 considers this chapter’s alternative resolution, but as a proposition yet untested as a set of hypotheses.

\textsuperscript{21} Cornell University is especially considered to send those with expertise on generative A.I. applications, like ChatGPT, because, according to the \textit{Cornell Daily Sun} in May 2023, “Cornell has [recently] emerged as a prime destination for […] artificial intelligence talent” (Caballo & isabelaperez, 2023). In fact, “Business Insider [has] cited Cornell alongside Stanford University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a leading hotspot for tech companies [including Big Tech in Silicon Valley, home to ChatGPT’s OpenAI] seeking employees with artificial intelligence experience” (Caballo & isabelaperez, 2023).
CHAPTER 2

Cuban Revolutionary Education and Cubanomics:
An Exploration of the Relationship Between Cuban Education and Cuban Success, but
From a Socioeconomic Perspective and the Average Cuban’s Point of View

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22 Chapter 2 is adapted from my term paper, “Cuban Revolutionary Education: An Anthropological Exploration of the Relationship Between Cuban Education and Cuban Success, but From a Socioeconomic Perspective and the Average Cuban’s Point of View,” for Professor Sofia Villenas’ courses, “LSP 7790: Latinx Education Across the Americas” and “ANTHR 7910: Independent Study,” taken during the 2022 fall semester at Cornell University.
2.1. Introduction

Chapter 1 left off while introducing an alternative resolution to lifting the U.S. embargo against Cuba (“embargo”), alias dictus the economic sanctions regime, at the current time $t_n$. The alternative resolution concerns subject-matter experts (SMEs) at U.S. universities and their counterparts at Cuban sister schools, who may collaborate with each other for higher-quality education with Americanesque technology gained and utilized in Cuba, such that, within embargoed reason, Cuba might be left less in the dust among the least of these with neutral-practice efficiency of the limited U.S. resources yet unavailable at the current time $t_n$. That is, the intent is that, through such Peace Corpsesque collaboration and technological change, Cuba might be able to incrementally improve its OE possible, even if only marginally, for a greater strategic positioning (“positioning”) possible closer to Chapter 1’s post-pandemic productivity frontier over time—i.e., a greater positioning possible for strategic benefit and potential value added with at least marginal gain in economic growth and opportunity, beginning with utilization of the Americanesque technology in the Cuban classroom. However, at the very least, if unable to improve Cuba’s positioning in the global economy, as discussed in Chapter 1, the intent is that, with within-country resource utilization and technology transfer of Americanesque technology, the alternative resolution should improve the sovereign nation’s own economy, beginning with improved education and relatively independent of its positioning in the global economy.

Regardless of the alternative resolution’s desirability (D), feasibility (F), and viability (V) at the current time $t_n$, as determinable with the DFV analysis discussed in Chapter 3, considered in all three chapters is technology’s relevance to economy, education, and the developments of both in Cuba. However, Chapter 1 focuses on economy more than education, while this chapter
focuses on education more than economy. Still, for a more comprehensive big picture, it is important to ascertain the Cuban education, history, and culture explored in this chapter, not only the international economics, the U.S. Government’s negative economic development, and the Cuban economy explored previously in Chapter 1.

To better understand Cuban education, this chapter walks through the Cuban space-time, while asking questions of how. Walking through a space-time and asking questions of how relates to late Brazilian critical pedagogist Paulo Freire’s decolonial Pedagogy of the Question, which is designed around the Spanish-speaker’s saying, «se hace camino al andar», or “you make the way [toward the future] as you go [through the past in the present],” per Walsh (2019, p. 207). The Pedagogy of the Question is a task in which “[w]e make the road by walking [through a space-time]”—i.e., in this case, a road toward Chapter 1’s post-pandemic productivity frontier without embargoed reason, whereupon the traveler, as the Cuban, “[introspectively speaks] reflections on the paths of struggle [within the Cuban space-time rife with embargoed reason]” (Walsh, 2019, p. 207):

The questions [of how] serve to learn how to walk [through the Cuban space-time, but also toward Cuba’s desired density along the post-pandemic productivity frontier at the current time $t_n$], and not to stand still [among the least of these with neutral-practice efficiency at point (0,0) in Chapter 1]. (internal quotation marks omitted) (Walsh, 2019, p. 207)

From a perspective perhaps more culturally relevant to the average American reading this chapter, consider late American icon Johnny Cash’s (2014) poetic verse that behaves as a perhaps-unintended interpretation of Freire’s Pedagogy of the Question. In his posthumously released track, “Tennessee,” Cash (2014) sings on his album, Out Among the Stars:

You [Mama] and her [my wife] could talk about babies,
Make some homemade apple pie,
While me and Dad could take a walk,
Maybe talk about old times. (2:03)
In Cash’s (2014) verse, “[Mama] and her” look toward future time $t_{(n+1)}$ (i.e., “talk about babies [not yet born at the current time $t_n$]”). However, “[Mama] and her” expect the future to be as culturally relevant as American “apple pie” is to the average citizen in the Tennessean space at the current Tennessean time $t_n$, which is to suggest a future Tennessean space-time designed, or “[made,” to feel like “home[]” (i.e., “homemade”) for the “babies [not yet born]”; it is not to feel forced, as by an exogenous actor, like how the U.S. attempts to force Cuba by bending Havana to Washington’s will in Chapter 1. At future time $t_{(n+1)}$, what is “homemade” is intended to agree with the culture of the space-time considered in the present, that is, at the current time $t_n$.

Still, at the same time $t_n$, “me and Dad” go for “a walk” through the same Tennessean space that includes “[Mama] and her” as fellow citizens. “[M]e” represents the present Tennessean individual and “Dad” the past Tennessean individual. In “walk[ing]” together, “me and Dad” collaborate together by “talk[ing]” with Chapter 1’s ethical discourse, similar to the Peace Corpsesque collaboration intended between the above SMEs at U.S. universities and their counterparts at Cuban sister schools. That is, in the present space-time, the present Tennessean learns from another Tennessean, who has better understandings of past Tennessean times $t$, such that, in collaboration with each other, the present Tennessean may learn from the past Tennessean, as they both work in the now, but toward the strategic benefit possible with maximum value, or impact, addable for the future Tennessean (i.e., the “babies [not yet born]”) at future time $t_{(n+1)}$.23

In brief, the present citizen learns from the past citizen’s culturally relevant understandings of the shared space-time, but for application toward the future citizen’s intended

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23 Chapter 3 further explores the maximum impact possible through DFV analysis.
benefit of a strategically improved and more valuable homeland, or patria (cf. § 2.4.1 below), within the same space-time. The term “understandings,” as used herein, is similar to Cervantes-Soon’s (2017) anthropological term, “conscientization” (p. 13), meaning a critical consciousness with $n$ levels of knowledge gained as cultural capital earned from experiences lived in the space-time, within which the space’s citizenry desires liberation from a political force at the current time $t_n$. For the cross-cultural reader, Cervantes-Soon’s (2017) English term, “conscientization,” relates to Freire’s (2018) Portuguese term, conscientização, meaning to possess and rupture reality, which suggests that reality, or space-time, is shockingly physical: «A conscientização é um tomar posse, uma ruptura da realidade» (p. 16), which is to say in English, “Conscientization is a seizing ownership, a punctuated break from the current status quo” (translated by me). See Chapter 1 for more information on punctuations and status quos.

Still, this chapter, in the Cuban space-time, attempts to answer Freirean questions of how, while exploring Cuban education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, but in relation to Cuban socioeconomics, or Cubanomics. “Cubanomics” is a term that O’Rourke (1996) coins to define Cuba’s political economy in the middle 1990s, well before incumbent Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed in Chapter 1. However, more contemporarily, “Cubanomics” is also a term that means herein the socioeconomics of Chapter 1’s socio-centric Cuban, who, as an average individual at the current time $t_n$, lives with past individuals within the present collective, but learns for the ultimate benefit of the future collective, in the Cuban space-time through which this chapter walks.

More specifically regarding the term “socioeconomics,” or the socioeconomics found within Cubanomics, it has to do with individuals’ (and collectives’) respective relationships with income, jobs, and education, as well as ability to access and afford certain resources important
for survival in today’s environment, like health resources, which are obviously important resources for equity in Chapter 1’s post-pandemic period (National Cancer Institute, n.d.). The closer the individual’s (or collective’s) relationship with income, jobs, and education (i.e., the greater the accessibility and affordability of the resources utilizable because of greater income, jobs, and education), such that the individual (or collective) is more likely, for example, not to be in poor health because of the total quantity and quality of the resources available with the income, jobs, and education had, then the higher the individual’s (or collective’s) socioeconomic status (SES) (National Cancer Institute, n.d.). See Chapter 1 for more information on total quantity and quality.

Regardless, while considering the average, socio-centric Cuban’s point of view that the literature largely disregards, perhaps for a lack of data availability related to information asymmetry and politics, this chapter attempts to answer the following four (4) questions of how:

(1) How has Cuban education come to be what it is today (cf. § 2.2)?

(2) How do Cubans define “success” for themselves (cf. § 2.3)?

(3) How do education and success in Cuba today subjectively compare to education and success in Cuba’s past (cf. § 2.4.1)? and

(4) How do education and success in Cuba today objectively compare to education and success in similar sovereign nations today (cf. § 2.4.2)?

In the process of answering the four (4) above questions on education and success, this chapter explores the rich and geopolitical history between the U.S. and Cuba, as well as why these questions matter for students of socioeconomics, especially Cubanomics. As a result, this chapter is an interdisciplinary study. In its interdisciplinary space, this chapter connects the fields of anthropology, education, government and public policy, history, and socioeconomics, altogether.

70
for a more comprehensive big picture of education and success in the Cuban space and across the same space’s time.

2.2. Why Cubans Value Education: An Introduction to Cuban Revolutionary Education

According to Cervantes-Soon (2017), “revolutionary schooling” connects to the political dimension of education in a geographical space, across a history (i.e., time), and within the same history’s struggle (p. 20). That is, in the space, the schooling occurs, and within the space’s history of struggle, the revolution, at least in part, occurs through the schooling. In other words, revolutionary schooling pertains to the practice of:

- resistance processes […] shaped by a specific [and forced] geopolitical position[ing] [such as Cuba at point (0,0) in Chapter 1] and [an] historical background in [a sovereign nation’s] struggle for [or because of] education, which is deeply rooted in socialist movements [that favor a geopolitical positioning that leans socialist]. (Cervantes-Soon, 2017, p. 20)

Cervantes-Soon’s (2017) concept of revolutionary schooling relates to Allman’s (1999) other concept of “critical education” (pp. 82, 85).

Allman (1999) acknowledges German economist Karl Marx’s socialist social construction, as Allman’s (1999) critical education occurs within “social transformation” (pp. 1, 85–86), where social transformation reconstructs the social construction, with revolution, or social evolution. Social transformation is, in this way, a people’s revolution of critique against the space’s history of how society has been constructed by an actor who behaves with either exogenous or exogenously controlled action and ideas (Allman, 1999). Action and ideas especially include political action taken for and/or from policy ideas (e.g., Chapter 1’s Peace Corps Act[ion] of [an idea, namely Executive Order 10924’s Kennedyan idea, from] 1961). Social transformation, however, is also a people’s revolution for a critical consciousness (i.e., conscientization) to establish political change (e.g., socialist change) in the same space, but
through opposing action and ideas (e.g., socialist vs. neoliberal) (Allman, 1999). A people’s revolution for such political change in a geographical space connects to Cervantes-Soon’s (2017) “resistance” in “a specific [and forced] geopolitical position[ing]” (p. 20).

Still, Cervantes-Soon’s (2017) “resistance” in “a specific [and forced] geopolitical position[ing]” also connects well to Cuba’s reasonable frustration with neutral-practice efficiency at point (0,0) on Chapter 1’s post-pandemic equilibrium. Díaz-Canel, with social (economic) transformation intended through his peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed, affirms Cuba’s frustration by “helping [to] free the [nation’s] productive forces” for, hopefully, a greater positioning possible closer to the post-pandemic productivity frontier, despite the economic sanctions regime’s negative economic development in Chapter 1 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2021, n.p.).

Regardless, considering, first, the two terms above (i.e., Cervantes-Soon’s [2017] “revolutionary schooling” and Allman’s [1999] “critical education”) and considering, second, the two terms’ interconnectedness painted above, this chapter recognizes both terms’ importance and respects their relationship when considering, third, the revolution that occurs through education, such as in Cuba’s historic struggle—i.e., a struggle that is punctuated by the Cuban Revolution for a new equilibrium of socialist stability on the island. That is, given “revolutionary schooling” and “critical education” their interconnectedness, this chapter coins a new term: “revolutionary education,” especially as it relates to the unique Cuban situation.

