BOUNDED DEMOCRACY: HOW AUTHORITARIAN CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS SHAPE DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

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This dissertation addresses two questions regarding post-praetorian democratization and democratic development. First, it explains why some militaries bind democracy by imposing certain parameters on political contestation and popular sovereignty while others do not. Second, it explains why some civilians are more successful than others at establishing civilian supremacy over the military after the transition has completed.

I theorize that militaries bind democratization when civilians lack credible commitments regarding the security of the military's interests under democracy. Specifically, I argue that three factors generate credible commitments and boost the military's confidence in civilians: trust with political parties, the institutionalization of the incumbent party, and the strength of the incumbent party. When incumbent parties hold the trust of the military, they can be expected to defend its interests. Yet militaries must expect the party will survive the transition and subsequent elections (institutionalization) and be strong enough to defend the military in the legislature and/or executive.

Regarding the development of civilian supremacy, I argue that civilians can marginalize the political influence of the military following military rule if parties and the party system are institutionalized. Institutionalized parties have higher degrees of autonomy, stronger links to society, and independent

fundraising capacity which allow them to check the political impulses of the military if they choose to. However, parties must also be able to coordinate against the military. This requires the party system to be stable with a low degree of fragmentation.

To test these theories I use a mix of methods. I employ a comparative historical analysis and use qualitative data to track and compare the development of the key causal mechanisms outlined in the theories. I also use an original dataset on military-led democratization to conduct a large-n cross-national analysis of whether trust, party institutionalization, and party strength results in less bounded democracy.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Darin Self received his Bachelors of Arts in Political Science from Brigham Young University in 2011. He then went on to receive a Masters of Public Policy from Brigham Young University in 2013. Darin then enrolled in the PhD program in Government at Cornell University in 2015 and completed this degree in 2022. Following completion of his PhD, Darin joined the faculty in the Department of Political Science at Brigham Young University.

His research is in Comparative Politics with a minor in International Relations. Darin's research focuses on democratic development and authoritarianism. His work in these sub-fields looks at how political parties and militaries affect the development of authoritarian regimes as well as newer democracies.

To Brillante, Shae, Belén and Emery

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PREFACE

Before beginning the introduction to the dissertation I would first like to provide a brief history of the intellectual journey that led me to develop the concept of bounded democratization and the theory that the military's strategic behavior during democratic transitions depends on the characteristics of civilian parties.

When I arrived at Cornell in the Fall of 2015 I had only a vague idea of what I wanted to do for my dissertation. At that point, I knew I was interested in democracy and authoritarianism with a particular interest in political parties. At that early stage in my academic path I had been heavily influenced by Anna Maria Grzymala-Busse's book on post-communism party building and the recent work by Adrienne LeBas and Rachel Beatty Riedl on the role authoritarian legacies had on democratic party building.

I was also influenced by my mentor, Joel Selway, and was interested in Southeast Asian politics. I had not yet chosen any individual country to study but at Cornell I quickly settled on Indonesia. Part of the decision was pragmatic. My advisor – Tom Pepinsky – was a leading scholar in the United States on Indonesia and he and Cornell had significant ties to the country. I also chose Indonesia because it fulfilled some parameters of interest. Indonesia had experienced authoritarian rule, had an authoritarian legacy party, and was linguistically diverse.

I was interested in the linguistic diversity of Indonesia because I was curious how linguistic diversity affected post-authoritarian party building. With that in mind, I sought out a case to compare to Indonesia. I settled on Paraguay because of its relative linguistic homogeneity and because it had a similar structure to authoritarian rule as Indonesia – a party-military coalition with a powerful regime leader. It was also in Latin America and my wife and I already spoke

Spanish – making the prospect of living there agreeable.

Thinking that my dissertation would go down this path, I first took a trip to Indonesia. While in Jakarta, I set up some interviews with former members of the ruling party – Golkar. My questions initially focused on how the party recruited members and built a party apparatus that would cut across linguistic groups. While performing these interviews I quickly learned of the dominate role the military played in Golkar but thought little of it. At the time it was intuitive to me that a military, with its tanks and guns, would be able to impose its will on a party. Soon after my trip to Jakarta I traveled to Paraguay expecting to find the same.

While in Paraguay I was surprised to find that the distribution of power was actually reversed. During the authoritarian period in Paraguay the party was the dominant actor and the military was more subservient. Realizing this I immediately changed my research aim to investigate how a party could be the dominant actor in a regime where the military was active. With this focus I wrote a prospectus and began field work.

Initially my field work followed my prospectus – looking at the historical development of the authoritarian parties to explain why Golkar was subservient to the military in Indonesia, while the Colorado Party in Paraguay was able to control the military. This research went well but while in Paraguay my work started to become dissatisfying. My theory appeared to be true but what bothered me was that there was little change in the relationship between the party and military over 30 years of authoritarian rule – especially in Paraguay. I, in effect, feared that my dissertation would be uninteresting.

While struggling with this fear, my friend and fellow graduate student from Asunción, Jose Thomas organized a conference on politics in Paraguay and in-

vited me to present my work. While writing the first manuscript of my findings, I became more aware of an interesting dynamic I was observing during the democratic process – the Paraguayan military deferred to the party even on security matters while the Indonesian military sought to constrain civilians – which didn't fit with much of the literature written on late stage military-rule and democratization. The manuscript was a very rough take on what would become the core of my dissertation and it was well received by respected political scientists in the room.

Seeing a positive reception to my ideas I ran in this new direction. Instead of simply focusing on the distribution of power between a party and the military during authoritarian rule, I would explain why some militaries supported democratization and why some civilians were better at marginalizing the political influence of the military after democratization. At this point, I still had not come up with the concept of *bounded democratization* as I had thought that whether militaries supported the mere prospect of democracy was a function of trust and the institutionalization and strength of the incumbent party.

The idea that militaries support democratization – or that democratization is more likely after military rule – should the three factors of trust, institutionalization, and strength be present did not hold up to initial quantitative test. No matter how I modeled it, democracy was not more likely with those explanatory variables. After presenting this to other graduate students and thinking through alternative ways of modeling the theory, I realized that it was not simply about democratization – but about the military getting democracy on its terms. From there I developed the concept and measure of bounded democratization and the dissertation came to be as it is.

I share this to show how many twists and turns a project can take. There

were many trips and apparent failures along the way. I also share this to show just how important a supportive committee is. At any point my committee could have intervened and told me that "this is a bad idea". Instead, my committee showed constructive support the entire time and explicitly told me that their role was to help make my research the best it could be, rather than push me to fit a certain mold.

Because my committee allowed me to wrestle with different ideas and pursue questions that I was deeply interested in, I am pleased with the dissertation. It is not, by any means, perfect. There are certainly plenty of flaws but I come away confident that I have helped those of us in comparative politics to think about democratization in a new way that allows us to make better sense of our world.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The path out of military rule to democracy is fraught with uncertainty for a military's interests. Because it requires a return to civilian rule, democratization reduces the military's control over its own interests and it may re-expose the military to the dangers that enticed it out of the barracks in the first place. If democratization potentially puts the military's interests at risk, why do some militaries support the proposition of democracy while others do not?

The key problem during any potential transition to democracy is whether the military will defer to civilians and refrain from using its power to influence politics. Democracy cannot exist if civilians do not manage and participate in free and fair elections or exercise legislative and executive power without the military interfering in these processes. Yet it is harder for the military to commit to stay out of politics if it fears civilian rule. If the military fears civilian rule and is unwilling to accept the terms of democracy, the military can use its coercive powers to set parameters on political institutions and popular sovereignty. By doing so the military creates credible commitments that civilian rule will not endanger its interests.

A military's coercive power presents a persistent danger to civilian rule, especially following authoritarian rule where the military was politically active. Because the military controls the tools of violent force, it can unilaterally undermine civilian rule simply by threatening to employ its power.[1] Given that a military can influence how civilians contest political power due to its control of

[1]Samuel Edward Finer. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962; Peter D Feaver. "Civil-military Relations". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1 (1999), pp. 211–241.

the tools of coercive force, we should consider why militaries use this power to affect the development of electoral, legislative, and executive institutions during democratization in some circumstances but not others. Under authoritarian rule, militaries often act overtly to influence these institutions, and significant work has already been done analyzing the military's behavior in these regimes and regime transitions.[2]

While this literature explains why military regimes fail more easily than others, or why some militaries repress popular revolts, it often considers the military's strategic decisions independent of the characteristics of civilian parties that rule or which may come to rule. When military-backed authoritarian rule fails, however, militaries often do not act unilaterally during a regime transition. Instead, militaries engage with civilian parties over the terms of demobilization and the conditions of returning to civilian rule. Previously, some have studied how militaries sought specific protections for prerogatives within their own traditional sphere.[3] Less attention has been given to how a military uses its power to shape institutions outside its traditional sphere of influence during the democratization process. Understanding why a military uses its influence

[2]Barbara Geddes. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1 (1999), pp. 115–144; Milan W Svolik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012; Jennifer Gandhi. "Political institutions under dictatorship". In: (2008); Barbara Geddes et al. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. Cambridge University Press, 2018; Eva Bellin. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective". In: *Comparative politics* (2004), pp. 139–157; Eva Bellin. "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring". In: *Comparative Politics* 44.2 (2012), pp. 127–149; Alfred C Stepan. *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*. Oxford University Press New York, 1989; Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. JHU Press, 1996.

[3]Alfred C Stepan. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton University Press, 2015; Wendy Hunter. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*. Univ of North Carolina Press, 1997; Brian Loveman. ""Protected Democracies" and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993". In: *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36.2 (1994), pp. 105–189; Felipe Agüero. "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America". In: *Mershon International Studies Review* 42.Supplement_2 (1998), pp. 383–404.

to shape political institutions is key to explaining variation in democratic development, which is a literature dominated largely by explanations centered on civilian actors.[4]

In this dissertation I highlight how the military is a major actor which influences democratization and democratic development. Specifically, I focus on the strategic interaction between the military and authoritarian incumbent parties to explain variation in the degree to which militaries influence the development of political institutions. While it is common for the military to directly bargain over the conditions of its return to the barracks, not all militaries use their power to influence the terms of the transition in their favor. Thus, the core motivation of this dissertation is to explain why some militaries use their coercive capacity to secure concessions from civilians while others do not.

The theory developed to explain this variation centers on three mechanisms which, together, influence the military's confidence in civilian parties: the de-

[4]See Acemoglu and Robinson; Boix; Ansell and Samuels; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead; Riedl et al.; Slater and Wong; Ziblatt; Putnam; Przeworski; Przeworski et al.; Inglehart; Moore; Lipset; and Haggard and Kaufman (Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2006; Carles Boix. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press, 2003; Ben W Ansell and David J Samuels. *Inequality and Democratization*. Cambridge University Press, 2014; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Vol. 3. JHU Press, 1986; Rachel Beatty Riedl et al. "Authoritarian-led Democratization". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 [2020]; Dan Slater and Joseph Wong. "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia". In: *Perspectives on Politics* 11.3 [2013], pp. 717–733; Daniel Ziblatt. *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2017; Robert D Putnam. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton university press, 1994; Adam Przeworski. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, 1991; Adam Przeworski et al. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*. Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press, 2000; Ronald Inglehart. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton university press, 1997; Barrington Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. 268. Beacon Press, 1993; Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". In: *American Political ScienceReview* 53.1 [1959], pp. 69–105; Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton University Press, 2018)

gree of trust in civilian parties, the institutionalization of the military's allied parties, and the electoral and political strength of allied parties. I argue that when the military's confidence in civilians is low, it uses its power to set the terms of electoral and political contestation as a check against civilian opponents. When the military has an allied party it can trust, knows this organization will be a permanent member of the party system, and it will be strong enough to defend the military, the military can return to the barracks confident that commitments made by civilians are credible. Should any of these factors be low, the confidence of the military wanes and it uses its power to set parameters on civilian rule – or what I call *bounded democratization*.

The Military and Political Power

When a military is in power, it acts directly to secure its interests, rather than relying heavily on a civilian partner to do so. The key concern for the military during democratization is whether civilian parties will protect the military's interests following a democratic transition. The issue of the military's interest is especially more salient during regime transitions because democratization introduces potential uncertainty about which party or parties may come to power. By surrendering power, the military must reduces it's control over politics and accept the outcome of elections that are not predetermined.

When civilians do come to power, it is possible that they may pursue policies antithetical to the military's self-defined purpose. Thus, if the military lacks confidence in the parties which may come to power, it will likely fear democracy. In turn, the military may employ its power to set the parameters of the transition as a means to hedge against threats to its interests. Thus, by using

its power to set conditions on political institutions, the military can narrow the scope of uncertainty introduced by democracy.[5]

Even when militaries are professionalized and support the idea of civilian control and democracy, they frequently intervene in democratic transitions and bargain with, or influence, civilians over the terms of democracy. An example of a self-described professional military influencing the terms of democratization can be seen in the case of Indonesia's democratic transition in the late 1990s. In the first half of 1998 the Indonesian government, led by former General Suharto, faced massive protests in response to his government's handling of the Asian Financial Crisis. Indonesia had been hit by the crisis hard, but the government's inability to promote a coherent policy response worsened the crisis.[6] The deepening economic shock prompted popular mobilization calling for his resignation, as well as the end of military-backed authoritarian rule.

The Indonesian military had come to power thirty-two years earlier when the military responded to a direct threat to its institution. Indonesia experienced turbulent civilian rule for several years after independence as Sukarno, the first president and leader of the independence movement, struggled to manage conflict between competing factions, including the military. Instability peaked when communists captured and killed six out of the seven highest ranking military officers. Seeing civilian rule as a direct threat to its institutional well-being, the military took direct control of politics and maintained a formal political role even after Suharto's tenure and the financial crisis ended.

In the early stages of the financial crisis, civilian and military leaders backed

[5]Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*.

[6]Thomas Pepinsky. *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Suharto and upheld the regime. As the public pressure against the regime increased, Suharto's civilian support within the government broke. While civilians were the first to withdraw support from Suharto, his fate rested with the military, which had served as the foundation of the regime for over thirty years. The military faced the decision to either suppress the popular protests or withdraw their support from Suharto. Ultimately, the chief of the military, Wiranto, refused to put down the popular movement and Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998. Following Suharto's resignation, the military allowed Suharto's civilian vice president, B.J. Habibie, to take power. Habibie immediately announced a transition towards civilian rule and democratization with the military's support.

The military's return to the barracks, however, was gradual as the military constrained the actions of civilian actors. Even after Suharto's resignation and the first free and fair elections the next year, the military remained politically active even though several high-ranking reformist generals wanted to emulate the ideal of an apolitical, professional military. Due to a lack of confidence in the civilian's ability to manage the transition, these officers slow-walked the military's return to the barracks to keep a seat at the table during the transition. One way the military kept political power was by maintaining a formal presence within the legislature.

During Suharto's tenure the military held a sufficiently large share of seats within the legislature to directly shape legislation. After Suharto's resignation, the military gave up some of its influence but maintained a reduced presence in the legislature and continued to hold leadership positions. The military also indirectly influenced the transition as several generals immediately retired to

run for political office or took places within the cabinet. By holding key political positions, the military had a role in drafting political reforms while preventing many reforms it deemed too extreme from passing. It was not until after the political reforms were all passed to the military's satisfaction and the second elections held in 2004, with the presidential election won by a retired general, that the military fully resigned its formal political positions.

Unlike the Indonesian military, which delayed its return to the barracks, the Paraguayan military's support for democratization was robust, and its return to the barracks swift. Like in Indonesia, Paraguay had experienced over three decades of military-backed authoritarian rule, with an army general as president. Following the Chaco War with Bolivia, the military was politically active for several years and eventually took direct control of the government in 1939. The military then remained in control until the end of a civil war, which vaulted the Colorado Party into power in 1947.

The early period of the Colorado Party's rule was tumultuous. In only a few years the party cycled through several presidents who were removed by allies from within the military. After a handful of years of stability, the Colorado Party and military removed President Federico Chaves who had attempted an *autogolpe*. After removing Chaves, the party was split over which members of the party to support, so it instead installed General Alfredo Stroessner into the presidency. Alfredo Stroessner became president in 1954, upholding the party-military coalition and remaining in power until a split in the ruling party laid the foundation for his ouster in early 1989. In the run up to the 1987 election, a faction within the ruling Colorado Party loyal to Stroessner strong-armed the traditionalist wing out of the party. Locked out of the party, these traditionalists

found allies within the military who also wanted Stroessner out of office. Knowing the military would have political support, officers who opposed Stroessner launched a bloody coup in 1989, which resulted in Stroessner's detainment and exile. As had been promised, the party installed the head of the leader of the coup, Andrés Rodríguez, as president, and continued with the party-military coalition.

A few years after the coup the party sought an end to the party-military coalition and pursued a transition to democracy. The democratic transition was fully supported by the military – which did not seek to influence the transition. Unlike in Indonesia, the military deferred to civilians and allowed them to draft a new constitution unimpeded. With the exception of a rogue general, the military submitted itself to civilian control and allowed parties to contest elections and operate legislative and executive power without interference. What is notable is that the Paraguayan military demobilized without any popular demand to step out of politics, unlike the Indonesian military which remained political in spite of overwhelming popular demand for it to surrender its political power. Despite the previous political activity and coercive capacity of both the Indonesian and Paraguayan military, why did the Indonesian military set bounds on the transition, while the Paraguayan military allowed civilians to act without restraint?

The difference in the strategies taken by these militaries is not unique to the Indonesian and Paraguayan cases. In many cases, militaries are active and bargain over the terms the new system, while others are largely absent during the transition. For example, in anticipation to stepping down from power in 1990, Chilean general Augusto Pinochet, the military, and their conservative allies,

drafted a constitution that favored conservatives allies. The Chilean military's actions to craft institutions in favor of conservatives not only protected the military's short term interests, (securing a peaceful retirement and non-prosecution agreements) but also ensured that the system would not revert back to the system in which leftists won power – which enticed the military out of the barracks in the first place.

In more recent history, the military in both Thailand and Sudan have been politically active during transitions to bind political institutions. After the 2014 coup, the Thai military directly managed the drafting of a new constitution. With its power the military created a senate appointed entirely by the military which can veto provisions from the popularly elected lower house, which is dominated by parties which do not share the military's interests. The Thai military has gone beyond simply drafting formal institutions which guarantee its influence, but has also barred popular political figures who are opponents to the military.

In Sudan, economic decline spurred massive popular protests against the incumbent regime. Unlike in Indonesia where the military did not respond with extreme force, the Sudanese military cracked down on protests. The decision to use force spurred greater popular mobilization. In response to this increased mobilization, the military ousted long-time president Omar al-Bashir and took direct control. Even in the face of massive protests calling for democracy, the military refused to cede to demands for democratization. Instead, the military agreed to a transitional council on which it holds considerable power after significant international pressure. Well over a year following the protests, the military appears unwilling to entertain the possibility of civilian rule and the

prospects for democratization appear bleak.[7]

Contrast the cases of the Thai, Sudanese, and Chilean militaries, with South Korea's military in the late 1980s. While the South Korean military refused calls for democratization for several years, it eventually relented to public pressure and resigned its political power. Unlike the militaries in Thailand, Sudan, and Chile, however, the South Korean military did little to shape formal institutions during the transition. Instead, the South Korean military backed political institutions that were not designed to bind civilian political power.

Binding Democratization: The Argument in Brief

In this dissertation, I argue that the military's support of democracy is conditional on the military's confidence that political parties can provide credible commitments that democracy will not endanger the military's interests. As the military's confidence in parties decreases, the military will pro-actively shape informal and formal institutions of the emerging system, as it did in Thailand, Sudan, and Chile. The military's confidence in parties is a function of the characteristics of the political parties which will inhabit the democratic system and control the military. Specifically, there are three key characteristics of civilian parties that shape how credible commitments are; the extent to which the military trusts any given party, the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party, and the electoral and political strength of the authoritarian incumbent party.

[7] Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda. "Sudan's Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator". In: *Journal of Democracy* 30.4 (2019), pp. 89–103.

The first component, a party's relationship with the military, plays a fundamental role in shaping the military's confidence. When the military has a close relationship with certain civilian parties the military can be confident these parties will advocate on behalf of the military. Trust is shaped by whether the party and military agree over the national project, or share an ideology, ethnic composition, and other interests. Should these parties come to power, they will govern in a way that the military can, at the very least, tolerate. If there are parties which are in open opposition to the military, however, the potential that that these parties come to power presents a danger to the military, as these civilians may seek fundamental changes to the military.

Whether there is a positive relationship between the military and incumbent party is moot should that party die during a regime transition or fail to win power via elections. Thus, the second and third components are also key. The second component, the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party, affects the likelihood that the party will survive the regime transition. Institutionalized parties are stable organizations and are well-equipped to survive democratic transitions, even in the midst of popular mobilization against the incumbent regime.[8] When parties are institutionalized, their stability makes it easier for the military to formulate credible expectations of what the future party system would look like and the role their civilian authoritarian partner is likely to have within the new system.

Should the incumbent party survive the transition, it can only defend the military if it can win seats in the legislature or capture the executive. Thus, it is critical that the military's allies exhibit electoral and political strength. Even

[8]Golkar in Indonesia was able to lean on its routinized leadership selection processes and territorial organization to survive popular unrest and compete well in democratic elections.

if the party cannot win majorities or executive office, winning a large share of power helps insulate the military against parties keen on undermining core interests of the military. The military can evaluate the party's electoral strength by looking at historical elections. If there are no historical elections for the military can use for reference, it evaluates the strength of its allies in transitional elections, where the failure of the incumbent party to perform well serves as a catalyst to the military to abort the transition. This was the case in Algeria in the early 1990s after the military did not anticipate the regime-backed party being overwhelmed by Islamist parties.

When facing the prospect of democratization, the military evaluates the three factors outlined above. If the military is uncertain about the capacity of its allies to win power, it will work to set bounds on the conditions of the emerging system. When the military constrains the transition, either requiring certain institutional structures, or restrictions on which actors can contest the elections, I consider this *bounded democratization*. Bounded democratization can result in a system with free and fair elections, but in which the military structures institutions to give sympathetic parties an advantage,[9] or a system where institutions and restrictions on contestation are sufficiently restrictive that it fails to meet a minimal threshold of democracy.[10]

Keeping the Military in the Barracks

Even should the military support democratization, it does not mean the military will stay out of politics following a democratic transition. Frequently the

[9] See Chile after Pinochet.

[10] See Thailand in the late 2010s.

military, or its officers, remain politically active on the margins – seeking to use its power to continue influencing politics without retaking a formal political role. Thus, in addition to understanding why some militaries bind the terms of democratization, we should also understand why some civilians are more effective than others at monopolizing control of political contestation. Democratic development cannot proceed if civilians are unable to keep military actors out of the executive, legislature, and party leadership bodies while also checking any political impulses exhibited by the military.

It is not uncommon for civilians to struggle to monopolize political contestation following authoritarian rule where the military was politically active. Following Suharto's resignation in 1998, not only did military officers remain politically active within the legislature, but many officers retired and immediately took positions within the cabinet and joined, or formed, political parties. To this day, over twenty years since Suharto's resignation, the Indonesian military remains influential in political areas that are normally reserved for civilians in democracies, including acting as brokers to political parties at the local level.[11]

This has not been the case in Paraguay. Unlike in Indonesia, civilians have been effective at taking full control of politics and completely sidelining the military and former officers. During the drafting of the new constitution, civilians barred the president at the time, recently retired General Rodríguez from running for reelection, and made it illegal for officers to be active in party politics. Even when one prominent officer, Lino Oviedo, tried to use his command in the military to garner political power, civilians acted together to keep Oviedo and

[11]Marcus Mietzner. *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009; Jacqui Baker et al. "Professionalism Without Reform: The Security Sector under Yudhoyono". In: *The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia's Decade of Stability and Stagnation* (2015), pp. 114–135.

his lieutenants out of power.

Explaining why some civilians are more successful at establishing civilian supremacy than others is key to understanding the course of political development in new democracies which have emerged from military rule. In the field of comparative civilian-military relations which focuses on new democracies, scholars have focused on civilians' ability to determine military prerogatives, rather than civilians' ability to control their own sphere of influence.[12] Yet in the context of civilian-military relations, conceptualizing democratic consolidation or development should not be reduced to whether civilians can determine military prerogatives. If we limit the conceptualization of democratization to civilian control of the military's sphere, we ignore the ability of civilians to act free of military intervention, in what falls within the traditionally civilian sphere (economic policy, elections, etc), which is also critical for democratic development.

In one of the most prominent works on civilian-military relations, Huntington[13] argued that whether the military remained in its own sphere was determined by the professionalism of the officer corps and the adoption of an apolitical norm within the military itself. Others, such as Stepan[14] and Hunter[15] focus on the conflict over the Brazilian military's prerogatives at the end of authoritarian rule, and how civilians were able to erode the military's control over certain functions related to security. While contributing to our understanding of civilian-military affairs, these works focus exclusively on factors explaining civilian influence over military prerogatives rather than factors which explain

[12] Aurel Croissant et al. "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies". In: *Democratization* 17.5 (2010), pp. 950–975.

[13] Samuel P Huntington. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Vol. 514. Harvard University Press, 1957.

[14] Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*; Alfred C Stepan. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, 1988.

[15] Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*.

the civilians' ability to monopolize control of political contestation and the capacity to keep the military out of the civilian's sphere.

In addition to these approaches, others are focused on civilian control more generally, with an emphasis on demobilization and security sector reform.[16] Again, these works focus on the military sphere with the expectation that reforms to the security sector keep the military out of the civilian sphere of politics.

By focusing on security sector reform, this literature explains why or how civilians are able to define the military's prerogatives, but falls short in explaining why the military or officers continue influencing civilian politics. While important to help explain post-military rule, the current approach to comparative civilian-military relations fails to explain variation in the extent to which civilians control elections, the legislature, or executive office for themselves, without undue interference from the military or its active or recently retired officers. Because democracy cannot develop should the military or its officers interfere in political parties, electoral, legislative, and executive institutions, it is critical to understand why some civilians are able to monopolize control of politics.

Should the military support democratization, democratic consolidation is the next key step. To explain variation in the degree of civilian supremacy I focus on two factors; party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Civilians will be unable to monopolize control of political and electoral institutions if parties cannot act independently from the military or if there are incentives for parties to engage in political activity with the military. Thus, party

[16] Mark Beeson and Alex Bellamy. *Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform*. Vol. 6. Routledge, 2007; Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner. *Civil-military Relations and Democracy*. JHU Press, 1996; Herbert Wulf. "Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries". In: *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management* 5 (2004).

institutionalization can explain some variation in the degree to which parties control civilian prerogatives.

More specifically, a party's autonomy, territorial organization, and fundraising capacity are key factors for whether a party will be able to push the military out of politics. When parties lack autonomy, active or retired officers can infiltrate the party's leadership and prevent the party from being more aggressive in exerting control of the military. Furthermore, parties need the capacity to mobilize society in support of their agenda to show that they have popular backing when confronting the military.[17] When parties have a weak territorial organization, they may not only be unable to demonstrate popular backing, but may also use the military to supplement their organizational weakness. In a similar vein, if parties are unable to support themselves financially, they become more reliant on actors, which may lead them to seek the support of the military or powerful officers.

At its core, the key dilemma for civilians in monopolizing political power is a collective action problem. If civilians can act in concert against the military, they are more effective at pushing the military completely out of politics. While civilians must be able to monopolize control of parties, the venue for determining whether civilians can act collectively and push the military completely out of politics is the party system. I argue that when party systems are more institutionalized, civilians will be more effective at exerting control over the military and constraining officers who seek to expand the political influence of the military. Specifically, I focus on the stability of the party system and the level of fragmentation.

[17] Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*.

When the party system is fragmented, attempted control of various dimensions of political contestation becomes more costly and difficult simply due to the higher number of parties in the system. Additionally, when there are more parties in the system, there is greater competition over political rents which results in the parties giving less concern to constraining the military.

As the difficulty of inter-party coordination increases, civilians struggle to contain the political ambitions of the military and active or recently retired officers. Whenever military actors push to expand the political influence of the military, they will be met with indifference or a lack of capacity to constrain them. Should the party system be more cohesive, however, civilians are better able to coordinate against any attempts by the military, or active and retired officers, to wield undue influence within the political system.

The stability of the party system also helps facility collective action. When parties enter and exit the system, it increases the difficulty for civilian parties to restrain the military over time. Constraining an institution as powerful as the military requires civilians to develop expertise and consistent policy. Doing so is more difficult if there is significant overturn in the legislature or executive. Furthermore, when parties have such short lifespans, their interests are more likely to be parochial and myopic. Instead of focusing on the long-term problem of constraining the military, these parties are more likely to emphasize issues and effort on surviving the next electoral cycle.

Overall, when parties and party systems are more institutionalized, there should be more autonomous, powerful actors inhabiting a stable and cohesive system that is more capable at marginalizing the political influence of the military. Sidelining the military or officers should improve the prospects for demo-

cratic development, but only as it pertains to political interference by the military. So long as the military faces coordinated action by civilians, it will be less likely to interfere in politics and there will be civilian supremacy. That the military remains out of politics does not necessarily mean that democracy will develop continuously, as democracy requires far more than a nonpartisan military, but also a commitment to democratic norms and procedures by civilian participants in the system.

Questions of successful democratization and democratic development are key to understanding the political development of scores of countries in the world. In this dissertation I explain why there has been successful democratization following decades of authoritarian rule. I go even further, however, and explain why some new democracies continue to develop, and shed the authoritarian legacies of military rule. By doing so, I bring the military back into the analysis of democratization, and contribute to the literature on democratization and comparative civilian-relations by demonstrating that the strategic decisions of the military is a function of its relationship with the incumbent authoritarian party and other parties in the system.

Why Focus on the Military?

Democratization has a central place in comparative politics, with a rich literature exploring explanations varying from structural,[18] cultural,[19] authoritarian-

[18] Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*; Ansell and Samuels, *Inequality and Democratization*; Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*.

[19] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy"; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*.

led,[20] and agency-oriented[21] theories of democratization. Beyond these explanation the military has been considered a key actor in the literature on democratization and regime transitions more generally. Indeed, many incorporate the military into their analysis and highlight how the military's characteristics situate it as a unique political actor that does not share the same characteristics or incentives as other political actors.[22] The role and relationship of the military with the regime is key to whether or not authoritarianism fails and whether there is even a chance of democratization.[23] Should authoritarianism fail, the question of demobilizing the military following the fall of authoritarian rule is crucial for the prospects of democracy, as the military may seek to maintain specific missions,[24] prerogatives,[25] autonomy,[26] or even leave specific legacies.[27]

Why then, should we return our focus to the military and consider variation in the military's support and influence on democratization and democratic development? We should place greater emphasis on the military because of its coercive power. Because the military controls the tools of coercive force, it can unilaterally prevent or undermine democratization.[28] Even should the military

[20]Slater and Wong, "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia"; Ziblatt, *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*; Riedl et al., "Authoritarian-led Democratization".

[21]O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*.

[22]Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?"; Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*.

[23]Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring".

[24]Craig L Arceneaux. *Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil*. Penn State Press, 2001.

[25]Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*; Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*.

[26]David Pion-Berlin. "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America". In: *Comparative Politics* (1992), pp. 83–102.

[27]Agüero, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America".

[28]Given that the military itself is well institutionalized.

not employ force directly, its control of the tools of violence grants it sizeable bargaining power that can be used to influence civilians' decisions. Thus, the military's political power requires that we pay greater attention to the military as a central actor in democratization. Yet to better explain variation in the military's behavior we must improve our understanding of the military's strategic interactions with civilians.

The military's coercive power isn't the sole reason to justify greater emphasis on the interests of the military when explaining democratization. One defining feature of the development of political regimes in the post-WWII era was the rise and proliferation of military-backed regimes. The military has been, and continues to be, a common ruling partner that is not necessarily subordinated to civilians. Often the military is the sole or dominant ruling actor. Thus, by focusing solely on civilian actors, such as the incumbent party, class, elites, or culture, we fail to account for an actor that has played a central role in several democratic transitions and which continues to play a central role in democratic development.

If we look at the history of authoritarian rule, we can see the magnitude of military-backed authoritarian rule which preceded the third wave of democracy. Using four datasets on regimes,[29] we see that it was common for militaries to be key members of authoritarian regimes. The frequency of military-backed regimes is presented in Figure 1.1 where I plot the percentage of the types of regime over time. In this figure, we can see that during parts of the Cold War,

[29] Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set". In: *Perspectives on Politics* 12.2 (2014), pp. 313–331; Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective". In: *Contemporary Politics* 19.1 (2013), pp. 19–34; Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*; Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*.

military regimes approached nearly half of all authoritarian regimes. That the military played such a prominent political role means we must be more careful with our scope conditions when developing theoretical frameworks to address democratization.[30] Theories of democratization that ignore the military cannot adequately explain large portions of regime transitions and the development of democracies which emerged from these failed authoritarian regimes.



Figure 1.1: Frequency of Regime Type

I contribute to the literature on democratization by, not only returning our focus to the military, but by highlighting the strategic interaction between civilian political parties and the military. The relationship between parties and the military is most pronounced in "hybrid" regimes where both institutions are

[30]For example, see Bratton and Van de Walle (Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge university press, 1997) which demonstrate how the paths of authoritarianism are influenced by the type of antecedent regime.

actors which govern in an alliance with each other. The relationship between the military and an authoritarian incumbent party varies and variation in this relationship holds key implications for the prospects of democratization. As the military's confidence in the conditions of democracy increases, the military's willingness to defer to incumbent civilians should increase. By developing a theoretical framework that focuses on the party-military relationship, we can better understand why some militaries seek formal institutional protections for specific prerogatives or reserve domains.[31] Furthermore, by focusing on the relationship between the parties and the military, we can better understand why some militaries or officers remain political active at the margins in some cases but not others.

This dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter I outline key concepts, the theoretical framework, and a research design to test the theories developed to explain the military's behavior during regime transitions and the early period of democratic rule. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I use comparative historical analysis to demonstrate the development of critical antecedent conditions which shaped the strategic decisions of the military during the democratic transitions of Indonesia and Paraguay. In Chapter 4 I continue the comparative historical analysis, with a focus on the regime transitions, to show why there was bounded democratization in Indonesia, but not Paraguay. Following this qualitative analysis, I test the theoretical argument of bounded democratization more generally using an original dataset and quantitative models in Chapter 5. I then turn to explaining variation in the degree of civilian monopolization

[31]Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*; Julio Samuel Valenzuela. *Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions*. Vol. 150. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1990.

of political contestation. I do so by returning to the comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay in Chapter 6. I then review the theory and empirical tests, and conclude in Chapter 7.

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CHAPTER 2

MILITARIES, PARTIES, AND BINDING DEMOCRATIZATION

The literature on democracy and democratization is expansive, with the bulk of research focusing on civilian-oriented explanations of democratization. While theoretical models of democratization frequently center around civilian interests, norms, or identities, significant attention has been paid to the military. The military merits attention because armed forces have been central to authoritarian rule in almost every region of the world and its coercive capacity grants it significant political power. The literature which does consider the military, however, largely ignores the strategic behavior of the military as it concerns civilian political parties. Instead, the literature largely focuses on characteristics of the military itself to explain its behavior. To improve our understanding of the behavior of the military during democratization, I use a concept which I term *bounded democratization*.

I define *bounded democratization* as a transition towards a more competitive system wherein the military sets parameters on electoral and political institutions or actors to constrain open contestation and popular sovereignty. For a transition to qualify as bounded or unbounded, there must be a shift to a system in which elections are used to select those in power, and where there is at least nominal decentralization of power between a legislature and the chief executive. Bounded democratization can vary by degree, and ranges from the military taking a minimal or no role in developing political institutions, to the military taking an active role where it develops formal institutions and seeks explicit concessions from civilians in exchange for its depoliticization.

Despite the military's potential influence on regime transitions, bounded de-

mocratization often produces systems which qualify as democratic. Under procedural definitions, a political system qualifies as democratic if contestation for political office happens through free and fair elections while restrictions on citizens' participation are limited.[1] Thus, if the military imposes conditions on political or electoral institutions, the system can qualify as democratic even if the military's actions narrow the range of possible political and electoral institutions that civilians would otherwise design without military interference.

While the military may allow procedural democracy, the bounds it sets on political contestation or participation may be sufficiently restrictive that it fails to meet a minimalist definition of democracy, even if the resulting system is more open than the antecedent regime. Over time, work has turned from conceptualizing more ideal forms of authoritarianism (e.g. totalitarianism, dictatorships, or sultanistic regimes)[2] to conceptualizing authoritarian regimes which incorporate democratic-like institutions. These approaches include concepts such as tutelary democracy,[3] illiberal democracy,[4] and a plethora of other concepts of democracy with adjectives.[5]

The proliferation of concepts arose from the difficulty of describing regimes which were more competitive than ideal forms of authoritarian rule, but which

[1] Robert Alan Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press, 1973; Joseph A Schumpeter. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. routledge, 2010; Adam Przeworski et al. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*. Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[2] Hannah Arendt. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Vol. 244. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973; Barrington Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. 268. Beacon Press, 1993; Juan J Linz. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Addison-Wesley, 1985.

[3] Brian Loveman. ""Protected Democracies" and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993". In: *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36.2 (1994), pp. 105–189.

[4] Larry Diamond. "Hybrid regimes". In: *In Search of Democracy*. Routledge, 2015, pp. 163–175.

[5] David Collier and Steven Levitsky. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research". In: *World politics* 49.3 (1997), pp. 430–451.

fall short of minimalist definitions of democracy. The difficulty of conceptualizing these regimes was, in part, addressed by Levitsky and Way.[6] With the concept of competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way highlighted how some aspects of democratic rule (e.g. elections or freedom of association) are present in regimes, but the political playing field is tilted beyond a reasonable advantage for the incumbents. This "tilting" of the playing field undermines free and fair elections and hampers the possibility of alternations in power. That the possibility of an alternation in power is sufficiently reduced results in a regime which does not meet the minimalist conditions of procedural democracy.

