Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.

I. Introduction

... economists have long considered "reputations" and brand names to be private devices which provide incentives that assure contract performance in the absence of any third-party enforcer. This private-contract enforcement mechanism relies upon the value to the firm of repeat sales to satisfied customers as a means of preventing nonperformance. However, it is possible that economic agents with well known brand names and reputation for honoring contracts may find it wealth maximizing to break such long-term exchange relationships and obtain a temporary increase in profit (Klein and Leffler (1981), p. 615).

Many interesting financial problems involve asymmetries of information between the seller and potential buyers of a good. In the seminal lemons paradigm of Akerlof (1970), the fact that the seller has superior information about the quality of the assets being sold implies that the goods being sold would be of lower

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than average quality, eventually leading to market failure. However, the situation is less obvious if there are repeated sales, as the above quotation suggests. For example, producers may initially be compelled to produce a higher quality product than otherwise optimal in order to overcome this "lemons premium." The repeated game setting thus creates a tension between the incentives to exploit informational asymmetries and the value of establishing a reputation for quality. The optimality of various strategies depends on, inter alia, the speed of information dissemination and the gains to reputation building.

Numerous theoretical models analyze this sequence of quality setting decisions, focusing on a producer that has the ability to change its quality in each period of a multi-period, discrete-time (potentially infinite-period) model. However, these models have undergone relatively little empirical testing. Motivated by this gap in the literature, this study uses a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs) to empirically investigate quality setting strategies of the producer. We run two basic tests: first, we test whether producers choose to initially build a reputation for quality and then produce lower quality goods in subsequent periods. In this case, we should observe a decreasing trend in the returns on the sequence of offerings of a given sponsor. We also explore alternative explanations for a declining trend in returns. Second, we test for mixing strategies, where the producer alternatively selects quality from either a high or a low quality regime. In this case, we should be able to identify two statistically different distributions of the producer's observed quality.

The RELP market provides an ideal setting for evaluating predictions concerning quality/reputation strategies for several important reasons. First, almost all empirical studies on the links between reputation and quality are based on inferences gained from experimental settings. Second, RELPs are perhaps more amenable to testing the theoretical predictions of quality/reputation models than the other studies that use real data. In particular, the RELPs in our study are established as "blind pools," that is, the funds for the partnership are raised prior to the developer actually purchasing any properties. This means that the developer (producer) has a great deal of flexibility in setting the quality level of the partnership. Absent significant reputation effects, there are thus incentives for the developer to take advantage of these information asymmetries. However, over time, as the cash flows from the properties are realized, the quality of the developer (and the RELP) is gradually revealed, albeit with some noise. In our analysis, we equate the "true quality" of a partnership with the adjusted holding period returns (i.e., returns relative to a RELP index and adjusted for year of origination) to the partnership unit holder. Finally, our data are extensive enough, in terms

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1This model has been extensively tested; see, for example, Genesove (1993).
2Tirole (1988) presents an overview of the economic literature on quality and reputation.
3Examples include articles dealing with learning and reputation in bargaining games (for example, Roth and Schoumaker (1984), Neelin, Sommerschein, and Spiegel (1988), and Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985)), tests of reputation and entry deterrence (such as Jung, Kagel, and Levin (1994), who test the chain store game of Selden (1978)), and more general tests of reputation and learning (e.g., Bloomfield (1994)).
4The empirical studies of reputation effects that we are aware of using real data are: Slade (1992), who uses Kalman filtering to test for supergame pricing strategies in gasoline retailing; Zupan (1989), who tests for predatory pricing behavior in cable television leasing; and Gorton (1996), who analyzes reputation formation in 19th century bank note markets.
of observations of individual developers and of a given developer’s offerings, to allow for reasonable statistical inferences.

Our empirical work can most easily be interpreted through Shapiro’s (1983b) and Diamond’s (1989) multi-period models of reputation formation. The literature on “experience goods” is also relevant.\(^5\) The quality setting model of Shapiro (1982), (1983a), (1983b) assumes that the producer is a monopolist that sets quantity and quality at each point in time so as to maximize expected utility by solving for an equilibrium quality setting strategy. He shows that for sufficiently high levels of reputation, it cannot pay to build up reputation continually. This eventual decline in quality is a testable hypothesis. Shapiro, less formally, also analyzes the possibility of mixing behavior. The model of Diamond (1989), (1991) considers the possibility of gaming behavior among the producers and buyers. While this model is of debt markets, it is a powerful tool for modeling reputation effects.\(^6\) A key component in Diamond’s model is the evolution of the producer’s reputation. In the initial period, all borrowers are identical so that all are charged the same borrowing rate. However, in subsequent periods, potential lenders can observe whether the borrower defaulted. Diamond assumes that in each period a new set of lenders emerges knowing only the track record of potential borrowers. In equilibrium, any borrower that defaults will subsequently be unable to borrow. This implies that the equilibrium interest rate will decline over time as the aggregate quality of surviving borrowers improves. This decline in interest rates provides an empirical test of reputation formation in the aggregate. This effect, and other aspects of Diamond’s model, is tested in Gorton (1996), which examines the market for bank notes in the 19th century. Gorton finds statistically significant evidence for a reputation effect in note prices. In addition to inferences about the aggregate population, Diamond’s model also has empirical predictions about the behavior of individual borrowers. One that will be tested in our model is the presence of mixed strategies in the equilibrium.\(^7\)

Although the model setting that Shapiro employs differs from that of Diamond, both models yield similar implications. In particular, producers choose to initially build a reputation for quality and then produce lower quality goods in subsequent periods. If this proposition holds, then we should observe a decreasing trend in the returns on the sequence of offerings of a given sponsor. There is also a possibility that producers engage in mixing strategies. If this is the case, then we should observe two different quality distributions.

We find that, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the reputation building hypothesis, the average quality decreases with each successive partnership issued by a given sponsor. This result is valid in the aggregate as well as for the majority of the sponsors in our sample. We also find that some producers engage in mixing strategies, producing high quality in some periods and low quality in others. However, it is important to observe that our results are influ-

\(^5\)Experience goods are goods whose quality cannot be determined precisely in one period. The usual setting involves the producer choosing the mean of the quality distribution. Alternatively, quality can only be observed with noise. In either case, some type of Bayesian updating is typically used to revise the estimates of the producer’s quality in each period.