Revolutionary education develops at the intersection of revolutionary schooling and critical education. It does not merely develop as a result of Cervantes-Soon’s (2017) “resistance processes […] shaped by a specific [and forced] geopolitical position[ing] [tied to a history of struggle with education]” (p. 20). Rather, revolutionary education also develops as a result of
war, namely revolution, for social transformation and political change against an historic identity and a political struggle native to the geography where the revolution occurs, but through, at least in part, schooling with a learned conscientization of action and ideas found within the revolutionary space and across the same space’s time.

One such space is the Cuban Revolutionary space, which is a space that began with the Cuban Revolution of a middle 20th-century punctuation, but still exists today on a new equilibrium unique to Cuba in the early 21st century’s New Media Age. The Cuban Revolutionary space still exists today because the Cuban Revolutionary narrative still exists today, with the same revolutionary and Marxist regime still in power in Cuba (i.e., the Partido Comunista de Cuba, or PCC) (Plath, 2018). What is more, the Cuban Revolutionary narrative still exists today because Cuba’s revolutionary and Marxist regime remains outspoken against U.S. interventionist strategy and the U.S.’s ongoing, specific, and forceful desires for (1) a military lily-pad strategy of a worldwide network of geopolitical positions and, more importantly to this chapter, (2) democratization in Cuba, such as via, respectively, (1) U.S. occupation of Guantánamo Bay and (2) the economic sanctions regime discussed in Chapter 1 (Castro, 2011; Escribà-Folch et al., 2021; Vine, 2012). As such, the revolutionary education within the ongoing U.S.–Cuban geopolitical struggle in the Cuban Revolutionary space is termed herein “Cuban Revolutionary education.”

Cuban Revolutionary education is in search of Carnovale’s (2022) Guevarist “new man” (p. 1)—or new society, or colectivo (Gomez & Hare, 2015)—who favors Argentine Marxist and Cuban Revolutionary War hero Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s grito, or Latin American revolutionary war cry, for social transformation via Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias (Madrazo Sosa, 2020). Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias are “what [former Cuban President
Fidel Castro and his friends [including Che Guevara and patriotic martyr Eduardo García Lavandero] [did and thought to do] and what makes them [Garcianists within the colectivo] act the way they have […] toward the United States[’] [interventionist strategy]” (Szulc, 1960, p. 32). The Guevarist grito is the New York Times’ “voice of the Cuban [R]evolution” focused on the “academic” and heard through the Garcianist acción and ideas revolucionarias taught in Cuban Revolutionary education throughout the island’s space-time (Szulc, 1960, p. 32). That is, the Guevarist grito calls upon the initial words of Cuban nationalist and poet José Martí: “To be educated is to be free,” which, according to Guevara, means that successful revolution requires education “as a means of self-improvement [or social evolution] and, through that, social development [or social transformation into a ‘new man’ of Garcianist acción and ideas revolucionarias]” (Yaffe, 2009, p. 70). Additionally, the “new man” with a Guevarist grito for Garcianist acción and ideas revolucionarias “re/members” Martí’s other words: “A man does not make a nation, but a nation at its [revolutionary] birth may find its vibrant and triumphant

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24 Jefe de Acción (Chief of Action) Eduardo García Lavandero was a Cuban Revolutionary War hero (translated by me) (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974; Candela, 2018; Oltuski et al., 1959). He operated in both Cuba and the U.S. and gained martyrdom status when assassinated with over 50 rounds shot by a squad of Batista’s soldiers (EcuRed, n.d.; Otero, 1965; Rodriguez Loeches, 1960). It is also said that García Lavandero operated for a time in Mexico—including Xicotepec de Juárez, Puebla, where I used to live—alongside those including Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, according to my friends who are locals of Xicotepec de Juárez; Guevara (2003) himself suggests what is said in Xicotepec de Juárez. Schools are named after García Lavandero because, among other possible reasons:

García Lavandero was an admirable and a virtuous man, in both his personal and Cuban Revolutionary War lives. His stoicism and courage are forever “re/membered” in Cuba’s history [of an ongoing lucha, or revolutionary struggle], and [in the ongoing lucha in the Cuban Revolutionary space] his stoicism and courage are recorded [and studied] as a beacon of applicable acción and ideas revolucionarias for the younger generations [across the Cuban space-time]. (translated by me) (Madrazo Sosa, 2020, n.p.)

Such ideas are considered intangible “weapons in the […] struggle [of an ongoing lucha]” for Marxist social transformation, which seeks “[potential] value [added]” and “social equality [with the other sovereign nations along Chapter 1’s post-pandemic productivity frontier]” (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998, p. 118). Historically, however, the intangible “weapons of Garcianist ideas” are primarily taught in “[Cuban Revolutionary] education” and, in turn, wielded by the New York Times’ “academic [of acción learned and taken toward Cuba’s own strategic end]” (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998, p. 118; Szulc, 1960, p. 32).

However, the social transformation is an ongoing process because the Guevarist grito for a colectivo is still heard in the Cuban Revolutionary space—i.e., a space that began with the revolutionary struggle, or lucha, in Cuba against U.S. intervention and U.S.-backed Dictator Fulgencio Batista, but continues today with the Cuban people’s lucha against the economic sanctions regime that seeks to bend the revolutionary and Marxist regime to Washington’s will, similar to how Batista was bent to it before losing the Cuban Revolution (Lamrani, 2013). Politically promoted through the economic sanctions regime that dates to the illegitimate Batista regime (Wiskari, 1958), Washington’s will, in brief, is for a neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics in Cuba, as discussed in Chapter 1 and which disfavors Cuba’s social transformation with socialist nationalization, instead favoring Americansque privatization of industry (Chomsky, 1999; Malott, 2007; Pickel, 1998).26 For a definition of “nationalization” as termed herein, see Footnote 16 above.

25 Taking from Dyrness and Sepúlveda (2020), to “re/member” in the Cuban Revolutionary space is to search for:

- self-knowledge [including within and as a colectivo], historical memory [of U.S. intervention and the U.S.-backed Batista regime], and [future] legal recognition [as a sovereign Cuban state without illegitimate dictation from the economic sanctions regime that encourages a U.S.-backed Batistanist positioning]. (p. 113)

That is, regarding “self-knowledge,” the colectivo may ask, “Who are we?”; regarding “historical memory,” the colectivo may ask, “From where do we come?”; and regarding “legal recognition,” the colectivo may ask, “Where do we go from here?” In this way that seeks to de-neocolonize Cuba from the U.S., to “re/member” is to “recuperat[e] and recogniz[e] submerged histories” on the island (Dyrness & Sepúlveda, 2020, p. 113).

26 Batista’s former Cuban presidency (1952–1959) is considered an illegitimate dictatorship because, on March 10, 1952, he gained political power through “a successful coup d’état against the democratically elected [then-]president of Cuba, Carlos Prio Socarrás” (Fernández Guevara, 2019, p. 117). In fact, of Batista’s U.S.-backed dictatorship, it is said that “[t]he corruption of the [Cuban] Government, the brutality of the police, the [G]overnment’s indifference to the needs of the people for education, medical care, housing, for social justice and economic justice […] [wa]s an open invitation to [Castro’s] revolution” (Schlesinger, 1973, p. 512).
In the ongoing *lucha* fought by a *colectivo* organized by the Guevarist *grito* and related Garcíaist *acción* and *ideas revolucionarias*, Cuban Revolutionary education works toward Marxist social transformation for a Cuban and socialist positioning against an Americanesque and a neoliberal one. In other words, Cuban Revolutionary education directs the average Cuban toward Cuba’s, not the U.S.’s, own strategic end. Toward Cuba’s own strategic end against the exogenous force for a U.S. democratic ideal in Cuba’s sovereign statehood, the Cuban Revolution promoted that which the PCC continues to promote in the same Cuban Revolutionary space today: a revolutionary ideal founded on education—i.e., an education for the purpose of revolutionary social transformation with a critical consciousness against the U.S.-backed Batistanist positioning that favors U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy (Castro, 1961; Sorel, 1998).

In a kind of twisted fate, Cuban Revolutionary education with anti-neoliberal rhetoric has become statistically greater than education elsewhere in the region without Chapter 1’s embargoed reason (Carnoy et al., 2007). This twisted fate is, in part, because Cuba voluntarily “re/members”—and does not simply “cancel”—its past. At the same time, Cuba applies its past to the people’s present *lucha* for a greater positioning idealized in a future without U.S. intervention via strategic policymaking (Schultz, 2020). Such “re/membrance” is promoted within the education at the various primary, secondary, and tertiary schools often named after war heroes and patriotic martyrs from the Cuban Revolution. For example, Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero in Artemisa is named after García Lavandero, whose Garcíaist *acción* and *ideas revolucionarias* are, as stated above, unearthed

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27 Opposite to “re/member,” to “cancel” is to behave within the so-called “cancel culture” that seeks to “focus exclusively or excessively on the negative aspects of [an] individual [dead or alive] while ignoring any positive aspects, or allowing them to be outweighed by the negative ones, thereby cancelling their net positive effect or influence” (Teixeira da Silva, 2021, p. 3).
within the Guevarist *grito*. See Figure 2.1 immediately below for images of a teacher at Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero, who teaches social transformation via Garcíaist *acción* and *ideas revolucionarias* in the Cuban Revolutionary space.

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**Figure 2.1**

*Social Transformation Taught via Garcíaist Acción and Ideas Revolucionarias*

![Image of a teacher at Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero](image)

*Instructivo encuentro que permitió a un grupo de estudiantes del IPU: Lavandero acercarse a la vida de quien fuera alumno del Instituto de Artemisa y fiel a sus principios, lo dio todo por esta Revolución, como dijera el poeta.*

@EugenioCubano

@DirectorMunici2.

#Artemisa.

Translate post

5:41 PM · Jun 23, 2022

2 Retweets 5 Likes
Note. Figure 2.1 is a post from Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero’s X (f.k.a. Twitter [Elon Musk, 2023]) account, @IpuGarcia. See IPU Eduardo Garcia Lavandero. Artemisa (2022) (sic). The teacher holds up a headshot of García Lavandero, the school’s namesake, as she teaches social transformation via Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias in the Cuban Revolutionary space because, to the average Cuban, history matters. Cubans, like Cuban-American New York University Professor of History Ada Ferrer (2022), care deeply about their historical consciousness (Devitt, 2021): “Our [Cuban] history is not just history, it is an epic. Nothing we [Cubans] do is a mere fact, it is a doughty deed, a fiery feat,” so says Cuban poet and former Cuban Vice President Enrique José Varona (Foreign Areas Studies Division, 1961, p. 174). Historical consciousness is the colectivo’s “sense of how its past has shaped the present” and is “circulated in official and scholarly discourses [for future development, including economic and educational developments, toward the colectivo’s own strategic end, as shown in Figure 2.1’s images]” (Wirtz, 2004, p. 413). The images share the same caption, which reads:

Class meeting that permitted a group of Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero’s students to take an interest in the life of he who was a graduate of Artemisa’s Instituto and who was a man of principle [i.e., of Garciaist acción and ideas revolucionarias, which were of course his own], as he laid down his life for this [Cuban] Revolution[ary] [education], so prophesizes the [P]oet [who is assumed herein to be Cuban nationalist José Martí, a bust of whom is displayed on a shelf in the top right corner of the image in the bottom left corner of the post].
@Eugeniocubano.
@DirectorMunici2.
#Artemisa. (translated by me) (IPU Eduardo Garcia Lavandero. Artemisa, 2022, 5:41 PM)

González Cabrera (2023) suggests that, via the Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias taught in Figure 2.1’s images, the teacher instructs how to solve society’s problems with individual responsibility that benefits the colectivo. This relates strongly to Chapter 1’s economic notion of growth and opportunity for the collective via growth and opportunity for the well-
educated and socio-centric individual. Additionally, see ARTV ARTEMISA (2023) for a more recent video representation of Figure 2.1’s teaching at Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero, albeit with different individuals included in the moving images than in these still images.