Civilians versus Military Actors

The concept of competitive authoritarianism, and those of democracy more generally, are often situated around civilian actors and assume a high degree of civilian control of the military. In competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbent politicians use their strength and the tools of the state following the death of a closed authoritarian regime to tilt the playing field in their favor. Thus, competitive authoritarianism is conceptualized and theorized around the behavior of civilian incumbents, who use the tools at their disposal to improve the odds of holding office in their favor, at the expense of the opposition.

While Levitsky and Way's[7] concept and theoretical explanation of competitive authoritarianism helps explain the presence of this regime type in the wake of the Cold War, it is centered on the idea that *civilian* incumbents use their power to tilt the playing field *to guarantee power for themselves*. Yet many regimes,

[6]Steven Levitsky and Lucan A Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[7]Ibid.

including those which should qualify as competitive authoritarian, emerge from military rule where it is the military, not civilians, which uses its power to *excluded certain actors or constrain their power*, rather than guarantee seats of power for themselves.

Where civilians are concerned with monopolizing seats for themselves, militaries are more concerned with preventing parties hostile to the military's interests from winning political power. When the military is concerned with who can win power, it shapes the terms of electoral and political contestation to prevent certain actors from winning elections, or exercising power freely should its opponents win elections. Even though a military is focused on securing and protecting its interests, it uses its power during regime transitions to bias electoral and political procedures because it can usually secure its interests with different parties. What militaries do not want are parties in power which pose a direct threat to their institutional well-being and corporate interests. Simply stated, militaries are more likely to favor a system where certain parties are *prevented* from winning power, whereas civilians are more likely to seek a system where their own party is *guaranteed* to win.

I take care to distinguish between civilian and military actors because the military can wield its coercive power to set restrictions on who can contest elections, how votes are translated into power, and how power is exercised following elections. The military's actions may result in a competitive authoritarian system that looks similar to those created by civilians, but which was created and is upheld in distinct ways. I visualize this difference in Figure 2.1 below.

Over the past decade, we have thought of competitive authoritarianism as solely composing the left half of this 2x2, where the incumbent party uses its

Table 2.1: Forms of Civilian and Military Competitive Authoritarianism

Restrictions on Contestation	Incumbent: Party	Incumbent: Military
Yes	Competitive Authoritarianism • Incumbent tilts playing field	Competitive Authoritarianism • Military sets parameters
No	Democracy • Level playing field	Democracy • Level playing field

strength to monopolize power. This approach ignores the meaningful distinction between the regimes created by a military and how it differs from a regime created by civilians. I contribute to our understanding of the process of democratization, or the opening of political contestation, by demonstrating that we indeed have multiple quadrants. What I contribute with bounded democratization falls into the right-hand side of the 2x2. With an updated conceptualization of competitive authoritarianism, within the framework of bounded democracy, we can account for how militaries set parameters on regime transitions, which may result in a system ranging between the two quadrants in the right-half.

Bounded Democratization and Other Concepts of Democracy

I highlight the distinction between civilian and military forms of democratization to build a theoretical framework which explains why and how militaries shape the parameters of electoral and political contestation. Thus, bounded

democratization captures any shift from a closed system to one where there is greater contestation. I intentionally avoid placing bounded democratization within the binary, or ideal types, of democracy to emphasize the implications of the military's behavior in political openings, rather than whether the transition meets various thresholds of democracy. My approach also shows that the military can act unilaterally and that bounds on democratization will not always result in a pacted, or negotiated, transition.

Bounded democratization is conceptually distinct from other types of transitions which have been developed elsewhere in the literature. The concept of "pacted" transitions evolved from the debate on strategic transitions towards democratization.[8] These transitions are characterized by an explicit agreement between regime insiders and their opponents over the conditions of a democratic transition. Pacted transitions differ from ruptures or collapses where the opposition sweeps into power.[9] Both these concepts fail to account for authoritarian-led democratization where incumbents control democratization.[10] It is under incumbent-led democratization where bounded democratization is most likely, but bounded democratization differs from recent conceptualizations of incumbent-led democratization because of the centrality of the military's role.

Bounded democratization is also conceptually distinct from protected or

[8]Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. JHU Press, 1996; Alfred C Stepan. *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*. Oxford University Press New York, 1989; Alfred Stepan. "Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory". In: *Government and opposition* 32.4 (1997), pp. 657–678; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Vol. 3. JHU Press, 1986.

[9]Gerardo L Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff. "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective". In: *Transitions to democracy* 193 (1999), pp. 201–03.

[10]Rachel Beatty Riedl et al. "Authoritarian-led Democratization". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020).

tutelary democracy. Loveman[11] conceptualizes protected democracy as a system where there are free and fair elections, but where elected officials are not free to govern independent of the military. Tutelary democracy and bounded democratization differ primarily in how the military uses its power to influence civilian politicians. Under tutelary democracy, the military uses implicit or explicit threats to coerce civilians to govern in a way that aligns with the military's interests. Under bounded democratization, the military shapes institutions to bias the procedures used to select those in power and how power is shared. Rather than directly influencing the decisions of civilians, the military sets parameters on who can contest elections, the institutions which are used to select political officials, and how power is formally shared following elections, to indirectly shape civilian's behavior.

Tutelary democracy can coexist with bounded democratization as bounded democratization is the broader concept and where tutelary democracy is a subtype of bounded democratization. Under tutelary democracy, the military uses the threat of employing its power to coerce civilians to govern according to its preferences, but electoral and political procedures are otherwise left to civilians. After stepping down from power, Pinochet made it clear that civilians in power would not remain in their positions should they pursue policies against Pinochet's and the military's wishes.[12]

Under bounded democracy, on the other hand, the military uses its power to tilt electoral and political procedures in favor of its political allies and away from its opponents, but does not necessarily use threats to coerce civilians. Re-

[11]Loveman, ""Protected Democracies" and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993".

[12]Brian Loveman. "? Misión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition". In: *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33.3 (1991), pp. 35–74.

turning to the Chilean case, Pinochet, the military, and their civilian allies designed a system that was biased towards conservatives. Thus, in addition to using explicit threats, the authoritarian incumbents also designed a system that reduced the power of their opponents. A key difference between bounded and tutelary democracy is that the bounded system can endure well beyond tutelary democracy. In Chile, Pinochet eventually retired from public life and the military surrendered its political ambitions – removing the threat to civilians. Yet the bounded system the authoritarian actors designed survived decades.

Military Interests and its Strategic Relationship with Civilians

With the concept of bounded democratization established, I now turn to creating a theoretical framework to explain variation in how militaries bind democratization. Before explaining why the military uses its power to set parameters on civilian contestation, I discuss treating the military as a unitary actor and the assumptions which are necessary to incorporate the military into my theoretical model. After outlining how I treat the military as an actor, I turn to the military's interests and how these interests are dependent upon the characteristics of civilian parties.

The Military as an Institution and its Interests

As with all organizations the military is composed of individuals but the degree to which these individuals see themselves as members of the same organization with similar values and interests varies. Not only does the degree to

which members of the military see themselves as part of the same organization vary but the routinization of internal procedures and stability of the organization varies as well. Internal cohesion, organizational stability, and routinization are key components which influence the degree of institutionalization of any organization and is certainly applicable to the military.[13] As officers increasingly see themselves as belonging to the military and act within established procedures to govern internal affairs to provide organizational stability, the more the military behaves as a unitary actor.

While all organizations vary in their internal cohesion, stability, and routinization, there are some characteristics unique to the military which increase a military's tendency to act more unified than other organizations. One factor which increases the military's ability to behave as a unitary actor is the presence of a well-defined command hierarchy. Due to the hierarchy within the military, commanding officers are endowed with significant power to direct the actions of subordinates. Thus, when the command hierarchy is institutionalized, commanding officers can use their position atop the hierarchy to steer the entire institution in a unified manner, even on political issues.

Compounding the effect of the hierarchy on the military's cohesion is military training. All members of the military undergo intense combat training to socialize members into the organization. The very purpose of this training is to break down a person's individuality and make them responsive to the commands of superiors. In addition to combat training, commissioned officers undergo substantial additional training which further socializes them within the command structure of the military. Not only does this additional training reinforce their place within the command hierarchy but also increases their ca-

[13]Samuel P Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, 1968.

maraderie with officers of the same class. After leaving the military academy, junior officers also build strong relationships with more senior officers as they serve under them, further strengthening linkages within the officer corps. The training and service of military officers increases the internal cohesion of the officer corps. Should the military engage in warfare, internal cohesion increases as combat experience further strengthens camaraderie within the corps.

For the purpose of this analysis, I assume that militaries have a minimal degree of institutionalization, where officers receive professional training that socializes them into the military. I also assume that there is a well-defined command structure to guide the actions of both enlisted and officers under the command of flag officers. Additionally, I assume that the military's institutionalization is a function of history, as internal cohesion, organizational stability, and routinization must be developed over significant time and with great effort. When militaries fall below this level of institutionalization, open conflict frequently breaks out, as factions within the officer corps uses the coercive power under their command to seize power, rather than shape the political institutions meant to guide civilian politics. When the military's cohesion breaks down it will be unable to guide or bind a transition and fall outside the scope of analysis.

Although I expect the military to have a minimal degree of cohesion, there are some factors which make it more difficult to act in a unified manner. One factor is the degree to which branches of the military have their own autonomous command hierarchies. When armies, navies, and air forces have distinct command hierarchies, inter-branch coordination becomes more difficult. Institutional impediments to coordination exist when staff officers control their own

branches and do not report to any centralized actor, such as a defense minister or joint chief of staff, to coordinate their actions. Coordinated action within the officer corps also becomes more difficult as competing identities, whether ethnic, religious, or ideological, become more salient. As officers differentiate themselves by these identities, they undermine the military's capacity to act coherently and influence civilian politics.

Ultimately, the institutionalization of the military also affects its interests. As the military's institutionalization increases, its corporate interests become more coherent. I assume that institutionalized militaries share common goals which center around their corporate interests. The most important interest to the military is its own survival. Thus, when faced with extreme opposition and its survival is in question, the military will use all of its power to secure its survival. When the military's survival is not at stake, the military also places importance on internal cohesion, as cohesion within the officer corps is central to the military accomplishing its mission.[14]

By being politically active, a military expands its interests to include political and policy interests which can create factionalism within the officer corps, as some officers seek a return to the military's traditional mission while others continue to seek political or economic rents. I argue that as the military begins its return to the barracks, its cohesion increases because its interests narrow away from political or policy issues towards corporate factors, reducing conflict within the officer corps. By returning to the barracks the military reduces the scope of interests to become more concerned with traditional corporate interests, such as control over promotion, training, discipline, and seeking a budget

[14]Barbara Geddes. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1 (1999), pp. 115–144.

sufficiently large to fulfill its mission.

Others which have analyzed the military and its role in political transitions often focus on the military's desire for autonomy from civilians.[15] In this dissertation I relax the assumption that the military emphasizes autonomy. These other analyses are rooted in the experience of militaries in Latin America's Southern Cone, where militaries lacked civilian allies during the transition and were wary of civilian rule. Expanding the scope of cases beyond the Southern Cone demonstrates that the relationship between the military and civilian parties affects the strategic decisions of the military to seek autonomy. When the military has trusted allies in power, there is not a trade-off between autonomy and the security of the military's interests and prerogatives. As civilian commitments concerning the military's key interests weaken, the military places greater emphasis on autonomy in order to secure its interests.

There are some other factors that must be addressed when considering the military as a unitary actor with corporate interests. As militaries become less institutionalized their interests become more idiosyncratic. The military's interests become more idiosyncratic as factionalism around social or ideological identities within the officer corps become more salient, or as officers become linked to business and economic enterprises which expands the scope of interests of these officers. Another factor to consider is whether the actions of a regime leader who rose to power from the military actually acts on behalf of the military. While the

[15] Alfred C Stepan. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton University Press, 2015; Alfred C Stepan. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, 1988; Felipe Agüero. "Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-authoritarian Regimes". In: *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (2001), pp. 194–222; David Pion-Berlin. "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America". In: *Comparative Politics* (1992), pp. 83–102; David Pion-Berlin. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2003.

interests and power of the regime leader should differ from the military, I argue that the effects of these differences are negligible. I argue that the differences are negligible because the interests of the regime leader and military overlap, as the leader came from the military itself and relies on its support to stay in power. Thus, the regime leader is likely to incorporate the interests of the military in his own actions when negotiating new institutions, while also seeking institutions favorable to himself.

When Militaries Tie the Hands of Civilians

To explain why militaries bind democratization I focus on three key factors which affect whether commitments made by civilians are credible and, which in turn, shape the military's behavior; the level of trust the military has with a given political party, the degree of institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party, and the electoral and political strength of the incumbent party. Combined, these three factors influence the military's confidence that democracy will not pose a danger to the military's interests.

One of the key problems of demobilizing the military is that the military must be confident that its interests and institutional well-being will be secure under democratic rule. I argue that a military will be more likely to support democratization and return to the barracks as commitments made by civilians to protect the military become more credible. Yet democratic transitions are fraught with uncertainty which may reduce the military's confidence moving forward. To explain the military's behavior during regimes democratization, I conceptualize these transitions as critical junctures.

Regime transitions are critical junctures wherein the outcome is uncertain, yet the way in which the military binds democratization often has a durable impact on the resulting institutions.[16] During this critical juncture, the outcome is contingent upon the decisions of military officers within the regime and it is these officers who use institutional innovation to solve the key dilemmas they face.[17] These officers' decisions, however, are influenced by structural and institutional factors, as well as the characteristics of other actors in the system. The factors which influence the military's strategic actions exist prior to the critical juncture beginning and function as critical antecedent conditions.[18]

The failure of an authoritarian regime is the beginning of the critical juncture. In this period, the military seeks commitments by civilians that its interests will be secured should the military return to the barracks. Democracy brings with it certain dangers for the military because it is a system in which no one single force controls political outcomes. This generates a certain level of uncertainty about electoral and political outcomes, yet the institutional framework and the resources actors have within the system leads to some certainty about the range of possible outcomes.[19] If the military perceives danger to its interests within the range of certain uncertainties, or that the range of possible outcomes is too large, the military uses institutions to reduce the range of uncertainty and create credible commitments that civilian rule will not endanger its interests. I argue that the military's confidence is shaped by the relationship shared by the mil-

[16] David Walder and David Collier. "What is a Critical Juncture? Contigency Should Not be a Defining Feature". In: 2020.

[17] Rachel Beatty Riedl and Kenneth Roberts. "Critical Junctures, Contingency, and Institutional Legacies: Insights from Party System Development in Africa and Latin America". In: 2020.

[18] Dan Slater and Erica Simmons. "Informative regress: Critical antecedents in comparative politics". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 43.7 (2010), pp. 886–917.

[19] Adam Przeworski. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, 1991.

itary and any given party, the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party, and the electoral strength of the incumbent party.

The first mechanism I present is the level of trust the military has with a given party. By trust I mean the expectation that a party will act on the military's behalf. The military is more likely to trust parties that share their interests, a vision of the national project, an ethnic identity, or ideology. Most important for trust, however, is a developed relationship over repeated interaction. Senior officers are more likely to trust politicians they have worked closely with and when the officers are certain of the politicians' worldview. If the incumbent party, or other parties, hold the military's trust, the military becomes more confident that these parties will govern in a way that protects the military's interests.

The military needs to trust that citizens will not seek to control the military in a way that counters the military's core interests. Should parties exist in the system that are openly opposed to the military, these parties present a direct and clear danger to the military. If the incumbent party, or other parties, share interests with the military, the military can trust that those civilians will govern in a way that the military can tolerate and their confidence in civilian rule increases.

The dangers posed by civilian parties to the military range in severity. Should more ardent opponents come to power they may seek radical change, including wholesale change to the command structure, training, internal governance, the budget, the very mission of the military, and prosecution of officers. While these dangers are present in several cases, the implications of civilian rule may be more minor but the military may still worry that civilians will take control of key military prerogatives and financial streams even without seeking

radical changes.

The degree of trust influences the military's confidence but is only one factor as it does little to help create any expectation of which parties will survive the transition, which will come to power, nor how effective any given party may be should it win power. Which parties survive the transition and come to power is influenced by two other mechanisms, the degree of the institutionalization of the incumbent party, and the electoral strength of parties. The degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party matters because it helps the military know whether the incoming party system will include an ally. For the sake of this theoretical exercise, I assume that any incumbent party is allied with the military, considering they ruled in a coalition.[20] It may be that this relationship breaks down, but this is likely the exception.

The degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party affects the military's confidence in civilian rule because it affects the ability of the incumbent party to survive a regime transition. Not only does the institutionalization of the incumbent party affect its ability to survive a transition, but also how that party will look in the future, how cohesively it will act in power, and how the party influences the development of the subsequent party system. I define an institutionalized party as one in which party organizations are routinized,[21] with a stable and broad party apparatus,[22] autonomy from other actors,[23] and its ca-

[20]This is not always the case as the party and military may not have the most amicable relationships. For example, while the NDP in Egypt held executive and legislative power, it was largely a personalistic vehicle for Mubarak that the military tolerated, rather than a proactive military ally.

[21]Fernando Bizzarro, Allen Hicken, and Darin Self. "The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: A New Global Indicator (1900-2015)". In: *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 48 (2017).

[22]Darin Sanders Self and Allen Hicken. "Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Party Building". In: *Annual Meeting of the Varieties of Democracy Project*. 2018.

[23]Anne Meng. "Ruling parties in authoritarian regimes: rethinking institutional strength". In: *British Journal of Political Science* 51.2 (2021), pp. 526–540.

pacity for national-level mobilization.[24]

Institutionalized parties are more likely to survive the end of the regime than parties which were personalistic vehicles for the ruler due to their autonomy and routinization.[25] Routinized parties also improve their odds at surviving regime transitions if they have a social base they can draw on for political support through clientelistic or programmatic linkages. Institutionalized parties are also less prone to radical shifts in policy programs and leadership as the party can agree on its policy goals. Greater stability in the party's platform, brand, or leadership, means that the party's values today are likely to hold in the near future, reducing variability concerning how the party will govern should it win power – meaning that the military can be more confident that this is how the party will be in the future.

Should the authoritarian incumbent party survive the regime transition, it also anchors and stabilizes the subsequent party system.[26] By serving as an anchor or focal point in the party system, the incumbent party provides the military with a credible expectation of what the party system will look like and increases its confidence that the party system will be stable. I center the theoretical framework around the presence of an institutionalized party, but in many circumstances incumbent militaries do not form political parties until democratization is imminent, or lack any allied party at all. When the military lacks an allied party, or the allied party is young, there is greater uncertainty about how the party will be in the future. When uncertainty about the permanency or

[24]Riedl et al., "Authoritarian-led Democratization".

[25]Meng, "Ruling parties in authoritarian regimes: rethinking institutional strength".

[26]Anna M Grzymala-Busse. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2002; Adrienne LeBas. *From Protest to Parties: Party-building and Democratization in Africa*. Oxford University Press, 2011; Rachel Beatty Riedl. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2014; Self and Hicken, "Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Party Building".

stability of allied parties is high, the military uses its power to bind democratization to hedge against the uncertainty.

While the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party affects its stability and the likelihood it survives the transition, it does not necessarily endow the party with the ability to win and hold power and govern on behalf of the military's interests. Thus, the strength of the party also matters for the military's confidence in civilian rule. By strength I mean the scope of the parties hold on sub-national and national political office and ability to govern independent of the military.

The military can evaluate a party's strength by looking to history and determining whether the party was able to hold power without the military's interference. Should parties manage the state and elections without needing the military's coercive capacity, it increases the military's confidence that the party will be sufficiently strong to protect the military's interests even after a shift to democracy – making civilian commitments more credible.

The military may also look to past elections, prior to when it came to power, to evaluate how parties will perform and which parties are likely to come to power. Using past elections to evaluate party strength the military can identify strong parties it opposes and then it can either design rules to weaken or eliminate these parties, or build in institutional checks to weaken these parties should they win elections.[27] It may be that the military cannot use past elections to formulate any expectation about the subsequent party system due to a historical lack of free and fair elections, the military being in power for a long period of time, or extreme restructuring of politics undertaken by the military. Under

[27]Militaries often use bicameralism to create an upper house that is designed to check the power of popular parties.

these circumstances, the military can rely on elections for constituent assemblies, or circumscribed elections while it is still politically active,[28] to evaluate the electoral prospects of their allies and opponents.

In cases where the military lacks an allied party, or its allied party is poorly institutionalized or electorally weak, the military is more likely to control the terms of democratization. To address its lack of confidence in parties, the military may become active in negotiations while only seeking informal agreements with civilians over who will participate in elections and/or how power will be shared. It may also be the case that the military takes a direct role in designing formal institutions to generate stronger commitments. When the military seeks stronger commitments it uses its power to bind democratization and reduce the possibility of opponents coming to power by shaping electoral institutions. Should the military expect these actions to be insufficient, it goes further and shapes legislative and executive institutions to reduce the power of opponents should they win power.[29]

The actions taken by the military to constrain civilian politics may not necessarily violate a minimalist conceptualization of democracy, as it is still possible that those in power are selected by free and fair elections. Should the actions taken by the military cross a threshold and violate procedures which produce democracy, it creates a form of competitive authoritarianism where the system designed by the military prohibits certain parties from winning and exercising power without undue constraints.

The three factors outlined above affect the degree of uncertainty the military

[28]The 1999 Indonesian election was free and fair, but a full transition to democracy did not take place until the 2004 election.

[29]In several cases, the military knows that opposition parties will overwhelm any electoral system and uses institutions to place horizontal restraints on these parties.

faces when considering democratization. It may be, however, that there is little uncertainty and the military knows which parties will win power. Even when the military is certain about electoral outcomes, it acts in a similar fashion to use its power to constrain opposition parties should those parties present a threat to the military's interests. Thus, instead of solely relating the military's behavior to uncertainty, I explain bounded democratization in terms of the credibility of commitments made by civilians and the military's confidence that civilian rule will not undermine its core interests. If there is a high degree of uncertainty about how politics will look in the future, the military will have low confidence that its interests will be secure after democratization. Similarly, if the military is certain that democracy will bring opponents to power, it will also have low confidence that its interests will be secure should it return to the barracks without binding democratization.

If the military has low confidence that civilians will protect its interests, whether due to a lack of trust in civilian parties, the presence of weakly institutionalized allied parties, or electorally weak allies, the military is more likely to bind democratization. I visualize this theory in Figure 2.1 below. On the left are the three background conditions which affect the military's confidence in civilian rule. Together, these factors influence the likelihood the military uses its power to shape the regime transition, with the possibility of either a bounded or unbounded transition.

Using the concept of bounded democratization I have laid out a theoretical framework to improve our understanding of a military's behavior during a political transition. As a military returns to the barracks, it uses its power to shape the terms of the incoming political regime as a way to protect its interests. By



Figure 2.1: Military Confidence in Civilian Parties

analyzing militaries in this way, we can better understand the rise of democracy or competitive authoritarianism in the wake of military rule. But a shift to civilian rule isn't necessarily the end of the story, however, as there is no guarantee that the military will remain in the barracks and not undermine civilian rule.

Monopolizing Politics and Marginalizing the Military

There are two fundamental challenges facing democratic development when considering the end of military-backed authoritarian rule. The first is whether the military supports a shift from authoritarianism to democracy. The second is whether civilians can then successfully marginalize the political power of the military. The first challenge I have addressed with the theory based around the concept of bounded democratization. The second I address here.

Even should the military buy into the prospect of democracy, whether

bounded or bounded, civilians face the challenge of continued democratic development. One key problem of democratic development, in the context of post-military rule, is whether civilians can capture complete control of electoral and political contestation. Democracy cannot develop if the military maintains any *direct* influence over the terms of electoral contestation and how power is exercised after elections. Even if the officer corps supported the initial transition to democracy, the military's support for democratization does not guarantee that the military is willing to give up all of its political influence, especially when there was bounded democratization. The question of democratic development following military rule depends upon the civilians' ability to push beyond the initial buy-in of the officer corps and monopolize control of electoral and political contestation.

There has been significant work on civilian control of the military in the field of civilian-military relations. This field is vast,[30] with an extremely broad scope on issues pertaining to the relationship between the military and its civilian counterparts. Much of this literature focuses on the dilemma of civilian control of the military given the coercive power of the armed forces.[31] This literature, however, largely frames civilian control around control of the military's sphere[32] which includes the military's mission, budget, hierarchy, etc. instead of explaining how or why civilians are able to control what traditionally falls under the civilian sphere.

Because this literature is so large, there is considerable debate on how to

[30]Risa A Brooks. "Integrating the Civil-military Relations Subfield". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (2019), pp. 379–398.

[31]Peter D Feaver. "Civil-military Relations". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1 (1999), pp. 211–241.

[32]Samuel P Huntington. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Vol. 514. Harvard University Press, 1957.

define civilian control of the military. This is especially problematic because, empirically, civilian control of the military varies widely, even within democracies where civilians are supreme. A major theoretical approach to civilian control focuses on the character of the military itself, and whether the officer corps is willing to *accept* civilian control. This approach emerged from classic works which focused on the professional nature of the officer corps.[33] These explanations argue that professionalized officers see themselves as part of the state, with a specific mission focused on security, and remove themselves from political matters.

Another major vein within this literature focuses on the ability of civilians to redefine the mission or prerogatives of the military. This literature highlights the conflict between civilians and the military over how the military itself should be structured and operate.[34] At the heart of this framework is the idea that military autonomy undermines civilian control of the military sphere. While it is certainly important to have robust civilian oversight of the military to produce stable democracy, this conceptualization of civilian control misses a key aspect of democracy – civilian autonomy from the military.

To help explain a critical part of civilian-military relations in post-authoritarian rule, I flip the concept of civilian control on its head. Specifically, I focus on civilian autonomy from the military, and the monopolization of electoral and political contestation by civilians, as a necessary component of post-

[33]Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*; Morris Janowitz. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Free Press, 1960; Amos Perlmutter. "The praetorian state and the praetorian army: Toward a taxonomy of civil-military relations in developing polities". In: *Comparative Politics* 1.3 (1969), pp. 382–404.

[34]Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*; Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*; Alain Rouquié. *The Military and the State in Latin America*. Univ of California Press, 1987; Pion-Berlin, *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*.

authoritarian democratic development. I focus on civilian monopolization of politics instead of more because if the military is able to set the terms of civilian-military relations during the transition and this structure of the relationship is durable,[35] civilians will have failed to dismantle the authoritarian legacies of military rule and improve democratic development. Furthermore, even if there is a transition to democratic rule, civilians cannot exercise control of the military if they themselves do not control the terms of how office holders are selected into power and how power is arbitrated amongst themselves. Thus, I ask, why are some civilians more effective at monopolizing control of electoral and political contestation than others after military rule?

To answer this question, I narrow the scope of the concept of civilian-military control[36] and focus on the relationship between the armed forces and civilians solely in cases of democracies which have emerged from military-back authoritarian rule. Following a democratic transition, whether bounded or unbounded, civilians face the challenge of coercing the military to accept reforms which go beyond allowing open contestation amongst civilians. Instead, civilians must check the military's willingness or ability to influence electoral and political contestation. If civilians fail to check or reform the military, democratic development will be weak. When civilians fail to monopolize the electoral and political contestation, the threat of military intervention in politics is always on the horizon which, in turn, affects the behavior of civilians within the developing democratic system. Only when reforms are thorough and civilian monopolization of contestation absolute, can we determine that the military's influence on political development has been marginalized.

[35] Agüero, "Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-authoritarian Regimes".

[36] Michael R Kenwick. "Self-reinforcing Civilian Control: A Measurement-Based Analysis of Civil-Military Relations". In: *International Studies Quarterly* 64.1 (2020), pp. 71–84.

I also conceptualize the problem around monopolization of contestation because civilian control, as traditionally used, is the wrong concept to employ in this context.[37] As previously stated, civilian control of the military can be conceptualized in a multitude of ways, many of which are not appropriate for understanding the influence of the military on civilians in new democracies. Instead, I focus on the concept of monopolization of contestation, which may include reforms to the military itself, because it is more useful for analyzing new democracies. When considering the health of new democracies it matters more that the system moves away from the previous authoritarian structure, where the military had its hand in politics and influenced civilian contestation, rather than how close the system of civilian oversight arrives at a Western oriented ideal.

The key problem of post-authoritarian civilian-military relations then, is less about civilian control of military affairs, but instead about whether civilians can check the military's political impulses. Thus, in new democracies, it matters less whether civilians can set the mission, autonomy, or even the budget of the military, but instead whether civilians can keep the military off the proverbial political playing field. I conceptualize civilian control this way because it strikes at a key factor of democracy that is usually neglected in this field, that of the military's role in electoral and political contestation. Democracy can exist under various forms of civilian control of the armed forces, but democracy is always undermined if civilians cannot keep the military from influencing electoral and political contestation.[38]

[37] Lindsay P Cohn. "It Wasn't in My Contract: Security Privatization and Civilian Control". In: *Armed Forces & Society* 37.3 (2011), pp. 381–398.

[38] One may also note that democracy would fail to develop if the military interferes on issues of participation, but this is rarely an issue on which the military intervenes.

Keeping the Military out of Politics

As mentioned, the question of civilian control of the military has received significant attention. While I diverge from a broader conceptualization of civilian control to the more narrow concept of civilian monopolization of contestation, I draw from this literature to develop a theory which explains the variation in civilians' ability to check the political impulses of the military.

The earliest literature on civilian control focused on the degree of professionalization within the officer corps.[39] This explanation is military-centric, with the military having almost total agency regarding its political activities. Another major explanation, which emerged decades after this initial work, is the threat model. Under this framework, militaries are more likely to submit to civilian authority when there are external threats.[40]

These explanations neglect the role of domestic civilian institutions as a way to constrain the political activity of the military. A decade after his work on the professional soldier, Huntington[41] pointed to the role of institutions as having a major influence on the order and stability of the political system.[42] Institutions help solve problems of collective action and facilitate interactions between competing factions within society, without resulting in open and violent conflict. One work which builds on the threat model, yet brings in domestic institutions is Staniland.[43] Staniland argues that the character of a threat may matter, but it is

[39] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.

[40] Michael C Desch. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. JHU Press, 2001.

[41] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

[42] Risa Brooks. "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States". In: *International Security* 44.4 (2020), pp. 7–44.

[43] Paul Staniland. "Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective". In: *Security Studies* 17.2 (2008), pp. 322–362.

insufficient to explain variation in civilian control. Instead, one must account for the strength of domestic institutions and civilian legitimacy. When elected officials are equipped with strong institutions, they are able to push back against the military and impose their dominance.

Like Staniland, Hunter[44] points to the strength of civilian politicians and democratic legitimacy as major factors of civilian control. For Hunter, Brazilian civilians were able to erode military autonomy because democratic competition gave them the incentive to do so. Instead of relying on the military as its patron, civilian politicians sought to increase their own power at the expense of the military's. Their capacity to do so, however, was derived from broad electoral victories that enhanced the power of reformist politicians within the legislature.

Like Hunter[45] and Staniland,[46] I argue that civilians' ability to control the political sphere is a function of the strength of civilian institutions, specifically, individual parties and the party system. To understand why parties matter so much with respect to checking the political power of the military, we should think of civilian monopolization of contestation as a collective action problem. As stated at the outset of this chapter, the military controls enormous coercive power. If civilians hope to constrain the military's political activity, they must be able to counter this with their own power which they can do in two ways. First, parties must coordinate efforts between and within national institutions (horizontally), such as the executive and legislature, to promote a unified effort against the political activities of the military. Their capacity to do so comes, in part, from an institutionalized party system. Second, the parties must demon-

[44]Wendy Hunter. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*. Univ of North Carolina Press, 1997.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Staniland, "Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective".

strate a strong capacity to mobilize mass and civil society on their behalf (vertically), while maintaining internal autonomy from the military. This capacity comes when individual parties are institutionalized.

Party System Institutionalization and Collective Action

Because of its coercive power, a politically active military is difficult for civilians to monopolize control of contestation if civilians are unable to coordinate against the military. Thus, the ability to keep the military out of politics is rooted in the party system – which facilitates collective action across and within the legislature and executive. I focus my discussion on the legislature because it is the institution in which conflict over military reforms often takes place, but the executive is certainly important for pressuring the military on issues of civilian supremacy.

In the legislature, civilians debate and pass reforms which can curb the political capacity of the military. For civilians to use the legislature to check the political impulses of the military, parties within the legislature must act in a relatively cohesive manner. Should the legislature not act cohesively, it becomes more difficult to pass reforms and present a credible commitment against the military's political impulses.

Presenting a unified front against the military's political activity plays a major role in democratic development. Legislatures can seek a host of reforms, from changes to the territorial command structure, to the command hierarchy, budget, mission, and other prerogatives, but these reforms may be insufficient to depoliticize the military because it will retain, for the most part, its coercive

capacity. Instead, must understand that it will face unified civilian opposition should it leave the barracks for the military to stay on the sidelines. While unified civilian opposition does not guarantee that the military will not employ its coercive force, it sets out clear costs of doing so.

Whether the legislature can implement reforms and check the political activity of the military is significantly influenced by two factors related to party system institutionalization: the level of party fragmentation and the stability of party competition. An institutionalized party system is one in which party competition is stable.[47] Without stability in inter-party competition, parties enter and exit the party system without a stable popular base to support them. Furthermore, when parties emerge and die in only a short period of time, the interests of the parties are more myopic and narrow in on simply surviving the next electoral cycle, rather than focusing on the long-term goal of monopolizing power for civilians. Essentially, when parties come and go, the military is able to exploit the chaos of the party system to continue its political activities.

The ability of civilians to check the military also depends on the number of parties within the party system. Party system fragmentation matters because simply having more actors makes coordinating efforts to push against military intrusion into politics more difficult. Not only does the higher number of actors make coordination more difficult, but as the number of parties increases it also makes inter-party coordination more difficult because parties are likely to pursue their own interests over the collective interests of civilians. Each party in the system has the incentive to pursue policies and behave in a way that results in greater gains for their own party, while at the same time acting in a way

[47]Scott Mainwaring, Timothy Scully, et al. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party systems in Latin America*. Stanford University Press Stanford, 1995.

that reduces the gains of other parties. Thus, each party is more likely to pursue their own narrow interests in competition against other parties in the system and reduce coordination, even on issues on which they may agree.

Coordinating to check the political activities of the military becomes even more difficult if parties within the system prefer a politicized military. With few, well-institutionalized parties in the party system, we should expect these parties to prefer autonomy from the military, largely because they stand a better chance at capturing power without the assistance of other actors. As the system becomes more fragmented, the incentive to partner with officers and lean on the institutional capacity of the military increases. Parties rely more on the military when parties capture smaller vote shares due to fragmentation because the marginal gains of partnering with the military increases when these smaller parties are competing against several other parties. As parties see the military as a beneficial political partner, the likelihood of coordinated action against the military decreases.

Party Institutionalization, Autonomy, and Social Mobilization

While the ability for parties to coordinate and present a united front against the military is key to keeping the military sidelined, another important factor is the degree of institutionalization of the individual parties themselves. For the military to stay out of politics, parties must demonstrate that they have popular backing and the capacity to mobilize society on their behalf. Parties will be unable to do this without their own developed territorial apparatus or independent capacity to raise funds.

It is also key that parties are autonomous from the military. When parties are institutionally weak, and rely on the military for elite, electoral, or financial support, they open the door for greater political participation by the military. Militaries are more successful at subverting civilian supremacy when officers can successfully penetrate and influence political parties. If parties are well institutionalized they increase their own autonomy and shut off avenues for officers to enter politics.

Key to marginalizing the military is demonstrating that civilians have popular backing. To do this, parties need to be sufficiently developed to use the party infrastructure to mobilize society. As parties are better able at mobilizing voters on their behalf, they increase the popular legitimacy of their claims.[48] This gives them greater leverage when pushing for reforms of the security sector, which the military may oppose but cannot prevent, knowing that the parties have popular backing. The capacity of parties to mobilize society outside of elections also matters. Should the military leave the barracks again, party elites become dependent on mass society to mobilize and check the power of the military.

One aspect of party institutionalization that increases a party's capacity to mobilize society is the territorial apparatus. Parties with a broad territorial apparatus can develop strong links throughout most of society. The parties can then use their relationship with civil and mass society to spur mobilization against the military if necessary. Parties with the capacity to mobilize mass society force the military to confront the possibility of ruling without popular backing and possibly relying on lethal force to the detriment of their institutional reputation.[49]

[48] Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*.

[49] Eva Bellin. "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring". In: *Comparative Politics* 44.2 (2012), pp. 127–149; Terence Lee. *Defect or De-*

Another way that party institutionalization can help civilians monopolize contestation is through its autonomy from the military elite. During military-backed authoritarian rule, officers often meddle in the affairs of the political parties. This behavior erodes formal and informal barriers parties typically have against intrusion in party leadership. When parties are well-institutionalized, the military has less access to leadership positions and committees, as the party recruits its own members for elite positions within the party, legislature, and executive. By controlling elite recruitment, parties create a firewall between elite civilian positions and office and the military, which decreases incentives for officers to be politically active or for the party to cater to demands of officers. Also, when officers are kept out of party leadership, parties act in accordance with the civilian interests of its members, rather than those of active or retired officers with links to the military.

Parties can also reduce the political influence of the military by relying solely on their own apparatuses for electoral mobilization. Because military rule can erode, or prevent the development, of fully institutionalized parties, parties may use the territorial apparatus of the military to supplement the party's institutional weakness. Instead of investing in its own territorial apparatus as a way to link to and mobilize society, parties may establish relationships with officers throughout the country's territory and pull the military into electoral campaigns.

One final way that party institutionalization can facilitate civilian monopolization of politics is by parties using well-developed and independent fundraising mechanisms. When parties lack their own robust fundraising capacity they

fend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia. JHU Press, 2014; Sharan Grewal. "Military Defection During Localized Protests: The Case of Tataouine". In: *International Studies Quarterly* 63.2 (2019), pp. 259–269.

may turn to officers as clientelistic brokers or using businesses owned by officers to fund campaigns. In addition to pulling the military into politics for electoral support, parties reliant on military support for campaigns are less likely to pursue actions that curb the political influence of the military in order to protect their relationship with the military.