\(^6\)While developed as a model for debt markets, Diamond (1989, p. 829) notes that his model is also applicable to reputation formation in general.

\(^7\)The conditions for the existence of mixed strategies are given in Diamond’s Lemma 11.
enced by survivorship and incubation bias (since poor sponsors are unlikely to be around long enough to produce many offerings). Furthermore, a number of sponsors tended to hold one type of property in their initial offerings, and another type in their later offerings, potentially moving outside of their initial property type or location expertise. This would also contribute to decreases in returns over time. Finally, since our data set is small, the statistical significance of our results is relatively weak and, as such, our results should be considered suggestive rather than conclusive.

The outline of the remainder of the study is as follows. Section II provides an overview of the basic institutional setting. Section III describes the data. Section IV analyzes our results and Section V presents our conclusions. The Appendix briefly reviews the relevant empirical methodology.

II. Institutional Environment

RELPs represent an important mechanism for individual investors to pool their resources to participate in real estate. In contrast to traditional securities, partnerships typically represent direct investment in businesses (such as real estate) and are not publicly traded. Moreover, partnerships are neither rated by a rating agency nor followed by Wall Street analysts. The general partner (GP) organizes and assumes responsibility for running the partnership. Partnerships are not required to publish the values of their assets and, as such, calculating capital gains and market values accurately is difficult. Most public partnerships require a minimum investment of $1,000 to $5,000 and they are actively marketed to "small" investors. Typically, the partnership is structured as a blind pool wherein the general partner (the sponsor) has not bought any assets until the offering is completely sold. Legally, a partnership must have a finite life, which is usually set at 50 years or more, to allow the general partner flexibility in timing the sale of properties.

Market participants in the initial offerings are almost always individual investors, while institutions dominate the secondary market. Secondary market trading in these RELPs is done at substantial discounts (an average of 45%) to appraised value. These points are elucidated in Barber (1996), p. 490):

The relation between current yields, leverage and discounts supports an agency cost explanation for the observed discounts. Reputation is particularly critical in the market for limited partnerships, which are traded in an unorganized secondary market and have been consistently plagued by negative coverage in the financial press.

The general partner usually has complete discretion on what properties to purchase. For example, the prospectus of First Capital Income Properties Series VII reads: "No specific properties have yet been identified for acquisition by the partnership as of the date of this prospectus, and the General Partners have complete discretion in investing the proceeds of this offering."

We sampled over 50 prospectuses of different partnerships and different sponsors. Only one had information on a few properties that the general partner intended to purchase with the proceeds of the offering.
With regard to the sale of properties, the partnership agreement does not usually bind the general partner in any way. However, many of the prospectuses have statements on when the general partner intends to start selling the property. A typical example from a partnership sponsored by JMB Corporation reads:

The Partnership intends to hold the real properties it acquires until such time as sale or other disposition appears to be advantageous from the viewpoint of the Partnership’s investment objectives. In general, the Partnership intends to sell or refinance properties between the fifth and twelfth years after acquisition ... However, the Corporate general partner will not be obligated to sell properties at any particular time.

Most of the partnership agreements stated expected time of sale between the fifth and fifteenth years. From the supplemental information provided subsequent to the offering, it was determined the proceeds are invested, in most part, within two years of the offering.

Because of the informational asymmetries associated with this organizational form, RELPs are particularly susceptible to the agent (general partner or sponsor) choosing actions that are suboptimal from the principal’s (limited partner or unit holder) perspective. This issue of conflicting incentives between the general and limited partners has been well documented. An example is Wolfson’s (1991) empirical analysis of oil and gas tax shelter programs. He cites the following excerpt from a drilling prospectus:

Should a Partnership acquire or lease or participate in drilling or producing operations on a Prospect in proximity to that of the General Partner or its Affiliates, the results of such activity by the Partnership may gratuitously benefit the General Partner or its Affiliates ... [This may] result in profits to the General Partner or its Affiliates, and such profits will not be paid to the Partnerships.

In our setting, the flurry of investor lawsuits involving misdealing, fraud and deceptive sales practices against the brokerage houses selling these RELPs provides us with ex post evidence of these incentive problems. These lawsuits have led the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate whether Wall Street firms such as Dean Witter, Paine Webber, Merrill Lynch, Shearson, and Prudential Securities, among others, misrepresented partnership risk and rewards. These observations suggest that, in the primary market, general partners might take advantage of relatively uninformed buyers. In the secondary market, as more information on asset quality is revealed, we expect prices to reflect more rational levels. This allows us to reasonably accurately assess the underlying quality of the RELP over time in our empirical analysis. However, as noted earlier, our tests cannot rule out other possible explanations for the evolution of the market. For example, it is plausible that, as the market for RELPs developed, investors became

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8 These Wall Street firms are not only the biggest marketers of partnerships but they also sponsor the partnerships. For example, Paine Webber sold about $2 billion in limited partnerships according to the New York Times (November 28, 1994), including the Paine Webber real estate partnership.
more familiar with the risk-return trade-offs and thus the market risk premium for RELPs changed.9

There has been relatively little research into limited partnerships, particularly real estate limited partnerships. Most studies focus on RELP performance. Rogers and Owers (1985) find that only investors in the highest marginal tax bracket earn an adequate after-tax return. Kapplin and Schwartz (1986) re-evaluate the performance characteristics of publicly offered RELPs using secondary market prices and find that the returns in Rogers and Owers (1985) are overstated.10 Kapplin and Schwartz (1988) find that returns on pre-1981 RELPs are similar to institutional grade real estate, while more recent RELPs tend to underperform institutional properties. Kallberg and Liu (1995) relate recent RELP performance to characteristics of sponsors and underlying properties; they find that the sponsor is one of the most important determinants of RELP performance.