* * *

In the exampled Garcianist school established for revolutionary “re/membrance” across the Cuban space-time, the average Cuban values education as a way to “re/member,” or record and study for application, Cuban history and the revolutionary struggle therein. In this way, Garcianist schools are institutions of learning, where the average, socio-centric Cuban is taught why and how to live and learn for a future collective of the Cuban space-time. In the Cuban Revolutionary space’s schools, the individuals who constitute the colectivo learn to echo the same Guevarist grito that those like García Lavandero also once echoed for social transformation during the Cuban Revolution of a punctuation: «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!» (e.g., Cienfuegos Perlavision, 2021, 0:06), which is not so much anti-U.S. as it is anti-U.S. intervention.

This saying of a Guevarist grito, «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!», has been made popular with Cuban and Cuban Revolution-inspired art, like Italian band Bandiera Rossa’s (1972/2021) Cuban Revolution-inspired and Spanish song, “Cuba SI, Yanquis NO [sic]” (cf. Bandiera Rossa - Topic, 2021). Bandiera Rossa’s is a (1972/2021) nationalist song that encourages the Cuban national mood to support Chapter 1’s mixed command economy with heavy, albeit shrinking, nationalization (Baer, 2019), as well as this chapter’s socialist positioning and Cuban Revolutionary education, while simultaneously denying “Yankee imperialism” rife with “economic exploitation” (i.e., economic imperialism via the so-called “Yankee[s’]” economic sanctions regime) (Szulc, 1960, p. 30). This economic imperialism supports strongly the U.S.-
backed Batistanist positioning that favors U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy. In turn, «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!»—as well as Cuban and Cuban Revolution-inspired art, like Bandiera Rossa’s (1972/2021) song—opposes strongly the same U.S.-backed Batistanist positioning found in the economic sanctions regime’s U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy.

2.3. How Cubans Measure Success: “Success” for the Average Cuban

According to Strenze (2007), “success” is a socioeconomic term that determines an individual’s social outcome within the *colectivo*, or society, based on the same individual’s economic situation. In other words, Strenze (2007) recognizes that an individual’s place in the world relates to the same individual’s ability to socioeconomically afford said place, which is his SES; the same may be said of the individual’s collective as one member state of the whole global society and economy (e.g., Cuba’s SES at point (0,0) in Chapter 1, based on its unique economic situation due to the economic sanctions regime’s negative development).

As suggested in Chapter 1, this socioeconomic placement, or positioning, at the individual level (SES) begins with education and how good the education is for the individual, such that, through the education, value might be added to both the individual’s and *colectivo*’s lives (Strenze, 2007). Still, this chapter maintains that there are two (2) types of success required for socioeconomic affordance, or success: (1) economic success and (2) social success. Economic success, as termed herein, is success for the economy, as evidenced by, for example, growth in production, industrial opportunity, and job growth (Department for International Development, n.d.). Social success, as also termed herein, is success according to the members of society, per their values met at the time (Georgia Public Broadcasting, 2023).

At the individual level in the Cuban Revolutionary space, value might be added as income from jobs because of education, whereas at the *colectivo* level in the same space, value
might be added as farther distance afforded from the above “Yankee[s’]” neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics “re/membered” in the Guevarist grito of «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!» (Szulc, 1960, p. 30). That is, value might be added as farther political distance afforded from U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy; however, at the same time and assuming the U.S. Government lifts the embargo, value might also be added with less dynamic distance afforded closer to, and ultimately along, the post-pandemic productivity frontier, as discussed in Chapter 1, with promising income growth from job opportunities because of higher-quality education (as with technology transfer between the U.S. and Cuba).

What is more, the U.S.’s anti-socialist rhetoric claims, rather uneducatedly, that Cuba’s colectivo identity of socialism is a reasonable threat to the U.S.’s democratic ideal, simply because the Cuban Revolutionary space is neither neoliberal, capitalist, nor privatized to the same extent as the contemporary U.S. space (Deare, 2020). As discussed in Chapter 1, the U.S. has “no time [or reasonable threat] of war” with Cuba (Chapman, 2018, p. 34), which means that no legally reasonable threat to American democracy exists on the part of the Cuban Government and its revolutionary ideal found in socialism (Defense Intelligence Agency et al., 1997; Kramer, 2013)—i.e., a socialism rife with a desire for the «ideales emancipadores de la Isla», for which those like García Lavandero have given up the ghost as patriotic martyrs gone before their time because of the U.S.-backed Batistanist positioning that literally killed them (Madrazo Sosa, 2020, n.p.). Madrazo Sosa’s (2020) «ideales emancipadores de la Isla» translates to “emancipatory [or revolutionary] ideals for [a] Cuba [liberated from neocolonial U.S. interventionist strategy]” (translated by me); Cuba is against neocolonial U.S. interventionist strategy on the island, not against the U.S. itself (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959–1960/2003).
Despite the U.S.’s claim of a reasonable threat, however, the Cuban people continue to socioeconomically thrive in the ongoing Cuban Revolutionary space with Cuban Revolutionary education, that is, within Chapter 1’s embargoed reason. For example, from 2018 up to 2022 in the Cuban Revolutionary space, the Cuban gross national income (GNI) increased an average of US$3.785B, with the greatest average (=US$6B) and total (=US$12B) increases occurring during the COVID-19 pandemic and peri-pandemic Great Lockdown of 2020 (Statista, 2022). This GNI increase relates to Díaz-Canel’s peri-pandemic economic policies passed in Chapter 1.

Associated with this economic success for the Cuban economy, especially during the pandemic years (PY) of PY20–21 and PY21–22, is social success, per the Cuban values met at the same time in the same Cuban Revolutionary space, which together provide socioeconomic success at the time, again within embargoed reason. For example, across the same time span of PY20–21 more PY21–22, the average household’s (HH) purchasing power within society increased from ~4.75 points up to ~5.975 points (Statista, 2021). That is, the average, socio-centric Cuban household strengthened itself economically at ~122.5% (≈+22.5%/HH) of its ability to endogenously consume domestic goods and services, which is a cultural practice that aligns with society’s collectivistic values at the time (Statista, 2021). Especially with Díaz-Canel’s peri-pandemic economic policies passed, this ability should encourage (1) growth in production with (2) industrial opportunity and (3) job growth, three (3) major concerns for the Cuban economy (Gilly, 1964).

With such an economically successful average household during such a turbulent time, in part because of the income and job growths from greater opportunities related to Díaz-Canel’s peri-pandemic economic policies passed, comes a more socially successful colectivo because, in an economy with heavy, albeit shrinking, nationalization, the socio-centric individual purchases
often from within the *colectivo* that values and strives to maintain economic independence from economic imperialism (i.e., distance from U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy) (Penrose et al., 1992), which is an appropriate expression of Chapter 1’s sovereign personhood. This notion is especially relevant, given the economic sanctions regime’s prohibiting certain goods and services because of extraterritorial effects for third-party nations (Lamrani, 2013). Regardless, especially if afforded not only the income and job growths already experienced, but also the ability for Chapter 1’s higher-quality education toward Cuba’s own strategic end (as with technology transfer), a more socioeconomically successful Cuba, even if a bit more less nationalized, could reasonably afford to retain and further its distance from that which the people devalues and disfavors on average: the U.S. neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics, or Washington’s will that historically embargoes Cuba’s sovereign equality in Chapter 1.

Overall, such socioeconomic data matter because the data relate to what the average Cuban says matters for how he defines “success” for himself, from a socioeconomic, namely Cubanomic, perspective. That is, the Cubanomic data above reasonably connect to a Cuban perspective of success elsewhere in the literature. For example, Sotgiu (2016) uses the term “happiness” (p. 83), instead of “success,” but ceteris paribus, Sotgiu’s (2016) “happiness” is the “success” defined herein, regarding Cubanomics. In the Cuban Revolutionary space, Sotgiu (2016) identifies that younger Cubans (mean age of 33.1 years) value income, or wealth, and other values that can come with the wealth, like health benefited from health resources (101% of participants surveyed); the individual’s household (68%); and the *colectivo* (33%). Percentages may exceed 100% if totals are added across similar values or if Sotgiu’s (2016) math contains one or more rounding errors, but the reason remains unclear for Sotgiu’s (2016) shallow methodological explanation. Still, older Cubans (mean age of 73.6 years) also value income, or
wealth, and other values that can come with the wealth, like health benefited from health
resources (76% of participants surveyed); the colectivo (36%); and the individual’s household
(30%) (Sotgiu, 2016).

Notably, when compared to less educated Cubans, more educated Cubans “report[]
higher levels of overall happiness [or success to access and afford, say, the valued health
resources, but of a higher total quantity and quality found in Chapter 1]” (Sotgiu, 2016, p. 85).
For example, the more educated Cuban with a higher SES on average may be more successful
(and happier for it) in accessing and affording health resources of a higher total quantity and
quality than those of a lower total quantity and quality accessible to and affordable by the less
educated Cuban with a lower SES on average, for the more educated Cuban has greater access to
the Cuban black market, or sociolismo (sic), which sells the health (and other) resources of a
higher total quantity and quality than those that are otherwise “free” for public consumption in
the heavily nationalized economy (International Business Publications, USA, 2016).28,29

Specifically regarding health resources, the sociolismo’s resources of a higher total quantity and
quality include “[t]he doctors [as human resources] in the hospitals [who] are charging [higher-
SES] patients under the table for better or quicker service [with tangible resources, like COVID-
19 vaccines],” according to Dr. Hilda Molina, the former head of Cuba’s National Center for
Neurological Restoration (Dorschner & de Valle, 2006, p. 20A). As such, “[t]he doctors [as
human resources]” act as socios, or black-market businesspeople who, for personal gain from

28 The Spanish term sociolismo—not to be confused with the other Spanish term socialismo, which
translates to “socialism”—has no direct translation, but is a “long Cuban tradition […] [with] the use of
social networks […] to meet daily [demand]” (Burke, 2021, p. 40), and, so, may be understandably
translated as “social network-ism.” Similarly, the other Spanish term mentioned below, socios, may be
understandably translated as “social networkers.” I translated all Spanish used in this footnote.

29 Out of respect for the economist’s view that what seems free might not actually be without costs, the
term “free” is within quotation marks (Gal & Rubinfeld, 2016).
and for others in society, steal the “free” goods and services from the state (International Business Publications, USA, 2016).

Regardless, this note on more educated Cubans relates to Chapter 1’s mentioning that, for each year that a student is retained with high-quality education, the student’s earnings reasonably grow at a rate of 10% (Patrinos, 2016), so that he might be better positioned to access and afford the resources important for survival in today’s environment. This note on more educated Cubans also relates to Strenze’s (2007) above recognition that the individual’s socioeconomic positioning begins with education and how good the education is for the individual and, in turn, the colectivo, including the colectivo’s socios, in Cuba’s socio-centric culture.

Through the education, Strenze (2007) avers that value, as success/happiness, may be added to both the individual’s and colectivo’s lives, whereas Sotgiu’s (2016) socioeconomic data confirm that, according to the intergenerational Cuban in the Cuban Revolutionary space (i.e., Cuban individuals from across the Cuban space-time), success/happiness is indeed added to both the individual’s and colectivo’s lives with socioeconomic affordability for the Cuban’s values, like the value of health benefited from health resources accessed and afforded, albeit within embargoed reason, or the other value to endogenously consume domestic goods and services.

In Chapter 1’s post-pandemic period rife with this chapter’s demand for health resources that are obviously important resources valued for equity today, the Cornell Chronicle indirectly supports this confirmation: “They [Cornell University psychology researchers] find that objective circumstances and behaviors, such as wealth [or affordability] and health [afforded by the wealth], influence happiness [or success] as much as psychological traits, like an outgoing nature” (emphasis added) (Dean, 2023a, n.p.). This Cornellian fact that ties economic success (“wealth”) to social success (“health”) (i.e., socioeconomic success) is important because, to
date, it indirectly stresses the failure of the economic sanctions regime to bend Havana to Washington’s will, as with Chapter 1’s government–citizenry division in Cuba (e.g., via public protests in Havana [de Córdoba, 2021a; de Córdoba, 2021b]). Some Cuban citizens may protest loudly, as they have (e.g., Walsh, 2021), but they are evidently not the average, and especially more educated, Cuban, who cries, «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!», because of his happiness influenced by the socioeconomic success experienced to date, albeit within embargoed reason (e.g., 90% of the Cuban society, including 97.5% of children older than two years, vaccinated from COVID-19 in 2022 [“health”], at the same time when [1] only 60% of the rest of the world was vaccinated [cf. Footnote 4 above] [MEDICC, 2022], and [2] Cuba had gained the aforementioned GNI increase [“wealth”]).