Overall I argue that parties play a key role in helping civilians monopolize control over political contestation and autonomy from the military. This happens in two ways. First, party system institutionalization reduces the coordination costs against the military. Stable party systems, with low levels of fragmentation, will be more effective at acting collectively against the military. Second, the institutionalization of individual parties boosts these parties' claims of popular legitimacy and will be better able to act independent of the military. Together, the institutionalization of the parties and party system increases the civilians' capacity to check the political impulses of the military.

As can be seen in Table 2.2, the combination of party system and party institutionalization holds consequences for post-democratization civilian-military relations. In circumstances where both party and party system institutionalization is low, there is a ubiquitous presence of retired officers. Retired officers are found throughout the system because they are able to penetrate parties and capture elite positions while parties fail to coordinate and marginalize the military because of poor party system institutionalization. When party system and party institutionalization are high, we observe a system that is completely monopolized by civilians with a subjugated military.

Where party institutionalization is low, but party system institutionalization is high, officers can enter politics by capturing parties. When this is the case the

Party System Institutionalization	Party Institutionalization: Low	Party Institutionalization: High
Low	Politically Active Military Officers Present in Parties (Indonesia)	Political Military Civilian Parties (Venezuela)
High	Established Parties Captured by Officers (Syria - 19060s)	Civilian Supremacy Officers Excluded from Politics (Paraguay)

Table 2.2: Party and Party System Institutionalization and Legacy Officers

military is largely subjugated by the parties which can coordinate and marginalize its political power. Inversely, when party system institutionalization is low, but party institutionalization is high, there is more room for the military to expand its scope of activity, but civilians continue to control elite recruitment and political institutions.

Case Selection and Methods

This dissertation analyzes the question of how militaries interact strategically with civilian parties over the terms of civilian control of politics. I have created a theoretical framework which facilitates this analysis of the military's interaction with parties in two stages. The first stage focuses on the terms of the transition and whether the military uses its power to hedge against the potential costs of democracy by binding democratization. The second stage focuses on whether civilian parties can monopolize contestation and push the military out of poli-

tics. To evaluate this theoretical framework empirically, I use a mixed-methods approach.

A mixed-methods approach is most appropriate given certain constraints with developing a research design in the context of democratization and military behavior. These constraints include incorporating the historical record into the analysis and political factors that cannot be manipulated by a researcher. The development of macro-political institutions cannot be randomized and require an observational approach which uses the historical record, rather than an experimental or quasi-experimental research design. Another potential approach would be to conduct survey or lab in the field experiments with elites who participated in the transition and subsequently struggled to consolidate democracy. This approach faces two major obstacles. Elites, especially military elites, are hard to access which makes it very difficult to build a representative sample. Furthermore, an approach that uses either survey or lab in the field experiments is more feasible in countries which democratized in the recent past. A large majority of cases of democratization occurred several decades ago, however, with many of the elites having already passed away.

Using an observational approach allows me to collect data and analyze the historical record using both qualitative and quantitative methods. I note here that my empirical exercise is designed to identify causal mechanisms, rather than any precise causal estimate of bounded democratization. I begin by outlining the qualitative approach in which I perform a comparative historical analysis with a controlled comparison.

The strength of a comparative historical analysis is that it can be used to com-

pare historical trajectories as a way to identify and test causal mechanisms.[50] Causal mechanisms are best identified when comparing positive and negative cases, or within the scope of this project, cases of bounded and unbounded democratization. Another strength of comparative historical analysis is that it allows the researcher to use a smaller number of cases to demonstrate causal mechanisms that may be representative and answer real world puzzles.[51]

The comparative historical approach is more likely to identify representative causal mechanisms when using a controlled comparison.[52] Controlled comparisons simulate a quantitative approach by "controlling" for certain factors that lend to external validity. This is only the case if the cases selected capture the necessary variation in the explanatory and dependent variable, while accounting for plausible alternative explanations. Comparative historical analysis with controlled, or paired, analysis also replicates the depth and granularity of within case analysis, but with the added benefit of a comparison or counterfactual case.[53]

As previously mentioned, I am looking at the development of macro-political institutions which cannot be randomized. Comparative historical analysis is an appropriate methodological approach under these constraints.[54] A comparative historical design allows me to identify the interplay between structural and institutional conditions with the agency of key actors, whether it be individuals or organizations. Using comparative historical analysis, I am also

[50]Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge University Press, 1979.

[51]Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney. "Comparative-historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science". In: *Advances in Comparative-historical Analysis* (2015), pp. 3–36.

[52]Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt. "The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 46.10 (2013), pp. 1301–1327.

[53]Henry E Brady and David Collier. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

[54]Thelen and Mahoney, "Comparative-historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science".

able to account for the relevant historical context. History matters in these circumstances because key actors which influence the path out of an authoritarian regime form expectations of the future by using their past experiences.

Comparative historical analysis is also the best qualitative approach because it is well-suited to analyze critical junctures.[55] During the period of uncertainty of a regime transition, I focus on how the decisions of agents, who are freer and their decisions more influential, result in the creation of durable institutional arrangements. This is especially appropriate for the concept of bounded democratization, as the institutions put into place during the critical juncture are causally distal, meaning these institutions affect political circumstances well into the future.

While agents are more unconstrained by institutions or structures during critical junctures, they are certainly not completely outside the influence of these factors. I am able to use comparative historical analysis which focuses on critical antecedent conditions to address this.[56] Critical antecedents are conditions which shape the decisions key actors make in the midst of a critical juncture but which are not deterministic. Thus, comparative historical analysis allows me to identify the historical context of these critical antecedents, why they're important prior to the critical juncture, and how they shape the behavior of key actors during the juncture.

To perform a comparative historical analysis, I use a number of qualitative methods including textual documents from archives, semi-structured elite interviews, and secondary resources. I use archival resources for two reasons. First,

[55]Giovanni Capoccia. "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change". In: *Advances in Comparative-historical Analysis* (2015), pp. 147–179.

[56]Slater and Simmons, "Informative regress: Critical antecedents in comparative politics".

because many of the democratic transitions occurred several decades ago, I cannot interview all relevant actors and archives help alleviate this pitfall. While conducting fieldwork I accessed national, party, and military archives. These archives allowed me to chart the historical development of key antecedent conditions regarding the relationship between the military and parties prior to, during, and following authoritarian rule. I supplemented archival work with semi-structured interviews with elites which allowed me to understand the context elites saw themselves in and better understand their strategic actions. Lastly, I used secondary resources to provide greater breadth to the data collected via my own archival work and interviews.

While comparative historical analysis is an appropriate method to identify causal mechanisms, one potential weakness is ensuring that explanatory mechanisms are generalizable. Even though I use controlled comparisons, external validity remains an issue. To address this, I pair the qualitative approach with a quantitative analysis as well. As I explain in greater depth in Chapter 5, I use secondary resources on over 140 cases of regime transitions to code the factors of bounded democratization. I combine this original data with data on party institutionalization and strength, along with other factors relevant to democratic transitions. I then use regression analysis to test the association of bounded democratization with the character of the party system prior to the transition to assess the generalizability of the theoretical claims.

Scope Conditions and Case Selection

I limit the scope of analysis to cases where the military was politically active during authoritarian rule. The degree of military involvement in politics is treated differently by various scholars and ranges from the presence of a regime leader who was a career officer, to the military as an institution actively controlling politics.[57] The scope of my analysis includes this entire range of military political activity. Using a permissive definition of what constitutes a military regime provides analytical leverage – allowing me to assess how generalizable the theory is and under what conditions the theory fails.

By setting the scope of the inquiry to only transitions out of military regimes I also increase the explanatory power of the theory by not stretching concepts to fit cases where it is less suitable. Many other works concerned with democratization explain variation in the propensity of democratization, or level of democracy, in as many cases as possible. By using wide scope conditions, the resulting theories lack explanatory power for many cases they are trying to explain, even if it would be more appropriate for a sub-set of the population.[58] Because I set the scope conditions to cases where the military played a significant political role, I ignore situations where the military was not politically active, was under complete civilian control, and had little influence over the transition or post-transition contestation.[59]

[57] Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set". In: *Perspectives on Politics* 12.2 (2014), pp. 313–331; Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective". In: *Contemporary Politics* 19.1 (2013), pp. 19–34; Milan W Svolik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012; José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited". In: *Public choice* 143.1-2 (2010), pp. 67–101.

[58] Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

[59] More discussion of the global sample of cases is presented in Chapter 5.

For the comparative historical analysis I select the post-authoritarian cases of Indonesia and Paraguay. I select Indonesia and Paraguay because they meet necessary conditions to test a theory wherein the military's strategic behavior is influenced by the characteristics of civilian parties. Indonesia and Paraguay are an appropriate comparison because they are similar on several theoretically relevant dimensions critical to explain the military's behavior during democratization, yet differ on the key explanatory variable.

Even though Indonesia and Paraguay are different on social, economic, cultural, and geographic factors, they do share important similarities on military characteristics and their authoritarian experience. Both militaries were well-institutionalized and unitary actors that played a major political role for decades prior to democratization. Indonesia and Paraguay experienced over thirty years of military rule where a former army general led the regime, while the military ruled in a coalition with a civilian party. The key difference between the two cases, which allows for a comparison that identifies the causal mechanisms at play, is the variation in the characteristics of the authoritarian incumbent party and the military's confidence in civilian parties. Should I compare either of these cases to another former military regime which did not feature a political party, it would be difficult to establish that the military's behavior was related to the absence of a party. Instead, by using these cases I hold the military and regime characteristics constant, and vary the characteristics of the incumbent party to demonstrate how variation in the party's institutionalization and strength influences the military's behavior.

While the differences between Indonesia and Paraguay on social, economic, cultural, and geographic factors may seem to matter, they do not play a signif-

icant role in explaining variation in bounded democratization between the two cases. Both countries passed the threshold for procedural democracy following three decades of military-backed authoritarian rule, but democratization in the case of Indonesia was bounded, whereas democratization in Paraguay was unbounded. I emphasize that the conceptual frameworks which are used to explain traditional democratization differ substantively from bounded democratization. I also argue that theoretical frameworks used to explain traditional procedural democratization cannot account for the difference in bounded democratization between the two cases.

I present the explanatory variables of prominent theoretical frameworks of traditional democratization in Table 2.3 to demonstrate how these explanations fail to explain variation in bounded democratization. If a given explanatory variable aligns in both the Paraguayan and Indonesian cases, and conforms with expected outcomes, I cannot dismiss that framework as an alternative explanation because it may also explain bounded democratization. If an explanatory variable diverges between Indonesia and Paraguay, I can dismiss that possible explanation because both cases passed the threshold for procedural democracy, and it is unlikely that that variable could pass by procedural democratization and explain variation in bounded democratization.

Furthermore, if the explanatory variables align between the two cases but contradict the expected outcome, I can also dismiss that explanation because it failed to explain traditional democratization in the two cases. If a variable is unable to explain traditional democratization in both Indonesia and Paraguay, it is unlikely to be a plausible cause of the variation in bounded democratization between the two cases.

Table 2.3: Alternative Explanations

Theory	*Explanation*	Indonesia prediction	Indonesia outcome	Paraguay prediction	Paraguay outcome
Elite agency	Insider - outsider pact → Democratization	✖	☑	✖	☑
Economic growth	Higher GDP → Democratization + Survival	✖	☑	✖	☑
Modernization	Modern values → Democratization	✖	☑	✖	☑
Redistributivist	Higher inequality → No democratization	☑	☑	✖	☑
Economic inclusion	Higher inequality → Democratization	✖	☑	☑	☑
Islamic culture	Islamic majorities → No democratization	✖	☑	☑	☑
Rentier effect	Resource wealth → No democratization	✖	☑	☑	☑

In Table 2.3, I stipulate whether the prediction of a given theory aligns with the observed outcome. For example, Indonesia and Paraguay were relatively poor at the time of democratization. Thus, the two cases converge on the explanatory variable, but contradict the expected outcome given that economic growth models would expect that poorer countries to either not democratize, or not survive long after democratization. Because both cases democratized while poor, and continue to be democracies decades later, the economic growth thesis is an unlikely explanation of the variation in bounded democratization between the two cases.

Indonesia and Paraguay also diverge on various mechanisms tied to democratization, but given that both democratized, I dismiss those mechanisms as potential explanations of bounded democratization. For example, Indonesia had far greater income and land equality than Paraguay, yet both democratized. If any of these explanations are applied to both cases, they fail to explain how both cases democratized and should not be used to explain variation in bounded democratization.

By selecting Indonesia and Paraguay, I hold the factors on which they are similar (i.e. political characteristics of the military) constant, and demonstrate how the factors where they diverge (i.e. characteristics of the party-military relationship) explain the variation in bounded democratization while dismissing alternative theories of democratization as potential explanations of bounded democratization.

I do not limit myself to the comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay. Because both cases feature a nationalist-oriented military and incumbent parties, I cannot account for how the causal mechanisms function should there not be an

incumbent party, or if the system is dominated by leftist party-military partners instead of a conservative-nationalist party-military relationship. To strengthen the empirical evaluation of the theory and account for greater variation in the characteristics of parties and officer corps, I also perform a large-n statistical analysis of the effects of party characteristics on bounded democratization in Chapter 5.

Conclusion and Plan for the Dissertation

Militaries and civilians face two major dilemmas when confronted with the end of an authoritarian regime. For the military, do civilians provide credible commitments that the military's interests will be secure under democracy? After democratization, can civilians monopolize the terms of political contestation and keep the military sidelined? To develop a theoretical framework to answer these questions, I developed two novel concepts: bounded democratization and civilian political monopolization.

With these concepts I develop a theoretical framework to answer these questions. For the first stage I argue that civilian commitments are credible when there are parties the military trusts, and when these parties are more institutionalized and electorally strong. When the military lacks confidence in civilian parties, it uses its power to bind democratization.

For the second stage I argue civilians will be more effective at marginalizing the political power of the military when the party system is stable and less fragmented, and parties themselves are more institutionalized. These conditions help reduce the costs of inter and intra-party coordination, as parties act to check

the political activity of the military.

I test these theories using a mixed method research design. With paired comparisons I use comparative historical analysis to demonstrate how the theoretical mechanisms outlined above explain variation in civilian-military relations during late-stage authoritarianism and early-stage democracy. To supplement the qualitative research, I also conduct a large-n quantitative analysis. Using an original dataset on the character of transitions out of military-rule, I test the likelihood of there being bounded democratization given the degree of party institutionalization or strength prior to the transition.

This dissertation contributes to the study of democratization and democratic development in two important ways. First, I diverge from other works by arguing that the military's strategic behavior during democratization is dependent upon the characteristics of the parties in the system. Most other works focus solely on the role of civilians, or fail to demonstrate how the military's interests are tied to the structure of political parties. Secondly, I narrow the scope of analysis to help explain how certain actors behave given specific constraints. Instead of using structural explanations in which elite behavior is determined, or agency explanations where individuals are relatively unconstrained, the theories offered here grant agency to major actors, but demonstrates how their behavior is shaped by structural and institutional factors.

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CHAPTER 3

CRITICAL ANTECEDENTS AND CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PARAGUAY AND INDONESIA

Democracy rarely emerges with a clean break from the authoritarian past. Instead, democracy and its political institutions develop as actors contest the possible structure of the new system, often within the institutional setting of the authoritarian regime itself.[1] Elites, whether they be authoritarian incumbents, or challengers to the regime, bargain over the terms of the new system. As they bargain, each actor seeks institutions which increase their access to power or which protects them from their opponents. While much of the literature on comparative democratization centers around civilian elites, significant attention has also been given to how militaries bargain over certain terms of regime transitions. I return the focus to the military to demonstrate that the willingness of the military to accept democratization is dependent upon whether civilians can provide credible commitments that the military's interests will not be violated after a democratic transition.

In this chapter I outline the critical antecedent conditions which affect the military's confidence that civilians will not violate its interests following democratization. These antecedent conditions are shaped by historical factors, such as the experiences between a military and parties, or the institutionalization and strengthening of political parties. During the critical juncture of a regime transition, these conditions affect how pathways out of authoritarian rule diverge when the system is open to reform. I do not argue that democratization is a mo-

[1] Daniel Ziblatt. "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization?: A Test of the "Bread and Democracy" Thesis and the Case of Prussia". In: *World Politics* 60.4 (2008), pp. 610–641; Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

ment in which agents, specifically the military, face and choose from an open range of options. Instead, I argue that the military seeks to mitigate fears it has with civilian rule, but that it must work with conditions currently present in the political system. Thus, the military's strategies are shaped by the civilian actors and institutions which are present and which developed prior to, and during, authoritarian rule.

There are three key antecedent conditions which are a function of history. When considering a democratic transition, the military evaluates the relationship it has with certain parties, the institutionalization of the incumbent party, as well as the expected electoral strength of the incumbent party. The military uses historical experience to evaluate each of these factors and form expectations of the future. The military considers these three factors because each influences how credible the commitment is that civilians will protect that military's interests under democratic rule.

A military sees democracy as less dangerous when it has a civilian ally in whom it is reasonably confident can survive the transition and then win sufficient power to protect its interests. Confidence in civilian parties is maximized during authoritarian rule when the military rules alongside an institutionalized party it trusts. As the incumbent party becomes more institutionalized, the likelihood of that party surviving the transition and playing a nontrivial role in the subsequent party system increases. Having a party it trusts and which survives the transition is insufficient, however, if that party is not electorally strong. For the military to be confident in civilian democratic rule it must expect that its allies will have sufficient power to protect it. When the military lacks a trusted civilian partner, or the parties in the system are poorly institutionalized or weak,

the dangers of democratization increase and the military binds democratization to mitigate these dangers.

In this chapter I lay out the historical development of the incumbent party in both Paraguay and Indonesia along with its relationship with the military. Both the military and party were central in the transition to democratization in Paraguay and Indonesia and the relationship between the two actors and institutional characteristics of the party influenced the militaries' strategies. I use process tracing to show 1) the degree of trust between the two actors 2) the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party and 3) uncertainty regarding the expectations of the strength of the incumbent party. In each case the authoritarian regime featured a party as member of a ruling coalition, with the military and a regime leader who originated from the officer corps. The degree of institutionalization of these parties was historically contingent, while conflicts which spurred the rise of the regimes shaped the relationship between the military and their civilian counterparts.

Military Rule and Bounded Democracy in Indonesia

In this section I outline the relationship between the military and civilian parties in Indonesia prior to the democratic transition which began in 1998. I trace the process of the development of the military and the eventual incumbent party, Golkar, to demonstrate how the military perceived that the civilian party system posed a danger to the military's interests prior to military taking power and which would later shape the military's behavior during the subsequent democratic transition.

I begin by tracing the historical development of the armed forces of Indonesia (TNI) because events in its early history shaped its perception of civilian parties.[2] The TNI's relationship with civilian parties is rooted in its foundation and strict adherence to Indonesia's foundational doctrine *Pancasila*.[3] What would become the Indonesian military was developed under Japanese tutelage prior to Indonesia's independence from colonial rule. During World War II, while occupying Indonesia, Japan created what was called the *Pembela Tanah Air*, or PETA, to counter any Allied invasion. Prior to PETA Indonesia had no standing army because the Dutch colonial administration refused to allow anything more than a single battalion of enlisted Indonesians to be part of its standing army.[4]

The experience of those who served in PETA forged strong links between many within the officer corps. Cadets who entered PETA underwent a particularly brutal training regimen under the Japanese military leadership. The harsh training created a sense of shared experience amongst those who had passed through Japanese military instruction and who could rely on others who had "survived the crucible".[5] It would be these PETA officers which later controlled the highest ranks within the officer corps when the revolutionary and national army were founded and who would purge the military of alternative factions in the wake of an attempted coup in 1965.

The experience of training in PETA may have created a strong camaraderie

[2]With regards to the Indonesian military I will refer to it as the TNI even though it has gone by different names throughout its history (TNR, TRI, ABRI, etc.). Unless referring to specific moments of its foundation, I will use TNI to refer to the Indonesian Armed Forces for simplification and ease for non-Indonesian experts.

[3]*Pancasila* is a national philosophy developed by Indonesia's independence leaders. *Pancasila* promotes an idea of a unified Indonesia with belief in a non-sectarian God.

[4]Tentara Nasional Indonesia. *Djogjakara Dokumen*. Djogjakara Dokumen 356. South Jakarta.

[5]John Lee. "A Spirit Of Destruction: The Origins Of The Indonesian Military'S Institutional Culture". In: (2013). URL: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/38831/jcl364.pdf.

between officers, but their experience during the revolution and early period of the republic solidified an adherence to *Pancasila* and nationalism, while creating a deep antipathy towards communists, Islamists, and civilian parties in general. Following Japan's surrender, independence leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared independence from Dutch colonial rule. The Dutch were not willing to relinquish control of Indonesia and engaged in an intense struggle with Indonesian forces for several years before agreeing to Indonesian independence.

During the revolutionary campaign the leader of the revolutionary government, Sukarno, struggled to manage extreme factionalism within the independence movement. Struggling to control the various revolutionary forces, independence leaders formed a government under the leadership of Sutan Sjharir. Under Sjharir, a Ministry of Defense was formed with Amir Sjarifuddin as its minister. Sjarifuddin was a socialist who had links to the revolutionary intellectuals, but lacked any credibility with the core of the armed forces which had served in PETA. Sjarifuddin's lack of credibility with the armed forces resulted in a low degree of civilian control of the new military, and prompted him to develop his own left-aligned security forces. By creating his own left-oriented armed forces, Sjarifuddin pitted the military directly against the leftist revolutionaries.

A key factor for the civilian's inability to control the military was the structure and cohesion that existed within the officer corps prior to the formation of a revolutionary government. The revolutionary intellectuals, not just Sjarifuddin, had weak ties to and lacked credibility with those that had served together in PETA. When the civilians sought to exert control over the military under

Sjarifuddin's leadership the army rebuffed their attempts by electing their own commander – Raden Sudirman who had served in PETA – rather than allowing civilian leadership to appoint their own.[6]

In 1947 and 1948, well into the revolution, Sukarno continued to struggle to bring all revolutionary forces under the same umbrella organization.[7] Sukarno's inability to bring all revolutionary forces under the same leadership meant that various armed forces, such as Islamic militias who operated under religious hierarchies, continued to operate independent of Sukarno and the TNI's command. The fractured structure of the revolution made developing trust between the various armed movements and the military difficult. The most problematic case of in-fighting within the revolutionary movement, however, was the communist led People's Democratic Front – headed by Amir Sjarifuddin.

After serving in the first revolutionary cabinets as Minister of Defense and later becoming Prime Minister, Sjarifuddin left the government and joined the communist movement. Sjarifuddin held extreme views on communism and pushed for a Marxist-Leninist oriented revolution. Sjarifuddin's approach alienated him and his faction from more moderate and nationalist oriented members of the revolution who pushed him out of power in early 1948. Instead of aligning with the national government in its aims to expel the Dutch, Sjarifuddin's faction turned its ire towards the government itself.

Soon after being expelled from the government Sjarifuddin, along with fellow socialists and communists, formed the People's Democratic Front (FDR)

[6]See Indonesia, *Djogjakara Dokumen* as the military elected their own commanding officer of the TKR on December 18th of 1945 – approximately one month after Sjarifuddin is appointed as Minister of Defense.

[7]Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia 291*. Surat Pemerintah. South Jakarta; Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia 292*. Surat Pemerintah. South Jakarta.

and pushed for radical economic reforms even in the midst of the revolution. To accomplish their goals, the FDR began agitating Indonesian Republican forces within Java. The FDR's agitation culminated in the "Madiun Affair" in which the FDR tried to seize power of local state offices in Madiun, East Java. The republican army responded by sending the Siliwangi Division, led by then Colonel Abdul Haris Nasution, to Madiun.[8] At Madiun the army dismantled the operation, captured, and executed several leaders, including Sjarifuddin.

The efforts of the socialist and communist factions to engage in a rebellion in the middle of the revolution solidified the anti-communist sentiment of nationalist officers within the army. Because of the leftists' behavior during the revolution, these army officers viewed socialists to be diametrically opposed to the army's nationalist goals espoused in *Pancasila*. The Madiun affair crystallized a sentiment of hostility towards anyone affiliated with the socialist or communist parties. Indeed, in the run up to the failed communist coup of 1965, Nasution informed the ambassador of the United States that, if the communists tried to do anything again, the military's response would make its response to Madiun look "mild".[9]

The military's antipathy was not reserved solely for the communists, but for Islamists as well. Following independence, militant Islamists continued to mobilize and pushed to create an Islamic state rather than support the non-sectarian state established under *Pancasila*. One of the largest Islamist movements which endangered the post-revolution national project was Darul Islam Indonesia (DII). DII first began in the early stages of the revolution and un-

[8]Nasution would later become commander of the military and was the highest ranking officer when a coup was attempted in 1965.

[9]RG 84 Records of FS Posts Indonesian Djakarata Embassy. *Box 2*. Folder Pol – Pol affairs and rel 1964. College Park, Maryland, USA, 1964.

dermined Sukarno's ability to pull all armed forces which fought against the Dutch under the same leadership. Following independence, DII expanded and established an insurgency in various parts of west Indonesia. During the 1950s and into the 1960s the military engaged in direct violent conflict with DII. The conflict with DII had a strong effect on the military in two key ways. First, the struggle to defeat DII reinforced a deep distrust within the military towards any movement within Indonesia society that put the national project at risk.

The second major way in which DII affected the military was how it spurred greater institutionalization of the military itself. Coming out of the revolution the military lacked a well-institutionalized command hierarchy. Instead, strong sub-national command centers acted autonomously. Years of violent struggle against DII pushed the military to become more cohesive and institutionalized as the TNI continuously underwent reforms to deal with the violent threat of DII.

After years of struggle the military eventually defeated DII in the early part of the 1960s. Even though the military defeated DII, it continued to view anyone who promoted an Islamic republic as a direct threat to its mission. After the military took power in 1965, it identified and prevented anyone who had participated in DII from participating in politics.

Another source of major instability in the post-revolutionary period was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Despite the military's open opposition to the PKI, the party continued to grow and it thrived during the 1950s and the early 1960s. Following independence, the PKI was one of the strongest civilian organizations in Indonesia. The PKI's mass following endowed the party with significant clout within the post-independence governments, especially follow-

ing elections in 1955.

The 1955 elections saw the PKI finish as one of the four largest parties in the party system, with over 16% of the total vote.[10] The 1955 elections resulted in a parliament divided amongst four larger parties with several minor parties. The PKI and leftist elements of Sukarno's PNI put pressure on Sukarno to adopt more socialist policies and govern against the military's goals. Over time, Sukarno increasingly favored a socialist approach to governing, which worried officers within the military that Sukarno would side with the communists. Thus, in the wake of the 1955 elections the military faced two large Islamist parties, the PKI, and Sukarno's PNI which had moved to the left, leaving the military with no civilian party it could trust with power within the party system.

Even though Sukarno favored the left he had to strategically balance the left, Islamist, and nationalist factions within the government in order to hold on to power. During the 1950s, democracy had failed to promote stability, as the party system was a chaotic mix of several parties that failed to cooperate with each other. The failure of cooperation between the parties produced paralysis in the government and prevented an effective response to DII, other regional rebellions that were emerging, as well persistent economic problems that hamstrung the state and military. The military blamed the chronic instability which plagued post independence Indonesia on political parties, further reinforcing its distrust of all political parties.

Despite Sukarno's attempts to balance the polarized coalition comprised of nationalists, communists, and Islamists, Indonesia's march towards crisis continued. The crisis accelerated during the Malaysian Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*).

[10]Sukarno's PNI finished first with only 22.3% of vote with two major Islamist parties receiving 21% and 18%.

Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia arose after the United Kingdom established a new territorial structure to Malaysia that included territory on the island of Borneo, which borders Indonesia. This low-level conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia exacerbated the tension between the communists and the military, not due to sending the military into a conflict it didn't necessarily want, but due to how leftists within the government used the conflict to try to break the military from its Western support, further damaging the relationship between the military and civilian leadership.

Following independence, the Indonesian state struggled to grow the economy and extract resources to fund state activities, including the military. The lack of state support for the military meant that the military was dependent on its own fundraising capabilities and foreign support. Prior to *Konfrontasi*, the Indonesian military was receiving aid from the West, including funds from the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Foreign Minister at the time, Soebandrio, who had strong leftist views, used confrontation with the Western aligned Malaysia as a way to isolate the military. Soebandrio's strategy was to agitate the United Kingdom by engaging in conflict with Malaysia to get the United Kingdom to push the United States to cancel assistance to Indonesia's military.[11]

As the tension between the military and the leftists increased, the communists became worried that the military would remove Sukarno from power. To prevent the military's rise to power, communists within the military planned the kidnapping and execution of the military's high command. At that time the entire high command had been part of the revolutionary army, with several of-

[11]FS Posts Indonesian Djakarata Embassy, *Box 2*; RG 84 Records of FS Posts Indonesian Djakarata Embassy. *Box 2*. Defense Affairs Folder, Telegram September 18, 1964. College Park, Maryland, USA, 1964.

ficers having been part of PETA. The communist's plot was known as *Gerakan 30 September*, or the September 30th movement.[12] If successful, officers aligned with the PKI would decapitate the nationalist leadership within the military and align the armed forces with Sukarno. The communists began their operation in the dead of the night of September 30th and early morning of October 1st. The communists successfully kidnapped and executed six of the seven highest ranking officers in the army.

While the communists succeeded in decapitating the central command of the military they failed to undermine the army's ability to respond to this direct threat to its institution. In response to the attempted coup, the TNI mobilized quickly and effectively. The army was able to respond effectively because the command of three major army units, the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), the Siliwangi Division (KODAM III), and the Jayakarta Division (KODAM V) were in, or close to, Jakarta and were able to coordinate the army's response and defeat the coup.[13]

The army kept Sukarno in power for nearly a year and a half after the attempted coup but the military eroded President Sukarno's power as the army's commanding officers increased the military's control of the government. During this time the army debated various political reforms with Sukarno serving as the nominal leader of the government.[14] Central to the army's concerns was the party system. Like Sukarno, the military viewed the party system as a primary source of the instability that plagued Indonesia. Not only was the party system at the heart of political instability, but it was this system which had failed to pro-

[12] Abbreviated as *Gestapu*

[13] KOSTRAD was a relatively new unit based in Jakarta and commanded by Major General Suharto, who would later replace Sukarno as president.

[14] David Jenkins. *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984.

tect the military from civilians who sought to undercut the military's mission. The military eventually pushed Sukarno out of power and began to establish a political regime which it called the New Order (*Orde Baru*). The key dilemma the military faced in taking power was that it did not want to appear to be in direct control of politics, but lacked an allied party that it was confident could govern.

Building Golkar

Prior to *Konfrontasi* and *Gestapu*, Sukarno abandoned democracy and moved to a corporatist authoritarian system called Guided Democracy. Sukarno shifted to Guided Democracy with the help of the military in an attempt to move away from a democratic party system. Instead of filling seats in the legislature based on electoral results, Sukarno and the government moved to a system in which representation was structured around corporatist units Sukarno called *functional groups*. These functional groups represented certain factions of society and the state and included worker, peasant, religious, and other civil society organizations, groups representing the civil service, and the military. In addition to the functional groups, the legislature also included political parties based on the results from the 1955 election.

The move to a corporatist form of government was largely due to Sukarno's dissatisfaction with parties. Instead of seeing parties as a necessary foundation of democracy, Sukarno viewed them as a source of the inability to govern. Under the institutional structure of Guided Democracy, the military adopted a strategy to counter the communists by bringing all nationalist and anti-communist

functional groups under a single umbrella organization. Doing so increased coordinated opposition against the PKI and checked its influence within the legislature. The umbrella functional group the military founded was known as the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*) or *Sekber Golkar*.

The military established Sekber Golkar in 1964 and it was initially comprised of 97 functional groups. All of these functional groups were technically organized under the leadership committee of Sekber Golkar, but the functional groups were more cohesively organized within smaller umbrella organizations. These smaller organizations had links to functional groups that existed prior to the foundation of Sekber Golkar. At its foundation, the leadership committee of Sekber Golkar was comprised of both active military officers and civilians, with officers holding the most important positions as well as driving much of the administration of the newly founded organization. Thus, with its close links to the military, Sekber Golkar was its primary ally in the political system.

In need of a civilian partner after taking power in 1965, but with a fraught relationship with those within the established parties, the military turned to Sekber Golkar with which it had its most secure relationship. The problem for the military was that Sekber Golkar was a weak institution and was in too poor condition to compete against established parties in elections, let alone govern if it could win. After repressing the immediate threat given by the PKI, the military began reforming Sekber Golkar to make it a more capable institution that could support the military.

The military's first actions to reform Sekber Golkar came in the winter of 1965. In a national meeting that year Sekber Golkar's leadership, many of whom

were active officers, defined the purpose of Sekber Golkar, outlined an action program, created a plan to consolidate the functional groups, developed a cadet recruitment and training program, and formed a daily oversight committee.

Consolidation of functional groups was a key concern for Sekber Golkar's leadership. Initially comprised of the 97 functional groups at the organization's founding in 1964, the next few years would see the number of functional groups within Sekber Golkar balloon to well over 200. These functional groups each had their own leadership and operating procedures, making coordination between the groups difficult. Thus, the challenge for Sekber Golkar was to consolidate all of these functional groups into one cohesive organization.

Reforming Sekber Golkar into a machine that could help the military govern would prove difficult for several years, as functional groups sought autonomy while coordinating with allied functional groups to prevent the consolidation of power into any one faction of functional groups. In the second national meeting, more of the functional groups' business was brought under Sekber Golkar's daily oversight committee, and its chair was given greater powers. At this same time functional groups began to consolidate into what were known as KINO, or parent functional groups (*Kelompok Induk Organisasi*). Each of these KINO had their own leadership and governing committees, many with active officers at the head of the KINO, or in other leadership positions. The autonomy of the KINO created a confederate structure of larger functional groups within Sekber Golkar, undermining the institutional capacity of Sekber Golkar.

For years the KINO were the primary source of in-fighting within the organization and prevented consolidation of functional groups and cohesion within Sekber Golkar. The push to consolidate would eventually come from the need to

promote a unified and cohesive front for elections to be held in 1971. In the run up to the elections, each of the KINO agreed to work under the same banner and to change the name of the organization to Golkar. The KINO also agreed to a plan which would eventually dissolve the KINO and delegate authority to the central committee of Golkar. In the run up to the 1971 elections, Golkar also established a territorial apparatus where sub-national areas were lead by organized committees. These committees were largely staffed by active and retired military, with some civilians, but Golkar was effectively an electoral arm of the military at this time.

Nearly six years following the attempted coup the military regime held its first elections in July of 1971. In this election all parties, except for the PKI, were allowed to compete. While all parties were legally allowed, the military made it so only Golkar could campaign at the local level and interfered in the other parties' business to undermine their electoral performance. With the military's help, Golkar won a surprisingly overwhelming victory, gaining just under 63% of the vote and capturing 236 of the 360 elected seats in the legislature. Golkar's performance exceeded expectations of many within the military and Golkar itself and meant that it could play a more central role in supporting the regime than what was initially expected of the organization.

In the few years following the 1971 election the KINO were officially dissolved and the party was brought completely under one leadership committee, with President Suharto at the head of the party. Despite Golkar's success in elections it remained a relatively minor actor in the regime for most of the regime's duration. The military, with Suharto as president, made sure to keep Golkar under their control.

The military was very active in controlling Golkar in its early history to ensure that it would not stray from the nationalist orientation of the military. Until the 1990s, all of Golkar's chairmen were active or retired military officers. The military also directly intervened in Golkar's party business. The military influenced Golkar's business through the military's Socio-political Affairs office (Sospol). The military could intervene on almost any issue because the regime structured Golkar as a member of a larger "family" (*Keluarga Besar*) that existed to support Suharto and the military's approach to *Pancasila*. Thus, Golkar could manage its day-to-day operations largely unimpeded, but the other two members of the larger Golkar family (the state and military) had a formal role in the "family" business. This meant that both the military and the state (which was also controlled by retired officers) had direct input on candidates and leadership positions within Golkar, in addition to seats in the legislature reserved for the military and state/civil society.

In the early stages of the regime, Suharto and the military relied very little on Golkar to maintain their rule given how little confidence they had in Golkar's capacity. Indeed, Suharto frequently referred to Golkar solely as the "face and soul" (*wajah dan jiwa*) of the regime, or a civilian facade meant to legitimize the military's role in political affairs.[15] In speeches given in various party conventions, Suharto frequently spoke on the need for Golkar to grow and strengthen and that it was not yet ready to take a major role in political affairs.

The regime's reluctance to lean heavily on Golkar, but instead on the coercive capacity of the military and national police,[16] can be seen in how the regime handled some of the first large-scale protests against the regime. In early 1974

[15]Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *466.1.* Pidato Presiden Suharto. South Jakarta, 1973.
[16]The police were structured within the military command.

the Prime Minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka, was on a state visit. Indonesia was heavily dependent on Japanese investment and the economy was still struggling at this time. In response to Tanaka's visit, students began to protest, with the protests eventually turning into riots.

These riots, and the military's response known as the Malari Incident, is evidence that the military was not ready to rely on civilians to maintain rule. In response to these riots the military responded unilaterally and cracked down on the protests, killing and injuring several protesters. This violent response differed significantly from the military's response to large scale protests and riots in 1998, where the military took a more restrained role while relying more on Golkar to navigate political instability. Thus, it is clear that when Golkar was a new and very weak organization, the military had little confidence in Golkar's strength.

The military was more willing to rely on Golkar in the late 1990s than the early 1970s because Golkar developed significantly during the 1980s and had demonstrated its ability to take a more proactive role in politics. While Golkar started out as a weakly-knit confederation of functional groups, it began a large scale developmental project in the early 1980s under the leadership of retired Lieutenant General Sudharmono.

Sudharmono was a career military lawyer and served with Suharto during the 1965 crisis. After the crisis had subsided, Sudharmono was made State Secretary in the early 1970s. As State Secretary, Sudharmono had significant control over internal state matters including overseeing the screening of political candidates for all parties, as well as having a say in Golkar's internal affairs. Sudharmono's role in Suharto's early cabinets elevated his political career and

he became the chairman of Golkar in 1983.