III. Experimental Data and Design

Data on secondary market prices, liquidations, and cash distributions were obtained from Robert A. Stanger & Company beginning in January 1, 1990 and ending in December 31, 1995. The time period studied coincides with the advent of reported secondary market prices for RELPs. All partnerships studied are publicly registered and are blind pools. Sponsors with less than six RELPs were excluded from our individual sponsor statistical analysis since there would be insufficient time-series data; this results in a sample of 253 RELPs, although the larger sample of 308 is used in computing the benchmark returns. Excluded from all of the subsequent analysis are partnerships that did not trade or traded very infrequently. As such, the data are biased toward actively traded partnerships of relatively large sponsors.

Origination dates associated with the partnerships studied range from 1977 to 1989. The total dollar volume of RELPs outstanding vs. the amount in our sample is depicted in Figure 1. Our data represent 55% of the total. The remaining 45% are mainly RELPs that did not trade in the secondary market, making it impossible to determine their rates of return. The annual fluctuation in total volumes is substantial and reflects the large number of issues in the early 1980s and the subsequent liquidation of older RELPs. Although the earlier RELPs are likely to be liquidating a significant number of their properties over our price observation window, we find that the amount of liquidation does not significantly affect returns.11

Returns used in the following analysis are holding period returns calculated over the 1990 through 1995 observation window. There is one excess (total period) return associated with each RELP calculated as follows. Initially, the total

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9 As clarified later in this section, we mitigate this bias by adjusting our measure of quality for year of RELP issuance.

10 The differential in the returns between the two studies is partly attributable to the sample size (Kaplin and Schwartz had a larger sample), the age of the partnerships (Kaplin and Schwartz had younger RELPs), the time period examined, and subjective classifications of the distinction between income-oriented and tax-oriented RELPs.

11 A regression of return vs. percentage of liquidation had an $R^2$ of less than 1% and an insignificant $F$-statistic.
FIGURE 1
Total Real Estate Limited Partnership (RELP) Volume

RELP volume by year

- Aggregate RELP volume
- Sample volume

Figure 1 depicts the total RELP volume (in $millions) over our sample period. It shows that our sample contains approximately 55% of the total dollar volume.

raw return in each quarter is calculated for each RELP based on observed transaction prices and cash distributions (liquidations and dividends). These raw returns are then modified by two factors. First, we compute the excess return by deducting the benchmark RELP return, which is an equally weighted average of all RELP returns available in the given quarter, from the raw return. Second, from this excess return, we make a further adjustment to account for trend or learning in our data. An OLS regression was run on average excess RELP returns vs. dummy variables for the year of origination. These dummy variable coefficients are then used to adjust the excess RELP return for year of origination. Thus, the quality of a given RELP is the raw holding period return adjusted for the benchmark return and year of origin. We call this figure the adjusted return. Henceforth, this adjusted return will be our empirical proxy for the "true quality" of the RELP. In the context of the Shapiro or Diamond models, it reflects the quality level chosen by the sponsor. This characterization corresponds to the experience goods setting, since the buyer cannot establish the true quality of the asset until a significant amount of time has passed.

We first test for trends in average quality. The tests are based on splitting the sequence of a developer's partnerships into halves and performing simple tests for mean and variance shifts between the two subsamples. In the subsequent analysis, for each developer, we will refer to the first half of its RELP issues as the first period and the second half of its RELP issues as the second period. Naturally these "time periods" will differ for each developer.

12 In less than 1% of the cases, a simple linear interpolation of prices was used if there was a quarter without an observed price.
13 An earlier version of this paper did not incorporate this trend correction. Those results are qualitatively nearly identical to those given below and are available from the authors.
We perform further tests (Quandt (1958), (1960), (1972), Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975), and Quandt and Ramsey (1978)) to see if developers change their quality regimes or engage in mixing strategies. For example, the finding of a higher variance in the first period and a lower mean in the second, is consistent both with markets learning more about the appropriate risk premium for a given developer, and with a strategy of mixing from a distribution in the first period (in order to make it difficult to uncover quality in the first period) and then in the second period to milk its reputation (in the parlance of Shapiro) by producing lower quality goods. This strategy is, in a sense, a variant of the reputation building story, where the developer, instead of building a reputation, injects variance into its quality level. The details of these tests are described in the Appendix. The tests are also performed on a pooled basis to test for overall reputation effects. A t- (F-) test is then computed to test if the mean (variance) in period 1 is higher than the mean (variance) in period 2.

IV. Empirical Results

A. Sample Characteristics

Table 1 presents the general characteristics of our RELP sample. Panel A shows the total dividend payout by 1987 to 1989 as a percentage of initial capital. By the end of 1989, the average RELP had paid out 25.4% of its initial capital as dividends. The average leverage (total debt over total initial capital) in our sample is 27.3%. One measure of RELP quality, which we will use later in this section, is the rating given LPs by Partnership Profiles. It is a rating from 1 (the highest) to 5. Separate ratings are given to financial condition and to cash distributions as of December 31, 1989; the respective averages for our sample are 1.69 and 3.35. The average cost basis value of our RELPs is $85.5 million. Panel B of Table 1 shows these RELP characteristics by RELP issuance sequence. The cost basis of the RELPs rises significantly from the first issue ($53.1 million) to the tenth RELP issued by a sponsor ($111.9 million). The Partnership Profile ratings for both financial condition and cash distributions decline slightly, although neither trend is significant. The downward trend in raw returns is also evident.

Table 2 shows the mean, semi-annual returns over our six-year observation window (January 1990 to December 1995) organized by offering number; the figures are unadjusted returns formed from data on cash distributions and secondary market prices. The in-sample group consists of the 253 offerings by developers with at least six RELPs in the sample; the out-of-sample group consists of the 52 offerings by developers with five or fewer RELPs. The most important feature is the trend of decreasing returns, which suggests an aggregate reputation effect. For the in-sample group, six of the first 10 offerings have positive mean returns; four of offerings 11 through 20 have positive mean returns; offerings 21 through 30 have positive mean returns; offerings 21 through 30

14 While we recognize that the power associated with the Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) test is limited relative to that of the Chow test, we use the BDE test since we do not know ex ante when the structural change occurs. The advantage of the Chow test diminishes when the regime shift is unknown. See Chapter 7 of Greene (2000) for further details.

