

A History of Indonesia's Armed Forces and  
Analysis of Military Reform  
during the *Reformasi* Period (1998-2012)

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## ABSTRACT

21 May 1998 was a seminal moment in Indonesian history. After more than thirty-one years of centralized military authoritarianism, President Suharto was unable to recover from a confluence of national problems and abruptly announced his resignation. The ensuing *Reformasi* (reform) period ushered in many reforms against Suharto's regime, including transitioning to a democracy and implementing military reform.

This thesis has two aims. The first is to investigate the historic influences of the Indonesian military and trace its evolution to its New Order pre-*Reformasi* condition in order to best analyze the ongoing military reform movement. The second is to examine the effects of military reform during the first fourteen years of the *Reformasi* period (1998-2012) and identify successful practices for future reform. One tool that I use to construct my argument is an exploration of the military's traditional functions and roles in society, specifically through its dual-function doctrine and territorial command system.

My research shows that structures and systems created for specific functions have been adjusted to meet changing political, social, and security challenges and priorities, and have subsequently become institutionalized. The central questions I ask are why are some aspects of military reform in Indonesia difficult to implement while others are not? Why, in a democracy in which the civilian national leaders are elected in free and fair national elections and have supremacy over the armed forces, does military reform still appear negotiable? And finally, how has the Indonesian military's doctrine evolved in response to the changing political climate? I argue that because of the Indonesian military's autonomous institutional culture and historic legacies as a sociopolitical force, reforming

some parts cannot be satisfactorily completed as quickly as the civilian government has required through legislation.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Matt Sova was born in Syracuse, New York and grew up in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington DC. After graduating from Providence College in 2000 with a B.A. in mathematics, he began a career in the United States Army where he continues to serve as a Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer. He is supported by his patient wife Rachel and two beautiful children, Leo and Harper. They have greatly enjoyed their time in Ithaca together and look forward to many new adventures and experiences in Southeast Asia.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

Only months after Indonesian President Suharto was reelected to his sixth term, his New Order regime came to a sudden, unexpected end on 21 May 1998. With the end of three decades of Suharto's authoritative rule came many new beginnings. Relieved to finally be free from Suharto's rule, many Indonesians raced forward with unbridled optimism in the post-Suharto *Reformasi* (reform) era. The country started its measured transition to an open, liberal democracy and began reforming established institutions that, under the New Order, were considered legitimate expressions of Indonesian political and social culture. Among the early successes of the *Reformasi* movement was freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, the expansion of political parties, decentralizing political power across the country, and new and fair national elections.

For many years, Suharto's military-authoritarianism had been an acceptable trade off for economic development. Under Suharto, the Indonesian military had expanded its role in society to include active participation in politics and direct involvement in social and economic issues throughout the country in all levels of society. The Indonesian military is one of the few national institutions that stretch across the entire Indonesian archipelago and touch most aspects of Indonesian daily life.<sup>1</sup> The military has been the most dominant force in politics, a position it certainly held for the first fifty-two years of its history, and was a significant part of the Indonesia's social fabric. It is impossible to have a

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<sup>1</sup> The Indonesian military was called the Armed Forces of the Republic (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, or ABRI) until the end of Suharto's New Order regime. It was renamed the Indonesian National Military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) in 1999 after the police were separated. To avoid confusion, the generic terms military and armed forces are used through out this paper.

conversation about politics, economics, history, or security in Indonesia without recognizing the military's direct influence.

After Suharto's resignation, the Indonesian military's central position in Indonesia was also challenged and military reform immediately became a high priority. Parts of military reform, including practices that had existed unchallenged for years such as the *Dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine and unelected members of the military simultaneously serving in parliament proved to be rather easy to remove. However, fourteen years after the start of military reform, other military reform goals have been slow and unsuccessfully implemented.

This thesis is about the challenges of implementing military reform in Indonesia. The central questions I ask are why are some aspects of military reform in Indonesia difficult to implement while others are not? Why, in a democracy in which the civilian national leaders are elected in free and fair national elections and have supremacy over the armed forces, does military reform still appear negotiable? And finally, how has the Indonesian military's doctrine evolved in response to the changing political climate? To answer these questions, I examine the historic influences of the Indonesian military and argue that because of the Indonesian military's autonomous institutional culture and historic legacies as a sociopolitical force, reforming some parts of the military cannot be satisfactorily completed as quickly as the civilian government and many observers may want.

My argument contributes to existing literature by concentrating on unfulfilled reform goals. I explain the existing challenges of military reform in Indonesia and why some reform has not been successful to date. Existing literature looks at the Indonesian

military in the *Reformasi* period as a part of a larger political movement. This paper focuses specifically on the military reform with the intent on uncovering the best ways to proceed so that reform goals are accomplished in a successful, permanent way. Lessons learned from the Indonesian military reform process may also serve as an example for what may help other authoritarian regime transition to a democracy and reform their militaries.

The conclusions are not intended as policy recommendations or as a critique of past efforts. My central findings, instead, are that military reform is difficult, time consuming, and that future success will be built on past experiences. This thesis analyzes the available data on the Indonesian reform period and catalogues what the major issues are, what works and does not work, and why. The human spirit is incalculable and future experiences may have different results. The object is to look specifically at the military reform efforts in Indonesia since 1998 and to identify clear commonalities that may be used as building blocks for future reforms.

This thesis also makes no apologies or judgments for the Indonesian military's past violence, human rights violations, and gross corruptive behavior. Although these are all a part of the military's history, finding fault and assigning blame is beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, while excessive military behavior has been alleged in the recent decade in Papua, Aceh, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, my research will show that most of the Indonesian military's excessive corruption and violent behavior with impunity occurred during the New Order regime or immediately after, such as the case of East Timor in 1999. Although it is still in the shadow of these past atrocities, the Indonesian military has made clear, positive institutional changes. All accolades and/or criticism of key figures

throughout this thesis should be looked at solely in the context of military leadership, acumen, and reform.

The structure of the modern Indonesian military is derived from earlier examples and influential force structures, including some that predate Indonesia's fight for independence. Since its inception in the 1940s, the Indonesian military has been an adaptive learning institution, capable of absorbing and personalizing new ideas and taking from them the best (and worst) practices.

My research will show that Indonesia's modern military is the product of five distinct phases spanning hundreds of years. Its roots begin in the first phase, the colonial period under the Dutch East Indies Company (or *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, referred throughout this paper by its acronym as the VOC) and, after the VOC went bankrupt, by the Dutch government. The period of European corporate and Dutch colonial influence is followed by Japanese influence during Japan's three transformative years of occupation during World War II. The third phase is Indonesia's fight for independence against the Netherlands in the late 1940s. It was here where, under the leadership of General Sudirman, that the modern military was "born out of the independence struggle" (Layador 1999, 217) and created out of trial and error and lessons learned from all its previous variations. The fourth phase is the early period of Indonesian's sovereignty and the military's social-political role under Indonesia's first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto. The last phase begins on 21 May 1998 when President Suharto abruptly announced his resignation. This ended over thirty-one years of power and started the *Reformasi* period, which continues into the present.

As the world's largest archipelago, the tyranny of distance presents numerous challenges for the military and is a significant planning concern in defending its territory.<sup>2</sup> To overcome this complexity, the military organized itself into territorial commands, permanently deploying army units throughout the archipelago as it deemed necessary (Indonesia's territorial commands will be discussed in great detail in the following chapter.) This structure is known as the territorial command system, and its origins and evolution are central to the argument of this thesis. Controlling territory where there was weak to no central government representation further empowered the military and "its leaders, seeing it as the chief founder of independence, have persistently asserted that it has a right to help determine the course of state policy" (Feith 1964, 226). The transition of the territorial command system from a revolutionary vanguard to a political actor began in at the end of Sukarno's administration and was solidified in Suharto's New Order regime.

The Indonesian military grew into one of the most capable institutions in the country. Three main reasons have continued to drive the armed forces high standing since Indonesia's independence. The first is its prominent role in the fight for independence from the Dutch. The second is its claim as the savior of the nation, enforcing the five tenets of *Pancasila* and ensuring national unity.<sup>3</sup> The third is the systemic weaknesses of civilian

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<sup>2</sup> This challenge gave birth to the *Wawasan Nusantara*, or Archipelagic Outlook, the geographical and social unity of the nation. As an example, present day Indonesia (which did not exist until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) consists of more than 17,500 islands including occupying parts of the second, third, and sixth largest islands in the World (New Guinea, Borneo, Sumatra respectively). From east to west, the archipelago spans a distance larger than the continental United States, extending over 3,100 miles from Aceh in the northwestern tip of Sumatra to Jayapura on the easternmost part of Irian Jaya. However, approximately only 3000 islands are inhabited and only 6000 have been officially named. See, for example Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 10.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, R.G. Layador, "Indonesia and the Military at the Crossroads", *INDONESIAN QUARTERLY*, no. 27: 210. *Pancasila* is the national philosophy and ideological core of Indonesia.

leadership and the failure of to effective governance outside of Java. This last reason is one primary justification for maintaining an active presence in national politics.

Over Indonesia's history, its military evolved into a powerful political body. Scholars including Harold Crouch have written the "expansion of the military's political role was not a planned process" but "rather a form of a series of responses to particular crises arising" (Layador 1999, 220). The military filled a void created by an immature system of government and inexperienced civilian leaders. Lawlessness, rebellions, and riots were resolved with a strong Indonesian military presence when no other arm of the government was able to do so. As the military's political power grew, its relationship with the civilian leadership grew to resemble a partnership rather than a subordinate relationship.

This thesis starts with a historic analysis of the Indonesian military and its substantial influences from foreign and domestic experiences, and continues to military reform in the *Reformasi* period beginning with the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. In chapter two I will describe the history of the Indonesian military and its evolution as an institution deeply entrenched in Indonesia's economic, political, and social life. My analysis of the Indonesian military's evolution spans from its earliest influences under Dutch colonialism through events in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, including the Japanese occupation during World War II, Indonesia's fight for independence against the Netherlands, and its first six decades as a sovereign country. My research shows that structures and systems created for specific functions have been adjusted to meet changing political, social, and security challenges and priorities, and have subsequently become institutionalized. I will specifically examine the military's doctrine and territorial

command system organization to construct my argument and explore the military's traditional functions and roles in society.

In chapter three and four, I will discuss the progress of military reform under the direction of the four presidents following Suharto: Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono. I will gather together my conclusions of the progress of military reform in Indonesia through the beginning of 2012 in chapter five. In doing so, two themes will emerge. First, military reform in Indonesia closely reflects the power of the president. During periods when the executive branch of the government is strongest, military reform has had the most traction. When the president is weak or politically diverted, military reform stalls. From this, I conclude that for any future reform to be successful and lasting, it must be specifically defined, and closely nested within the goals of the civilian democratically elected government.

The second theme is about the military's collective definition of self and its protection of what it sees as its own interests. The narrative of the Indonesian military as a self-created army of the people has justified the military many privileged exceptions that have solidified over time, becoming entitlements. As the successes and failures in the reform movement will show, the military is very sensitive to releasing its grip on some of its traditional roles in society. For continued reform to be successful, the Indonesian military's professionalism and capability must be improved. In this sense, military reform progresses along both internal and external lines and adequate time must be given for the military to change its culture. Civilian supremacy over the armed forces is paramount to guiding military reform. Creating qualified civilian defense leaders and restructuring the military to best perform its mission is critical to military reform and national defense.

## Chapter 2: The History of the Indonesia Military: From the VOC Era to Suharto

The earliest historic influences on the modern Indonesian armed forces, including its territorial command system, occur during the colonial period under the VOC (Dutch East India Company).<sup>4</sup> While the VOC was initially solely interested in economic issues through trade and extracting resources, it was the first central power in the Indonesian archipelago to enforce a Westphalian system by defining and defending its borders with an active duty professional military.<sup>5</sup>

Initially the Dutch, through the VOC, had little interest in controlling and administrating the archipelago beyond issues that affected its financial prosperity.<sup>6</sup> From the beginning, the Dutch mindset was that the East Indies was an financial opportunity and they were most concerned with the valuable spices clove, nutmeg, and mace found in the eastern islands which could be sold at twelve times their purchase price in European markets and coffee and sugar grown on Java.<sup>7</sup> To this effect, historian John David Legge

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<sup>4</sup> Europeans started arriving in the Indonesian archipelago in great numbers around the same time as they ventured to the Americas. A major difference with the Americas was that locals in Asia were already used to foreign merchants. Frequent exposure over time to other societies through commerce networks is one reason why Asians were not ravished by disease the way the Aztecs, Incas, and other “New World” people were.

<sup>5</sup> Including the territory in the Dutch East Indies made the Netherlands the third largest colonial power in the world, behind Great Britain and France.

<sup>6</sup> After five different Dutch companies chartered expeditions to Asia return with a 400% profit, the VOC formed in March 1602 (over two years after the British East India Company received its charter) when four of the major trading companies merged and were charged with quasi-sovereign administrative and military control to best serve the Dutch Republic’s interests in Asia. The VOC was the world’s first multi-national company. As such, corporation and maximizing profit was the model and the VOC was responsible to big enterprise and to its shareholders in Europe. See, for example, M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 30-34.

<sup>7</sup> Until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the only place in the world where nutmeg grew was on the Banda islands. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century there were an estimated half-million nutmeg trees on Banda, which could produce a yearly output of 600,000 pounds of nutmeg and 140,000 pounds of mace. The Dutch were also interested in sandalwood, sappanwood, camphor, and the (non-indigenous) pepper-producing area of southern Sumatra.

commented that VOC interests were to “maintain control of business and commerce, while the Indonesians were left to cultivate the soil” (Legge 1977, 8).

The Company’s interests were purely economic and not strategic like the British objectives in Burma or ideological like the Spanish in the Philippines.<sup>8</sup> The VOC “deliberately sought to avoid territorial responsibilities” and was “not interested in making an ideological impact upon the society of the Indies” (Legge 1977, 83). However, over time the Dutch inherited administrative responsibilities and expanded their reach throughout the archipelago.

The Dutch and the VOC had no initial intention of forming or supporting an indigenous military. In fact, they had little desire to have much of a military presence at all beyond maintaining naval superiority in order to protect trade routes. The VOC established many small garrisons throughout the archipelago at key port and trade locations, but maintained them at the lowest levels possible.<sup>9</sup> A very small garrison of the VOC army was stationed in Batavia, the center of gravity for administration in the Dutch East Indies.<sup>10</sup> This garrison totaled only seventy soldiers in 1618 and one hundred forty three by 1622. The small mercenary security force was a combination of German, French,

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<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, the Dutch did make all Catholics convert to Protestantism but did not bother with any other religions. Converting to Islam became an opportunity to be in opposition to Dutch rule.

<sup>9</sup> In a strange irony of history, the Dutch formed a military to protect its business interests, while many years later the TNI would form businesses to protect its military. In fact, in the 1950s when the Dutch businesses were nationalized, most were taken by the Indonesian military to manage.

<sup>10</sup> Benedict Anderson described Batavia as a “swampy coastal township” when the Dutch decided to base their operations there. Located on the northern coast of western Java, Batavia is protected by the calm waters of the Java Sea as opposed to the rougher water in the Indian Ocean. It is also one of the best ports on Java and has easy access to the common trade routes to East Indonesia, the Straits of Melaka, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. See Benedict Anderson, “Old State, New Society,” *Journal of Asian Studies* (1983): 478.

English, Dutch, and other European soldiers.<sup>11</sup> Other garrisons throughout the archipelago had similar multi-national representation, but were always led by Dutch officers.<sup>12</sup>

The first military reform on Java started when Napoleon Bonaparte regime occupied the Netherlands and selected Marshal Herman Willem Daendels to be Governor General of Batavia in 1808. Daendels expanded Batavia's direct control in central Java and increased Dutch military forces from 4000 to 18,000 by hiring Javanese men to serve in military units.<sup>13</sup>

The Dutch allocated a minimum amount of combat power outside of Java, and Daendels' defense plan essentially ceded the outer islands if they were aggressively attacked. The three security sector tasks issued by the Minister of the Colonies were: "(1) the maintenance of law and order within the East Indies; (2) the maintenance of neutrality in a war in which the Netherlands would not be involved; and (3) the absorption of the first shock of a direct attack" (Vandenbosch 1941, 345). The first and third task assigned to the army is very similar to the responsibilities of the Indonesian army today through TRIDEK (*Tri Dharma Eka Putra*, three missions one deed) and the Total People's Defense and Security doctrine.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Soldiers enlisted for a minimum of five years like the other civilian merchants and employees of the VOC. Many of the initial soldiers in the VOC army were poor, uneducated men or orphans. Often, the educated men in the military seeking adventure and proven capable of greater responsibility were allowed to transfer and work as merchants in the VOC. Much later in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Dutch also included indigenous soldiers from parts of the archipelago deemed loyal and worthy, such as Minhasa and Ambon. During the Aceh war they also hired soldiers from Africa fighting under the Dutch flag.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Jean Gelman Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), ch.1, and C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (New York: Knopf, 1965), 80-81.

<sup>13</sup> Daendels created small cavalry units that were integrated into the Dutch colonial army with upper class recruits that were stuck in a purgatory of not being able to find work in the bureaucracy but too noble to work as laborers, farmers, or craftsmen. See, for example, M.C. Ricklefs 2001, 143-147.

<sup>14</sup> The Total People's Defense and Security doctrine would be replaced after the resignation of President Suharto with the New Paradigm after the separation of the police from the armed forces. But the possibility of mobilizing civilians is still present in the army's defense plan.

After the VOC collapsed in bankruptcy in 1800, ending two centuries of continuous operations in the Indonesian archipelago, its territory and trade enterprises were taken over by the Dutch government. The Netherlands was now directly responsible for its administration and defense. Formulating a defense plan for the Indonesian archipelago was a monumental challenge for the Dutch. In some ways, the geographical issues with the Indonesian archipelago were similar to those faced by the Netherlands in Europe, only on a much grander scale. Both the Netherlands and the Indonesian territories are along the dominant sea route used for transportation and especially trade. Also, both territories are geographically located between other military powers.

In March 1830, Governor General Johannes van den Bosch formed the Royal Netherlands Indies' Army (or in Dutch, the *Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger* or KNIL).<sup>15</sup> This semi-autonomous arm of the Royal Netherlands Army was created to expand the colonial rule to western Sumatra and the outer islands in more remote areas of the archipelago. Military officers were charged with administrative control over the civilian population outside of Java. This was mostly because of the lack of civilian administrators qualified and willing to perform the duties, a common occurrence lasting through most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Indonesia. Military officers were entrusted with a great deal of autonomy, and by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they were performing duties as civil administrators in Aceh, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumba, Sumbawa, and Timor.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Van Den Bosch also introduced the Culture System in Java where at least 1/5<sup>th</sup> of every peasant's output was collected instead of tax in 1830.

<sup>16</sup> Appointment of military officers to civilian posts was often at the great displeasure of many Dutch civilian authorities. For greater detail, see HW van den Doel's essay "Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies" in R.B. Cribb, *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 57-77. Common criticisms then that military officers were not culturally attuned and too busy or otherwise distracted to effectively govern could be just as effectively said in the 1990s.

Later in the 1830s the Dutch needed to further augment their security forces, so they created professional detachments comprised of Indonesian soldiers and led by a few carefully selected Indonesian officers with assistance from European officers and non-commissioned officers. These detachments' primary duty was to guard warehouses, prisons, and other government buildings and escort prisoners as needed. They received very little military tactical training.

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Dutch Army force structure peaked at 30,000 soldiers, with over 40 percent stationed on Java.<sup>17</sup> Half were Europeans and the others were mercenaries from Africa or Asia and local conscripts, usually from Ambon, north Sulawesi, or one of the other areas known for sympathy for Dutch rule.<sup>18</sup> Units were always lead by Europeans and Indonesians rarely served as junior officers. For example, when the Dutch surrendered to Japan in March 1942, there were only twenty Indonesian officers out of over twenty-thousand Indonesian soldiers.<sup>19</sup> The most senior officer was a major, a rank impossible to achieve without also having a high, pre-existing social status.

Finite resources and high sustainment costs were not conducive to large military garrisons in the eastern islands. Forts at Timor, Kalimantan, Makassar, Padang, and in other eastern islands were merely symbolic. The Dutch treated Indonesia as “a group of essentially separate sub-colonies linked to the administrative center” in Batavia, which Kingsbury argues was the model for independent Indonesia’s central, paternalistic national

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<sup>17</sup> The Dutch did not have direct authority over the greater archipelago until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. For example, Bali was not occupied and under Dutch administration until 1906, Aceh until 1908, and they effectively ignored central Kalimantan and Sulawesi until 1900-1910. For further examples, see Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (second edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27-33.

<sup>18</sup> It is not a coincidence that these parts in Indonesia were dominant Christian areas.

<sup>19</sup> Some of the Indonesian officers serving in KNIL, such as General Abdul Harris Nasution, Tahi Bonar Simatupang, and Alex Kawailarang would have important roles in the military after Indonesia’s independence.

political identity.<sup>20</sup> Using the economy of force principle - allocating minimum combat power to secondary interests - the Netherland's defense plan for the colony was to concentrate on protecting Java, using its army strategically located in the major urban areas.

The Dutch model reflected the span of control challenges caused by the Indonesian archipelago's unique geography. The VOC and KNIL had to overcome the challenge of defending the world's largest archipelago with limited funding and resources. The Dutch responded by delegating responsibility to the local commanders, a decision that would influence the doctrine and task organization of the modern Indonesian armed forces. The semi-autonomous military territorial command system and assignment of responsibility to military officers to serve as a form of government foreshadows A.H. Nasutions's "Middle Way" and later the TNI's *dwifungsi* mission.

The Dutch armed forces also provided the first prolonged exposure Indonesia had to modern military equipment and Western military tactics. The prolonged colonial experience superseded indigenous military experience and the martial traditions that existed in the scattered former kingdoms throughout the archipelago.<sup>21</sup> The Dutch military, with its professional active duty soldiers, leadership hierarchy with multiple layers of command, advanced weapons, and logistical support operations on a grand scale were new and informative to Indonesian military minds. The Dutch also were the first to employ the modern principles of warfare, specifically economy of force, in Indonesia. This has become a cornerstone of the TNI's defense doctrine.

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<sup>20</sup> Kingsbury 2002, 33.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), ch 1.

## **Influence from the Japanese occupation through PETA**

The 1940s was a period of change, in Indonesia and around the world. At the start of the decade among the ten countries that now comprise ASEAN, only Thailand was an independent nation. In the next few years the region would see Japan's military march through or occupy parts of every country in Southeast Asia, only to see Allied forces fight them back. By the end of the decade, five countries would be independent and free from colonial rule.<sup>22</sup>

Japan's military invaded Indonesia in January 1942. By early March, Japan had defeated all the remaining Dutch troops, culminating in the Battle of the Java Sea. On 9 March 1942 the Dutch military commander and Governor General surrendered, effectively signaling the end of the Netherland East Indies. The Netherlands could do little to defend their colonies; Germany had occupied the Netherlands since May 1940 and its military in the Indonesian archipelago was too thinly spread and too poorly equipped to defend against a superior Japanese force. The Japanese occupation period includes some of the most critical years in shaping the Indonesian military's history, and provided a new framework for the future development and spirit of its military.