One of Sudharmono's primary goals as chairman was to develop the organization into a mass party that could exercise institutional strength. Having come from the military, but outside of combat units, Sudharmono wasn't as supportive of the military's control of politics. Thus, he saw strengthening Golkar as a way to re-balance power within the regime and to tilt power away from the military, which was dominated by officers within the army with a combat background. To erode the military's influence in Golkar, he and his deputy, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, implemented a massive recruitment and training plan.

As part of the developmental plan, Golkar had the goal of recruiting up to eight million new party members at the village level.[17] Previously, Golkar had a very weak presence at the local level, with the party relying heavily on the military's institutional presence within the villages. Golkar's recruitment and training helped the party become less dependent on active and retired members of the military by replacing them with civilians loyal to Golkar.

In addition to the membership drive at the village level, Golkar also recruited and trained up to one million more party cadres (*Kader Fungsional)*. These cadres were drawn from functional groups, such as religious, youth, labor, and women's corporatist groups, and were trained and incorporated into Golkar. Golkar had structured committees to reach out and build relationships with these groups in order to broaden its social presence and boost its capacity to mobilize these mass organizations during elections. While Golkar pushed for autonomy from the military, it never strayed from its nationalist orientation. Thus, even though the military's influence over Golkar waned over time, the

[17] A. E. Manihuruk. *Sejarah perkembangan Golkar dan mekanisme keluarga besar Golkar*. D.P.P. Golkar, 1991.

two actors were closely aligned in their interests.

Near the end of Sudharmono's term as chairman of Golkar, Indonesia held an election in 1987. Due to Sudharmono's developmental project, Golkar greatly increased its political performance – increasing its vote share by 8.7% over the previous election, and capturing 57 additional seats in the legislature. The improved electoral performance had significant benefits for both Sudharmono and Golkar. Following this election, Sudharmono became the vice president, and Suharto gave greater responsibilities to Golkar.

Where Golkar was previously just the "face and soul" of the New Order, after Sudharmono's developmental project Golkar began to take a direct role in designing and implementing legislation with the approval of Suharto.[18] In speeches given at later Golkar conventions, Suharto's language changed. Later in the New Order, Suharto referred to Golkar as a strong political organization and stated that Golkar's electoral wins demonstrated its ability to garner popular legitimacy.[19] Suharto also began treating Golkar as a senior member of the regime and, after elevating a civilian to its chairmanship, Golkar took the reigns of government within the legislature. Not only was Golkar seen as being able to implement policy, but to be a primary actor responsible for upholding political order.[20]

The development of Golkar under military leadership, and then under Sudharmono, was impressive. Golkar transformed from a chaotic confederation of corporatist groups into a cohesive organization, with well institutionalized leadership. The routinization of power within the party meant that the organi-

[18]Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *486.4*. Pidato Presiden Suharto. South Jakarta, 1988.
[19]Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *486.5*. Pidato Presiden Suharto. South Jakarta, 1989.
[20]Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *504.3*. Pidato Presiden Suharto. South Jakarta, 1992.

zation could manage Suharto's eventual resignation, and endowed it with the tools to navigate the transition, increasing the military's confidence that its ally would survive the transition.[21] Golkar's history demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can build institutionalized parties. Yet the conditions of authoritarianism also played a key role in circumscribing Golkar's full development. Because Golkar was developed during authoritarian rule, it could not undergo robust institutionalization that would have resulted in a strong party.

Golkar and its Uncertain Electoral Clout

Despite its development under Sudharmono, Golkar's insulated place within the New Order prevented its full development and left it untested in competitive elections. Because authoritarian rule shielded Golkar from real electoral competition, Golkar lacked the incentive to develop strong links to society. Instead of developing a robust programmatic structure, with thick links to civil society, Golkar relied on its territorial organization to engage in transactional clientelistic relationships. Also, because the regime suppressed the activity of opposition parties there was little competition for Golkar and it was able to monopolize these clientelistic relationships. Since democratization alternative parties have been able to siphon off much of Golkar's support with their own clientelistic linkages.

The conditions of authoritarian rule also led Golkar to be reliant on the state and regime for support. Suharto, as Golkar's patron, directed significant state resources to Golkar. Suharto's patronage allowed Golkar to function and main-

[21] Darin Sanders Self. "Putting on the Civilian's Uniform: Understanding Authoritarian Legacies in Civilian-Military Relations". In: *Working Paper*. 2020.

tain a robust operation without having to develop and institutionalize its own revenue streams. Thus, when Suharto fell from power and Indonesia transitioned to a democracy, Golkar was caught flat footed with only a weak capacity to generate its own revenue.[22]

During the thirty years of authoritarian rule, Golkar was also insulated from real electoral pressure. Although the military created laws that put significant restrictions on all political parties, Golkar's place within the regime allowed it to bypass these restrictions and have the upper hand during elections. For example, under New Order electoral law, no political party was allowed to campaign at the village level. Yet because Golkar was considered a functional group, rather than a party, it was allowed to be active at the village level. Not only did the military allow Golkar to campaign at the local level but the military also interfered in the business of the opposition parties, undermining their operations and making it easier for Golkar to win elections. When democracy came Golkar enjoyed none of these advantages.

Because of the military's role in favoring Golkar, the party's ability in free and fair elections was unknown. As I will show in the next chapter, Golkar's lack of experience in free and fair elections created significant uncertainty for the military. The uncertainty of Golkar's electoral strength meant that the military could not be confident that Golkar would win power and protect the military's interests.

That Golkar remained untested was not the only problem for the military when considering democratization. Looking at Indonesia's past, Islamist parties, whose vision of an Islamic oriented state instead of a nationalist vision

[22]Dirk Tomsa. *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era*. Routledge, 2008.

of *Pancasila*, had demonstrated significant strength in the elections prior to the New Order. Even though these parties were not free to organize during the authoritarian period, the structure of Islamic organizations and potential foundations for Islamist parties remained in place, posing a threat to the nationalist oriented military. Furthermore, the PDI's historical links with Sukarno's PNI, which had embraced leftism, remained a major party. Increasing the military's concern over the PDI was Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who controlled the party. Together, these factors generated worry amongst some officers that Golkar would be unable to control politics sufficiently to protect the military's interests.

Colorado Party Dominance in Paraguay

Having traced the historical development of Golkar and its relationship with the military in Indonesia, I now turn to the case of Paraguay. Like in Indonesia, authoritarian rule was structured by an alliance between a political party and the military. The purpose of comparing democratization in Indonesian and Paraguayan is to demonstrate how paths of the historical development of the ruling parties alter the critical antecedent conditions. In this section I demonstrate that the historical development of the military and party set the stage for democratization without military interference in Paraguay.

The Paraguayan military developed into a strong political actor in the wake of the Chaco War (1932-1935) with Bolivia. While the development of the military to wage war provided the means for the military to take a direct political role, it was the development of the Colorado Party, while independent of the

military, that set the conditions for civilian supremacy. Where the weakness of parties prompted the military to take a more active role in politics in Indonesia, it was the strength of the incumbent party in Paraguay which insulated the military from political threats.

The relationship between the military and the Colorado Party begins with Francisco Solano López. Solano López became president of Paraguay after the death of his father. After becoming president, Solano López embarked on a disastrous war that devastated Paraguay. Near the end of 1864 and early 1865, Solano López invaded both Brazil and Argentina. These invasions prompted a unified response by Brazil and Argentina who, along with Uruguay, formed the Triple Alliance to confront the Paraguayan invasion. Paraguay stood little chance against a united alliance and suffered defeat in conventional warfare. Despite defeat, Solano López engaged in a drawn out guerrilla war against the alliance, which culminated in the total defeat of the Paraguayan military and the death of Solano López in battle.

Following Solano López's death the military was left in complete ruin.[23] What was left of the Paraguayan military and state were several dozen former officers who competed for power. The power vacuum created by Solano López's death and complete devastation of the military resulted in profound instability for several years as *caudillos* used loyalists in the military to seize power.

Seeing the lack of an institutionalized military as a source of instability, the Liberal Party, which won power following a civil war in 1904, set its sights on military reforms. While in power the Liberals began reforming the military by establishing a military academy. The Liberal's intent was to begin professional-

[23]Coronel (R) Agustín Olmedo Alvarenga. *El Ejército Paraguayo en la Historia Nacional 1811-2012*. Asunción, Paraguay, 2012.

izing the officer corps which had been recently done in Chile and Argentina.[24] Despite these and other reforms to the institutional structure of the military, the Liberal government kept the size of military small in order to prevent the military from obtaining sufficient strength to undermine its rule.

Liberal rule and control of the military held until the Bolivian incursion into the Chaco region in northwestern Paraguay. During the 1920s, the Liberals maintained a small standing military of approximately 2,500 active troops despite the military's desire to increase the scale of its fighting force to counter foreign threats. One officer, Colonel Schenone, advised the Liberal government against maintaining such a small fighting force and warned that the lack of strength would allow the Bolivians to take the Chaco. Despite the military's warnings and small skirmishes in the Chaco region, the Liberal government continued to maintain the small military until negotiations over oil rights with Bolivia broke down.

With the Bolivians keen on taking the Chaco territory, the Liberal government delegated authority to the military to oversee its own mobilization. The military dramatically increased its size with the intent to counter the Bolivian military with a full standing army of at least 80,000 active troops. Overseeing this mobilization was former Chief of Staff of the Army, José Félix Estigarribia.

The war resulted in victory for Paraguay, but the negotiated end to the war required large-scale demobilization of both the Bolivian and Paraguayan militaries. The Liberal's agreement to a full scale demobilization angered many officers within the Paraguayan military who were already upset with the Liberal government for its mismanagement in preparing the military for war. Officers

[24] Alvarenga, *El Ejército Paraguayo en la Historia Nacional 1811-2012*.

viewed the Liberals agreement to demobilization as an attempt to de-fang the military. To compound issues with civilian-military relations at the time, the Liberals also did not compensate enlisted soldiers after they had been demobilized.

Dissatisfaction within the military directed towards the Liberals culminated in a coup less than a year after the war had ended. In early February of 1936, after the Liberals exiled prominent officer Colonel Rafael Franco, a faction of officers staged a coup to remove the incumbent Liberal president, Eusebio Ayala. After coming to power through the coup, Franco held power for little over a year but was thrown out of power via another coup for trying to consolidate power. After removing Franco, the military installed a hand-picked Liberal back into the presidency.

The re-installation of a Liberal into the presidency was only for a short period of time as the military never intended to allow the Liberal Party to regain its power. Instead, the military sought to use the party to hold power for themselves with civilian legitimacy. Soon after the coup to remove Franco, the military coerced the party to nominate war hero José Félix Estigarribia as its candidate for the presidency. The party acquiesced and Estigarribia became president in 1939. Estigarribia governed with a civilian-military coalition with the military holding key positions within the cabinet, but was only in power for a short time because he died in a plane crash in 1940.

Following Estigarribia's death high-ranking officers jockeyed for power, with the cabinet and military command eventually selecting General Higinio Morínigo as president. Morínigo did not govern in the same way as Estigarribia. Soon after he became president, Morínigo forced the Liberal members of the cabinet to resign and Morínigo ruled directly as head of a military regime.

Initially, Morínigo tried to ban all political parties, but after a few years he found that he could not govern without their support. Seeing he could not govern without party support, Morínigo created a coalition cabinet with members of the Colorado Party and Febrerista Party.[25] Morínigo eventually came to rely more on the Colorado Party, whose mass base provided greater support.

Morínigo's coalition cabinet eventually failed when he pushed the Feberistas out and sided completely with the Colorado Party. This move had dire consequences as it launched Paraguay into a civil war in 1947. The civil war pitted factions of the military loyal to Morínigo and the Colorado Party against those loyal to the Febreristas, Liberals, and other parties. The civil war was bloody, but Morínigo's faction was able to win due to his ability to call up reservists and the mass-base of the Colorado Party.

The result of the civil war was a complete victory for Morínigo and the Colorado Party, with the state and military completely in the hands of the Colorados. With rebel officers purged from the military, the war produced an officer corps that was entirely aligned with the Colorado Party. Ten years after the transition to Colorado rule another former general, Alfredo Stroessner, became president and ruled for over thirty years. During his time in power, the government required that all those entering the military academy were members of the Colorado Party. With the requirement that all new officers be members of the party, and the purging of Liberal and Feberista aligned officers during the civil war, the military was wholly allied with the party. This alliance meant that the party and military shared the same ideas of the national project, ideology, and views of the opposition, resulting in a high degree of confidence in the Colorado Party.

[25] Party founded by Rafael Franco and evoked the name of their February coup, or revolution.

Origins of the Colorado Party's Institutional Strength

In addition to the close relationship between the party and officer corps, the military leaned on the party's strength to stay in power. The Colorado Party's strength is derived from its deep and strong roots in society, coupled with elite cohesion. The party was founded in the 1880s after the disastrous Triple Alliance War. Following the end of the war, Paraguayan male elites founded social clubs which were largely comprised of former officers who had served in the military, but who had retired and reentered civilian life after the collapse of the military. Two large clubs formed at this time; the Club del Pueblo and the Republican Union Club. These clubs then reformed themselves into the Liberal Party (Club del Pueblo) and the National Republican Association or Colorado Party (Republican Union Club). Thus both parties had a nationalist orientation and support for the parties was split within the officer corps.

The Colorado Party was officially formed by Bernardino Caballero, who had been a high-ranking military officer with close ties to former president Solano López. When establishing the party, Caballero leaned on his background in the military, as well as from what he learned about the United States' Republican Party, to establish a territorially broad party. In the first few months of the party, Caballero established twenty-six party chapters located throughout Paraguay's territory.[26] These chapters were headed by local notables who had strong ties through familial, social, or retired officer networks. For much of its early life, Caballero's organization was an oligarchic party, dominated by elites with weak ties to society or a mass base.[27]

[26] Leandro Prieto Yegros. *Enciclopedia Republicana: Itinerario Colorado de la Causa Nacional 1880-1904*. Asunción, Paraguay.

[27] Robert Michels. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Free Press, 1962.

With the support of oligarchs, the Colorado Party held power for much of the post-war period but the party's hold on power was weak and unstable and eventually came to an end in 1904. In 1904 the Liberal Party ousted the Colorados in a revolution and exiled the Colorado's leadership. In exile, Caballero's health began to deteriorate and he negotiated a pact with the Liberals which allowed him and the other Colorados to return if they would not challenge the Liberal Party's hold on power. With this pact in place, Caballero and the others returned to Paraguay but Caballero died in 1912, not long after his return.

Upon Caballero's death the party fractured. The elites who had previously coordinated their activity at a national level through Cabellero's leadership, split and fled to their local enclaves, with little coordination between the party's *caudillos*. The party's institutional weakness undermined its ability to play any major role in politics, leaving the Liberal Party to monopolize control of politics until the Chaco War. Even though the party was out of power for nearly four decades, these years were critical for the party's development, its eventual reemergence as a major political actor, and decades of political dominance.

One major component of the party's strength and permanence is its deep and strong roots in Paraguayan society. As I mentioned, Caballero established a territorially broad oligarchic party with shallow roots in society. This structure continued after his death into the 1920s but it was during that decade that a major member of the party, Juan Manual Frutos, embarked on a developmental project that established strong ties with Paraguayan society.

Frutos' family was linked to the early days of the Colorado Party and he was interested in agrarian reform. Because much of Paraguay's territory was rural, Frutos sought to bring the party into the countryside and link it to the rural

population. He began his project in 1920 with a small team of party cadres. Frutos and his team traveled from town to town establishing party offices known as *seccionales*. Prior to Frutos' work, the party only had a limited number of *seccionales* concentrated in more urban areas. After years dedicated to establishing these local offices, the party boasted hundreds of *seccionales* and smaller *subseccionales* by the time the party regained power in the late 1940s.[28]

These *seccionales* became the lifeblood of the party. Each *seccional* had a designated territory and administered party business down to the neighborhood level. *Seccionales* were staffed by cadres who were elected by party members of each local *seccional*. Yet these *seccionales* did more than just generic party business – they stimulated and intertwined in the social life of everyday Paraguayans. Social events, such as barbeques, dances, and soccer matches, were frequently sponsored and held at the local *seccional* with the event promoted in the party's daily newspaper. These *seccionales* forged durable and strong ties between the party and local society, producing a crystallized identity of being a Colorado for vast swaths of Paraguayan society.

The party's social ties were developed while the party was out of power, from the beginning of the 1920s to after the events of the Chaco War. But because the party was locked out of power due to the Liberal Party maintaining a closed authoritarian regime, the party could not use its mass-base to contest elections. Even though the party could not contest elections, its mass-base would help the party capture power with the eruption of civil war in 1947.

After Higinio Morínigo expelled the Feberistas from his cabinet the military split, with a significant portion of the officer corps and enlisted siding against

[28] Arsenio Basualdo. *Espejo Para La Juventud*. Asunción, Paraguay, 2009.

Morínigo and the Colorados. One key to the incumbent's victory in the civil war was the Colorado Party's ability to marshal their own armed forces. Using its *seccionales*, the Colorado Party marshalled its own army with thousands of *pynandi* [29] peasant foot-soldiers from throughout the country. The broad territorial organization which was first established by Caballero, and then expanded by Frutos, allowed the party to not only marshal sufficient force to defeat the rebels in concentrated battles around the capital, but also to exert political control throughout the entire territory.

While the party used mass mobilization to win the civil war, the party's deep roots in society would have been less effective had the party's elites remained fractured. Recall that after the death of the party's founder, party elites fractured and retreated to their own enclaves within the party's territorial structure. The fractured nature of the party at the elite level remained throughout the 1920s, as there was little impetus to drive elites to reform the party and coordinate at the national level.

The party began to cohere in the immediate wake of the Chaco War when the Liberal Party moved to ban political parties in late 1935 and early 1936. Following the war the Liberal Party's hold on power began to weaken. In reaction to the threat to its power the e Liberals moved to ban all other parties' activity. Only a few weeks after the ban was announced the Liberal Party was removed from power in the February revolution led by a faction loyal to Rafael Franco. After assuming power, Franco sought to impose a single party totalitarian system which also included a legal ban on all political parties other then the Feberista Party.

[29] Pynandi is a Guarani word which can be roughly translated to shoe-less.

These attempts to ban parties, including the Colorado Party, served as the catalyst to induce cohesion amongst party elites.[30] In early 1936, party elites called for a national convention to discuss party unity. Up to this point, there had been no national conventions and the party lacked a standing national committee that could handle party business at the national level. At this national meeting the party developed and agreed to a unity pact. The pact obligated elites in the party to support party unity above all else. Those that put their personal interests above that of the party would violate the pact and face sanctions for their behavior.[31]

In addition to writing and supporting the unity pact, party elites agreed to form a new national committee (*Junta de Gobierno*) that would govern and coordinate party business on a regular basis. This new committee was elected by leaders of the various *seccionales* during the national convention held two years later. Members of the *Junta de Gobierno* then elected an executive committee, comprised of a president, multiple vice-presidents, secretaries, and treasurers. The executive committee coordinated efforts of the broader national committee and made executive decisions on behalf of the party. It was this institutionalization of leadership and national party business that endowed the party with the capacity to survive leadership transitions, including the transition away from Alfredo Stroessner's thirty-three year tenure.

After winning the civil war and taking power, the Colorado Party cycled through several presidents until it settled on Federico Chaves. Chaves served as president for several years until he was removed in a coup backed by the party. Chaves was removed from power for attempting to consolidate power through

[30] Asociación Nacional Repbulicana. *Patria*. Mar. 1936.
[31] Asociación Nacional Repbulicana. *Patria*. Mar. 1936.

an *autogolpe*. Chaves had mobilized key military units with Alfredo Stroessner, who has the chief of the military at the time, unaware of what Chaves was doing. Unable to stop the *autogolpe*, Stroessner immediately contacted the Colorado Party's leadership. With Stroessner, the executive committee of the party reached out to high-ranking officers who were loyal to the party to countermobilize against the Chaves' mobilized units. Once the threat was contained, the party forced Chaves to resign his position as president, stating explicitly that he had violated the unity pact and his charge to put the party above all else. Under party rules, the Colorado leadership met to discuss selecting a new president. The party was split on who to select and eventually turned to Stroessner to be a unity candidate in the short term until the party could select and prepare a more permanent candidate.

It is important to note that the party selected Stroessner on its own rather than assuming that Stroessner took power for himself due to his position as a commander of the military. After elevating Stroessner into the presidency the party required him to acknowledge the authority of the *Junta de Gobierno*.[32] With Stroessner elevated to the presidency the party also installed a prominent member of the party, Edgar Ynsfrán, into the most important cabinet position as the Minister of the Interior. By controlling the Interior, Ynsfrán managed the intelligence and police, which could arrest members of the military. While in this position, Ynsfrán, oversaw a project to further expand the *seccionales* and strengthen the party. When Stroessner came to power, the party had 142 *seccionales*,[33] and by the end of Ynsfrán's tenure there were over 200.[34]

[32]Leandro Prieto Yegros. *El Coloradismo Eterno Con Stroessner de la División a la Unidad*. Asunción, Paraguay, 1988.
[33]Ibid., pg. 279.
[34]Roberto Paredes. *Los Persidentes Del Paraguay Tomo II (1954-2005)*. Asunción, Paraguay, 2005.

The decision to select Stroessner paid off for the party for decades. Stroessner brought stability that was hard to achieve by either the Liberal or early Colorado Party. With Stroessner as president, the Colorado Party controlled the government for over thirty years with no signs of instability. During its decades in power, the party used regular institutionalized processes to select leadership at the local and national level. Prior to the end of Stroessner's tenure, the party was well equipped to manage a leadership transition. Despite Stroessner's role in providing unity, he eventually did personalize party leadership – which led to his ouster. As I will show in the following chapter, the party's institutionalization at the local level, the experience of life-long members of the party at the national level, and a durable identity tied to the party, ensured that the party could survive the fall of Stroessner while providing military officers confidence that the party would play a major political role following a democratic transition.

The Colorado Party and its Mobilization Capacity

The third key antecedent condition is the party's strength. Although Paraguay did not have experience with free and fair elections until after Stroessner's fall, the party had demonstrated its strength to control the president and legislature for decades. The party's strength was rooted in the work done by Frutos who built the *seccionales*. These *seccionales* changed the game for political parties in Paraguay, as the Colorado Party developed social mobilization capacity that was not available to any party before Frutos' party building project. The party's social mobilization was also key to the party taking power through the 1947 civil war. Instead of simply relying on allies in the officer corps, the party used

its vast social following to mobilize and defeat its opposition.

Even though the Colorado Party had exceptional mobilizing capacity, it did not entertain the possibility of free and fair elections following the civil war. With its power, the party banned opposition parties until after the party and Stroessner relaxed marshal law prior to the elections in 1963. Following the relaxation of these laws, and the drafting of a new constitutions in 1967, opposition parties began participating in elections with full voter enfranchisement.

Despite the expansion in enfranchisement and some opening to opposition parties, the system remained structured to ensure the Colorado Party would win. During this time opposition parties were not allowed to campaign and the government used its powers to harass members of the opposition. While the electoral experience in Paraguay was similar to the unfair elections conducted in Indonesia, a key difference between the Colorado Party and Golkar was the party's history of mobilizing society in its support, its strong identity pervasive throughout Paraguay's society, the close links to society the party had at the local level, and its ability to control the presidency, legislature, and state. Prior to democratization, and after Stroessner was removed from power, the Colorado Party contested and dominated two elections that were freer and fairer than those under Stroessner, demonstrating its electoral strength.

Another key difference between the two parties was the involvement of the military in authoritarian rule. The Indonesian military was active in politics for much of the New Order and used its power to undermine the opposition and sustain Golkar. In Paraguay, on the other hand, the Colorado Party maintained authoritarian rule with little help from the military. Instead, the party's domination of the state and broad social support provided the party with power

without needing to rely on the military except to resolve elite disputes.

Conclusion

Whether a military binds democratization depends on whether civilians provide credible commitments that democracy will not endanger the military's interests. When the military is confident that civilians will protect its interests within a democratic system, it will refrain from using its coercive capacity to shape the development of political and electoral institutions. When there is significant uncertainty surrounded the military's interests, or its clear that opponents to the military will win power, the military uses its power to shape the terms of the regime transition to ensure its interests are secured.

I argue that the military's confidence in civilian rule is shaped by three factors; trust, the institutionalization of incumbent parties, and the electoral and political strength of the incumbent party. Each of these three factors play an important role in the military's evaluation of its allies' capacity to win power and secure its interests in a democratic system. Importantly, each of these factors is historically contingent because the military relies on its historical experience to form an expectation of future circumstances.

In the case of Indonesia, the military's historical experience with parties made it distrustful of civilian rule. Even after developing its own party (Golkar) the military was wary of the prospects of other parties gaining too much power. Alternatively, the military in Paraguay had no such worries. Instead, the Paraguayan military had a high degree of trust in the Colorado Party while opposition parties were not hostile towards the military.

While trust is a key component of the military's confidence in civilians, its confidence also depends upon the stability and permanency of allied parties. In the early period of Indonesia's New Order, the military used force to suppress popular uprisings because Golkar was not institutionalized and would likely fail without the military's protection. In Paraguay, the Colorado Party's institutionalization provided a stable partner that the military could rely on throughout the authoritarian period and transition.

Together, trust and institutionalization help the military know whether it will have a partner in the party system that will advocate on its behalf, but this partnership is moot if the party is weak and cannot control political offices. Prior to the end of authoritarian rule in Paraguay, the Colorado Party had repeatedly demonstrated its mobilization capacity in the civil war and in the elections in the run up to democratization. Golkar, on the other hand, was completely untested in open elections, leaving the military in the dark as to the party's capacity to mobilize society during democratic elections.

In the next chapter I demonstrate how these historically contingent factors shaped the strategic decision-making of the military during the transition. When faced with the decision to continue with authoritarian rule or accept democratization, each military had to make the decision whether to use its own power to pursue its interests, or to turn to civilian allies to act on their behalf. When uncertainty over the capacity of their civilian counterparts was high, as was the case in Indonesia, the military acted to bind the transition. When the military is confident in its civilian allies, as it was in Paraguay, the military deferred to civilians during democratization.

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CHAPTER 4

REGIME BREAKDOWN AND MILITARY BEHAVIOR IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS OF PARAGUAY AND INDONESIA

To demonstrate how trust, party institutionalization, and party strength affect the military's confidence in civilian rule I employ a comparative historical analysis of the democratic transitions of Indonesia and Paraguay. Specifically, I compare the democratic transitions of Indonesia from 1999-2004 and Paraguay from 1989-1992. In both cases the military had been politically active during the authoritarian period and ruled alongside a political party while under the leadership of a president who had emerged from the army's officer corps. I select these cases because, despite the similarity of authoritarian rule, the Indonesian military bounded democratization while the Paraguayan military deferred almost entirely to civilians.

To conduct the comparative historical analysis I use an array of qualitative methods. These methods range from archival research, relying on secondary data, and conducting elite interviews. The narrative presented in this chapter draws on data collected from a year's worth of field work spent on site. While I incorporate archival data and secondary resources published by local presses into my analysis, I rely heavily on elite interviews. These interviews were conducted with members of the authoritarian regimes or opposition who were also active and played significant roles in the transitions. Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, and to allow a candid conversation, I ensured that names would be protected unless given explicit permission to reveal them. Interviews were secured by developing relationships with individuals within party and retired officer networks.

In the case of Indonesia, I focus on individuals who had been part of Golkar and the military (TNI/ABRI) prior to, and during, the transitional period. I select Indonesia because the military took power in 1965 when political parties were weakly institutionalized and the strongest parties at that time either had a leftist bent, were communist, or Islamist. These parties had antagonistic relationships with the military and political instability culminated in the assassination of several high-ranking army officers by members of the Communist Party.

After taking power, the military invested in developing a civilian party (Golkar) which shared its vision of the national project. While the military transformed Golkar into a coherent and territorially expansive party, its development under authoritarianism stunted its institutionalization and strength. Because Golkar failed to develop into a strong party, the Indonesian party system remained open to parties the military distrusted. The presence of these parties in combination with the uncertain strength of Golkar meant that opposition parties stood a reasonable chance at winning power and potentially governing in a way antithetical to the military's interests.

I compare the case of Indonesia's democratization to that of post-Stroessner Paraguay. Unlike Golkar, Paraguay's Colorado Party was exceptionally strong. Decades of party building while out of power and the threat of being banned induce strong social linkages and elite cohesion. Unlike Golkar, the Colorado Party's strength meant that it could out-maneuver opposition parties and perform well in democratic elections. Because of the Colorado Party's strength, the Paraguayan military was confident that those winning power would support the military's interests and that there would be no major political threat to the

military.

Asian Financial Crisis and the End of the New Order

In this section I present evidence of the Indonesian military's behavior to constrain civilian actors during the democratic transition. I argue that the military constrained civilians because civilians lacked the ability to provide credible commitments to the military. Civilians could not provide credible commitments because the incumbent party (Golkar) could not control the transition and effectively advocate on behalf of the military on its own.

In the previous chapter I outlined the antecedent conditions in Indonesia which influence the strategic actions of the commanding officers of the TNI. Prior to the New Order regime, the party system was fragmented with the communist party (PKI), a fierce opponent of the military and nationalists, demonstrating significant strength. Not only did the PKI threaten the military, but the other largest parties in the system did not share the military's nationalist project. The largest party, Sukarno's PNI, moved increasingly leftward to the chagrin of the military,[1] and the two other parties were Islamist parties that the military distrusted. With no party the military could trust, the military lacked a civilian partner in the government that could secure its interests. When the PKI attempted a coup, the military took full control of the political system and focused political reforms on the party system.

After coming to power, the military began to develop the confederate system of corporatist groups known as *Sekber Golkar* into a functioning party that

[1] David Jenkins. *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984.

assisted in the military's rule. A developmental program led by retired Lt. General Sudharmono helped recruit and train millions of party cadres. With Golkar strengthened under the leadership of Sudharmono, the regime and party underwent a scheduled leadership transition every five years. Because of his work strengthening Golkar, Sudharmono became vice president and Golkar's chairmanship was handed to Wahono, another retired general. The party then began preparing for the 1992 election. Golkar dominated this election as in previous elections but performed worse than it had in 1987 under Sudharmono. After exceeding expectations in 1987, Golkar lost 5% of the share of the vote it had in the previous election, with the bulk of this share going to the secular opposition party: PDI. This small shift in votes was a minor setback and Golkar and the military went on to elect Suharto for another term as President.

The party-military relationship appeared on firm ground in the early 1990s, with no end in sight for the New Order. In 1993, the party transitioned to its first civilian chairman, Harmoko. Harmoko led the party into the 1997 election where Golkar improved on its 1992 performance and appeared well situated to reelect Suharto the next year.[2] Just months after the 1997 election the Asian Financial Crisis began, casting doubt on whether Golkar should continue supporting Suharto and reelect him.

The Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia especially hard. Suharto's government was unable to promote a coherent response, vacillating between different policy options to respond to the diverse coalition within the regime.[3] As the crisis deepened, debate within Golkar emerged about whether it should support

[2]While Harmoko was the first civilian chairman of the party, there were several other retired officers that served in party leadership.

[3]Thomas Pepinsky. *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Suharto for president in March 1998 as scheduled, or take some other course of action, such as delaying the presidential election. Despite the deep economic contraction and uncertainty concerning the future, Golkar moved forward and reelected Suharto on March 11, 1998.

In addition to reelecting Suharto, the regime chose a civilian, B.J. Habibie, as vice president. Habibie, an engineer, was the first civilian without any ties to the military to become vice president since 1983. His elevation rankled many within the military because it reduced the status of the military within the regime and placed a military outsider directly in line to become president in the midst of an economic crisis. Habibie's rise to the vice presidency proved crucial, as just two months following Suharto's reelection he gave in to pressures to resign and Habibie became president. Having Habibie in position as vice president may have been a key factor in shifting power away from the military but ultimately the fate of the transition depended on the military – as Habibie could not exercise power without the military's consent.

As the financial crisis deepened, unrest emerged throughout Indonesia with large scale mobilization in the capital of Jakarta. With riots breaking out throughout the capital region, popular mobilization against the regime centered around student movements. Student groups organized protests against the New Order, with their ranks continuing to grow as the crisis deepened. Protests continued to strengthen even in response to crackdowns by the police and military, as these actions spurred greater backlash against the regime. These protests swelled in the early weeks of May 1998, bringing the students in direct confrontation with the military which had mobilized to contain the unrest. The demands of the protesters were for the removal of Suharto, the depolicitization

of the military, and democratization.

Leading the military at this time was General Wiranto. Just months before the protests, Wiranto had been elevated to the position as commander of the armed forces (ABRI). Wiranto had risen quickly through the ranks of the army to eventually become the commanding officer of the entire military. After graduating first in his class at the military academy, Wiranto served as Suharto's aide-de-camp and later held several major commands during his career. It is important to note that Wiranto was tied to a nationalist faction within the military,[4] and was adamantly dedicated to a united Indonesia. As an ardent nationalist, Wiranto saw opposition to the regime as a threat to national unity itself. Thus, Wiranto faced the challenge of upholding a united nationalist vision of Indonesia and containing the unrest, without endangering the reputation of the military.

The challenge facing Wiranto and other members of the regime peaked in mid-May. As the crisis continued and Suharto remained unwilling to give way, students stormed the national legislature and occupied its grounds. Trapped inside the building was the legislature's leadership. The Indonesian legislature is structured into two houses: the People's Representative Council (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Leading these two houses during the New Order was a speaker, who came from the largest party, as well as deputies representing the major factions, Golkar, PPP, PDI, the state and civil society, and the military. At this time, the Speaker of the House was Harmoko. After the students stormed the building, Harmoko met with all deputy speakers who debated how to resolve the protester's concerns.

[4]Marcus Mietzner. *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

One of the deputies present was Syarwan Hamid. Hamid had served as the head of the military's socio-political office, which coordinated the political affairs of the military and achieved the rank of Lt. General. After his time as head of the socio-political affairs office, Hamid retired immediately prior to accepting a position as a deputy speaker under Harmoko. As a deputy speaker, Hamid led the military faction and held considerable power over decisions made within the legislature due to the large number of seats the military held. After deliberating for hours, all members of the leadership concluded that the appropriate response to the protests was to accede to the demands of the protesters, call for Suharto's resignation, and reduce the political influence of the military. Hamid's support on this decision was crucial. As the deputy speaker for the military's faction in the MPR he represented the military's political interests and provided crucial backing for this action.

In calling for Suharto's resignation, Hamid acted independently of Wiranto and the command hierarchy of the military. As deputy speaker representing the military, Hamid operated outside the command hierarchy and did not need to consult with, or have his decisions approved by, the commander of the military. Hamid's decision to support a resolution calling for Suharto's resignation was not solely due to the popular pressure and a desire to regain the people's trust. Instead, Hamid trusted Harmoko and Golkar.[5] Having served in the socio-political office for several years, Hamid had had close interaction with Golkar's leadership and trusted their vision and ability to manage the government alongside the military in the absence of Suharto.

Another key actor in the room was Abdul Gafur. Gafur had had a long career in the military and served as a member of the military's faction in the leg-

[5]Interview conducted with Syarwan Hamid on March 14th, 2019.

islature. After retiring from the military, Gafur joined Golkar and rose high in its leadership several years prior to the crisis. Gafur was one of many within Golkar that established tight links between the military and Golkar and helped establish a high degree of trust between the two actors. Thus, with both Gafur and Hamid in leadership positions there were two high ranking officials with extensive military careers that used their power to back a resolution calling for Suharto to resign.

The opposition leaders also joined Harmoko, Hamid, and Gafur – making the leadership of the Indonesian legislature unified in their decision. Following their meeting, Harmoko and the deputy speakers published a resolution calling for Suharto's resignation.[6] Should Suharto refuse to resign, the legislature's leadership would call a special session to impeach Suharto. Suharto tried to placate the civilian leadership by offering to reshuffle the cabinet. Suharto's move failed as most members of the cabinet, including prominent members of Golkar, refused[7] and offered their resignations as a sign that Suharto should resign. With formerly loyal civilians withdrawing their support, Suharto's hope for power rested entirely with Wiranto and the military.

Because of Habibie's rise to the vice presidency any transition following proscribed laws meant that power would be transferred away from the military to someone without any experience serving in the military. This would then subject the military to civilian control by an outsider. After Harmoko and other civilian elites called for Suharto's resignation, Wiranto initially opposed their demands for Suharto to step down and continued with his, and the military's,

[6] Richard Lloyd Perry. "The Army Stays Loyal as Party Turns on Suharto". In: *Independent* (May 18, 1998). URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-army-stays-loyal-as-party-turns-on-suharto-1158426.html.

[7] Including future Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung.

support.

Following the publication of the legislature's resolution calling for Suharto's resignation, Wiranto met with the upper brass of the military to develop a strategy for the military's path forward. In this meeting the leadership of the officer corps decided to push back against civilian leadership with some, such as Prabowo Subianto, advocating harsh measures against the protesters and greater military control of the situation. After meeting with the other commanders Wiranto announced that the resolution offered by the civilians was illegitimate and that the civilians had no legal grounds to call for Suharto's resignation.[8] Thus, at this point in the crisis Wiranto and other high ranking officers demonstrated little confidence in Golkar's and the civilians' ability to manage the transition and sought to continue with a regime that permitted the military a high degree of influence over political matters.

With civilians withdrawing their support but the military remaining loyal, Suharto leaned more on the military to stay in power. One move he took to stay in office was granting Wiranto almost total power to use the military how Wiranto wished. Suharto issued an executive order which allowed Wiranto to use the full force of the military to quell the popular movement should he choose. With this power, Wiranto had to decide how to quell the popular unrest without sacrificing the military's reputation. After claiming the move of the legislature to be illegitimate but protests continuing, Wiranto was caught in a standstill for several days.