15 The latter group is omitted from our more detailed statistical analysis because we judged that five RELPs was too small a sample to permit inferences about trends in quality.
TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics

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<th>Panel A General Characteristics</th>
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<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
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<td>Cumulative dividends till 1989 (%)</td>
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<td>28.4%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
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<td>Cumulative dividends till 1988 (%)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
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<td>Cumulative dividends till 1987 (%)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leverage (%)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operating income (in $000s)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.418</td>
<td>4.004</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Financial condition rating</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1.69</td>
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<td>3.35</td>
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<td>7.312</td>
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<td>Cost basis (in $000s)</td>
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<th>3</th>
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<td>31.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
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<td>16.1</td>
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<td>Cumulative dividends till 1988 (%)</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
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<td>Cumulative dividends till 1989 (%)</td>
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<td>23.3</td>
<td>28.1</td>
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<td>29.0</td>
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<td>Operating income (in $000s)</td>
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<td>1,458</td>
<td>3,326</td>
<td>3,374</td>
<td>4,760</td>
<td>1,773</td>
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<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.91</td>
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<td>3.22</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.75</td>
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<td>Gross revenue (in $000s)</td>
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<td>5,472</td>
<td>7,545</td>
<td>7,335</td>
<td>7,576</td>
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<td>6,541</td>
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<td>Cost basis (in $000s)</td>
<td>53,077</td>
<td>64,106</td>
<td>66,778</td>
<td>79,463</td>
<td>86,500</td>
<td>89,934</td>
<td>54,297</td>
<td>88,894</td>
<td>103,288</td>
<td>118,885</td>
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</table>

Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the complete sample of RELPs. The first three rows give the average dividend distributions as a percentage of initial capital, from the partnership's inception until 1987, 1988, and 1989. The cost basis of the properties is the total capitalized cost before depreciation, amortization, and property value write-downs. Total leverage is measured with respect to the total cost basis of the properties. The ratings are from Slanger's Partnership Profiles, ranging from 1 (best) to 5. The ratings and the financial statement data are as of the end of 1989. Panel B disaggregates this data by offering number.

have no positive mean returns. Note that it is difficult to draw too much statistical inference at this point because the number of observations drops off rapidly after offering number 13. Additionally, the data show no significant differences between the in-sample and out-of-sample average returns for offerings one through five, suggesting that our results will not be overly influenced by survivorship or incubation bias. In the statistical analysis, we will present detailed evidence of the reputation effect both on the aggregate level and for individual developers in our sample.

It is of interest to investigate the aggregate behavior of the RELP developers in our sample before focusing on individual developers. Figure 2 plots the adjusted return for each RELP ordered by issuance date. Thus, the \( x \)-axis value of \( i \) represents the adjusted return of the \( i \)th RELP for each developer. The regression of adjusted returns versus offering number shows a significant negative coefficient on offering number and a significant positive constant. This suggests that, even after censoring out developers with fewer than six RELPs, and after netting out
aggregate market performance, the general quality of the RELPs declines with offering number. This decline in returns is consistent with the notion that, in the aggregate, developers in our sample engaged in reputation building.

The next series of statistical tests tries to identify which strategies individual developers may be following. Table 3 presents a test of mean and variance shifts. We find that four of the 20 developers (Century, CNL, Krupp, and Prudential) have significantly lower means (at the 0.05 level) in the second half of their offerings. The pooled data and three developers (Angeles, Insured, and JMB) have significantly lower means at a significance level of 0.10. On the other hand, only Shurgard shows significantly higher returns in the second half of its offerings. Increasing returns are not predicted by any of the theoretical models. Although not a formal prediction of either Diamond's or Shapiro's model, Table 3 also suggests that the variance is decreasing over subsequent offerings. In particular, three of the developers have significantly lower variances (at the 0.05 level) in the second half of their offerings: Angeles, Krupp, and Prudential. It is very interesting that each of these three also had significantly lower means in the first half of their offerings.
Figure 2 plots the adjusted returns for each RELP in its issuance order. The fitted regression line shows the negative trend in the returns. This regression uses White's correction for heteroskedastic errors.

Table 3 shows the results of testing for significant differences between the means and variances of sponsor returns in the first and second half of their offerings. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

B. Testing for Regime Shifts

To simplify our exposition, we focus on developers that showed a significant decline in adjusted return in the second half of their offerings and that had more
than 10 offerings in our data. This leaves us with five developers: Angeles, Insured, JMB, Krupp, and Prudential. For comparison, we also include aggregate results (when relevant) and results from the only developer, Shurgard, that had significantly higher quality in the second half of its offerings.

Testing for different quality regimes and mixed strategies is done in three stages. Initially we use the Quandt-Ramsey approach to test for mixtures of distributions. Secondly we compute the Quandt ratios for these six developers to provide an informal test. Finally, we use the Brown-Durbin-Evans (BDE) technique to test for the statistical significance of a possible regime shift. While this analysis provides some evidence that certain sponsors appear to exploit their informational advantages, these results should be taken as suggestive, since the underlying distributional assumptions of the test are unlikely to be met in our small data set. To assist in the interpretation of these ratios, the adjusted returns are plotted in Figure 3. The Appendix presents details on the statistical techniques used.

