

## ON MUSSO'S RETURN

(Translator's Introduction)

It is now almost thirty-five years since Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence. The men and women who were their comrades-in-arms in the *pergerakan* of the late colonial period are mostly dead and gone. Yet in some ways the lives, experiences, and conceptions of the *pergerakan* leaders in that period may be more accessible than those of the succeeding generation. They were in the habit of writing, in part because they were always far from power, in part because the *pergerakan* was as much a matter of ideas as it was of organization. And the pace of events in the 1930s often seemed frustratingly slow; time hung heavy on many people's hands, at home and in exile. Moreover, a number of the prominent figures from that period have found the will and the time to leave autobiographies for succeeding generations. Few though these texts are, they are varied enough in content and perspective that there is not much danger of students of Indonesian history getting a fundamentally one-sided conception of that era.

With the coming of the Japanese, and especially with the outbreak of the revolution, almost everything changed. Events moved at break-neck speed. The men of the *pergerakan*--and a younger generation--were catapulted overnight into power. They now made decisions, not protests. They stood to lose, not arguments, but their own lives. Perhaps because it was a time of action, the revolution produced no great works--outside the breathtaking fiction of Pramudya Ananta Tur. Sukarno's collected speeches contain no items from the revolution. Indonesia's three prime ministers during the revolution (Sjahrir, Amir Sjarifuddin, and Hatta) left no fundamental texts.<sup>1</sup> Because paper was very scarce and of poor quality, less was written, and it disintegrated faster than in earlier times. The ravages of war also destroyed much unique documentary material.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, a number of the leading personalities of the revolutionary period--men like Amir Sjarifuddin, Tan Malaka, and General Sudirman--died or were killed during its tumult or immediately afterwards. Memoirs of the revolution--in books like Ali Sastroamidjojo's *Tonggak-tonggak di Perjalananku*, Abu Hanifah's *Tales of a Revolution*, Soekanto Sajidiman's *The Tender Power*, and Simatupang's *Report from Banaran*, are fragmentary and only marginally representative.

As a result, the revolution is in many ways a period more obscure than the era of the *pergerakan*, though it is closer to our own, and many of its participants survive, indeed hold the highest positions of political power in Indonesia. And of all the major episodes in the revolution, none is more obscure than what has gone down to history as the Madiun Affair. To my knowledge, only two serious scholarly works, both in English, have covered the whole Affair.<sup>3</sup> On the Indonesian side,

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1. Except for *Our Struggle*, written before Sjahrir came to power.

2. For example, most of the government archives were destroyed. Most Republican newspapers still in existence for the crucial year 1947-48 are now only to be found in Yogyakarta.

3. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca:

the obscurity derives less from lack of attention than from the strongly partisan nature of nearly all accounts.<sup>4</sup> The Affair has always aroused fierce emotions and bitter memories. For its outcome not only determined the kind of *merdeka* that Indonesia would inherit in the 1950s, but it was very costly in terms of Indonesian lives. From the start, there was an inevitable imbalance in the accounts in that so many leaders of the FDR (People's Democratic Front)--the losing side in the Affair--were killed in battle or executed in its aftermath, and so had no chance to record their views and experiences. Subsequently, two other factors accentuated this imbalance. First, and most important, has been the fact that since 1965 it has been impossible for Indonesians on the left to publish anything in their own country, let alone anything on the Madiun Affair. Secondly, the political and moral ethos of the left, above all the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), seems to have discouraged the publication of personal memoirs and accounts.<sup>5</sup>

Under these circumstances, Mr. Soerjono's personal memoir, written in the form of a letter in response to the translator's enquiries, is a significant addition to the historical record: it is, I believe, the first unofficial, personal account of the background to the Madiun Affair from a left-wing perspective. It is to be hoped that its publication will stimulate others to follow Mr. Soerjono's example. Its publication in *Indonesia* stems from two considerations beyond the text's intrinsic value. First, the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project and Southeast Asia Program have a long tradition of publishing translations of first-hand accounts of episodes in modern Indonesian history. Second, under present circumstances, it is not easy to see where else Mr. Soerjono's account could appear.

To preserve as far as possible the informal flavor of the original Indonesian letter, the translator has made only minor alterations to eliminate redundancies, clarify the chronology, and standardize the spelling of personal names. Rather extensive footnotes have been added to guide the reader unfamiliar with the period of the Affair, since Mr. Soerjono's text assumes considerable familiarity with events and personalities on the reader's part. The author's own footnotes are indicated by asterisks and those of the translator are numbered. Square brackets in the text are the translator's interpolations. English language words used by Soerjono in the original text are written in *this italic type*.

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Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 256-303; Elizabeth Ann Swift, "Madiun" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1979). Additional information on the Affair can be found in David Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," *Indonesia*, 21 (April 1976), pp. 1-64; and Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri dari sebuah Djalan (Pemberontakan PKI di Madiun September 1948)" (M.A. thesis, University of Indonesia, 1969). None of these made use of the documentation available in Yogyakarta.

4. These include: Dipa Nusantara Aidit, *Aidit Accuses Madiun Affair* (Jakarta: Pembaruan, 1955); M. Isa Anshary, Sjarif Usman, and Jusuf Wibisono, *Bahaya Merah di Indonesia* [Red Threat in Indonesia] (Bandung: Front Anti-Komunis, 1955); Djamal Marsudi, *Peristiwa Madiun* (Jakarta: Merdeka Press, 1966); H. A. Notosoetardjo, *Peristiwa Madiun Tragedi Nasional* (Jakarta: Api Islam, 1966); Pinardi, *Peristiwa Coup Berdarah PKI September 1948 di Madiun* (Jakarta: Inkopak-Hazera, 1967).

5. The only memoirs by Indonesian Communists are those of "eccentrics" such as Tan Malaka's *Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara* and Alimin Prawirodirdjo's *Riwajat Hidup Alimin*.

## ON MUSSO'S RETURN

(Written in answer to questions by Bung Ben Anderson)

By Soerjono

Translated by Ben Anderson

It was a long time ago that you wrote to me asking about Musso's arrival. Among the questions you raised was why Musso's political line was so quickly accepted by the leaders of the FDR [Front Demokrasi Rakjat--People's Democratic Front]. Was it because they had lost hope as a result of the failure of their opposition [to the Hatta government]?

As I see it, that was not the case. For it is now a fact of history, and can be stated confidently as such, that all the leaders of the FDR, from Amir Sjarifuddin<sup>1</sup> down to the generation of Aidit<sup>2</sup> and Sudisman<sup>3</sup> (who were then members of the younger generation in the FDR), underwent the history of their struggle until death without ever losing hope.

So it was not a question of any loss of hope. And as to why Musso's political line was so quickly accepted, Amir Sjarifuddin's statement at one or other FDR plenum (the term for plenum at that time was "*madjelis lengkap*" [full council]) in August, after Musso's arrival, comes closer to the truth. What Bung Amir then said was: "The arrival of *oude heer* [Old Man] Musso means a *versnelling* [speeding up] of a process which was already developing among us." As you know, Musso arrived at the beginning of August, 1948. By then, Amir Sjarifuddin had long since resigned as prime minister.

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1. Amir Sjarifuddin (1907-1948) was a student activist before World War II, was imprisoned by the Japanese for underground activities during the war, and during the revolution was a top leader of the Socialist Party, minister of defense (1945-1948) and prime minister (1947-1948). He was executed by government forces in December 1948.

2. D. N. Aidit (1923-1965) came to prominence in the early revolution as a leader and parliamentary spokesman for the Indonesian Communist Party. After the fusion of the FDR's components into the new Musso-led Communist Party, he became a member of its Politbureau. He was killed by government troops in October 1965.

3. Sudisman (1920-1967) had been a nationalist militant in the prewar years. During the early revolution he was a leading figure in the leftwing paramilitary youth organization Pesindo (Socialist Youth of Indonesia). In the expanded Musso-led PKI of September 1948, he headed the organization secretariat of the Politbureau. He was sentenced to death for his alleged role in the October 1, 1965 coup and executed in 1967.

In my view, things might have developed differently in the archipelago if Musso had come earlier, in other words, if he had come before the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet resigned.<sup>4</sup> It would have been easier to solve the basic problems of the Indonesian revolution, including the mistakes of the FDR, with Amir Sjarifuddin in the government, rather than trying to correct those mistakes when the FDR was in opposition outside the government.

In this connection, you should realize that even before Amir Sjarifuddin resigned, there were signs of *rethinking* among the FDR leaders themselves, especially among those leaders who lived close to the center of political developments in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In those days the term "*otokritik*" [self-criticism] was not much used and was not yet in vogue. But this change in conceptions, or process of rethinking, manifested itself publicly in certain organizational changes. The name Sajap Kiri [Left Wing] became Front Demokrasi Rakjat. Its offices, housed at Jl. Gondolayu 13 in Yogyakarta, which were originally known as the Sajap Kiri secretariat, became the FDR secretariat. These changes were not simply changes of names, but were also at the same time manifestations of a process of introspection going on among groups which had long been plagued by sectarianism, which, within certain limits, had caused harm to the ranks of the progressives and revolutionaries themselves.

Moreover, in connection with the policy of compromising with the Dutch, the name Sajap Kiri had too long been the target of hostile propaganda by groups who claimed to be further to the "left,"\* i.e., the Tan Malaka people, including Ibnu Parna.<sup>5</sup>

It can't be denied any longer that this change of name was not just a change of words on a signboard. The FDR was a continuation of, but it was also not the same as, the Sajap Kiri. The birth of the FDR came in February 1948.

The public change of name brought with it internal consequences, in particular an improvement in work-methods. In the period of the Sajap Kiri, i.e., before the FDR was born, the most important problems were worked out within the Sjahrir-Amir inner circle, i.e., in the Socialist Party's Party Council. As a result, the Sajap Kiri's secretariat in practice only called a meeting when a Special Train came in by night from Jakarta, meaning that Prime Minister Sjahrir had come to Yogyakarta, the capital of the Republic. As prime minister, he stayed longer and more often in Betawi or Batavia than in Yogyakarta.<sup>6</sup> All this meant that when he

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\* *Kirei* is a Japanese-language term for the Japanese-style bow of respect. The Sajap Kiri was ridiculed as the *Siap Kirei*, meaning "ready to bow to the Dutch." I learned subsequently that this particular agitation originated with Ibnu Parna, leader of Akoma [Angkatan Komunis Muda--Young Communist Generation].

4. Amir's cabinet resigned on January 23, 1948. Musso arrived in Java on August 11 of that year.

5. Ibnu Parna (b. 1920) came to public attention at the start of the revolution as a militantly nationalist leftwing youth leader, first in AMRI (Young Generation of the Indonesian Republic) in Semarang, later in Pesindo. He was a leading figure in Tan Malaka's radical opposition movement, the Persatuan Perjuangan, in 1946, and was arrested by the Sjahrir-Amir government on charges of subversion after the July 3, 1946 Affair. In the meantime he had founded the Akoma, which survived into the 1950s.