Still, when averaging Sotgiu’s (2016) totals per value between younger and older Cubans, 88.5%, 52%, and 31.5% of all participants surveyed value, respectively, income, or wealth, and other values that can come with the wealth, like health benefited from health resources; the colectivo; and the individual’s household. These average percentages say that, between generations, or across time in the same Cuban Revolutionary space, 88.5% of Cubans consider successful Cuba’s socialist positioning. They consider successful Cuba’s socialist positioning because, even within embargoed reason, the positioning still adds value with income (i.e., wealth for, e.g., health resources) gained at the household level (e.g., ~+22.5%/HH for added economic strength [Statista, 2021]), even though potential value added would likely be greater with a greater positioning possible for strategic benefit sans embargo and extraterritorial effects (cf. Chapter 1). In other words, the unique Cuban situation is not yet as great as it socioeconomically could, or ethically should, be along Chapter 1’s post-pandemic productivity frontier without embargoed reason and with technology transfer—i.e., it has yet to fully satisfy the Garcíánist
desire for «ideales emancipadores de la Isla» (Madrazo Sosa, 2020, n.p.), or Cuban liberation from neocolonial U.S. interventionist strategy—but, for the time being with, for example, Díaz-Canel’s peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed, it is nevertheless good enough for the average, socio-centric, and especially more educated Cuban, who lives within the present collective and learns for a future collective, even if still within, but ideally without, embargoed reason.

What is more, 52% of Cubans consider successful the colectivo because, as with Díaz-Canel’s peri- and post-pandemic economic policies passed, Cuba’s socialist positioning affords the ability to stay a socialist people with domestic income and job growths for domestic production and endogenous consumption, as well as the aforementioned Cuban GNI increase, at a reasonably safe distance from U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy, again within embargoed reason. However, greater than 52% of Cubans might consider successful the colectivo, if the income and job growths are able to become even higher with Chapter 1’s ability for higher-quality education (as with technology transfer), so that the average Cuban can afford even more of what he values. Still, this ability to maintain a reasonably safe distance is despite the economic sanctions regime. Politics aside, such an ability is an impressive feat in the ongoing lucha, especially when considering the economically turbulent PY20–21 more PY21–22 that had the whole global society and economy, which include the U.S. as the Leader of the Free World (cf. Chapter 1), on edge. For example, with the aforementioned Cuban GNI increase, this impressive feat is evidenced by the above 90% of Cubans who benefited from health resources domestically produced, endogenously consumed, and served with job growth (i.e., COVID-19 vaccines), versus 60% of the rest of the global society at the same economically turbulent time. See Figure 2.2 immediately below for an image of the domestically produced and endogenously consumed
COVID-19 vaccines being served at Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero, during Chapter 1’s peri-pandemic period.

* * *

**Figure 2.2**

*COVID-19 Vaccines Served at Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero*

Se vacunan los estudiantes de doce en Artemisa.
Note. Figure 2.2 is a post from Instituto Preuniversitario Urbano Eduardo García Lavandero’s X account, @IPUGarcia. See IPU Eduardo Garcia Lavandero. Artemisa (2021) (sic). Figure 2.2’s image shows the domestically produced and endogenously consumed COVID-19 vaccine’s being served to a Cuban citizen. The health resource is served by fellow socio-centric citizens, who, because of peri-pandemic job growth, have the opportunity to do this particular job.

However, while the Cuban good of a health resource is expectedly “free” for the Cuban citizen in the highly nationalized economy, also expected is that, within embargoed reason, socios “are charging [higher-SES] patients under the table for better or quicker service [with the COVID-19 vaccine]” (Dorschner & de Valle, 2006, p. 20A). Regardless, the image’s caption reads, “Twelfth-graders are vaccinated in Artemisa” (translated by me) (IPU Eduardo Garcia Lavandero. Artemisa, 2021, 8:51 AM).

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Last, 31.5% of Cubans consider successful the individual’s household because, with the added value of household income at ~+22.5%/HH, it is the household’s individual who buys into the colectivo’s successful economic independence from U.S. economic imperialism and neocolonial policymaking, including during the economically turbulent PY20–21 more PY21–22. Still, even if the education could be of a higher quality (cf. Chapter 1), this Cuban success begins with good Cuban education, as discussed further below, that permits the average Cuban to “re/member” with the Guevarist grito of «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!», as shown through the Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias taught for social transformation in Figure 2.1 above.

2.4. How Cuban Success Relates to Cuban Revolutionary Education

First, in § 2.4.1 below, this chapter compares Cuban education before the Cuban Revolution to Cuban education since the Cuban Revolution (i.e., Cuban Revolutionary education). If Cuban
Revolutionary education is determinedly better than Cuban education before the Cuban Revolution, then Cuban Revolutionary education is considered subjectively good, and so, § 2.3’s associated Cuban success is also considered subjectively good—even if within embargoed reason and, so, not yet as socioeconomically good as it could, or ethically should, be without embargoed reason—because success, especially good success, begins with good education.

Second, in § 2.4.2 below, this chapter also compares Cuban Revolutionary education to education in spaces with latinidades similar to the Cuban Revolutionary space’s own latinidad (i.e., in other Latin American and Caribbean spaces, but at the same time as the Cuban Revolutionary space). If Cuban Revolutionary education is determinedly better than education in spaces with latinidades similar to the Cuban Revolutionary space’s own latinidad, then Cuban Revolutionary education is considered objectively good, and so, § 2.3’s associated Cuban success is also considered objectively good—again, even if within embargoed reason and, so, not yet as socioeconomically good as it could, or ethically should, be without embargoed reason—because, again, success, especially good success, begins with good education. Third, in § 2.4.3 below, this chapter discusses in sum the results of the two comparisons made in §§ 2.4.1–2.4.2 below.

2.4.1. Cuban Education Before, Versus Since, the Cuban Revolution

First, regarding Cuban education before the Cuban Revolution, Cuban schools were established, teachers were trained, administrative practices were instituted, and textbooks were imported with

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30 Latinidad (pl. latinidades) is a Spanish term that translates to “Latino identity,” where the Spanish suffix, -idad, is taken from the Spanish-speaker’s word for the English-speaker’s “identity,” identidad (pl. identidades): “[T]he term [latinidad] emerged most strongly in literary studies as an abstract signifier that remitted us [Latinos] to the condition of being Latina/o” (Aparicio, 2017, p. 113). With an English, instead of Spanish, suffix, latinidad becomes “Latinity” (pl. “Latinities”). For added linguistic comprehension, noteworthy is that the English-speaker’s “Latinity” is morphologically similar to other English words of his, such as “humanity,” meaning “human identity” or “of humanness.” I translated all Spanish used in this footnote.
U.S. intervention disguised as assistance, after Cuban independence from Spain in 1898, when the U.S. defeated the former New World colonizer during the Spanish-American War (Johnston, 1996). Beginning in 1899, the U.S. Government assisted Cuba, or intervened in Cuban affairs, because the U.S. viewed itself as having the moral responsibility to help Cuba learn how to govern itself, or become more “civilized,” ideally with an Americansque positioning toward the U.S.’s own strategic end rife with U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy (Johnston, 1996). Still, successful self-governance in Cuba—as is similar elsewhere, including the U.S. (Zieger, 2008)—begins with the Garcíaist acción and ideas revolucionarias gained from the good education required for strategic benefit and potential value added at the individual and colectivo levels, as discussed above (Johnston, 1996).

However, Cuban education did not achieve the level of success the U.S. hoped. This lack of success is, in part, because U.S. policymaking failed to establish good education for good success. For example, the U.S. policymakers had trouble retaining trained annexationist teachers sent from the U.S. to Cuba with inadequate pay, and of those retained, ~40% were inadequately trained and resourced (e.g., no desks for students by 1912) (Johnston, 1996). Additionally, they were inadequately trained to teach cubanidad, but were equipped well enough to teach americanidad, or estadounidad, with lessons on U.S. war heroes and patriotic martyrs, who fought and/or died as Cuba’s false White saviors in the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Johnston, 1996).  

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31 Morphologically similar to the above term latinidad, the term cubanidad (pl. cubanidades) is a Spanish term that translates to “Cuban identity,” where the English-speaker’s “Cuban” is the Spanish-speaker’s cubano/a. With an English, instead of Spanish, suffix, cubanidad becomes “Cubanity” (pl. “Cubanities”). I translated all Spanish used in this footnote.

32 Also morphologically similar to the above term latinidad, the term estadounidad (pl. estadounidades) is a Spanish term that translates to “U.S. identity.” The term estadounidad derives from estadounidense, another Spanish term sometimes used to be more specific and to differentiate from yet another Spanish
Even before Chapter 1’s economic sanctions regime began under the Eisenhower administration (Prevost, 2007), the U.S. Government desired to swing the Cuban national mood in favor of U.S. geopolitics and what is now neoliberal, formerly liberal, strategy. Before democratization through U.S. global-development initiatives, direct and indirect, that began in the middle 20th century and continue up to today (e.g., Chapter 1’s Peace Corps), liberalism was taught to schoolchildren and famously internalized in the U.S.’s “vaunted liberal arts degree” (Phelan & Dawes, 2018, n.p.). It is important to note that this type of education that focuses on estadounidad, U.S. war heroes, and U.S. patriotic martyrs (e.g., former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, then-Colonel of the First U.S. Volunteer Cavalry nicknamed “Roosevelt’s Rough Riders” [National Park Service, 2020]) coincidentally precedes Cuban Revolutionary education’s focusing on cubanidad, Cuban war heroes, and Cuban patriotic martyrs (e.g., García Lavandero in Figure 2.1 above). Just as Cuban Revolutionary education teaches Garcíaist acción and ideas revolucionarias, in order to encourage a sense of cubanidad, so does U.S. education today—as in U.S.-“assisted” Cuba—teach Rooseveltian action and ideas, in order to encourage a sense of estadounidad. For example, today, Rooseveltian action and ideas are taught at the Roosevelt Institute at Cornell University (2023), which is a premier student-run think tank that empowers students by providing them with a platform to publish and circulate their [Rooseveltian] policy ideas [with action for a revolutionary tomorrow, or a tomorrow that works to transform society toward a greater, and ideally the

term, americano/a. While both estadounidense and americano/a mean “American” in English, they divide the English term’s double entendre. That is, while the English-speaker’s “American” means both “of the U.S.” and “of the Americas,” the Spanish-speaker’s estadounidense means only “of the U.S.,” while americano/a means both “of the U.S.” and “of the Americas,” similar to the English-speaker’s “American.” Therefore, estadounidad means only “U.S. identity,” while americanidad (pl. americanidades) means both “U.S. identity” and “American identity,” where the latter is an identity from anywhere within the Americas. In English, estadounidad and americanidad become “United Statesmanship” (pl. “United Statesmanships”) and “Americanity” (pl. “Americanities”), respectively. I translated all Spanish used in this footnote.
greatest, good possible, but from the U.S.’s own strategic positioning]. (n.p.)

See Chapter 1 for more information on the greater and greatest goods, as well as strategic positioning.

To boot, with U.S. control of Cuban land and Spanish control of the Cuban peso, Cuba suffered to provide industrial opportunity and job growth for the average, socio-centric Cuban in the post-Spanish-American War space (Johnston, 1996). What is more, despite, for example, an increase in the Afro-Cuban literacy rate from 24.5% in 1899 up to 45% in 1907, by 1912 and especially the 1920s, the quality of Cuban education had declined significantly, and so, the U.S. policymakers began to leave Cuba behind the U.S. (Johnston, 1996). Cuba’s having been left behind continues up to today, compounded by the economic sanctions regime’s negative economic development in the post-pandemic period, as Cuba remains among the least of these without equitable access to the limited U.S. resources yet unavailable at point (0,0) in Chapter 1.