Table 4 reports the result of tests for mixtures of normals. For the aggregate data, there is a 43% probability ($\lambda$) that returns are drawn from a distribution with a mean of 4.7% ($\mu_1$) and a 57% probability ($1 - \lambda$) that returns are drawn from a distribution with a mean of -3.6% ($\mu_2$). This mean difference is significant at the 5% level, but the difference in standard deviations is not significant. Table 4 demonstrates that Angeles is primarily a low quality producer; the $\lambda$ value indicates that there is a 91% probability that the mean-adjusted return on an Angeles-issued RELP is -5.4% and a 9% probability that the return is 28.7%. Table 4 also shows significant evidence of mixing behavior for Krupp. There is a 30% chance that returns are drawn from a distribution with a high return (44.9%) and a high standard deviation (17.6%); there is a 70% chance that the distribution has a mean of -11.5% and a standard deviation of only 3.2%. The trend of returns in Figure 3 indicates that prior to the seventh RELP issued, Krupp was primarily a high quality producer. The Quandt likelihood ratio and the BDE cumulative sum of squares are plotted against issuance sequence in Figure 4. The Quandt technique identifies the regime break as the maximum of the plotted maximum likelihood ratio. The BDE technique signals a regime shift if the graph of the cumulative sum of squares moves outside the 95% fractile of the theoretical distribution. The techniques in Figure 4 jointly suggest that two of the developers in this subsample may be switching quality regimes: JMB (offering four) and Krupp (offering six). Generally the techniques are in agreement although, because of the sensitivity of these techniques to the initial observations, they can disagree. For example, with Prudential (offering seven), the Quandt ratio suggests a regime shift, but the BDE test fails to detect this. For Angeles, Insured, and Shurgard, the test fails to reject the hypothesis of constant quality. These RELP sponsors either consistently produced the same quality or there were more than two switches between regimes.

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18 The results for all developers are contained in a previous draft of this paper, which is available from the authors.

19 We do not report the $R^2$ statistic in Table 4 because in nonlinear estimation, the $R^2$ is not guaranteed to be in the range of zero to one. In lieu of the $R^2$ statistic, we report the Wald statistic, which turns out to be significant in all cases except for Shurgard.
The Quandt ratio shows that the change in quality occurred near the issuance of the fifth RELP offering by Angeles, while the BDE graph reveals that this quality change is insignificant at the 5% level. From Figure 3, it appears as if the fifth RELP issued was the only offering (with the possible exception of the third) that performed reasonably well, that is, was of "good" quality. The profile of the returns on Prudential-sponsored RELPs resembles that of Angeles in terms of the $\lambda$, $\mu_1$, and $\mu_2$ in Table 4. Figure 3 also shows some evidence that Prudential
engaged in reputation building, since the trend in adjusted returns associated with sequential RELP offerings is generally positive and increasing until the seventh RELP offering, where the Quandt ratio indicates that a possible change in quality occurred. This change in quality however, is not significant according to the BDE graph. As for Angeles, Table 4 shows that the means are statistically different. For Krupp, the returns from the first to the third RELP are increasing and suggest reputation building. Subsequent to the sixth offering, where the Quandt ratio in
Figure 3 (continued)
Excess Returns on RELPs by Sponsor

Figure 3 shows the excess returns (adjusted for the year of RELP formation) for the six sponsors analyzed in detail.

Figure 4 reveals that a shift in quality occurred. Krupp was a consistently low quality producer. This shift from high quality to low quality is also evidenced by noting that $\mu_1 > \mu_2$ and $\sigma_1 > \sigma_2$ from Table 3. As with Angeles and Prudential, this evidence is consistent with a reputation effect.
TABLE A

Tests for Mixed Strategy Using Normal Mixtures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELP Sponsor</th>
<th>( \lambda )</th>
<th>( \rho_1 )</th>
<th>( \rho_2 )</th>
<th>( \sigma_1 )</th>
<th>( \sigma_2 )</th>
<th>( \sigma_{\text{mixed}} )</th>
<th>( \text{Max} \theta_1 )</th>
<th>( \text{Max} \theta_2 )</th>
<th>Wald Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-3.6*</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angeles</td>
<td>0.9*</td>
<td>-5.4*</td>
<td>28.7*</td>
<td>-4.5*</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured</td>
<td>0.0*</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.4*</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>18.9*</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>33.4*</td>
<td>19.8*</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krupp</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>-44.9*</td>
<td>-11.5*</td>
<td>17.6*</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>24.6*</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shurgard</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To estimate the mixture of normals, the following moment-generating function is minimized using weighted nonlinear least squares with \( j = 15 \) to ensure that the corresponding normal equations are of full rank:

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{15} \frac{g_j(y)}{\sigma} = \lambda e^{\mu_j + \frac{y^2}{2\sigma^2}} + (1 - \lambda) e^{\mu_j + \frac{y^2}{2\sigma^2}} / j = 1, 2, \ldots, 15.
\]

Here \( y \) represents the adjusted return (in percentage) for the \( j \)th RELP offering of a sponsor. Parameter restrictions are tested using a Wald test with the level of significance reported in the last column of the table. The null hypothesis is that \( \mu_1 = \mu_2 \) and \( \sigma_1 = \sigma_2 \), i.e., that observations are drawn from a single normal distribution. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

C. Ex Ante Sponsor Characteristics

Since these experiments suggest that certain developers in our sample have declining adjusted returns in their sequence of offerings, it is then interesting to investigate whether or not, ex ante, there are certain characteristics of the developer that affect this pattern of returns. This analysis is motivated by and related to the extensive literature dealing with equity offerings. Specifically, the literature dealing with longer-term performance and the underwriting certification hypothesis.

We initially investigate the relationship between sponsor characteristics and realized performance by analyzing the correlations between a set of developer characteristics and quality. The correlations are presented in Table 5. None of the correlations of sponsor characteristics vs. quality are greater than 0.37 in absolute value. The negative correlations, although insignificant at the 0.01 level, correspond to characteristics that relate to increasing size of the sponsor: number of offerings, a dummy variable for sponsors that are publicly traded, number of developer SICs, and total offering size. This suggests that the lemons premium is smaller for larger sponsors, presumably because of their greater initial reputation. To augment these correlations, a logistic regression (not shown) was performed with the dependent variable differentiating developers with a significant decrease in means in the second half of their offerings (cf. Table 3) from the remaining developers. Using a stepwise logistic approach, none of the sponsor variables were significant. This may be a further indication of the lack of transparency in this market. Even though these developers have observable ex ante characteristics that should lead investors to distinguish among them, apparently these differences have little influence on returns.

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20 Our primary focus is not on issues relating to IPO underpricing since our assessment of quality is based on longer-term performance.

21 See, for example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) on the former issue, and Booth and Smith (1986) on the latter.

22 See Table 5 for definitions.
FIGURE 4
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq Residuals

For the six sponsors analyzed in detail, Figure 4 shows the results of Quandt’s and Brown, Durbin, and Evans’ estimation of regime shifts.