Soon after establishing military dominance in Java and Sumatra, the Japanese arrested most of the European permanent residents and placed them in detention camps.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The new countries and their dates of independence are Indonesia (17 August 1945), Vietnam (2 September 1945), Philippines (4 July 1946, but the government of the Philippines later changed the date to 12 June) Burma (4 January 1948), and Laos (19 July 1949). Cambodia received its independence on 9 November 1953 and Malaya on 31 August 1957.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Herbert Feith "Part Three: Indonesia" from George Kahin (editor), *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), 197 or Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 86-88. Over 100,000 civilians were placed in prison camps and another 80,000 Allied soldiers were held in prisoner-of-war camps in Indonesia.

This was effective in removing all foreign leaders, but also caused problems for the Japanese administration of the territory. Without a working system in place, Japanese officers had to take control of government services and activities. However the vastness of Indonesia combined with Japan's finite number of soldiers created a new challenge. This led Japanese authorities to look for Indonesian leaders who could work with them to help maintain order, something that had only been done in limited measure and with heavy supervision under Dutch authority.

Hoping to win the hearts and minds of the Indonesians and build a sympathetic, if not loyal, base of support, Japanese leaders combed the population for their ideal candidates. Japan had not yet disclosed its plans for the future of Indonesia after the war was over, but the Japanese did prefer leaders from the nationalist movement and of Muslim organizations (the common theme the Japanese were trying to instill was that Indonesia was better off led by other Asians than by Europeans or Westerners).<sup>24</sup> Many leaders, including future president Sukarno and the first vice-president Mohammad Hatta, were more than willing to cooperate.

As the tide of the war changed to the Allies advantage and Japan's forces spread over much of Asia, Japan also executed an economy of force mission and assumed risk in the outer islands with minimal defense assets. Unlike its earlier battles against China and Russia, Japan now had to prepare for possible invasions by forces led by the United States and Great Britain – two highly industrialized nations with better naval power and air superiority.

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<sup>24</sup> Many Indonesians were extremely optimistic and hopeful when Japan first invaded and removed the Dutch. Often in the first few weeks Japan was respectfully referred to as Indonesia's "older brother".

Japan's generals stationed in Indonesia began preparing for possible invasions from Australia or via Sulawesi and Borneo and the Java Sea.<sup>25</sup> Without the possibility of reinforcements, they had to be creative in stretching their defense as much as possible. The best solution was to include the Indonesians themselves as part of the military defense effort. This concept was not new to Japan. The Japanese had already formed non-Japanese military forces in Burma (the Burma Independence Army) and in Malaya (in December 1941), consisting of local nationalists aligned with mutual interests against the British. Although the Japanese controlled these units, they had their own local leaders as officers.

In Indonesia, the Japanese formed two types of military units in which Indonesians served. The first, started in April 1943, was called *heiho* (soldier auxiliary) and was designed solely with a military objective in mind. In these units Indonesian soldiers worked side by side with Japanese soldiers as manual laborers on military construction projects. They served and fought with the Japanese all over Southeast Asia, including in Thailand, Burma, the Solomon Islands, and parts of Indonesia defending against the Australians.<sup>26</sup> *Heiho* soldiers were imbedded in Japanese units and, through shared hardship and experience, came to be greatly respected by the Japanese.

The second units formed were called *Pembela Tanah Air* (Defenders of the Homeland), more commonly known by the acronym PETA.<sup>27</sup> PETA was formed to satisfy two primary concerns of the Japanese. One was the need to organize native military units

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<sup>25</sup> The Japanese themselves invaded along this route and were met with very little military resistance. When Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies, Germany already occupied the Netherlands and there was very little the Dutch could do to defend their colony, especially with the few military forces it had remaining in Southeast Asia.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example Nugroho Notosusanto, *The PETA Army During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia* (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979), 79-80.

<sup>27</sup> The unit was originally named *Tentara Sukarela* but its name was permanently changed to PETA a few months later in 1944.

to overcome Japan's lack of soldiers and the slim possibility of receiving reinforcements.

The other reason was for political and propaganda purposes. Japan hoped to instill in Indonesians what the Dutch never wanted to do: a stake in defending their country for their own (eventual) independence. This strategy required local support, and the only way to do that was to make Indonesians active stakeholders in the defense effort. "To win the support of the occupied peoples they must be given a stake in the war, a feeling that the Pacific War was their war and that they had to defend their respective countries to avoid the return of the hated Western colonialists."<sup>28</sup> Japanese General Inada thought that Indonesians could not embody this attitude and belief without their own army. (This was one reason the Dutch failed in their efforts against Japan; Indonesians had little to gain in defending Dutch colonialism in their country and in fighting along the sides of the Dutch for whom they had little respect.)

Japanese leaders also believed that it was important for Indonesia to have the resemblance of an army as a symbol of its fight for independence, but still be in the shadow of Japanese control. The idea may be credited in part to Japan's Lieutenant General Inada Masazumi and his staff, but Indonesian leaders also supported it in order to avoid possible conscription.<sup>29</sup> Thus, PETA was formed with four critical tenants: the PETA army would only have Indonesian membership, Japanese military personnel would only be used in a

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<sup>28</sup> Nugroho Notosusanto 1979, 89.

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, Harumi Wanasita Evans, and Ruth McVey "The PETA and My Relations with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno's Autobiography," *Indonesia* no. 5 (1968): 105-134. Not all of the Japanese officers thought PETA would be welcomed with fanfare from Indonesians, yet alone be successful. An example of the differing opinions among the Japanese is a bet between two officers, Captain Maruzaki and Mr Yangawa. Once PETA proved to be flourishing and Captain Maruzaki was on the losing side of the bet, he cut off his little finger in front of his command with his own samurai sword. The Japanese tried to reinforce a dominant Muslim nature in PETA, including incorporating prayer time into the training schedule as much as possible. In fact much of its recruiting base came from persuasion and enthusiasm from Muslim leaders. However, there were certain qualities about the Japanese that were inherently offensive to the religious hardliners, such as the Japanese soldier's heavy drinking and insistence that soldiers pay respect through a deep bow towards Japan in honor of the Emperor.

training and advisory capacity, the PETA army would be directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander and independent of any other agency, and the PETA army would be a territorial army tasked with the defense of its respective regions.<sup>30</sup>

Although future versions of the Indonesian military would be very different from PETA, some of these principles remain as part of its core ideology. As we shall see, the concept of the military's semi-independence and territorial orientation continued after the war and into the *Reformasi* period. These two are the best examples of what the Indonesia scholar Ruth McVey means when she wrote "the initial force from which the Indonesian army sprang was the PETA, a paramilitary body created in 1943 in the expectation of an Allied invasion of Japanese occupied Java" (McVey 1971, 133).

The Japanese generals in Indonesia received approval from their headquarters in Tokyo to form PETA, but it came with the understanding that no additional equipment or men would be sent to assist them. To arm the new soldiers, Japanese generals in Indonesia were to use confiscated Allied equipment, and the first training centers for PETA officers took place in abandoned Dutch military bases. Indonesian army units officially formed in September 1943, and the first battalion-sized units in Java were created by December 1943.

PETA units were formed up to the battalion level. Tactically, if the Allied forces invaded Indonesia, PETA units were supposed to operate as a decentralized guerilla force within their sectors, harassing the enemy until Japanese forces could arrive for a counter attack. Each battalion (called a *daidan*) had four companies (*chudan*), which had three

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<sup>30</sup> For more detail see Notosusanto 1979, 99-100 or Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia" from John J. Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), 189-192.

platoons (*shodan*) consisting of four squads (*bundan*).<sup>31</sup> By the end of the war there were sixty-six battalions in Java and three in Bali.<sup>32</sup>

Each PETA unit was solely comprised of and led by Indonesians from top to bottom (compared with *heiho* where all the Indonesian soldiers were in Japanese units led by Japanese officers). However, there were several Japanese officers and non-commissioned officers serving as advisers assigned to each battalion.<sup>33</sup> “The Indonesia auxiliary troops during the Japanese Occupation were neither colonial troops nor armed forces of a new nation” (Notosusanto 1979, 113). Officers in PETA received a little formal military education in consolidated centers before they were assigned to their unit.<sup>34</sup> Soldiers were trained at their units at their commander’s discretion, with no centralized training center or basic training format.

It is important to note that PETA was not a meritocracy. Senior officers of each unit were carefully selected and were already prominent men with established credibility and prior leadership experience as civilian community leaders. The younger officers, usually in their mid-twenties, had usually received formal education or were recent graduates and drawn largely from the “more privileged strata of Indonesian society” (McVey 1971, 133). This practice played into the Asian values of respect for seniority, but created unofficial glass ceilings and allowed little upward movement from within the ranks for younger

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<sup>31</sup> An ideal battalion size was approximately five hundred and thirty five soldiers. A company would have one hundred and thirty two, and a platoon forty-four soldiers.

<sup>32</sup> There are varying estimates, but by the time the Japanese surrendered in 1945 there were between 40,000-55,000 soldiers in PETA (as many as 35,000 in Java and 20,000 in Sumatra) and an estimated 42,000 soldiers in *heiho* units. In Kahin’s book *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* on page 109 he estimates that “at its peak strength in the middle of 1945 it numbered about 120,000 armed men.”

<sup>33</sup> By the end of the Japanese Occupation there were approximately three hundred and fifty Japanese officers and many more non-commissioned officers embedded in PETA.

<sup>34</sup> The first Indonesian officers in PETA graduated from a two-month Japanese-led officer-training course in December 1943. The school was located in Bogor, just outside Jakarta, in a former Dutch military base.

motivated soldiers. Most non-commissioned officers had a secondary education, implying that they also came from families that were relatively wealthy. However, it is worth noting that they were usually not from the university-educated population, which tended to gravitate towards service in the civilian administration.

Japan's fearless and aggressive military culture resonated deeply with many Indonesians, once they had prolonged exposure to it. Similar to how centuries before the Indonesian's embraced Islam and incorporated it with existing Hindu and Buddhist practices, the soldiers of PETA were attracted to Japan's samurai or "*bushido*" (the way of the warrior) lifestyle. *Bushido* exemplifies many respected attributes and already familiar and present in Indonesian culture and often represented by *wayang* characters in public performances.<sup>35</sup>

Although most Indonesian soldiers were not ideologically aligned with the Japanese, they did have great respect for Japan's military acumen, especially after witnessing first-hand Japan's quick and complete defeat of the Dutch (the Dutch military capitulated less than three months after Japan's first strike). Japan's military was stronger and more sophisticated than the Dutch. This memory would not fade after the end of WWII, and the training that Indonesian soldiers received from the Japanese soldiers was greatly valued, boosting their confidence and moral.

Indonesian soldiers were also greatly impressed by Japan's military and economic accomplishments. Japan had never been colonized and had recently defeated Russia, a

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<sup>35</sup> Two examples in particular are worth noting. The first is the character Kumbakarna, who in the epic Ramayana, once it was clear war was unavoidable, fights bravely and with honor for his country and king until he dies in battle. The second is Karna, who is the older half brother of the Pandawa's but despite the blood relation through their mother Kundi, fights against them allied with the Korawa's. See, for example, Benedict Anderson, *Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1965).

European power. Indonesian officers in PETA did not accept all of Japan's samurai values, but they served as motivation to return to their own cultural values and inspiration to create their own military identity. This mindset, not the centuries of colonial influence, would carry into the future and be the "formative ideological experience" of the Indonesian army.<sup>36</sup>

The militarization of the Indonesian population during these few years, through military units like PETA, had lasting effects beyond the Japanese occupation. The military framework the Japanese provided a blueprint that future Indonesian military leaders would use to create their own units. After the Dutch civilian leaders were so easily displaced by the Japanese, Indonesian nationalist leaders found new hope that their cause was achievable.

Japan singularly wiped out the Dutch colonial grasp of Indonesia, strengthening Indonesians' demand for independence.<sup>37</sup> The military training and experience PETA soldiers received, as limited as it was, empowered them with confidence they had never had under Dutch occupation. Through the PETA experience, the Japanese stirred a militaristic impulse that had been dormant. Indonesia scholar Damien Kingsbury suggested that one of the lasting influences of the Japanese military in Indonesia was the "introduction of the notion that society could and should be controlled" (Kingsbury 2002, 30). Furthermore, the tactical positioning of military units throughout the country in active defensive positions became the framework for the future Indonesian military's territorial command structure.

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<sup>36</sup> Ruth T. McVey, "The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army" *Indonesia* no. 11 (1971): 132

<sup>37</sup> Fighting for Independence was nothing new in parts of Indonesia. There were numerous rebellions against the Dutch for years, but they were uncoordinated and unsuccessful.

## **Fight for Independence and Birth of a National Military**

On 15 August 1945, nine days after the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima, Japan's Emperor Hirohito announced complete and unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces. Two days later President Sukarno seized the advantage created by the ensuing power vacuum. In the name of the people of Indonesia, President Sukarno read a proclamation of independence signed by himself and vice-President Mohammad Hatta from the verandah of his house in Jakarta to an assembly of about a thousand people.<sup>38</sup> This moment at 10 am on Friday, 17 August 1945 marks the beginning of Indonesia's claim of independence.<sup>39</sup>

When Sukarno declared Indonesian independence, the country did not have a government, military, or even a consensus of what the boundaries of its territory would be.<sup>40</sup> As Sukarno and Hatta concentrated first on organizing the government, they agreed that they did not even want a military. Civilian leaders feared it would draw unwanted attention and solicit a military response from the Allied Forces in Southeast Asia to which they were incapable of reacting.

Sukarno and Hatta adopted a cautious, pacifist policy based on diplomacy and maintaining a low profile instead of confrontation. They both agreed that forming a military would be perceived as a sign of aggressiveness and draw a heavier, faster response

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<sup>38</sup> The proclamation was only two sentences and began "We the people of Indonesia", a concept that was unimaginable under the Dutch because the Dutch never saw the Indonesian archipelago as one homogenous group. As much as it was meant for Indonesian citizens, Suharto's statement was also directed at the Dutch and the Allies. The Dutch were eager to get their lost territory back, but did not have the resources immediately available to take it. Allied conditions of Japan's surrender expressed that everything was to return to its pre-war status. Soldiers from PETA units were securing Sukarno's house as he read the short statement, not knowing that every PETA unit would be permanently disbanded the following day.

<sup>39</sup> This date is celebrated as Indonesia's Independence Day and cleverly depicted in the national symbol of the Garuda. On the Garuda's neck there are 45 feathers (representing 1945). Its tail has 8 (for August, the 8<sup>th</sup> month) and there are a total of 17 on its wings.

<sup>40</sup> PETA was officially disbanded by the Japanese on 18 August 1945. In a meeting on 29 August, the civilian leadership decided that the territory of Indonesia would be everything from the former Dutch East Indies.

from the Allied Forces still in Asia. Sukarno was so concerned about this that he omitted a position for Minister of Defense when he announced his first presidential cabinet. A month later he appointed a person that had been missing for months (and was never found) to serve as Minister of Security.<sup>41</sup>

The new government's security strategy was not popular with large portions of the population, especially hardline nationalists and youth. Many of the men in this demographic had recent military experience training in militias, primary school, or organized units like PETA, *heiho*, or earlier from the days of KNIL.<sup>42</sup> Rooted in a common theme of the need to arm themselves, but not nested within a higher mission, individuals took initiative and formed numerous localized groups with a military purpose. In the beginning there was no feature that distinguished the freedom fighters and nationalists from the average civilians.

One of the first of the armed units to form called itself the People's Security Organization (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*, or BKR).<sup>43</sup> BKR started with volunteer members that were mostly former PETA soldiers who joined units in their hometowns. The BKR was a regrouping of former soldiers that identified itself as freedom fighters and, critically, not a military arm of the new government. However, the only similarities between PETA and the BKR were a shared warrior ethos and a vague concept among some officers about what a

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<sup>41</sup> Suprijadi, a former PETA officer, was the appointed minister who had not been accounted for in months and was never seen again. It is widely believed that he was captured by the Japanese after leading a small revolt and tortured to death. See, for example, Gotō, Ken'ichi and Paul H. Kratoska, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2003), 100-101 or Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), ch. 1.

<sup>42</sup> The Japanese thought very highly about the effects of military discipline and mandated time to be spent on basic drill and ceremony in public schools.

<sup>43</sup> Other groups that formed from soldiers trained by the Japanese and were active in fighting for independence were called The Army of God (*Hisbullah*) and Vanguard Corps (*Barisan Pelopor*).

higher command looked like and was able to achieve. There was “not a single case known of PETA units being reestablished in their original form” (Notosusanto 1979, 180).

BKR units were formed in the haste and confusion of a revolutionary moment and without deliberate planning by experienced leaders. Leadership positions within BKR were taken by any credible person with a military background, regardless of the source of his training and experience. During the four years that Indonesia fought against the Dutch “a combat officer’s effectiveness and reputation had rested largely on his ability to attract and keep a following of soldiers” and the “strength of the leader depended on the strength of his personality and ability to appear as a father figure” (McVey 1971, 142).

Former PETA officers were more successful than *heiho* or KNIL soldiers in acquiring these positions because there were more of them, and because they were accustomed to fighting and training with limited resources (in contrast to the few Dutch-trained officers). The BKR was a simple, locally oriented force without central organization, an overarching long-term strategy, or an operational command hierarchy above the smallest tactical level. They armed themselves with anything they could acquire, and by commandeering weapons from the Japanese before the Allied Forces could disarm them.

Two months after declaring Indonesia’s independence, the civilian leadership changed policy. On 5 October 1945 President Sukarno officially endorsed the formation of the armed forces and the BKR became the nucleus of the new Army. The Indonesian armed forces was first called the People’s Security Army (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*, or TKR). The military changed its name three months later to the Army of the Republic of Indonesia (*Tentara Republik Indonesia*, or TRI). It took another 18 months for most of the other smaller militia organizations to merge or be absorbed by the TRI and for the armed forces

of Indonesia to be consolidated under one command. This change occurred for a few reasons, including pressure from nationalist groups and reassurance from the first Allied Forces that landed in Java that they were not going to meddle in internal affairs.<sup>44</sup>

Despite Sukarno's endorsement, the TRI began to form an identity that was separate from central government. For these reasons the Indonesian military is known as a "self created" army, "born out of the revolution for independence" (Widjojo 2000, 1). It was not formed by a government or a political party, or to serve a government or political party, but from a collective need of the Indonesian people.<sup>45</sup> Sukarno might not have realized it at the moment, but this was a delicate situation in which the government he represented could not live without the military, but the military was willing live without his government.

Military leaders "had refused from the outset to accept the principle of civilian control over military affairs and the course of the revolution did nothing to convince them that they had been wrong in maintaining their independence" (McVey 1971, 131). An example of the power struggle and divide between the military and civilian leadership took place on 11 November 1945 in Yogyakarta when all the regional commanders of units from Java and Sumatra were summoned to meet in a historic military conference.

At the conference, without approval or input from the civilian government, the military representatives determined that the military needed to be consolidated under one unified command. They elected the young, patriotic and charismatic 29-year old Sudirman

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<sup>44</sup> The mission of the first European military units that arrived in Indonesia after the end of World War II was to oversee the disarming of Japanese forces and receive the prisoners of war. The British were the first to arrive via Singapore and although they would eventually be involved, they were initially totally uninterested in reestablishing European colonial authority anywhere in the Indonesian archipelago.

<sup>45</sup> See also Robert Lowry 1996, 46-47, 99 or R.G. Layador "Indonesia and the Military at the Crossroads" *INDONESIAN QUARTERLY*, no. 27 (1999): 217.

to be the *Panglima Besar*, the first commander-in-chief of the military.<sup>46</sup> This election set the precedent that the military could and would do as it wished, and began an era of dual leadership where the military acted with relative autonomy and more as a partner than as a subordinate to the civilian government. The military's relationship would continue this way until 1998, with the end of Suharto's New Order regime and beginning of the *Reformasi* period.

The election of Sudirman also represented a changing of the guard in the military culture. The few years of Japanese occupation were just long enough for the Japanese military example to leave an impression, but short enough that Indonesians still remembered Dutch rule. This was especially true among military-aged males who were still recovering from the colonial experience, and who disregarded the Dutch military as weak.

KNIL-trained soldiers and especially officers were often met with suspicion. This is another reason why the military leaders present at the conference could circumvent their cultural deferral to elders and elect a young officer like Sudirman over a more senior cadre of potential leaders such as Urip Sumoharjo and A.H. Nasution. During the revolution, the spirit of the nascent Indonesian military was best captured by optimistic enthusiasm of the new generation of leaders who demanded action.

The self-congratulations were short lived, however, and the new military was quickly put to test. The Dutch refused to recognize Indonesian independence and, with the help of the British, arrived to retake the Indies. Indonesians now had to fight for the

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<sup>46</sup> Sudirman, a former PETA officer, was selected over older officers such as Urip Sumoharjo, a former Major in the KNIL. Urip would become the chief of staff under Sudirman. See, for example, Tjokropranolo, Elizabeth Krahling, Bert Jordan, Steve Dawson, and Ian MacFarling, *General Sudirman: the Leader Who Finally Destroyed Colonialism in Indonesia* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995), 50-53.

independence that they had already declared. At first the military tried to fight by employing a linear defense strategy, in which the Indonesian military tried to hold specific ground against the Dutch. The Dutch military - better organized, experienced, and with superior weapons and equipment - was able to decisively win early battles and firmly establish itself in key cities in Java. By 1947 there were over 150,000 Dutch soldiers in Indonesia and they controlled most of the large cities in Java and Sumatra.

After a series of defeats, the Indonesians modified their strategy into a non-linear defense centered on guerilla warfare tactics, marking the beginning of the territorial defense doctrine. Indonesia's geographic challenges, poor infrastructure, and limited military resources made it very difficult for the emergent Indonesian government to have centralized control. The result was the military's territorial commanders had "great independence vis-à-vis Jakarta and the army's relationship to them was more one of negotiation than of command" (McVey 1971, 147).

A decisive challenge to the Indonesian military, and a seminal moment in both civil-military relations and defense doctrine, occurred in mid-December 1948.<sup>47</sup> Jakarta could not be defended against the returning Dutch, so the newly formed government moved to the central Java city of Yogyakarta. On 19 December, Dutch forces attacked Yogyakarta, capturing President Sukarno and much of the civilian leadership.<sup>48</sup> Sudirman did not surrender, retreating instead to the countryside with his soldiers, where they began a six-

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<sup>47</sup> The name of the Dutch's offensive was *Operatie Kraai* (Operation Crow). It was prompted, in part, when the Indonesian military guerilla forces crossed the Van Mook line. This was a violation of the Renville Agreement, a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations Security Council and signed by Suharto and Hatta. (The agreement was signed aboard the USS Renville, a 455-foot long transport on 17 January 1948.) See, for example, George Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), ch. 7.