In fact, the at-large literacy rate improved from 36% in 1899 up to 48% in 1919, but primarily because of already-educated immigrants (e.g., Spaniards) to the island (Johnston, 1996), which supports this notion that Cuba has been left behind, even if not at face value. Cuba’s being left behind in this way continued under the U.S.-backed Batista regime that eventually lost the Cuban Revolution to Castro, Guevara, and García Lavandero, among other war heroes and patriotic martyrs “re/membered.” For example, under Batista’s leadership, the at-large literacy rate showed no sign of future growth and remained stagnant at 76.4% because, for another example, only 3% of Cubans had completed secondary school in Pinar del Río (Johnston, 1996), which is now home to Escuela Primaria Eduardo García Lavandero, a

33 While the Roosevelt Institute at Cornell University is named after former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as his then-First Lady Elenore Roosevelt (Roosevelt Institute, 2023), herein, the term “Rooseveltian” refers to both Franklin D. Roosevelt and his fifth cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, per the New York Times’ (Kristoff, 2021) and American Affairs’ (Stagg Istre, 2020) usages of the term.
Garcíanist school that, along with the rest of Cuba in the Cuban Revolutionary space, boasts the at-large literacy rate at 100% because of Castro’s wildly successful National Literacy Campaign of 1961 (Rey, 2021).

During the Year of Education, which was 1961, “the revolutionary leadership […] fulfill[ed] a long-standing commitment to eradicate illiteracy as part of the [Cuban] [R]evolution’s educational reform program” (Fagen, 2003, p. 386). On May 14, 1961, to:

underline[] the relationship among [the] neocolonialism, underdevelopment, and educational backwardness [of U.S. interventionist strategy] […] Castro exhorted departing [National Literacy Campaign Volunteers, like Lewis et al. (2003), who acted quite similar to Peace Corps Volunteers today, but within-country]: “The battle to be won against ignorance will give our country more glory than the military battles already fought or still to be fought. . . . While [U.S. economic] imperialism wants to destroy us and our revolution[ary] [social transformation], we [the colectivo of a ‘new man’] are going to destroy [U.S. economic] imperialism[’s] [economic sanctions regime of an interventionist strategy] with our example [of Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias], our success.” (emphases added) (Fagen, 2003, p. 386)

In brief, Castro recognized in 1961 that which this research also recognizes in 2023: In the Cuban Revolutionary space, sustainable development begins with education and how good the education is, ultimately, for the colectivo. What is more, Castro’s “example [of Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias]” included the establishment of 10,000 new Garcíanist schools “in only twenty months—that is to say, that in such a brief period of time, the number of rural schools that had been built over fifty years ha[d] been doubled [with enough teachers retained for the many classrooms]” (Prieto, 1981, p. 215).

Still, in recognition of not only Cuba’s, but the average Cuban’s, having been left behind by U.S. policymakers throughout the first half of the 20th century, a dual desire has blossomed for (1) no U.S. intervention via strategic policymaking (e.g., no economic sanctions regime that began under the U.S.-backed Batista regime), and (2) sovereign Cuban statehood, or patria (Johnston, 1996). Today, the ideal patria exists in a future Cuban space-time, with Cuba’s
sovereign personhood and sovereign equality from Chapter 1 recognized by the U.S. Government on the international stage, as well as without U.S. economic imperialism and neocolonial policymaking. In other words, the Cuban Revolutionary space’s patria hopes to fully satisfy that which has been popularized by patriotic martyrs, namely García Lavandero: the colectivo’s Garcianist desire for the above, liberating «ideales emancipadores de la Isla» for a future Cuba without U.S. interventionist strategy in the Cuban economy discussed in Chapter 1 (ideal #1), in the Cuban education discussed in this chapter (ideal #2), and elsewhere in the Cuban space-time (ideales #3–n) (Madrazo Sosa, 2020, n.p.).

Regardless, in the second quarter of the 20th century, Cubans began to adopt the term patria, a term that has ultimately given rise to what the colectivo now cries with Garcianist meaning in the Cuban Revolutionary space: «¡Patria o muerte!», which is a Guevarist cry of cultural expression akin to other (Latin) American spaces’ revolutionary war cries, like the Paraguayan’s «¡República o muerte!», but especially, and rather ironically, the American’s “Give me liberty, or give me death!” (David, 2021; Guevara, 1964a; Guevara, 1964b; Guevara, 1967; Henry, 1775; Historic St. John’s Church, 2015; JR videos, 2017; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2022; Rubiani, 2016; United Nations, 2009).

As such, the colectivo’s cultural adoption of the term, patria, began with the initial U.S. intervention that caused the average Cuban to feel more neocolonized by U.S. “Crown” rule than liberated from Spanish Crown rule because of the poor education that, regardless of his willingness to gain industrial opportunity and job growth, denied his ability to do so without a sense of cubanidad. That is, he was denied his ability to be taught what are now the Garcianist acción and ideas revolucionarias gained from the good education needed to add value at the individual and colectivo levels, which is socioeconomic success and strong Cubanomics.
This is not to say that U.S. educators should never be sent to Cuba, but that they should be sent without U.S. interventionist strategy toward the U.S.’s own strategic end. If sent, they should be sent as apolitical actors for the ethical purpose of assisting Cuba toward its own desired end, not toward the U.S.’s desired end for Cuba, unless the two desired ends align at the same time. Cuba is not the U.S., but has its own character independent of the U.S.’s—and all other sovereign nations’—own character, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Thus, especially with Guevara’s ghost of a patriotic martyr now slain by the same U.S. Government that has left Cuba behind (Yaffe, 2009), the average Cuban in the Cuban Revolutionary space now cries not only, «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!», but also, «¡Patria o muerte!»; they cry these Guevarist cries because of this unique U.S.–Cuban history “re/membered” in the Garcíaist schools that now teach the Cuban Revolutionary education, with the acción and ideas revolucionarias taught in honor of García Lavandero’s ghost of another patriotic martyr also slain by the U.S. Government, albeit indirectly by the U.S.-backed Batista regime (Madrazo Sosa, 2020).

Therefore, while educational data from before the Cuban Revolution remain largely unavailable because of Cuba’s then-developing status and limited resource availability in the early-to-middle 20th century—as well as, perhaps, because of political reasons—this chapter nevertheless holds that the U.S.–Cuban history above leaves ample room for educational development, and greater success possible for it, in the Cuban Revolutionary space, as exampled by the aforementioned National Literacy Campaign of 1961. The bar was set low in the early-to-middle 20th century, up through U.S.-backed Batista’s defeat in 1959.

Due to the bar set low, now regarding Cuban education since the Cuban Revolution, Cuba not only boasts the at-large literacy rate at 100% (The City University of New York, 2011;
Rey, 2021). According to data available from 1969 up to 1988 in the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook sourced from the United Nations, Cuba also boasts improved total numbers of teachers retained (i.e., the problem identified above because of inadequate pay under U.S. interventionist policymaking in the early 20th century) and students enrolled, as well as reduced students-per-teacher (SPT) ratios because of the growing number of teachers retained, despite the growing number of students enrolled (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998).

More specifically, according to the data available for all primary schools from 1969 up to 1988, the total number of teachers retained increased from 52,008 up to 73,216 (+40.778%), and the SPT ratio decreased from 21:1 down to 12:1 (~42.857%), though the total number of students enrolled decreased from 1,427,607 down to 899,936 (~36.962%) (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998). However, according to the World Bank (2023), the decreased total number of students enrolled is because of gradually fewer children born from 1963 up to 1982 (i.e., the youngest year to enter primary school by 1988) in not only Cuba, but all nations indexed similar to Cuba, especially “small countries,” “Caribbean small countries,” and “Latin American and Caribbean countries” (n.p.).

Still, according to the data available for all secondary schools from 1969 up to 1988, the total number of teachers retained increased from 19,732 up to 108,078 (+447.73%), the total number of students enrolled increased from 266,651 up to 1,127,035 (+322.663%), and the SPT ratio decreased from 14:1 down to 10:1 (~28.571%) (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998). Also, according to the data available for all tertiary schools from 1969 up to 1988, the total number of teachers retained increased from 5,725 up to 24,499 (+327.93%), the total number of students enrolled increased from 55,435 up to 242,366 (+337.208%), and the SPT ratio decreased from 12:1 down to 10:1 (~16.667%) (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998).
Last, according to the data available across all primary, secondary, and tertiary schools from 1969 up to 1988, the overall SPT ratio decreased from 20%–24% down to 11%, where 20% includes tertiary schools, but 24% does not because of unavailable data at the time (Aguirre & Vichot, 1998). As a result, Cuban Revolutionary education seems to have improved, given the unavailable data from before the bar set low and according to all indices measured between all primary, secondary, and tertiary schools in the same Cuban Revolutionary space at the same Cuban time. This improvement suggests correlated improvement in ability to learn the Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias gained from good education needed to add value at the individual and colectivo levels in the Cuban Revolutionary space, which would be socioeconomic success and strong Cubanomics. The only arguable exception to the improved education is the above change in the total number of students in primary school, but this decrease is comparable to all similar spaces at the same time (World Bank, 2023).

Therefore, regardless of lacking confidence because of comparable data unavailable from before the Cuban Revolution, this chapter confirms, within reason and with the bar set low, the literature’s seeming affirmation that Cuban education has improved since the Cuban Revolution. In kind, Cuban Revolutionary education is determinedly better than Cuban education before the Cuban Revolution, despite U.S. policymaking’s negative impacts before and since the Cuban Revolution, which means that Cuban Revolutionary education is considered subjectively good (i.e., good, according to Cuban standards), and so, § 2.3’s associated Cuban success is also considered subjectively good—even if within embargoed reason—because, as aforementioned, success begins with education and how good the education is for the individual and, in turn, the colectivo, per Cubanomics. Still, largely because of the economic sanctions regime, the Cuban success had to date, while seemingly good despite all odds, is not as great as it
socioeconomically could, or ethically should, be sans embargo and extraterritorial effects.

2.4.2. **Cuban Revolutionary Education Versus Education in Spaces with Latinidades Similar to the Cuban Revolutionary Space’s Own Latinidad**

Next, regarding education in spaces with *latinidades* similar to the Cuban Revolutionary space’s own *latinidad*, traditionally, the education is not as good as in Cuba, according to Carnoy and Marshall (2005). Carnoy and Marshall’s (2005) traditional claim suggests that either (1) Cuba is more developed socioeconomically than comparable sovereign nations with *latinidades* similar to Cuba’s own *latinidad*, or (2) Cuba possesses the ability to be more developed socioeconomically than comparable sovereign nations with *latinidades* similar to Cuba’s own *latinidad*. Regardless, both conclusions suppose greater ability on the part of the Cuban people than on the parts of comparable peoples with *latinidades* similar to Cubans’ own *latinidad*. Still, this is not to suggest that there is no room for improvement in Cuba, especially according to the younger generation in Cuba (Tompson et al., 2017), and as considered with the higher-quality education possible without embargoed reason in Chapter 1.

The fundamental reason for greater ability on the part of the Cuban people is that, on average, Cuban students exceed other Latino students on standardized math and language tests (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). Let “Latino students” be “students with *latinidades* similar to Cuban students’ own *latinidad*.” Still, ceteris paribus, the average Cuban student’s objectively exceeding all other average Latino students on standardized math and language tests further supports this chapter’s above claim that Cuban education since the Cuban Revolution is successful in the Cuban Revolutionary space with Garcíaist schools.

For example, when comparing the average Cuban student to the average Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican students of the same or similar grade level, the average Cuban student
receives higher standardized math and language test scores because the average Cuban student does not have to perform child labor (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). Child labor, according to the International Labour Organization (n.d.) and as termed herein, has to do with “[t]he participation of children or adolescents [not yet] above the minimum age for admission to employment in work that does […] interfere with their schooling” (emphasis added) (n.p.). Contrarily, the average Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican students do have to perform child labor and, as a result, lose time for their studies (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). Such is an example of opportunity cost, where the average Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican students’ respective opportunity costs are each more expensive than the average Cuban student’s opportunity cost to become a more educated individual who can benefit the colectivo, per Cubanomics.

For another example, when comparing the average Cuban student to the average Argentine, Bolivian, and Colombian students of the same or similar grade level, the average Cuban student receives higher standardized math and language test scores because the average Cuban student experiences less violence, both inside (e.g., bullying) and outside (e.g., street crime) the classroom (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). Contrarily, the average Argentine, Bolivian, and Colombian students experience more violence, both inside and outside the classroom (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005), which suggests that the students struggle to focus on their studies because of problems with psychosocial stressors within the school and community environments. These psychosocial stressors do not appear to be present, or as significant, in the Cuban Revolutionary space’s school and community environments because of differences in Cuban culture, as discussed in the reasons immediately hereunder.

Cultural reasons for the average Cuban student’s success are three (3), but add to overall better school and community environments for the average Cuban student. (1) The first reason is
that each socio-centric generation since the Cuban Revolution invests in the younger generations across time, such that the younger generation at any given time experiences a compounded investment from all older generations across time (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). Such is a sustained investment for Cuban Revolutionary education in Garcianist schools throughout the Cuban Revolutionary space.