A. Quandt Ratio Angeles

B. Brown Durbin Evans CuSqr Angeles

D. Alternative Hypotheses

There are a number of competing hypotheses to explain the declining trend in abnormal returns. The most appealing alternative explanation is learning, either by the market or by the developer. In the first case, the uncertainty of the quality of the sponsor’s offering declines as investors observe the performance of the earlier
RELPs. In the second case, the developer acquires more skill in asset selection, financing, management, or otherwise; this increasing skill leads to higher quality RELPs over time. Our data are also, in general, consistent with this interpretation.

There is another important factor that influences our empirical findings. Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995), henceforth BGR, show that survival bias can lead to the finding of decreasing returns over time (as in the Diamond and Shapiro model) as well as decreasing variance over time. This survivorship bias has two possible effects on our analysis. First, our statistical tests are run with
FIGURE 4 (continued)
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq Residuals

E. Quandt Ratio, JMB

F. Brown Durbin Evans CuSumSq, JMB

only those developers that have issued six or more partnerships. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, survival bias affects even those developers that were included in our sample. As pointed out by BGR, we would expect that developers of lower quality would have a higher probability of being censored out of our sample. Thus, the negative trend in returns, rather than being an outcome of a conscious attempt by the developer to build up a reputation, could merely result from the fact that surviving developers had "lucky" outcomes in their initial part-
FIGURE 4 (continued)
Comparison of Quandt's Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq Residuals

G. Quandt Ratio: Krupp

H. Brown Durbin Evans CuSSQ: Krupp

(continued on next page)

nerships. Similarly, high variance developers would have a greater probability of being censored out of our data.

We address the first potential problem by comparing the mean (unadjusted) returns on sponsors with less than six partnerships (the out-of-sample group), with those included in our sample. We further restrict the out-of-sample group by deleting the sponsors that issued RELPs after 1990, which would not have been included in our sample. Although the out-of-sample group has a slightly higher mean return, a simple t-test indicates that the means are insignificantly
different from each other. To address the second survival bias effect, we regress the excess returns of the partnerships on a series of dummy variables for the year in which the partnership was formed. There is no apparent pattern in the dummy variables. A survival explanation would imply that partnerships formed earlier should have higher returns. Nevertheless, to account for possible year-specific

21 The mean in-sample return is 12.4% vs. 13.5% for the out-of-sample developers; the corresponding t-statistic is -0.47, which is insignificant at all conventional levels. The mean test with all of the out-of-sample partnerships generates almost precisely the same result.
effects, we conduct the above statistical tests on the returns adjusted for these dummy variable effects. These year-specific factors capture more than survival bias, such as the performance of the overall real estate market. In summary, it is likely that survival effects have a significant influence on our results. The above
TABLE 5

Correlation of Median Returns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nparl</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>SIC</th>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Offsize</th>
<th>Medret</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nparl</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIC</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>-0.453</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offsize</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medret</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows correlations between sponsor characteristics and median raw returns. Significance levels are indicated in parentheses. Nparl is the number of partnerships that each developer sponsored in our sample. Public is a dummy variable with one denoting a sponsor that is publicly traded. SIC is the number of SICs that the developer (or its parent) is engaged in. Developer is a dummy variable with one denoting a sponsor that is primarily a developer. Offsize is the total size of all offerings of the developer. Medret is the sponsor's overall median raw return.

Tests suggest, however, that the magnitude of these effects is not so large as to invalidate our inferences.

A final alternative explanation for declining quality over time is that, as the number of offerings increased, the sponsors moved away from their initial area of expertise. This could have been the case if attractive "local" investments became scarce. This diversification could have been by location or by type of property, for example, moving from investment in office buildings to residential real estate. Table 6 provides a brief description of the sequence of offerings by type and location for the six sponsors studied in detail. The table generally supports the conclusion that deviating from the original investment strategy contributed to the decline in returns. Four of the sponsors with declining returns (Century, JMB, Krupp, and Prudential) moved away from their initial investment focus as the number of offerings increased, typically becoming more diverse in type of real estate investment, rather than in location.

E. Alternative Measures of Quality

We also performed robustness checks to ensure that our proxy for quality, adjusted return over the period 1990 to 1995, is reasonable. One measure of quality is the total dividends received until 1990. Table 7 shows an OLS regression (with White's correction for heteroskedasticity) using cumulative dividends as the dependent variable. The table shows that, even after correcting for partnership age, partnership sequence number has a significantly negative effect. This is consistent with our finding that issuance number has a significant negative effect on adjusted return.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{25}\)A second alternative measure of quality was tested: the Partnership Profile financial condition rating at the end of 1989. This rating embodies both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the RELP. We performed an ordered probit analysis (not shown here) to predict this rating. While the overall fit was significant, none of the key characteristics (partnership issuance number, operating margin, leverage, age, and size) were.
Table 6
Investment Strategy of Sponsor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Investment Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Century</td>
<td>For the first four partnerships, the sponsor held a diversified portfolio of apartment, office, and retail properties located in the Sunbelt and West Coast areas. The sponsor then invested in other property types such as industrial and mobile homes. In addition, their locational preference shifted to the Midwest and Southeast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNL</td>
<td>This sponsor followed a consistent strategy, focusing exclusively on fast-food restaurant properties leased on a triple net lease basis to major chains such as Burger King and Taco Bell. Properties were located across the nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>The initial RELPs were geographically diverse and mainly invested in offices and retail properties. After the 11th RELP, the sponsor began to diversify somewhat into raw land and into real estate debt rather than its previous equity investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krupp</td>
<td>The initial RELPs were primarily invested in apartments. Later, the sponsor shifted its focus to shopping centers. The later RELPs also invested in apartments by taking a risky debt position instead of equity, as done earlier. These debt instruments included participating first mortgage and construction loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential</td>
<td>The sponsor initially focused on self-storage properties and office warehouses, primarily in Sunbelt locations. The focus then shifted to either apartments or retail properties (equity ownership) or tax exempt participating first mortgage revenue bonds on apartments. While the sponsor still emphasized Sunbelt areas, investment also started to occur in non-Sunbelt locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shurgard</td>
<td>This sponsor focuses solely on self-storage warehouses. Its initial locational preference was West Coast and Midwest cities with large populations. The sponsor later expanded their geographical orientation to also include Texas, Georgia, and East Coast states with large populations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 summarizes the evolution of the sponsor’s strategy (in terms of location and type of investment) over its sequence of offerings. Only the six sponsors analyzed in detail are included.