<sup>48</sup> Some historians have argued that Suharto and Hatta choose to stay and be captured in an act of martyrdom, hoping to raise international awareness and garner sympathy.

month guerilla warfare campaign against the Dutch, operating in hideouts in the slopes of the surrounding mountains.<sup>49</sup>

While Indonesia's political leadership was locked away in a prison camp in Sumatra, the military was the sole remaining national institution. As the commander the army, Sudirman realized he did not have the resources for a conventional war strategy and attacked the Dutch army with smaller, quicker forces and avoided direct combat in open territory.<sup>50</sup> General Sudirman, with help from Colonel Nasution, codified this tactic in his Tactical Order Number 1 issued in December 1948 following the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta. The order specifically stated to (1) not fight in a linear defense, (2) form self-sufficient military cells in every district based in mountain ranges in order to conduct guerilla warfare, and (3) turn the entire island of Java into a giant battlefield.<sup>51</sup> This method became the basic fighting style of the Indonesian army and is still part of the Indonesian military psyche. It has evolved into the doctrine of the Total People's Defense.<sup>52</sup>

This campaign was ultimately successful. In May 1949 a ceasefire was declared and the Dutch officially ended their fight in August. Although never decisively defeated militarily, political pressure from the United Nations Security Council and the United States through the Marshall plan weakened the Netherlands' resolve.<sup>53</sup> On December 1949, more

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<sup>49</sup> Sudirman's deputy commander was A.H. Nasution, a former KNIL officer.

<sup>50</sup> By this point, General Sudirman was severely weakened by tuberculosis and had to be carried on a stretcher across the countryside as he led the resistance.

<sup>51</sup> See Elizabeth Krahling Tjokropranolo, Bert Jordan, Steve Dawson, and Ian MacFarling, *General Sudirman: the Leader Who Finally Destroyed Colonialism in Indonesia* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995), 101.

<sup>52</sup> See, for example, Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 9-12. The Total People's Defense emphasizes mass public mobilization and for the Army to fight a mixture of conventional and guerilla warfare until reinforcements (now called KOSTRAD) arrive or the enemy quits.

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 100, 111-112. He states that between 1945 and 1949 only 700 British and Dutch troops were killed in

than four years after the end of World War II, the Dutch finally acknowledged Indonesia's independence.

Many Indonesians, both in and out of uniform, considered the initial hesitancy of the government to form a military and at least prepare for future combat operations an unforgivable weakness. This was highlighted throughout the revolution by the government's general ineffectiveness in both controlling the military and preventing the Dutch from re-entering Indonesia. The military was the only institution that was willing and able to resist Dutch occupation. In some areas, especially during 1945-1949, the military was the government. These events led to the military's claim to a special bond with the people of Indonesia highlighted in the slogan "*Asal rakyat, milik rakyat, bagian rakyat*" (from the people, owned by the people, part of the people).

The struggle for independence against the Dutch after World War II gave the Indonesian military its current identity. For the first time, military units comprised of and led by Indonesians were fighting for freedom. This experience in battle bonded the soldiers under a single cause and a common national identity. PETA, KNIL, *heiho*, and other military groups evaporated.

Furthermore, this experience refined the military's tactics and defined its defense doctrine. The army adopted a circle defense strategy nested with a strategy of Total People's Defense. Units were already positioned across much of the country and Indonesia did not have the capability to transport or project its forces in mass quickly, which necessitated a static defensive posture. This further entrenched the territorial command system in Indonesian defense doctrine.

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Indonesia, but estimates there were between 45,000 and 100,000 Indonesians soldiers and an equal number of civilians killed, plus over 7 million displaced on Java and Sumatra alone.

## **Post Revolution: The Territorial Command System and *Dwifungsi* during the Guided Democracy and New Order periods (1949-1998)**

With international recognition of independence and the cessation of fighting against the Dutch, the Indonesian military was for the first time without an enemy inside its borders. Peace can be an interesting time for a large military, especially one that is defined by aggressive initiative and action. The military now had to develop a non-combat role in a free Indonesian society. The strengths of the military to this point were its nationalist guerilla fighters and their fighting spirit.<sup>54</sup> Military leaders now faced the new challenge of peacetime while also having to organize the military and consolidate it under a unified command. This was especially challenging after the death of General Sudirman, the face of the armed forces and prominent military personality.

Without a common enemy, factionalism also became a bigger problem. In the years after independence, internal divisions and differing loyalties were common. Senior officers commanding units in the new military now came from three different periods: most of the older officers had received their formal training by the Dutch before 1942, others joined during the Japanese occupation period between 1943 and 1945, and still others joined during the fight for independence between 1945 and 1949. Generally speaking, the older generation favored a smaller, professional force organized in the image of European militaries. They were accustomed to a military's subservient role to the civilian government. The younger generation favored the type of military used in the fight for independence. They valued comradeship, power, and the opportunities afforded to them

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<sup>54</sup> This is a direct influence from the Japanese, unharnessed through exposure to the Japanese warrior ethos by Indonesians serving in *heiho* and PETA. The soldier's fighting spirit was considered more important than technical or formal training. See, for example, Pauker 1962, 198-199.

through the military's strong presence in society. This group saw the separation of the military's security role from its other functions as a wasteful and unnecessary.<sup>55</sup>

Internal posturing was further affected by the concentrated power of Sukarno's unitary government and its focus on economic development. The geopolitical landscape in Southeast Asia did not warrant a high defense budget and a large standing army was not sustainable, especially with the massive debt burden Indonesia inherited from the Netherlands.

At the high water mark during its fight against the Dutch, the estimated size of the Indonesian military was greater than 450,000 soldiers. Army chief of staff A. H. Nasution and Tahi Bonar Simatupang, General Sudirman's replacement and second commander of the recently renamed Indonesian Armed Forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or ABRI), spearheaded the reorganization, hoping to modify ABRI into a more modern, professional force. Initially the size of the active duty force was reduced to 160,000, with plans to further reduce the number below 60,000.<sup>56</sup> The ideal size of the active duty force was designed to operate and conduct tactical operations remotely in battalion-sized combat teams. This tactic, called a "mobile offensive system" by George Kahin, allowed military formations to be mobile and fast without complex logistic support.<sup>57</sup> This military strategy is still used in the unit currently called *Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat* (KOSTRAD, Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command).

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<sup>55</sup> See, for example, Hamish McDonald 1980, ch. 2.

<sup>56</sup> Discharged veterans were often given job training or other help by programs overseen by the Minister of Youth and Reconstruction. However many officers and soldiers were against the reduction and disbandment and had to be forced to do so by other military units. See, for example, George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), ch. 9.

<sup>57</sup> See Kahin 1952, 263. As Indonesian military leaders conducted their threat analysis, the enemy they were preparing to have to fight was the Dutch if they decided to attack again.

The small, mobile force was augmented with a wide network of territorially aligned forces would act as a first line of defense. The territorial defense concept in Indonesia originates from the circle defense strategy used under General Sudirman in Java fighting the Dutch, and the guerilla tactics used in the 1948 during the war of independence against the better-equipped and organized Dutch army.<sup>58</sup> The new territorially aligned forces were comprised of peasants and other local citizens that would receive basic military training as part-time soldiers. As an example, the Defense Act of 1954 ensures all Indonesians were aware of their specific defense requirements through basic military training and required classes.<sup>59</sup> This strategy became known as Total People's Defense because of its inclusion, if not reliance on, civilians and part-time soldiers. These defense strategies divided Indonesia's military into units that were tactically and territorially oriented.<sup>60</sup>

Indonesia's defense doctrine developed as a direct result of its vast geography and limited military capability. Its territory could never be centrally defended with the limited number of soldiers and equipment available. The air force and navy were poorly equipped and incapable of preventing an enemy landing - something that the Japanese and Dutch (with assistance from the British navy) had done in the 1940s. Therefore the defense

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<sup>58</sup> See Agus Widjojo, "Security Sector Reform and the Territorial Command" from Beni Sukadis, ed. *Almanac Indonesia 2007 security sector reform* (Jakarta: LESPERSSI, 2007), 120 or Ian MacFarling, *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia* (Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996), 132-137.

<sup>59</sup> See, for example, Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*. (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 31.

<sup>60</sup> This practice continues in the present. Approximately twenty five percent of the Indonesian army is assigned to its tactical units, KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS. The rest are either assigned to territorial commands, training centers, or central headquarters. For a more detailed breakdown of its force structure, see Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996) or Angel Rabasa and John Haseman *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), ch. 2.

strategy was designed to ensure that if any part of the country were overtaken, fighting would continue.<sup>61</sup>

For a guerilla-style defense strategy to be successful, the military first requires the complete support of the local population and intimate knowledge of the terrain and other available resources. General Nasution captured this sentiment, stating that fighting this kind of war “absolutely requires territorial support and service from the whole people in the territory” (Nasution 1964, 39). Considering the challenge of defending the world’s largest archipelago, the doctrine justifies a continued military presence throughout the country. During the 1950s this gave rise to the military’s establishment of a system of territorial commands in which the country is divided geographically and each command is responsible for defense within its sector. Later, during Suharto’s New Order regime, the territorial command system was justified as necessary to defend and provide security for the entire archipelago, but in reality, it was maintained in order to continue Suharto’s loyalty-based political system.<sup>62</sup>

The territorial command system divides Indonesia into military territories paralleling the civilian government, each assigned to a military commander as an area of responsibility.<sup>63</sup> This system absorbs the lion’s share of the Indonesian army, with anywhere between fifty and seventy percent of the forces assigned (the remaining force is assigned to operational units in KOSTRAD or KOPASSUS, or to training and logistical assignments). The twelve territorial commands (see Table 1) duplicate the organization of

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<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*. (Blackburn, Vic: Fontana Books, 1980), 32-34.

<sup>62</sup> Rieffel and Pramodhawardani 2007, 91.

<sup>63</sup> See Sebastian and Iisgindarsah, RSIS Working Paper No. 227, “Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform” (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011), 4.


the local government and, continuing to the present, are actively involved in daily life. See figure 1 below for a breakdown of the KODAMs in 1999 (this map was created prior to East Timor's independence). Two additional KODAMs have been added, one centered in Ambon covering the eastern islands south of KODAM VIII, and another in Aceh, northwest of KODAM I, covering northern Sumatra. Jakarta has its own KODAM.

Table 1

KODAM name	Provinces Included
KODAM <i>Iskandar Muda</i>	Aceh
KODAM I <i>Bukit Barisan</i> (Mountain Chain)	North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau Islands
KODAM II Sriwijaya	South Sumatra, Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung, Bangka Belitung
KODAM <i>Jaya</i> (Victory)	Jakarta
KODAM III Siliwangi	West Java, Banten
KODAM IV Diponegoro	Central Java, Yogyakarta
KODAM V Brawijaya	East Java
KODAM VI Tanjungpura	East, South, West, and Central Kalimantan
KODAM VII Wirabuana	Southeast, South, West, North, and Central Sulawesi
KODAM VIII <i>Trikora</i> (Succession)	Papua, West Papua
KODAM IX Udayana	Bali, NTB, NTT
KODAM XVI Pattimura	Maluku, North Maluku

Source: Agus Widjojo, "Security Sector Reform and the Territorial Command" in Beni Sukadis, ed. *Almanac Indonesia 2007: Security Sector Reform* (Jakarta: LESPERSI, 2007), 126.

Figure 1: Indonesian KODAMs



Source: Federation of American Scientists, September 13, 1999. Accessed November 1, 2012, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/adri.htm>

The largest command area is equal to or above the provincial level and is known as a *Kommando Daerah Militer* (KODAM). It is usually commanded by a two-star general with a headquarters of between 700-800 personnel. Each KODAM is responsible for defending its particular sector of the archipelago.<sup>64</sup> The KODAM commander has unmatched visibility and awareness of daily activities in his region because of the military intelligence component of his command, and he generally has greater situational awareness of local

<sup>64</sup> See Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 56-58 or Abdul Haris Nasution, *Towards a People's Army* (Djakarta: c.v. Delagsi, 1964). It is important to note that general Nasution sees no distinction between external defense and internal security.

religious activities, student movements, political dissent, and other daily activities than the civilian government.<sup>65</sup>

The KODAMs are divided into sub-regional commands (*Komando Resort Militer*, or KOREM), each commanded by a colonel with a headquarters of approximately 350 personnel. Beneath these, district commands (*Komando Distrik Militer*, or KODIM) are commanded by a lieutenant colonel; KODIM are again divided into smaller units paralleling the civilian forms of government. The lowest level of the system was at the sub-district or village level, where a junior officer or non-commissioned officer (*Bintara Pembina Desa* or BABINSA) is assigned to offer guidance and supervision.<sup>66</sup> See Table 1 below depicting the military's territorial command structure and Table 2 depicting the levels and associated senior ranks for the territorial command system and operation units.

Table 2

Civilian Government Equivalent	Territorial Command Name	Number in Indonesia
Province / Region	KODAM	12
Sub-Region, multiple Districts	KOREM	39
District	KODIM	271
Sub-District	KORAMIL	3818
Village	BABINSA	Between 27,000 and 30,000

Source: Lowry 1996, 229 and Rabasa and Haseman 2002, 12-14.

<sup>65</sup> See MacFarling 1996, 140.

<sup>66</sup> See Bilveer Singh, *Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces* (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 78-82 or Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 58-59.

Table 3

Rank	Territorial Command System	Operational Unit	United States Army Equivalent
Non-Commissioned Officer	BABINSA		Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant
Second Lieutenant	KORAMIL Commander	Team Leader	Platoon Leader
First Lieutenant	KORAMIL Commander	Battalion Staff Officer	Platoon Leader
Captain	KORAMIL Commander or Staff Officer	Company Commander	Company Commander or Battalion Staff Officer
Major	Staff Officer	Brigade or Division Staff Officer	Battalion, Brigade, or Division Staff Officer
Lieutenant Colonel	KODIM Commander	Battalion Commander	Battalion Commander
Colonel	KOREM Commander	Brigade Commander	Brigade Commander
Brigadier General	KODAM Chief of Staff	Army Staff	Assistant Division Commander
Major General	KODAM Commander	Division Commander	Division Commander

The defense doctrine that accompanies the territorial command system has three levels. First is conventional-style war in which the active army has the lead responsibility. Second is unconventional guerilla war, or “people’s resistance,” in which civilians are called on to actively participate as a militia fighting under the army’s leadership. The third is called “civil resistance,” and includes the entire population, with every civilian asset assisting the military effort. In this last situation the local population may be forced to leave their villages and take refuge wherever they can safely provide support to the military.<sup>67</sup>

The modern territorial command system, created by then-Army Chief of Staff

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<sup>67</sup> See Nasution 1964, 51-56.

Colonel A.H. Nasution, was officially established seven months after Indonesia achieved independence and was key to implementing the “total people’s defense and security” doctrine.<sup>68</sup> The three-level defense strategy and doctrine still exists and in times of peace “the function of the TNI is to prepare available combat units for the defense of the country in the advent of war” (Widjojo 2007, 121).

Critically, at this time the police was still part of the armed forces, and that the territorial system was also designed to react to internal threats which were identified as coming from four types of problems. These are labeled “SARA issues” and include disturbances related to ethnicity, religion, race, or class.<sup>69</sup>

The territorial command system was also responsible for monitoring local issues and influencing local politics and economic development. For example, the intelligence arm of the command paid close attention to civilian leaders and social groups, looking for any signs of rebellion or separatist movements. The system and doctrine were designed to control the “activities of political parties, trade unions, religious organizations, student groups, the press, and non-governmental organizations to ensure that challenges to the government were nipped in the bud” (Crouch 2010, 129).

The military presence under the territorial command system was deliberately public, and officers were involved in all aspects of civilian life. The territorial command system gave the military, empowered by the *Dwifungsi* doctrine, access and influence over the entire country. *Dwifungsi* significantly expanded the role of the military and involved in

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<sup>68</sup> Benedict R. O’G Anderson and Audrey Kahin, “Indonesian Army Territorial Commanders 1950-March 1983”, *Indonesia* no. 35 (1983): 109. A.H. Nasution was one of the few Indonesian soldiers trained by the Dutch Military Academy in Breda to serve as an officer in the KNIL (the soldiers were Indonesian while most of the officers were Dutch.) He would go on to serve as the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces and had contentious relationships with both Presidents Sukarno and Suharto.

<sup>69</sup> See MacFarling, 1996, 135. SARA is an acronym for *Suku* (tribe), *Agama* (religion), *Ras* (race), and *Antargolongan* (interest group) disputes.

“setting the national agenda and directions with the key positions held by the military” (Singh 1995, 56).

In sum, the central preoccupation of the territorial command system was security. But in reality, military leaders, through an amalgam of dominant personalities, organizational skills, and access to numerous logistic and commercial networks, began to dominate local politics and businesses. This system also proved to be highly effective and profitable, facilitating some of the military’s illegal and illicit businesses. In the 1950s and early 60s, “the political reality in most of the areas outside Java is that the army commander is the most powerful person” (Feith 1964, 263), although regional commanders could not overstep their authority and were still subordinate to central army leadership.

Thus, the function of the Indonesian military grew to include “secur[ing] the state internally, rather than protect[ing] it from external aggression” (Kingsbury 2002, 23). Through installing a military presence throughout the country and at every layer of the civilian political hierarchy, the military was able to expand its power and influence and become politically active throughout archipelago. The military believed that unless it was embedded politically throughout the countryside, Indonesia would not continue to exist.<sup>70</sup>

With the strong military presence throughout the country, the military was a visible sign of national identity. Often it was the only arm of the state that extended into the remote areas of the countryside. At a time when the idea of one unified Indonesia was still fragile and uncertain, the military was the bond that forced it together.<sup>71</sup> The tasks of

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<sup>70</sup> See Kingsbury 2002, 274-275.

<sup>71</sup> Unfortunately this was often done violently and on occasion against its own rough or sympathetic military units.

projecting nationalism and providing training and civic action programs drew many local populations together. Similar to the intentions of the Japanese officers during the occupation period in World War II, the Indonesian military made local populations active stakeholders in territorial defense.

Through the processes detailed above, the military was able to establish a strong foothold as an institution of power. By the end of the 1950s, it had thrust itself again into the national spotlight. After parliamentary democracy was abandoned in March 1957, there was a threat of civil war, and the military strongly sided with Sukarno's plan for Guided Democracy. Sukarno, in turn, supported Army chief-of-staff Major General A.H. Nasution's nationwide declaration of martial law on 14 March 1957. This act created the legal basis for the Indonesian military to be involved in civilian affairs.<sup>72</sup>

The 13 December decree authorized army commanders to take over control of the business enterprises that were previously owned by the Dutch.<sup>73</sup> After nationalization, Dutch-owned businesses came under direct ABRI control; at the time, Feith wrote that "the huge Dutch business establishment has all but formally become Indonesian government property" (Feith 1964, 211). In 1958, Nasution introduced his "Middle Way" concept that elevated the military's role in society beyond a simple fighting force, sanctioning its role in politics. Nasution's "Middle Way" obligated the military to participate in political, economic, and social affairs. During the first years of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, military territory commanders "had begun to make extensive use of their martial law

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<sup>72</sup> Sukarno agreed in part so that the military could deal with rebellious commanders that had gone rogue and enacted bloodless coups in parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and other outer islands.

<sup>73</sup> See Kingsbury 2002, 291 and Feith 1964, 210-211.

powers to exercise control over civilian administration and political affairs” (Feith 1964, 213).

The military’s territorial command system and the “Middle Way” concept became a pillar of Indonesian society by the early 1960s. As the military’s strength and influence grew, it became embedded in the social fabric of Indonesia. However, it is during the regime of Indonesia’s second president that both would become truly powerful in themselves.

### **The New Order**

The end of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Suharto’s rise to power marks a significant period in modern Indonesian history. Suharto’s seizure of national power began after a failed coup attempt allegedly initiated by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on 30 September 1965.<sup>74</sup> At that time, Major General Suharto was in control of the Army’s Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), and according to the legend propagated throughout his rule, he saved the country from crumbling into a collapsed communist

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<sup>74</sup> The coup still remains highly controversial and the truth about the PKI’s involvement may never be known. For an example of the army’s “evidence” see John Roosa’s essay, “The truths of torture: victims’ memories and state histories in Indonesia” *Indonesia* no. 85 (2008): 46-49. The fact that is not argued is that mid-ranking officers commanded by President Sukarno’s bodyguard, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, murdered six senior generals on the night of 30 September 1965 (later called the “30 September Movement”). In a different essay, Roosa claims that the two leading conspirators of the coup, Colonel Latief and Lieutenant Colonel Untung were good friends of Suharto and that they had informed him ahead of time about the plot. See John Roosa’s “Suharto (June 8, 1921-January 27, 2008)” *Indonesia* no. 81 (2008), 139. Cornell professors Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, and Frederick Bunnell published a paper (later known as the “Cornell Paper”) that proposed the coup was engineered from within the Army as a way of cleansing certain leaders that were allegedly working with the United State Central Intelligence Agency. See Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Ruth Thomas McVey, and Frederick P. Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971).

state.<sup>75</sup> Suharto was rewarded for his actions two weeks later with a promotion to the Army Chief of Staff.<sup>76</sup>

Following the events of 30 September, Indonesia was in a period of confusion and disorder. Perhaps foreshadowing events, Sukarno had an affinity for and was fond of quoting United States' President Abraham Lincoln, often saying during this period "a nation divided against itself cannot stand" (Crouch 1978, 156). As Muslim organizations, student groups, academics, and many of the middle-class turned against President Sukarno, Suharto seized emergency governing authority.<sup>77</sup> The accompanying political instability culminated with the arrest of more than 100,000 political prisoners and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in just a few months.<sup>78</sup>

Aided by his military and business connections and powerful personality, Suharto consolidated power and established himself as head of state.<sup>79</sup> In the next few years he secured his military base, filling critical leadership positions with his most loyal supporters.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> According to Suharto, he was unaware anything was going to happen and was at the hospital the night of 30 September to see his 4-year old son Tomy who was recovering from burns from an accident with hot soup. Upon hearing about the incident, Suharto's forces quickly intervened and prevented LTC Untung from any further disturbance. For more information, see G. Dwipayana Soeharto, *Soeharto, My thoughts, Words, and Deeds: an Autobiography* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Lamtoro Gun Persada, 1991), 99-110.

<sup>76</sup> Suharto was promoted to Lieutenant General a few months after his intervention, and promoted again to General, the highest military rank, in July 1966. He officially retired from the military in 1978.

<sup>77</sup> See Tineke Hellwig and Eric Tagliacozzo, *The Indonesian Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 352.

<sup>78</sup> Reliable figures for casualties for the 1965-1967 massacres do not exist. Reasonable estimates are between 400,000 and 1 million. For more information, see Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), 170-172 or Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 355-360.

<sup>79</sup> Suharto's regime unofficially began on 11 March 1966 when he received "orders" to restore order and stability in exchange for personal protection for President Sukarno who was isolated (and later placed under house arrest) in his Bogor summer palace. Suharto was formally named president a year later on 12 March 1967.