The second reason is that those who invest sustainably in Cuban students also pressure the Garcianist schools to maintain high-quality education throughout the Cuban Revolutionary space and across the same space’s time (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). For example, § 2.4.1’s improved total numbers of teachers retained across primary, secondary, and tertiary schools mathematically determines high quantity. However, when “re/membering” § 2.4.1’s correlation between weak teacher retention and inadequate pay under U.S. interventionist policymaking in the early 20th century, competitive pay at Garcianist schools now improves not only teacher quantity with higher teacher retention rates (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005). It also improves teacher quality because, with competitive pay, more talented and higher-quality teachers do not need to make the financial decision to go into different industries with better pay, which is the third reason: (3) Teachers can afford to be teachers in the Cuban space-time (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005).

This ability to afford a career as a teacher with between-industry competitive pay supports § 2.3’s above evidence that, on average, 31.5% of Cubans consider successful the individual’s household with the added value of household income at ~+22.5%/HH because of, for example, between-industry competitive pay for teachers. In turn, this household-level success supported by between-industry competitive pay itself supports § 2.3’s other evidence that, on average, 52% of Cubans also consider successful the colectivo because it is the household’s
individual (e.g., competitively paid teachers) who buys, affordably, into the colectivo’s success. With such individuals’ buying into the colectivo’s success because of happiness with household-level success, Cuba, even within embargoed reason, can afford its popularly valued socialist positioning at a safe distance from the U.S. neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics. Cyclically, and still within embargoed reason, since Cuba can afford its popularly valued socialist positioning with individuals who buy, affordably, into the highly nationalized system, Cuba can also afford to pay competitively its popularly valued teachers—and, assumedly, other workers between nationalized industries—which supports § 2.3’s final evidence that, on average, 88.5% of Cubans consider successful Cuba’s socialist positioning, despite the economic sanctions regime of a failed policy collective (Kaplowitz, 1998).

2.4.3. Cuban Education Compared in Sum

Therefore, as reasoned above, when compared to Cuban education before the Cuban Revolution, as well as education in similar spaces with latinidades similar to Cuba’s own latinidad, Cuban Revolutionary education is considered not only subjectively better than Cuban education before the Cuban Revolution, but also objectively better than education in similar spaces with latinidades similar to Cuba’s own latinidad, despite room for improvement, ideally along Chapter 1’s post-pandemic productivity frontier.34 In other words, Cuban Revolutionary

34 By this point in the chapter, the reader may wonder why I only advocate to send SMEs to Cuba, instead of to the other Latin American and Caribbean sovereign nations with worse education than Cuba. For two (2) main reasons, sovereign nations with poorer educational outcomes on average than Cuba, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Colombia, are unconsidered for the alternative resolution herein:

(1) Such discussion is outside the scope of this research, which chiefly regards the international relationship, or rather lack thereof, between the U.S. and Cuba, as well as Cuba’s place in the world afforded in large part because of the lacking U.S.–Cuban relations; and

(2) Cuba is the sovereign nation within Chapter 1’s embargoed reason, and as a result, remains with a reasonably lesser ability to utilize the limited resources available for development, including economic and educational developments, than the other sovereign nations without embargoed reason—i.e., those not among the least of these at point (0,0) in Chapter 1, who, regardless of willingness, are more equitably able to utilize Chapter 1’s U.S. technology (e.g., Zoom,
education with Garcíánist schools is considered both subjectively and objectively good, but within embargoed reason that leaves room for improvement with U.S., or at least Americasque, technology-related OE that is teachable in the Cuban classroom for resource utilization outside the classroom (cf. Chapter 1), where income and job growths may be more directly impacted by the higher-quality education.

Since Cuban success is, Cubanomically, associated with Cuban education, as greater Cuban success begins with greater Cuban education, subjectively and objectively, this twofold goodness of Cuban education permits Cuban success to be likewise twice the rate of what is good. With twice-good Cuban education comes twice-good Cuban success permissible for Cubans in the Cuban Revolutionary space, who experience an average quality of life that is relatively better than the average quality of life for Cubans before the Cuban Revolution (e.g., under U.S. interventionist policymaking in the early 20th century and under the U.S.-backed Batista regime), but also relatively better than the average qualities of life for other Latinos in spaces with latinidades similar to Cuba’s own latinidad since the Cuban Revolution. This notion suggests that, even within embargoed reason, Cuba is relatively successful at self-governance, despite the U.S.’s ideal for a more Americasque positioning toward the U.S.’s own strategic end rife with U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy. Still, as aforementioned, this is not to suggest that there is no room for improvement in Cuba, especially without embargoed reason.

ChatGPT), with a higher total quantity and quality possible closer to the U.S.-led post-pandemic productivity frontier (cf. Chapter 1). Still, this is not to say if the U.S. should or should not assist other interested sovereign nations without embargoed reason, but simply that such a determination remains outside the scope of this research. To boot, in the post-pandemic period, certain sovereign nations with poorer educational outcomes on average than Cuba, namely Mexico, already receive U.S. assistance for educational development offered through SMEs in Peace Corps service (U.S. Mission to Mexico, 2022). As such, the more appropriate question might not be whether the U.S. should or should not assist, for example, interested Mexico, but whether the U.S. assistance already offered to Mexico (and others) best helps to set Mexico (and others) on a positive trajectory toward Mexico’s (and others’) own strategic end.
Also, whereas Sotgiu’s (2016) “happiness,” ceteris paribus, equals the “success” in § 2.3 above, arguable is that, with twice-good Cuban education comes not only twice-good Cuban success, but also twice-good Cuban happiness. Arguable, then, is that, on average, Cubans since the Cuban Revolution are subjectively happier than Cubans before the Cuban Revolution, as well as objectively happier than comparable Latinos in spaces with latinidades similar to Cuba’s own latinidad since the Cuban Revolution.

Even within embargoed reason, if Cubans in the Cuban Revolutionary space are increasingly more educated, more successful, and happier on average, with compounded investment from older generations across time, then the same Cubans, at the individual level, will reasonably continue to invest in the colectivo who learns to cry the Guevarist grito of «¡Cuba, sí! ¡Yanquis, no!» and «¡Patria o muerte!» in the people’s ongoing, revolutionary lucha for liberation from U.S. economic imperialism and neocolonial policymaking.

And, as long as the socialist Cuban Government can afford to sustain, and perhaps further, its political distance from that which strongly encourages its people to join the lucha (i.e., U.S. geopolitics and neoliberal strategy), then individuals will reasonably continue to join the colectivo organized by the Garcíanist acción and ideas revolucionarias learned as schoolchildren in the Garcíanist schools with high-quality and relatively well-paid teachers who profess Cuban Revolutionary education’s truth of a Guevarist grito. In such a case, Washington is not expected to be able to bend Havana to its will for a neoliberal doctrine of capitalist socioeconomics in Cuba, even within embargoed reason.

2.5. Conclusion with Areas for Further Research in This Chapter’s Interdisciplinary Space

From a socioeconomic, namely Cubanomic, perspective, Cuban success is considered both
subjectively and objectively good because the education upon which the success is built is also considered both subjectively and objectively good. Still, the subjective goodness remains an unofficial claim because of this chapter’s current impossibility to compare data unavailable from before the Cuban Revolution to the data available since the Cuban Revolution. As reasoned above, though, the claim of subjective goodness is made in good faith, based on the limited information available today.

Still, the Cuban Revolutionary space is a relatively better space than all other spaces considered hereabove and with *latinidades* similar to Cuba’s own *latinidad*, despite the economic sanctions regime. The Cuban Revolutionary space’s being relatively better is exampled by the facts that, on average, (1) Cuba is without child labor; (2) Cuban schoolchildren are kind to one another in their respective school environments; and (3) Cuban communities invest with intergenerationally compounded interest in the schoolchildren’s school environments, but also their community environments, such that there are little or no street crime and other psychosocial stressors.

Therefore, through the exploration in this chapter’s interdisciplinary space, and within the embargoed reason explored in Chapter 1, the relationship between Cuban education and Cuban success is considered good in both ways, that is, subjectively and objectively, but from a socioeconomic perspective and the average Cuban’s point of view. Still, further research in this chapter’s interdisciplinary space may consider four (4) more Freirean questions of how, which add to those already asked in § 2.1 and answered above:

1. How might the U.S.’s lifting the embargo strategically benefit Cuban Revolutionary education in today’s Cuban Revolutionary space (e.g., with U.S. technology-related OE teachable toward Cuba’s own strategic end for potential value added to the *colectivo* of a
macro-target population over time, as discussed in Chapter 1)?

(2) How does the definition of “success” differ between Cubans currently in and not yet in the Garcíanist schools?

(3) How do education and success in Cuba, both past and present, objectively compare to education and success in the U.S., both past and present? and

(4) How do education and success in Cuba’s past objectively compare to education and success in similar sovereign nations’ pasts?
CHAPTER 3

Cuba, According to Cubans:

Desirability, Feasibility, and Viability at the Current Time $t_n$
3.1. Introduction

Chapter 1 previously explores international development economics and policy, namely Cuba’s negative economic development encouraged by U.S. policy on the international stage. Following Chapter 1, Chapter 2 previously explores education and development, namely Cuban education and its development in the Cuban space-time. This chapter concludes Chapters 1 and 2, with a discussion on how to possibly improve Cuban education, so that the Cuban society has the ability to become more economically developed and viable, despite the U.S. policy.

However, this chapter’s discussion is not intended to be as comprehensive as the first two chapters’ explorations. It is not intended to be as comprehensive because Chapters 1 and 2 serve largely to fill in any observable gaps in the literature that, for example, largely disregards the average, socio-centric Cuban’s point of view in Chapter 2. Further, it is not intended to be as comprehensive because this chapter serves as a mere introduction to how to determine what may or may not be possible as an alternative resolution proposed for short-term and sustainable strategic benefit and value added within embargoed reason at the current time $t_n$. Recommended is that further research uses the tools and techniques expressed in this chapter, in order to ascertain the levels of desirability, feasibility, and viability for Chapter 1’s alternative resolution proposed herein for future hypothesis testing.

Still, the reader may wonder why the hypothesis testing is not done in this chapter. The reason is simple: time. As attestable by anyone else who, like me, has background knowledge of public administration, time is the limited resource with the most value (Blackwill, 2020), perhaps especially regarding (1) economics (Węgrzyn & Miłaszewicz, 2021), (2) education (Unger et al., 2008), and (3) (1) and (2)’s relation to the COVID-19 pandemic (De Jesus & Garcia, 2023; Sripada & Ulmer, 2020; Wheatly et al., 2023): “There is a fallacious assumption that time is a
free commodity that can be used without regard to marginal productivity. There is always an
opportunity cost involved in giving up an alternative activity” (Jones, 1970, p. 27). This research
was written over the course of one year at Cornell University (2022–2023), which is,
unfortunately, not enough time to do the hypothesis testing in this chapter, along with all else
done. Another part of this research would have had to have been sacrificed as an alternative
activity worth less than the hypothesis testing. However, such a sacrifice could not be reasonably
made because, for example, the observable gaps in the literature needed to be filled, sometimes
quite more than marginally, so that he who does the hypothesis testing might have enough
background knowledge of the subject matter at hand, independent of his skill to test hypotheses.
As such, a proposition, not a set of hypotheses, is primarily considered hereunder because the
desired data have yet to be collected and analyzed to test the proposition as a set of hypotheses.

Regardless, consider track and field’s distance medley relay, the first and second legs of
which are, respectively, three laps (=1,200 meters) and one lap (=400 meters) around the
standard outdoor track (Becton, 2022). Consider, next, that Chapters 1–3 of this research are
representative of the first leg’s three laps. Now, having completed my three laps of research, I
pass the baton of a proposition to the reader for another lap of hypothesis testing.