*Under a triple net lease, the tenant pays for utilities, property taxes, insurance, and property maintenance in addition to paying the rent on the property.

Table 7 displays the results of two regressions with the dependent variable being the sum of all dividends (paid from issuance date to the end of 1989) as a percentage of offering size. Partnership number is the offering number for the given sponsor. PPI financial condition rating is the Stanger rating as of 1989. Operating margin is operating income in 1989 over gross 1989 revenues. Leverage is total debt over the partnership’s cost basis as of 1989. Age of the partnership is the number of years from the offering date until 1989. Initial capital raised is total offering size. All regressions use the White correction for heteroscedasticity. The regressions also used fixed effects to account for sponsor characteristics. These coefficients are not shown in order to focus on the more relevant issues. The number of observations varies because of the lack of accounting data for some partnerships.

Table 7
Regressions on Dividends Paid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership issuance number</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI financial condition rating</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating margin</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage (%)</td>
<td>-0.312</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of partnership</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of initial offering size (in millions)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 displays the results of two regressions with the dependent variable being the sum of all dividends (paid from issuance date to the end of 1989) as a percentage of offering size. Partnership number is the offering number for the given sponsor. PPI financial condition rating is the Stanger rating as of 1989. Operating margin is operating income in 1989 over gross 1989 revenues. Leverage is total debt over the partnership’s cost basis as of 1989. Age of the partnership is the number of years from the offering date until 1989. Initial capital raised is total offering size. All regressions use the White correction for heteroscedasticity. The regressions also used fixed effects to account for sponsor characteristics. These coefficients are not shown in order to focus on the more relevant issues. The number of observations varies because of the lack of accounting data for some partnerships.
F. Ex Post Analysis

One possible explanation for our findings is that a number of developers exploited the informational asymmetries in this market. Informal evidence for this comes from a variety of popular press articles. In particular, Prudential Securities, in the fall of 1993, agreed to pay $371 million to settle complaints about its sales activity and promised returns in oil and gas and real estate limited partnerships. Prudential Securities, in an agreement with the Justice Department, admitted to fraud in selling $8 billion of limited partnership units. Our statistical analysis suggests that the returns on Angeles-sponsored RELPs appear to be drawn from two regimes with the mean return being significantly lower in the second half of its offerings. In a news story that appears to support this conclusion, a reporter wrote that this:

West Los Angeles-based company has had an extraordinarily rich history as an incubator of some of the greatest investment stars—and some of the biggest flops—of the modern era . . . How the 60 year old Elliott (CEO) and his crew avoided the corporate gallows for so long is a classic tale of management making promises it couldn't keep, to investors who didn't know better.

Angeles survived several financial crises, including a crash in the ski resort condo market, by focusing on “cash flow” rather than real earnings until the cash flows on properties became nonexistent. The crises that finished Angeles involved investing in outlet malls and congregate care apartments; both were high-risk ventures involving heavy cash infusions.

In addition, two of the developers in our sample have gone bankrupt (Integrated Resources and Angeles Corporation) and most of the sponsors have changed organizational form to convert their RELPs into either real estate investment trusts (REITs) or master limited partnerships (MLPs). Shurgard appears to be the only high quality producer on a relative basis. Published reports on Shurgard seem to support this view.

V. Conclusions

This study empirically investigates the dynamics of quality setting and reputation using a unique database of returns on a series of real estate limited partnerships by the same developer. By examining the time series of a given developer’s performance, we obtain important insights into the developer’s strategy in determining its optimal trade-off between reputation and short-term profits. We also...


obtain some understanding of the extent to which investors and RELP developers behave in this informationally opaque market.

We find that, as predicted by the Diamond and Shapiro models, in the aggregate, the average return declines with offering number. One interpretation of this result is that several sponsors, such as Angeles, Krupp, and Prudential, appear to exploit the opportunities created by informational inefficiencies. This is evidenced by the returns on their sequence of RELPs issued being initially positive followed by negative returns on subsequent offerings. We also find significant evidence that these three developers also engage in mixed strategies, shifting between quality regimes, perhaps in an effort to make detection of their true quality more difficult. While these empirical findings correspond with known ex post facts, in particular the negative reports on Krupp and Prudential and the positive reports on Shurgard, the relatively small number of observations implies that these results are suggestive, rather than conclusive. Furthermore, we have shown that factors such as learning, survivorship bias, and increasing diversified strategies by the sponsor also contribute to the observed decline in returns.

Appendix: Empirical Methodology

This appendix briefly overviews our empirical approaches. Evidence that a developer is using a mixing strategy is evaluated using the switching regression model of Quandt (1958), (1960), (1972).28 This model assumes the existence of two regression regimes with a single unknown switch point between the two regimes. If there are $T$ observations, the first $t$ observations (sequential offerings of RELPs) are assumed to come from a regime with a given quality level, while the last $T - t$ observations represent RELP offerings from a different quality regime. The null hypothesis that sponsors do not change the level of quality in their RELP offerings is tested against the alternative proposition that a single change in quality occurs. The problem is to estimate the time, if any, at which the sponsor switches from one quality regime to another. We model the two different quality regimes as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
R &= \alpha_1 + \beta_1 t + \varepsilon_1 \\
R &= \alpha_2 + \beta_2 t + \varepsilon_2,
\end{align*}
\]

where $R$ is the adjusted holding period return on the $r$th RELP issued by a particular sponsor, and $\varepsilon_1$ and $\varepsilon_2$ are independent, normally distributed error terms with mean zero and standard deviations $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_2$, respectively. This modeling of the quality regimes is motivated by the prediction of the Shapiro and Diamond models concerning the declining trend in quality.