<sup>80</sup> One of the first generals Suharto replaced was A.H. Nasution, an early reformer who in 1959 relieved Suharto (then a Colonel) from his assignment as punishment for Suharto's involvement in smuggling and sent him to work in the Army Command and General Staff College in Bandung. There, Suharto worked with other

Under Suharto's thirty two-year regime, dubbed the "New Order," the armed forces of Indonesia maintained its distinct social-political role.<sup>81</sup> Suharto sought economic development believed that political stability throughout the country was a precondition for this.<sup>82</sup> He also believed that national security and national development were equal, parallel goals, and charged the armed forces with responsibility for both. Suharto made sure to distribute the fruits of economic growth to his loyal followers, including many men in uniform.

Under President Suharto the "Middle Way" evolved into the doctrine known as *Dwifungsi* (Dual Function). *Dwifungsi* mandated that the Indonesian military had two equally important functions: defense and security, and an active social-political role. As a result, the Indonesian military was now assigned the equal responsibilities of providing external defense, political stability, and economic development. *Dwifungsi* "cannot be regarded as merely a buzzword or an excuse to justify the Indonesian armed forces' involvement in politics" (Lee 2008, 497); it was codified into law in 1966, and its legal authority was further expanded in later years. Law 20 in 1982, for example, states that the "Armed Forces are directed to raise and strengthen National Resilience by participating in the decision making on national and government matters, implementing Pancasila

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senior officers implementing Nasution's "Middle Way" but otherwise disenfranchised with Nasution's idealism. See, for example, Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn, Vic: Fontana Books, 1980).

<sup>81</sup> The term New Order (*Orde Baru*) came to be in 1966 just after the transition of power as a way to distinguish between supporters of Suharto and the displaced Sukarno. Born amidst tragedy and violence, Suharto managed to include Sukarno's five-principle *Pancasila* ideology, which justified and legitimized his rule. Through political pressure and legislation, President Suharto ensured *Pancasila* was accepted as the sole government philosophy and charged the military with defending it. See, for example, Resy Canonica-Walangitang, *The End of Suharto's New Order in Indonesia* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2003).

<sup>82</sup> See R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175.

Democracy and supporting constitutional like based on UUD45 in all activities associated with national development” (MacFarling 1996, 143).

The social-political aspect of the *Dwifungsi* doctrine affected the military in three distinct ways. First, it codified the duality of the military’s distinct functions. The military continued to be responsible for Indonesia’s external defense and internal security. *Dwifungsi* added the military’s social-political role, in which the military was one of many different active government elements of society and works side-by-side to promote mutual development.

The second effect of *dwifungsi* on the military was that the military was now an element of national power, not an entity that was subordinate to a civilian government. The interpretation of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution and the continued opinion of senior military officers was that “in civil-military relations in Indonesia there is no civil supremacy over the military and no military supremacy over the civilian” (Singh 1995, 122). The guiding conviction behind the *Dwifungsi* doctrine was “based on the familial principle with the object of promoting the interests of the whole community” (Singh 1995, 60). The military considered itself a protective father figure whose influence should legitimately pervade all aspects of society.

The third effect of *dwifungsi* on the military was the tenet of shared responsibility. This evolved from similar ideological principles found in Sukarno’s Guided Democracy where all citizens were part of a greater community. According to Suharto’s vision, every Indonesian was tasked with national development and defense. Under *dwifungsi*, the military was supposedly more loyal to the citizens of Indonesia, providing necessary oversight and organization as needed. As Colonel Sukowati explained in the 1960s “the TNI

is the army of the people, it comes from the common people and always lives in the environment of the people” (Elson 2008, 237). This meant that what was best for society at large was also best for the military.

President Suharto elevated the role of the military in Indonesian politics because he believed that the military was essential to maintaining his government and providing political legitimacy. Mandatory instruction of basic military discipline, territorial defense, and general tactics were codified into the public education system. This was further emphasized through the organization of the national police as part of the military. Until the separation of the police force, the two components were essentially indistinguishable.<sup>83</sup> The military was assigned responsibility for safeguarding territorial integrity against both external and internal threats, while the police, or *polri*, was charged with enforcing law and order domestically.<sup>84</sup> This organization structure would remain until 1999, when the police and military were formally separated as part of the reform process.<sup>85</sup>

Indonesia was remarkably stable during Suharto’s New Order government, and the territorial command system and the political power of the military through *dwifungsi* contributed to this stability. While some individuals acted in their personal self-interest, many military commanders supported and developed projects that benefited the local

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<sup>83</sup> This is actually a common practice. For example, the Philippine Constabulary was part of the Ministry of Defense until 1991, five years after the EDSA I revolution and removal of President Marcos.

<sup>84</sup> See, for example, A. Hasnan Habib, Lt. General (Ret), “The Role of the Armed Forces in Indonesia’s Future Political Development” from Harold Crouch and Hal Hill, eds. *Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), 84.

<sup>85</sup> When the police force was separated from the Armed Forces, the military changed its name from ABRI to TNI.

community.<sup>86</sup> Indonesia's economy grew, averaging more than seven percent growth per year during the 1970s and more than four percent yearly growth in the 1980s.

Consolidating power under Suharto's New Order involved removing political challengers. Suharto did this by replacing his political opponents with loyal military officers. Suharto himself remained on active duty for most of the 1970s and the military culture of respecting senior officers empowered him to oversee personnel assignments.<sup>87</sup> Suharto further rewarded military allies with key positions that "offered the opportunity for financial advantage, either through corruption or indirectly through privileged access" (Cribb 2000, 172). These additional streams of revenue compensated for the paucity of funds available through the national budget, and rewarded Suharto's most ardent supporters.

Interestingly, because of the military's new social-political responsibilities, members of the military were not allowed to vote - so that there would never be any dissent within the military.<sup>88</sup> The military was instead handsomely compensated with automatic seats in parliament. While the armed forces constituted less than one-half percent of the total population of Indonesia, the president was allowed to appoint twenty percent of the members of Parliament.<sup>89</sup> This ensured that Suharto would always have a strong block that unconditionally supported him in parliament; the military would retain this privilege until 2004, six years into the *Reformasi* period.

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<sup>86</sup> See, for example, Herbert Feith "Part Three: Indonesia" from George McTurnan Kahin (editor), *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), 263.

<sup>87</sup> Suharto retired from the military in 1978 after he was "re-elected" to his third presidential term.

<sup>88</sup> Bilveer Singh, *Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces* (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 55-56. Members of the military and police are still not allowed to vote for the same reason.

<sup>89</sup> The extreme disproportional representation had many critics, including some senior military officers such as General A.H. Nasution and Sri Bintang. Many of the critical officers believed that the military should have a purely professional and technical role.

Through *dwifungsi* and the territorial command system, the military cemented its political role during the 1980s and 1990s. Indonesia did not face any external threats during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, so the military gravitated towards its social-political role. Some military officers were so involved in domestic politics they behaved more like politicians than soldiers.<sup>90</sup> According to research and interviews by Harold Maynard and Ian MacFarling, many officers believed that the military added value to Indonesian society, especially in the rural communities, in a way the civilian government was not willing or capable to do because of limited resources or personnel.<sup>91</sup> These civil service projects included building or improving roads, irrigation systems, retaining walls, and public buildings.

## Conclusion

In Western-style democracy, military participation in politics is illegitimate. During the New Order, military policy legitimized the Indonesian military's activities, viewing the military's social and political roles as provided a stabilizing force in Indonesia. The military saw its role as analogous to a drummer in a band, constantly beating and keeping rhythm in order for the country to keep pace as it continued to develop. The Indonesian military viewed itself as providing a service, not exploiting an entitlement. Nevertheless, the degree of military involvement in domestic politics was staggering, as catalogued by authors such as Harold Crouch, Damien Kingsbury, and Ulf Sundhausen.<sup>92</sup> Harold Crouch has argued

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<sup>90</sup> See Ian MacFarling 1996, chapter 8.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, 162-166.

<sup>92</sup> See, for example, Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Ulf Sundhausen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).

that after the 1971 elections two-thirds of these positions were filled by military officers, and according to Indonesian scholar Marcus Mietzner, the percentage increased to 80 percent within the decade.<sup>93</sup>

Under the New Order regime, the Indonesian military completed its transition from a revolutionary vanguard to a full time political actor. The military was widely dispersed across the country in the territorial command system, and *Dwifungsi* empowered the military's active, direct involvement in local politics, business, and other activities. The original purpose of the territorial command system was to give the military the ability to engage in military operations anywhere in the country and to finance the military through natural resource extraction.<sup>94</sup> Yet as the military's power and authority grew in this period, so did its overt political and economic involvement. Towards the end of the New Order, the military began to reduce its involvement in politics – a self-preserving reaction to the growing unpopularity of Suharto and his children's unabashed greed – but the military remained the backbone of Suharto's regime. This political dominance, and the territorial command structure that enabled it, became impossible to ignore under a democratic regime, and became a central focus for military reform in the *Reformasi* period.

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<sup>93</sup> See, for examples, Crouch 1978, 244 or Mietzner 2009, 59.

<sup>94</sup> See Agus Widjojo, "Security Sector Reform and the Territorial Command" in Beni Sukadis *Almanac Indonesia 2007, Security Sector Reform* (Jakarta: LESPERSI, 2007), 120-121.

## Chapter 3: The Indonesian Military during *Reformasi* (1998-2004)

### The Fall of Suharto and the Beginning of Transition

Only months after he was reelected to his sixth term in 1998, President Suharto's administration came to a sudden, unexpected end. The year prior, events in another country were set in motion that would prove to be unrecoverable for Suharto's regime. Investors in Thailand were overextended and unable to pay off their debts. International investors worried about the region's economic stability and began to pull their investments, negatively affecting the currencies and economies of every country in Southeast Asia, starting what is now called the Asian Financial Crisis.<sup>95</sup>

The legitimacy of Suharto's government was tied to national economic performance. As long as the economy was prosperous and the standard of living was rising, most Indonesians were willing to tolerate having fewer political rights and living in an authoritarian regime. Suharto's government was not built on ideology, religion, or military strength. It was built on money, and it took a money problem to topple it.

Suharto failed to implement International Monetary Fund requirements, and his administration received incessant criticism for its economic policies.<sup>96</sup> This resulted in Indonesia's currency losing eighty percent of its value and extremely high levels of

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<sup>95</sup> In his book *Suharto*, author R.E. Elson reports that many commentators thought Indonesia's economic fundamentals were sound in the 1990s. Ross H. McLeod disagrees and described Indonesia's economic situation as a "disaster waiting to happen" despite a decade of sustained growth and over \$11 billion in a government nest egg. McLeod speculates that the financial crisis would have happened eventually regardless of the devaluation of the Thai baht because of deficiencies in its macroeconomic policy. For more, see Ross H. McLeod, "Indonesia" in *East Asia in Crisis* (New York: Routledge, 1998). The quote in this footnote is from page 35.

<sup>96</sup> For further information, see McLeod 1998, 31-47, Cribb 2000, 188, or Vickers 2005, 200-204.

unemployment.<sup>97</sup> The confluence of Suharto's weakening health (he was seventy-six years old and had a stroke in December 1997), his unpopular political moves in the March 1998 election, the excessive greed of Suharto's children in a time of national economic crisis, and an unfortunate El Nino drought that caused a nation-wide food shortage, created a tipping point.

This abundance of problems added to the public's growing dissatisfaction with the government and manifested itself in student-led protests. Although peaceful at first, the protests quickly turned into violent riots after members of the army or police (it has never been determined, and at the time they were consolidated under one centralized military command) shot and killed four student protesters at Trisakti University, a respected private university in downtown Jakarta, on 12 May. Anti-Suharto sentiment fueled by an increasingly frustrated population (twenty million were estimated to be unemployed and up to seventy percent of the country was living in poverty because of the drastic fall of the rupiah) grew and overtook the city.<sup>98</sup> In the following days, the rioting and widespread looting in Jakarta resulted in over 1200 Indonesians killed and thousands wounded (ethnic Chinese Indonesians were specifically targeted). Later in the week, thousands of student protesters occupied the parliament building in Jakarta and their protests became the subject of international media attention.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> See McLeod 1998, 42. Between July 1997 and January 1998, the rupiah's value fell from Rp 2,430/\$1 to Rp 17,000/\$1.

<sup>98</sup> See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "The Habibie Presidency" in Geoff Forrester, ed, *Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1999), 37.

<sup>99</sup> Terence Lee comments in "The Military's Corporate Interests" (*Armed Forces & Society*. vol. 34, no. 3, 2008) that the military under the command of General Wiranto "were consistently conciliatory to the student protesters from February to May 1998" and that "members of the military officers' wives club were also seen distributing food and snacks to the student protesters." The quotes are from page 655.

In a short span of a few days, Suharto, who feared being replaced and had never bothered to groom a successor, realized he had lost his legitimacy and his ability to rule was no longer tenable.<sup>100</sup> Early in the morning on 21 May 1998 at the Merdeka Palace, dressed in a dark suit and without any trace of emotion, he read a short statement in which he apologized for his mistakes. Then in front of vice-president Bacharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie, senior military officers and members of the Supreme Court, he announced his resignation. Just like that, at nine in the morning on 21 May 1998, Suharto's thirty two-year-rule as President of Indonesia and one of the world's longest military governments was over.

B.J. Habibie, who had been elected vice president only two months previously, assumed the presidency in accordance with the normal transfer of executive powers under the Indonesian constitution. This may have been Suharto's final gift to the military. By allowing a peaceful, constitutional transfer of authority instead of resisting by declaring martial law and certain further violence by the hands of the military, Suharto essentially protected the military from doing further harm to itself in the eyes of the general population. Suharto's decision to just let go prevented a total regime collapse such as the recent Arab Revolution examples in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.

President Habibie faced immediate criticism. He was widely unpopular and not trusted, viewed by many as a puppet of Suharto. Unable to escape the previous administration's ties to Indonesia's worst economic crisis in thirty years, many observers

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<sup>100</sup> See R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 292. Sometime between 8 and 11 pm on 20 May Suharto realized that his 32-year rule was coming to a crashing halt. Suharto's half-brother Probosutejo was with him then and reported Suharto succinctly lamenting "Well, that's it, then." Some scholars believe Suharto was grooming his oldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti "Tutut" Rukamana as a possible successor, but her political career was only just beginning in the 1990s.

believed that his administration would be short lived.<sup>101</sup> One of Habibie's first intentions as president was military reform.<sup>102</sup> He immediately began to distance himself from Suharto's more unpopular domestic policies, which focused on the *Dwifungsi* doctrine and Suharto's familial network of business partners.<sup>103</sup>

During the tumultuous two-week period in mid-May 1998 of violent public outrage and Suharto's resignation, the military was caught in a difficult position. Would the senior military leaders remain loyal and support their president and supreme commander, possible going down with the proverbial sinking ship? Or would they return to their historic roots of serving in an army "of and for the people"? Were the current events a test of character or another chance to rescue the country?

These competing choices again uncovered factionalism within the ranks of the military. The two sides are best represented by a power struggle rivalry between two senior officers, General Wiranto, the military's commander-in-chief personally selected by Suharto, and Lieutenant General Prabowo, Suharto's ambitious yet impulsive son-in-law whom Suharto had already rapidly advanced through the ranks to the position of

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<sup>101</sup> See Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 207. Vickers notes that many officials never bothered to print new photographs of President Habibie once he assumed office, choosing instead to apply white out over the word vice on his official photograph expecting that he would be out of office soon.

<sup>102</sup> B.J. Habibie started his professional career as an aircraft engineer and aeronautical researcher and became a leader in technological and economic development. It is worth noting that he does not come from a military background unlike the previous vice presidents since the end of Adam Malik's term in 1983, however he had served as the research and technology minister under Suharto for two decades. Among his most notable reform issues included allowing free press, agreeing to presidential term limits, allowing the special referendum for East Timor's independence, and holding Indonesia's first free general election in 1998, in which he lost to Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur).

<sup>103</sup> See, for examples, Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian security: 1999-2000*, (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 2000), 109-110. Listed are some of President Habibie's "De-Suhartoization" policies such as releasing some political prisoners, allowing the formation of labor unions, easing restrictions on the media, and speeding up the ratification process for human rights treaties.

commander of KOSTRAD.<sup>104</sup> Prabowo, with grand aspirations including becoming the next military commander-in-chief, desperately wanted to seize power and prestige amidst the chaos.<sup>105</sup> He wanted emergency authority and to use his KOSTRAD forces to restore order in Jakarta. General Wiranto was more reserved and calculating, willing to let the situation develop. He resisted the urge to use the military against popular demand any more than was absolutely necessary.<sup>106</sup> While publically not taking an opinion and downplaying the statements of other key political leaders, Wiranto was hedging his bets and had an agreement with B.J. Habibie in which they would mutually support each other in a post-Suharto administration.

Despite this divide at the very top, the military as an institution held together and weathered the May riots and political storm, however it did not escape unscathed. The public's voice was louder and stronger and the move towards military reform had already begun. During the New Order regime, the Indonesian military had established a violent reputation and was accused of numerous human rights violations.<sup>107</sup> After the fall of

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<sup>104</sup> These, of course, were not the only two senior officers taking sides. In April 1998 Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs and future President Yudhoyono and Generals Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah agreed with General Wiranto that Suharto's presidency was short-lived. Other generals like Hartono and Feisal Tanjung agreed with Prabowo and wanted Suharto to declare martial law.

<sup>105</sup> See Emmerson 1999, 306-312. Prabowo has continued his political ambitions. He finished as runner-up for the Golkar party's presidential candidate to Wiranto in 2004, ran as Megawati's Vice-President in her unsuccessful 2009 election finishing second with over thirty-nine percent of the popular vote to the incumbent, President Yudhoyono. Prabowo has announced his intention to run in the 2014 Presidential election and is backed by his business partner and brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo. Hashim is an oil tycoon whom Forbes Magazine lists as Indonesia's 32<sup>nd</sup> most wealthy man in 2011, with a net worth close to \$800 million (see "Indonesia's 40 Richest", accessed September 28, 2012, [http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/80/indonesia-billionaires-11\\_rank.html](http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/80/indonesia-billionaires-11_rank.html)).

<sup>106</sup> There exists interesting speculation about Wiranto and Prabowo's actions in the mid-May Jakarta riots, especially while Suharto was abroad at a conference in Cairo. One argument is that Prabowo and his supporters initiated or at least allowed the violence in Jakarta to continue in hopes that Wiranto would receive the blame. Another is that Wiranto specifically did not want the military to be explicitly involved to avoid another Trisakti University event. It also may have been the case that the security forces were caught unprepared and not equipped to safely handle the mass of violence, rioting, and looting.

<sup>107</sup> Most Indonesians were not aware of the severity of violence occurring within their own country. So controlled was the public relations message, many Indonesian's formed their opinion about the brutal

Suharto, the depth and severity of the violations were further publicized, as more and more cases of abuse were disclosed. As the new reports about past abuses of power and human rights violations emerged, the military's reputation, especially the army's, was at an all-time low.<sup>108</sup> The fall of Suharto proved to be the tipping point after which the military reform movement could not be reversed.

### **Reforms Under the Habibie and Wahid Presidencies: The New Paradigm and *Reformasi***

To better comprehend military reform during the *Reformasi* movement and chart its progress and shortcomings, it is best to view the next few years of Indonesia's recent history chronologically by administration. Since President Suharto, there have been four presidents that have each affected the military reform process in a different, often inconsistent way. What will be clear after a review of this period is that military reform in Indonesia closely reflects political reform and the intensity of military reform is inversely related to the strength of the civilian leaders. While many changes have occurred, with varying levels of success, some institutional legacies such as the territorial command structure remain essentially untouched.

What will also be evident is that the cleavages among the military's elite during the change in government did not weaken the military as an institution. In fact, in the early years of *reformasi*, the military was still one of the stronger sectors of government and was able to actively shape its own reform path. Evidence of this is how most of the senior

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military practices from foreign media. This was especially true after images from the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili, East Timor were smuggled out of the country and quickly became an international headline story. See also Sukma and Prasetyono 2003, 21.

<sup>108</sup> The military's reputational nadir would be the following year after its ruthless role in East Timor reached international attention.

military leaders from the days of Suharto stayed in positions of power within the military. Relieving outspoken generals like Prabowo seemed to soften the public's distrust and anger towards the military, which in turn prevented sweeping clean-house personnel changes.

Under the New Order regime the military evolved in order to satisfy its own institutional interests, which chiefly comprised of making money and staying in power.<sup>109</sup> By the 1980s the generation of officers from the independence revolution had reached retirement age and many had already transitioned to more lucrative professions, including politics. The younger cohorts of officers out of the military academy were less idealistic and quickly integrated into Suharto's patronage network, considering personal financial perks and incentives an entitlement.<sup>110</sup> It may be said that many of these officers were businessmen in uniform.

The military's ideology under Suharto was Machiavellian in that priority was based on outcomes, not techniques. Results were all that mattered, and the means by which they were achieved were only valued by their speed and degree of difficulty to perform. The government controlled the press, and therefore also its message and what was reported. The judicial system was weak, and the military was able to act with impunity as it deemed fit. While the military was clearly subordinate to Suharto, it was only in a system resembling a military chain of command. In the past decisions were made unilaterally without regard for public opinion. It justified its need of autonomy from civilian authority

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<sup>109</sup> Some critics have called this perception the Army's third function, or "*trifungsi*."

<sup>110</sup> Harold Crouch, *Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto*, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 130.

because of a constant internal security threat and need to maintain national integrity, and no civilian power had the ability to contest this.<sup>111</sup>

The bottom-up student-led movement to replace Suharto sent a signal that Indonesia was clearly primed for change. President Habibie fully embraced the *Reformasi* movement, knowing that his political survival depended on tangible change, and even tried to take credit for spearheading the reform initiative. Habibie started to view his administration as a transitional government in a critical period of Indonesia. Habibie had to deconstruct the very political power structure that placed him in power, and eliminating the political role of the military was paramount to successful democratic reform. Reform became his platform, and this included overseeing an overhaul of the military. The following chart summarizes some of the major issues of the Indonesian military requiring reform at the beginning of Habibie's presidency.<sup>112</sup>

President Habibie inherited a military that was used to being a political instrument and having an active role in politics. For example, as noted in the above chart, seventy-five of the 500 seats in Parliament were uncontested and reserved for the military (this number was reduced to thirty eight in the 1999 election and to zero in 2004).<sup>113</sup> This alone gave the military a fifteen percent share of Parliament, and since they tended to vote in solidarity made them a considerable voice in all legislative matters, often legitimizing Suharto's agenda. Interestingly, members of the Indonesian military and police were then

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<sup>111</sup> Edward Schneider, "Reformasi and the Indonesian 'War on Terror': State, Military and Legislative-Executive Relations in an Emerging Democracy" *The Journal of Legislative Studies* no. 15 (2009): 294.

<sup>112</sup> The issues are selected by the author, while goal is that of the Indonesian government. This chart is based on specific areas within the Indonesian military that fit into broad concepts of military reform theory. See Cottey et al, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations" (*Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 29 no. 1, Fall 2002) and Mietzner 2006.

<sup>113</sup> At this time the police force was still part of the military.