3.2. Desirability, Feasibility, and Viability (DFV) Analysis

In DFV analysis, (1) desirability (D), (2) feasibility (F), and (3) viability (V) are three (3)
intersecting lenses that are built upon opportunity for real-world potential (Gomez, 2023),
especially a technologically fit opportunity that is also competitively appreciated and
developmentally affordable (Thaveesangsakulthai, 2020). While DFV analysis is traditionally a
design-thinking tool used in business administration (SOIL Institute of Management, 2022),
from a public-administration perspective that borrows the private-sector tool, an opportunity that
is competitively appreciated, or less likely to sustain the current economic hardship most undesired in Cuba (cf. Chapter 1), is also desirable; an opportunity that is technologically fit, or able to be possible because of a high-enough total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for educational—and, in turn, economic—development in Cuba (cf. Chapter 1), is also feasible; and an opportunity that is developmentally affordable, or culturally acceptable, as exampled by taxes payable and paid, for an improved and a sustainable socioeconomic reality throughout the Cuban space-time (cf. Chapter 2), is also viable. In other words, a DFV analysis from a public-administration perspective, as my own, may consider the following three (3) questions:

(1) D: Is the alternative resolution proposed that which the target population desires and values more than all other alternative resolutions proposed and proposable at the time? (a) In other words, in Cuba’s unique situation, is appreciation expected with more growth and opportunity competitively added than the growth and opportunity both (i) currently experienced and (ii) expected to be experienced with all other alternative resolutions?

(2) F: Are the required infrastructure (e.g., classrooms) and limited resources feasibly available and/or developable for the alternative resolution proposed? and (a) In other words, in Cuba’s unique situation, is the technology (able to become) fit enough for development purposes and in a timely and cost-effective manner?

(3) V: Is the proposed alternative resolution economically viable and financially securable, as with taxes payable and paid to fund research and development for stronger socioeconomics via growth and opportunity possible with technological change valued today and in the future, especially the near future?
(a) In other words, in Cuba’s unique situation, is the proposed alternative resolution’s development affordable, including by eventually paying for itself, across the Cuban space-time of today and tomorrow?

Such are three (3) important questions for the Alternative Resolution Team to keep in mind.

Regardless, an appropriate example of an especially technologically fit opportunity that is also competitively appreciated and developmentally affordable is thought to be Chapter 1’s alternative resolution proposed. The alternative resolution proposed is thought to be such because it altogether considers this research’s economic growth and opportunity possible for less economic hardship (competitively appreciated), beginning with higher-quality education via an increase in the total quantity and quality of the limited resources available for the resource utilization taught (technologically fit)—as through the collaboration between U.S. subject-matter experts (SMEs) and their Cuban counterparts for Americanesque technology-related OE gained within the Cuban economy—to strategically benefit and add value to the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population with not only higher-quality education secured, but also income and job growths that permit society to cyclically invest in the higher-quality education, over time (developmentally affordable).

3.2.1. D: Desirability

Specifically regarding the alternative resolution proposed, desirability has to do with whether, on average, the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population, including the interested Cuban universities with whom the U.S. universities would collaborate, as well as the Cuban businesses and schools interested in within-country resource utilization of the Americanesque technology developed and taught at the interested Cuban universities:

(1) Wants the total amount of economic growth and opportunity possible for Cuba at large,
beginning, with scalability, in each interested Cuban university’s respective community 
(Mastering UX, 2022; Thaveesangsakulthai, 2020); and 

(2) Considers the alternative resolution proposed as the utilitarianly best alternative activity 
for solving Cuba’s most undesired problem of economic hardship because of, ultimately, 
strategic benefit and value addable, beginning at the current time $t_n$ (Cortina, 2022; 
Mayer & Pero Parker, 2018).

The utilitarianly best alternative is, as discussed in Chapter 1, the activity that benefits as much 
of the target population as possible with a good state of affairs “no worse than the effects of the 
alternatives open [including the economic sanctions regime as is, that is, without any alternative 
resolution to the unique Cuban situation proposed within embargoed reason]” (Lyons, 1965, p. 
vii).

Further, while a common research tool, like a survey, may be used to assess desirability 
(Wlömert et al., 2019), recommended herein is a mixed-methods, contemporary, and creative 
approach that reaches the evermore technologically savvy Cuban in the New Media Age. The 
evermore technologically savvy Cuban is exampled by the annual increase in Cuban utilization 
of Chinese smartphones (Statista Research Department, 2023), which are, for all intents and 
purposes, Americanesque technology, but made with Chinese, not Cuban, resources that mimic 
the U.S. technology of iPhones and the like because of “[t]he [Cuban] [G]overnment’s [recent] 
digital push [in the New Media Age]” (Perlmutter, 2021, n.p.). Also, for utilitarianism’s sake and 
while preventing, or at least minimizing, bias (Choi & Pak, 2005), the approach should honestly 
try to equitably reach the Cuban citizen by meeting him wherever he might be located, 
including along society’s margins, as do Cervantes-Soon (2017) and Orellana (2009).

Discussed next is a creative, yet contemporarily technological, way to assess the
alternative resolution’s desirability for the target population in each target area (e.g., in each interested Cuban university’s respective community). Ideally, the sum of these target populations across all target areas should adequately represent and equitably include the diverse whole of the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population in the at-large target area of Cuba.

Initial target areas might include each interested Cuban university’s respective community because, especially at first, such are where the most direct impacts are expected from the alternative resolution’s intended outcomes (e.g., stronger economic growth and opportunity with within-country resource utilization of the Americanesque technology shared between local businesses in partnership). Such are where the most direct impacts are expected, given (1) greater proximity to the alternative resolution’s centers for research and development at each interested Cuban university, and in turn, (2) greater influence for technology adoption because of greater, or more immediate, access to the Americanesque technology developed (Czaja et al., 2006). See Figure 3.1 immediately below for the initial target areas recommended with the most direct impacts expected from the alternative resolution’s intended outcomes.

* * *

**Figure 3.1**

*Initial Target Areas Recommended with the Most Direct Impacts Expected*
Note. Hereunder are the cities recommended with a Cuban university that, in my own educated judgement and based on the careers that the universities respectively teach (e.g., engineering informatics), might be interested in the alternative resolution proposed. The following numbers correspond to the numbered cities on Figure 3.1’s map of Cuba. Beneath each numbered city is a respective university of possible interest in the city. Last, beneath each university per city is/are the respective university’s career(s) taught and relevant to the alternative resolution proposed and the DFV analysis for it (e.g., engineering informatics for the dynamic quick-response [QR] codes explored in Illustration 3.1 below):

1) Camagüey

   (a) Universidad de Camagüey “Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz” (UC) (2023)

      (i) Informatics and exact sciences

2) Ciego de Ávila

   (a) Universidad de Ciego de Ávila “Máximo Gómez Báez” (UNICA) (2023)

      (i) Business, informatics and exact sciences, technical sciences

3) Cienfuegos

   (a) Universidad de Cienfuegos “Carlos Rafael Rodríguez” (UCf) (n.d.)

      (i) Education economics, engineering informatics, industrial engineering, mechanical engineering

4) La Habana

   (a) Universidad de La Habana (UH) (2022)

      (i) Technologies

5) Holguín

   (a) Universidad de Holguín “Oscar Lucero Moya” (UHo) (2023)
Regardless, a creative, yet contemporarily technological, way to assess the alternative resolution’s desirability in Figure 3.1’s initial target areas is with dynamic QR codes. Unlike static QR codes, dynamic QR codes are changeable and gather tracking metrics for analysis (Stein, 2020). Dynamic QR codes commonly embed a uniform resource locator (URL) that, once scanned, lands the user onto a desired landing page, like a Web-based survey, that gathers
information and collects data for intelligence purposes (Denso Wave Incorporated, 2023). The information gathered and data collected may include the survey results, but also the total number of scans per site, digital and physical, and each operating system utilized for the scanning (Denso Wave Incorporated, 2023).

Knowing, for example, the total number of scans per site may help the Alternative Resolution Team to understand which types of landing pages (digital sites) are more beneficial for the final analysis, assuming that different types of landing pages’ URLs are embedded into different dynamic QR codes in the target areas (physical sites). Knowing, for another example, each operating system utilized for scanning can help the Alternative Resolution Team to reduce data redundancy in the final analysis. However, knowing each operating system utilized for scanning can also help with knowing what individuals do (i.e., hard evidence; e.g., knowing that individuals of one age bracket tend to interact with a given dynamic QR code more than individuals of another age bracket, but in the same target area), instead of just what individuals say (i.e., verbal statistics; e.g., “I do not often utilize technology,” reports a hypothetical individual, who subjectively considers himself to be someone who does not often utilize technology, but who also objectively does often utilize technology, according to the hard evidence from the data collected on how many times his unique operating system has interacted with the given dynamic QR code) (Sowell, 2018; Thomas SowellTV, 2022).

Still, a survey is satisfactory for desirability assessment (Ponto, 2015), as long as the survey is appropriately made accessible to the target population, including those along society’s margins, that has a growing cultural interest in technology (e.g., the aforementioned Chinese smartphones that can reasonably scan dynamic QR codes). However, while utilization of dynamic QR codes may be culturally appropriate, especially given “[t]he [Cuban]
[G]overnment’s [recent] digital push [in the New Media Age]” (Perlmutter, 2021, n.p.), utilizing the dynamic QR codes in any which way may not always be culturally appropriate, or may not always be most culturally appropriate. That is, how the Alternative Resolution Team utilizes the dynamic QR codes may be more culturally appropriate in one target area than another target area, hence the call for a contemporarily technological way that is also a creative way to assess the alternative resolution’s desirability.

For example, one such creative, yet contemporarily technological, way to appropriately assess desirability might be to design street art that is made with dynamic QR codes, but in the shape of either Chapter 2’s Cuban Revolutionary War hero, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, or the same chapter’s patriotic martyr, Eduardo García Lavandero. In one target area, Guevara might be the more culturally appropriate choice, but in another target area, García Lavandero might instead be the more culturally appropriate choice, according to the two target populations’ respective values considered at the time. Selected dynamic QR codes within the shape can also be colorized (Denso Wave Incorporated, 2019), so as to give the shape defining characteristics, like a red background that mimics Irish artist Jim Fitzpatrick’s (1968) famous silk screening of Guevara. See Illustration 3.1 immediately below for an example of street art made with dynamic QR codes. See, also, Figure 3.2 further below for Fitzpatrick’s (1968) stylized image of Guevara.

* * *
Illustration 3.1

An Example of a Creative Way to Perform Desirability Assessment Within a Target Area

Note. Taken by me on March 8, 2023, Illustration 3.1’s photograph is of street art made with dynamic QR codes on public display in Syracuse, New York. When designing such street art for a creative, yet contemporarily technological, way to appropriately assess desirability, the following are some important questions to consider, according to my own experience with how to professionally utilize dynamic QR codes for growth and opportunity, albeit in Germany:

(1) Where should the street art’s dynamic QR codes land the user?

(2) Should the dynamic QR codes all land the user on the same landing page?
(3) How should the landing page be designed, so that it is as culturally appropriate as possible, according to the average user in each target area?

(4) How should the dynamic QR codes be displayed? That is, what is the most culturally appropriate, least offensive, and most attractive way to display the street art in each target area (e.g., in the shape of either Guevara or García Lavandero)? and

(5) Where should the Alternative Resolution Team locate the street art made with dynamic QR codes (e.g., on the side of a building, as in Illustration 3.1)? That is, where is the most equitably accessible site to include as many diverse users as possible, as well as to gather as many diverse opinions as possible, for more utilitarian outcomes intended?

* * *

**Figure 3.2**

*Fitzpatrick’s (1968) Famous Silk Screening of Guevara*
Still, another option for a creative, yet technologically contemporary, way to assess the alternative resolution’s desirability is with term frequency–inverse document frequency (tf–idf). However, this other way is not as technologically contemporary because it does not similarly involve the Cuban citizenry’s participation. Participation, such as community engagement, is an important part of how technology is used today (Attygalle, 2015). Regardless, tf–idf is used in information retrieval of data, latent and otherwise, which are uncoverable in graffiti, billboards, flyers, commercial advertisements, newspaper articles, news media transcripts, and any other relevant cultural artifacts that are text-based and that may represent the Cuban society, especially the target population in the target area, including society’s values, throughout the Cuban space at the current time $t_n$ (e.g., no news media transcripts from, say, 50 years ago because, while they are cultural artifacts that are text-based and that may represent the Cuban society, they do not reasonably represent the Cuban society today—i.e., the data may have become stale).

In brief and largely from my professional experience with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), tf–idf is a text representation scheme that “appli[es] a numerical statistic to a word [or term] that [is] representative of its importance [or weight] within” not only the individual text, but society at large (Naushan, 2020, n.p.). This might be likened to trend analysis. At least in theory, the more times a particular term appears (e.g., the terms información artificial and I.A., which are Spanish for, respectively, “artificial intelligence” and “A.I.” [translated by me]), the more confident the Alternative Resolution Team might become in having
identified that which is desired or desirable at the current time $t_n$. The goal is to identify how many times a term appears over a specific time span, as well as how the appearances cluster, but still at the current time $t_n$.