The estimated location of the unknown (single) switch point $t$ involves choosing as the maximum likelihood estimate the value of $t$ that maximizes

\[
\lambda(t) = -T \log \sqrt{2\pi} - t \log \hat{\sigma}_1 - (T - t) \log \hat{\sigma}_2 - \frac{T}{2}.
\]

More specifically, the procedure entails first ordering our RELPs in issuance date sequence. Separate regressions are then estimated for each of these groups. Next, the point

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29 All of the mixed strategy tests were performed only for those developers for which we had data on at least 11 partnerships. Eleven of the 20 sponsors qualified under this criterion. The value of this cutoff level is somewhat arbitrary. However, reliable estimation of mixed strategies requires a greater number of observations than simple mean or variance tests.
of division between the two groups is moved by one time unit and a new set of regressions is estimated. This process is repeated for all possible division points. There is no unbiased test statistic associated with this maximum likelihood procedure, especially in small samples (as in the present case) given contamination effects associated with the switch point. As such, even though a particular plot may suggest that a switch has occurred, this point may not be statistically significant.

To overcome this deficiency in Quandt’s likelihood ratio (LR) test, Brown, Durbin, and Evans (BDE) proposed a test of nonstationarity that can be used with the LR test to determine if a given switch point is significant. In this approach, the recursive residuals, \( w_t \), are computed as follows:

\[
W_t = \sqrt{\frac{Y_t - \hat{\alpha}_{t-1} - \hat{\beta}_{t-1}x_t}{1 + \frac{1}{t-1} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} (x_i - \bar{x}_{t-1})^2}}.
\]

Here \( \hat{\alpha}_{t-1}, \hat{\beta}_{t-1}, \text{ and } \bar{x}_{t-1} \) are the least squares estimators and the sample mean based on the first \( t-1 \) observations. If the null hypothesis of a constant \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) is true, these residuals are independent standard normals. By plotting the cumulative sum of squares, \( s_t \), defined as

\[
s_t = \sum_{j=1}^{t} w_j^2,
\]

against time (number of offerings), we can reject the null hypothesis if the graph of \( s_t \) crosses the significance line. Thus, if the switch indicated by the BDE is close to the peak of the likelihood ratio, then we can conclude that there exist two distinct regression regimes. However, the BDE test could indicate nonstationarity without the LR showing any distinct peak. In this case, we would conclude that the quality changed gradually over time.

Both Quandt’s LR and the BDE test assume that there is a single change in regression regimes. However, this need not always be the case. To address this problem, Quandt and Ramsey (QR) (1978) propose another test for the existence of two regression regimes. They assume that at each point in time, nature (in our case, the developer) picks one regime with probability \( \lambda \) and the other regime with probability \( 1 - \lambda \).

The QR model assumes that the probability density function associated with the RELP quality for a given sponsor represents a mixture of (at most) two normal densities. The null hypothesis, that sponsors do not change the level of quality in their RELP offerings, is tested against the alternative proposition that two quality regimes exist. Formally, we model the two different levels of quality as

\[
R_{\text{H1}} \sim N\left(\mu_1, \sigma_1^2\right) \text{ with probability } \lambda
\]

\[
R_{\text{H2}} \sim N\left(\mu_2, \sigma_2^2\right) \text{ with probability } (1 - \lambda),
\]

where the parameters \( \lambda, \mu_1, \mu_2, \sigma_1^2, \text{ and } \sigma_2^2 \) are unknown. The two distributions of returns represent two different modes of sponsor behavior with \( \lambda \) measuring the probability that a sponsor chooses the first quality level. A disadvantage of this method is that it cannot

\(^{30}\) Contamination is associated with the interval around the dividing point between the two groups of observations, \( t \) and \( T - t \) observations. In essence, one does not know which regime the data are associated with.

\(^{31}\) See Mehta and Beranek (1982) for an application to detecting changes in beta.
identify which points belong to a particular regime. However, in this study, we are mainly interested in the existence of two regimes and identification of the regime to which an observation belongs is less important.

To estimate the mixture of normal distributions and \( \lambda \), the moment-generating function (MGF), \( E(e^{\theta Y}) \), is minimized using weighted nonlinear least-squares with the number \( q \) of values of \( \theta \) set equal to 15 to ensure that the corresponding normal equations are of full rank.

\[
\left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{\theta Y_i} / n \right) = \lambda e^{\theta \mu_1 + \sigma_1^2 \theta^2 / 2} + (1 - \lambda) e^{\theta \mu_2 + \sigma_2^2 \theta^2 / 2} \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, 15.
\]

Since \( \theta \)s determine the weights for the moments of the data by the MGF estimator, relatively small \( \theta \)s were chosen (to the extent possible) so that low-order moments receive more weight. The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm is used to minimize the MGF. The parameters are estimated using nonlinear weighted least squares where the weights are the reciprocal of the disturbance variance.

Quandt and Ramsey (1978) argue that the preceding MGF has several advantages over using a maximum likelihood (MLE) function. Most importantly, the MGF can be used with relatively small samples having considerable overlap in the two populations and the parameters obtained are unique estimates. The MGF method also yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimates. The asymptotic distribution of the MGF is independent of the \( \theta \) parameters. In conjunction with the estimation of the mixture of normals, we use a Wald statistic to determine if the two normal distributions are identical (\( H_0 : \mu_1 = \mu_2 \) and \( \sigma_1^2 = \sigma_2^2 \)).

References


23 This approach can be generalized to switching regressions. For further details, see Quandt and Ramsey (1978).

While Quandt and Ramsey (1978) note that the choice of \( \theta \) is important when \( q = 5 \), Schmidt (1982) has found that all reasonable choices of \( \theta \) lead to the same asymptotic covariance matrix when \( q = 15 \) and that this matrix represents the lower bounds for the asymptotic variances. This is further justification for our use of \( q = 15 \).

Known difficulties with the MLE method include the fact that the estimate may not be obtainable due to the unboundedness of the likelihood function. The possibility of a singular matrix of second partials of the log-likelihood function might also exist when unequal variances are allowed in the components of the mixture. In addition, the finite sample properties of the resulting estimates are unknown.