Table 4

Issue	Discussion	Goal
Military's Presence in Government	Seventy-five of the 500 seats (15%) in Parliament were uncontested and reserved for the military. The <i>Dwifungsi</i> doctrine thrust the military into politics.	-Remove the military from non-defense and security related responsibilities -Remove the military's un-elected presence in the legislative branch. -Remove the undemocratic nature of military leaders
Civil-Military Relations and Civilian Supremacy Over the Military	Habitually the Commander-in-Chief of the military was also the Minister of Defense and reported directly to the President. Military officers held key positions that drove policy and regulation of the military.	-Divide the position into two with the chief of the military subordinate to a civilian Minister of Defense. -Create civilian positions within the defense department with the responsibility to form and enforce regulations -Formulate a grand defense strategy that uses all elements of national power
External versus Internal Threats	The military is responsible for internal and external security and maintaining the integrity of the nation.	-Separate the military and police forces. Place domestic security under a civilian-led agency and unburden the military with internal security issues.
Professionalize the Military	Soldiers are distracted with their heavy involvement in local politics and businesses and not solely focused on defense operations.	-Soldiers' focus should be performing their duties with integrity, technical competence, and proficiency and abiding to the rule of law.
Accountability	The military's respect for human rights and rule of law is highly suspect. The military judicial system had no credibility and was completely ambiguous. Military commanders had the power to decide if a soldier should be punished. Soldiers operated with impunity in regards to human rights violations, corruption, and general misconduct.	-Place the military under the authority of civilian courts with the authority to oversee military conduct.
Budget and Funding Source Under the Central Government	The government does not have full control over the military's budget and only has cursory oversight.	-End the military's involvement in businesses and cease off-budget revenue. -Create a transparent budget and procurement process.
Territorial Command Structure	Overemphasis on territorial commands gives the idea that internal threats are more likely and dangerous than external attacks. Also allows off-budget funding opportunities and influence in local politics.	-Dissolve the territorial command structure and permanently abolish the military's socio-political role.

and are still restricted from voting in national elections.<sup>114</sup> One of the first challenges faced by the new Indonesian government was how to sever the political ties of the armed forces.

<sup>114</sup> See, for example, Bawono Kumoro, "For the Sake of the Nation, Allow Military and Police to Cast Votes." Jakarta Globe, July 23 2012. Accessed October 31, 2012, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/commentary/for-the-sake-of-the-nation-allow-military-and-police-to-cast-votes/531992>. In this article, President Yudhoyono said Indonesia was not ready for the military to have the right to vote and worried that it would lead to disunity within the military. Interestingly, five of the leading candidates to replace him in the 2014 presidential election are former senior military officers.

The military's distinct role in politics was now viewed as an obstacle to democracy, and its roles unrelated to security were seen as needing to be separated from civilian affairs.<sup>115</sup>

Another significant issue on the reform agenda was the need for civilian supremacy over the military. The TNI commander-in-chief was influential and drove military policy. He only had to answer to the President. Habitually, he also served as the Minister of Defense and Security and was responsible for the internal and external security of the entire country, as well as for nominating individuals for senior positions.<sup>116</sup> Civilian leadership within the defense ministry was almost non-existent, and active duty officers between field commands held most bureaucratic positions. The lack of civilian defense experts is troubling in that it is difficult to articulate the problems and advance a national debate about military reform. Furthermore, the military did not have a grand defense strategy or a specific, overarching guidance for defense that would direct the resources of the military toward a unified objective nested within other elements of national power. Military's perform best when operating under clear guidance and a mission statement.

Part of the need for reform is to shape the military into a professional organization. This includes turning the military into a force that is not involved in politics or economics. The freedom from civilian authority of the Indonesian military is obtained from its separate, off-budget revenue. Maintaining its independent business activities also takes time and energy away from the military training and performing their primary mission. It also means turning the military into a competent fighting force with resources to train soldiers and focus on protecting its borders. The promotion system should move towards a

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<sup>115</sup> Rizal Sukma and Edy Prasetyono, "Working Paper 9: Security Sector Reform in Indonesia: The Military and Police" (Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2003), 21.

<sup>116</sup> For example, this would loosely translate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also serving as the Secretary of Defense in the United States and all the service secretaries also being active duty officers.

meritocracy, based on technical and tactical potential, competence, and abiding by a warrior ethos based on a system of values, combat skills, and codes of conduct.

Striving for professionalism is different from seeking to modernize, but the two may overlap. Serviceable equipment is needed for a military to do its job. For example, Indonesia's navy must defend one of the world's longest of coastlines and six million square miles of water with only 117 ships, of which only thirty percent are actually seaworthy.<sup>117</sup> Likewise, it is extremely difficult to maintain currency for elite and airborne units when less than half the airlift airplanes required for training are operational. The question thus becomes, if the soldiers, sailors, and airmen cannot perform their duties because they do not have the equipment to do so, what do they do instead?

A military with advanced equipment requires specialization and dedication. Advanced weapon systems are most effective when supplementing an advanced strategy. Integrating battle systems aid in the command and control element of warfare. Operating on a professional level requires constant training and development of standard operating procedures and lessons learned from tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), leaving little time for non-operational activities, especially politics or running a business.

One of Habibie's biggest military reform challenges was that for years Indonesia's military had institutional autonomy and was not subordinate to civilian leaders.<sup>118</sup> Military leaders were aware of their unpopularity after Suharto and initiated a form of damage

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<sup>117</sup> See Sebastian 2006, 240. See also figure 4 in chapter 4. Of the 117 ships in the Indonesian navy, two are submarines and forty-four are tankers or other support ships. Considering Indonesia's vast waters and maritime borders with six countries, this is hardly ideal for security operations. Most military funding provided by the United States is towards creating a network of remote radar sites to secure and over watch the maritime border. Recent 1206 funds have mostly been used in northern Sulawesi and Northern Sumatra oriented on the Straights of Malacca.

<sup>118</sup> David Pion-Berlin defined this as "the military's professional independence and exclusivity." See David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America" *Comparative Politics* no. 25 (1992): 84.

control. Military reform after the Suharto's presidency began from within the military. As a way to restore their reputation and avoid a larger public outcry, they wanted to be publically seen as making progress in reform while giving up as little actual power as possible. Thus, the military and not orders from the president or legislation from parliament, was the pioneer of military reform, even if it was for an altruistic purpose.

President Habibie and the military had a mutually supportive relationship. The military needed Habibie's support to give it credibility in a post-authoritarian era. Habibie needed the military's support, both in helping maintain security while he focused on social and political issues and in thwarting individuals from undermining his programs. However the military, with most of the senior leadership still intact, maintained its influence within Habibie's administration and was able to guide its own reform from within, keeping the certain issues like reforming the territory command system off the agenda. Habibie was content with steady progress and not willing to overstep his means and risk losing the support and political safety net the military provided.

At a military seminar in September 1998, leaders developed a "New Paradigm" which formally changed the direction of the military and ended the *Dwifungsi* doctrine. This plan, supported by the equable then-Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly known as SBY), provided formal guidance to the Indonesian military and called for it to express its influence indirectly rather than directly. The "New Paradigm" was based on four principles: (1) it is not necessary for the military to be at the forefront of politics, (2) the military no longer seeks to 'occupy' positions in the state but would only 'influence' government decisions, (3) the method of influence would be indirect instead of direct, and (4) the military would act upon the principle of role

sharing with other national components.<sup>119</sup> The *Dwifungsi* doctrine was officially abandoned in 2000, marking a new chapter for the military. Notably absent is any mention of reforming the territorial command structure. The military was is not yet willing to concede its political and economic activity outside of the Jakarta spotlight.<sup>120</sup>

Habibie successfully implemented many reforms, such as widening the freedom of the press and overseeing new general elections with multiple political parties participating. One of his most surprising decisions was occurred in 1999 when he opened Pandora's box by announcing that he would allow East Timor to hold a referendum for independence on 11 March 1999.<sup>121</sup> Despite his attempt at reform, Habibie was unable to sufficiently shake his associations with the New Order regime and lost the 1999 presidential election to Abdurrahman Wahid (known by his nickname Gus Dur).

On 20 October 1999, Wahid became Indonesia's fourth president, and the third in eighteen months.<sup>122</sup> Wahid desperately wanted to continue with military reform and filled his cabinet with many senior military officers, including General Wiranto as Minister of Politics, Social, and Security, General Yudhoyono as Minister of Mines and Energy, General Suryadi as Minister of Home Affairs, and General Agum Gumelar as Minister of Transportation. Wahid's appointment to cabinet level positions of military generals, even

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<sup>119</sup> See Sukma and Prasetyono 2003, 22 or Mietzner 2006, 11.

<sup>120</sup> See R.G. Layador, "Indonesia and the Military at the Crossroads" *INDONESIAN QUARTERLY*, no. 27 (1999): 216.

<sup>121</sup> President Habibie believed the occupation of East Timor was too taxing on the Indonesian military and causing too much negative international attention. This came at a complete surprise, he had not consulted his own cabinet or the military prior to making the official announcement. The referendum, sponsored by the United Nations, took place on 30 August 1999. Turn out was extremely high with 98.5 percent of eligible voters participating and 78.5 percent voting for independence. See, for example, Douglas Kammen, "The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor" in Benedict Anderson, ed., *Violence and the State of Suharto's Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001).

<sup>122</sup> Wahid was elected president by MPR, the legislative branch of the Indonesian government. He received 373 votes, narrowly beating Megawati. The day following his victory, with a political conciliatory move, he supported Megawati as she was elected vice-president.

those who were willing to continue military reform, highlights the point that there were few qualified civilian leaders capable of serving in these top level positions.

Wahid took office a month after the East Timor referendum and the violent response from some army units and supported militias. The international attention spawned from the violence and human rights violations in East Timor brought the military's reputation to an all-time low. Riding this momentum with many pro-reform senior military officers in his administration, and his own unbridled optimism, Wahid set off on an aggressive goal to completely subjugate the military under civilian authority, end its political role and links to business and illegal activities, and dismantle the territorial command structure.<sup>123</sup>

Wahid wanted swift, far-reaching reform. After his election, Wahid appointed Juwono Sudarsono, the first civilian in 50 years, to serve as the Minister of Defense, and began cleaning house by removing officers that still had questionable loyalties to Suharto's New Order military.<sup>124</sup> This was the first time since the Department of Defense was created in 1945 that the position of Minister of Defense and Commander of the military was split into two separate appointments.<sup>125</sup> Wahid mandated all non-military positions in government to be filled by civilians, requiring military officers selected to fill those positions to retire from active duty. After removing Wiranto as the leader of the TNI, Wahid promoted navy Admiral Widodo Adi Sutjipto to the highest military post. This

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<sup>123</sup> See, for example, Kingsbury 2002, 100.

<sup>124</sup> Juwono Sudarsono would serve as Minister of Defense twice, first from 1999-2000 and later for Yudhoyono's entire first term from 2004-2009. He is a well-respected academic and taught at the University of Indonesia and Columbia University prior to public service. He was also Megawati's Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

<sup>125</sup> See Kusnanto Anggoro, "The Department of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Ineffective Civilian Control" in Beni Sukadis (ed) *Almanac Indonesia 2007: Security Sector Reform*, (Jakarta: LESPERSI, 2007), 5-6.

action was significant at the time because it started the informal policy of rotating the position between the three major services.<sup>126</sup> He also promoted the heterodox General Agus Wirahadikusumah, an opinionated military reformer and one of the most outspoken military reformers in the early 2000s, to command KOSTRAD.<sup>127</sup> Supported by president Wahid, the brazen idealist General Wirahadikusumah was almost successful in implementing a pilot project that would have removed the lowest levels (KOREM and below) of the territorial command system in selected urban areas with the ultimate goal of completely liquidating the military's territorial structure.<sup>128</sup> Military reformers like General Wirahadikusumah believe that adherence to the territorial system signaled failure to adjust to the global strategic environment and adapting to the security needs of modern times.<sup>129</sup>

However political differences with parliament distracted president Wahid and created space for conservative military officers to stall the changes. Their argument was that the territorial command system is "an indivisible feature of the TNI and must remain unchanged because it is a historic and permanent feature of the Indonesian Army" (Widjojo 2007, 123). Part of the reason it is an indivisible feature is due to the lack of sufficient and modern weapon systems and military equipment to deal with external threats in a

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<sup>126</sup> The three services are the army, navy, and air force. In the past, an army general always held this position.

<sup>127</sup> General Agus Wirahadikusumah is a member of Indonesia's military class of 1973 (the same graduating class as current president Yudhoyono) and studied at Harvard University. He is the nephew of Umar Wirahadikusumah, a soldier in PETA, adjutant to General Nasution, and the fourth vice-president of Indonesia from 1983-1988.

<sup>128</sup> See Benedict Anderson, et al, "Changes in civil-military relations since the fall of Suharto" (*Indonesia* no. 70 (2000): 135 or Mietzner 2006, 20-22.

<sup>129</sup> See Usman Hamid and Syaiful Haq, "TNI Reform: No More Business as Usual" *The Jakarta Post*, October 17, 2008. Accessed September 28, 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/10/17/tni-reform-no-more-business-usual.html>.

conventional manner and protect Indonesia's territorial integrity. Hence they must rely on the territorial concept of defense.<sup>130</sup>

In hindsight, the problem with Wahid and Wirahadikusumah's rapid, big-bang, wide-reaching reform may have been their over-eagerness, which over-stretched their reach. While highly intelligent and idealistic, neither was a man of prowess with the necessary tact or loyal following that was required to push the reform through the numerous pockets of resistance. Wahid and Wirahadikusumah lacked the charisma to motivate the neutral block into following them.

Many conservative officers felt that military reform to date was sufficient. Wahid's reform proposals were a direct threat to the livelihood of many officers who were comfortable, living of the dividends from existing patronizing networks. Wahid's rapid whole-scale reform did not allow time for the required cultural shift within the military. For his reform to take root, he needed an effective social marketing campaign to gain support and convince reluctant officers that this was in fact the right direction in which to proceed. In the short period of time that he had given himself, Wahid was not strong enough to force his way through, and could not produce a sufficient incentive that was worth the old guard giving up the traditional roles and benefits. Furthermore, the aggressive, intense pace of Wirahadikusumah's reforms caused immediate pushback within the military and became a threat to the cohesion and integrity of the military. Many conservative officers did not want to reform and did not like the direction Wirahadikusumah was taking the military. Growing pockets of unrest and dissent were

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<sup>130</sup> Imanuddin Razak, "TNI Reforms: Between Expectation and Reality" *The Jakarta Post*, April 1, 2004. Accessed September 28, 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/04/01/tni-reforms-between-expectation-and-reality.html>.

threatening to undermine the military chain of command. While Wirahadikusumah style might work in other situations or at other times, the Indonesian military was collectively not ready to absorb such a shock to its established system.

A combination of political miscalculations and entrenched resistance to change on the part of conservative military officers prevented Wahid from implementing his reform initiatives. Conflicts with parliament diverted Wahid's attention and weakened his support base. With the lack of unity among the civilian government's leadership, the military was able to stall reform projects.

In 2000 Wahid became more politically erratic and irrational. A contributing factor to was the lack of support from the conservative sections of the military. Tensions between Wahid and parliament grew irreversible, and in February 2001 the process to impeach him began. In a final act of desperation, Wahid wanted to declare a state of emergency, but had already lost the support of the military, which refused his request. Ironically, Wahid gave the military a convenient exit strategy it desperately needed without having to damage its reputation. Now, instead of being seen as opposing reform because of their own self-interest, the military would be seen as protecting the democratic process. The military's inaction in supporting Wahid's unpopular demands was also spun through public relations to highlight the New Paradigm's doctrine of political party neutrality.

While the military at large was generally unsympathetic towards president Wahid, his opponents were still soliciting its support. Again the military was at the center of attention, only this time it was seen as the calming, stabilizing force.

Vice President Megawati was also a beneficiary of Wahid's fall from popularity. Although she remained loyal to Wahid longer than most, she was careful not to closely

associate with the increasingly unpopular president. On 23 July 2001, the parliament voted unanimously to remove Wahid, and Megawati became Indonesia's fifth president. Thus Wahid, an unabashed champion of rapid reform who was able to clearly articulate his military reform objectives, witnessed his administration fizzle and then collapse prior to implementing most of his military reforms.

### **The Megawati Administration: The End of *Reformasi*?**

Megawati ascended to the presidency after a year of political turmoil and division between her predecessor and the parliament and she inherited a military that was growing in strength relative to the civilian government because of the ongoing political tension. Megawati seemed apathetic towards military reform, mindful of the role of the military in Wahid's forced exit from office. Almost immediately after she became president, she had to deal with new security issues that were beyond her control and would greatly affect the direction and degree of military reform. Two new security issues in Indonesia trumped the torpid military reform movement during her administration and resulted in the stalling and even regression in many of Habibie and Wahid's initiatives.

The first issue arose less than two months after she became president when the world changed with the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in the United States.<sup>131</sup> The next year, terrorism reached Indonesia with the 12 October 2002 Bali night-club bombings,

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<sup>131</sup> On 20 September 2001, Megawati was in Washington D.C. on a preplanned trip. She was the first head of state from a majority Muslim country to visit the U.S. and condemn the attacks after September 11<sup>th</sup>.

followed by a bombing at the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta in 2003 and further bombings at the Australian embassy on 9 September 2003.<sup>132</sup>

The combination of these events, especially the public anxiety caused by terrorist activities within its own borders, changed the focus of reform. The issue of security was no longer theoretical. Now it was real, and for all sectors of Indonesian society, including the president, parliament, media, and the public. Megawati's response was to include the military in counterterrorism units, augmenting and sometimes leading police efforts. Conservative officers in the military that were against reform were able to capitalize on this and push reform initiatives aside. Scholar Rita Smith Kipp commented about this point, writing "at the very least, the threats of terrorism and separatism have allowed the military to resist overhauling a territorial command structure" (Kipp 2004, 68). The military knew they were needed and its new leadership was going to exploit this as much as possible.

Megawati did not push back, supporting placing officers and civilians who were not interested in immediately furthering reform or energizing existing proposals to senior positions. For example, Megawati appointed Matori Abdul Djilil, a career politician with a limited understanding of military issues, as Minister of Defense. (Matori died while still in office in August 2003 and the Minister of Defense remained vacant until after the October 2004 election and the new administration selected Juwono Sudarsono again.) In 2002 General Endriartono Sutarto, an advocate of the territorial command structure and former

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<sup>132</sup> The Bali bombings by members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was a significant awakening moment and elicited a hasty response by the Indonesian government. Prior to this event Indonesia was not as enthusiastic or serious as other Southeast Asian nations in joining the U.S. in fighting terrorism, thinking the problem did not affect them directly. After the bombings, Bali was now mentioned along with the cities Madrid, London, Riyadh, and Istanbul as victims of the worldwide reach of al-Qaeda's ideology. The bombings took place in Kuta, Bali at Paddy's Bar and the Sari Club, both popular and frequented by Westerners. A total of 164 foreigners and 38 Indonesians died and more than 300 were injured. See, for more information, Rita Smith Kipp, "Indonesia in 2003: Terror's Aftermath" (*Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 1, 2004).

commander of Suharto's presidential guard, became the commander of the military. Also, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, who opposed military reform, became the Army chief of staff in 2002.

The second security concern that plagued Megawati was the growing issue of separatism in Indonesia. Many nationalists felt East Timor had been allowed to slip away in 1999 and the military and police were stretched thin dealing with the refugee crisis in West Timor. Many politicians and citizens were still angry about East Timor's independence and felt that a precedent had been set in which future regions would also try to break away. Separatist movements and a low-level insurgency on Indonesia's eastern and western territorial extremes (Papua and Aceh respectively) were gaining momentum and becoming increasingly violent. Added to this were prolonged vicious ethnic clashes in the northern islands of Maluku, Sulawesi, and parts of Kalimantan that the police forces were not able to suppress. Maintaining territorial integrity was one issue upon which all parts of the quarrelling civilian government could agree. It had always been a paramount focus of the military, and conservative sections within the top levels of military leadership took advantage by dismissing the post-Suharto military reform rhetoric in order to maintain their interests.<sup>133</sup>

For example, by April 2003 negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Aceh Freedom Movement unraveled and the situation in Aceh worsened. On 19 May 2003, Megawati declared martial law in Aceh and, to the delight of the TNI's leadership, delegated full authority to the military to control the situation. The military responded

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<sup>133</sup> See Mietzner 2006, 40-43.

with a full-scale military operation, sending a force of 45,000 soldiers and police into the area. This was the largest mobilization of the military since it invaded East Timor in 1975.

The central government in Jakarta was overstretched and was incapable of sufficiently responding politically to control the numerous situations. The military's answer was to preserve its territorial command structure and its presence throughout the country, especially in areas where the government had little reach. Emboldened by this, conservative Indonesian military leaders suggested expanding human intelligence collection through their territorial commands, a suggestion which was well received by the government.<sup>134</sup> The threat of international terrorism and shift towards cooperation in the name of global security ended the international pressure for Indonesia's military reform. For example, the United States and Australia were quick to try to resume their military relationships with Indonesia.<sup>135</sup> In 2003 the Australian Special Airborne Service Regiment resumed joint training missions with its Indonesian equivalent, KOPASSUS. The United States has also resumed training exercises with selected Indonesian military units, focusing on counter-terrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures. The United Kingdom helped Indonesia with a strategic defense review, highlighting security threats and helping to guide security sector reform and educate civilian defense officials. The German

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<sup>134</sup> Paranoia about terrorism on the part of the Indonesian government is understandable and not unique. The suggestion to increase intelligence collection resources is not unlike the USA PATRIOT Act, signed into law just 45 days after September 11<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>135</sup> The United States' perspective and priorities changed with the new challenges of the twenty-first century, including the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the economic and political emergence of China as a regional power. Concerns over hotspots such as the Taiwan Straits, South China Sea, transnational terrorist networks throughout Southeast Asia, and desire to partner with a moderate, secular country with a Muslim-majority nation made Indonesia an attractive security partner. American foreign policy has pivoted towards Asia, and Indonesia is seen as a significant fulcrum for US strategy, evidenced by Secretary of Defense Leon Penetta stating the United States was "rebalancing our global posture and presence, emphasizing the Pacific and the Middle East". The quote is from US Secretary of Defense Leon E. Penetta at the Defense Strategic Guidance Briefing Pentagon on 5 January 2012. (News Transcript from the US Department of Defense, accessed April 14, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4953>).

government assisted by providing internships for civilians in the Ministry of Defense and conducting seminars that teaches the principles of democratic military reform management.

In addition to these security challenges, Indonesia was also experiencing a stagnant economy with high unemployment. Megawati was able to finish her term and began campaigning for re-election. She had trouble connecting with voters, and her administration was considered unresponsive and was blamed for not stimulating economic growth or doing enough to curb corruption.<sup>136</sup> She ran in the 2004 election held on 20 September and finished second with 39.4 percent of the popular vote to Yudhoyono's 60.6 percent.<sup>137</sup> President Yudhoyono was seen as more intellectually capable and honest than Megawati, and better suited to handle the economic and security challenges facing Indonesia.