Unsure of what to do, Wiranto again held a meeting. Instead of meeting solely with commanding officers Wiranto met with prominent social elites and

[8]Salim Said. *Dari Gestapu ke reformasi: Serangkaian kesaksian*. Mizan Pustaka, 2013.

more reformist oriented officers from the nationalist wing of the military. In this meeting they debated what they should do and how to manage a transition of power in a legitimate way. During this meeting Wiranto left to go visit with Suharto. While visiting with Wiranto, Suharto notified Wiranto that he, Suharto, would resign the next day and gave Wiranto authority to form a military council to guide the transition.[9]

Immediately following this meeting with Suharto, Wiranto again met with the general staff of the military. There, Wiranto informed the officers of Suharto's plans to resign and the power he delegated to the military but also his reluctance to use the military to take entire control of the transition. Wiranto worried that protests would continue and that more students could be killed as a result. Instead, Wiranto directed the military to support a transition of power to Vice President B.J. Habibie – a member of Golkar. Even though Wiranto was reluctant to take total control of the transition the military could and would use its political power to bind the transition. Instead of creating a pact with the opposition over the terms of the transition, Wiranto and the military used its partnership with Golkar to guide the transition because the two actors controlled the legislature.

It is clear that the financial crisis and subsequent protests did not determine the military's behavior. Instead, the military's behavior was a function of strategic decisions made by high-ranking officers of the military who were uncertain of the best course of action. After Harmoko and the deputy speakers, including a prominent retired officer, announced their desire for Suharto to resign, the military could have demonstrated full confidence in Harmoko and Golkar and immediately backed the civilian leadership. Instead, Wiranto continued sup-

[9]Said, *Dari Gestapu ke reformasi: Serangkaian kesaksian*.

porting Suharto because he was was not fully confident in Golkar which, in turn, made him uncertain of how a civilian-led transition would play out.

In the time between the legislature's leadership's call for Suharto's resignation and Suharto's actual resignation, Wiranto and the military could have taken many other actions, including full suppression of the student-led movement. Even with Suharto's resignation, there was no guarantee that Wiranto would not have used the military's power to take full control of the transition. All of these alternative options were available to Wiranto and the military, yet the military allowed civilians to lead, but not control, the transition.

On the morning of 21 May 1998, Suharto resigned and passed power to his vice president, B.J. Habibie. Habibie had become vice president due to his loyalty to Suharto and was not known for his political prowess. Despite being considered as someone without a strong political acumen, Habibie had held several leadership positions in Golkar prior to becoming vice president. Habibie becoming vice president during the financial crisis was essential to political reforms in Indonesia. After becoming president, Habibie set Indonesia on the path of democratization by calling for elections which were to be held the following year.

While Habibie's leadership was key for democratization, the transition was still very much steered by Golkar and the military prior to the election. Because the 1997 elections were held under the rules of the New Order, the legislature was dominated by Golkar and the military factions. The incumbent's large majority granted Golkar and the military significant influence over reforms during the early stages of the transition and insulated the incumbents from the opposition. One major demand of the protesters and opposition, for example, was political decentralization.

For most of its time under independence, Indonesia was a centralized state with limited regional autonomy. The centralization of the state was viewed within nationalist factions, including those within the military, to be critical to uphold the national doctrine of *Pancasila*. During the New Order Suharto, Golkar, and the military exploited the state's centralization to appoint loyalists to sub-national offices. Thus, at the time of Suharto's resignation sub-national legislative and executive offices where dominated by Golkar and retired officers. Full decentralization worried the military because it could weaken the nationalist's hold on regional political offices and potentially fan the flames of regional tension that had plagued Indonesia since independence.

Even though Golkar and the military would have preferred not to reform the structure of the state, they were not in a position to ignore the demands of the protesters and the opposition parties, especially if these parties won power in the 1999 elections. To preempt the possibility of decentralization on the terms of the opposition, Golkar and the military used their influence in the interim period to pass decentralization on their terms. Instead of extensive decentralization, Golkar and the military passed reforms which allowed for autonomy at the sub-national level, including direct elections for mayors, governors, and local legislatures, but significant power over taxation and security remained with the central state. Additionally, decentralization reforms would be gradually implemented, meaning those placed in power by Golkar and military at the sub-national level would be gradually replaced through popular elections over several years.[10]

During the debate over these reforms, the military openly stated its opposi-

[10]Sekretariat Jenderal. *Proses Pembahasan Rancangan Udang-Undang Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah*. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 1999.

tion to extensive decentralization and warned that any decentralization could endanger national unity. Despite fears of Indonesia breaking apart as a result of decentralization, the military backed the Golkar-oriented decentralization reforms prior to the 1999 elections because they were more likely to be limited than reforms initiated by opposition parties. The decentralization reforms are but one example of the way the military used its presence in the legislature prior to, and after, the 1999 elections to set bounds on democratization.

Another way the military constrained civilians was by maintaining reserve domains in the legislature. Prior to the transition, the lower house of the national legislature was comprised of only three parties; Golkar, the Islamist PPP, and the secular PDI, with 75 seats reserved for the military. What constitutes the upper house was comprised of regional representatives and representatives of corporatist interest groups, which were dominated by members of Golkar and retired officers. Additional seats were given to the military in the upper house, increasing its power within the legislature during the New Order. The 1999 election reduced the power and influence of both Golkar and the military, but did not completely strip them of their ability to check the preferences of other parties.

For the 1999 election, the total number of seats in both houses was reduced from a combined total of 1,000 seats to 700, with 500 directly elected seats in the lower house. Of the 200 remaining seats, 130 were allocated to regional representatives and 70 to corporatist groups, with the military and police (ABRI) holding 40 of these 70 seats. While the power of the military was reduced, the military not immediately returning to the barracks demonstrates a lack of confidence in civilians and a desire to constrain the power of civilians during the

transition.

One reason for the military's hesitation to return to the barracks was the weakness of Golkar. Under the free and fair elections of 1999, Golkar saw its share of seats reduced from 75% in 1997, to 26% in 1999. This large shift in power reduce the Golkar - military faction to 23% of total seats in the legislature. Despite this large decrease, Golkar was still the second largest party behind the PDI-P, which was a reformed legacy party of the New Order PDI. Even though the PDI-P saw its vote share catapult it into position as the largest party, it only held 34% of the seats. The remaining seats were divided amongst several smaller nationalist and Islamist parties which had split off of the New Order triumvirate parties.

Even though the introduction of free and fair elections removed Golkar from its position as a hegemonic party, it still held considerable influence within the legislature and prevented any anti-military parties from gaining power. This was essential for further de-politicization of the military because it showed the military that Golkar could hold some of its ground in the party system. Golkar was able to hold some power against the New Order opposition and insulate the military by gaining control of the speakership, placing the Golkar chairman, Akbar Tandjung, as Speaker of the House. Despite Golkar's position as the second largest party, it was still fairly weak as other parties could form coalitions against Golkar. Given Golkar's reduced strength we should then expect the military to act strategically to bind the terms of the transition to compensate for Golkar's weakness – which is what the military did.

Reformasi and Bounded Democratization

Although the military's formal presence in the legislature was reduced from 115 to 40 seats in the transitional legislature, the military still held considerable influence. With only 40 seats the military could not unilaterally influence policy but, in combination with allies, it could check more ambitious reforms. Furthermore, because the military was formally represented in the legislature it was given a deputy speaker position in the upper house. With this position, the military was directly involved in bargaining at the leadership level over policy, reforms, and other actions taken in the legislature, which would eventually include the decision to impeach a president from an Islamist party.

Even though Habibie called for free and fair elections in 1999, he and the legislature did not change the mechanisms to select the president and vice-president. Instead of direct presidential elections, Habibie, Golkar, and the military kept the presidency indirectly elected via the legislature. That the president was indirectly elected meant the military had a vote on who could become the president. Despite the PDI-P's new found plurality following the elections it failed to gain sufficient support to elect its leader – Megawati Sukarnoputri who is the daughter of Indonesia's first president. Instead, the legislature selected the long time leader of Indonesia's largest Islamic organization (Nahdlatul Ulama) Abdurrahman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur.

Gus Dur won the vote to become president after a contentious process in the legislature. The contention began after the legislature rejected an accountability speech by B.J. Habibie, who had nominated Wiranto as his vice president. After rejecting Habibie, the legislature also rejected the nomination of Akbar Tandjung, the leader of Golkar who also had Wiranto as his vice presidential candi-

date. With its candidates rejected and wanting to prevent Megawati from winning the presidency, Golkar threw its support behind Gus Dur. After winning the presidency, Gus Dur sought reconciliation with the PDI-P for a contentious process by selecting Megawati as his vice president.

Gus Dur's presidency was marked by instability and the new president was frequently checked by the military. In addition to the military's continued presence in the legislature, several recently retired officers joined Gus Dur's cabinet and played a key role in internal security affairs. One aspect of the instability of Gus Dur's brief tenure was a constant shuffle within the cabinet. Despite the instability in the cabinet, one constant was the control of the security portfolio by former officers who rebuffed Gus Dur's attempts to reform the military and use it for political support.

The control of the security portfolio by retired officers was key for the continued support of democratization by the military. These officers were recently retired and maintained the confidence of the active officer corps. With their close ties to the office corps, retired officers held a high degree of trust of the military and were able to advocate for the military's mission within the executive. The control of security matters by retired officers guaranteed that Gus Dur could not stray too far from the military's preferences. Indeed, when Gus Dur tried to do so the military pushed back and supported the move to impeach and remove him.

Altogether, Gus Dur struggled to manage the complex elite relationship within the Indonesian political arena. To further complicate matters, Gus Dur's brief tenure as president was plagued by regional instability which broke out after the fall of Suharto. The regional instability included mass sectarian vi-

olence between Christians and Muslims in Maluku, terrorist attacks, national movements in Papua, the continued insurgency in Aceh, and the transfer of East Timorean administration to the United Nations.

With events spiraling out of control Gus Dur tried to dig in. Refusing calls from members of his own cabinet to resign, Gus Dur ordered the Minister for Politics and Security, retired Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to implement a state of emergency. Yudhoyono refused to follow this order and resigned. Just days later, the military mobilized as a show of force against Gus Dur and protected the special legislative session organized to impeach and remove him from the presidency. On 23 July 2000, the impeachment resolution was adopted without a single vote in dissent, including votes in favor of impeachment by the military faction. With his impeachment, Gus Dur was removed from office and replaced by Megawati. After Gus Dur was removed and Megawati was sworn in, the military returned the barracks and the turbulent transition to democracy continued.

Gus Dur's impeachment provides a clear example of the military binding the democratic transition. In response to an executive who acted against the military's interests and who it did not trust, the military mobilized in opposition and backed a coalition to remove him from power. In its bid to remove him from power, the military employed its coercive capacity and only demobilized after a more nationalist oriented politician became president. By helping remove Gus Dur, the military demonstrated its willingness and capacity to bind civilian leaders who deviated too far from its preferences without having to take direct control of politics.

Megawati's tenure as president can be characterized as cautious because she

did little to antagonize the military and other elites. Where Gus Dur was more ambitious in seeking military reforms, Megawati only pursued reforms offered by the military itself. Megawati successfully served out the rest of the presidential mandate which expired in 2004 and then ran for reelection. In her bid for the presidency in 2004 Megawati faced two prominent retired generals; Wiranto and Yudhoyono. Unlike the previous election, the rules for selecting the president in the 2004 election were changed from an indirect to a direct election.

Following the collapse of the New Order, Wiranto joined Golkar and ran as a vice presidential candidate twice under Golkar's banner. In the run up to the 2004 election, Wiranto defeated several career civilians, such as Akbar Tandjung, as well as former general Prabawo Subianto, to capture Golkar's nomination for the presidency. For Yudhoyono, the retired general formed the Democrat Party a year after he resigned from Gus Dur's cabinet. Unlike Wiranto, Yudhoyono had developed a reputation as a reformist oriented officer. Yudhoyono had led a clique of officers who developed the ideas of military reform and depoliticization towards the end of the New Order and his resignation in response to Gus Dur's order to use a state of emergency cemented this reputation as a reformist. Wiranto, on the other hand, had led the military during the 1997-1998 unrest which had seen several students killed, was linked to violence in East Timor, and carried a legacy tied to Suharto's New Order which was reinforced by his bid for the presidency under Golkar's label.

Thus, in 2004 two powerful retired generals ran against Megawati for the presidency. Wiranto finished a close 3rd behind Megawati in the first round, leaving Megawati and Yudhoyono to contest the second round. With a prominent Golkar businessman as his vice presidential running-mate, Yudhoyono ran

away with the election and easily defeated Megawati in the second round. Despite his success on the presidential ticket, Yudhoyono's party performed poorly in the legislative elections. With Yudhonoyo's party performing poorly, Golkar went on to regain its position as the largest party in the legislature after PDI-P saw a large drop in support.

With the 2004 election, Indonesia saw a prominent retired general aligned with nationalists elected to the presidency. The 2004 election also saw the military's old political ally, Golkar, regain its position as the largest party in the legislature. With nationalists in control of politics, civilians, with the help of several retired officers, had demonstrated their ability to secure power and shield the military from parties which wanted to alter the national project. With former officers and allies in power, the military fully resigned its formal political powers in the legislature and finished its protracted return to the barracks. Having successfully bounded the transition, the military was confident that the ensuing democratic system would not endanger the national project.

Indonesia's democratization demonstrates the need to incorporate the strategic decisions the military makes based on its relationship with parties into analysis of democratization. While Suharto resigned in the face of mass-mobilization against the regime, alternative explanations of democratization fail to explain Indonesia's path out of authoritarian rule. Because of its Muslim majority society with more traditional values, oil wealth, and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, Indonesia was an unlikely case of democratization. Despite each of these factors which should make democratization unlikely, Indonesia successfully democratized and remains a democracy today, largely because the military is confident that nationalists will hold power.

Indonesia's path out of authoritarianism not only pushes against religious or modernization approaches to democratization, but it also does not fit with elite-agency or distributional conflict models. Indonesia does not fit with distributional conflict models because mass-mobilization occurred even though income inequality was low. The demands of the popular movement against Suharto were not focused on wealth redistribution or the need for better economic institutions. Instead, the protesters demanded the military to depoliticize and for the presidency and legislature to be democratically elected. Regarding elite-agency models, regime insiders did not form pacts with outsiders over the terms of democratization. Instead, incumbents initiated the transition on their own. Indonesia's democratization fits more with the recent developed incumbent-led transition thesis but this work highlights the need to include the military as a key incumbent actor.

The Fall of Stroessner and Party Led Democratization

The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Paraguay differed significantly than in Indonesia. Where the Indonesian military was active throughout the transition, the Paraguayan military stepped away and completely deferred to civilians. Instead of binding civilian's behavior, the Paraguayan military quickly returned to the barracks and allowed the civilians to control the process of crafting electoral and political institutions.

In this section, I trace the behavior of the military and party through the entire democratization process. I begin with the conditions that produced a split in the ruling coalition and Stroessner's ouster, through the drafting of a new con-

stitution, and subsequent free and fair elections. I show how the antecedent conditions of party institutionalization, strength, and trust produced credible commitments that civilians would not violate the military's interests. These credible commitments allowed the military to quickly return to the barracks without having to set bounds on the transition.

The crisis which produced the downfall of authoritarian rule in Paraguay is directly linked to Stroessner betraying the trust of both the party and the military. For most of his thirty-four year rule Stroessner did little to upset the party and military. While in power, Stroessner touted the the party's interests and supremacy, allowed the party's old guard to run the party and legislature autonomously, and only played a symbolic role in party politics for much of his tenure. As long as Stroessner maintained this relationship, the party was happy to keep Stroessner in power. Stroessner treated the military largely the same way. Even though he had the power to interfere in internal military issues he rarely did so. Instead, Stroessner allowed the military to operate much as he did the party, leaving officers to manage internal affairs and respecting their institutional prerogatives.

Had Stroessner not deviated from his behavior of respecting institutional autonomy and prerogatives, he would have likely remained in power until he chose to retire. Instead, Stroessner began meddling in the internal affairs of both the party and military to increase his personal power and to carve out a path to elevate his son within the military in preparation to succeed him.

The regime led by Stroessner was characterized by calm and internal stability during the 1960s and 1970s. As the old guard of the party (whose fathers and grandfathers had created the party) began to retire, Stroessner became

more active in the party and worked to elevate loyalists within party leadership. By throwing his support behind loyalists Stroessner helped create two factions within the party; the *militantes* and *tradicionalistas*. The *militantes* received their name for their militant loyalty to Stroessner, placing him above all institutions, rather than receiving the name for any type of loyalty to the military. These *militantes* incrementally gained greater power in the 1980s, eventually capturing the party. But the rise of the *militantes* to power ruptured the party-military relationship that had produced decades of stable authoritarian rule.

The *militantes* and *tradicionalistas* were able to co-exist for some time during the 1980s, keeping the party in power with its alliance with the military secured. Despite their differences over how power should be delegated to Stroessner, the two factions initially shared power by splitting positions within the party's *Junta de Gobierno* and executive committee. The *militantes*, however, eventually forced the *tradicionalistas* out of the party altogether in 1987 to capture total control of the party. The *militantes* were able to force the *tradicionalistas* out of power and capture the entire party through a ploy which locked the *tradicionalistas* out of the 1987 party congress.

Prior to each presidential election, the party held a convention which was used to select new leadership and potentially renominate Stroessner. In the run up to the party's 1987 convention all proceeded as normal. Leaders of each faction met together and planned the meeting as they had with all previous meetings, discussing the order of business and other procedures. The two factions, however, failed to bargain over access to the grounds within the party headquarters used to hold the convention. On the eve of the party congress, the *militantes* entered the grounds and locked the gates. The *militantes* then used their

connections within the Ministry of the Interior to deploy the police to protect the grounds. When the *tradicionalistas* arrived at the party headquarters in the morning of the scheduled congress, they found themselves literally locked out.

With the *tradicionalistas* barred from the party congress, the *militantes* captured the entirety of the party's leadership in both the *Junta de Gobierno* and executive committee. With total control of the party the *militantes* renominated Stroessner to the presidency and went on to win the 1988 election.

In addition to renominating Stroessner, the *militantes* began to lay a plan to open up a path of promotions in the military for Stroessner's son Gustavo, who was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force. Gustavo Stroessner had little path to rise to the rank of general like his father for two factors. First, there were several officers in front of Gustavo and, with few retirements, there simply were not enough positions to provide promotions. Second, Gustavo was not widely liked in the military which was dominated by the Paraguayan Army. As an officer in the Air Force, Gustavo had weak links to those who had served in combat in the military, especially the army, and was seen as benefiting from nepotism rather than merit.

To open the way for Gustavo to rise through the ranks, Stroessner and the *militantes* devised a plan to force the retirements of officers who blocked Gustavo's path. In 1988, twenty-one out of thirty brigadier generals had held their rank for more than eight years, with eight of the thirteen division generals having held their ranks for over twelve years. Under Stroessner's plan, the party would pass a law that would force the retirement of any colonel or higher ranking officer who had held their rank for over eight years.[11] With forced retire-

[11]Marcial Antonio Riquelme. *Stronismo, Golpe Militar y Apertura Tutelada*. CDE, 1992.

ments, Stroessner could open up the way for his son to be promoted to colonel, without directly removing generals who could use their positions of command to remove Stroessner. In addition to the law to force retirements for officers, Stroessner's personal secretary Mario Benítez, who was also a vice-president within the Colorado Party, had drawn up a list of officers they wanted to force into retirement.

The move by Stroessner and the *militantes* to force retirements rankled many within the officer corps. According to a survey conducted by Riquelme,[12] a large majority of officers saw themselves as institutionalists, loyal to the military instead of Stroessner himself. Of these officers, many had started their careers prior to the requirement that officers had to be members of the Colorado Party to enter the military academy and had not depended on Stroessner's, nor the party's, patronage. These officers saw the party's attempt to force retirements as a violation of the previous institutional autonomy they had enjoyed when the *tradicionalistas* controlled the party.

With the trust between the military and party quickly eroding the institutionalists within the military turned to the *tradicionalistas* for help. Even though the *tradicionalistas* had been locked out of the party, the institutionalists within the military trusted them because they had fought together in the civil war of 1947 and then ruled side-by-side for several decades. Outside of power, the *tradicionalistas* had little sway within the party's committees but their experience and links to the *seccionales* throughout the country meant they had a credible base of power should they regain control of the party's leadership committees. It was within this context that officers reached out to some of the party's old guard to develop a plan to oust Stroessner and his *militantes* from the party.

[12]Riquelme, *Stronismo, Golpe Militar y Apertura Tutelada*.

The conspiracy to oust Stroessner was led by two prominent members of the Colorado Party who had been forced out of the party. First was Edgar Ynsfrán, whose family had long ties to the party and who had served as the Minister of the Interior for years under Stroessner. In addition to Ynsfrán was Luis María Argaña. Argaña had served as the President of the Supreme Court for several years before being ousted after the *militantes* took over the party. Together, these two prominent Colorados worked with General Andrés Rodríguez, who was the commander of the Army's First Division. As head of the First Division, Rodríguez commanded the army's largest and best equipped armored and infantry units, while also having strong ties to other commanders throughout the army.

As part of the plan for the coup, the three elites agreed that the party would give Rodríguez political support and make him president should he remove Stroessner and return the party to the *tradicionalistas*. With this plan in place, Rodríguez launched the coup when Stroessner moved to force Rodríguez's retirement in February 1989.[13] In the middle of the night, all military units throughout the country were mobilized as Rodríguez aimed for Stroessner. During the coup dozens died in the fighting between the army and presidential guard, yet the military overwhelmed Stroessner who surrendered and was forced into exile.

After removing Stroessner from power Rodríguez helped the *tradicionalistas* recapture the party. During the coup, Rodríguez made an announcement that the military had left the barracks for the "full and total unification of Coloradism in the government".[14] The old guard immediately forced out the *mil-*

[13]Carlos María Lezcano and Carlos Martini. "Fuerzas Armadas y Democracia: a la Búsqueda del Equilibrio Perdido, Paraguay 1989-1993". In: (1994).
[14]Ibid.

itantes and established an interim *Junta de Gobierno* and executive committee comprised of retired *tradicionalistas*. Returned to power in the party, the *tradicionalistas* nominated Rodríguez and installed him into the presidency. The behavior of the military in returning power to the party, rather than taking power for itself, demonstrates that the coup was about reestablishing the trust between the party and military, which had existed prior to the rise of the *militantes*. With the *tradicionalistas* in power, the military could be confident that their institutional interests would be secure.

After recapturing the party, and installing another general as president, the military and party had reestablished the military-party coalition that had sustained authoritarian rule since the end of the civil war in 1947. Soon after Rodríguez's installment as president, elections were held in which greater freedoms were allowed for opposition parties. Even with greater freedom for the opposition parties, the Colorados won significant majorities and demonstrated their strength by maintaining control of the presidency and both houses of congress. Despite the Colorado's electoral win, there were many in the party that worried that they were repeating the same mistake they had made with Stroessner.

Wary of keeping a general in power, the party could limit Rodríguez's power by initiating democratization via a provision in the constitution. The 1967 constitution provided the power of revising the constitution, in part or totality, to the National Assembly. Should the National Assembly call for revisions to the constitution, a constitutional assembly would be formed which included both houses of the National Assembly and the Council of State. The Council of State was comprised of the executive cabinet, the chiefs of each arm of the military,

the archbishop of Asunción, and other leaders of labor, agricultural, and education sectors.

Having determined to pursue democracy and prevent Rodríguez from consolidating power, party leadership determined that the President of the Senate, Waldino Ramón Lovera, would call for the constitutional assembly. Catching word of their intentions, President Rodríguez undercut the party and announced the call for the constitutional assembly himself.

With the call for a new constitution, Paraguay held an election to select a constitutional assembly. The Colorado Party dominated this election, winning 122 of the 198 elected seats. With a large majority in the constitutional assembly, the Colorado Party was positioned to design the subsequent democratic system largely on its own terms. A potential challenge for the party, however, was the presence of the military due to its place in the Council of State which took part in the constitutional assembly. By having a formal presence in the assembly the military could directly influence the development of the new system should it exercise this prerogative. Despite its formal prerogative, the military deferred to civilian leadership throughout the process of designing the new constitution, even on matters of military reforms.

According to interviews with civilians who participated in the drafting of the constitution, the trust between the military and the Colorado Party was key for the military to defer to civilians and not interfere with democratization. Trust between the Colorado Party and the military was high for several reasons. The foundation of the relationship between the officers and the party was set by a shared vision of the national project, with a close alignment between the two actors due to their alliance during the civil war and conservative ideology. The

trust between the two actors was based on more than this shared vision of the nation. In addition to a shared ideology, the party's old guard demonstrated its willingness to act on behalf of the military by providing political support in removing Stroessner and the *militantes* which had threatened the institutional interests of the military.

Another key to the military's confidence in the Colorado Party was the party's political strength. In addition to holding the military's trust, the party had demonstrated its political power and ability to secure the military's interests under democracy. The party demonstrated its strength in the two elections following the 1989 coup.[15] By gaining over 60% of the seats in both elections, the party sent a clear signal to the military that the party would remain in power under democratic conditions.[16]

Overall, the transition to complete civilian rule was relatively smooth, with the military differing to civilians to design the new political system. One point of friction was on the issue of Rodríguez running for reelection. Because the party wanted to prevent anyone, especially a general, from holding power indefinitely, the constitutional assembly imposed term limits that prevented any president from running for reelection. Not only did the constitutional assembly set a single five year term limit on the president but it also barred any family member of Rodríguez from running for president. This infuriated Rodríguez, as well as those close to him in the military, who saw this as a betrayal of the accord made between the Colorados and military when conspiring to oust Stroessner.

[15]Dieter Nohlen et al. *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook: Volume 2 South America*. Vol. 2. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2005.

[16]There was also little reason for the military to fear the opposition. The primary opponents to the Colorado Party did not hold radical views that would threaten the military even in the event that they won power.

Angry at the leadership of the constitutional assembly for including this provision, Rodríguez threatened to pull his support of the new constitution and overthrow the assembly. Fearing a coup the civilians debated how to respond. In the end, civilian leaders decided to go forward with the ratification of the new constitution, with or without the backing of Rodríguez. The civilians could proceed with ratification because of their strength through strong links to society and their performance in elections. Should Rodríguez follow through on his threat, party elites would be unified against Rodríguez and could employ their own power against him. After the civilians showed no sign of backing down, Rodríguez relented and supported the ratification of the new constitution – ushering in a new democratic system. The institutional structure of this new system was entirely determined by civilians, with the Colorado Party holding the most sway.

As with Indonesia, the case of Paraguay demonstrates the need to understand the strategic behavior of the military to explain democratization. Like Indonesia, democratization in Paraguay was led by incumbents who did not form any pact with the opposition. Not only did the incumbents not form a pact with the opposition, but democratization occurred in the absence of popular demands for democratization. Furthermore, Paraguay democratized even though land and income inequality was high. That there was democratization in the absence of popular demands for democratization and high income and land equality demonstrates that Paraguay does not comport with distributional conflict models of democratization.

While Paraguay does not share many of the same characteristics which make democratization as unlikely as Indonesia, it does not feature many factors which

are used to explain the rise of democracy. Paraguay democratized despite being relatively poorer than its neighbors, not having a robust middle class, and holding more traditional values. To understand why Paraguay democratized we must account for the confidence of the military in the Colorado Party and civilians more generally. Because the Colorado Party held the military's trust, and was a stable and strong party, the military could support democratization without fearing the prospects of civilian rule.

Conclusion

Both the Indonesian and Paraguayan militaries faced the uncertainty of democratization, yet only the Indonesian military used its power to bind the transition. The mere possibility of opponents winning power doesn't necessarily mean that a military will use its power to bind regime transitions. Instead, the military's decision to restrict or tilt political contestation depends on the confidence the military has in its civilian partners. This confidence is, in part, a function of the trust between the military and a political party or parties. In order for the military to accept the open contestation that democracy brings, the military must first have a civilian partner that shares its interests or values. While it is important for the military to have parties it trusts, the military must also have the confidence that its allies can actually win power before the military defers to civilians.

In the previous chapter I outlined the antecedent conditions that were critical in shaping the decisions made by the military during a potential democratic transition. These conditions were not deterministic, as the officer corps

could have employed the military's power differently at various points in the transition when uncertainty was most pronounced. In Paraguay, the antecedent conditions fostered a high degree of confidence between the military and the ruling Colorado Party. In addition to the positive relationship between the military and party, years of party building endowed the Colorado Party with a well-institutionalized and electorally strong party. The party demonstrated its strength in the elections in the months following the 1989 coup and an election for a constitutional assembly. Knowing that the Colorado Party was strong, the military could return to the barracks with little worry for the subsequent democratic system.

The outcome was quite different in Indonesia. Prior to the fall of the New Order, the military and Suharto had invested in building a ruling party. While their efforts resulted in a routinized and cohesive party, it lacked strong roots in society and was electorally weak because it had never been tested by real electoral competition. The lack of evidence that Golkar could perform well in free and fair elections created greater uncertainty for the military. Thus, prior to the 1999 elections the military and Golkar rushed reforms through the legislature on their own terms before possibly losing control of the legislature and presidency.

Following the 1999 elections where the military's primary opponents, the PDI-P, performed well and various Islamist parties gained significant representation, the military remained active in politics for several years. Even though the military reduced the number of seats it held in the legislature, it maintained its place in the legislature's leadership and several generals retired and took positions in the cabinet and constrained the president's attempts to reform the mil-

itary. By remaining politically active the military constrained civilians and prevented the system from deviating from its interests and national project rooted in *Pancasila*. Ultimately, the military returned to the barracks after one of its own, a retired army officer, won the 2004 presidential election and Golkar once again became the largest party in the legislature.

The selection of Indonesia and Paraguay provided a useful qualitative test of the theory outlined in the second chapter. By using comparative historical analysis I have demonstrated that a military's decision to bind a regime transition is influenced by the characteristics of civilian parties. Importantly, the conditions which influence the military's decisions are developed over time and are not changed dramatically by the exogenous shock which produced the failure of the regime. Where Paraguay's military had a strong allied party which had developed over several decades, Indonesia's military's allied party was weak and inexperienced due to developing under the military's tutelage. The weakness of Indonesia's incumbent party left the Indonesian military in a weaker position when the authoritarian regime failed, creating the incentive for the military to bind the transition. This dynamic can be seen in Table 4.1.

In both Indonesia and Paraguay, the military returned to the barracks and free and fair elections followed. Yet it was in Paraguay that the military did not seek to bind democratization by allowing civilians to control the transition. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the military remained politically active to secure its interests. While the Indonesian military ultimately allowed free and fair elections, democratization was not guaranteed from the outset. When the military-backed New Order faced economic difficulties and popular mobilization in the 1970s, the military did not allow democratization at all but instead devised a po-

Table 4.1: Party-Military Relations and Bounded Democratization

	Paraguay	Indonesia
Incumbent Party - Military Relationship		
Trust	High	High
National Project	Shared	Shared
Incumbent Party Institutionalization		
Cohesion	High	High
Routinization	High	High
Autonomy	High	Low
Territorial Breadth	Broad	Broad
Social linkages	Strong	Weak
Incumbent Party Strength		
Control of Legislature	Yes	No
Control of Executive	Yes	No
Electoral Strength	Extensive	Limited
Bounded Democratization	No	Yes

litical system that ensured that no party could come to power which could put the military's interests in danger. During the same period of the 1970s Golkar was institutionally underdeveloped and could not credibly protect the military should the military return to the barracks. Thus, the key difference between the crisis in the 1970s, and that of the 1990s, was the presence of a more institutionalized allied party. Had the military allowed democratization in the 1970s, the party system would most likely have reverted back to the unstable system that existed prior to military rule. Thirty years of military rule produced a more institutionalized party which shared the trust and national vision of the military. Thus, the presence of Golkar reduced the danger to the military but Golkar lacked the strength to produce sufficient confidence for the military to return quickly to the barracks.

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CHAPTER 5

BOUNDED DEMOCRATIZATION IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Military regimes were ubiquitous for much of the Cold War. Authoritarian regimes, with some military component, could be found in almost every region of the world. From Greece to Chile, or from Pakistan to South Korea, uniformed or retired generals were commonplace in authoritarian politics. While generals sat at the head of authoritarian regimes with the coercive capacity of the military behind them, these regimes were not immune to the possibility of democratization. Indeed, the Third Wave of Democratization included the end of many of these regimes.

The ubiquity of military rule and the military's distinct political characteristics justifies special attention to military-led democratization. While military rule shares certain features with other forms of authoritarianism, the military's control of coercive force and its distinct political interests set the military apart from other traditional political actors. More specifically, because the military must accept a role as a subordinate actor in a democratic system, we should better understand how the military's relationship with other actors, such as political parties, influences the military's behavior when facing the prospect of democratization.

In the previous two chapters I have outlined the causal mechanisms which affect whether a military binds democratization. While the cases of Paraguay and Indonesia demonstrated how the theoretical mechanisms function in practice, the ubiquity of military rule requires a generalized test of the theoretical mechanisms to ensure that the causal story is valid outside of these two cases.

In this chapter I evaluate whether trust, party institutionalization, and party strength are associated with bounded democratization by using a global sample of military-led transitions. Performing a cross-national analysis of bounded democratization requires a measure of democratization that specifically accounts for the military's behavior, which is not usually accounted for in widely used measures of democracy or democratization (e.g. Polity or V-Dem). I address this shortcoming in the current literature by developing an original dataset which codes the behavior of militaries during regime transitions. I then use statistical models to test whether bounded democratization is associated with a low degree of confidence in political parties by the military. By using quantitative methods, I build on the qualitative comparative historical analysis performed in previous chapters and demonstrate that the evidence of the tie between military confidence and bounded democratization is generalizable beyond Indonesia and Paraguay.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by justifying the scope of analysis which is limited to military-led democratization, rather than all instances of democratization. I then operationalize the dependent variable (bounded democracy) and primary explanatory variables (incumbent party institutionalization and strength) and follow with a brief description of control variables used in the analysis. I then provide the quantitative analysis and conclude with a discussion of the results.

Comparative Democratization and Military-led Transitions

There is a rich history of quantitative analysis in the field of comparative democratization that has contributed greatly to our understanding of democracy

and democratization. Despite the wealth of work on the subject, this chapter addresses two areas in the literature where I make a direct contribution; issues of scope and measurement.

Much of the quantitative analysis on democratization is linked to the *modernization*[1] or *distributional consequences* hypothesis.[2]. Despite the strengths of these works, one shortcoming in this literature is the generalizability of these theories. As Haggard and Kaufman[3] point out, several instances of democratization are primarily elite or incumbent driven, even when there may be distributional of modernization factors present.

I do not highlight the modernization and distributional consequences literature as alternative explanations. Instead, this exercise is to demonstrate how explanations of regime transitions would benefit from narrowing the scope of inquiry. I argue that the traditional approach in the democratization literature has led scholars to overlook certain strategies pursued by incumbents, such as the military, during transitions in a way which has prevented us from developing situationally appropriate concepts.

The claims of broad generalizability in the distributional consequences and modernization literature inadvertently include cases of military-led democratization where the distribution of economic goods was not a concern to the mili-

[1]Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". In: *American Political ScienceReview* 53.1 (1959), pp. 69–105; Adam Przeworski et al. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*. Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press, 2000; Carles Boix and Susan C Stokes. "Endogenous Democratization". In: *World politics* 55.4 (2003), pp. 517–549.

[2]Carles Boix. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press, 2003; Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2006; Ben W Ansell and David J Samuels. *Inequality and Democratization*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

[3]Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

tary, nor was development a factor in driving the military towards liberalizing. Instead, issues of military prerogatives and its interests were the primary factors at play during these transitions.[4] I address this issue by narrowing the scope of analysis solely to cases of military-led democratization where the primary concern of the military should be its institutional interests. By restricting the scope to military-led transitions, I provide a more precise understanding of the dynamics affecting democratic development when emerging from military rule, rather than making any broad claims about democratization more generally.

Another area where I build on the past approach to democratization is the conceptualization and operationalization of democracy around neither the *quality* or *robustness* of democratic institutions, procedures, and liberalism. Widely used measures of democracy range from measuring strict procedural terms of democracy, to a more normative approach that accounts for inclusivity and rights.[5] The variation in conceptualizations has thus produced minimalist measures of democracy, where a simple procedural threshold must be met,[6] to continuous measures which try to capture various dimensions of democratic quality.[7]

While conceptualizing democracy around its quality or robustness is certainly appropriate in most circumstances, doing so results in measures which fail to capture certain features of military-led democratization. Current mea-

[4] Alfred C Stepan. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, 1988; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Vol. 3. JHU Press, 1986.

[5] Michael Coppedge et al. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach". In: *Perspectives on Politics* (2011), pp. 247–267.

[6] Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*.

[7] Monty G Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. "Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual". In: *College Park: University of Maryland* (2002); Michael Coppedge et al. "V-Dem Codebook v10". In: (2020); Freedom House. *Freedom in the World 2014: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

sures of democracy, with their focus on contestation, participation, and media or individual rights, do not account for how the military may shape these institutions. Because the military may design institutions that are more competitive than what was found in the previous regime, both binary and continuous measures of democracy may capture a discrete shift towards democracy, but fail to account for how the system may be biased in favor of the military's allies or capture institutional constraints on democratic competition, even though these constraints do not violate certain thresholds of democracy measured by traditional indicators of democracy. It may be that the military creates a new system that is considered democratic under traditional measures but which is actually more restrictive, or biased towards allies, than a counterfactual system that was developed without the military's influence.

For example, under coding schemes such as Polity IV or Varieties of Democratization, Chile was considered highly democratic after Pinochet stepped down, even though he and the military bound democracy by ensuring the overrepresentation of conservatives, but which is not accounted for in these measures of democracy. Pinochet and the military designed an open system with free and fair elections, along with specific protections of liberal rights. How they bound the system, however, ensured that the results of democratic electoral procedures would not produce a government dominated by leftists – which the military feared. It was not until 2020-2021 that Chileans were able to fully dismantle the military-era constitution. Because previously developed concepts and measures of democracy are ill-suited to account for how the military can set parameters on democracy, even when the emerging system is democratic, I developed the concept of bounded democratization with a corresponding measure. Thus, a key contribution I make to the literature on democratization is to provide a

more nuanced measure of democracy, which captures political liberalization, but which also measures the restrictions that the military sets on the emerging democratic system.