6. Throughout his tenure as prime minister (November 1945-June 1947), Sjahrir also held the portfolio of foreign affairs. Necessarily, he spent much of his time negotiating with the Dutch in Jakarta.

arrived in Yogyakarta, the results of his negotiations with the Dutch were first talked out in the Socialist Party's Party Council on Jl. Mahameru, and only then presented as a *fait accompli* to the madjelis lengkap of the Sajap Kiri. At that time the Sajap Kiri madjelis lengkap consisted of the permanent staff of the secretariat plus representatives of the member parties and organizations. These were: Tan Ling Djie<sup>7</sup> and Mr. Abdulmadjid Djojoaningrat,<sup>8</sup> representing the Socialist Party; Drs. Setiadjid,<sup>9</sup> Asmu,<sup>10</sup> Musirin<sup>11</sup> and S. K. Trimurti,<sup>12</sup> representing the Labor Party; Maruto Darusman<sup>13</sup> and Sutrisno,<sup>14</sup> representing the central committee of the Bintaran Communist Party [PKI-Bintaran]<sup>15</sup> (in addition there was also an illegal PKI); Sudisman, Soerjono,<sup>16</sup> and Lagiono,<sup>17</sup> representing Pesindo; Njono<sup>18</sup>

7. Tan Ling Djie (1904-1965?) started his political career in the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI--Indonesian Chinese Party) and as an editor of *Sin Tit Po* in the later 1930s. During the early revolution he became secretary-general of the Socialist Party. He later became a member of the general secretariat and the Politbureau of Musso's expanded PKI. He was killed in Kalisosok prison, Surabaya, in 1965 or 1966.

8. Abdulmadjid Djojoaningrat (b. 1904), an aristocrat closely related to Kartini, was active in leftwing politics while a student in Holland in the late 1930s. On his return to Indonesia he became a top leader of the Socialist Party. Earlier he had been a member of the Dutch Communist Party's central executive.

9. Setiadjid, like Abdulmadjid, was an aristocrat who was active in leftwing politics while a student in Holland before and during the war. On his return to Indonesia in 1946, he became a leader of the Indonesian Labor Party. He disappeared in the aftermath of the Madiun Affair, but is believed to have been killed.

10. Asmu, reportedly a member of the Indonesian Labor Party at this time, was to become Chairman of the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia--Indonesian Peasants' League) in the late 1950s.

11. Musirin Sosrosubroto (b. 1901) was active in dockworkers' and seamen's unions in the early 1920s. In the wake of the Communist uprisings of 1926-27, he was banished to Boven Digul. On his return to Indonesia after the war, he was active again in labor unions and the Indonesian Labor Party.

12. S. K. Trimurti (b. 1914), one of the most prominent female journalists and political figures of the prewar nationalist movement, became a top leader of the Indonesian Labor Party in 1946.

13. Maruto Darusman was, like Setiadjid and Abdulmadjid, an aristocrat who became involved in leftwing activities in Holland before the war. Like them, he was active in the anti-Nazi underground. On his return to Indonesia in 1946, he joined the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In the expanded Musso-led party of September 1948 he was a member of the general secretariat and the Politbureau. He was executed along with Amir Sjarifuddin and others in December 1948.

14. Sutrisno was a labor organizer and member of the underground Communist Party of the 1930s, and was among those arrested by the Japanese for Communist subversion in 1944. After the Proclamation of Independence he was released, and joined, first, the Socialist Party, and later the PKI.

15. PKI-Bintaran or Bintaran PKI--a contemporary colloquialism for the official PKI of the 1946-47 period, which had its offices in Bintaran, Yogyakarta.

16. Soerjono--this is probably the pemuda leader popularly known later as Pak Kasur, who was first active in Bandung in 1945, and, afterwards, a top leader of Pesindo's defense section.

representing SOBSI; Ir. Sakirman<sup>19</sup> representing the Lasjkar Rakjat (excluding the West Java Lasjkar Rakjat which was led by Chaerul Saleh<sup>20</sup> and Armunanto<sup>21</sup>). The result was that in practice the Sjahrir-Amir inner circle, then still united within the Socialist Party's party council, was the "*policy-maker*" of the federation, even though Tan Ling Djie was simultaneously secretary-general of the Socialist Party and of the illegal CCPKI, and Amir Sjarifuddin, Abdulmadjid, Maruto Darusman, and Setiadjid were all members of the Politbureau of the illegal CCPKI which controlled the Bintaran CCPKI.

Ministerial *beleid* [policy] was never brought up for discussion in the Sajap Kiri's madjelis lengkap, but was talked out in each component party's leadership. The secretariat only invited representatives of the parties and organizations if there was a major question at issue, above all with regard to negotiations with the Dutch.

With the birth of the FDR, the secretariat took a more active role, as did the madjelis lengkap, on which each member organization had a permanent representative.

It turned out later on that this new work-style produced new thinking. In other words, there was more possibility for a horizontal exchange of ideas, direct and on a daily basis, between the functionaries of the various organizations contained within the FDR. Many of the older generation who had positions in the mass organizations and had direct contact with the broad masses carried out *flashbacks*. Many high-ranking leadership cadres, who previously had been mainly involved with the problems of the executive, began to be able to see various issues more clearly, now that they were outside the cabinet. Many of them began to talk about the "November Belofte" [November Promises]--a promise of administrative changes which the Dutch Indies never fulfilled.<sup>22</sup> They also began to speak quite

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17. Lagiono was a prominent youth leader in Yogyakarta after the Proclamation of Independence, and co-author with Aidit, Wikana, and Mustapha of *Dokumentasi Pemuda: Sekitar Proklamasi Merdeka* (Yogyakarta: Pusat SBPI, June 1948).

18. Njono (1922-1966) first came to public notice as a labor leader in the fall of 1945 in Jakarta. Thereafter, he was a key figure in SOBSI (All-Indonesian Labor Union Federation), during the revolution and afterwards. He was sentenced to death for his alleged role in the October 1, 1965 coup, and executed in 1966.

19. Sakirman (1911-1966) achieved fame first as leader of the Lasjkar Rakjat (People's Militia) in Central Java after 1945. In the 1950s he became a top leader of the PKI and was "shot while attempting to escape from prison" in 1966.

20. Chaerul Saleh (1916-1967), already active in nationalist student politics in the 1930s, became one of the most charismatic and controversial pemuda figures of the revolution. A hero of the Proclamation of Independence events, briefly a top Pesindo leader, later a follower of Tan Malaka, he was jailed for his purported association with the July 3, 1946 coup. On his release, he and Armunanto led the West Java People's Militia, which was much more radical and anti-Dutch than Sakirman's in Central Java. Imprisoned in 1966 for his support for Sukarno, he died soon afterwards while still in custody.

21. Armunanto was in the period 1945-47 a close associate of Chaerul Saleh.

22. In November 1918 severe revolutionary disturbances seemed likely to spread from Germany into Holland. So alarmed was the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, van Limburg Stirum, by news of these developments that he appeared before the largely impotent colonial legislature, the Volksraad, and promised rapid

frankly about the Sutardjo Petition in the days of the Volksraad.<sup>23</sup> This petition had simply "demanded" that natives be given high administrative positions within the framework of the Dutch Indies Government. The aim being simply to improve the efficiency of the Dutch administration. Not to determine policy, but merely to carry it out, for policy-determination would remain with the Dutch Indies Governor [sic]. Even this petition was rejected [by the Dutch]. It's not surprising that even then the people began to ridicule the name Volksraad by nicknaming it "Volk Sekarat" [The People are at Death's Door].<sup>24</sup> Then there came the "Visman Commission,"<sup>25</sup> a commission headed by Mr. Visman, without any power, but assigned the task of "discussing" with representatives of the National Political Parties to hear their demands. After listening, it rushed to file away the demands for Indonesian independence in its desk drawer. The single concession made by the Dutch colonial government to the Indonesian people at that time was that Indonesians in the Volksraad would be allowed to refer to their people and their country using, in place of "native," the word "Indonesian." A word which Mr. Jonkman<sup>26</sup> himself was already using while still an Indology student in Holland.

Among the FDR leaders many began to ask themselves: "Are we really on the right road? If we want independence, why in the world do we have to negotiate for it with the Dutch? When every demand, from the November Promises to the Sutardjo Petition (which merely pressed for high official positions and didn't ask for independence) was always rejected--let alone what we are demanding now?" In going through this kind of introspection, many began to feel that something had been wrong all along.

For example, they'd learned by heart that the present stage of the revolution was the antifeudal and antiimperialist bourgeois democratic revolution. Yet in the Working Committee of the Central National Committee (KNIP), which formed the provisional parliament of the Republic, Socialist Party representative and Minister of the Interior Mr. Abdulmadjid rejected the Mangunsarkoro motion demanding the liquidation of the Yogyakarta Sultanate as a Special Region. In this way, the antifeudal banner in that stage of the revolution was dropped by a representative of a Marxist Party like Mr. Abdulmadjid, and picked up by a Taman Siswa school-teacher representing the Marhaenists, Ki Mangunsarkoro,<sup>27</sup> and flown in the name

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and far-reaching reforms. These promises were, needless to say, mostly broken once the panic subsided, but they lived on in bitter folk-memory as the *November-Belofte*.

23. The Sutardjo Petition, passed by a 26-20 majority of the Volksraad, in mid-1936, asked for a conference to be held to discuss Indonesia's evolution towards self-government over a ten-year period within the framework of the Dutch Constitution. It was rejected out of hand by the colonial authorities.

24. The reference is to the miserable conditions prevailing among the people during the worst years of the Great Depression.

25. This Visman Commission was set up under the chairmanship of F. H. Visman of the Council of the Indies in late 1940.

26. Jan Jonkman, one of the best-known products of the Leiden University Indological faculty, had a distinguished career in the last years of the Netherlands Indies, ending as chairman of the Volksraad in 1939. After the war, he was Holland's second minister for overseas territories, and was a key figure in the signing and later disintegration of the Linggadjati Agreement (1946). He was also a member of the prewar "Stuw"-group of colonial liberals.

27. Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro (1904-1957), long active in the nationalist Taman

of the PNI. Prominent among those who saw this problem clearly and spoke about it frankly in his own way, was Sardjono Petruk. He was a peasant, and his language and his *approach* to problems were typical of a peasant. By the feudal standards of Yogyakarta or Surakarta he was perhaps rather *kasar*, but the way he spoke and his method of approaching problems was *straight* and open.

In addition to all this, it cannot be denied that at that time the "motor" of the FDR secretariat was in the hands of the younger generation, namely Aidit, Njoto,<sup>28</sup> and Sudisman. At that time Lukman<sup>29</sup> was quite removed from the FDR because he was busy every day running the journal *Bintang Merah* [Red Star] in Bintaran, Yogyakarta.

I remember how once, in 1947, at his house in Jl. Kantil Baciro, Yogyakarta, Sudisman urged me to read a text by Sharkey,<sup>30</sup> a leader of the Australian Communist Party, on the need for "*new forces*" to develop in the Party. I asked him: "Why do you recommend this book, Mas Dis?" "Well, in this book Comrade Sharkey talks about the need for developing and stimulating *new forces* in the Party." "What does he mean by *new forces*?" "A younger generation in the Party." He made this recommendation to me a little while before the Amir Cabinet resigned. For a long time after that I never saw the book. But from friends I heard that it really existed, and had been brought back by Indonesian friends who had recently returned from Australia. And from that time on I sensed that intensive discussions were going on among the people whose names I have just mentioned. It is undeniable that the quartet Aidit-Lukman-Njoto-Sudisman was born in the period of the FDR secretariat, with the note that at that time Sudisman was the most senior.

For simplicity's sake we can call this younger group, and the various leaders who were beginning to carry out introspection, "locally-produced cadres." Most of them were *pejuang* or people in the *pergerakan*<sup>31</sup> at the end of the Dutch Indies period, who then continued their struggle under the Japanese. Except for Njoto,

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Siswa private school system in colonial times, as well as a leading figure in the nationalist parties PNI, Partindo, and Gerindo, before the war, became a spokesman for the radical wing of the PNI in the revolutionary period. He was particularly active in the oppositional campaigns for the elimination of the traditional feudal monarchies in Central Java, which, for complex reasons, the Socialist governments of Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin (1945-1948) did much to protect. "Marhaenists" is a colloquialism for members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and its associated organizations.