At the current time $t_n$, a time span may be, say, from 01/01/2022 up to 12/31/2022 (ordered) or from 03/13/2020 up to 10/16/2020 (random). The reader may notice that March 13, 2020, is from Chapter 1, when the Trump administration “declare[d] a nationwide emergency” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2023a, n.p.) and Zoom’s share price was at US$107.47 (Aboulezz, 2021). The reader may also notice that October 16, 2020, is also from Chapter 1, when, at its peri-pandemic peak, Zoom’s share price was instead at US$559.00 (+420.145%) (Nasdaq, 2023). Time spans from one date up to another date should be intelligently chosen in such a way for tf–idf that is intelligently designed for the design-thinking tool of DFV analysis.

From either an ordered or a random time span at the current time $t_n$, the information gathered (e.g., the terms información artificial and I.A.) become data collected (e.g., how many times the term información artificial appears in regions $s_1$ through $s_n$ over the specific time span, and how those appearances cluster) for a final analysis of the relevant cultural artifacts chosen (e.g., news media transcripts). Regardless of the relevant cultural artifacts chosen, creativity is key to uncover truly latent, or unobvious, variables that govern the data source’s semantics, or preference (i.e., desire). Additionally, recommended is creative convergence with different texts as data sources (i.e., not only news media transcripts, but also all other relevant cultural artifacts, like those aforementioned) for truly innovative transformation because, for tf–idf, it is best to collect as much data as possible within the allotted time span at the current time $t_n$. 
The equation to calculate a tf–idf vector for a term $W_{i,j}$ is:

$$W_{i,j} = tf_{i,j} \times \log \frac{N}{df_i} \tag{1}$$

where $tf_{i,j}$ is the “number of occurrences of word $i$ in document $j$,” where $N$ is the “total number of documents,” and where $df_i$ is the “number of documents containing word $i$” (Naushan, 2020, n.p.).

3.2.2. $F$: Feasibility

Still regarding the alternative resolution proposed, feasibility, on the other hand, has to do with whether, on average, the alternative resolution’s Americanesque technology:

1. Is producible at a high-enough total quantity and quality, given the U.S. SMEs’ and Cuban counterparts’ shared access to the same limited resources readily available for research and development of the Americanesque technology in the Cuban marketplace at the current time $t_n$ (Davidson Institute, 2018; Mastering UX, 2022; Mayer & Pero Parker, 2018);

2. Is teachable by the average Cuban professor, given the limited resources available, in the average Cuban classroom per interested Cuban university in collaboration with the interested U.S. universities (Orton, 2017);

3. Is learnable by the average Cuban student, given the limited resources available, in the average Cuban classroom, but for application with resource utilization outside the classroom, including within each interested Cuban university’s respective community (Orton, 2017); and

4. Is reasonably utilizable by the businesses and schools, partnered and unpartnered, that are interested in resource utilization of the Americanesque technology developed at the
interested Cuban universities, which will be technology appliable by the newly hired graduates who will have learned such resource utilization for real-world potential outside the classroom (Mayer & Pero Parker, 2018).

Averages are considered, as for statistical analyses for effective decision-making. However, how to compute the statistical analyses for effective decision-making remains beyond this chapter’s introductory scope. Still, to learn how to compute the statistical analyses for effective decision-making, I recommend beginning with Lind et al.’s (2018) textbook. While Lind et al.’s (2018) textbook focuses on statistical techniques used in the private sector, it remains a relevant resource for this chapter’s public-sector subject matter because the public sector often reinvents itself with the private sector’s tools and techniques, such as with then-U.S. Vice President Albert A. Gore, Jr., his National Performance Review of 1993 (Gleckman & Garland, 1993; National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.) and, more recently in the past few years, at NASA, which has reinvented itself from a center-centric model to an enterprise model (Kennedy-Reynolds, 2021).

3.2.3. \textit{V: Viability}

Last, and still regarding the alternative resolution proposed, viability has to do with whether the average Cuban becomes more well-positioned to be \textit{as happy as possible} for his values met, albeit still within embargoed reason, with his opportunity for income growth from his opportunity for job growth because of his opportunity for educational growth via higher-quality education with Americanesque technology, which is strong Cubanomics (cf. Chapter 2). As such, viability has to do with whether the average, socio-centric Cuban:

(1) Considers his society of a \textit{colectivo}, as well as himself as an individual within the \textit{colectivo}, as having developed greater opportunity for educational growth via higher-
quality education with Americanesque technology (Thaveesangsakulthai, 2020);

(2) Considers his society of a colectivo, as well as himself as an individual within the colectivo, as having developed greater opportunity for job growth because of a sustained greater opportunity for educational growth via higher-quality education with Americanesque technology (Thaveesangsakulthai, 2020);

(3) Considers his society of a colectivo, as well as himself as an individual within the colectivo, as having developed greater opportunity for income growth from a sustained greater opportunity for job growth because of a sustained greater opportunity for educational growth via higher-quality education with Americanesque technology (Thaveesangsakulthai, 2020); and

(4) Is able and willing to buy into the alternative resolution proposed, as with taxes payable and paid, because of (1), (2), and (3) undeliverable without his doing so, but only as deemed necessary for the socioeconomic profit related to education, jobs, and income (Mayer & Pero Parker, 2018; Vinney, 2022).

Such questions should be asked at the local level (e.g., in each interested Cuban university’s respective community) because bottom-up data matter for effective decision-making in top-down management of the alternative resolution proposed (Heiss et al., 2004), but also at the state, regional, and national levels for a more comprehensive, big-picture view of the unique Cuban situation and how attitudes (e.g., the Cuban national mood) toward the situation might change, or swing, in each space and over time (Longworth, 2006).

Additionally, the localities that ought to be assessed most closely are those in which each interested Cuban university operates because, in those target areas, there are likely to be the most immediate and observable impacts possible for the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population,
as aforementioned (Czaja et al., 2006). Depending upon the levels of impact observed in the respective community of each interested Cuban university, scalability and practicality of impact may be determined for long-term and sustainable development, both educational and economic (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.). Scalability and practicality of impact across the Cuban space should be measured with periodic assessment and performance review, holding accountable those responsible, including the Alternative Resolution Team of Peace Corpsesque collaborators, and beginning with how efficiently the Americansque technology is being developed, relative to what is developable, at each periodic time $t$ (e.g., at each yearly time $t$) (Behn, 2014).

3.2.4. The Latent E: Ethicality

If the alternative resolution is altogether desirable, feasible, and viable at the current time $t_n$, then it has the potential for the maximum impact possible ($X$) (Friis Dam & Yu Siang, 2022). The maximum impact possible is identifiable within the area of ethicality ($E$) (Alejo, 2023). Herein, the area of ethicality is wherein lies the potential for the maximum impact possible, but it is also the overlapping area of the desirability, feasibility, and viability lenses.

However, if multiple alternative resolutions fall within proximity to $X$ at the same time $t$ and if none of them fall right at $X$, that is, if they each have the potential for the maximum impact possible within the area of ethicality at the given time, then that which is the closest to $X$ at the center of the three lenses’ overlapping area is considered the alternative resolution with the maximum impact possible, not simply the potential for it. In other words, that which is altogether the most desirable, feasible, and viable is the alternative resolution with the maximum impact possible, not simply the potential for it, because it is deemed the most ethical alternative activity to perform at the time, even if it does not fall ideally right at $X$ (Alejo, 2023).
As such, the alternative resolution with the maximum impact possible is also that which has the highest level of ethicality at the current time $t_n$. Therefore, the alternative resolution becomes the most ethical alternative activity to perform, in order to, ultimately, most strategically benefit and add maximum value to the Cuban citizenry of a macro-target population still within embargoed reason at the current time $t_n$.

In this unique way, X marks the spot. As such, a DFV analysis from a public-administration perspective, as my own, may consider the following fourth question to go with the three (3) others asked in § 3.2 above:

(4) E: Is the alternative resolution proposed that which is altogether the most desirable, feasible, and viable for the maximum impact possible within the area of ethicality at the current time $t_n$?

(a) In other words, in Cuba’s unique situation, is the alternative resolution proposed that which is the most ethical alternative activity to perform at the time, so as to best attempt to counteract, within embargoed reason, Chapters 1–2’s long history of poor ethics practiced in the U.S.–Cuban foreign affairs space?

See Figure 3.3 immediately below for the ideal site of the maximum impact possible within the three lenses’ overlapping area of ethicality at the current time $t_n$.

***
Figure 3.3

*The Maximum Impact Possible Located Within the Three Lenses’ Overlapping Area of Ethicality*

*Note.* In Figure 3.3, D represents the desirability lens (blue), F represents the feasibility lens (red), and V represents the viability lens (yellow). The area where the desirability, feasibility, and viability lenses overlap within DFV analysis is the area of ethicality (E). X represents the maximum impact possible within DFV analysis and with the highest level of ethicality at the current time $t_n$.

***

3.3. **Conclusion**

As promised previously in Chapter 1, this chapter further considers this research’s alternative resolution, diving into how it, as a proposition, may be tested as a set of hypotheses, especially from a public-administration perspective that is forward-looking and that uses DFV analysis. That is, from the perspective of someone with knowledge of the public sector, namely me, this chapter introduces how the alternative resolution’s levels of desirability (D), feasibility (F), and viability (V) may be altogether analyzed with DFV analysis, where the alternative resolution
should have the highest level of ethicality (E) with the maximum impact possible (X) at the current time \( t_n \). As such, this chapter considers the alternative resolution introduced in Chapter 1, but as a proposition yet untested as a set of hypotheses.

Finally, hereunder is the proposition \( P_1 \) for the alternative resolution proposed herein, as well as the set of hypotheses \( H_1–H_3 \) that, while yet untested herein for time’s sake and an opportunity cost deemed too costly, is intended to get the ball rolling for he who runs the metaphorical distance medley relay’s second leg of hypothesis testing. First is the proposition \( P_1 \):

\[
P_1: \quad \text{For the average Cuban interested, the alternative resolution proposed herein is altogether desirable, feasible, and viable, as well as ethical with the potential for the maximum impact possible, at the current time } t_n.\]

Next is the set of hypotheses \( H_1–H_3 \) for the proposition \( P_1 \):

\[
H_1: \quad \text{For the average Cuban interested, the alternative resolution proposed herein is that which is altogether the most desirable, feasible, and viable, as well as the most ethical with the maximum impact possible, at the current time } t_n.\]

\[
H_2: \quad \text{For the average Cuban interested, the alternative resolution proposed herein is altogether desirable, feasible, and viable, but not the most ethical with the maximum impact possible, at the current time } t_n.\]

\[
H_3: \quad \text{For the average Cuban interested, the alternative resolution proposed herein is not desirable and/or not feasible and/or not viable, regardless of the level of ethicality, at the current time } t_n.\]

Overall, the proposition \( P_1 \), as well as the set of hypotheses \( H_1–H_3 \) closely associated with it, considers this research—including the international development economics and policy previously explored in Chapter 1, the education and development previously explored in Chapter
2, and the discussion on how to possibly improve Cuban education for an improved Cuban economy in this chapter—which is a research in search of a crevice along the margin of the problem area, where the problem area is the unique Cuban situation considered throughout this research. In compliance with the U.S. Government’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations (1963), the crevice identified is the economic sanctions regime’s permitting U.S. universities to send employees, who are SMEs, to Cuba for professional research (e.g., meetings) and educational (e.g., teaching) activities (cf. Footnote 19 above) (Office of Research Services at the University of Pennsylvania, n.d.).

By working to deepen this crevice with the alternative resolution proposed herein, this research intends to work toward the heart of the problem. This research intends to improve the unique, and rather unduly and unethical, Cuban situation, with educational and, in turn, economic developments possible on the island with important and urgent technological change at the current time $t_n$. Still, this research is not intended to be an end in and of itself because the heart of the problem cannot be fully reached, until the embargo is lifted with post-pandemic U.S. policy change. As the Leader of the Free World, We the People must do better ethically and must demand more ethical policymaking of the U.S. Government in service to the Sovereign because, according to former Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor John Winthrop (1630):

[W]ee [the People] must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The eies of all people are upon us. Soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our God in this worke wee have undertaken, and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the world [sic]. (n.p.)
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