With the three highest positions in her government filled by men who were either ineffective reformers or against reform, and domestic and international security challenges requiring military action and political support, it is not surprising Megawati's administration is seen as a period in which military reform stalled. Maintaining positive relations with the military was an insurance plan for Megawati. In a climax of political uncertainty, pushing reform and potentially damaging that relationship was too high of a cost for Megawati.

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<sup>136</sup> Public anger wasn't solely pinned on Megawati. In the elections for national parliament all of five of the big political party's experienced a decrease, but the biggest loser was Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Part of Struggle (PDI-P). Also, seventy-two percent of the 550 member parliament were elected for the first time.

<sup>137</sup> The 2004 elections were viewed as extremely successful by international democratic-watch organizations. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had lengthy exposure in United States and was a 4-time graduate of U.S. IMET programs. Also interesting to note, former General Wiranto, who was previously acquitted for charges connected to the 1999 violence in East Timor, finished third in the first round of presidential elections (only the top two candidates proceed to the second round) with over 26 million votes (twenty-two percent). Part of his campaign included patriotic songs from his self-released CD.

The movement of Indonesia's military reform since Suharto, threading through three presidential administrations, was still a work in progress by the 2004 presidential election. Indonesia's six years of democratic transition suggest how difficult it is to create change, and how ingrained the military is in many facets of Indonesian life. While some clear, tangible steps were taken toward reform (see table 4 below), the progress always underachieved its established benchmarks. The sluggish movement of the reform agenda and enormous inertia required for many reform issues questioned the political will and commitment of the civilian leaders. At this point, many ongoing reform issues were still not to the point that observers are willing to acknowledge even a satisfactory start.<sup>138</sup> The following table charts the military reform effort's achievements and unreached goals in Indonesia's first six years of post-authoritarianism.

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<sup>138</sup> See for example, a bipartisan letter signed by forty-five members of the U.S. Congress to then Secretary of State Colin Powell about the failure of Indonesia's military to satisfactorily provide budget transparency and enforce accountability for human rights violations and the military's continued involvement in illegal activities. The complete letter may be found at <http://etan.org/news/2004/10housefmf.htm#Congress> (accessed October 5, 2012).

Table 5

Issue	Subcomponent	Progress
Military Presence in Government	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Removing unelected military members in Parliament.</li> <li>2. End military's active role in politics.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Complete.</b> Reduced from seventy-five to thirty-eight in 1999 and to zero in 2004.</li> <li>2. <b>Complete.</b> The <i>Dwifungsi</i> doctrine terminated in 2000, replaced with New Paradigm.</li> </ol>
Civilian Supremacy Over the Military	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. End practice of active-duty officers working in civilian bureaucratic positions.</li> <li>2. Separate Minister of Defense and Commander of the military, appoint civilian Minister of Defense</li> <li>3. Pass legislation to strengthen Minister of Defense.</li> <li>4. Remove active-duty officers from unnecessary positions in central government, such as the Minister of Interior.</li> <li>5. Publish National Grand Defense Strategy.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Complete</b>, 1998 during the Habibie administration.</li> <li>2. <b>Complete</b>, 1999 during the Wahid administration.</li> <li>3. <b>Initiated but incomplete.</b></li> <li>4. <b>Complete</b>, under the Wahid administration.</li> <li>5. <b>Incomplete</b>, but assigned to the Department of Defense in legislation passed in 2002.</li> </ol>
Threat Management (Internal versus External)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Separate the Armed Forces and the Police</li> <li>2. Clearly define responsibilities and roles for defense</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Complete</b>, 1999.</li> <li>2. <b>Complete</b>, 2000.<sup>139</sup></li> </ol>
Professionalism of the Military	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Re-establish military-to-military relations with</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Working issue</b>, started but not complete.</li> </ol>
Accountability versus Impunity of the Military	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Establish Supreme Court as superior to military Courts.</li> <li>2. Establish Human Rights Courts</li> <li>3. Convict military members on past human rights abuses.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Complete</b>, 2004.</li> <li>2. <b>Complete</b>, 2000.</li> <li>3. <b>Incomplete.</b></li> </ol>
Budget and Off-budget Revenue	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pass legislation specifically mandating handing over military businesses</li> <li>2. Begin process of handing over military businesses</li> <li>3. Provide adequate funding for defense budget.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Complete</b>, 2004 Armed Forces Act of 2004 (Law TNI 34/2004)</li> <li>2. <b>Incomplete.</b></li> <li>3. <b>Incomplete.</b></li> </ol>
Territorial Command Structure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dismantle territorial command structure.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Incomplete</b> (initiated in mid-2000, then abandoned).</li> </ol>

<sup>139</sup> In 2000, parliament passed the second amendment to the 1945 constitution that spelled out the differences between the military and police. The military was an instrument of the state responsible for defense and maintaining national unity. The national police was responsible for security and public order.

## Chapter 4: Indonesian Military Reform during the Yudhoyono Administration (2004-2012)

When president Yudhoyono was elected in 2004, he began a new series of firsts for Indonesia. Yudhoyono was the first former military officer to become president since Suharto and the start of *reformasi*. The 2004 presidential election was also the first time the president was directly elected by the public.<sup>140</sup> Yudhoyono, running under the *Partai Demokrat* (Democrat Party), received the most votes in a democratic election in the world when he defeated Megawati.<sup>141</sup> Yudhoyono was also the first president since Suharto to finish his term and to win reelection.<sup>142</sup>

Continuing military reform was a challenge for Yudhoyono, but his campaign centered on improving the economy. He targeted the seven percent economic growth rate last seen under Suharto, and spoke more about reducing corruption within the government than reforming the military.

Yudhoyono's rise to Indonesia's highest office was a personal success story. He was born into a middle class Javanese family on 9 September 1949, three months before

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<sup>140</sup> It is perhaps a bit of irony that Indonesia's first democratically elected president is a former general. The democratic reform that specifically targeted ending the military's role in politics, something Yudhoyono supported as an officer, is the very vehicle that delivered him into the presidency.

<sup>141</sup> The 2004 election in Indonesia was the first presidential election following the 2002 Constitutional amendment where the president would be elected nationally, and the candidate with the most national votes wins. Prior to this the President was selected by the parliament. Yudhoyono received over 69,250,00 votes with 60.6 percent. Megawati finished second, just shy of 45 million votes (that same year George Bush only received 62,040,000 votes). The Democrat Party, based on *Pancasila*, began in 2001 and Yudhoyono was a founding member.

<sup>142</sup> In the 2009 election, Yudhoyono received 73,870,000 votes in a three-way race. Megawati and her vice president candidate Prabowo (the pair's portmanteau was Mega-Pro) finished second, receiving 32,500,000 votes and Jusuf Kalla, Yudhoyono's Vice President during his first term, ran for the Golkar party and finished third with just over 15 million votes. The 73 million votes Yudhoyono received are more than any other democratically-elected world leader (Barack Obama received just over 69,450,000 in 2008). The successful election and political reform to date established Indonesia as the only country in Southeast Asia that is now considered "fully free and democratic" by Freedom House (accessed January 27, 2012, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>).

the Dutch recognized Indonesia's independence. He was a good student and excelled in academics. After finishing high school he attended the Indonesian armed forces academy and graduated in 1973. His first assignment was as a platoon leader in an airborne unit in KOSTRAD.

Through the U.S. IMET program, he was selected to attend the U.S. Army airborne and ranger schools in 1975 and the Infantry Officer Advance Course in 1981, all at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1991 he also completed the Command and General Staff College, where he took additional night classes and finished a masters degree in business from Webster University.

Yudhoyono had a very successful military career, rising to the position of Army Chief of Staff. He was a progressive thinker and one of the first active duty officers to talk about moderate military reform in the early 1990s. He was as intelligent as he was charismatic, and managed to deliver his message in a way that was not overly aggressive or threatening, and he did not alienate himself from hard-line non-reformers. Yudhoyono has a long history as a moderate military reformer and was adamant that military reform was extremely important in Indonesia's democratization and the *Reformasi* movement. For example, after the fall of Suharto he was a leader at the Bandung conference and pushed the army's doctrinal change from *dwifungsi* to the New Paradigm. Yudhoyono emphasized moderate reform and did not seize the moment to try to initiate widespread changes the way Wirahadikusumah wanted, which would have included changing the territorial command system. After retiring from the military, Yudhoyono continued working in high-profile positions, serving in Wahid's cabinet as the Minister of Mining and Energy and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs and again in Megawati's

administration in the same position as the Minister for Political and Security Affairs before resigning to campaign against her.

Known as a fair, open-minded individual (his nickname was “the thinking General” because of his intelligence and that he did not always give the party line) and moderate reformist while serving in the military, many reformers were optimistic that Yudhoyono would reenergize the military reform movement. In the years since he has been president, ardent reform observers have been disappointed in the lack of progress. Eager reformist have been critical of and disappointed in Yuhhoyono because of how few tangible military reform projects have been achieved so far in his administration. However, a thorough examination of Yudhoyono’s actions will show the military has experienced a calculated, measured reform during his presidency, albeit at an unhurried pace.

The Wahid and Wirahadikusumah experience showed that changing the Indonesian military culture too quickly would be met with great resistance and ultimately, not be successful. Yudhoyono addressed this through appointing qualified, forward-thinking officers to the highest positions within the military. After his first election, he brought back Juwono Sudarsono as minister of defense and retained General Endriartono Sutarto as the military commander past his mandatory retirement in order to maintain continuity within the armed forces. Next, he rotated the position to the Air Force in 2006 when he selected Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto, who unveiled the *Tri Dharma Eka Putra* (Three Missions One Deed) doctrine.<sup>143</sup> In 2007 he selected General Djoko Santoso, who was followed in 2010 by the current commander-in-Chief Admiral Agus Suhartono.

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<sup>143</sup> General Djoko Santoso concentrated on professionalism and made soldier’s welfare and neutrality in politics a priority. Suyanto, a fighter pilot and former territorial commander, was the first officer from the Air

More important than the names of the previous military Commands-in-Chief are two noticeable trends. The first is that there was no dominant personality that maintained power and office longer than at the pleasure of the civilian leadership, and all had a clearly subordinate professional relationship to the president. The second is the rotation of the position between the services, selecting the most qualified officer available instead of the senior army officer. Before Yudhoyono (with the exception of Wahid's appointment of Admiral Sutjipto in 2000) the army has had a traditional monopoly on the top leadership posts in the military. Including Navy and Air Force officers widens the perspective of the military. As Yudhoyono exercised his control over senior military appointments, he effectively prevented the more conservative officers from advancing into leadership positions. The regular rotations and changes in leadership also prevented cliques and nepotistic consolidations of military influence. Admiral Agus Suhartono, the current Commander-in-Chief, is working hard to increase the professionalism of the military, modernize its equipment, and enthusiastically supports military reform projects.

The *Tri Dharma Eka Putra* doctrine, introduced by Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto, specifies the military's role in defense and prohibits active involvement in politics. Suyanto, the leader and senior officer of the Indonesian military in 2007, confirmed the new direction of the military stating, "the new doctrine bans the armed forces from active involvement in the country's sociopolitical affairs" (Soedarjo 2007).

Under Yudhoyono, the professionalism, modernization, and capability of the military have steadily improved. The limits of the military's capability were exposed a few month's into his administration following the 26 December 2004 tsunami in Aceh. An

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Force to be selected as Commander-in-Chief. He also attended advanced military education courses in the United States and Australia. The three missions are those of the army, navy, and air force.

earthquake just off Sumatra's west coast measuring between 9.1 and 9.3 on the Richter scale caused a devastating tsunami with waves over thirty feet high.<sup>144</sup> The west coast of Aceh, including the large city Banda Aceh, were the hardest hit, destroying 80 percent of the region's infrastructure and leaving an estimated 170,000 dead and many more displaced.<sup>145</sup>

Indonesia was unable to immediately project its own forces within its borders to assist with disaster relief efforts and was forced to rely on foreign assistance. The Indonesian Air Force's cargo and lift aircraft, consisting of American-made C-130 transport airplanes, were crippled from years of poor maintenance due to an inability to obtain spare parts because of the sanctions related to the Indonesian military's past human rights violations. Operational readiness levels for its C-130 and F-16 airplanes dropped below twenty percent.<sup>146</sup> The inability of the Indonesian military to respond to a domestic crisis and conduct internal humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations was an eye-opening event for Indonesia. In the most recent Indonesian Defense White Paper, published in 2008, the military was directly tasked to respond to natural disasters and provide humanitarian aid within Indonesia.

Many foreign donor countries, including the United States, Australia, Germany, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have recently re-established military relationships focused on military education and counterterrorism. The Indonesian-United States

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<sup>144</sup> This was the world's third largest earthquake ever measured by a seismograph and the largest since 1964.

<sup>145</sup> Scott Baldauf, "Post-Tsunami Aceh" in Tineke Hellwig and Eric Tagliacozzo, eds, *The Indonesian Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 440.

<sup>146</sup> John Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, *The U.S.-Indonesian Security Relationship: The Next Steps* (USINDO: The United States-Indonesian Society, January 2009), 37 and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2010), 384-385. The military capability was also seen as a victim of neglect after a series of fatal aviation accidents between 2006-2009. A C-130 airplane that crashed in Magetan with more than 100 fatalities and helicopter crashes in Cianjur and Bogor were attributed to poor maintenance and outdated equipment.

military relationship has strengthened every year since 2005.<sup>147</sup> For example, between 2005 and 2009, the United States alone has contributed more than \$35.7 million through the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program for Indonesia's military to modernize its equipment.

The Indonesian Air Force now has access to repair parts and advanced maintenance and has increased its capability since the Aceh tsunami. It has also greatly improved its ability to project its forces within the archipelago as needed. However, the low serviceability and limited procurement of new equipment continue to affect the Indonesian military.<sup>148</sup> While the global war on terror and the United States' energized focus on Asia have headlined the improving relations between the United States and Indonesia, President Yudhoyono's willingness and good-faith efforts were also contributing factors.

The Indonesian military has recognized that it can no longer operate above the law and must operate under humanitarian principles in accordance with ethics and the international law of war.<sup>149</sup> Article 39 of the 2004 Law on the Indonesian national military forbids soldiers from becoming members of political parties and participating in politics or business.<sup>150</sup> This is an example of the military's larger focus to include new experiences aimed to show both domestically and the international community the Indonesian military in a positive light. The Indonesian army and navy have recently participated in United Nations missions in the Congo, Darfur, Georgia, Lebanon, and Liberia. Yudhoyono's commitment earlier this year to send up to 4,000 soldiers in support of United Nation's

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<sup>147</sup> The United States cited "National Security Interests" as the reason for lifting military-aid sanctions and restoring full military-to-military relations.

<sup>148</sup> Recent emphasis on new items bought by the Indonesian military is on transportation vehicles for use in humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief operations.

<sup>149</sup> See Andi Widjajanto, "Transforming Indonesia's Armed Forces," UNISCI Discussion Paper 15, (2007): 20.

<sup>150</sup> See, for all seventy-eight articles of this law, Sebastian 2006, 479-501.

peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa makes Indonesian one of the largest contributors in the world. In a speech this year, Yudhoyono outlined a goal for Indonesia to join the nine other countries in the world that contribute at least 10,000 service members to international peacekeeping missions.<sup>151</sup>

In 2009, Yudhoyono inaugurated the Indonesian Defense University (*Univertas Pertahanan Indonesia*). The goal of the University is to instruct civilian and military students on areas of national security such as modern warfare, military strategy, defense budget management, weapons procurement, and defense policy. The University's goal is to increase professionalism through creating security experts, ultimately reducing the military stronghold that influences defense policy.<sup>152</sup> Many observers hope that this will contribute to a demilitarizing of the national government, especially in the Department of Defense, which still has a large amount of military personnel and influence. The Defense University is the first of its kind in Indonesia and only the third in Southeast Asia. Indonesia joins Singapore and Malaysia as the only ASEAN countries with a graduate-level university to educate civilian and soldiers together on defense and security issues.

Yudhoyono has also spearheaded the construction of the Indonesian Peace and Security Center (IPSC) in Sentul, West Java (nineteen miles southwest of Jakarta). The center will train soldiers in counterterrorism, disaster management, and peacekeeping operations as well as teach foreign languages and appreciation for foreign cultures. The

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<sup>151</sup> See *Jakarta Globe*, "Indonesia to send 4,000 Troops, Helicopters to UN Peacekeeping Missions" March 20, 2012 (accessed online on 12 October 2012 at <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/indonesia-to-send-4000-troops-helicopters-to-un-peacekeeping-missions/506100>).

<sup>152</sup> See, for example, the Indonesia Defense University's official website at <http://idu.ac.id/>.

center is still under construction, but was inaugurated by Yudhoyono in January 2012 and scheduled to be fully operational in 2014.<sup>153</sup>

At the national level, the reform goal of civilian supremacy over the military is complete. Military leaders are now formally subordinate to civilian leadership, but the lack of funding to enforce significant change prevents the change from permeating the lowest levels of society, especially in the villages and regions far from Jakarta's grasp where the military still has an informal presence. Organizations such as the Indonesian Working Group on Security Sector Reform have strengthened military reform awareness among politicians and civilian government employees. However, the ingrained military culture, especially in the senior ranks, is still resistant to total subordination to civilian authority. Changing deep-rooted beliefs takes time, but as long as the civilian government grows stronger relative to the military on security matters and applies constant pressure on reform, the next generation of officers will not have similar outlooks.

Indonesia's two Defense White Papers, published in 2004 and 2008, are the first attempts in crafting a total national defense strategy. The military is still a primary actor, but for the first time it is included with other elements of national power as part of rather than leading a national strategy. The 2008 Defense White Paper identified additional areas of increasing concern and the military received formal guidance to concentrate on operations other than war, such as maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and terrorism.

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<sup>153</sup> While the total budget for constructing the IPSC is unknown, Indonesia has received money for this complex from foreign donors. For example, Australia has helped fund the language center and the United States has helped build the barracks. When complete, the IPSC will be the largest United Nations peacekeeping training facility in Southeast Asia.

During Yudhoyono's administration, the military and police have continued to work out procedures for joint operations, specifically in counterterrorism. By charging the police with the internal counterinsurgency mission, there is considerable mission overlap as the police now perform many roles that were traditionally done by the military. For example, in 2003 Detachment 88 was formed (with \$16 million in aid from the United States) to fight terrorist groups with top-quality weapons and advanced training.<sup>154</sup> While Detachment 88 is well regarded as a professional unit and has had success, it duplicates the military's KOPASSUS's Unit 81, whose mission is essentially the same.<sup>155</sup> The responsibility of intelligence collection, especially at the village level, is another task the police are taking over that was traditionally done by the military.<sup>156</sup>

While the police are now the primary agency for domestic security, the police force continues to be undermanned and often relies on the military for support. In 2008, there were fewer than 300,000 police officers, and the police to population ratio was approximately 1:815, over twice as high as the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:400. Although the force is slowly growing, it will have to double in size and improve its effectiveness before the military is no longer needed to supplement internal security. The present challenge for the civilian leaders is how to implement the military's transition role

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<sup>154</sup> Detachment 88 is a police force, although it is equipped with US-supplied military weapons such as the M-4, AR-10, and Remington 870 shotgun and uses military tactics in its operations. When trained by the US, instructors are mostly former US military soldiers. There is no significance to its name. Some consider 8 to be an auspicious number associated with prosperity and wealth, and others think 88 is a symbol of handcuffs. See, for more information, Ken Conboy, *Elite: The Special Forces of Indonesia 1950-2008* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2008), 141.

<sup>155</sup> One difference during the period of United States military sanctions is that KOPASSUS was subjected to the military aid restrictions along with the rest of the Indonesian military, while the police were not.

<sup>156</sup> The role of the BABINSA, a military non-commissioned officer assigned to villages to monitor and report on suspicious activity was reduced after the separation of the police and military. The BABINSA is still there, but now with a limited, largely administrative. See, for example, A'an Suryana, "Babinsa 'crucial' to Help Stamp Out Terrorists", *The Jakarta Press*, October 8, 2005. Accessed September 26, 2012, [www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/10/08/babinsa-039crucial039-help-stamp-out-terrorists.html](http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/10/08/babinsa-039crucial039-help-stamp-out-terrorists.html).

and phase out its function in domestic security as the police gradually build capability and increase their proficiency.<sup>157</sup>

During Yudhoyono's administration the judicial system has also strengthened. By 2005, the Indonesian Supreme Court had full authority over military courts. However, the military still has full jurisdiction over military crimes and according to the Indonesian Criminal Code, there are no guidelines for a military service member to be tried under a civilian court the same way a civilian would be.<sup>158</sup> Legal accountability and human rights records have been improving, but the military still continues to face allegations of human rights violations in West Papua. As of 2009, the Military Tribunal Bill (first introduced in 1997) that would require a soldier committing criminal acts to stand trial in a civilian court has not been passed.

The biggest unresolved military reform challenge to date in Yudhoyono's presidency has been providing adequate budget support for the military. The military attempts to bridge this gap in part with revenue from its many off-budget business interests. Military revenue from non-budgeted means is generated from three sources. The first is legitimate businesses owned and operated by branches of the TNI. These include majority and minority ownership interests in major corporations, including banks, airlines, and a petroleum company.<sup>159</sup>

The second source comes from informal activities, which ambiguous yet military-specific services the military provides. Many officers charge fees for consulting and helping

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<sup>157</sup> See, for example, International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy* (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2004).

<sup>158</sup> Kusnanto Anggoro, "Relative Autonomy, Interdependency and Change at The Ministry of Defense" in Sukadis, Beni, ed. *Almanac on Indonesian Security Sector Reform 2009* (Jakarta: LESPERSI, 2009), 27-28.

<sup>159</sup> Other examples, both current and past, are beach resorts and other hotels, golf courses, oil refineries, plantations, and sugar mills. See, for example, Lowry 1996, chapter 5 and Rieffel and Pramodawardani, 2007.

businesses win contracts within their sphere of influence. Also, some unit commanders will negotiate payments for insurance with private companies, promising that there will not be any problems in the future. These contracts most often occur in remote areas outside of Java and are extremely difficult to quantify because there are no records or acknowledgment that they occur. Payments usually go directly into the commander's discretionary account, and it is custom to spread the wealth around within the unit.<sup>160</sup> It may be easy for an outside observer to label these actions as endemic corruption. But in doing so, the deeper problem is overlooked, which is that corruption is the norm. To the individual, this is natural behavior and the benefits are instead seen as entitlements and perks associated with the rank.

Other examples of active services include using military equipment for transportation for a fee (most popular in remote areas during harvest season) and security contracts with private companies, including foreign and international firms.<sup>161</sup> Passive informal activities generate revenue from leases on military property or the commercialization of military assets (one golf course outside Jakarta on military property is believed to generate \$8 million a year).

The third and last source of off-budget revenue is from illegal activities. These include a wide range of activities including extortion, illegal resource extraction (mostly logging, mining, and sand), smuggling (oil is the most profitable), illegal tolls, and also

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<sup>160</sup> See Lowry 1996, 140-142 and Rieffel and Pramodhawardani 2007, 22. Because of this practice, many positions (called *basah*, or "wet assignments") are well known to provide significant additional financial opportunities. The military does not have a monopoly on access to off-budget revenue, and *basah* positions started many years before Indonesia's independence.