28. Njoto (1925-1965) came to prominence in the revolutionary period as a young PKI intellectual and parliamentary spokesman. At the age of 23, he became a member of the Musso-led PKI's secretariat and Politbureau, having earlier served on the FDR secretariat. He was killed by the military in the aftermath of the October 1, 1965 coup.

29. M. H. Lukman (1920-1965), a leading member of the young generation of postwar Indonesian Communists, was active in the PKI from 1946 on, with special responsibility for the party journal *Bintang Merah*. Like Aidit and Njoto, he was summarily killed in the aftermath of the October 1, 1965 coup.

30. L. L. Sharkey was a principal leader of the Australian Communist Party from 1930 to the early 1950s.

31. *Pejuang* and *pergerakan* are key political terms from the period of national independence struggle but are difficult to translate. *Pejuang* roughly means "freedom-fighter" and *pergerakan* "the Movement."



who was a complete "newcomer." They were born and grew up in the midst of Indonesian society, and were inured to living in hardship during the Japanese occupation. At the same time, these people were extremely isolated from international developments during the Second World War. They only really became acquainted with the literature of Marxism after the revolution broke out, when former prisoners in Boven Digul came home via Australia, bringing with them books published by the Australian Communists; and when Indonesians returning from Holland after the Proclamation of Independence brought back with them books issued by the CPN.<sup>32</sup> Thus they had the advantage of knowing a great deal about Indonesian society, but also the weakness, at that time, of as yet being unable to formulate their experience theoretically.

Correct thinking, and turning that thinking into a struggle program are two separate things, and the journey between them sometimes requires a long struggle with many twists and turns.

Aside from these "locally-produced cadres," there were also "old cracks"<sup>33</sup> from Australia within the body of the FDR. This group consisted of the "Generation of '26" and the "Generation of '35" (Central Committee members recruited by Musso when he slipped back into Indonesia in those years). Most of these people came, not from the intelligentsia, but from the *Rakyat jelata* [the common people], steeled by their sufferings in the jungles of Boven Digul, and then evacuated by the Dutch to Australia, because of the Second World War, and put to work as *unskilled labor* at various Allied military installations. There, through their contacts with the Australian Workers, they began to get acquainted with the literature or the theories of Marxism. But they too had their shortcomings alongside their advantages. Because they originated from the *Rakyat*, their class-consciousness was sharp, their *solidariteit* was strong, and they were free from the disease of careerism in the struggle. Their weaknesses were that they had been away from Indonesia for too long; they'd studied a bit of Marxist theory, but in isolation from concrete social problems and the central problems of the Indonesian revolution.

After the PKI Congress in Solo,<sup>34</sup> during the revolution, when Sardjono,<sup>35</sup> Ngadiman,<sup>36</sup> and Djokosudjono<sup>37</sup> assumed leadership of the legal PKI, they mostly or mainly swarmed round the PKI, which had its office at Bintaran, Yogyakarta.

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32. CPN--Communist Party of the Netherlands.

33. "Old cracks"--a common phrase in modern Indonesian--seems to be derived from a Dutch misconception that this is an echt-English sporty phrase.

34. This Congress took place on April 29, 1946, and it saw the return to leadership of many veterans of the 1926-27 rebellion who had been in Boven Digul and Australia.

35. Sardjono had been chairman of the PKI in 1926, and was arrested and exiled to Boven Digul before the rebellion of that year broke out. He was among those executed along with Amir Sjarifuddin in December 1948.

36. Ngadiman, another Communist from prewar days, became a member of the general secretariat of the Musso-led PKI in 1948, and of its Politbureau, and was executed with Amir, Sardjono, and others in December 1948.

37. Djokosudjono (b. 1912) was recruited into the underground PKI of 1935 by Musso, having earlier been active in nationalist organizations. In 1938 he was arrested and interned by the Dutch in Boven Digul. He spent the war years in Australia and returned to Indonesia in 1946.

In addition, there were those whom people called the "*groep* from Holland." Most of these were intellectuals, with a small additional group of ex-sailors, who were studying or working in Holland before World War II broke out.

Aside from the small group of ex-sailors, most of those who set off to study in Holland before the Second World War came from families of aristocrats, or *priyayi*, or rich merchants from Java or Sumatra. As one striking example, take the case of Jusuf Muda Dalam.<sup>38</sup> He was a student from Aceh, came from a rich family, and when he set off he didn't forget to take with him, along with his clothes, . . . a prayer mat. When they left Indonesia they did so under the intellectual influence of the blazing-up of the Indonesian nationalist movement. In Holland they started to get acquainted with Western democracy. They began to frown in surprise when they noticed how the progressive newspapers in Holland defended the struggle of the Indonesian people, and when they observed the debates in the Dutch Lower House, where the Dutch Communists sharply denounced Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. Whereas, if Indonesians were to say exactly the same thing in Indonesia, the Dutch would throw them into jails like Glodok, or Cipinang, or banish them to the jungles of Boven Digul. Later on they noticed how, when there was an uprising of the Indonesian workers on the ship "*Zeven Provinciën*,"<sup>39</sup> the Dutch Communists stoutly defended these sailors. As intellectuals they reflected on all this and began to learn about Marxism, which subsequently changed their whole view of the world; they changed themselves before they developed the ideal of changing Indonesian society.

They began to understand the nature of Dutch colonialism in a more systematic way. And in addition, during the Second World War, they "got training" from their experience of Nazi cruelty. Many of them joined the antifascist struggle against the Germans. So it was that after the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, i.e., after World War II ended with the defeat of Japan, many of them went home to struggle for the freedom of their country. And thus, when units of Dutch colonial troops disembarked at Jakarta at the beginning of 1946, among them were Indonesians in Royal Army uniforms who then made contact with the headquarters of API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia--Indonesian Younger Generation)<sup>40</sup> at Menteng 31, Jakarta, which was then headed by Wikana.<sup>41</sup>

Among the first people to come to API headquarters was Mr. Abdulmajid, former head of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI--Indonesian Association).<sup>42</sup> He was

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38. Jusuf Muda Dalam (1914-1976) was involved in the leftwing anti-Nazi underground during the war. On his return to Indonesia he became an official in the defense ministry under Amir, and eventually a member of the PKI. In 1954, he switched to the PNI.

39. This celebrated mutiny took place in January 1933.

40. API was the leading pemuda organization in Jakarta after the Proclamation of Independence, and included virtually all the pemuda leaders of any reputation.

41. Wikana (1914-1966) was a prominent youthful activist in Gerindo just before the war, and also had close personal ties to Sukarno. During the Japanese Occupation he engaged in underground activities and was a leading participant in the crisis of the Proclamation of Independence. He led API in 1945 and later became a top Pesindo leader when API merged with other leftwing youth groups to form this organization. He sat on the youth secretariat and the Politbureau of the Musso-led PKI of September 1948. He "disappeared" during the massacres of 1965-66.

42. Perhimpunan Indonesia was the main organization of nationalist Indonesian

sent straight on to Yogyakarta. Subsequently, Drs. Setiadjid, Drs. Maruto Darusman, Gondoprato, Ir. Thaher Thajeb,<sup>43</sup> and others also showed up in Yogyakarta. By comparison with those FDR leadership cadres who were "local products," or "old cracks" from Boven Digul and Australia, most of the returnees from Holland had some superiority in the field of theory or at least in book knowledge of Marxism. This is understandable, since their intellectual level was quite high by comparison with either the "local products" or the "old cracks." Or at least their knowledge of languages was richer, and this made it possible for them to read the works of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, and the products of advanced thinking in Western Europe in general, and Holland in particular. Some of them, such as Mr. Abdulmadjid and Tan Ling Djie, had had the opportunity to go with Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri<sup>44</sup> to study Marxism-Leninism at the Oriental Institute in Moscow in the period of the Comintern. As a result, the level of their theoretical knowledge of Marxism was relatively higher, and their view of the international situation and the anatomy of Dutch colonialism were relatively broader.

In Holland most of them had been active in the PI. Before the war, the PI was acknowledged and even entitled by many echelons of the nationalist movement in Indonesia as "the front-line post in the freedom struggle of the Indonesian People against Dutch colonialism." Nonetheless, even this group was not free of *handicaps*. On the whole, they came from the upper strata of Indonesian society; they had been away from Indonesia for a long time; and when they'd left Indonesia decades before, their knowledge of Indonesian society was still very inadequate.

It is, of course, true that those who had the chance to study at the Oriental Institute in Moscow were given intensive instruction on the problems of colonialism for the Peoples of the East, and even on agrarian problems too. But as a theory of social science, and still more as a theory of struggle, to be put to the practical test on many kinds of *battleground*, in many different periods, each involving its own stage, with adversaries manifesting themselves in countless different forms, Marxism itself has undergone development, especially with regard to the problem[s?] of the peasantry. Especially in Asia, still more so in Southeast Asia, and above all in Indonesia. It's possible that the people who then studied at the Oriental Institute were still being taught that the peasants are "an auxiliary force in the revolution." For at that time the question of the armed peasantry forming the backbone of the people's army in long-range warfare, and the vanguard in *agrarian reform*, had not yet emerged as a concrete problematic, even though Engels had already written the "Peasant War in Germany."

Their weakness in knowledge of Indonesian society was overcome by learning from the masses of the Indonesian people themselves. Thus, after reaching Republican territory, Drs. Setiadjid was active among the sugar mill workers, Drs. Maruto Darusman among the plantation workers, Gondoprato among the railway

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students in Holland in the 1920s and 1930s. It came under increasing Communist influence during the 1930s.

43. Thaher Thajeb (b. 1910), of aristocratic Acehese descent, studied in Holland in the late 1930s and joined the Perhimpunan Indonesia. On his return to Indonesia after the war he worked with the state railways and the railway unions. He joined the PKI only in 1956.

44. Iwa Kusumasumantri (b. 1899), a Sundanese aristocrat and stormy petrel of the pergerakan, had studied in Holland in the 1920s and been chairman of the PI for a time. He returned to Indonesia in 1927 and was active on the margins of the PNI. Because of his activity with labor groups in East Sumatra he was exiled to Banda in 1930 and only released fully on the arrival of the Japanese.

workers, and Zainuddin<sup>45</sup> too. In general, they were successful in integrating themselves with the workers, and it is now a historical reality that practically all of them fell in the independence struggle against the Dutch, or were liquidated by Hatta during the Madiun Affair, or died after 1965. In short, an ex-feudalist or ex-bourgeois who sides with the people's struggle is far better than a "proletarian" who bourgeoisifies himself. Generally speaking, these leadership cadres from Holland became, on arrival in Yogyakarta, the "inner circle" of Sjahrir and Amir so long as they were in power, and the inner circle of Amir after he split with Sjahrir. Accordingly, many of them occupied positions as *policy-makers* for Amir Sjarifuddin.

In giving all these people names such as "local products," or "old cracks from Boven Digul and Australia," or "returnees from Holland," I don't mean to attribute a political line to each. For in practice, within the constellation of the Indonesian left, including the FDR, divisions on political lines were not based on such backgrounds. Among those who came from Australia, and even among those from Holland, there were some who sided with, or became, followers of Sjahrir, some who followed Amir, and some who followed Tan Malaka, very much in line with the general development of political thinking at that time. For example, Djamaludin Tamin from Australia and Rustam Effendi from Holland,<sup>46</sup> both became followers of Tan Malaka.