While I contribute to the literature on the military within the context of democratization, I am certainly not the first to use quantitative methods to analyze democratization with a particular eye towards the military. Bratton and Van de Walle[8] were some of the first to analyze the relationship between military rule and the democratic prospects for countries in Africa. In their analysis of Third Wave democracies in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle found that the path out of military rule was fraught with many of the same difficulties as countries emerging from neo-patrimonial regimes.

Only a few years after Bratton and van de Walle's work, Barbara Geddes reemphasized the need to focus on the military as a distinct actor which affects authoritarian regime durability and the prospects of democratization.[9] Eventually, systematic cross-national analysis of the military's role in authoritarian durability and democratization was made possible with the creation of datasets which coded for the presence of military rule in a global sample.[10] For example, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz[11] found that militaries are more likely to give up power peacefully and democratize than other regime types. Their finding reinforced the hypothesis presented by others that the military can act more

[8]Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge university press, 1997.

[9]Barbara Geddes. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1 (1999), pp. 115–144.

[10]Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set". In: *Perspectives on Politics* 12.2 (2014), pp. 313–331; José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited". In: *Public choice* 143.1-2 (2010), pp. 67–101.

[11]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set".

cohesively and give up power should their institutional interests be secured.[12]

Most recently, quantitative analysis centered on military regimes has turned towards the *democratic coup* thesis. The democratic coup thesis argues that pro-democracy officers can use their military power and coups not to take power for themselves but to act as caretakers and overturn entrenched authoritarian regimes in support of democracy.[13] The democratic coup hypothesis has not gone unchallenged as others have shown that, while democracy may emerge in the wake of some coups, coups are still a major driver in the rise of new authoritarian regimes and violent suppression.[14]

I contribute to the quantitative work on the military, and democratization more generally, by providing a new analytical framework. Instead of treating the military as an independent actor which affects the path of democratization unilaterally, I frame the problem concerning the path out of military rule in terms of the military's strategic partnership with civilian parties. While it may be that some faction of the officer corps may be more democratic than others, democracy is difficult to sustain if these reformist officers lack capable civilian allies which can manage democratization, without the military having to resort

[12]Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa". In: *World politics* 46.4 (1994), pp. 453–489; Barbara Geddes. "Changes in the Causes of Democratization through Time". In: *Landman, Todd/Robinson, Neil (Hg.): Handbook of Comparative Politics, London: Sage* (2009), pp. 278–298.

[13]Sharan Grewal and Yasser Kureshi. "How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation". In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.4 (2019), pp. 1001–1031; Kevin Koehler and Holger Albrecht. "Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy". In: *Armed Forces & Society* (2019), p. 0095327X19881747; David Kuehn. "Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military's Impact on Democratic Development". In: *Democratization* 24.5 (2017), pp. 783–800; Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans. "Coups and Democracy". In: *British Journal of Political Science* (2014), pp. 799–825; Michael K Miller. "Reanalysis: Are Coups Good for Democracy?" In: *Research & Politics* 3.4 (2016), p. 2053168016681908; Clayton L Thyne and Jonathan M Powell. "Coup d'état or Coup d'autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008". In: *Foreign policy analysis* 12.2 (2016), pp. 192–213.

[14]George Derpanopoulos et al. "Are Coups Good for Democracy?" In: *Research & Politics* 3.1 (2016), p. 2053168016630837; George Derpanopoulos et al. "Are Coups Good for Democracy? A Response to Miller (2016)". In: *Research & Politics* 4.2 (2017), p. 2053168017707355.

to its coercive capacity. Furthermore, officers who use democracy to justify their interference into politics may adroitly manipulate the political development of a system by binding democracy to ensure that democracy develops on the military's terms.

As I demonstrate using the universe of post-WWII military regimes, which includes ruling coalitions with both parties and militaries, unbounded democratization is more likely to occur when the military has confidence that its interests will be secured under democracy. Thus, an institutionalized and strong incumbent party is a key condition for democracy to emerge without the military undermining the democratization process.

Classifying Military Regimes

To determine whether bounded democratization is a function of the military's confidence in political parties, I construct a global sample of military regimes which is drawn from the post-WWII period. There is considerable debate as to what constitutes a military regime. For some, an authoritarian regime does not qualify as military rule unless the military controls access to political office or policy as a corporate entity.[15] Under this more conservative conceptualization of a military regime, the officer corps must act cohesively to control politics without delegating too much power to the regime leader. Thus, any regime where the regime leader emerged from the officer corps, but who garners sufficient power to control access to political office independent of the military, is not considered a military regime, but instead a personalist regime. Others offer a more

[15]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set".

inclusive conceptualization of military rule where an authoritarian regime is considered to qualify as military rule if the effective regime leader had ever been a career officer.[16] Still, others take a position of military rule in the middle, considering whether military rule is characterized by corporate military rule, personalist military rule, or indirect military rule, or whether the regime leader had worn the uniform immediately prior to taking power through non-democratic means.[17]

I do not arbitrate amongst these various approaches nor do I formulate my own conceptualization of military rule. Each of the various approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. The more conservative approach captures institutionalized military rule but may fail to capture the significant political role the military plays in supporting a regime leader with substantial power. For example, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz[18] does not consider Jerry Rawling's regime in Ghana to have a military component, even though Rawlings came to power and ruled as the head of a junta until 1992, because the authors consider Rawlings to hold sufficient power to render the military's role insignificant. The more liberal conceptualization may consider regimes such as Rawling's to be a military regime, but a key weakness is that this approach may qualify regimes as military rule even when the military plays no significant role. For example, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland[19] code Singapore under Lee Hsien Loong as a military regime because Lee, the son of Lee Kuan Yew, was an officer in Singapore's military, even though he retired from the military decades before becoming Prime

[16]Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, "Democracy and dictatorship revisited".

[17]Milan W Svolik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012; Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective". In: *Contemporary Politics* 19.1 (2013), pp. 19–34.

[18]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set".

[19]Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, "Democracy and dictatorship revisited".

Minister. Should Singapore transition to democracy we should not expect the military to play any significant role in the transition because civilian control of the military is robust in Singapore.

Instead of developing my own conceptualization of military rule I use different samples of military regimes. I use various samples to test the robustness of my theory and to identify the conditions under which it should fail. To construct the various samples of military regimes I use four widely used datasets which code authoritarian regimes and code for whether the regime qualified as military rule. The first dataset is Geddes, Wright, and Frantz[20] (Hereafter GWF). GWF uses a conservative conceptualization of military rule where the military must act as a corporate entity to restrict access to political office or control policy. In this sense it is best suited to test my theory which centers around a military acting to secure its institutional interests. While GWF uses a more strict definition of military rule there are considerable benefits to using GWF. One benefit of GWF is that the authors code for hybrid regimes where the military rules alongside either/or a personalist ruler and/or party. Thus, GWF does not limit regimes to be only either military or civilian but also captures civilian-military coalitions. A more conservative conceptualization of military rule is also suitable for testing my theory of bounded democratization because it aligns with the assumption that the military is a relatively well-institutionalized unified actor. As can be seen in Table 5.1 below, however, this produces a smaller sample with only 89 possible military regimes to consider.

In addition to GWF I also use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland[21] (Hereafter DD). DD conceptualizes military rule more inclusively, with a regime consid-

[20]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set".

[21]Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, "Democracy and dictatorship revisited".

ered to be under military rule had the effective regime leader ever worn a military uniform. When using DD the universe of military regimes is significantly larger than GWF, with an additional 42 cases for a total of 137 regimes but this larger sample also includes cases where the military may have played a negligible role in sustaining authoritarian rule. The presence of observations where the military may have not played a substantive political role should attenuate any estimate because civilian incumbents already control politics independent of the strength or degree of institutionalization of the ruling party. Should I find no significant correlation between the characteristics of incumbent parties and the likelihood of bounded democratization, I will conclude that this framework of bounded democratization is only appropriate where the military, as an institution, played a substantive role in politics.

I also use the dataset developed by Svolik[22] (Hereafter PAR). PAR differs from both DD and GWF in that it codes components (e.g. ruling party, military, etc.) of an authoritarian regime independently. Thus, PAR codes for whether the military was involved in politics or if the regime was completely civilian. Should the military feature a military component, PAR then accounts for whether it was personalist, corporate, or indirect military rule. PAR also differs from DD in that it is more conservative in what it qualifies as a military leader. For PAR, the military is considered to be part of the regime if the head of the regime is a professional solider who was active directly in the run up to them coming to power. With a more conservative approach than DD, PAR ignores cases such as Lee Hsien Loong, but does capture cases such as Jerry Rawlings. Another strength of PAR is it accounts for regime transitions even should the regime leader remain in power, or if the military remains in control, by coding for nominal shifts

[22]Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*.

in executive power. Thus, PAR captures regime transitions from corporate military rule, where the junta held executive power, to where an officer captures significant personal power and marginalizes the junta.

The last dataset I use to sample military regimes is Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius[23] (Hereafter WTH). Unlike GWF, WTH rejects the notion of a personalist regime type. WTH instead centers its conceptualization of regime types around the party system. Thus, WTH codes a regime depending on the degree to which the party system is constrained. When the regime is authoritarian, WTH codes the regime as military when the military exercises power either directly or indirectly. One way that WTH addresses the issue of a regime leader with a military background is by coding cases where the regime leader was an officer, but was selected by open elections without military interference, as non-military. Thus, WTH differs slightly from DD and PAR, with a more narrow focus on the mechanisms to select the regime leader and provides an additional robustness check of the theory.

As a final note on the classification of military regimes, I highlight that the observed sample of military regimes which become more competitive is non-random and caution should be taken in the interpretation of any results from the quantitative analysis using these samples. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the proportion of military regimes which transition to more competitive regimes ranges from as low as 46% in PAR, to as high as 58% in GWF. That only about half of all military regimes shift to more competitive regimes suggests that there are factors which affect whether these transitions result in more competitive regimes which are not accounted for using selection on observable variables.

[23]Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective".

Table 5.1: Count and Duration of Military Regimes

Dataset	Total Military Rule	Average Duration	Transitions to Competitive Regimes
GWF	89	10.19	52
PAR	147	9.52	67
DD	137	12.36	76
WTH	135	6.71	66

While nearly half of military regimes transition to more competitive regimes, these transitions also differ from other authoritarian regime types regarding their level of democracy prior to and following the transition. Using the same four datasets, I provide a summary of how these regimes vary in the level of their democracy in Table 5.2. As can be seen in the table, on average, military regimes tend to be less democratic than other forms of authoritarian regimes prior to the transition. But these same military regimes then tend to result in more democratic systems using either Polity or V-Dem's Polyarchy in the year after the transition.

In circumstances of military-led transitions, there may be an alternative logic for the military and whether it even chooses to pursue a more competitive regime. The theory I have outlined highlights three factors that affect the military's behavior – given the military's decision to support a transition to a competitive regime. Whether the military even tolerates the idea of competitive elections is significant as it denotes a substantial shift away from military rule.

For example, the South Korean military regime resisted pressure to democra-

Table 5.2: Military-led Democratization Compared

	Military-led		Others			Military-led		Others	
Time	Polity	Polyarchy	Polity	Polyarchy	Time	Polity	Polyarchy	Polity	Polyarchy
GWF					PAR				
Year prior	-2.30	0.21	-1.76	0.24	Year prior	-1.67	0.23	-1.59	0.27
	(4.64)	(0.11)	(4.79)	(0.14)		(5.00)	(0.13)	(6.82)	(0.15)
Year of	3.33	0.27	1.58	0.29	Year of	2.33	0.31	0.52	0.33
	(4.43)	(0.12)	(5.72)	(0.16)		(5.36)	(0.16)	(6.54)	(0.21)
Year after	3.60	0.39	2.46	0.38	Year after	3.05	0.42	2.82	0.40
	(5.04)	(0.17)	(5.53)	(0.21)		(5.11)	(0.19)	(5.62)	(0.21)
WTH					DD				
Year prior	-4.48	0.19	-0.43	0.30	Year prior	-3.34	0.22	-2.27	0.27
	(3.72)	(0.09)	(5.99)	(0.17)		(4.37)	(0.13)	(5.76)	(0.16)
Year of	-3.53	0.21	2.48	0.35	Year of	-1.04	0.23	-0.11	0.29
	(3.94)	(0.11)	(5.79)	(0.18)		(4.99)	(0.12)	(6.07)	(0.18)
Year after	0.50	0.28	2.50	0.44	Year after	2.76	0.32	0.83	0.37
	(5.22)	(0.14)	(6.09)	(0.20)		(4.57)	(0.15)	(6.23)	(0.22)

tize for much of the 1980s, often suppressing pro-democratic movements, only to relent in 1987. In addition to pressure from civil-society, factionalism within the retired and active officer corps created the conditions which moved the military away from its position to uphold the authoritarian status-quo.[24] Thus, there may be endogenous factors which explain the military's support for a transition to a more competitive system. While this may be the case, the theory provided herein helps explain the military's behavior once this decision had been made. One reason why the military could accept democratization in South Korea is because it was closely allied with the Democratic Justice Party and was able to

[24]Han Sung-Joo. "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization". In: *Asian Survey* 28.1 (1988), pp. 52–61.

obtain an institutional structure to its liking.

It may also be the case that the military does not support the idea of a transition to a competitive regime, even with a strong and/or well-institutionalized party that it trusts. There are numerous instances of single-party regimes which emerged or fused with military rule in which a junta gave way to either single-party or personalist rule. One of these cases can be found in Burundi, which cycled through various dictators who came to power via coups, despite the central role of the UPRONA party in sustaining authoritarian rule.

Because there are various factors which influence whether a military supports any transition away from closed authoritarian rule, the findings which come as a result of the subsequent analysis should be interpreted with the caveat that the specified theoretical mechanisms, trust, party institutionalization, and party strength, matter for bounded democratization given that the military has already made the decision to pursue a competitive regime.

Operationalization of Bounded Democracy

In Chapter 2 I defined bounded democratization as a shift towards a more competitive political system in which the military set parameters on institutions and/or actors to constrain open contestation and popular sovereignty. Bounded democracy is not a binary concept but varies by degree. Bounded democracy increases as the military uses its power to impose additional restrictions on political and electoral institutions or actors. I measure bounded democratization by developing a latent variable which is built using several binary measures of the military's behavior during a transition.

To measure bounded democratization, I identify four dimensions of politics that a military may influence during transitions. These categories were selected based on field work and extensive reading of secondary resources on military-led transitions. These four groups correspond to key democratic political institutions and actors; the executive, legislature, elections, and transitional bodies. Within each component I use several binary variables which code for the military's behavior in a political transition. To code bounded democracy, I identify each regime transition as coded by one of the four datasets used and using the historical record I score each sub-component. A list of all binary variables can be found in Table 5.3.

To construct the index of bounded democracy, I only code the behavior of the military during the transition. Once the transition ends, I no longer code what the military does. A challenge to coding the behavior of a military during a transition is defining when a transition begins and when it ends. There is agreement within the literature over what constitutes a transition and how to identify the end of a transition. Broadly defined, a transition is a discrete shift in the rules which determine how those in power come to be and how they are then allowed to govern.[25]

In their work on democratic transitions, Linz and Stepan[26] state that a democratic transition is complete when there is general agreement on most political procedures, when a free and fair election is used to select the government, and the government effectively controls policy-making bodies. Thus, I no longer code the behavior of the military once there have been competitive elections and

[25]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set"; Bratton and Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*.

[26]Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. JHU Press, 1996.

Table 5.3: Component Variables of Bounded Democratization

Dimension	Binary Coding
Executive	Did the military design executive institutions?
	Did uniformed or recently retired officers sit in cabinet?
	Did the military create unelected executive institutions?
	Did the military appoint a civilian executive?
Legislature	Did the military design legislative institutions?
	Did the military design institutions to favor civilian allies?
	Did the military hold seats in the legislature during the transition?
	Did the military create unelected legislative institutions?
Elections	Did the military bar significant parties/candidates from contesting elections?
	Did officers actively influence campaigns?
	Did the military bargain over which candidates/parties could participate?
	Did the military intervene to corrupt or annul election results?
	Did active or retired officers run for executive office?
	Did the military restrict electoral franchise?
	Did the military kill or imprison candidates?
	Did the military design electoral institutions?
Transition	Did the military exercise power within formal transitional institutions?
	Did the military appoint officers or civilians to transitional institutions?
	Did the military hold power during transitional elections?

when there appears to be general agreement on political procedures (e.g. when a new constitution has been ratified). Whether the institutions imposed by the military or its informal influence wanes is outside the scope of the concept of bounded democratization.

While we have a consensus upon criteria for identifying the end of a transition, there is less clarity on how to identify the start of a transition. The events which spark political transitions vary widely. From mass-protests to breakdowns in elite coalitions there is considerable difficulty in conceptualizing the initiation of a political transition. Do we consider the start of a transition when mass-protests begin, with the resignation or forced removal of the incumbent president, or some other event? The problem with focusing on events in determining the start of a transition is that the events may trigger a transition but do not constitute the beginning of the transition itself.

To operationalize a political transition, I build off of the intuition found in the literature. Specifically, Bratton and Van de Walle[27] argue that a political transition is when there is significant uncertainty and debate regarding the rules of the game. I identify a transition as the period where it is clear that elite decision makers are considering a new set of rules to govern elections and political contestation. Thus, if the incumbents, such as a military junta, begin a process to develop a new system, I consider their behavior as qualifying the start of a transition.

Unlike Bratton and Van de Walle,[28] I define a transition in a way that there does not need to be debate between incumbents and their opposition for it to

[27] Bratton and Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*.
[28] Ibid.

qualify as a transition – as the military may not face sufficient popular or international pressure to democratize. Instead, incumbent militaries may judge it to be the opportune time to democratize if they believe that the transition will proceed on their terms.

I rely on publicly identifiable factors to determine if there is uncertainty regarding the rules of the game. Most often, this is identified when constitutional conventions or councils are convened to develop a new constitution. In other circumstances there may be a transitional council (e.g. Sovereignty Council of Sudan) which is formed to govern and oversee political development during a transition. At times, the transition may not be conducted via special institutions formed specifically for the transition but instead conducted through debate within the legislature and/or between the legislature, executive, and armed forces with the specific aim of coming to an agreement over the terms of a transition to a more competitive system.

In some circumstances the uncertainty may last for only a few days or weeks[29] to several years.[30] Identifying the beginning of a transition in circumstances of gradual liberalization (e.g. abetura in Brazil) is more difficult. To address this difficulty, I code the beginning of a transition when it is no longer plausibly deniable that the military seeks to maintain full authoritarian rule but instead is on a path towards a more competitive regime with free and fair elections being possible. This means that I code the behavior of the military between the last authoritarian election and first competitive election.

Defining transitions in this way also means that popular demands for a polit-

[29]The transition to democracy only lasted days following a coup to oust the military incumbents in Syria in 1954.

[30]Most often transitions are drawn out and can last several years (e.g. four years in Indonesia).

ical transition are neither necessary nor sufficient for a transition. For example, when considering the case of the democratic transition in South Korea the military faced significant pressure to democratize, both in terms of mass popular demonstrations for democratization, as well as well-organized behavior of opposition parties. Despite these demands the military refused to consider a shift in the rules until the late 1980s. Thus, when coding the South Korean case I ignore the military's oppressive and intransigent behavior during most of the 1980s, instead focusing on how the military behaved when it was considering changes to the constitution.

I note that I do not narrowly focus on full democratic transitions which end with meaningful free and fair elections. I instead focus on shifts to more competitive systems which may include full democratization but also transitions to competitive authoritarian regimes. Thus, I code the behavior of the military during periods in which there is uncertainty and debate regarding the rules of the game, regardless of whether the shift in rules results in more strict definitions of democratization.

Measuring Bounded Democratization

Using the nineteen sub-components outlined in the previous section I create a measure of bounded democratization by using Item Response Theory (IRT analysis) or Latent Trait Theory. IRT analysis has been used elsewhere in comparative democracy and authoritarianism to measure latent variables, such as personalism.[31] The measure, *Bounded Democracy*, is constructed using the set of

[31] Barbara Geddes et al. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

nineteen sub-components by each of the four datasets individually. Thus, I have a measure, *Bounded Democracy*, for GWF, PAR, DD, and WTH. In each instance, *Bounded Democracy* varies from zero to one, with a median ranging between 0.51 to 0.59, depending on the dataset used. In Table 5.4 I report the Cronbach's α. For each dataset the Cronbach's α was high, signifying a high degree of inter-correlation between the nineteen items, suggesting that they share the same dimensionality.

I also performed a face-validity check to ensure that the scores of *Bounded Democracy* vary according to my prior expectations and I am confident that *Bounded Democracy* serves as an appropriate outcome variable that captures the concept. For example, using the GWF dataset, the Thai transition following the 2006-2007 military regime receives the highest value of 1. During this transition the military largely controlled the process of designing the constitution and created a system in which the military appointed representatives while also banning popular opposition candidates from running for office. At the other end of the spectrum, the lowest level of bounded democratization included in the final sample is the Syrian transition following the 1951-1954 military regime which was scored at 0.22. The incumbent regime was toppled in a military coup in which the leading officers of the coup immediately returned power to a previously elected government that had been overthrown by a competing faction in the officer corps.

Table 5.4: Components of Bounded Democracy and Cronbach's α

Variable	GWF	PAR	DD	WTH
All Items	0.74	0.75	0.77	0.72
Executive1	0.72	0.74	0.76	0.71
Executive2	0.73	0.74	0.76	0.71
Executive3	0.72	0.75	0.76	0.72
Executive4	0.75	0.78	0.79	0.74
Legislature1	0.68	0.70	0.73	0.67
Legislature2	0.73	0.74	0.76	0.7
Legislature3	0.74	0.75	0.77	0.72
Legislature4	0.73	0.75	0.77	0.72
Election1	0.72	0.74	0.76	0.71
Election2	0.72	0.75	0.77	0.73
Election3	0.73	0.75	0.77	0.72
Election4	0.74	0.75	0.78	0.73
Election5	0.74	0.76	0.78	0.73
Election6	0.74	0.76	0.78	0.73
Election7	0.73	0.75	0.77	0.72
Election8	0.70	0.71	0.74	0.68
Transitionary1	0.68	0.69	0.72	0.66
Transitionary2	0.69	0.70	0.73	0.68
Transitionary3	0.74	0.76	0.77	0.74

Operationalizing Military Confidence

I argue that a military is less likely to bind democratic transitions when there are credible commitments that civilians will not imperil the military's interests following democratization. The military's confidence in civilians is a function of trust along with the institutionalization and strength of the parties allied with the military. To measure the military's confidence, I create variables that measure the degree of party institutionalization and strength of the incumbent party prior to a transition.

I select the incumbent party because I lack a measure of trust – or the expectation that a party will act on behalf of the military. Due to the lack of a measure of trust I assume that incumbent parties are, at the very least, partners that the military tolerates. That the military tolerates incumbent parties is a sound assumption because incumbent parties and militaries often come to power through some shared struggle and then share power. Their time passing through a political struggle and then ruling together forges institutional and inter-personal bounds that cultivate trust. If the military distrusts the party, it is able to use its power to exclude the party from the political system.

I define an institutionalized party as one that has a stable and durable organization,[32] with routinized procedures,[33] and organizational autonomy,[34] and the capacity for national level mobilization.[35] After identifying the incumbent party

[32]Samuel P Huntington. *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*. Vol. 3. Free Press, 1962; Angelo Panebianco. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

[33]Steven Levitsky. *Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[34]Anne Meng. "Ruling parties in authoritarian regimes: rethinking institutional strength". In: *British Journal of Political Science* 51.2 (2021), pp. 526–540.

[35]Rachel Beatty Riedl et al. "Authoritarian-led Democratization". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020).

or parties I use data developed by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) on the institutional features of individual parties from the V-Party sub-project. V-Party codes several dimensions pertinent to party politics, ranging from a party's position on social issues to the organizational features of the party. V-Party collects data on parties by surveying country experts. These country experts were asked to code several factors relevant to parties resulting in several indicators for a given party. Each indicator is then restructured using a measurement model that maps coders' scores into a continuous latent variable using a Bayesian IRT model.[36]

To develop a measure of the party's institutionalization I select three components from V-Party's battery of questions on individual parties. I include measures on the degree to which the party maintains permanent local offices (stability), the degree of the party's control over candidate nomination (autonomy), and to what extent the party is linked to prominent social organizations (national level mobilization).[37] With these three components I pair each party in the V-Party dataset with the ruling party from a regime by the four datasets used in the analysis. After sub-setting by each dataset and pairing the parties, I use Factor Analysis to create a continuous normally distributed measure of party institutionalization that ranges from 0-1.

[36] Daniel Pemstein et al. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-national and Cross-temporal Expert-coded Data". In: *V-Dem Working Paper* 21 (2018). URL: https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/60/a5/60a52aaf-008c-4d80-82ca-3bca827fbeb9/v-dem_working_paper_2019_21_4.pdf.

[37] I exclude party cohesion for several reasons. Cohesion is often artificially high in authoritarian regimes because centralized control of access to political rents incentivizes cohesion, rather than any type of value infused with the party. Furthermore, it may be that factionalism within the party leads to the breakdown of the ruling coalition but routinzation, breadth, and independence endow the party with the capacity to survive the transition and regain cohesion following a change in power. When cohesion is included in the Factor Analysis, it significantly penalizes incumbent parties which have robust organizations, misclassifying them as poorly institutionalized parties.

With the Factor Analysis I develop a measure of party institutionalization but an issue is that a significant portion of military regimes do not feature a ruling or support party. Should there be no incumbent party, I measure the average party institutionalization and strength of the parties in the system at the time of the transition by using data developed by Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self[38] which measures the average level of party institutionalization in the party system. Like the measure of party institutionalization which I developed for this analysis, Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self[39] used V-Dem data to develop a measure of party institutionalization. The key difference, however, is that their data measures party institutionalization at the party system level, rather than the individual party level.

While less ideal than having a measure of individual parties that may be formally or informally allied with the military, this strategy rests on the sound assumption that the military, at the very least, tolerates the existing parties. Should the military significantly fear any specific parties, it would likely ban them, which is common under military rule. For example, the Indonesian military, and many other militaries, explicitly banned or eliminated communist parties that it viewed as a direct threat to its institution. Thus, any parties the military does not tolerate are not part of the party system and their strength and institutionalization are not measured. Alternatively, should the military see a relatively stable and professionalized set of parties that it tolerates, its confidence increases that commitments provided by civilians are credible.

In addition to measuring party institutionalization, I also account for the political and electoral strength of the incumbent party as a proxy for the military's

[38]Fernando Bizzarro, Allen Hicken, and Darin Self. "The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: A New Global Indicator (1900-2015)". In: *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 48 (2017).
[39]Ibid.

confidence. I measure the strength of the party, again using V-Party data, using the percentage of vote captured in the most recent election, the percentage of seats held in the legislature after the most recent election, and the degree to which a single party controls sub-national office.

The intent of this measure is not to capture the institutional strength of the party but instead measure the degree to which the incumbent party can capture political office. By using these indicators, I measure the extent to which an incumbent party garners large shares of votes, captures seats, and controls sub-national office. I use these indicators because the military can refer to these factors as it attempts to gain some understanding of how the party will perform in open elections. These indicators do not simply measure the popularity of the party, although this is one component of the party's strength. In addition to winning seats via elections, a strong, well-organized party with a robust organization, that is present throughout society, should be better able to capture local political offices – hence why I include a component on sub-national control of political office.

Control Variables

Because I am using an observational approach I must address potential confounding bias in the models. I attempt to reduce confounding bias by controlling for factors that may produce party institutionalization or strength but also be correlated with bounded democratization. I also include controls that are typically included in the literature on democratization. Among these, I include controls for income and land inequality. Land and income inequality may pro-

duce the structural conditions for party building which could plausibly act as a backdoor path to bound democratization but are also found to correlate with the emergence of democratic systems. I measure income inequality using Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla[40] which was one of the primary measures of inequality used in Ansell and Samuels.[41] Ansell and Samuels also devised a measure of land inequality by adjusting for the number of family farms by the degree of urbanization. From Ansell and Samuels I also draw data on whether the country had a Muslim majority.

I also control for the status of the military in the political system. Using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data,[42] I construct a measure of the military's status with data on military expenditures. If military spending is high, it would likely increase the military's desire to lock-in its budget. The data is taken from the CoW NMC dataset and then standardized to the 2000 U.S. dollar. I then divide expenditures by the total population to capture when military's receive a disproportionally high budget, and then log the data. I also account for the repressive nature of the incumbent government by including a measure of human rights abuses.[43]

From the CoW NMC dataset I also control for the level of urbanization, which could plausibly produce conditions for mass mobilization and party building.[44] Lastly I use data from V-Dem to control for the GDP per capita

[40]Salvatore J Babones and María José Alvarez-Rivadulla. "Standardized Income Inequality Data for Use in Cross-national Research". In: *Sociological Inquiry* 77.1 (2007), pp. 3–22.

[41]Ansell and Samuels, *Inequality and Democratization*.

[42]J David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965". In: *Peace, war, and numbers* 19 (1972), p. 48, p. V5.0.

[43]Christopher J Fariss, Michael R Kenwick, and Kevin Reuning. "Estimating one-sided-killings from a robust measurement model of human rights". In: *Journal of peace research* 57.6 (2020), pp. 801–814.

[44]Jeremy Wallace. "Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival". In: *The Journal of Politics* 75.3 (2013), pp. 632–645.

(logged), as development may also result in the conditions of mass mobilization and the development of party politics. From this same dataset, I control for the level of education, as modernization could plausibly affect the development of parties. Again, using this same data, I also control for oil and resource wealth, as greater wealth could enable greater coercive capacity for the incumbents to restrict the path of democratization. Lastly, I control for the political region because there could be spillover affects, as militaries learn from, and behave similarly to their neighbors.

There are certainly other factors that could affect the relationship the military has with a party and its view of whether democracy brings with it credible commitments. For example, the role the military has previously played in politics or the duration of the antecedent regime may affect whether the military builds relationships with parties. The military may also be more wary of civilian rule if the country has experienced regular regime breakdown. Lastly, social structure also may play a role in shaping the party system, and ultimately the relationship the military has with society itself. I control for these additional factors by including the previous regime's duration, the number of coups conducted in the past, the number of regimes in the country's history, as well as a measure of ethnic fractionalization from Drazanova.[45]

For reference, I have provided a table with descriptive statistics of time-variant controls in Table 5.5. In this table I organize the data by dataset, as well as by the time by including the data for the year prior to the transition, the year of the transition, and the year after the transition.[46] As can be seen, the control variables are largely stable from the year prior to the transition to the year after.

[45]Lenka Drazanova. "Historical index of ethnic fractionalisation dataset". In: (2019).
[46]Data includes the mean for the variable and the standard deviation in parentheses.

Results

To model how the military's confidence affects regime transitions, I use *Bounded Democracy* as the dependent variable and examine all regimes that have a military component and which transitioned to a more competitive system. I then create a cross-section of data for the year of a regime transition. Because *Bounded Democracy* is a continuous variable ranging from 0-1, I use OLS with robust standard errors to estimate the correlation between a military's confidence and the degree of *Bounded Democracy*.

I begin by using a sample drawn from GWF and note there should be an observed negative correlation between an increase in the military's confidence and bounded democratization which would provide evidence that the military acts to protect its interests during a regime transition. I model the relationship between bounded democratization and institutionalization and strength independently because the two variables are strongly correlated – ranging from 0.53 to 0.68. I also model institutionalization and strength separately because I do not have any theoretical prior concerning whether the relationship between the two would be additive or multiplicative. Instead, I model each independently and then provide results of models which include both an additive and multiplicative specification in Appendix D.

I first model the relationship between *Bounded Democracy* and *Institutionalization* of the incumbent party – assuming that the incumbent party is trusted by the military, given that they ruled together. Thus, the explanatory variable,

Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics

Time	Military Spending	GDP PC	Education	Resources	GINI	Rural
GWF						
Year prior	11.49	8.14	4.55	148.58	48.77	0.41
	(2.13)	(0.70)	(2.04)	(228.63)	(8.93)	(0.16)
Year of	11.54	8.13	4.62	161.4	48.21	0.41
	(2.21)	(0.74)	(2.15)	(264.45)	(8.90)	(0.18)
Year after	11.32	8.09	4.55	173.7	46.97	0.43
	(2.41)	(0.73)	(2.18)	(340.55)	(8.84)	(0.20)
PAR						
Year prior	10.68	7.95	4.16	146.73	46.83	0.41
	(2.68)	(0.81)	(2.31)	(305.60)	(8.24)	(0.18)
Year of	11.04	7.98	4.29	163.6	46.93	0.40
	(2.48)	(0.82)	(2.31)	(340.36)	(8.19)	(0.17)
Year after	11.37	8.02	4.44	163.61	46.91	0.37
	(2.26)	(0.83)	(2.30)	(312.52)	(8.16)	(0.16)
WTH						
Year prior	11.57	7.78	4.08	101.42	44.75	0.34
	(1.78)	(0.82)	(1.98)	(176.64)	(7.99)	(0.12)
Year of	11.57	7.79	4.28	119.48	45.73	0.34
	(1.80)	(0.79)	(2.04)	(202.62)	(8.21)	(0.12)
Year after	11.57	7.81	4.50	151.73	46.63	0.34
	(1.83)	(0.79)	(2.08)	(246.41)	(8.24)	(0.12)
DD						
Year prior	11.24	8.04	4.54	127.19	47.05	0.39
	(2.42)	(0.88)	(2.50)	(212.21)	(8.99)	(0.19)
Year of	11.17	8.04	4.54	119.12	47.62	0.39
	(2.43)	(0.84)	(2.41)	(196.30)	(9.07)	(0.19)
Year after	11.1	8.03	4.57	130.47	47.74	0.39
	(2.41)	(0.82)	(2.34)	(226.64)	(9.01)	(0.18)

Institutionalization, captures the components of trust and institutionalization together.

I use three models to measure the relationship between *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy*. The first model is a bivariate regression of *Bounded Democracy* on *Institutionalization*. In the second model, *Base*, I include the control variables outlined above. In the third model, *Inequality*, I include these same control variables, but also include income and land inequality. I exclude land and income inequality in the first models, because by including these two variables I lose some observations from the early post-WWII era where there is no data. I present the results of two models in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Bounded Democracy and Party Institutionalization – GWF



These models show that as the incumbent party becomes more institutionalized, the probability of bounded democracy decreases. While these results are

not statistically significant, using robust standard errors at the 95% level, each model is directionally consistent with my theory.

While party institutionalization of trusted parties is essential for the military's confidence, it is only one component of confidence. Thus, I also model the relationship between *Bounded Democracy* and the *Strength* of the incumbent party and present the results in Figure 5.2. As with *Institutionalization*, I structure the models into three separate models. We should expect to observe that as *Strength* increases, *Bounded Democracy* decreases.

Figure 5.2: Bounded Democratization and Party Strength – GWF



The findings presented in Figure 5.2 support the theory. I find that as a party's strength increases, the degree of bounded democracy decreases. Unlike in the *Institutionalization* models, the results are statistically significant for both

the *Base* and *Inequality* models.

Figure 5.3: Predicted Values of Bounded Democratization – GWF



Because OLS coefficients provide an average estimate for the entire sample, I also demonstrate that the negative relationship between the military's confidence and *Bounded Democracy* holds for the range of the values of the explanatory variables. To do so, I plot the predicted values of *Bounded Democracy* by *Institutionalization* and *Strength* of the incumbent party in Figure 5.3. The trend line of the predicted values is smoothed using a LOESS function. Figure 5.3 shows a clear negative relationship between *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy* for the entire range of values of *Institutionalization*. For *Strength* and *Bounded Democracy*, the relationship is also negative, albeit less linear than with *Institutionalization*.

Using predicted values we can interpret the substantive changes in bounded democratization based on changes in party institutionalization or strength. When considering values of *Institutionalization* in the lower quartile, a range from 0-0.43, the expected degree of *Bounded Democracy* is near 0.77. In real world

terms this is like the 1988 transition in Pakistan where the military actively set conditions on civilian rule, stacked the Senate with allies, backed certain conservative candidates in elections, and where the incoming Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, had to accept specific conditions in order to come to power.[47] When *Institutionalization* shifts to the third quartile, or a range between 0.54-0.77, there is less binding, such as in the South Korean 1987 transition where the new constitution was drafted by civilians and approved by referendum, but where retired General Roh Tae-woo won the presidential election, along with a substantial presence of retired military in the executive cabinet and National Assembly.[48]

The story is similar when looking at *Strength*. When *Strength* is in the lowest quartile, ranging from 0-0.43, the result is a system like the Thai 2007 transition where the military actively designed the new system, including a substantial portion of unelected seats, along with a five year direct ban on Thaksin Shinawatra and his party.[49]. When *Strength*, is fairly high, such as the third quartile, there is less binding, such as in the Uruguayan 1984 transition, where the military negotiated a pact regarding military prerogatives with the incoming parties, but did little in terms of institutional engineering to influence democratic competition.[50]

To test the robustness of these findings I replicate the same analysis with

[47] Riaz Ahmed Shiekh. "A State of Transition: Authoritarianism and Democratization in Pakistan". In: *Asia Journal of Global Studies Vol 3* 3 (2010), pp. 4–6; Michael Hoffman. "Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan". In: *Democratization* 18.1 (2011), pp. 75–99; Steven I Wilkinson. "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan". In: *Democratization* 7.3 (2000), pp. 203–226.

[48] Aurel Croissant. "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea". In: *Armed Forces & Society* 30.3 (2004), pp. 357–381; Insoo Kim. "Intra-military Divisions and Democratization in South Korea". In: *Armed Forces & Society* 39.4 (2013), pp. 695–710; Sung-Joo, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization".

[49] Allen Hicken and Yuko Kasuya. "A Guide to the Constitutional Structures and Electoral Systems of East, South and Southeast Asia". In: *Electoral Studies* 22.1 (2003), pp. 121–151.