<sup>161</sup> For a very interesting story about the Indonesian military receiving payment for security services, see Jane Perlez and Ramon Bonner's New York Times article "Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste", December 27, 2005. The article states that an American mining company called Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold paid the Indonesian military \$20 million between 1998 and 2004. Accessed September 7, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/27/international/asia/27gold.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>).

includes prostitution, drugs, gambling, and piracy. Outside of Jakarta and away from the reach of the federal government and intense scrutiny of the media, the military is able to get away with more unchecked activity. Undoubtedly, Indonesia's military's territorial command structure creates the opportunities for most of these off-budget activities.

However, while Indonesia's military is still consistently under funded, it has determined that its soldiers' involvement in economic activities weaken their professionalism.<sup>162</sup> In an opinion piece in the newspaper *The Jakarta Post*, then-Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono stated, "the TNI has never had a decent budget to provide security and defense services" (Sudarsono 2006). The deadlines set in the legislation in 2004 to transfer military businesses to the government have not been implemented and the military has been keen on delaying all actions as long as possible.<sup>163</sup>

Current Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro and President Yudhoyono have worked on closing the gap between the needs and the means in the defense budget, but the difference is still great. The defense budget has been increased to \$5.2 billion in 2010, \$6.5 billion in 2011, and further increases (up to 1.5 percent of GDP) are planned for 2012-2014. However these increases are still insufficient for the military's personnel, operational, and maintenance costs.<sup>164</sup> The overall dearth of funding from the central government means the majority of funding is supplied via non-transparent off-budget sources and military businesses.<sup>165</sup> For example, the 2009 defense budget was Rp 33.6

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<sup>162</sup> Andi Widjajanto, "Transforming Indonesia's Armed Forces" UNISCI Discussion Paper 15 (2007): 20.

<sup>163</sup> See, for example, Yuliah Qotimah's essay "The Presidency and Security Sector Reform" in Beni Sukadis, ed. *Almanac on Indonesian Security Sector Reform 2009* (Jakarta: LESPERSSI, 2009).

<sup>164</sup> The military receives some money from foreign donors for modern equipment and specific needs-based military education, but not nearly enough to train and equip the entire armed forces.

<sup>165</sup> See, for example, Jane's Information Group, accessed October 11, 2012, <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Southeast-Asia/Defence-budget-Indonesia.html>.

trillion (approximately \$3.5 billion).<sup>166</sup> While this may seem like a large figure, it was well short of the Rp 127 trillion requested by the Department of Defense. Seventy percent of the funding received by the military was applied directly to routine expenditures, leaving insufficient funds for planned and unplanned maintenance, military education, training exercises, and weapons procurement. Indonesia's defense budget will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Also in 2009, the year in which the transfer of all off-budget sources of revenue for the military was supposed to be complete, the estimated total value of military business activities was Rp 3.1 trillion (approximately \$322.9 million).<sup>167</sup> This value is a total of twenty-three foundations, fifty-three limited liability companies, and 1098 cooperatives. The cooperatives alone employ over 8000 people, of whom 3500 are TNI personnel.<sup>168</sup> Suhartono, the current military commander, has vowed to terminate the military's involvement in business activities, but progress has been slow.<sup>169</sup> Indonesia has started the process of weaning itself off its many off-budget sources of income, but the military is far from ready to be fully supported by the government.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> The exchange rate changes daily. For continuity, the rate used for all conversions from the Indonesian Rupiah to the United States dollar was 1 USD = 9,600 IDR, which was the approximate value in December 2009 as well as October 2012.

<sup>167</sup> Five days before the final day, set in the 2004 Armed Forces Act, in which all business were supposed to be handed over to the government, president Yudhoyono extended the date indefinitely.

<sup>168</sup> See, for example, Yuliah Qotimah's essay "The Presidency and Security Sector Reform" in Beni Sukadis, ed. *Almanac on Indonesian Security Sector Reform 2009* (Jakarta: LESPERSSI, 2009), 17. See also Alexis Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, *Out of Business and on Budget: the Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia* (Washington, D.C.: United States-Indonesia Society, 2007) on military businesses.

<sup>169</sup> See, for example, a Jakarta Post article titled "New TNI commander vows to close military businesses" written on September 29, 2010. Accessed September 26, 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/09/29/new-tni-commander-vows-close-military-businesses.html>.

<sup>170</sup> Military business is not exclusive to Indonesia. Many communist countries militaries, such as China, Cuba, and Vietnam, have also been very active in the economic sector. Interestingly, examining the experiences in China may provide a successful solution for Indonesia's military. China successfully transitioned thousands of military-run businesses to the central government. The government aided the military with corresponding budget increases, which offset the initial losses. See, for example, Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007.

Many Indonesian soldiers make less than \$200 a month and are from poor backgrounds.<sup>171</sup> Salaries have recently increased by as much as forty percent between 2009 and 2011, largely due to Defense Minister Yusgiantoro and President Yudhoyono's efforts. However, low salaries are still a hindrance to reform because soldiers often look outside their military paycheck to supplement their standard of living. Many reformers have commented on this, including Widjajanto, who opined in 2008, that if the military salaries are not "increased substantially it will decrease standards of professionalism and morale. It should be the first priority of the government to increase soldier welfare."<sup>172</sup> While increasing the salaries is certainly not the only change that will prevent soldiers from seeking additional sources of income, a higher wage will remove the incentive to pursue illegal activities or tolerate such activity in their unit and certainly silence the military's excuse for participating in illegal and illicit business activities.

In the post-Suharto years, the military has had tangible success in reforming and completing many of the first generation milestones transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system. The Indonesian military is no longer a significant actor in politics at the national level. Institutional arrangements for democratic control of the armed forces have been established, and are steadily growing in capability. The legislative branch of government increasingly provides oversight of the military, and there is emerging civil-society engagement on defense and security issues.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> For example, according to the 2006 pay scale, the salary range for a Lieutenant Colonel, who could expect to have been in the military for 20 years, is between \$2400 and \$3000 a year. For comparison, the CIA World Factbook, according to 2011 figures, estimates the Indonesian GDP per capita at \$2,328 a year.

<sup>172</sup> Peter Gelling, "Reform keeps Indonesian military in check" *New York Times*, October 28, 2008. Accessed October 13, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/asia/28iht-indo.1.17307298.html? r=0>.

<sup>173</sup> See Mietzner 2009 and Crouch 2010.

However not all critics were content with the current progress (see Table 6). Reformers such as Indonesian criminologist and University of Indonesia professor Adrianus Meliala want to see more than words and promises. In an interview in 2007 he opined the “new doctrine must be carried out in the field” and observed that there were still “many territorial commands throughout the archipelago that involved members of the military in local security” instead of the police.<sup>174</sup> While president Yudhoyono has supported military reform, it has continued in a piecemeal approach and his administration has yet to produce a coherent central plan for future reform.

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<sup>174</sup> Alvin Darlanika Soedarjo, “TNI Unveils New Doctrine: No Politics,” *The Jakarta Post*, January 25, 2007 Accessed September 26, 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/01/25/tni-unveils-new-doctrine-no-politics.html>. Both quotes are taken from this article.

Table 6

Issue	Subcomponent	Progress
Military Presence in Government	1. Further distance the military in government by prohibiting officers from an active role in politics.	1. <b>Complete</b> , 2007 when the military produced the <i>Tri Dharma Eka Putra</i> (Three Missions One Deed) doctrine.
Civilian Supremacy Over the Military	1. Strengthen politicians and civilian officials awareness and understanding of military reform. 2. Publish National Defense Strategy. 3. Give military a clear mission statement	1. <b>Complete</b> , during the Yudhoyono administration, through organizations such as the Indonesian Working Group on Security Reform. 2. <b>Complete</b> , 2004 and 2008 Defense White Paper released. 3. <b>Complete</b> , 2004. The Military is responsible for upholding state sovereignty, maintaining territorial integrity, and protecting Indonesia from threats and disturbances.
Threat Management (Internal versus External)	1. Establish chain of command for joint operations, especially domestic counter-terrorism missions. 2. Build police force capable of performing assigned mission.	1. <b>Working issue</b> . Incomplete but not prohibitive to other reform issues. 2. <b>Incomplete</b> . The Indonesian police force is under strength.
Professionalism of the Military	1. Restore military-to-military relations, especially with donor countries. 2. Provide graduate-level defense education to active duty and civilian officials. 3. Participate in United Nation Peacekeeping operations.	1. <b>Complete</b> and improving. 2. <b>Complete</b> , 2009 ( <i>Univertas Pertahanan Indonesia</i> ) 3. <b>Complete</b> .
Accountability versus Impunity of the Military	1. Pass legislation requiring civilian court authority for criminal acts committed by soldiers.	1. <b>Incomplete</b> but working. As of 2007, The Military Tribunal Bill (first introduced in 1997) has not been passed.
Budget and Off-budget Revenue	1. Consolidate and transfer military-owned business to government. 2. Approve appropriate defense budget.	1. <b>Incomplete</b> . Deadline for transfer of military business extended indefinitely. 2. <b>Incomplete</b> . Budget is increasing, but remains insufficient.
Territorial Command Structure	1. Remove military's political (unofficial) influence at the local level 2. Disband territorial command system.	1. <b>Working, but incomplete</b> . Local elections in 2005 were the first time local politicians were elected by popular vote. Many officers ran as candidates in a non-active status, the equivalent of a temporary sabbatical, to avoid directly violating the 2004 law prohibiting soldier's involvement in politics. 2. <b>Incomplete</b> , no progress has been made. After a debate in Parliament in 2005, a compromise was reached in which the territorial command system would remain, but would be stripped of all its political functions. <sup>175</sup>

## The Territorial Command System Debate

The territorial command structure is the center of gravity around which the future military reform in Indonesia will orbit. To date, there has been no serious effort since Agus Wirahadikusumah in the Wahid administration to implement a restructuring of the

<sup>175</sup> Salim Said 2006, 251-252.

territorial command system and it remains the most controversial of the reform topics not completed. Indonesian scholar Geoffrey Robinson called it the “most important institutional base of military power” (Robinson 2001, 251). Its function, necessity, and even legitimacy are the subjects of great debate because it includes the final hurdle of reform, and ultimately the acknowledgment that the Indonesian military is truly subordinate to the central government. There are strong differences of opinion and two sides of the argument, which split over the issues of Indonesia’s current state of development and its fiscal constraints. The territorial command system affords the Indonesian military wonderful opportunities, but it also brings considerable baggage. The debate over the need to reform revolves around the three key issues of defense financing, security and defense doctrine, and government competence. Although the debate continues, no measures have been taken to change the territorial command system and its reform status remains in stasis.

The first fundamental yet unresolved issue that fuels the debate is the poor financing and lack of transparency within the Indonesian military.<sup>176</sup> President Yudhoyono has admitted as much, remarking, “the defense budget at the moment is far from adequate to build a military capable of defending the nation and carrying out other defense assignments” (Qotimah 2009, 18). By share of gross domestic product and accounting for Indonesia’s population and size, the Indonesian military is one of the least funded militaries in Southeast Asia. Using the most current data available, Indonesia’s defense budget in

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<sup>176</sup> The Indonesian budget, and particular the military’s funding, is a great example of the guns versus butter model, meaning that the public is currently more interested in domestic economic issues and less interested in military issues. It is important to be mindful that Yudhoyono was elected foremost because he was the candidate that was most believed to be able to improve the economy and standard of living of the population. However Indonesia’s relatively low tax rates have been increasing every year since 2002 at the same time the central government is reducing its subsidies. The national budget is expected to continue to increase, and it is reasonable to expect the defense budget to increase as well.

2009 was \$14.57 per citizen (in 2009 in Singapore it was \$1767.23) or \$1838 per square kilometer (in 2009 in Thailand it was \$9997).<sup>177</sup> See Figures 2, 3, and 4, which depict the defense budget relative to the Gross Domestic Product, populations, and territory size for the years 2007-2009 for selected Southeast Asian countries.<sup>178</sup>

In 2000, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono estimated “over seventy percent of our defense spending are accrued from off-budget sources” (Mietzner 2010, 213). Two years later in 2002, International Crisis Group estimated the same, stating that only thirty percent of the military’s revenue comes out of Jakarta via the official budget.<sup>179</sup> Sudarsono stated this same figure again in 2004 (although he admitted someone else did the math).<sup>180</sup> Since its inception, the territorial command system’s design has been to tap into any available economic resource to pay for the army’s operational and administrative costs.<sup>181</sup> It is worth noting that the Habibie and Megawati administrations never attempted to address military businesses as part of their reform agenda.

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
<sup>177</sup> The statistics for computing the cost per square kilometer are based only on the country’s land size and do not reflect the additional responsibilities of maritime security for the archipelagic countries. In Leonard Sebastian’s book *Realpolitik Ideology*, he estimates that Indonesia has an additional 6 million square miles. If that area is included, Indonesia’s would be \$200.63 per square kilometer.

<sup>178</sup> Data for each country’s defense budget and GDP for the charts was taken from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2010). Malaysia’s Defense Budget for 2009 is uncertain and an estimation was used at the time of publishing. The statistics used for population and area for each country is taken from the CIA World Factbook, accessed online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. Indonesia’s defense spending percentage relative to its GDP was .82, .67, and .62 respectively for 2007, 2008, and 2009.

<sup>179</sup> See Biddle 2002, 3.


<sup>180</sup> See Lowry 1996, 134-146, Sebastian et al 2011, 18 or Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007, 50-53, or Widjanto 2007, 31. While writing before the seventy percent figure became the public perception, Lowry argues the highly believed percentage of off-budget revenue is a misnomer because profit is often linked to specific individuals and not units or the aggregate military. Rieffel and Pramodhawardani argue that while military business is pervasive, this figure is also likely too high and does not accurately represent the net profits of military businesses, which they estimate to be much less, between \$27 and \$73 million. Widjanto estimates it to be between \$60 and \$120 million, or less than five percent of annual defense spending. One takeaway is clear: the process is not transparent and the true figures are not feasible to obtain.

<sup>181</sup> Mietzner 2010, 49.




Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2010. *The Military Balance 2010*. (Oxfordshire: Routledge), 394-433.

The insufficient funding of the military by the national government is the leading public reason why a majority of the military's senior officers want to maintain the status quo of the territorial command system. The system's economic benefits literally provide the necessary funds in order to keep the military operational. Unofficially, many in the military desire a private desire to keep the status quo is that the off-budget revenue enables the continuation of military-run businesses and easy access to local resources, infrastructure, and customers. In a perversion of military culture over time, many senior officers in Indonesia consider kickbacks and personal reward as an entitlement. They do not think of it as corruption or stealing, but rather as an additional benefit of attaining a key



Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2010. *The Military Balance 2010*. (Oxfordshire: Routledge), 394-433.



Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2010. *The Military Balance 2010*. (Oxfordshire: Routledge), 394-433.

position or senior rank. In addition, lower-ranking officers also see it as a future reward.

This observation is nothing new. In a 1961 speech to army officers, General Nasution acknowledged the presence of corruption amongst senior officers.<sup>182</sup> However,

<sup>182</sup> Nasution 1964, 34. General Nasution was perhaps a bit optimistic, remarking that although the reports of corruption may be true, only one in 500 officers are excessively benefitting from their financial involvement.

some scholars think the level of corruption is exaggerated, or at least overestimated, because many officers retire and then conduct business with contacts they made when they were in active duty.<sup>183</sup>

One problem in confirming the exact amount of funds that are off the books is the total lack of transparency when outside revenue brought into the military. The Armed Forces Act of 2004 tried to remedy this by mandating the transfer of military businesses to the government by 2009. However semantic loopholes uncontested by weak civilian leadership sidestepped the legislation, as 194 of the 219 core businesses were exempt because they were deemed crucial to the welfare of the soldiers.<sup>184</sup> Until the civilian leadership can accurately enforce its legislation and properly fund the armed forces, military businesses are needed to run the military in its current configuration. Although not ideal, there is no other way to maintain a military of this size.

A second issue is the legitimacy of the defense strategy incorporated in the territorial command system. As already mentioned, the territorial command system is essential for Indonesia's defense doctrine. Until the military is capable of sufficiently projecting its forces in order to respond to a credible threat or other mission and the police force is capable of executing its internal security mission. The task organization of the Indonesian military is specifically designed for this purpose. This remains the most salient reason for maintaining military forces spread across the country rather than consolidating them in military bases. As recently as September 2009, then army chief of staff General Agustadi Sasongko defended the army's territorial command system, claiming it is

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<sup>183</sup> Lowry 1996, 145.

<sup>184</sup> Mietzner 2006, 55.

fundamental to the “Total Defense doctrine”.<sup>185</sup> Further proof that the police force is not ready to handle internal security and the necessity of the military’s presence is the 31 October 2012 deployment of 500 military soldiers. They were sent in order to assist the national police in the South Lampung regency (South East Java) following violence resulting from ethnic tensions that caused fourteen deaths and more homes were burned to the ground.<sup>186</sup>

However some reformist officers (especially the younger generation of officers) question the continued need for this strategy, and claim that the military hijacks civilian initiatives in the name of security. These critics believe the military overplays the threat of insurrection and the threat to national unity, claiming “threats of terrorism and separatism have allowed the military to resist overhauling a territorial command structure that gives it a foothold throughout the country at all levels of government, a perk that also permits military personnel to engage in the many businesses – some of them illegal – that underwrite military power” (Kipp 2004, 68).

“National Defense” is an ambiguous term and can include security from domestic disturbances. Even after the police were separated from military control, Indonesia has no distinct legal framework that delineates how to prevent and respond to internal security threats. While the police force is responsible for maintaining domestic peace and security, they have done so in a very militaristic way. By duplicating the military’s efforts, from

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<sup>185</sup> See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2010), 384.

<sup>186</sup> Oyos Saroso H.N. and Bagus BT Saragih, “14 Dead in Lampung Violence,” *The Jakarta Post*, October 31, 2012. Accessed October 31, 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/31/14-dead-lampung-violence.html>. In the same article, President Yudhoyono was quoted “All parties must care for and work toward creating peace and harmony. Never again leave it to the police and TNI.” Minister Djoko Su-yanto had similar remarks. Clearly the President and senior civilian government leaders still think the military has an active role in internal peace and security.

intelligence collection cells to assault teams, the police force taxes the already thin resources and funds available.

Furthermore, one may argue that the police are incapable of fully embracing their internal security mission because they do not have sufficiently sized forces or proper training.<sup>187</sup> As of 2006, estimates place the total size of the national police force at 250,000 for the entire country.<sup>188</sup> To overcome this limitation, maintaining the military's country-wide presence will help fight terrorism.

The final issue in the debate is the effect that the territorial command system has on the local communities. On one side is the advocacy for a clear separation of civilian and military powers. However, in a developing country as geographically and economically diverse as Indonesia, many regions still depend on leadership and guidance habitually provided by the military. Military and civilian leaders alike agree that there are insufficient civilian local government presence in some remote areas of the country.<sup>189</sup>

In some remote areas where the military assistance has become culturally entrenched, the people want the military's continued presence. If the military left, so would the positive contributions it makes on the local community, such as improving irrigation systems, building farm-to-market roads, schools, providing first responders following natural disasters, and other civic projects. In the best case, the military brought stability and at its worst, it was the devil that they knew. In most of the country in the 1970s through 1990s, Indonesia was remarkably stable, even if it was a result of military

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<sup>187</sup> Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 64.

<sup>188</sup> See US House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. US Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006, Vol. I. Accessed April 4, 2012, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-110JPRT33723/html/CPRT-110JPRT33723.htm>.

<sup>189</sup> Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 64.

rule.<sup>190</sup> Economic growth and prosperity, not democracy in a maximalist definition, had been the linchpin in Indonesian society. Under Suharto and the territorial command system Indonesia's economy experienced a steady seven percent rate of growth. Since Yudhoyono assumed the presidency in 2004, it has averaged been between four and six percent, and over six percent the past eight of nine most recent quarters between 2009 and 2012. There is also a large population that over time had established close ties to the Army and benefited greatly from traditional business relationships with local officers or units.

The lack of informed civilian input on defense reform in the first years of the *Reformasi* era has enabled the military to resist substantial changes to the territorial command structure. Reformers cite the Indonesian military's unchecked violent reputation, poor human rights record, and history of impunity as reasons to dissolve the territorial command system. Analysts and nongovernment organizations have expressed growing concern, as Taufiqurrahman and Hari noted in a *Jakarta Post* article on 30 September 2004 that "the decision to maintain the military's territorial role would lead to a repeat of the intimidation that occurred in the past" (Taufiqurrahman and Hari, 2004). Only time, patience, and consistent progress on reform objectives can change this image.

Agus Widjojo, a former army general and leading military reformer, has suggested two ways in which the territorial command system could be altered from its present configuration, and if implemented, they could lead to further reform in the future.<sup>191</sup> His first suggestion was to start by eliminating the lowest levels, from districts (KODIM, or *Komando Distrik Militer*) to villages (BABINSA, or *Bintara Pembina Desa*). This would

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<sup>190</sup> Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (second edition), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.

<sup>191</sup> Interestingly, General Widjojo had an important part strengthening the territorial command system, increasing the total number of KODAMs from ten to seventeen after East Timor received its independence. For more, see Kingsbury 2002, 290-291.

consolidate the military's presence and remove its influence at the lowest levels of civilian administration.

Widjojo's second solution was to disband it completely and replace it with a conventional military task organization of divisions and brigades with headquarters at large military bases throughout the country. This is similar to a suggestion that the Indonesian military should form joint commands of integrated army, navy, and air force units with a regional focus.<sup>192</sup>

Presently, both of these have fallen on deaf ears and no movement has been made to implement anything along the lines of Widjojo's recommendations. Changing the military territorial command organization into operational units and transferring soldiers and military equipment to centralized locations would be a high one-time cost the Indonesian government and military simply cannot afford.

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<sup>192</sup> The Armed Forces of the Philippines is organized this way, although each service has separate bases there is a regional joint headquarters at the three-star level.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

It has been fourteen years since Suharto announced his resignation and his New Order regime came to an abrupt end. While the euphoric swell of emotion following the transition to a new democratic system has ended, Indonesia's political and economic progress has still been remarkable during this time. Indonesia's political transformation from an authoritarian regime to a free and fair democracy is a *fait accompli*. Indonesia has had steady economic growth, controlled militant Islamic terrorist groups, improved its international reputation in regards to human rights and adherence to the rule of law, and become a regional diplomatic power. Indonesia's military is no longer subject to sanctions from donor countries for human rights violations, and it now increasingly benefits from foreign economic and military aid.

Indonesia's military reform, while not complete, has been equally remarkable. The process of establishing civilian supremacy over the military has progressed steadily, and the military is increasingly under democratic civilian control. This is especially notable considering how powerful an institution the military had been for the entirety of Indonesia's history and the domestic and international security threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, this thesis has shown that a total overhaul of the Indonesian military is unlikely to occur quickly because of the government's lack of adequate financial resources and the prevailing institutional strength of the military, which allows it to resist reforms it does not want. See the following table that highlights the military reform progress by comparing the change in the military before *reformasi* and at the present.