The point of setting out these groups is only to point to the historical background of each. For once the FDR was outside the government, in practice, new thinking emerged in each group of leadership cadres, along with introspection about past mistakes.

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The ideological struggle in the Sajap Kiri, from the time of the Amir Cabinet's resignation to the eve of the birth of the FDR itself, as a continuation or "een verbeterde editie" of the Sajap Kiri, came to be most visibly focused around two interrelated problems. The first was the political problem of how to continue the independence struggle to its conclusion. Or, how best to struggle against Dutch colonialism. Continuing the policy of compromise meant supporting the Hatta Government's policy of negotiations. The second was that, if one didn't support this policy, then one ought to take the position that negotiating was wrong and express it clearly to the people. And this necessarily involved *zelfkritik* [self-criticism], namely that the negotiations policy followed earlier was also wrong.

In those days there was a *warung* by the Gondolayu bridge, right in front of the FDR secretariat, a bit off to the right. I still remember the girl who served the food there, though none of us knew her name. All we knew was that we called her Ju Tien. The *warung's* name wasn't at all wishy-washy. On the roofing above the door was attached in big letters: Warung Revolusi [Revolution Warung]. Almost

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45. Natar Zainuddin was born in West Sumatra and was active in the union of railway and tramway personnel in the early 1920s. He was arrested and exiled by the Dutch in 1923, but allowed to return to Sumatra in the 1930s.

46. Djamaludin Tamin, a fellow Minangkabau and old close associate of Tan Malaka, was interned by the Dutch in Boven Digul in the aftermath of the 1926-27 PKI rebellions and evacuated to Australia during the war. Rustam Effendi (b. 1903), a distinguished and sophisticated poet, became a member of the Lower House of the Dutch parliament as a member of its Communist Fraction. On his return to Indonesia after the war, he came to reject the "too moderate" position of Amir Sjarifuddin and the Socialist and PKI leaders and aligned himself with Tan Malaka.

every day, around noon, the young people would gather there for lunch and even in the evenings they'd quite often take dinner at the Warung Revolusi. At Gondolayu 13, the FDR secretariat occupied the front part of the premises, the headquarters of the Yogyakarta Special Region Pesindo took up the middle, and at the rear was the headquarters of the Yogyakarta municipal branch of Pesindo, which also stored a 500 kg long-fuse bomb. The people from these three offices who went to each lunch at the Warung Revolusi were almost always the same: Wachid Amanullah, Sidartojo,<sup>47</sup> and, from the FDR secretariat, most frequently Hasan Raid and Pardede Peris,<sup>48</sup> who was then working there as a clerk. At that time the revolutionary spirit often manifested itself as the street-wolf spirit, and the proletarian spirit was often identical with the bohemian life style. So it was that while squatting there at the Warung Revolusi (because it was always we who ate there), we'd often gossip about everything under the sun. Among the things we gossiped about there were the armed clash that developed out of the football match between PSIM (Mataram Football Club) and Persidja (Jakarta Football Club), in which, nota bene [sic], the players consisted of boys from the Krawang Lasjkar Rakjat and former players from Jong Ambon Betawi<sup>49</sup> who were now refugees in the Klaten area; the secret "Golden Chain" organization said to be a Dutch-organized spy-ring utilizing beautiful girls; and the plantation workers' strike at Delanggu;<sup>50</sup> and the Hatta Cabinet.

And we began to call this kind of gossip "Warung Revolusi gossip." "Silent grows the paddy" goes the proverb--and, in the same way, silently, the warung grew into a sort of "lobby." Aside from hearing directly from Sudisman how wrong the Sjahrir policy of compromise was, I'd also often listen to Hasan Raid in the Warung Revolusi criticizing the policy of negotiations. Only when Sudisman talked, he spoke of the "Sjahrir compromise policy," while Hasan Raid attacked "the whole policy of negotiations" in general.

Pardede was a bit more concrete. He often used to say quite frankly that "Renville, with the withdrawal of troops from the pockets, was incorrect." Since in my experience Pardede wasn't the "eigen-denker" type [someone who thinks for himself], I felt pretty certain that his voice was a bamboo flute others were blowing. And indeed it can no longer be denied that his words were a reflection of the struggle going on within the FDR itself. The general feeling was (??) that the climax of all the mistakes was Amir Sjarifuddin's resignation as prime minister simply because of a demonstration by a few hundred Masjumi people. In the organizational field the struggle between the two lines took on a still more complicated form. It manifested itself focally on the leadership role of the Communist Party. The

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47. Sidartojo (b. c. 1927) became prominent as a Pesindo leader in Yogyakarta in the early stages of the revolution. Attached to Sudisman, he became an active militant of the Musso-led PKI of September 1948.

48. Peris Pardede (b. 1918) started his political life in API under Wikana in Jakarta in 1945. He soon joined the PKI and helped Lukman edit *Bintang Merah*. Later, along with Aidit, Njoto, and Sudisman, he served on the FDR secretariat.

49. Jong Ambon Betawi = Ambonese Youth from Batavia/Jakarta.

50. From mid-May to mid-June 1948, the workers on the important cotton plantations of Delanggu, Central Java, went on strike against the state-controlled management. The cotton they produced was the chief source of textiles for the beleaguered and blockaded Republic. The Republican public quickly divided and polarized for or against the strikers, with the left generally in support; the bitterness of the strike, which involved a good deal of violence, helped prepare the psychological atmosphere for the "Madiun Affair."



Musso



Amir Sjarifuddin



Abdulmadjid Djojoadingrat

Photos: "Ipphos"  
(courtesy George McT. Kahin)

basic question was whether the Communist Party should step forward to lead the revolution or not. The "new forces" group which dominated the FDR secretariat--Sudisman, Aidit, and Njoto, with M. H. Lukman virtually controlling the agitprop [section] of the Bintaran CCPKI--believed that "the time has now come for the Communist Party to step directly to the fore." On the other hand, it appeared that this line was not yet acceptable to Tan Ling Djie, who was then officially not merely a member of the leadership, but actually the secretary-general, of the Socialist Party, with its headquarters on [Jl.] Mahameru near Kridosono Square in Yogyakarta. Tan Ling Djie's position, which of course had its supporters too, was that Indonesia was not Vietnam. If the Communist Party stepped to the fore, the form of the Indonesian national democratic revolution would change, i.e., it would fall into the two-camp framework of the Cold War. This would only invite American intervention. What had to be taken into consideration, back and forth, at that time, was the influence of Indonesia's geographic situation. In this way, the difference in views manifested itself in the form of a difference in conceptions between some members of the "new forces" group and some people from the Socialist Party's party council. Or so it appeared on the surface. But at the same time it should be remembered that, aside from being secretary-general of the Socialist Party, Tan Ling Djie was also secretary-general of the illegal PKI, on whose Politbureau sat Amir Sjarifuddin, Abdulmadjid, and Setiadjid.

In the struggle between the old concepts and the new, the latter, aside from finding some support from members of the older generation who had done some introspection, was also reflected in the younger generation's intellectual struggle against old ideas. A striking example of this occurred when the younger men wanted to publish the Communist Manifesto. This publication was arranged to coincide with the centennial of the Manifesto's original publication in 1848. There had been a previous translation, done even before 1926, by a man called Pratanda. It's my suspicion that this was a pseudonym for Darsono.<sup>51</sup> Not surprisingly, this translation had its flaws. Not only were there many mistranslations, but its style was still very much the Malay style. By Malay, I mean a form of Indonesian still in the embryonic stage. The new translators consisted of a team led by Rollah Sjarifah, a sister of M. H. Lukman, assisted by Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto. When the translation was finished and the text ready to be published officially in the name of the [agitprop?] department of the Central Committee of the PKI in Bintaran Yogyakarta, the question arose what its title should be. At this point, in came Tan Ling Djie, as secretary-general of the "illegaal" CCPKI, to settle the matter. The argument was whether the title should be "Communist Manifesto" or "Communist Party Manifesto." Aidit thought that the book ought to be called "Communist Party Manifesto" because, organizationally speaking, it was the Communist Party's manifesto; indeed a Communist manifesto that did not come from the [a?] Party was unimaginable. Tan Ling Djie took the other view. The title had to be Communist Manifesto. He argued that when the text was first published the Communist Party had not yet been born. All there was was the Communist League.

Under normal conditions, when there was no struggle between two lines within the body of the FDR itself, this question would not have become so important. Both parties had strong arguments, on organizational or historical grounds. But in fact, of course, the dispute took place in the shadow of the struggle between the two lines. Historically speaking, Tan Ling Djie was right--the original name of the manifesto was *The Communist Manifesto*. Nonetheless, later developments

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51. Darsono, vice-president of the PKI at the time of its formation in 1920. At that time he was the party's leading intellectual. He later left the party.

also showed that after Marx's death, and even while Engels was still alive, the text was published in Spanish under the title "Manifiesto del Partido Komunista [sic]."

Yet the difference of opinion on this matter was only a surface symptom. The group that called itself the "*new forces*," originally inspired by the writings of Sharkey, already clearly sensed there was something not straight [deviating?] going on, but was still unable to formulate its feelings completely in theoretical terms. But from my conversations with the young men at the FDR secretariat at that time, I can say today that the "*new forces*"--i.e., Sudisman, then the most senior, plus Lukman, Aidit, and Njoto--were disillusioned with the Renville Agreement, the withdrawal of troops from the enclaves (then referred to as "*pocket areas*"), and, to crown it all, the resignation of the Amir Cabinet, which they regarded as a false step.

At that time the *otoriteit* [authority] of Amir Sjarifuddin was still so great that they did not lay the blame on Bung Amir, but rather on his *policy-maker[s]*: i.e., Amir's inner circle from the Socialist Party's party council, most of whose members were also members of the illegal CCPKI's Politbureau led by Tan Ling Djie.

So it was that a simple matter, like a difference in opinion at the FDR offices in Gondolayu 13 on whether to title a book "The Communist Manifesto" or "The Communist Party Manifesto," was finally settled by Aidit with a severe intervention against Tan Ling Djie.\* And behind what appeared to be simply a struggle over a name lay hidden the concept of the "*new forces*' group" to stress the *otoriteit* of the PKI, which, as they put it, had been "stuffed under the table" hitherto.

Looking only at the surface manifestations of the difference of views will not, I believe, bring us to an understanding of the real essence of the matter. In essence, all of this was also a contradiction within the PKI itself, between the legal and the illegal party. It so happened that the people involved were PKI activists in the FDR and members of the Pesindo Central Council in Yogyakarta. The struggle between the two lines also emerged in the ideological field in the form of a "theoretical" polemic between the magazine *Bintang Merah*, run by M. H. Lukman, and *Suara Ibu Kota* under Wikana, but in which the active role was taken by Jusuf Muda Dalam who had come back into Republican territory from Holland as a reporter for the *Daily Worker*. Here again the problem was basically quite simple. Wikana had published a brochure called *Marxism Made Easy*. His idea was to enlighten the people, i.e., to give guidance to the people, whose level of consciousness was then not very high. They could not be expected to understand the meaning of "das kapital" or "surplus value" or "the historical philosophy of materialism [sic]." So they needed to be given some guidance, to make it easier for them to understand the essence of Marxism. This little booklet was, it turned out, strongly attacked by M. H. Lukman, who took as his point of departure the idea that Marxism is a science, and cannot be studied in a facile way, etc.