[50] Felipe Agüero. "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America". In: *Mershon International Studies Review* 42.Supplement_2 (1998), pp. 383–404.

different samples. I begin by using the same models, but using the PAR dataset.[51] PAR is more inclusive than GWF by including more personalist military regimes. Using the same models as previously, I plot the results for both *Institutionalization* and *Strength* in Figure 5.4. The results using PAR provide some support for what I found using GWF.

Using *Institutionalization* as an explanatory variable, I find a negative relationship between *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy* that is statistically significant. Again, this negative relationship suggests that as the incumbent party becomes more institutionalized, the military's confidence in a democratic transition increases and it becomes less assertive during a transition. When using *Strength* as a proxy for the military's confidence, I find a statistically significant negative relationship between *Strength* and *Bounded Democracy* for the *Bivariate* and *Base* models.

Figure 5.4: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – PAR



As with GWF, I also plot the predicted values for *Institutionalization* and

[51] Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*.

Strength by *Bounded Democracy* in Figure 5.5. The predicted plots help explain the lack of a statistically significant result for *Strength* but the significant result for *Institutionalization*. As is shown in Figure 5.5, the smoothed slope for *Institutionalization* is consistently negative. The same cannot be said for *Strength*, with a sharp increase in the predicted value of *Bounded Democracy* when *Strength* is near its highest value.

Figure 5.5: Predicted Values of Bounded Democratization – PAR



This large uptick in the predicted value in *Bounded Democracy* is largely driven by the end of the Kolingba regime in the Central African Republic. The incumbent Central African Democratic Rally party is scored as exceptionally strong in the measure developed using Factor Analysis, due to its total control of legislative bodies from the 1987 election – when the regime was still closed – even though the party was revealed to be electorally weak when competing in free and fair elections. While the transition ultimately resulted in a democratic transition, the Central African Republic 1993 transition is scored fairly high on the bounded democracy score because Kolingba and the military attempted to

bind the transition and were unsuccessful due to international intervention.[52] As can be seen in Figure 5.6, this large uptick at the end is no longer present when the case of the Central African Republic is excluded from the sample.

Figure 5.6: Bounded Democratization and Party Strength – Without C.A.R



By using PAR I have demonstrated that the findings established using GWF are robust to including more cases of indirect and personalist military rule. Where GWF was more restrictive in their coding, including only cases where the military ruled as a cohesive unit, PAR included more cases where the military may be politicized, yet not be the ruling actor. That bounded democratization is still a function of the military's relationship with political parties, even when including indirect or personalized military rule, demonstrates that incumbents with close relationships with the military may use the military as a political tool

[52] Bruce Baker. "The class of 1990: how have the autocratic leaders of sub-Saharan Africa fared under democratisation?" In: *Third World Quarterly* 19.1 (1998), pp. 115–127; Bratton and Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*.

to get democracy on their terms.

As another robustness check I replicate the same models as GWF and PAR, but use WTH[53] to construct the sample of military rule. WTH uses a typology for their coding scheme that is similar to GWF, but instead conceptualizes the regime-type around the party system. When accounting for military rule, WTH considers whether the military played a significant role in constraining party competition. WTH qualifies a regime as military rule if the regime leader was an active officer immediately prior to birth of the regime, who did not become the chief executive via free and fair elections. As with the GWF and PAR, I use three models to estimate the relationship of *Bounded Democracy* and the military's confidence and I present the results in Figure 5.7

Figure 5.7: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – WTH



Using WTH as an alternative sample of military-led regime transitions produces moderate support of the hypothesis that as the military's confidence increases, bounded democratization decreases. As can be seen in Figure 5.7, the

[53]Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective".

coefficients for *Institutionalization* are directionally consistent with the hypothesis and is close to the 95% confidence threshold for the *Inequality* model, while significant for the *Bivariate* model. When proxying military confidence using *Strength* the coefficients are only negative for the *Bivariate* model but zero for the others.

Because the coefficients are directionally consistent using GWF, PAR, and WTH, there appears to be sufficient evidence to infer that the findings established in the paired comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay are generalizable. As with the previous exercises, I also produce the predicted values for *Bounded Democracy* and the two measures of the military's confidence. I present the results in Figure 5.8.

Figure 5.8: Predicted Values of Bounded Democratization – WTH



Unlike the predicted values for both *Strength* and *Institutionalization* when using GWF and PAR, there is a non-linearity in the predicted values between *Bounded Democracy* and the two measures of a military's confidence in political parties. When using WTH, there is a substantial positive relationship as *Institu-*

tionalization and *Strength* increase when both measures are low. This trend then reverses for both *Institutionalization* and *Strength* with moderate increases at the highest values of these two variables. It appears that using PAR and WTH may introduce significant heterogeneity within the sample, which is intuitive considering both PAR and WTH are more permissive than GWF.

Because of the heterogeneity in these samples, I do an additional robustness check. Fortunately, PAR codes the military component of a regime as being one of *indirect*, *personal*, or *corporate*. Thus, we should observe a more robust negative relationship between a military's confidence and bounded democracy when sampling solely on instances of corporate military rule using PAR. As can be seen in Figure 5.9 this is the case. Sampling solely on instances of corporate military rule, the expected level of *Bounded Democracy* is larger, negative, and statistically significant for both *Institutionalization* and *Strength* for each model.

Figure 5.9: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – PAR Corporate



I also plot the predicted values of *Bounded Democracy* given the more conservative sample in Figure 5.10. As expected, the predicted relationship between

Institutionalization, *Strength*, and *Bounded Democracy* is stronger. When compared to Figure 5.5, the slope for *Institutionalization* is noticeably steeper, suggesting that expected degree of bounded democracy declines substantially as the institutionalization of an incumbent party increases following corporate military rule.

Figure 5.10: Predicted Values of Bounded Democracy – PAR Corporate



Unfortunately, the same robustness check of excluding non-corporate rule is not possible for WTH. When constructing WTH the authors coded regimes holistically, thus I am not able to desegregate for whether there was a junta or a uniformed/retired officer in position as the chief executive. Even though I am not able to narrow the sample for WTH, I do conduct another robustness check using DD.[54] Given that both PAR and WTH introduced heterogeneity within the sample which then attenuated the expected value of *Bounded Democracy*, I should expect to measure a less robust relationship between bounded democracy and the measures of a military's confidence given DD's criteria for including cases in the sample. Recall that DD is more permissive than GWF, PAR, and

[54]Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, "Democracy and dictatorship revisited".

WTH, because the authors code a regime as having a military component solely if the regime leader had, at any time, been an officer. Thus, former officers that rose to power solely through civilian mechanisms are still considered to be a military regime.

For example, DD codes the Albanian regime under Enver Hoxha as military rule. Hoxha led the Party of Labor of Albania in addition to being the highest ranking officer in the National Liberation Army. After taking power in Albania, Hoxha and the Party of Labor ruled using party mechanisms, although Hoxha remained the commander-in-chief of the military.[55] Another example where DD codes a regime as military rule, but where the other three datasets disagree, is Tunisia under Ben Ali. Ben Ali had served in the Tunisia military, rising to the rank of Brigadier general but retired and served in several civilian executive positions before becoming president in 1987. During his rule the military did not play a major political role nor did Ali rely heavily on the military to stay in power.[56]

That DD is more inclusive than the other three datasets means we should expect the relationship between the military's relationship and bounded democracy to be more attenuated. Indeed, this is what I find when I replicate the same models used with the previous datasets. In Figure 5.11 we can see that there is not a statistical difference between *Institutionalization* or *Strength* and zero. When modeling the relationship between *Strength* and *Bounded Democracy*, the coefficients are directionally consistent with expectations but are not statistically significant.

[55] Blendi Fevziu. *Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.

[56] Risa Brooks. "The Tunisian Military and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces". In: *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring* (2016), pp. 203–24.

Figure 5.11: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – DD



As a final exercise I plot the predicted values of bounded democratization for DD in Figure 5.12. Unsurprisingly, there is no easily noticeable trend between *Strength* or *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy*. There may be a slight decrease in the level of *Bounded Democracy* for cases at the lowest level versus highest of *Strength* and *Institutionalization*, but that difference is minor and demonstrates why the coefficients in the previous figure show no statistical difference from zero.

Using various samples I have demonstrated that the relationship between the military's confidence in parties and bounded democratization is related, and that these results are robust to different model specifications and samples – with some caveats. These caveats, however, should not undermine our confidence in the theory, but should instead do the opposite. Where the models reported no consistency in the coefficients is where there were critical differences in what is considered military rule.

I find that the results are most robust when using samples where military

Figure 5.12: Predicted Values of Bounded Democratization – DD



rule was more institutionalized. This is consistent with the theoretical logic which relies on the assumption that officers use the coercive capacity of the military to influence politics as an attempt to secure their institutional interests. These results demonstrate that bounded democratization is more likely to occur when the military acts as a cohesive unit to use its political powers to defend its interests. When authoritarian rule is more personalized, even with power concentrated into an individual who had been a member of the officer corps, the military is less involved in the development of competitive institutions during regime transitions.

These results also demonstrate how conceptualizing military rule matters for our understanding of regime transitions. We cannot simply see a former officer in power and assume that the military is his political tool. Instead, we must think of how the military, as an institution, is politicized and whether its interests are at stake. As others have demonstrated, whether the military is a cohesive and well-institutionalized actor matters for military rule, and the evidence I have provided shows that this also matters for regime transitions.

Conclusion

In this chapter I tested whether militaries were more likely to bind democratization generally. To do so I developed an original dataset on militaries' behavior during political transitions. The new measure of bounded democratization I developed allows researchers to measure the degree to which a military interferes in the development of political institutions and procedures during regime transitions and will be useful beyond the scope of this analysis. Using this data and OLS models, I found that as either party institutionalization or strength increase, the degree of bounded democratization decreases.

In Chapters 3 and 4 I provided qualitative evidence that a military's attempt to bind democratization was a function of its trust in incumbent parties and the institutionalization and strength of the incumbent party. Using the paired comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay, I demonstrated how these three factors are causal mechanisms which affect the military's behavior during regime transitions. Given the findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4 we can be confident that the results from the quantitative exercises have a causal interpretation.

As the military's confidence increases, as measured by the strength and institutionalization of the trusted incumbent party, the degree of bounded democratization decreases. The goal of this exercise is not to provide any *causal estimate* of the military's confidence on bounded democratization. Instead, it is to establish the generalizability of the *causal mechanisms* established in the qualitative analysis. While there may certainly be extenuating circumstances that produce different results, such as a ruptured transition where the incumbents are overwhelmed and cannot lead the transition, these results show that, on

average, military's set parameters on political and electoral institutions/actors when civilians lack credible commitments to pacify the military.

I have established that, on average and all else equal, incumbent militaries use their power to bind transitions when they lack confidence in political parties. While the military may bind democratization to generate credible commitments, formal or informal parameters imposed by the military are no guarantee that the military will completely evacuate its political role. Following democratization, a key question is whether the military can become apartisan or divorced from party politics altogether. Whether the military completely separates itself from party politics is a key question regarding democratization, as full democratic development cannot proceed if the military plays any meaningful role in party politics. In the next chapter I build on the analysis from Chapters 3-5 to show how certain factors of party politics enable civilians to monopolize their traditional sphere and keep the military at bay.

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CHAPTER 6

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIAN MONOPOLIZATION OF PARTY POLITICS

Figure 6.1: Billboard Depicting the Military/National Police Support for Indonesia's Elections in 2019

Even when militaries return to the barracks and there are free and fair elections, continued democratic development is not assured. While the military may surrender its formal hold on power with democratization, a significant challenge for civilians is establishing civilian supremacy by wresting total control of electoral, executive, legislative, and party politics from officers who were active during the authoritarian period or those who become politically active following democratization. It is quite common for active or recently retired officers to continue being politically active given that holding political power during authoritarian rule offered access to political or economic rents that otherwise would not have been available. Additionally, the military may remain active at the margins after democratization, seeking to influence politics or shirking oversight without acting overtly to violate norms of democratic contestation or popular sovereignty.

A good example of a military remaining politically active on the margins after democratization can be found in Indonesia. Despite resigning its formal po-

litical power in 2004, the Indonesian military and national police remain politically active. As illustrated in Figure 6.1[12] the Indonesian security forces maintain a public profile in what are traditional civilian prerogatives, such as elections. The Indonesian military has not only maintained a public profile during national and sub-national elections but active and retired officers are ubiquitous in the state, political parties, and national and sub-national executive institutions. The lack of total civilian control over political and electoral politics poses an ever present danger to Indonesian democracy.

This chapter builds on previous chapters by continuing down the path of democratic development. In previous chapters I focused on the challenges of the first stage of post-praetorian rule – moving from late-stage authoritarianism through a democratic transition. In this chapter I shift to the second stage – post-transition democratic development – where it is uncertain whether civilians can fully monopolize control of political and electoral institutions.

Specifically, I highlight that certain dimensions of party and party system institutionalization affect whether civilian authority can override the military's political ambitions. When individual parties are more institutionalized they have a higher degree of autonomy, have a strong territorial apparatus, and can raise their own funds. These factors lead to greater control over elite recruitment, endows the parties with financial independence, and sees parties rely less on alternative institutions or actors to mobilize society. In turn, highly institutionalized parties present stronger barriers for officers to enter politics through party channels.

[1] Billboards such as these were ubiquitous throughout Indonesia during the 2019 election.

[2] Unknown. *TNI-POLRI Menjamin Keamanan Pileg dan Pilpres 2019 Hingga di TPS*. Feb. 2019. URL: https://spiritnews.co.id/2019/02/27/tni-polri-menjamin-keamanan-pileg-dan-pilpres-2019-hingga-di-tps/.

Party system institutionalization is also key for civilians to monopolize control over political and electoral institutions. Whenever officers or the military challenge civilian supremacy, civilians must be able to coordinate and present a unified front against the military, which controls the tools of coercive force. I argue that collective action to counter any military incursion into civilian politics is more likely when the party system is stable and when party fragmentation is low. Should parties enter or exit the party system with some frequency, it becomes more difficult for parties to coordinate on issues of civilian supremacy. Likewise, as the number of parties in the system increases the costs of coordination increase as well.

I note that these theoretical mechanisms may interact. As party institutionalization decreases, so too may party system institutionalization. Furthermore, when individual parties are weaker, retired officers – who were part of the authoritarian regime – are more likely to enter the system through these parties. As individual parties become home to a greater number of these officers, the priority for these parties to marginalize the power of the military decreases, which makes it more difficult for all parties to coordinate on issues of civilian supremacy.

In the literature on post-democratization civilian-military relations, analysis most often focuses on military autonomy and control of traditional military prerogatives (e.g. budget, strategy, promotion, etc).[3] I turn the focus towards traditional civilian prerogatives and how the military intrudes into politics, both as an institution as well as with officers. This includes the degree to which the military, as an institution, plays a role in policy outside of what is more tradi-

[3] Alfred C Stepan. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, 1988.

tionally reserved for the military. I also focus on ways that uniformed officers act independent of the military, such as working with political candidates or within parties themselves while still in uniform.

In addition to analyzing the behavior of the military and uniformed officers I also focus on what I call *legacy officers*. These are officers who were active in the military but who retire and then are active in party politics following democratization. Legacy officers may have multiple paths to public office available to them, such as positions in the cabinet or sub-national political office, but the most prominent path to power runs through parties that contest elections for legislative and executive office. Legacy officers have distinct political interests than uniformed officers, but they often maintain strong ties to active military officers and may affect civilian-military relations, which necessarily affects democratic development.

To provide empirical evidence of the theory outlined in Chapter 2, I return to the paired comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay. In both cases military officers were active in politics prior to, and during the democratic transitions. The arrival of free and fair elections did not mean that officers immediately ceased political activity and surrendered all political prerogatives to civilians. In both Indonesia and Paraguay active and retired officers remained politically active following the democratic transitions. The paired comparison demonstrates that Paraguayan political parties have been more successful at marginalizing the political activity of the military and officers while their Indonesian counterparts have been less successful. I use the paired comparison to show that there are two key dynamics at play in the path of democratic development which produces a party system relatively free of the military and its associated active or

retired officers. As with previous chapters, data for these qualitative comparisons was collected during a year of field work and includes archival data, data drawn from elite interviews, and data from secondary resources.

Political Parties and Monopolizing Power

Given the theory outlined earlier there are several observable implications. Should political parties be less institutionalized we should observe 1) a larger presence of legacy officers within the executive, legislature, state, and political parties and 2) a willingness of parties to lean on the military to supplement the parties' weaknesses. If parties are highly institutionalized, on the other hand, we should observe parties exerting control over elite recruitment, controlling key civilian functions such as party finances, and relying primarily on its own organization to link to and mobilize society.

With regards to the party system, in circumstances where the party system is less institutionalized we should observe the military eschewing oversight and successfully challenging civilian supremacy. Should there be an institutionalized party systems we should observe greater civilian control as parties coordinate to impose sanctions against military actors who challenge civilian authority.

I begin the discussion with the case of Indonesia, where key weaknesses in party institutionalization and a low degree of party system institutionalization have led to the proliferation of legacy officers in politics, the encroachment of the military on civilian prerogatives, and the inability of civilians to exert much control over the military. I then follow with a case study of Paraguay where,

despite direct challenges to civilian supremacy by military actors, parties have successfully monopolized control of power.

Indonesian Parties and Reliance on the Military

The Indonesian case demonstrates how parties which are less developed on key dimensions of institutionalization are more susceptible to political interference by the military, active, and retired officers. Indonesian parties are, for the most part, institutionalized when considering some metrics of institutionalization. The major parties have permanent and stable organizations which survive multiple electoral cycles, have clearly defined organizational structures with routinized procedures, and feature established procedures to select party committees and govern party business. Thus, many would consider Indonesian parties to be institutionalized.[4]

Despite Indonesian parties being institutionalized along these dimensions there are other dimensions on which the parties are less institutionalized. One key dimension on which Indonesian parties are less institutionalized is autonomy. Simply put, Indonesian parties rely heavily on alternative actors to supplement the parties' political and electoral activities. In turn, the low degree of autonomy weakens Indonesian parties' capacity to constrain elites. This problem is so pervasive in the system that it is often referred to as an oligarchic system wherein several parties are partially or entirely subservient to oligarchs.[5] While much of the analysis on Indonesian party system focuses on oligarchs the prob-

[4]Marcus Mietzner. *Money, power, and ideology*. Flipside Digital Content Company Inc., 2013.

[5]Marcus Mietzner. "Oligarchs, Politicians, and Activists: Contesting Party Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia Marcus Mietzner". In: *Beyond Oligarchy*. Cornell University Press, 2014, pp. 99–116; Ross Tapsell. *Media power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, citizens and the digital revolution*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

lem extends beyond business elites to also include prominent and well-known legacy officers.

The lack of autonomy allows legacy officers to play an oversized role in party politics and capitalize on their status. At the end of the New Order authoritarian period many officers were quite popular due to the political role they played during authoritarian rule.[6] Since democratization, instead of nominating party loyalists for prominent office, parties have leaned heavily on legacy officers. For example, Golkar, the authoritarian incumbent party, nominated the former commander of the military, Wiranto, for the presidency in 2004. Amien Rais, the former leader of one of Indonesia's largest Islamic organizations – Muhammadiyah – sought out a legacy officer to run as his vice presidential nominee under the banner of the National Mandate Party. Another prominent politician affiliated with the Islamist United Development Party – Hamzah Haz – recruited Agum Gumeral – a retired four star general and Minister of Defense – to run for office under his banner.[7]

In the immediate wake of the democratic transition, it was common for all parties to recruit prominent legacy officers rather than nominate their own candidates as a way to capitalize on the political strength of the military while overcoming their own party's weakness. After decades of authoritarian rule under which party activity was highly circumscribed, these parties lacked the institutional capacity to win office without enlisting the military. The reliance on legacy officers demonstrates a clear inability for parties to set the terms of elite recruitment on their own terms and exclude legacy officers.

[6]Marcus Mietzner. *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009; Mietzner, *Money, power, and ideology*.

[7]Mietzner, *Money, power, and ideology*.

Furthermore, legacy officers have had success at establishing parties even without the backing of oligarchs because barriers to entry are so low due to generally lower levels of institutionalization. Examples of legacy officers without significant financial backing starting parties can be observed with three cases. This can be seen with Edi Sudradjat and the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKP). During the early 1990s Edi served as the commander of the armed forces prior to being replaced by Wiranto. During the democratic transition, Edi tried to capture control of Golkar but was defeated by Akbar Tandjung. After his defeat, Edi left Golkar and formed the PKP with several officers that had served under his command. The PKP has never performed well in elections but joined coalitions to support another legacy officer – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – for the presidency. Yudhoyono is another legacy officer that formed his own party after leaving the military and immediately becoming active in politics. In Yudhoyono's case he formed the Democratic Party (PD) after resigning from Gus Dur's cabinet during the chaotic early period of the democratic transition. Initially, Yudhoyono's PD also performed poorly in legislative elections considering Yudhoyono was on the presidential ticket but improved after he became president. However, since the end of his second term the PD has atrophied and become a minor party in the party system.

The last notable party being established by a legacy officer is Wiranto's People's Conscious Party (Hanura). Recall that Wiranto ran for vice-president twice and president once under Golkar's banner. With Yudhoyono winning the presidency over Wiranto, there was little room to advance further within Golkar, so Wiranto left the party to establish his own. Like with Edi's PKP and Yudhoyono's PD, Hanura is heavily dependent upon Wiranto's reputation. The party performed better than the PKP but not as well the PD and has since fallen into

irrelevancy as Wiranto became less active in party politics to instead play a major role in the executive branch.

Another area that is traditionally monopolized by civilians in democracies is the executive branch which extends beyond the presidency to include the cabinet. Indonesian parties have relied heavily on legacy officers to staff the executive cabinet rather than relying on their own members to fill positions within the executive. While not uncommon for parties in both new and old democracies to recruit former officers to serve as defense ministers, the Indonesian case is notable for the number of legacy officers holding portfolios beyond the defense ministry.

What is most notable in the Indonesian case is that, while the number of legacy officers holding governorships and legislative seats has declined, this is not the case in the executive. During the democratic period the two directly elected presidents, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – a legacy officer himself – and Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi) have relied heavily on legacy officers to manage key portfolios which are not limited to security matters.

At the time of writing, 18 years following Indonesia's first fully democratic election, the incumbent president's most important positions are staffed by former officers. Most notable is Luhut Binsar Panjaitan. Luhut, a retired four star general with experience in special forces, is the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs. Because Indonesia is a large archipelago, this position gives Luhut significant influence over trade and investment in Indonesia. Not only does Luhut control this portfolio but he is widely considered to be Jokowi's most influential member of the cabinet and holds portfolios beyond his appointed ministry. During the Covid-19 pandemic Jokowi has delegated

significant power to Luhut to direct and manage the government's pandemic response rather than rely directly on civil servants or civilian appointees from parties. Furthermore, Luhut recently joined Golkar's advisory board as its chairman, a move by the party linking itself to a legacy officer to try to gain influence within the government because it cannot control elite recruitment on its own.[8]

In addition to Luhut, Jokowi has relied heavily on Moeldoko – another retired four-star general and commander of TNI – as his chief-of-staff. Unlike Luhut, who rose to prominence during the authoritarian and early democratic period, Moeldoko was the head of TNI from 2013-2015 and then joined Jokowi's staff in 2018 – showing that the presence of legacy officers are not simply an authoritarian holdover. Most recently, Moeldoko recently supplanted Yudhoyono's son – Agus – as the chairman of Yudhoyono's PD.[9] With Moeldoko's recent victory, the PD remains a haven for legacy officers in the party system.

Moeldoko's victory within the PD is not the only example of the lack of party autonomy which results in legacy officers taking prominent administrative positions in parties. Despite Golkar's place as one of the most institutionalized parties in the system, the party elevated Lodewijk Freidrich Paulus as its secretary general. Lodewijk retired as a three-star general and commander within the army's territorial structure. Despite his lack of political experience, or any service to Golkar, Golkar elevated Lodewijk directly into one of the most powerful positions within Golkar to help the party benefit from his connections to the officer corps and the military's territorial structure. Lodewijk's connection

[8]Unknown. *Alasan Airlangga Pilih Luhut Pandjaitan Jadi Ketua Dewan Penasihat Golkar*. Jan. 2020. URL: https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4156561/alasan-airlangga-pilih-luhut-pandjaitan-jadi-ketua-dewan-penasihat-golkar.

[9]Nikson Sinaga. *KLB Partai Demokrat Pilih Moeldoko Jadi Ketua Umum*. Mar. 2021. URL: https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2021/03/05/klb-partai-demokrat-pilih-moeldoko-jadi-ketua-umum/.

to the military is publicized by the party and he even wears three stars on his tie in his official party photo – a clear reference to his military rank despite his position as a civilian official.[10]

Lodewijk's rapid ascension in the party is not the first time that Golkar has relied on legacy officers to staff major administrative posts in the party. After winning his position as chairman of the party during the democratic transition, Akbar Tandjung, who had no experience in the military, sought out a legacy officer, Budi Harsono – a retired three-star general from the army – to serve under him as secretary general. Tandjung likely sought out legacy officers in attempt to keep active and retired officers in Golkar's coalition so the party could capitalize on its close ties to the military.[11] The next chairman of the party and prominent businessman, Jusuf Kalla, also selected a retired three-star army general – Sumarsono – to serve as secretary general.

Even though it has been common for Indonesian parties to recruit well-known legacy officers for executive office and party administrative positions, it is also quite common for parties to nominate legacy officers for legislative office. Legacy officers make up a non-negligible portion of seated members of the legislature. While the number of legacy officers or active officers in the legislature has declined with democratization, when compared to Paraguay it is notable how legacy officers play a much more significant role in Indonesian party politics than in Paraguay, where there are no retired officers holding elected office.

The presence of legacy officers in the legislature clearly demonstrates that parties rely on these officers to fill seats. But the parties reliance on outside ac-

[10] Partai Golkar. *Lodewijk Freidrich Paulus*. 2021. URL: `https://www.partaigolkar.com/lodewijk-f-paulus/` (visited on 03/08/2021).

[11] *Akbar Tandjung*. South Jakarta, Feb. 2019; Idrus Marham. *Magent Politik Partai Golkar*. Pondok Gede, Bekasi, Indonesia: PT Penjuru Ilmu Sejati, 2016.

tors goes even further. Parties also rely on retired and active officers to manage, staff, and conduct electoral campaigns due to their weak local organizations and dependence on local elites to pay for campaigns.[12]

It is quite common for Indonesian parties to partner with active officers to capitalize on the military's institutional structure and to supplement the weakness in the territorial apparatus of the parties. The Indonesian military – specifically the army – is present in every village, district, and province in Indonesia due to its origins as a counter-invasion force organized by the Japanese and its subsequent development during the revolution against Dutch colonial rule. As officers serve in the military they are rotated throughout the territory and develop personal networks and business associations during their time at a specific post. Officers' business activity may include starting their own businesses or managing military owned cooperatives.

Political parties, which face considerable costs in building a nation-wide party apparatus, latch onto the military's structure and capitalize on its ubiquitous presence. Parties capitalize on the military's institutional strength and establish relationships with officers who manage businesses to provide clientelistic benefits to voters. While the parties use officers' businesses to provide clientelistic goods to try to win votes, it is certainly not the parties' primary source of funding for clientelism, nor the parties' core vote winning strategy. I simply note this behavior as evidence that these parties, due to an institutional weakness, use the military's institutional structure to supplement its own capacity to mobilize voters.

Another reason the parties stand to benefit from establishing ties to offi-

[12]I learned of this phenomenon through several conversations with individuals familiar with Indonesian party politics and military political activity.

cers' businesses is because Indonesian parties lack well-established fundraising mechanisms and either need to capitalize on the strong personal brand of legacy officers or find other forms of financial backing. As previously mentioned, Indonesian parties rely heavily on patrons to fund the party at the national and local level. The parties' reliance on patrons is a significant reason why many Indonesian parties are dominated by oligarchs.

Even as the incumbent authoritarian party that was developed over 30 years, Golkar is not immune to this issue. During the authoritarian period Golkar benefited from state resources directed to it from Suharto. This meant that the party relied on state patronage rather than developing its own fundraising capacity.[13] When Indonesia democratized, the party struggled financially and turned to business elites to prop up its vast territorial apparatus. These business elites eventually captured the party chairmanship. In 2004, Akbar Tanjung, a long time member of Golkar and activist from the New Order, lost the chairmanship to Jusuf Kalla. Following Jusuf Kalla, Abdurizal Bakrie – another wealthy businessman – won the chairmanship for two electoral cycles from 2009 to 2016. Today, Airlangga Hartarto, yet another successful businessman, controls the party's chairmanship.

Golkar is certainly not the only party to rely heavily on oligarchs. Gerindra, the party established by former general Prabowo Subianto during his bids for the presidency, also relies heavily on wealthy patrons. While Prabowo himself is a popular figure in Indonesian politics due to his history in the military, it is his brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo – one of the wealthiest Indonesians – who provides financial backing for Gerindra. Thus, both Golkar and Gerindra

[13]Dirk Tomsa. *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era*. Routledge, 2008.

demonstrate a hybrid form of party building that features financial backing by business elites coupled with capitalizing on the reputation and networks of legacy officers.

I highlight the presence of oligarchs in the party system more generally, even if they lack ties to the military, to demonstrate the weakness of the financial capacity of these parties. Instead of relying on membership fees or fundraising campaigns, Indonesian parties rely on patrons, both at the national and local level, to fund the parties.[14] With oligarchs, the benefit is simple as the patrons can bankroll the party.

When parties lack a wealthy financier they can turn to legacy officers to benefit off of the reputation and extensive networks developed by officers as they serve throughout the army's expansive territorial apparatus. The combination of emerging from military rule and institutional weakness of the parties reduces the opportunity costs for parties to rely on active and retired officers to supplement the parties' institutional weaknesses. While officers usually are not amongst the wealthiest elite, they do provide benefits for the parties at the local level because these parties lack the institutional and financial strength at the sub-national level to maintain the party and run electoral campaigns.

I have shown that certain institutional weaknesses in Indonesian parties reduces the parties' control over elite recruitment, autonomy, and financial self-sufficiency. These weaknesses result in parties relying more directly on active and retired officers for support which opens avenues for these officers to enter politics. Ultimately this leads to a large presence of former or active officers in political and state institutions and eroding civilian supremacy.

[14]Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot. *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia*. Cornell University Press, 2019; Mietzner, *Money, power, and ideology*.

Political Paralysis in Indonesia

Given the extent of the Indonesian military's political activity during authoritarian rule and the democratic transition, a high degree of coordination amongst civilian parties is necessary to marginalize the military's political power. Yet the presence of legacy officers, the entry of new parties, and the fragmented party system has prevented this from happening. Since the full transition to democracy in 2004 there have only been minor reforms to the military. Over the past 18 years the military has slowly expanded the scope of its political activities without completely violating the norm of an apolitical military.

I argue that this is due, in part, to the fragmented nature of the party system. As shown in Table 6.1, the party system has had a large number of parties in the legislature since democratization – with an average of 6.7 effective parties since the 1999 election. As will be shown in the section on Paraguay, this is much higher than Paraguay, where the average effective number of parties since democratization is only 2.7 parties.

Table 6.1: Effective Number of Legislative Parties in Indonesia

Election	Effective Number of Parties
1999	4.72
2004	7.08
2009	6.21
2014	8.17
2019	7.47

The fragmentation of the Indonesian party system is also partly driven by

the entrance and exit of parties from cycle to cycle. Earlier I highlighted several parties established by legacy officers but because barriers to entry are so low, new parties unaffiliated with legacy officers also frequently enter the party system – whether backed by oligarchs or Islamic institutions and their leaders. As these new parties enter the system their focus is on survival and winning seats which reduces the priority of marginalizing the political power of the military. Parties will especially de-prioritize civilian supremacy if they can benefit from establishing a relationship with the military and supplement their institutional weakness with the military's presence throughout the territory. Overall, these new parties and their myopic interests make coordination on military reforms difficult.

One key issue where civilians have failed to coordinate against the military is on the issue of the territorial command structure. As previously mentioned the military, more specifically the army, has a unit present in every village, district, area, and region and its structure correlates with the structure of the state. The army's territorial presence is key to the military's political power which allows it to penetrate all levels of politics.

If civilians are to establish civilian supremacy, implementing significant reforms to the army's territorial command structure is absolutely necessary. Yet pushing through reforms on the territorial command structure requires significant pressure from civilians – which would require a high level of inter-party coordination – because the military is unwilling to budge on the issue. Civilians have brought up the issue of reforming the territorial structure of the army but the military pushed back hard against this proposed reform and accused anyone of supporting this reform of being a leftist.[15] Despite the desire of the reformists

[15]Interview with Syamsuddin Haris, Spring 2019.

in wanting to change the military's structure, the legislature and executive have simply been unable to coordinate a push against the military on this issue.[16] The inability to coordinate on reforming the territorial structure is partly due to the presence of so many parties. With so many parties there is intense competition for political rents rather than a unified focus on military reforms.[17]

Not only have civilians been unable to define the territorial structure of the military but they have also struggled to exert control over the military's command structure. During the authoritarian period command of the military was consolidated under the commander of the armed forces – known as Panglima – with the cabinet position typically thought of as the defense ministry held by Panglima concurrently. With democratization, the defense ministry was removed from the direct control of Panglima, but the Ministry of Defense is widely seen as a weak institution that has little influence with the armed forces.

The Ministry of Defense is weak for a few reasons. One reason for its weakness is that it is only given advisory powers to the armed forces and president. The ministry is charged with developing defense policy and strategy but can only directly manage ministry officials – meaning the chain of military command does not run through the ministry. This structure means that operational control of the military remains under Panglima who does not report to the Minister of Defense. Instead of reporting to the Minister of Defense the commander of the armed forces sits as an *ex officio* member of the cabinet and reports to the president directly with nearly the same status as civilian members of the cabinet.

[16] Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*.

[17] Anies Rasyid Baswedan. "Regional autonomy and patterns of democracy in Indonesia". In: (2007); Stephen Sherlock et al. *Parties and elections in Indonesia 2009: the consolidation of democracy*. Parliamentary Library, 2009.

Another area where civilians have struggled to exert control is over the security budget. Since independence in 1945 the military has managed its own business ventures, granting it considerable financial autonomy. Since democratization in 1999, little has been done to fully remove the military's capacity to generate its own revenue and create dependence on civilians for financial support.[18]

One factor undermining the civilian's capacity to remove the military's businesses was the election of Yudhoyono. While Yudhoyono was seen as a reformer he did very little to push for reforms of the military's budget and finance. After democratization and Yudhoyono's election, some parties sought to close loopholes in the law that allowed the military to continue raising funds outside of the legislature's authority but Yudhoyono, as a legacy officer, did not use his authority to push the military to divest itself of its illicit funding.[19]

One reason the military considered its off-books funding to be critical is because its state-owned enterprises failed during the Asian Financial Crisis. In response, Yudhoyono increased the military's budget and slightly decreased off-budget activities.[20] While many of the military's state-owned businesses failed, the military has maintained control over smaller businesses in order to fund local operations to this day.[21]

In addition to the lack of control over the military's finances, the legisla-

[18]Meidi Kosandi and Subur Wahono. "Military Reform in the Post-New Order Indonesia: A Transitional or a New Subtle Role in Indonesian Democracy?" In: *Asian Politics & Policy* 12.2 (2020), pp. 224–241.

[19]Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*.

[20]Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa. *The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia's Decade of Stability and Stagnation*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015.

[21]Deni Angela and Meidi Kosandi. "Military Business in Indonesia: Army Cooperative after Acquisition Policy 2009 and its Impact on Civil-military Relations". In: *International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research* 4.10 (2019).

ture simply lacks the capacity to conduct meaningful oversight of the military.[22] There is significant ambiguity over what the legislature's role is in overseeing the Indonesian military.[23] The ambiguity is likely due to the inability of the legislature to coordinate and produce a cohesive doctrine concerning the military's place in politics.

While the legislature does have a formal body that is charged with overseeing the military (Commission I), this body has been largely ineffective. One reason for the ineffectiveness of Commission I is the lack of authority given to it. The commission may be charged with conducting oversight but it lacks any real formal authority over issues of the military's structure, command, legal code, or ethics and is almost completely dependent on the military for information.[24]

For example, it is normal in many democracies for legislatures to control the rank advancement of high-ranking officers. As I show later, Paraguay has such control given to its senate but the extent of the Indonesian's authority over rank advancement is limited. Commission I's authority over rank advancement extends only to evaluating the conduct and fitness of the commander of the armed forces (Panglima TNI). This amounts to a hearing in front of Commission I but wherein the commission can do nothing of substance to control who heads the armed forces. The lack of power for Commission I means that the one organ within the legislature meant to constrain the military is toothless.

Even though the commission is not formally designated significant power

[22] Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan. *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*. Vol. 13. Columbia University Press, 2013.

[23] Jacqui Baker et al. "Professionalism Without Reform: The Security Sector under Yudhoyono". In: *The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia's Decade of Stability and Stagnation* (2015), pp. 114–135.

[24] Jürgen Rüland, Maria-Gabriela Manea, and Hans Born. *The politics of military reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria*. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.

over the military, it could be an institution that initiates reform and expands civilian supremacy. This, however, is unlikely as coordination with the commission is costly. The commission is composed of 54 members (9% of the lower house) and seats are allocated to parties to match the proportion of the lower house. By matching the distribution of parties in the lower house, the commission is highly fractured with members spanning up to nine parties. Further undermining the commission's capacity is a lack of staff and funding. Despite the large size of the commission, it only boasts 20 staff and a small budget to conduct its work.[25]

The weakness of Commission I as a fulcrum for civilian supremacy results in a legislature that cannot respond to civilian-military issues. Recently, the military has faced a significant problem with handling officer promotions. Partially due to the lack of civilian oversight, the military has continuously recruited and promoted officers. The problem, however, is that there are not enough posts to fill which correspond with officer promotions.[26]

A possible course of action would be for the legislature and executive to reform the military to control recruitment and promotion to reduce the log-jams but civilians have failed to do so. What has happened is that the military pressured the government to migrate active officers into Indonesia's civil service and expand its scope of political activity. There was little resistance within the legislature due to the cartelization of party politics[27] and the difficulty of such a large and fragmented party system to coordinate against the military to offer

[25] Rüland, Manea, and Born, *The politics of military reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria*.