Table 7

Prior to 1998	Present
<i>Dwifungsi</i> Doctrine: the military was an active political force.	<i>Tri Dharma Eka Karma</i> Doctrine: the military is prohibited from involvement in politics.
Fifteen percent of seats in parliament were reserved for unelected members of the military.	No unelected military representation in government.
The military was strongly affiliated with Golkar.	All official links to Golkar have been severed. Members of the military are officially neutral in politics, especially elections.
Military Commander-in-Chief reports directly to the President. Army generals repeatedly serve simultaneously as the Minister of Defense.	The military is subordinate to a political appointed civilian Minister of Defense. There is an established trend of a civilian defense expert serving as the Minister of Defense, position and office increasingly growing stronger.
Few civilian defense experts capable of managing the defense sector. Civilian leaders kowtow to senior military officers for military policy and administration.	Knowledge of defense and security sector among civilian leadership drastically increasing through domestic programs, institutions, and training from partner countries.
Limited military-to-military relations with major foreign militaries.	Military-to-military relations reestablished and flourishing. Indonesia's military receives millions of dollars annually in equipment and training and conducts numerous annual bilateral training exercises.
Armed Forces and Police under unified military command.	The military and the police are under completely separate chain of commands.
Military Courts are autonomous and subordinate to local military commanders with a reputation as self-serving. Soldiers repeatedly commit human rights violations with impunity.	Military courts are subordinate to civilian courts. Teaching soldiers and enforcing the rule of law and ethics is a top concern of military leaders.
Military focused on business and political interests.	Military focused on territorial defense and operations other than war (HADR, civic projects, other aid missions). Military legally prohibited from external business activities.
Numerous active duty military officers serving in civilian positions in central and regional governments.	Active duty officers forced to transfer or permanently retire first in order to serve in government positions.

This thesis has found that Indonesia's political landscape is such that only strong presidential leadership can overcome political enmity and rivalries within national

institutions to advance the sensitive issue of military reform. This suggests that further reforms will not be successful without savvy presidential leadership capable of uniting the collective political will to push for reform. A concerted effort of the legislative and judicial branches of government and senior military leaders backed with public support is also needed for continued reform to be implemented.

Like wet rice cultivation, military reform is a labor and time-intensive process. Many people are required to work together towards a common goal for it to be successful. The success of future reforms depends on the military's acceptance of reform based on democratic principles, including the supremacy of civilian leadership, adherence to human rights, and total removal of the military from politics and economics. Although the *Dwifungsi* doctrine officially ended in 2000, the military's social and political role is deeply rooted in Indonesian society and cannot be easily erased. Its presence is most noticeable in the territorial command system, which has been impossible to quickly dismantle. The New Paradigm doctrine developed in 1998 was a clean break from *dwifungsi* and put the military on track for reform. The *Tri Dharma Eka Putra* doctrine introduced 2007 provided necessary adjustments towards the reform goal. These are promising first steps upon which the government may build to catalyze future reforms.

The Indonesian military still requires improvement in terms of professionalism and equipment modernization. Greater civilian oversight will produce long-term benefits in both of these areas by keeping the military focused on its defense and security mission. The Indonesian saying "*Sekali pedang dihunus, pantang untuk mundur*" (once the sword is unsheathed, one cannot retreat) is applicable to current military reform because the

reforms have already set in motion permanent changes.<sup>193</sup> Indonesia's civilian and senior military leaders are now best placed to guide reform and ensure the changes are sustainable and done in the best interests of its citizens.

This review of the military reform process from 1998 highlights important lessons. The first and most important conclusion is that reforms have been most effective when done at a pace that is sustainable. Reforming an institution that is deeply ingrained in society is a slow process. Looking forward, it will behoove reformers to be mindful of pacing and not allow the ends to exceed the financial means. For future reform to be possible without creating more harm and instability, Indonesian politicians would benefit from recognizing that they are in a "second best" world. The Indonesian democratic government does not yet have the capability of achieving its ideal military posture, and until it can, government leaders may have to temporarily support or at least tolerate non-optimum conditions. This may explain Yudhoyono's reluctance to commit further political energy towards fast reform, such as quickly turning over all military-run business, granting members of the military and police the right to vote, and ending the territorial command structure.

Indonesia's military culture and undemocratic traditions were born from experiences during the Dutch colonization period, Japanese occupation, years fighting for independence with little government support, and then solidified under five decades of authoritarian rule. This reinforced the military's involvement in economics, politics, and entrenchment in all levels of social life. It will take a generation or longer to permanently change the culture of the military.

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<sup>193</sup> Imanuddin Razak, "Let the TNI Do the Job, But With Restrictions," *The Jakarta Post*, October 12, 2005.

President Yudhoyono grasps this concept, but other reformers and critical observers in the past have not. The civilian leadership appears to have learned from President Wahid and General Wirahadikusumah's failure to generate reform by pushing too hard and too fast when the government was not capable of financing and military was not willing to absorb the changes. This suggests that failure to be mindful of the military's proud history of autonomy without offering suitable alternatives will achieve similar poor results. An examination of the history of the *Reformasi* period further suggests that a successful solution may require the Indonesian government to ignore pressures from foreign governments, special interests organizations, and domestic groups with specific agendas that want immediate results.

A second conclusion is that military reform has been most successful when it is driven by events, not time driven. Specific time-driven reform benchmarks have proven to be unsuccessful. For example, the 2004 law mandating that the military hand over all its businesses to the central government within five years has been a failure, and its last minute extension is considered a victory by non-reformers. The government's inability to properly fund the military based on its security and defense expectations and powerlessness in enforcing the transfer of military businesses according to their required timeline caused the government to lose credibility. By contrast, successful examples of reform include moving from the *Dwifungsi* to TRIDEK doctrines and the removal of unelected military members from parliament at the start of *reformasi*. These were completed by progressively phasing out their presence, pausing just long enough to allow the political system and the military to adjust.

It is possible that many senior military officers simply do not know how to be

apolitical and not participate in business activities. While it may be possible to identify some officers and thin them out of the military through alternative incentives, separation, or forced retirement, it is not feasible to expect them to change immediately on their own. The findings in this thesis indicate that it may take a generation of military officers and civilian leaders brought up in a new, democratic system before this entrenched military view is purged from the Indonesian military.

The third conclusion from the military reform process in Indonesia is that templates work. While flawed, the New Paradigm doctrine succeeded in redefining the role of the Indonesian military in a changing society. This clearly separated the military from the *Dwifungsi* doctrine that was cultivated under Suharto. The New Paradigm was executed in a way that so its results were permanent and did not wound the pride of the military. The *Tri Dharma Eka Putra* doctrine introduced almost a decade later implemented further changes. Codifying military reform objectives into doctrine proved to be a highly effective method to ensure that they were completed. Where reform was directionless and uncoordinated, it recalled shooting an arrow, painting a bull's eye around where it landed, and calling it success.

The fourth conclusion is about the sensitivities of militaries following an authoritarian regime. The Indonesian military – and especially the army – is a proud, insular institution. Throughout Indonesia's history the army has claimed to be the savior of the country and protector of the people. Military officers, when not seeking jobs as politicians, have often seen themselves as superior to politicians. Even after fourteen years, military reform is still relatively new. For most senior officers, the military reform movement has occurred in the last quarter or third of their career. Successful reform

campaigns have been mindful of this attitude and developed incentives that are not perceived as insulting. Senior military leaders have been more accepting of reforms when offered an exit strategy that did not offend their sense of pride. President Yudhoyono has been successful in cooperating with senior military leaders on reform issues, and careful not to alienate senior leaders like President Wahid did or kowtow to them like Habibie and Megawati.

Indonesian military reform has also been about the military becoming a more professional institution. This has required a confluence of behavioral and structural changes within the military. It has been most successful when the civilian leadership has balanced its expectations of reform with its capability to provide for the military. The desire for further reform cannot exceed its ability to implement the reform.

The final conclusion is that reform is most successful when reformers establish a clear reform objective before initiating further changes. This is particularly true with respect to the territorial command system, the future of which remains to be debated. This thesis has shown that there are some benefits provided by the territorial command system, in addition to its vital role in Indonesia's defense and security strategy. KODAM and KODEM commanders have excellent situational awareness and are most capable of quickly initiating many civil action projects such as building or improving health centers, places of worship, roads, bridges, wells, irrigation systems, and other infrastructure. Now that the military is subordinate to the civilian government, the increased social and economic integration of the military into society enforces Jakarta's authority throughout the archipelago and softens differences caused by regionalism while strengthening the spirit of

*Pancasila*.<sup>194</sup>

This thesis has shown that the Indonesian civilian leadership and military have the capacity to implement further military reform. Military reform will be most successful when civilian leaders prevail over some of the negative residual elements of the New Order regime. For example, implementing effective democratic control in Indonesia has proven to be a challenge because there is a dearth of suitable civilian expertise with military matters. Although this area is quickly improving, few civilians are qualified enough or knowledgeable enough about defense matters to lead and direct military policy, and they still have to overcome dominant military personalities who are resistant to change. This area is improving, but establishing credibility and command of security and military issues may take years. Politicians who are not former military officers lack experience and understanding of complicated military administration, operations, policy, and budget needs.<sup>195</sup> Most military and defense policy and doctrine formulation are not fully incorporated into Indonesia's national objectives, and are still delegated to the leaders of the military.

The future of military reform in Indonesia and the status of the territorial command system are unknown. Future reforms will target illegal and illicit activity to create a fair system that holds violators accountable. The military reform movement's ideal state is still a long way away, but this thesis has shown that the current situation is not conducive to rapid reform. The first stages of the *Reformasi* period have indicated that it is in Indonesia's best interest to take patient, deliberate and calculated reform steps. In the

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<sup>194</sup> Bilveer Singh, *Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces* (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 55.

<sup>195</sup> See, for examples, Sukma and Prasetyono 2003, 31-32.

words of former United States President Bill Clinton, “progress changes consciousness, and when you change people’s consciousness, then their awareness of what is possible changes as well – a virtuous cycle.” Steady perseverance may be the only way to ensure the change will be sustainable.

## Appendix A: List of Acronyms and Key Terms

ABRI	(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) Indonesian Armed Forces (see also TNI).
APBN	(Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara) National Budget.
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum. Focuses on matters of regional security in Asia and the Pacific. The main objectives are to promote peace and security through dialogue, cooperation, and preventive diplomacy. Membership consists of the 10 ASEAN countries, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, East Timor, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, and the United State.
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Membership consists of the ten principle Southeast Asian countries including: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. English is the common language within ASEAN.
BABINSA	(Bintara Pembina Desa) Non-Commissioned Officers offering guidance (and supervision) in a village.
BKR	(Badan Keamanan Rakyat) People's Security Body, people's militia formed with many former Peta soldiers after the end of World War II. Indonesian leaders at the time decided against forming a national military fearing it would infuriate the Allied Forces and did not believe they had the necessary equipment or military prowess to defeat Allied Forces attempting to retrun to the staus-quo prior to the outbreak of the war.
BUMN	(Badan Usaha Milik Negara) State-owned enterprises.
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training. Series of bi-lateral or multi-lateral training exercises with the United States Navy and Marine Corps and other militaries in South and Southeast Asia. Objectives include building regional cooperation and strengthening combat, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief skills.
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DPR	(Dewan Pertahanan Nasional) Indonesian House of Representatives
FMF	Foreign Military Financing. U.S. provides grants in order for the recipient country's military to purchase specific equipment from the U.S.
FMS	Foreign Military Sales. A direct country-to-country sales program of military equipment, maintenance, support, and training.
FOAA	Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Annual legislation in which Congress authorizes funding for security assistance programs. The

programs are controlled by the State Department but executed by the Department of Defense. FMF, FMS, and IMET are subsets of the FOAA.

GAM	(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) Aceh Freedom Movement.
IMET	International Military Education and Training program. A U.S. program that provides funding to cover the costs associated (administrative, travel, and living expenses) for foreign military personnel in order to attend a professional military course taught in the United States. Past beneficiaries include current Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In FY2009, the U.S. spent over \$91 million training over 8000 foreign students. Indonesia's allocation was approximately \$1 million.
KKN	(Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotism) Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism.
KNIL	(Koninklik Netherlands-Indische Leger) Dutch Colonial Army.
KODAM	(Komando Daerah Militer) Regional Military Command.
KODIM	(Komando Distrik Militer) District Military Command.
KOREM	(Komando Resort Militer) Military Command Post.
KORMAR	Indonesian Marine Corps. Possibly the most popular of the services in Indonesia by its citizens. Earned credit as a professional, disciplined force during relief operations in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami.
KOSTRAD	(Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat) The Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command. It has been historically the largest, most prestigious, and best-equipped command in the Indonesian Armed Forces. Prior commanders include Major General Suharto.
ODC	Office of Defense Coordination. An office within the American Embassy that manages the U.S. security assistance program under the supervision of the Senior Defense Attaché (U.S. military officer) and the Ambassador. Size and scope of the budget varies by country and over time depending on the programs under administration. The current office in Jakarta consists of 16 personnel, including four active duty U.S. military officers. <sup>196</sup>
NDA	National Defense Authorization Act (US).
NDU	Nation Defense University in Washington, DC.
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command. The oldest and largest of the U.S. military's major Unified Combatant Command's, PACOM's headquarters in Camp Smith (Honolulu), Hawaii. Its missions statement is to promote security and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by

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<sup>196</sup> Official Briefing conducted with the ODC on March 17, 2011. Verified via email in March, 2012.

detering aggression, advancing regional security cooperation, responding to crisis, and fighting to win. PACOM is typically commanded by an active duty four-star admiral (although it may be a general) nominated by the President and confirmed by Congress. PACOM's area of responsibility includes South, East, and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, or more colloquially, from Hollywood to Bollywood.

PETA	(Pembela Tanah Air) Defenders of the Homeland.
PKI	(Partai Komunis Indonesia) Communist Party in Indonesia, popular under Sukarno.
POLRI	(Polisi Republic Indonesia) National Police.
Sishankamrata	(Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan) Whole People's System of Defense and Security.
TKR	(Tentara Keamanan Rakyat) People's Security Army. Officially endorsed by President Sukarno on October 5 1945. Three months later it changed its name to Tentara Republik Indonesia.
TNI	(Tentara Nasional Indonesia) Indonesian National Military
TRI	(Tentara Republik Indonesia) Army of the Republic of Indonesia. Formally TKR
TRIDEK	(Tri Dharma Eka Putra) Three missions one deed. New military doctrine initiated by Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto on 25 January 2007 which prohibited the military's sociopolitical involvement and business activities.
UUD45	(Undang-Undang Dasar 1945) Indonesia's 1945 Constitution.
VOC	( <i>Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie</i> ) Dutch East India Company.
WAKSAD	(Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat) Deputy Commander of the Army.

## Appendix B: Cast of Characters

**Habibie:** Indonesia's third president and successor to Suharto.

**Hatta, Muhammad:** (b. 1902, d. 1980) Indonesian nationalist and first vice president under Sukarno.

**Megawati:** Indonesia's fifth president. Daughter Sukarno, Indonesia's first president.

**Nasution, Abdul Haris:** (b. 1918, d. 2000) Professional Indonesian soldier who served as the Indonesian army's chief of staff twice (1949-1952 and 1955-1962). Nasution was instrumental in formulating the Indonesian military's doctrine and formal involvement in politics. His "Middle-Way" concept is a forerunner to the *Dwifungsi* doctrine. He also served as an officer in the KNIL before Indonesia's independence.

**Probowo, Subianto:** (b. 1951) Ambitious Indonesian Army general with a reputation as recklessly unpredictable and prone to violence. He is a former commander of KOPASUS (Special Forces) and KOSTRAD (Strategic Command) and also a former son-in-law of Suharto. Probowo is a serious candidate for the 2014 presidential election.

**Purnomo, Agustadi Sasongko:** Indonesian Army General served as Army Chief of Staff from 2008-2009.

**Ryacudu, Ryamizard:** Indonesian Army General who served as the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff from 2002-2005.

**Santoso, Djoko:** Indonesian Army General who served as the Indonesian Chief of Staff from 2005 – 2008.

**Sudarsono, Juwono:** First civilian Indonesian Defense Minister in the *Reformasi* era. A well-respected political scientist and academic, Sudarsono served as Defense Minister under President Wahid and President Yudhoyono.

**Sudirman:** (b. 1916, d. 1950) As a child he was deeply influenced by a convergence of ideologies and ideas that he formed into his own, including secular nationalism, Muslim reformism, and military tactics. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesian, he was a battalion commander (the highest rank possible for an Indonesian) in PETA and commanding a battalion in Banyumas. After World War II he was a leader in the people's militia Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People's Security Body) and served as a Division commander of the Banyumas region. After the numerous fighting groups were consolidated and unity of command was established, General Sudirman was elected as the First Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian National Army, a position at the time referred to as panglima besar. He was instrumental in shaping the early identity of the armed forces and maintaining the autonomy and respect of the military with the civilian leaders in

government. General Sudirman died at the early age of thirty-four on 29 January 1950 and was soon declared a National Hero of Indonesia.

**Sukarno:** (b. 1901, d. 1970) Indonesia's first president.

**Suharto:** (b. 1921, d. 2008) Indonesia's second president from 1967-1998. Suharto was a member of the KNIL and PETA before Indonesia's independence and a general in the Indonesian army, remaining on active duty for ten years after becoming president.

**Suhartono, Agus:** Indonesian Navy Admiral and current military Commander-in-Chief.

**Sumoharjo, Urip:** The only Indonesian officer to reach the rank of Major in the KNIL. He was very respected by the other Indonesian KNIL officers and many frequently went to him for advice. He maintained a low profile during the Japanese occupation but was a central military figure during nationalist movement against the Dutch. He became the first Chief of Staff of the Indonesian army serving directly under General Sudirman.

**Sutarto, Endriartono:** Indonesian Army General who served as the Indonesian Army's Chief of Staff from 2000-2002 and military Commander in Chief from 2002-2006. Sutarto supports military territory command structure, especially the intelligence collection capability of its lowest levels.

**Sutjipto, Widodo Adi:** Commander-in-Chief appointed by president Wahid. Sutjipto was the first navy admiral appointed to the military's highest position.

**Sutrisno, Try:** (b. 1935) Indonesian Army general from east Java. Served as the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff from 1986-1988 and Head of Armed Forces from 1988-1993. Served as vice-president under Suharto from 1993-1998.

**Suyanto, Djoko:** (b. 1950) Indonesian Air Chief Marshal in the Indonesian Air Force. Served as the TNI Commander-in-Chief under President Yudhoyono from 2006-2007. Recognized as a reformist and mindful of the military's public perception, he strongly supported the civilian control of the military, introduced the *Tri Dharma Eka Putra* doctrine (Three Missions One Deed), which removed the military from domestic politics. However, during his confirmation hearing with the House of Representatives he argued it was necessary to maintain the military's territorial command structure because it was needed for unspecified goals and would only be used to support military operations.

**Toisutta, George:** Indonesian Army General who served as Indonesian Army chief of staff from 2009-2011.

**Wahid:** Indonesia's fourth president and most radical military reformer.

**Wibowo, Pramono Edhie:** Indonesian Army General and current Indonesian Army chief of staff since 2011.

**Widjojo, Agus:** Indonesian army Lieutenant General who served at the highest commands including as the Chief of Territorial Affairs and Commandant of SESKO where he was responsible for creating the Indonesian military's political and security doctrine. He graduated from the Indonesian military academy in 1970 and was also the recipient of professional military education in the United States through the IMET program, including graduating from CGSC in 1988, the US National Defense University (NDU), and George Washington University where he received a Master of Public Administration degree.

**Wiranto:** Indonesian Army General who served as the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff from 1997-1998.

**Wirahadikusumah:** Army General and radical military reformer. President Wahid appointed him as commander of KOSTRAD.

**Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang:** (b. 1949) Current President of Indonesia. Elected in 2004 and re-elected 2009. Yudhoyono is a retired Army general and key leader in the military's initial internal reform movement.

## Appendix C: Comparison of selected Southeast Asian Countries (2007-2009)

		2007	2008	2009
<b>Indonesia</b>	GDP	\$433 B	\$511 B	\$559 B
	GDP / per capita	\$1845	\$2151	\$2328
	Defense Budget	\$3.57 B	\$3.4 B	\$3.5 B
	Area	1904569 sq km <sup>197</sup> 735,358 sq miles		
	Population	232,000,000	237,512,255	240,271,522
<b>Malaysia</b>	Size of Active Duty		302,000	302,000
	GDP	\$187 B	\$222 B	\$214 B
	GDP / per capita	\$7529	\$8792	\$8321
	Defense Budget	\$4.02 B	\$4.18 B	\$4.03 B
	Area	328,657 sq km <sup>198</sup> 126,895 sq miles		
<b>Philippines</b>	Population	25,000,000	25,274,133	25,715,819
	Size of Active Duty		109,000	109,000
	GDP	\$144 B	\$168 B	\$164 B
	GDP / per capita	\$1583	\$1758	\$1680
	Defense Budget	\$1.13 B	\$1.42 B	\$1.16 B
<b>Singapore</b>	Area	300,000 sq km <sup>199</sup> 115,831 sq miles		
	Population	88,700,000	92,681,453	97,976,603
	Size of Active Duty		106,000	106,000
	GDP	\$161 B	\$182 B	\$170 B
	GDP / per capita	\$35345	\$39554	\$36454
<b>Thailand</b>	Defense Budget	\$7.01 B	\$7.66 B	8.23 B
	Area	697 sq km <sup>200</sup> 269 sq miles		
	Population	4,600,000	4,608,167	4,657,542
	Size of Active Duty		72,500	72,500
	GDP	\$245 B	\$273 B	\$259 B
<b>Vietnam</b>	GDP / per capita	\$3773	\$4168	\$3927
	Defense Budget	\$3.33 B	\$4.29 B	\$5.13 B
	Area	513,120 sq km <sup>201</sup> 198,117 sq miles		
	Population	65,000,000	65,493,298	65,998,436
	Size of Active Duty		306,600	306,600
<b>Vietnam</b>	GDP	\$88 B	\$91 B	\$94 B
	GDP / per capita	\$1034	\$1042	\$1061
	Defense Budget	\$3.7 B	\$2.9 B	\$2.8 B
	Area	331210 sq km <sup>202</sup> 127,881 sq miles		
	Population	85,100,000	86,116,559	88,576,758
	Size of Active Duty		455,000	455,000

Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> and International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2010. *The Military Balance 2010*. (Oxfordshire: Routledge), 394-433.

<sup>197</sup> Indonesia: land: 1,811,560, water: 93,000, 54716 km of coastline

<sup>198</sup> Malaysia: land: 328,657, water: 1,190

<sup>199</sup> Philippines: land: 298,170, water: 1830

<sup>200</sup> Singapore: land: 687, water 10

<sup>201</sup> Thailand: land: 510,890, water: 2230

<sup>202</sup> Vietnam: land: 310070, water: 21140

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