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\* It turned out that this affair had long term consequences. After Aidit came to head the PKI's Politbureau, Tan Ling Djie was kicked out of it, and Aidit published a "theoretical" text on "Tan Ling Djie-ism." One of the political conclusions in this text was "T.L.D.-ism is an ism, prevalent among Indonesian revolutionaries, that wants to change society by legal means." But wasn't this exactly what Aidit did so effectively during the period he led the Party? In 1962, Tan Ling Djie once dropped by my house at Jl. Cilosari 31, Jakarta, and complained that he'd never been given the opportunity to defend himself or express his views on this thesis. It should be noted that, after Suharto came to power, Tan Ling Djie was liquidated in the Kalisosok prison in Surabaya.



The struggle between the two lines in the FDR, or, more precisely, within the PKI, inevitably reverberated in the Pesindo Central Council in Surakarta. Inevitably, because it is no exaggeration to say that, in terms both of personnel and politics, Pesindo was the backbone of the FDR. The reason for this was not simply that, as a young organization, Pesindo was a bit better when compared with other youth organizations (or with the other organizations within the FDR), but it also had a military organization which, while not as strong as the TNI [Army], still can be said to have been the strongest among all the various *lasjkars*. In practically every important *kabupaten* [regency] in Central and East Java, and also in some places in West Java, there were armed Pesindo units.

Among these units, the strongest was the "Surabaya Division," with an arms-troop ratio of 1 to 4, i.e., with a real fighting strength of one regiment, under the leadership of Sidik Arselan.<sup>52</sup> After the rationalization and reconstruction of the Armed Forces under Hatta,<sup>53</sup> this regiment became Brigade 29 under Ov. Mohamad Dahlan. Before crystallization took place in the Socialist Party,<sup>54</sup> the terms "kite" [we]<sup>55</sup> and "mereka" [they] were already current in the FDR. "Kite" meant Amir's people, while "they" were the followers of Sjahrir who virtually controlled the Pesindo central headquarters in Malang. After the split in the Socialist Party and the birth of the Indonesian Socialist Party, the Central Defense Headquarters located on Jl. Glintung in Malang was "daulated"<sup>56</sup> by Rudito, a *pemuda* who earlier had freed Amir Sjarifuddin from the Lowokwaru jail in Malang.<sup>57</sup> (At the time of the Proclamation, Amir Sjarifuddin had been appointed the first minister of information, but no one yet knew where he had been "stashed" by the

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52. Lt. Col. Sidik Arselan was a Pesindo regimental commander in what became Brigade 29. He was arrested after the Madiun uprising and shot on October 11, 1948.

53. In the so-called Presidential Cabinet that succeeded Amir Sjarifuddin's on January 29, 1948, Vice-President Hatta assumed the functions of both prime minister and defense minister. Among the cabinet's programs was a plan (partially taken over from Amir's cabinet) to "rationalize" the Republican armed forces, which had swollen to an enormous size, beyond the government's capacity to pay, arm, or feed them. The plan involved the amalgamation of many units, and the discharge of all superfluous personnel back into civilian life. Needless to say, it was very unpopular.

54. On February 13, 1948 Sjahrir and his followers broke off from the Socialist Party to form the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia--Socialist Party of Indonesia). Conflict between the "left" (Amir) and "right" (Sjahrir) wings of the Socialist Party had always existed, and it had worsened particularly in 1947, when many Sjahrir supporters believed Amir had exploited Sjahrir's diplomatic difficulties to replace him as prime minister.

55. *Kite*--Jakarta slang for *kita* (the "inclusive" we).

56. To "daulat" someone was a typical coined phrase of the revolutionary years. *Daulat/kedaulatan* means "sovereignty": to daulat someone meant to arrest, kidnap, or kill a suspected spy, feudalism, or counterrevolutionary in the name of the sovereignty of the people.

57. Amir Sjarifuddin had been imprisoned in Malang by the Japanese in 1944, on suspicion of being involved in a Communist underground. He had been saved from execution only by the personal intervention of Sukarno and Hatta with the Japanese authorities. He was not freed from the Malang jail until well after the Proclamation of Independence.



Wikana



Suripno



Djokosujono

Photos: "Ipphos"  
(courtesy George McT. Kahin)

Japanese.) In this way the terminology "kite" and "mereka" fell out of use in the Pesindo Central Council. This did not mean that the struggle between different viewpoints ended, however. Particularly in Yogyakarta, it should be noted, Pesindo, as the backbone of the FDR, had a certain prestige. Especially in *lasjkar* circles, in the wake of the unsuccessful Tan Malaka coup d'etat of July 3, 1946. As is well known, this coup was launched by the division commanded by Sudarsono, whose territory was Yogyakarta. And at that time Suharto, who was commander of the Yogyakarta Regiment, was ordered by Bung Karno to arrest Sudarsono, but failed to do so.<sup>58</sup> Thus the position of the Republic's central government was like an egg on the tip of a buffalo's horn. To overcome this crisis, East Java Pesindo units were rushed in, and security and protection for the [Presidential] palace were assigned to the Pesindo Maluku,<sup>59</sup> led by Major Ririhena. Nonetheless, this element of prestige did not make Pesindo immune from the struggle between the two lines within the FDR, which in essence was a struggle between two lines within the PKI itself.

The reason for this, naturally, was not "Warung Revolusi gossip" alone, but mainly that within Pesindo itself there was a means of entry, since many top-level FDR figures were also Pesindo functionaries. Wikana was both an FDR leader and second deputy chairman of Pesindo's Central Council. Sudisman was chairman of Pesindo's Planning Council, which in practice was the organization's "policy-planner," and Aidit was a member of Pesindo's Plenary Central Council. Wikana and Sudisman were also members of the illegal PKI's Politbureau, while Aidit was a representative of the Bintaran PKI's Central Committee in the FDR's secretariat.

Within the ambience of the Pesindo Central Council Wikana made an attempt to overcome the differences in views prevailing in the FDR, by theses presented to the Central Council's plenary meeting in November 1947. These theses were entitled "Preventing the bankruptcy of revolutionary-ism," but they were also known as the "November theses." Their aim was to combat both rightwing and leftwing opportunism. The plenum decided to "go back to the masses," and that Pesindo would not be the *onderbouw* [sic] of the PKI, but rather a sort of educational institution guided by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, while acknowledging the leading role of the PKI in the struggle against the Dutch. A *green light* for highlighting the leadership role of the PKI. This decision was evidently an attempt to build bridges. On the one hand, it decided that [Pesindo was] not an "onderbouw of the PKI"--because it was felt that, if Pesindo became such an *onderbouw*, many of its members, especially people in its Plenary Central Council, would split. On the other hand, it "acknowledged the leading role of the PKI in the revolution."

Even though these new ideas were developing, then, they still did not represent a dominant line. Yet within certain limits, the struggle between the two lines was reflected in February 1948 in the process that then gave birth to the FDR's struggle program, namely: 1. Break off negotiations with the Dutch. 2. Agrarian

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58. The reference is to General Sudarsono, commander of the Third Division in the spring of 1946. The Suharto referred to here is the current President of Indonesia. At the time he was a middle-level officer, strategically placed on the outskirts of Yogyakarta. President Sukarno and the Amir-Sjahrir government found themselves helpless against Sudarsono in view of the attitude of the local armed forces to the ongoing negotiations with the Dutch. They had to be rescued by the summoning of Pesindo troops loyal to Amir from East Java.

59. Pesindo Maluku--a special section of Pesindo filled with Ambonese/Moluccan youths.

reform as an endeavor to attract the peasants by abolishing the remnants of feudalism. But in the field of organization, especially with regard to the leadership role of the PKI, there was evidently no resolution as yet. Whether or not the "green light" would mean moving ahead, now depended basically on subjective factors within the PKI itself. And so long as the fundamental problems of the anti-colonial revolution against the Dutch were not yet *klaar* [solved], even though the *green light* had been given, this leadership role would not in fact be manifested--until Musso's arrival.

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In such a situation, where this central problem remained unresolved and yet smoldered away inside, at the beginning of August 1948 Musso returned to Indonesia, after an absence of 13 years, and for the umpteenth time eluding the Dutch colonial government's secret police. From what I heard in Indonesia about Musso's return route, it appeared that he'd come by plane from Prague, via Cairo and Rangoon. After stopping over in Bukittinggi, he finally landed on the swamp of Campur Darat, a district in South Tulungagung. He arrived back in Indonesia along with Suripno.<sup>60</sup> There was no airfield in that area, just a huge swamp. The only correct conclusion is that he came in from Bukittinggi on a Catalina amphibious plane. His landing did not particularly attract the attention of the local inhabitants, for ever since the end of Dutch colonial rule, i.e., during the Pacific War, the Dutch had used the swamp as an amphibian airbase. And during the Japanese occupation, the same swamp was often used by planes bringing in high Japanese officials to inspect the Nee-Yama Project. (This Nee-Yama Project, formerly known as the Tumpak Oyod Project--involved the construction of a tunnel under the mountains to drain the swamp into Popoh Bay in order to prevent floods in Tulungagung.) At that time Suripno's official position abroad was representative of Indonesian students at the IUS (International Union of Students) which was headquartered in Prague. In addition, he also had a mandate from Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin to act as ambassador plenipotentiary to seek recognition for the Republic of Indonesia. Before returning to Indonesia, he had succeeded in signing a protocol of full diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Indonesia by the Soviet Union. This act of recognition was signed in Prague by Silin, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Officially this was a "Suripno-Musso" party, not a "Musso-Suripno" party, for officially Suripno was returning to Indonesia as ambassador plenipotentiary, whereas Musso's status was that of his secretary.

In the book "*Lives given to Freedom--Dedications to communist fighters*" published by the "Nauka Publishing House, Department of Oriental Literature, Moscow," 1966, "Indonesia" section, there are on page 221 biographies of Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin, while on page 229 there is a picture of Musso and Suripno

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60. Suripno was a brilliant young Communist protege of Amir Sjarifuddin, who had been sent to Prague in 1947 to act as ambassador plenipotentiary to the East European states, with the idea of securing recognition of the Republic from them. On May 22, 1948, rather out of the blue, he concluded a consular treaty with the Russian ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Although he was carrying out his mission in good faith, his success deeply embarrassed the Hatta government which was trying to gain American favor, and Suripno was disavowed and recalled. (He had been a member of the PI and the anti-Nazi underground in Holland, like Setiadjid, Abdulmadjid, and Jusuf Muda Dalam.)

relaxing on the grass beside a river. From this picture one gets the impression that before their departure the two men had met or known each other in Moscow.

From Campur Darat Musso headed for Yogyakarta, stopping off on the way in Solo, but not in Madiun. At that time, even though Madiun was headquarters for the Working Body of the Youth Congress, led by Sumarsono,<sup>61</sup> it was nonetheless not yet a "center of political developments." And the contradictions between armed units, *lasjkar* against *lasjkar*, and *lasjkar* against the Army, were not as sharp as they were in Surakarta (Solo) or Yogyakarta. It seems that in Solo Musso received information which was a bit "overestimate": in particular about the strength of the progressive armed forces, consisting of the Su'adi Brigade, the Sujoto Brigade,<sup>62</sup> and the Navy Brigade under Ahmad Jadau.<sup>63</sup> For aside from these, there were also the Barisan Pemberontakan led by Anwar and Mardjuki,<sup>64</sup> and the Barisan Banteng under Dr. Muwardi.<sup>65</sup> The antagonisms between the people and the feudal system in Surakarta were manifested in the question of *swaprada* [sunanate autonomy],<sup>66</sup> the plantation workers' strike in Delanggu, etc. All of them, within certain limits, found their expression in conflicts between the political parties and also among the armed forces. This situation became all the more complex and heated with the arrival of the Siliwangi *hijrah* troops,<sup>67</sup> who

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61. Sumarsono was also a leading figure in Pesindo.