[26] Evan A Laksmana. "Reshuffling the deck? Military corporatism, promotional logjams and post-authoritarian civil-military relations in Indonesia". In: *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 49.5 (2019), pp. 806–836.

[27] Dan Slater. "Indonesia's accountability trap: Party cartels and presidential power after democratic transition". In: *Indonesia* 78 (2004), pp. 61–92.

any solution.

The lack of coordination by the parties has produced a system wherein the military can incrementally expand its scope. Watchers of Indonesian civilian-military affairs often point to the evolution of a neo-*Dwi Fungsi* – an update on the philosophy used by the military to justify its political control during authoritarian rule. The result is a military that takes liberties to involve itself in traditional civilian affairs – as shown in Figure 6.1 at the beginning of the chapter.

Even though there is significant interest amongst some in the parties and civil society to increase civilian supremacy it is difficult to do so because of the nature of the party system. One impediment to increased civilian supremacy is the presence of legacy officers in the political parties. Political parties keep away from issues which may upset the military with the hope of further recruiting help from active and retired officers.

Further impeding civilian supremacy is the presence of too many parties and the short life-span of these parties. As parties enter the party system their focus is on capturing seats and competing against more established parties. Focusing on military reform is costly to these parties because it is not a salient issue to voters and these parties cannot risk alienating a potential ally in the military. With so many parties in the system it is also difficult for these parties to coordinate with each other. Instead of a few parties coordinating to marginalize the influence of the military, the several parties in the Indonesian system are constantly trying to elbow past each other to secure the most prominent positions in the cabinet and leadership in the legislature.

To conclude the section on Indonesia I want to make a few final points. Some may argue that the extensive reforms the military underwent during the transition is evidence of more robust civilian oversight and reform. It is true that the TNI underwent major reforms during the democratization period from 1998-2004 but the New Order featured an extensively developed military regime. Rather than relying solely on coercive power and a junta or single commanding officer, the military (ABRI) thoroughly penetrated state, political, and electoral institutions. Without being totalitarian, the military was omnipresent in ways most other militaries are not during military rule.

I should also note the agency of the military itself during democratization. The evidence presented herein and throughout much of the literature on the Indonesian military suggests that the military itself drove most of the reforms and that civilians only had a minor influence on changes made to the military. As show in in previous chapters, the military was active during democratization and frequently constrained civilians and shirked civilian attempts at reform. This is not to say that all changes to the military were fully endorsed by the military. As the historical record shows, civilians were able to check the military's intransigence on some more minor issues. While civilians have had some success it falls woefully short of demonstrating civilian supremacy.

It is also the case that some of the changes pushed by civilians have originated from civil society rather than the parties. Starting with the 1998 protests there has continued to be a strong base of society mobilized to check the military's political activities. Through protests and other forms of contentious politics, civil society has pressured civilian and military elites to stop executive actions or legislation that would expand the military's scope in civilian politics.

Thus, it is often civil society, not the parties, that exercise some constraint over the military.

Another alternative explanation of the lack of apparent civilian supremacy in Indonesia is that it is not the military intruding into politics but instead civilian parties pulling the military into what is the traditional civilian sphere. This is true to some extent. It is certainly the case that parties and other civilian authorities willingly attach themselves to the military. Yet this is largely due to the institutional weakness of the state and parties. These actors lack capacity to manage their traditional sphere of politics and policy and thus ”pull” on the military to supplement their institutional weakness with the military's strength.

It is also the case that civilians lack a coherent philosophy of civilian supremacy. As established in this chapter the party system is highly fragmented with new parties often entering into the party system. The instability of the party system makes the development of any coherent philosophy of civilian supremacy difficult to form and allows space for the military to operate.

Party Domination in Paraguay

Like many post-military rule democracies, Paraguay saw active and legacy officers push to maintain access to political rents following democratization. Unlike in Indonesia and other cases, however, Paraguayan parties have been far more successful at monopolizing control of executive, legislative, and electoral institutions away from military elites – resulting in a system that is almost completely devoid of legacy officers.

I begin the qualitative analysis of Paraguayan party institutionalization by focusing on the first dimension which was considered in the Indonesian section found above – autonomy. The largest party in the system – the Colorado Party – has a high degree of autonomy which has allowed it to act independent of the military and has been a key factor in the party's capacity to constrain the military. I focus this discussion on the Colorado Party because it has the strongest ties to the military due to its conservative ideology and decades long authoritarian rule in a coalition with the military.

The party's autonomy is rooted in its foundation in the late 1800s and its independent development in the 1920s and 1930s. Prior to the authoritarian period and Stroessner era the military had no formal presence within the party. Thus, the party is unlike many parties that are a derivative of military rule where the military and/or officers create parties to facilitate authoritarian rule or a transition to democracy.

The military gained inroads into the party when the party sought to remove Federico Chavez from the presidency after learning of a plot between a key military unit and a party *seccional*. After the military removed Chavez on behalf of the party, the party struck a bargain with Stroessner and the military and allowed a single uniformed officer to sit on the party's leadership committees. As part of the bargain additional uniformed officers were allowed to join Stroessner's cabinet. Thus, like in the Indonesian case, high ranking officers held key portfolios in the government that gave the military significant control, not only over military policy, but also the economic sector.

Unlike in Indonesia, however, the party was able to monopolize elite recruitment after democratization. The Colorado Party was able to set the terms on

leadership in the party, executive, and legislature. In order to remove Stroessner from power, ousted party elites coordinated with General Andrés Rodríguez who conducted a coup and returned the party to party traditionalists. In turn, the party elevated Rodríguez to the presidency.

Even though the party had to rely on Rodríguez and the military to oust Stroessner it quickly exerted control over elite recruitment. Rodríguez was allowed to become president but his cabinet was staffed entirely by civilians loyal to the party. Most notably, the party ensured that a civilian controlled the Ministry of Defense. This would be the first time since 1949 that a civilian held this post rather than an active officer loyal to the president.

Its also important to note that the Colorado Party not only set the terms of Rodríguez's cabinet but also helped ensure that he could not run for a second term. While developing the new constitution the Colorado Party coordinated with opposition parties to set a formal rule that the president was limited to a single term. When Rodríguez learned of this rule he was upset and threatened a coup. The parties, however, held firm and used their strength to constrain Rodríguez and continue with the term limit.[28]

The party's monopolization of elite recruitment extends to nominations for who the party nominated for the presidency since Rodríguez. Since Paraguay's democratization in 1993, the Colorado Party has won the presidency in all but one election. Almost all of its candidates for the presidency have been life-long members with deep familial ties to the Colorado Party. These candidates usually rise through the party, serving in leadership positions in the party and legislature, before gaining the nomination for the presidency.

[28]Interview with Jos'e Antonio Moreno Rufinelli, former leader of the House of Deputies.

In addition to exerting greater control over the elite recruitment for the presidency, the Colorado Party has monopolized control of leadership positions within the party. Where uniformed officers held important positions in the party during the Stroessner era no active or retired officers have held any position in the party's leadership committees since democratization.

This is not to say that officers have not sought these positions. After the coup, one of Rodríguez's main lieutenants, Lino Oviedo, continued to be politically active. During the campaign to select the Colorado's presidential candidate for the 1993 election, Oviedo was in talks to form a coalition with two other major figures within the party, including Luis María Argaña, to share power in the party's national committee. The civilians, however, coordinated to lock Oviedo and his clique of officers out of leadership positions[29] and secured the nomination for Juan Carlos Wasmosy – a prominent businessman with longstanding ties to the party.

The party's push to break away from the military was also reflected in who the party supported for legislative office. Of the nearly one hundred Colorados who gained seats in the lower and upper houses in the 1989 election, not one was a retired officer. This carried over into the first democratic election of 1993, which resulted in a legislative delegation of the party comprised solely of career civilians.

In addition to controlling elite recruitment, Paraguayan parties do not rely on the military for support in mobilizing voters. Unlike parties in Indonesia, the Colorado Party has a strong apparatus it can use to mobilize voters. With its own robust territorial organization with strong social ties, the party does not

[29]Juan Carlos Wasmosy. *Contra Viento y Marea: Se Institucionalizaron las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación*. Servi Libro, 2006.

need to attach itself to the military nor create alliances with officers to mobilize voters. Instead, the party relies on its widespread and durable attachment to voters and mobilizes them through its *seccionales*.

While the Colorado Party has the strongest territorial apparatus, it is important to note that other parties also boast a territorial organizations that facilitate strong social ties. Indeed, the primary rival to the Colorado Party – the Authentic Liberal Radical Party (PLRA) – also has an extensive territorial organization that reaches deep to the local level. The PLRA also benefits from a strong and widespread identity with the party as a significant segment of the population see themselves as *liberales*. The strength of the Colorado Party's and PLRA's territorial organization and social ties requires that challenger parties invest significantly in developing their own institutions. Overall, the strength of partisan institutions lessens the need for Paraguayan parties to capitalize on any institutional strength the military may proffer during elections or in government.

Paraguayan parties must also rely more on their party infrastructure to mobilize voters because of strict legal limits on campaign finance. Where Indonesian parties can be bankrolled by wealthy benefactors, Paraguayan parties must finance themselves largely through grassroots fundraising. Well documented and widespread corruption led to measures being adopted intended to reduce the level of corruption in Paraguayan elections. These restrictions include total bans on corporate donations and strong restrictions on how much individuals can donate to campaigns.[30][31] Thus, Paraguayan parties must rely on their own institutional capacity to raise funds. By relying more on their own institutional

[30]While these are formal limits, there is still belief that parties launder money into party coffers.

[31]Library of Congress. *Paraguay: Campaign financing law amended*. 2020. URL: https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-05-07/paraguay-campaign-financing-law-amended/.

capacity Paraguayan parties are less reliant on alternative actors, such as legacy officers, to reach the parties' goals.

As a final note, the formal restrictions on party financing benefit a party like the Colorado Party. Instead of relying on military officers or oligarchs, parties must develop their own capacity to try to match the Colorado Party. Yet because the Colorado Party maintained power for decades it prevented the development of opposition parties – effectively giving the party a significant head start at the time of democratization. This has raised the bar for parties and makes it difficult for new parties to enter the system and increase the number of parties in the system – allowing the Colorado Party and the PLRA to continue to remain the two largest parties in the system.

Civilian Supremacy in Paraguay

While individual parties have been able to operate without leaning on the military or legacy officers it has also taken coordination between the parties to constrain the military and its officers. To date, many of the problems present in Indonesia, such as a lack of control over promotions and finance or weak oversight, simply do not exist or are far less pronounced in Paraguay. Unlike in Indonesia, Paraguayan parties have worked together effectively to control the military. This is not to say that civilian authority in Paraguay has not faced any challenges from the officers in the military. Indeed, prominent officers in the military sought to use their position to coerce civilians but failed because of the coordinated actions by the major political parties across the entire government.

Key to civilian supremacy is the strength of party identification in Paraguay

and the stability of the party system. While there are certainly those in Indonesia that are fiercely loyal to one party, party attachment is more robust in Paraguay. For example, the two largest parties, the Colorado Party and the PLRA have averaged 70% of the vote for the lower legislative chamber across the six elections since democratization. When considering the two largest and most stable parties in Indonesia, the PDI-P and Golkar, these parties only account for 38% of the vote, on average, across the five elections since democratization. Furthermore, the vote between the two major parties is more stable in Paraguay, as the major parties in Indonesia have seen their vote share slip with almost every election since democratization.[32]

Paraguay's stable party system has helped civilians focus on civilian supremacy and stave off threats to their authority. The most direct threat to civilian rule in Paraguay came from a prominent officer – General Lino Oviedo. Oviedo was introduced into politics and developed relationships with members of the Colorado Party when he served under Rodríguez during the coup to remove Stroessner. Despite the Colorado Party shutting the military out of politics during the transition and subsequently barring Oviedo from having any formal role within the party, Oviedo continued to use his military authority to push his way into politics.

Oviedo's willingness to use the military to gain political power came to a head when President Wasmosy requested Oviedo's retirement from his post. At that time, Oviedo was serving as the commander of the army and had considerable coercive power at his disposal. In response to Wasmosy's request for his resignation, Oviedo returned to the barracks and began mobilizing the divisions

[32]The PLRA in Paraguay has struggled in the past two elections, as defectors have left the party but still enter into informal electoral coalitions with the PLRA.

under his command and threatened a coup on 22 April 1996. Stopping Oviedo's coup required a high degree of coordination across the entire government, parties, and armed forces.

In response to Oviedo's threat Wasmosy began coordinating with his cabinet, the leadership in the legislature, and the leadership in the Colorado Party. The role the Colorado Party and legislature's leadership played was essential because these institutions were able to check Oviedo's actions in a way that Wasmosy could not do alone. It is critical to note that coordination with the legislature required the Colorado Party to coordinate with multiple parties because the Colorado Party did not have control of the Senate at this time.

In the case of the legislature the Senate was able to credibly threaten Oviedo with legal repercussions and demonstrate that he would not have political support should he continue with the coup. In response to the threatened coup the Paraguayan Senate convened informally to debate what it should do. During the meeting senators from all parties decided to back Wasmosy as a way to exert civilian control over Oviedo and the portion of the army loyal to him.[33] This action meant that all opposition senators backed an action to support a Colorado president – whom they normally opposed. Along with their opposition, Colorado senators wrote and publicized a declaration condemning Ovideo. The Senate's quick and unified actions created a clear signal to Oviedo that he would not have a key institution's backing should he continue with his coup.

The Colorado Party's leadership also played a significant role in checking Oviedo's threat. Because of their longstanding relationship with the military, party leaders were able to coordinate with loyal generals to counter the strength

[33]Interview with a member of the senate at the time.

of Oviedo's forces.[34] Thus, after a few tense days civilians effectively coordinated against Oviedo, who relented because he faced cohesive opposition to his coup. When Oviedo emerged from the barracks, he was promptly arrested.

In response to Oviedo's coup threat, civilians coordinated to exert further control of the military and establish civilian supremacy by restructuring laws related to the armed forces. During the early period of democratization the Paraguayan legislature passed a law defining the armed forces. The initial law was quite simple and only outlined the structure of the military – establishing the command hierarchy and territorial structure.[35] The lack of specificity allowed considerable leeway for the military to define its own ethics, laws, and its own relationship with politics.

Parties within the legislature reduced the military's ability to act on its own accord within a year of the Oviedo's attempted coup. With a much more thorough and precise law the legislature re-defined Paraguay's armed forces.[36] Most notably, at the beginning of the new law civilians established that the armed forces are entirely subject to civilian authority by explicitly stating that the armed forces are to respect legal constitutional authorities. The new law also explicitly stated that the military is subordinated to the president. It was necessary to lay out subordination to the presidency explicitly in the new law because Oviedo challenged Wasmosy's request for his resignation by claiming that, as the commander of the armed forces, he was not subject to Wasmosy's orders.

In addition to creating a law placing the armed forces under the presidency, the legislature made it clear that the service chiefs were subordinate to the Gen-

[34]Wasmosy, *Contra Viento y Marea: Se Institucionalizaron las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación*.
[35]Ley N° 216/1993.
[36]Ley N° 1115/1997.

eral Staff (Estado Mayor) – helping define a clear command hierarchy. Parties in the legislature also went so far as to define the internal military legal code and ethics. Another notable segment of the law was that the legislature made this new law and the new military code applicable to active *and retired* officers – which meant that Oviedo could be punished for his actions under the new law.

Despite successfully countering Oviedo's coup, civilians continued to struggle to completely constrain Oviedo, even after forcing him out of the military. Capitalizing off of his immense popularity and a split in the Colorado Party,[37] Oviedo used the power of the Colorado Party's *seccionales* to win the nomination for the presidency. Oviedo, however, would not be able to stand for the election because he was subsequently constrained by alternative civilian institutions and sentenced to prison for his role in the coup under the recently passed law.

After his imprisonment, his running mate, Raúl Cubas Grau, ran on a platform of freeing Oviedo and openly spoke of intervening on Oviedo's behalf, despite Oviedo facing prosecution. After Cubas Grau won the presidential election in May 1998, the parties in the legislature passed a new penal code before Cubas Grau could be sworn in. The new code made it illegal for public officials to speak on any active cases and also made it so uniformed military officials could not attend trials.[38] This was action clearly taken by the parties to constrain how Cubas Grau could help Oviedo and usurp civilian authority over active and retired military officials.

After winning the presidency, however, Cubas Grau commuted the sentence of Oviedo but was overruled by the Supreme Court. In response to the Supreme Court overruling his commuting of Oviedo's sentence, Cubas Grau ignored the

[37] A sizable portion of the Colorado Party at the grassroots level supported Oviedo.
[38] Ley N° 1286/1998.

order from the court and forced Oveido's release which produced a split in his government.

The split over Oviedo's sentence broke into violence when the vice president, Luis María Argaña was assassinated. Argaña was a target of Oviedo's supporters for several reasons. To begin, Argaña was a vocal critic of Oviedo. Furthermore, some of Oviedo's supporters felt Argaña betrayed Oviedo by coordinating against him a few years prior to lock him out of prominent positions within the Colorado Party. Argaña was also a target because, as vice president, he was set to become president because there were active impeachment proceedings against Cubas Grau in legislature at the time.

In response to Argaña's assassination there was a groundswell of popular opposition in the form of the *Marzo Paraguayo* – a large social movement protesting the actions of Cubas Grau and Oviedo. With Argaña's assassination and the protests, the parties in the lower house quickly impeached Cubas Grau who, facing a certain prosecution in the senate, resigned while Oviedo fled the country.

The case with Oviedo shows how difficult it can be for civilians to completely exert control over military figures after authoritarian rule due to the military's continued control of coercive power. Ultimately, Paraguayan civilian parties have been successful in marginalizing the role of legacy officers and the military because they have been able to coordinate and establish civilian supremacy. Aside from the case of Oviedo, civilians have demonstrated control over the military by removing other officers who have challenged their authority. This happened after the 1993 coup, where Wasmosy removed pro-Stroessner officers, as well as after Oviedo's attempted coup, where many pro-Oviedo of-

ficers were removed from the corps.[39]

Beyond Oviedo, Paraguayan civilian authorities have been more successful than their Indonesian counterparts at establishing civilian supremacy. Unlike in Indonesia, civilians have also been far more effective in conducting oversight and controlling the military – as is summarized in Table 6.2. For example, the Paraguayan Senate controls rank advancement at any grade higher than a Lieutenant Colonel. Oversight of the military, including control of rank advancement for general or flag officers is under the authority of the Comisión de Asuntos Constitucionales, Defensa Nacional Y Furza Pública (Commission on Constitutional Affairs, National Defense, and Public Force). The commission is comprised of 13 senators (out of 45 total) and responsibility is shared across several parties with the Colorado Party and PLRA controlling a majority of seats. The parties have been able to use this institution as an effective mechanism of coordination to conduct oversight of the armed forces.

Furthermore, subsequent presidents and the legislature have been able to coordinate on issues of military oversight, reform, and professionalization.[40] Latter reforms have been more minor than those established in the wake of Oveido's coup threat but civilians are still able to make reforms with the aim of professionalization and reducing activities outside of the traditional military sphere. Where the legislature and president largely defer to the military on issues of professionalization in Indonesia, the military is subjected to civilian institutions in Paraguay.

Lastly, Paraguayan civilian authorities have been far more successful in con-

[39]Paul C Sondrol. "Paraguay: A Semi-authoritarian Regime?" In: *Armed Forces & Society* 34.1 (2007), pp. 46–66.

[40]Interview with former President Duarte Frutos, Summer 2019

trolling military financing than their Indonesian counterparts. After the end of authoritarian rule civilians dramatically reduced the military budget which was bloated due to Stroessner redirecting patronage to his fellow officers. The military has not responded by developing alternative sources of revenue but has instead accepted the decisions of civilian authority on budgetary issues.

Conclusion

Democratization is not simply a discontinuous break from the past. This is especially true when emerging from military rule where the military and its active or retired officers remain politically ambitious. For democracy to fully take root civilians must be able to exert their power and control elite recruitment and oversight of the military while also not relying on the institutional power of the military or the means of officers.

Using the cases of Indonesia and Paraguay I have shown how both party institutionalization and party system institutionalization influence the capacity of civilians to monopolize electoral, party, and political institutions. In Indonesia, institutional weaknesses opened the path for legacy officers to play predominant role in politics. Also, due to specific weaknesses in party institutions, civilians have been reliant on alternative actors – including the military.

Further reducing the civilian's capacity to marginalize the military in Indonesia is a lower degree of party system institutionalization. The fragmented party system and frequent entry of new parties increase the costs of coordination against the military – undermining the ability of civilians to form a cohesive bloc necessary to check the military. This has not been the case in Paraguay

Table 6.2: Civilian Monopolization Compared

	Paraguay	Indonesia		Paraguay	Indonesia
Party Institutionalization			*Party System Institutionalization*		
Autonomy	High	Moderate	Stable	Yes	No
Territorial apparatus	High	Weak	Fragmented	No	Yes
Financial apparatus	Strong	Weak			
Elite recruitment	Independent	Dependent	Civilian supremacy	Strong	Weak
Social mobilization	Independent	Dependent	Oversight	Strong	Weak
Financial capacity	Independent	Dependent			

where a lower degree of party system fragmentation and greater stability in the party system has facilitated a coordinated response across party lines by civilians against any military violations of civilian sovereignty.

Also, unlike in Indonesia, Paraguayan civilians have been able to monopolize control of their institutions due to the higher degree of party institutionalization. As legacy officers and the military sought to intrude on civilian prerogatives, Paraguayan parties have successfully rebutted their efforts and maintained control of these institutions. By maintaining control of parties civilians have effectively shut off one of the primary paths into politics for active or retired officers.

The cases of Indonesia and Paraguay demonstrate how the emergence of civilian supremacy is key for democratic development. In Paraguay, the question of the military playing a role in undermining democracy is completely absent. Instead, the focus is entirely on the role the parties play in supporting or undermining democratic health.

Alternatively, in Indonesia there is a constant worry that the military could play a significant role in undermining democratic development. Over the two decades of democracy in Indonesia the military has increasingly expanded its scope of influence. While the officer corps has stayed in the barracks, there is worry that the military is too close to politics and is poised to pull democracy back into authoritarian rule. This worry has been most pronounced over the past two elections, as retired general Prabowo Subianto campaigned on the idea of returning to an authoritarian era with the military playing a central role. As long as Indonesian civilian parties remain weak and the party system fragmented, the military will continue to play a significant political role in Indone-

sia.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

It is widely accepted that democracy without parties is unattainable.[1] Yet this is typically thought of solely in terms of how parties contest elections and the role they play in the formulation of policy through legislative and executive institutions. But this dissertation has clearly shown that democracy is unattainable without parties playing a role in subordinating the military. Allaying the fears of incumbent autocrats, including the military, is a key challenge when facing the prospect of democratization. Should there not be strong and stable parties which the military trusts, the military will be less willing to submit to civilian rule and more likely to encroach on political contestation and popular sovereignty. Thus, stable, strong parties, which hold the military's trust are a necessary component for successful democratic development.

When incumbents fear democratization, they seek to entrench authoritarian rule or undercut democratization by tilting the playing field.[2] On the other hand, when incumbent autocrats have little to fear and they expect to perform well within democratic regimes, they seek or support democratization.[3] This dynamic is seen during late-stage military rule.

Unlike civilian autocratic parties, democratization means that the military cannot simply join the party system and contest power through democratic in-

[1] Elmer Eric Schattschneider. *Party Government: American Government in Action*. Farrar and Rinehart, Inc, 1942.

[2] Steven Levitsky and Lucan A Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[3] Daniel Ziblatt. *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2017; Rachel Beatty Riedl et al. "Authoritarian-led Democratization". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020); Dan Slater and Joseph Wong. "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia". In: *Perspectives on Politics* 11.3 (2013), pp. 717–733.

stitutions. Instead, democratization requires the military to surrender control. By surrendering control, the military becomes subject to civilian power and creates a need for credible commitments that parties will not violate the military's interests. If democratization requires the military to submit to civilian rule, how do civilians produce credible commitments which allow the military to voluntarily surrender power?

In previous work on the military and democratization, others have argued that militaries surrender power because holding power runs against the officer corps' primary interests.[4] Others focus on the character of the military itself, as splits in the officer corps opens the door for alliances between regime insiders and the opposition.[5] While this previous work has helped explain some of the decision-making of the military, it has largely ignored the strategic decision-making of the officer corps that is conditioned on the military's relationship with civilians.

Credible Commitments and Democratization

In this dissertation I argued that a military will willingly surrender power when it is confident that civilian parties will govern in a way that protects the military's core interests. When the military lacks confidence in civilian parties, the military uses its power to bind democratization – or set parameters on political contestation and popular sovereignty. By binding democratization, the military generates credible commitments that civilian rule will not threaten its core in-

[4]Barbara Geddes. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1 (1999), pp. 115–144.

[5]Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Vol. 3. JHU Press, 1986.

terests. Yet the military does not necessarily need to bind democratization if credible commitments already exist should trustworthy parties be stable and strong.

How bounded democratization is observed and practiced varies. In many cases, the military requires a formal presence and power in transitional institutions. By exercising power in these institutions, the military can directly shape the design of the democratic system. Often, the military will require or support institutions that bias the system towards allies and which weaken the power of its opposition. In other cases, the military may require a ban on specific parties or actors as part of a democratic bargain. In some cases, officers in the military resign their commission to form parties and contest elections as a way to penetrate civilian institutions and influence them. Despite the variation in how the military influences the development of democratic institutions, at its core is a military using its power to shore up its interests after the democratic transition.

To explain variation in the extent to which militaries bind democratization I key in on three characteristics of the military's relationship with parties and the parties themselves. These factors determine whether pre-existing commitments are credible. They are the degree of trust the military holds in parties, the level of party institutionalization of the party allied with the military, as well as the strength of the military's partisan allies. Alone, each of these characteristics can marginally increase the confidence of the military in democratization, but together these characteristics generate credible commitments and boost the military's confidence in civilian rule.

Concerning trust, the military needs to know that there is overlap between the party's and military's interests. Does the party share a vision of the national

project? Or do the actors share an ideology or ethnic composition? The military cannot be confident in democratization if the party system is void of parties that, in some way, agree with the military on core issues. Yet trust is more than just agreement on policy or the role of the military. Trust is built through repeated interaction between civilians and the military to the point that the military can form concrete expectations of the character of the civilian parties and how they will govern. Trust is most usually developed between a party and a military when they share power in an authoritarian regime, or in cases where the military or its officers form their own party in anticipation of democratization.

Yet a party sharing the military's interests is insufficient to make commitments credible. The military cannot be confident in civilians if there is an expectation that its allies might not survive the transition. Thus, party institutionalization is also key. Institutionalized parties are more likely to survive transitions due to their stability and routinization. Parties that are little more than personalistic vehicles for the regime ruler, or which lack any organizational stability, are more likely to fail and be unable to defend the military in the subsequent party system.

While a higher level of institutionalization increases the likelihood that parties allied with the military may survive the transition, civilians can do little for the military if they are electorally week. Thus, party strength is another key factor which shapes the military's confidence in democracy. In order to protect the military, parties allied with the military need to, at the very least, win a sufficient number of seats to prevent the majority from governing in direct contrast to what the military wants. Should the military face democratization with parties it trusts, which are strong and institutionalized, the military should be

confident that democratization does not pose significant danger to its interests.

Establishing Civilian Supremacy

Even if the military supports a transition to a more democratic system, democracy itself cannot fully develop so long as the military remains politically active and influential. Thus, even should the military support democratization, a key question for civilians is how to monopolize power away from the military following the transition. In many cases following praetorian rule the military continues to act on the fringes, even after surrendering formal power to civilians. To explain why some civilians are more successful than others at marginalizing the political power of the military following democratization, I again center the explanation around political parties and the party system.

Civilians will be more successful at monopolizing political power following military rule if parties and the party system are institutionalized. In the case of individual parties, institutionalization increases organizational autonomy from the military. When autonomous, parties rely more on their own civilian cadres to fill elite positions, both within the party and in other political institutions, rather than lean on connections to the military or retired officers – allowing the parties to act independently rather than as an extension of the military.

Another key factor of party institutionalization that helps parties marginalize the military is the presence of a well-developed territorial apparatus. When endowed with a broad and robust territorial apparatus, the party will use its own institution to mobilize support, rather than rely on or latching on to the military's territorial presence. Lastly, having its own financial fundraising capacity

is also key for parties. By maintaining its own revenue streams, parties can break away from the military or officers which could contribute to the party's coffers in any meaningful way. Altogether, there is little incentive for parties to pull the military or active and/or retired officers into party politics when the parties are well institutionalized.

While it is difficult for parties to marginalize the military if they cannot control their own institutions, it is also critical that the parties work together to marginalize the military – especially when the military remains politically active. After entering politics during the authoritarian period, the military often remains active even if it surrenders direct, formal control of politics. To counter the coercive power of the military, civilian parties are more successful at establishing civilian supremacy when they coordinate against the military and provide a unified front against military intrusion into politics. Parties will be better equipped to coordinate against the military when the party system is stable and fragmentation is low.

Parties have a more difficult time at subordinating the military if parties are constantly entering and exiting the system. Not only does turnover simply make coordination difficult but a high degree of instability shortens the parties' time horizons. Instead of planning and implementing policies with an eye well into the future, parties act with surviving the next election in mind – leaving the long-term project of controlling the military ignored. It is also difficult for civilians to monopolize power as the number of parties in the system increases. The presence of more parties increases the cost of coordination and reduces the space for there to be agreement on issues, such as controlling the military. Ultimately, an unstable and fragmented party system provides the military with the op-

portunity to challenge civilian authority and expand the scope of its political power.

Bounded Democratization and Democracy Around the Globe

The theory underpinning the first stage of the dissertation was developed during field work performed in Indonesia and Paraguay. In these two cases, I observed variation in the degree to which the military was willing to withdraw from politics and defer to civilians, despite both countries democratizing. Despite the prominent role the military played in both cases, parties helped explain why the military retreated to the barracks more willingly in Paraguay than in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the military had a long history of distrust towards political parties and the military's primary ally was an untested party it had built itself during the authoritarian period. As a result, the military used its power to shape the development of democracy to ensure that its opponents would not design a system that ran against the military's interests. In Paraguay, however, I observed a military that was far more willing to defer to civilians and not use its power, despite being politically active for a half century. The key difference for Paraguay was that the military was more trustful of the parties in the system and knew that its primary ally, the Colorado Party, was a stable and strong party.

While I observed this dynamic in Indonesia and Paraguay, the theory travels well outside of this paired comparison. Indeed, by using a cross-regional case selection method, I have demonstrated that the strategic decision-making of a military is not a regional artifact and can be observed globally. For example, the

Pakistan military repeatedly used its power to bind democratic transitions by designing and stacking a senate that would be friendly to the military – knowing that opposition parties would win majorities in the lower house. Similarly, the Nigerian military manipulated electoral rules to tilt the system against parties it disfavored and repeatedly interfered in electoral administration to make it harder for opposition parties to contest elections.

The theory and empirical data not only help explain patterns of bounded democratization but can also be extended to analyze the behavior of the military in other contexts as well – such as why militaries retake power after a democratic transition. In early 2021 the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) staged a coup after years of slow democratic development. The coup was conducted on the night before the National League for Democracy (NLD) would again take control of the legislature. Some explanations of the Myanmar military's behavior have focused on its need to control illicit markets and on the political ambitions of officers. While these other explanations have some merit, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation sheds light on the military's behavior.

The Tatmadaw began a partial transition to democracy in the late 2000s during which it kept strict control of the development of competitive institutions. The military bound democracy by keeping a reserve of seats in the legislature that could prevent any changes to the constitution while also forming its own party to contest elections. A major reason the Tatmadaw behaved this way was because it feared the NLD and other parties that were linked to regional independence movements. While the parameters of contestation prevented wholesale changes to the constitution, the military underestimated the strength of the NLD and the weakness of its party – the USDP. In consecutive elections, the

USDP was routed by the NLD. Thus, the military likely came to the conclusion that its parameters were insufficient to constrain the NLD and it retook control before the NLD could expand its power after the 2020 election.

This theoretical framework can also be used as a starting point to help explain shifts in civilian-military relations in established democracies. For example, this framework can help make sense of how a military's political behavior may change if a major party becomes extreme and loses the military's trust. We have observed greater tension in civilian-military relations in the United States as the Republican Party has become more extreme. In the past several years, the Republican Party has diverged from its traditional conservative position that the military could easily trust. Some of this change is driven by some weak dimensions in the institutionalization of the Republican Party. A key weakness in the institutional character of the party deals with control over nominations. Instead of party elites coordinating against more peripheral members and maintaining control over the party, more extreme members or outsiders have been able to capitalize on the institutional weakness of the party and drive the party to more extreme positions that do not align with the military's commanding officers.

For example, the military was pulled into politics during the 2020 election, when the incumbent president publicly demanded the military squash anti-racism protests. The relationship with the military was further strained when the incumbent president and party backed a violent insurrection against the sitting legislature. These actions by the party have clearly strained relations with the military and threaten further pulling the military into what should be the civilian sphere of politics. What is unknown is how the erosion of trust between

a major party will impact the military's role in a long-standing democracy. As the party becomes more extreme, will the military act overtly and violate norms of an apartisan military in order to preserve the system it prefers?

Moving Forward

While the theoretical framework can help make sense of current events, the framework provided in this dissertation can help facilitate further research. To strengthen the empirical assessment of the theory, the scope of analysis was intentionally kept narrow. Instead of including democracies without any history of military involvement in politics, I selected cases only if they emerged from military rule. Yet comparing cases with a history of military rule to those without can help demonstrate how parties play a role in promoting democratic stability and preventing coup cycles.

For example, comparing Pakistan and India allows an analysis with two cases that come from the same effective British colonial rule. Yet one country experienced fairly consistent and stable democratic development, while the other experienced several rounds of military rule. One of the key differences between the two cases is that India emerged from colonial rule with a well-established party in the Congress Party. The institutionalized Congress Party helped create a stable, albeit dominated, party system rooted in ideas of national independence.

Alternatively, Pakistan emerged from colonial rule with its party system on much less sure footing. Instead of a large, well institutionalized, and nationalist oriented party, Pakistan's party system was far more fragmented. At the time of independence, its largest party was the Muslim League, which was insuffi-

ciently strong to win a majority of seats in the constituent assembly meant to develop Pakistan's first constitution. In the first few years following the adoption of the initial constitution, Pakistan experienced significant instability, with the government cycling through several prime ministers, which culminated in a coup with the military entering politics in an attempt to create stability. This cycle continued for decades, with the military reentering politics after parties it distrusted dominated its political allies in elections.

The comparison of India and Pakistan demonstrates that the military's intervention into politics can be thought of as a function of its relationship with parties and the party system. Instead of limiting analysis to the more narrow concept of bounded democratization following military rule – the theoretical framework can be extended to help explain democratic development along the dimensions of military subordination.

Another area for more research is to understand the long-term effects of bounded democratization. After the military binds democracy and retreats to the barracks, what implications does its institutional engineering have on a wide range of phenomenon? This may range from party system institutionalization, to the development of civil society, or even economic development. The post-praetorian case of Chilean democracy shows how the imposition of formal political institutions can be durable and affect the behavior of the government and society's relationship with the government for decades.

The system developed by the Chilean military took effect at the end of the 1980s and structured elections and government until a referendum to replace the constitution passed in 2020. This means that the parameters the military set on democracy were in place for thirty years. How would Chile have been

different if the military had not bound democracy? Or, how would things be different if parties and society removed the military's bounds earlier?

Not only should we think about the long term effects of these systems, but what also makes some of the bounded arrangements more durable than others? Chile's lasted for thirty years and Indonesia's has been in place for twenty years with little change. Others, however, are far less durable. In Thailand the military frequently returns to power only years after trying to bind contestation. Do some militaries come up with better institutional arrangements that resolve issues better than others? What role do other actors have in challenging the military's institutions? Under what circumstances does the military's institutional engineering actually lead to stable and robust democratic development? This last question is especially relevant, as some officers justify their coups as instruments of bringing democracy to their society.

Ultimately, these questions remain relevant today. Even though military rule is less common than it was during its peak during the Cold War, militaries remain politically active in many parts of the world. We cannot fully understand democratic development outside of the West without accounting for the role the military has played in shaping the political systems of so many countries.

Going Beyond the Military

In this dissertation I narrowed the scope of inquiry to cases of late-stage military rule and post-praetorian democratization. I did this to show that the military, with its unique political interests and coercive capacity, acts strategically with political parties in mind. Yet militaries are not the only authoritarian actor with

sufficient capacity to control or drive regime transitions.

Indeed, the last decade or more of work in comparative authoritarianism and democracy shows how influential actors can drive[6] or curtail[7] democratization. Much of this work has used traditional concepts to determine whether transitions passed thresholds of democracy with free and fair elections and popular sovereignty. In cases where influential incumbents tilt the playing field to build regimes with democratic features, but which fail to meet minimal thresholds, we view these in terms of competitive authoritarianism or electoral democracy.

This dissertation should contribute significantly to the field of comparative authoritarianism and democracy to help expand our understanding of regime transitions and democratization. To do so we cannot limit the concepts of bounded democratization or bounded democracy to systems emerging from military rule because militaries are not the only incumbents with sufficient power to set the terms of democracy. It is certainly the case that civilians, when endowed with greater power than their opposition, will seek favorable terms rather than an "ideal" form of democracy.

The task going forward, then, is to appropriately tailor the concepts and measurements of bounded democratization and democracy to account for *all* incumbent actors who may bind democratic institutions to their favor. By doing so we will be better equipped to conceive of counterfactual democratic systems and determine whether incumbents allowed full democratization or used their power to bind the emerging system. With a more expansive conceptualization ins place, we will be able to go beyond explaining why incumbents support de-

[6]Riedl et al., "Authoritarian-led Democratization"; Slater and Wong, "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia"; Ziblatt, *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*.

[7]Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*.

mocratization, but also why certain incumbents bind the transition while others do not.

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