62. Su'adi and Sujoto were both brigade commanders, believed to have leftwing sympathies, in the Solo area at the time, within the Senapati Division.

63. In this period the Indonesian Navy functioned much more as a land-based infantry force than as a naval presence on seas completely dominated by the Dutch. The real name of Jadau, who headed these forces, was A. W. Sardjono (b. 1923). He was the son of a well-known pejuang in the pergerakan. He was arrested after the 1965 coup.

64. The Barisan Pemberontakan was an important, if rather erratic, nationalist paramilitary force under the loose general control of the famous Bung Tomo. Anwar and Mardjuki were its local leaders in Solo, both widely reputed to be engaged in corruption and extortion, to the point that some of their units were forcibly disarmed by the government in the spring of 1948.

65. The Barisan Banteng (Wild Buffalo Corps) was an ultra-nationalist paramilitary organization led by the hot-tempered Dr. Muwardi, a close associate of Sukarno, and, to a much lesser extent, of Tan Malaka. The Barisan Banteng became an important component in 1948 of the Gerakan Revolusioner Rakjat (People's Revolutionary Movement), inspired by Tan Malaka, hostile both to the FDR and the government on the grounds of their alleged opportunism and weakness in face of the Dutch.

66. The *swapradja* issue was a long-standing conflict over the status of the former feudal principalities of Central Java, especially the two in Solo. *Swapradja* = self-rule.

67. By the terms of the Renville Agreement Siliwangi troops from West Java under the command of Col. Sadikin had had to evacuate their base areas in West Java and move into the new shrunken boundaries of the Republic, in Central Java. The term *hijrah*, an Arabic word referring to the Prophet's flight from Mecca to Medina, was used in 1947-48 to describe the enforced "flight" of Siliwangi and other troops from enemy controlled territory. Just as Muhammad eventually returned in triumph to Mecca, so it was hoped that the Republican troops would eventually triumphantly reenter their former region.

immediately altered the balance of power between the progressives and the reactionaries in Surakarta. The manifestation of this which most obviously became a public controversy was the antagonism between units led by officers of the Panembahan Senapati [Division], most of whom had been activists of the pergerakan, and then received military training in Peta during the Japanese period, and those led by [Siliwangi] officers who had been trained in the KNIL [Koninklijke Nederlandsch Indische Leger--Royal Netherlands Indies Army] in the Dutch Indies period. Naturally, these were only surface symptoms. The deeper conflict was a long-standing and unresolved social antagonism, dating back long before the arrival of the Siliwangi hijrah troops. The presence of the Siliwangi with its "*Hollands sprekende officieren*" [Dutch-speaking officers] simply sharpened the existing antagonism. With a perceptio [perspective?] of this sort Musso left Solo for Yogyakarta.

Musso's first public statement was his open letter to the newspapers in the capital. The two papers which published it in full were, as I recall it, *Suara Ibu Kota*, edited by Wikana and Jusuf Muda Dalam, and *Revolusioner*, run by Soepeno.<sup>68</sup> The only real point of this letter was the formation of a "National Front." Its title was "Proposal for the Formation of a National Front." The gist of it was that the various political parties should draw up a common "*platform*," and create a practical foreign and domestic program which the people could feel as relevant. The sole aim of this proposal for the formation of a National Front was to mobilize every potential to fight Dutch colonialism. What struck everyone in Republican territory then as new was the conception of an organized National Front. Membership was to be open both to political parties opposed to Dutch colonialism, and to individuals. The basic idea was to solve the big problem of how to involve the very large numbers of people in society who were not members of political parties but whose thinking was opposed to Dutch colonialism. This then was the National Front, a conception or idea which, it seemed, Musso had thought over carefully while still abroad, with the aim of making it a unifying mechanism for mobilizing the masses to fight Dutch colonialism. But beside this there was the *realiteit* of a variety of political parties whose existence could not be ignored. Immediately after Musso arrived, he met Bung Karno. This was their first and last meeting. After leaving the palace, Musso was taken off by Suripno to visit the editorial offices of the weekly *Revolusioner* in Jl. Loji Kecil Wetan 14, in the Gondamanan district. There Musso explained, inter alia, that in his meeting [with Bung Karno] the main topic of their discussions had been how to organize the people to confront Dutch colonialism. The question of whether or not to negotiate with the Dutch had not been raised; but, as Musso was on the point of leaving the palace, Bung Karno had given him this message: "I hope, Pak Musso, now that you're back in the motherland, you can help create *rust en orde*." "Don't worry, *ik kom hier terug om orde te scheppen* [I've come here precisely to establish order]." After that the two men never met again.

While staying in Yogya, Musso held meetings or *briefing* with various organizations in a very intensive way; in addition, he once gave a lecture to the students of Gajah Mada University. And before leaving Yogyakarta with Amir Sjariuddin, Setiadjid and Maruto Darusman, for a tour of the provinces to make propaganda for a united front to fight the Dutch, Musso also on one occasion addressed a mass rally in the *alun2 utara* [northern alun2] of Yogyakarta.<sup>69</sup> During

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68. Soepeno (b. 1916) had been a youthful nationalist militant in the late 1930s and became a top leader of Pesindo in 1946-48, during which period he edited the magazine *Revolusioner* in Yogyakarta.

69. Alun2--the traditional large square in the center of Javanese towns of any

his lecture at Gajah Mada, there was a student who asked a question in what Musso may have felt was a rather "skeptical" tone. The student asked, "In the present situation are we capable of resisting the Dutch?"

Musso rolled up his sleeves and answered: "Why not? Here is Musso, my friend, who once joined the International Brigade to fight against fascism in Madrid. . . ."

The sugar mill workers in Tasikmadu or Padokan, or the plantation workers in Delanggu, or the peasants in Kediri might have greeted Musso's answer with applause. And indeed some of the students at the meeting that night did clap, but there were also some who regarded Musso's answer as un-"acceptable" because it was not scientific.

At the mass rally in the northern alun2 in Yogyakarta, one part of Musso's speech answered the "general" question of the balance of military power between the Republic and the Dutch. He said: "Who says we are militarily weak? There are plenty of weapons, over there in the hands of the Dutch colonial army, plenty of them! They're the ones we must seize." This speech was actually a double-bladed knife. In a general sense, it was an explanation to the people, teaching them to have the courage to resist the Dutch and abandon the policy of negotiations. But, more specifically, it was also clearly an answer to elements who were dubious about his concept, of whom there were particularly large numbers in the Labor Party led by Setiadjid. This needs some explanation. Before Musso left Yogyakarta with the FDR group, much of his time was taken up by meetings with the leaderships of the FDR's component parties and with individuals. The main reasons for this were that conditions in the FDR were ripe, and it was also essential to unite the members of the FDR first before proceeding to unite the people. Crystallization in the Socialist Party had already taken place with the formation of the PSI headed by Sjahrir. So there was no real problem there any more. At one meeting in the presence of the workers at the SOBSI Central Bureau's offices, which lay close by the Tugu [railway] station, Bung Amir said: "The prime responsibility for the mistaken policy that has been pursued by the FDR lies with me. If the People demand that someone be put on trial, the first one to be hanged by the People should be me."

But things didn't go nearly so smoothly when Musso put forward his concept to the Labor Party. In every briefing Musso gave, including the one to the Labor Party, he always pointed to the same conclusion--the need for organizational and political preparation. The most important organizational preparation was the holding of a fusion congress. Political preparation included the preparation of public opinion for resisting the Dutch. With regard to the latter, there were no real problems. But this was not the case with organizational preparations.

It was evident that the internal condition of the Labor Party was rather complicated. One group, whose spokesmen were Asrarudin<sup>70</sup> and S. K. Trimurti, turned out to be highly recalcitrant to accepting Musso's concept. Resisting the Dutch was no problem. But fusion under the leadership of the PKI was another story. At a meeting held in SOBSI's Central Bureau at Tugu, S. K. Trimurti put

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size. The old royal capitals of Yogyakarta and Solo each had two, one to the north and one to the south of the royal palaces.

70. Asrarudin (b. 1907) had been a labor organizer and nationalist cadre in the late 1920s and 1930s. In the revolution, he continued in both roles, as a politician in the Indonesian Labor Party and (from 1947 to 1949) as deputy chairman of SOBSI's leadership in Yogyakarta.

forward the following question: "Given that the PKI has made a lot of political mistakes in this struggle against the Dutch, can it really be given the leading role, can it really win the confidence of the people?" He [Musso] answered, pointing to S. K. Trimurti: "Naaah, that . . . that's a Trotskyist question. . . ." Actually it was a simple question, based on facts, which really could have been answered patiently by: "Yes, indeed, the PKI has made mistakes, and these mistakes have been pretty fundamental. But still the PKI has carried out self-criticism, meaning, it has voluntarily criticized itself. Whereas up till now not a single other party has had the courage to admit its mistakes before the people. On the question of whether [the Party] is capable or not of providing leadership, and winning the confidence of the people, the answer mainly depends, once a correct political line has been laid down, on the struggle of the Party's cadres to win over the people. A correct political line doesn't automatically win the people's confidence, for this depends very much on the human beings who promote this political line." In this context "human beings" means "cadres."

Unfortunately, Musso didn't have the patience to answer this way. By bringing the issue of "Trotskyism" into the country, Musso, who in forming the "National Front" intended to create the broadest possible basis for mobilizing the people to fight against Dutch colonialism, actually lost the chance to attract revolutionary forces with potential (??) from the Murba Party<sup>71</sup> and the Angkatan Komunis Muda [Young Communist Generation] (abbreviated as Akoma, and with Ibnu Parna as its main figure). When Aidit set to work on these lines after 1950, many members of the Murba Party and Akoma, who had earlier been branded as Trotskyites simply because they rejected the Linggadjati and Renville agreements, became actual leaders in the PKI. Such were: Legiman Haryana (a member of Murba's Political Council), who after the Dutch aggression changed his name to Ismail Bakri, and later became a member of the PKI Central Committee and its top figure in West Java; Sidik Kertapati,<sup>72</sup> a leader of Akoma, who together with Chaerul Saleh and Armunanto was active in the West Java Lasjkar Rakjat, which was part of the opposition to Linggadjati and rejected the whole policy of negotiating with the Dutch whether this policy was pursued by Sjahrir, Amir, or Hatta, and who later became a member of the PKI's Central Committee. In addition there was also Juliarso, foreign editor of *Harian Rakjat*.<sup>73</sup>

In effect, Musso would have been better able to attract people in Murba and Akoma, which were federated within the GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat--People's Revolution Movement), if the question of Trotskyism and the question of Tan Malaka had not been made an issue. The reason was that Trotskyism was not a central problem in the revolution at that time. For, aside from the fact that the number [of Trotskyists] was very small, the main enemy of the revolution was Dutch colonialism. Like Trotskyism, the problem of Tan Malaka was also a legacy of an earlier historical period. Besides, Tan Malaka himself was then in prison, in connection with the failure of the July 3, 1946 coup d'etat.

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71. The Murba (Proletarian) party was formed in November 1948, by a fusion of various small pro-Tan Malaka organizations hitherto federated within the GRR. (In some respects this fusion corresponded to the fusion of component FDR organizations into the new PKI.)

72. Sidik Kertapati (b. 1919) was a well-known writer and intellectual who had participated successively in Gerindo, the API of Jakarta under Wikana, and the West Java People's Militia under Chaerul Saleh.

73. The official PKI newspaper in the 1950s and early 1960s.



Before the FDR group led by Musso started on its tour to Purwodadi, Madiun, and Bojonegoro to make propaganda for the formation of the National Front to resist Dutch imperialism, it stopped off briefly in Solo. There Musso attended a plenary meeting of Pesindo's Central Council, quartered in the building that once housed the Habipraya Society. In this plenary meeting, Musso gave his short address. At the start of this speech he did not give the usual Pesindo gesture of greeting at that time--the shout "Merdeka!" with the five fingers of the left hand clenched into a fist--but rather clenched his right hand and shouted: "Menang Perang!" ["Victory!"]. He explained his confidence that we would be victorious in the fight against Dutch colonialism by saying that conditions now were much more favorable to us than in 1926. He then went on to propose the following functions for Pesindo after the projected FDR fusion congress, functions which indeed were later reflected in the decisions taken at that meeting: 1. Pesindo would remain a mass organization of the Pemuda, and organizationally would not be the onderbouw of any party. 2. Its function would be to serve as a place for preparing and training revolutionary cadres with a Marxist-Leninist education.

Subsequently, in mass rallies at Madiun, before he headed off for Bojonegoro and Purwodadi, Musso stated for the first time that: "The PKI does not feel bound by either the Linggadjati or Renville agreements." So it was that, after Musso reached the Purwodadi region, the Madiun Affair occurred. We will not discuss here how, before the revolt, fighting broke out in Solo, how Slamet Rijadi<sup>74</sup> came to the Pemuda Congress headquarters in Madiun to find Sumarsono and ask for military support, how Defense Minister Hatta wired the KRU (Kesatuan Reserve Umum [General Reserve Units] under Dr. Mustopo)<sup>75</sup> to disarm all Pesindo units, and so forth.

As I once wrote to Bung Ben before, when the Solo affair (also known as the Srambatan affair) erupted, which ended with the murder of Major Sutarno, Bung Amir, as head of the Defense Section of the FDR (read Military Commission under the Central Committee), in a letter to Sakirman as his representative/deputy urged him repeatedly to make sure that the Solo affair was localized. This letter was received by Sakirman while he was at a meeting of the FDR secretariat behind the editorial offices of *Suara Ibu Kota* in Gondolayu.

Daily life went on as usual in Yogyakarta, quite calm. Up until the evening of September 19, 1948, when Bung Karno made his radio speech calling on the people to choose "Musso" or "Sukarno-Hatta." That morning, before the Working Committee of the KNIP, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hatta had asked for extraordinary powers to crush the Madiun rebellion, since, as stated in his official speech that day, "according to reports, which may or may not be true, a Soviet Government has been set up in Madiun with Musso as its President."

From that moment a communistophobic hysteria was whipped up, on the pretext of what was termed "the Communist rebellion" or "the savagery of the Communists."

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74. Slamet Rijadi was a charismatic young Catholic commander in the Senopati Division which controlled the Solo area. He came to ask for this help because fighting had broken out between Senopati men and Siliwangi hijrah troops stationed in that city under the Renville Agreement; in this fighting, which involved also kidnappings and murders, Senopati got the worst of it.

75. The General Reserve Units, brainchild of Army Chief of Staff Nasution, were intended as a crack strike force directly under central government command. Dr. Mustopo, a brave but eccentric ex-Peta commander, was a Sukarno-Hatta loyalist.

But from that day to this, it has always been the same story, not a single person has ever brought before a court convincing proofs of how the rebellion was planned. So it was that in Madiun the only methods of proof were those of "snelrecht" [summary justice] as practiced at that time. In other words, military field courts which require little in the way of evidentiary procedures.

For this reason, I am not surprised when I hear that now in Jakarta there are many people writing again about the "Madiun rebellion," according to their separate versions--with the Communists, who have been imprisoned for thirteen years without any proof of their guilt, as the scapegoats. This is only too likely, for in every period of history, every social group will certainly worship its own heroes on the stage of its own history.

Of course, it is not my intention here to write about the Madiun Affair. But on this affair, during the period when I was on the run, I wrote a little book called "The Solo and Madiun Affairs" under the pseudonym of Jusuf Bakri. I prepared this manuscript while Njoto and I were in Magelang, in 1948-49. Later, after the Round Table Conference, it was issued as a brochure, nicely printed in Medan. In Magelang, it was stencilled and then, via Yogyakarta, distributed to Jakarta and the regions of Central and East Java. To those without prejudices the Madiun Affair only really became clear ten years later. In court Aidit made his accusation in a work entitled "A Confrontation of the PRRI Affair with the Madiun Affair." It was later published as a white book.

All these books were published in a situation where the mass media in the larger cities of Indonesia could not be said to be "dominated," let alone "controlled," by the Communists. Nonetheless, not a single newspaper or magazine offered a serious rebuttal of the factual explanations provided about all the details of the Madiun Affair. And now, when the Communist press has been closed down, their [the Communists'] printeries confiscated, and more than 100,000 of them thrown into jail or put into various concentration camps, i.e., when they have not even the most elementary means to defend themselves, many people are writing again about questions that are already clear.

If one speaks of the affair itself, the Communists were above all the victims, not those who claimed victims. For this reason, to speak about this national tragedy is deeply saddening. But some day, when there is a forum which provides an outlet for the Communists, I am ready to provide what explanations I can. Though actually there is no need for further repetition, for things are already quite clear, in the sense that both sides have already given their respective views. The highest court is history itself, and the generations that are still to come. We still have much time ahead.

All during the revolution, and even till today, even though I have no newspaper to work for, I have always tried to be nothing other than a reporter. For that reason I have always avoided involving myself with the executives or organizations or of the Party. For me, being a professional reporter is enough. Not too high and not too low. If I were involved in the executive organs of mass organizations, or of the Party, it would, in my view, too easily put me in the position of losing "check and balance." So, as a reporter, from the moment that Musso arrived to the time he left Yogyakarta, I took a lot of trouble to keep my ears open. So, too, after the Madiun Affair, I always asked myself: "Did Musso really bring with him a plan to set up a Soviet in Madiun with himself as president?" The answer--after I listened to various people I talked with before the affair occurred--was "impossible."

Even the speech of Bung Hatta as prime minister and minister of defense at that time still included as an "escape clause" the words, "which may or may not

be true." And, in addition, according to even the most elementary Marxist dictionary, in the stage of the national democratic revolution against colonialism, the task that has to be carried out is, as Bung Karno often put it, the "*samenbundeling van alle revolutionaire krachten*." Furthermore, at the 1946 Pesindo Congress in Malang, Bung Karno said to us: "In the struggle for the *samenbundeling van alle revolutionaire krachten*, the criterion is: whoever is antiimperialist or, put concretely, against Dutch colonialism, is a revolutionary. Clement Attlee says he is from the Labour Party, Ernest Bevin says he is from the Labour Party and agrees with Marxism, but he also agrees to colonialism's war in Indonesia, and oppresses the Malayan independence movement. Therefore he is a reactionary. In the same way, Koos Vorrink is the head of the *Partai van der Arbeid*<sup>76</sup> and claims to be a Marxist, but since he accepts the colonial war in Indonesia, he is a reactionary. On the other hand, Emir Amanullah of Afghanistan was a monarch, a feudalist, but he was antiimperialist, and so he was a revolutionary." This viewpoint is one which is generally accepted among progressives. And by the dictionary of Marxism this is very elementary.

But why then did Musso return as "*a right man in a wrong time*"? For, to this day, I still think that Musso would have more easily corrected the errors of the FDR if he had returned when Amir Sjarifuddin was still in power. Did he return simply to meet old resistance comrades, or to see his family, or because he was homesick for his country? I think such a conclusion is too simple. For *letterlijk* Musso only once, and for a very brief time, met his *mbakyu* [wife] from Pagu (Pare-Kediri) and only once met his son Margono from Magetan. All of this took place in the Party offices at Jl. Bintaran Wetan, Yogyakarta. After the meeting, Pirngadi, a member of *Bintang Merah's* editorial staff, told me about it. He said that, at the end of the meeting, Musso gave his watch to his son as a souvenir and said to him: "Here's a keepsake from me. When you go home, you must have the courage to fight for the revolution." In these matters, Musso was a *puritan*. And this was the first and last meeting with his son. Similarly, in briefings with the leaders of the various FDR member organizations, Musso mostly talked about political and organizational preparations for the formation of a single working class Party and the formation of the National Front. In discussions with various military commanders, Musso focused most of his attention on the struggle against the Dutch. All this was, I think, a correct reflection of Musso's concept at that time.

In briefings with various cadres who commanded armed units, Musso's orientation was a bit more concrete. Let me offer a more or less typical example. One of those briefed was Sudradjad. In the period of the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet he'd been a Major-General, since he ran the munitions section [of the defense ministry]. When Amir resigned, Sudradjad left Republican territory and organized units in the occupied zone. Another person there was Soepeno, former chief of the Pemuda Inspectorate in the Central Resistance Bureau, who still commanded a number of armed units as *dekking* [protection] for the weekly *Revolusioner* in Yogyakarta (which later became a daily).

The last person who spoke to me rather openly was the head of the *Barisan Pemberontakan Rakjat Indonesia* (BPRI [Insurrectionary League of the Indonesian People]) for the residency of Kediri. His name was Nata'. He spoke frankly with me because both of us were from Blitar, and in the Japanese time we were arrested and imprisoned together by the Japanese. After meeting with Musso, he came and told me: "The main thing is we have to have the courage to fight behind enemy

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76. *Partij van der Arbeid*--The Dutch Labor Party--was a central element in all postwar Dutch cabinets and so bore major responsibility for their colonial policies.

lines. Right now, we shouldn't have too many speeches." "Meaning what?" I asked. "Pak Musso's idea is that we should move our units and be active in enemy-occupied zones. Now that they're empty, whoever is the most active there, whoever's bravest in fighting the Dutch, he'll be the one to be recognized by the people." So Nata' told me. He was rather older than I. In the Dutch colonial time he'd been an electrical worker. His hair had turned a bit gray just in front. So the gray part looked a bit like a cock's comb [*jambul*]. When we talked about him we used to use his nom de guerre, Si Jambul. I never thought then that this meeting would be our last. He survived the Madiun Affair. During the second military action he reassembled his troops in south Blitar. He had one battalion under him, known as the Brantas battalion. After the Round Table Agreement, on the orders of regimental commander Surachmad, this Brantas battalion was, without any justification, suddenly disarmed by the "Sikatan" battalion, the "Glatihik" battalion, and the "Brandjangan" battalion, and Nata' himself was murdered in the area of Suruhwadang in southern Blitar.<sup>77</sup> What Nata' had said was so simple and clear. And if we look at the level of his intelligence, and especially if we remember that he was a former electrical worker, I believe he said the truth of what had happened. Perhaps he even copied Musso's own formulation. In Nata's words there were three elements that I always remember: Move units into the occupied zones, fight actively, and "will be recognized by the people."

After that, I was moved to *Penghela Rakjat*<sup>78</sup> in Magelang. By then Magelang had become a city of refugees, because so many had poured in from Semarang. At night it looked very lively because of all the little flickering lamps. The refugees from the north coast would be selling food, "Atom" spectacles, "Atom" combs, clothing, and CP drill pants, goods they had been smuggling in from the occupied zone.\* In Magelang I stayed at the home of Sojas, former minister for food supplies during the Amir Cabinet. He was a very simple man; and every evening commanders of Lasjkar Rakjat companies or sections would gather at his house. At that period Magelang was the headquarters of the Central Java Resistance Council, and also of the central headquarters of the Lasjkar Rakjat led by Ir. Sakirman, also known as the Central Java Lasjkar Rakjat, as opposed to the West Java Lasjkar Rakjat. Originally one, they had split because the West Java Lasjkar Rakjat, led by Chaerul Saleh, Armunanto, and Sidik Kertapati, had rejected Linggadjati.

After I'd arrived, I noticed that for several successive nights many of these Lasjkar Rakjat commanders didn't show up. Some days later I got wind of the fact that Sugiri, commander of the "Tenggor Regiment" had headed off to Temanggung, in the direction of the Demarcation Line. Non-Lasjkar Rakjat elements followed suit. The Pesindo battalion led by Major Mahmud (the former Pesindo of Pekalongan), which was normally under the Central Java Command, had also gone off to Temanggung close by the Demarcation Line. It was then that I remembered what Maj. Gen. Sudradjad, Soepeno, and Nata' had told me, the gist of which was

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\* In Republican areas, articles made of plastic were something quite new, only appearing after the war. The people coined the term "atom" for these articles. So in those days, as a result of smuggling from the occupied zone, a whole lot of "Atom" spectacles, "Atom" combs, and "Atom" belts--all made of plastic--showed up [in Republican territory].

77. Surachmad's troops are also widely believed to have been responsible for the killing of Tan Malaka in February 1949.

78. *Penghela Rakjat*, leftwing newspaper published in Magelang, identified with Pesindo and the Central Java People's Militia.

essentially the same. In his speech before a mass rally in the alun2 of Madiun at the beginning of September Musso had said: "We no longer recognize either the cease-fire agreement or Renville." This concept of Musso's was made still more explicit in the text of the resolution "A New Road for the Republic of Indonesia." The occupied zone was raised to a strategic level. It was no longer just a part, and a small part, of the defense section, but became a section all on its own, in which it was explained that the PKI intended to intensify its activity in Dutch-occupied territory.

The background to this concept of Musso's, which for some of the FDR leaders was a real "*new look*," was the idea that the pockets which had been emptied of army forces should now be refilled with units oriented towards the people. The withdrawal of the regular army from the pockets meant that there was in essence a vacuum of power in the Dutch-occupied zone. Dutch power did not reach down to the villages in all areas, while the Republic's power was paralyzed [*lumpuh*] because of the withdrawal of troops from the base areas.

The intensification of Dutch patrols did not essentially change this situation, for, with only 240,000 colonial troops, the Dutch could only occupy the larger towns, and were incapable of territorial consolidation. Such conditions were ideal for developing long-range people's war. For the time being it would be a war of attrition, i.e., at this strategically defense stage, seizing weapons\* rather than towns, attracting the people, and, where the conditions permitted, setting up administrative units at the village or *kecamatan* [subdistrict] level. Meanwhile in Republican territory only small units would be left behind, for routine purposes, including tactical needs, or simply as support staff. The whole concept, however, would only work effectively if the *conditio qua non* [*sic*] of a unified command were first achieved. And this would only be possible if a fusion congress of the three workers' parties in the FDR were held, and, underneath, the military units under the banners of Pesindo, the Lasjkar Buruh [Workers' Lasjkar], the Lasjkar Merah [Red Lasjkar],<sup>79</sup> and the Lasjkar Rakjat were reorganized into a single command.

The necessary outcome of the realization of this concept would be that the occupied zone, which, after the withdrawal of the army, was regarded by the Dutch as stable, would again become unstable. The no-man's-land would gradually become Republican territory in a newer, deeper sense. Thus the cease-fire agreement would automatically become paralyzed and the Renville Agreement annulled, since there would now be a *casus belli* [*sic*]. The Hatta Government by no means failed to understand these indications. A *casus belli*, whereby at the very least a part of the rakyat would not be behind it, since popularity without organization is fictive, would make it possible that further developments would occur outside the control of its leadership. Accordingly, steps were required to counteract this concept. The steps taken were military repression against Madiun, based on reports "which may or may not be" true, followed almost simultaneously by meetings between Hatta and Stikker, the Dutch foreign minister, at Kaliurang, which produced the Hatta-Stikker memorandum [agreeing] to form a "*gemeenschap*-

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\* "Who says there are no weapons? There are weapons in the hands of the Dutch troops, and those we must seize," Musso's speech before the mass meeting in the northern alun2 of Yogyakarta.

79. The Lasjkar Buruh and Lasjkar Merah were rather small and weak paramilitary organizations affiliated with, respectively, the Indonesian Labor Party and the PKI.

*pelijke gendarmerie* [ joint police force]."\* The *gemeenschappelijke gendarmerie* in this context was a political followup, once Hatta felt confident that the military operations in Madiun were basically "successful." Thus it is quite clear that the Hatta-Stikker agreement to form a "joint police force" was none other than a *countermove* to the concept of creating a *casus belli* which would paralyze the cease-fire and Renville agreements.

I became still more convinced of this picture of events when in 1951 I came down into Yogyakarta from Sawangan (on the western slopes of the Merapi-Merbabu complex) and found in the reporters' mess a copy of the magazine *Mutiara*, edited by Mochtar Lubis. There I found the diary of Suripno entitled "Why We Lost." It seems that this diary was confiscated by the military before Suripno was liquidated along with Amir Sjarifuddin, Sardjono, Harjono, Djokosujono, Maruto Darusman, Sukarno, Ronomarsono, Oei Gee Hwat, Katamhadi, and D. Mangku in the village of Ngalihan.<sup>80</sup>

I heard that these notes were turned over to Mochtar Lubis by Sribudoyo who'd then come in from Surakarta.<sup>81</sup> The notes had been made, if I'm not mistaken, at a meeting in Bantar and in Pulung, after Amir Sjarifuddin had abandoned Madiun. Their contents were very good, the only pity was that there was too much personal comment by Mochtar Lubis. It's been a long time since I read these notes, and all I remember now is their conclusion, where Suripno said, quite frankly: "We were not prepared to deal with this situation," meaning that he admitted that the Madiun Affair was not part of his mental preparation.

Later on, in the 1950s, in Jakarta, I heard that a French writer wrote a book called "Night in Sarangan." I forget his name (Roger Valian?). In it he said that the Madiun Affair had been set up a long time beforehand at a meeting of Republican and American leaders in Sarangan.<sup>82</sup> But I bring this up only as an additional illustration in support of my belief that the Madiun Affair was not at all part of the alternative policy envisioned by Musso; rather, the alternative that he considered very seriously was raising the armed struggle in the Dutch-occupied zone to the strategic level. For it was generally accepted at that time, not just within the FDR (including the Pesindo), but in much wider circles, that once a *casus belli* had occurred, Sukarno and Hatta would not be able to control the situation. But the masses' need for the political leadership provided by these two figures counterbalanced their weakness in the military sphere. Soepeno, who, when Bung Karno was interned in Bengkulu by the Dutch along with his wife and children, shared that internment, on one occasion wrote quite straightforwardly about this. While the

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\* This memorandum was leaked, and I later heard from both Bung Karno and Bung Hatta that the leak came from Dr. Tjoa Sik Ien, who was then officially a member of the Indonesian delegation, or a representative of Indonesia, at the UN. He was recalled and eventually replaced by Mr. Roem.

80. Some of those mentioned here as being executed have already been referred to earlier. The others were middle- and upper-level FDR leaders of various stripes.

81. Mochtar Lubis, well-known publicist and novelist, popularly associated with the leaders of the Indonesian Socialist Party. Sribudoyo, a young leader of the Student Army (Tentera Peladjar) in the Yogyakarta area at the time.

82. This refers to the book by Roger Vailland, *Boroboudour*, published in 1951. Vailland, a prize-winning novelist, was also a member of the French Communist Party. Sarangan is an attractive lake resort on the eastern slopes of Mt. Lawu in East Java.

fire of the revolution was still raging, in 1946, Nico Palar,<sup>83</sup> a member of the Dutch Lower House and representative of the Partai van der Arbeid, arrived in the Republican capital of Yogyakarta and met with Bung Karno. As they parted at the end of the meeting, Bung Karno said: "If the Dutch attack Republican territory I will lead the guerrilla war myself." "Impossible," was Soepeno's answer to this statement of Bung Karno. He went on: "How could Bung Karno want or be able to lead a guerrilla war, when he can't even bear to see a chicken's head cut off?" This reaction of Soepeno was written down in a special issue of *Revolusioner* for August 1947, in commemoration of the Proclamation of Independence. What were the reactions to this article of Soepeno? From Madiun appeared Sumarsono and Bambang Kaslan.<sup>84</sup> They leaked a written order from the Kelaskaran Council of the Center and the Outer Islands, signed by Maj. Gen. Djokosujono,<sup>85</sup> ordering that Soepeno be arrested and "stashed" away in Madiun. This episode reflected internal contradictions in the FDR that could not be quickly overcome. The way out was for Soepeno quietly to disappear from Yogyakarta with a Pesindo company from East Java, which, equipped with one mortar and one machine-gun, set up a defense sector in the village of Sanden on the coast south of Yogyakarta. This kind of situation showed at the same time how complex were the internal contradictions within the FDR before Musso arrived. Naturally Djokosujono's orders did not originate from Bung Karno. Bung Karno was too humanistic for that. Both towards his political opponents, and towards people who criticized him. And Djokosujono himself was only carrying out orders. He issued this command on the instructions of Bung Amir who himself got the order from the FDR "inner circle." The complications simply reflected the struggle between different ideas and conceptions within the body of the FDR before Musso arrived, and which had not yet found their [correct] conceptual formulation. At the same time, most of this struggle over ideas and conceptions was kept within each component member of the Sajap Kiri. But gradually the frameworks of the struggle widened, once Amir Sjarifuddin resigned as prime minister and the Sajap Kiri became the FDR. Previously, the organization [Sajap Kiri] had been mainly a means of communication between individuals or representatives of the FDR [sic] in the government. But now, much of the planning and execution of the FDR's political line was hammered out within the FDR [as a whole], with the result that the struggle between various concepts, which had once been contained within the organizational framework of the FDR's [Sajap Kiri's] member organizations, came more into the open. In this context, Musso's arrival provided an avenue for the crystallization of various conceptions that in fact already existed. It was this situation that provided the conditions whereby Musso found little difficulty in formulating an acceptable new political line. It should also be stated that Musso's very brief mission would probably have had greater success if he had been able to attract a majority of the leadership cadres of the GRR, which included the Murba Party and Akoma, into

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83. Palar, of Menadonese origin, was then living in Holland, and active in the Dutch Labor Party. He came to Indonesia to help build personal bridges between the Labor Party leaders and the Republican authorities.

84. Kaslan and Sumarsono were both Pesindo leaders from East Java, close to Amir Sjarifuddin. It is likely that they were angered by what could have been read as a remark designed to create divisions between the President and the then prime minister of Indonesia.

85. Djokosujono (not to be confused with Djokosudjono) was a top-level military officer with very close ties to Amir Sjarifuddin and the left. He was executed along with Amir in December 1948.

a united front against Dutch colonialism. But this would only have been a real possibility if Musso had refrained from making an issue of Trotskyism. In that way, the Solo affair could have been localized, and special attention could have been focused on the struggle against Dutch colonialism, filling the vacuum in the occupied zone, and raising the struggle of the people in the territory occupied by the Dutch to the level of strategy.

Home. February 7, 1979.