RE-SCALING STRATEGIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR DYNAMICS IN THE GLOBAL MINING INDUSTRY

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This dissertation compares subcontracted workers' organizations in Chile and Peru. While these countries share several institutional features, and labor organizations in both countries face similar employer strategies, the workers' responses have been divergent. Between 2000 and 2015, Chilean miners formed a robust and militant national union that coordinated successful countrywide strategies. In Peru, on the other hand, workers organized at a more decentralized local level, and, despite high levels of mobilization, failed to create a stable labor organization. Drawing on union revitalization, economic geography, and social movement literatures, along with eighteen months of fieldwork in several mining camps of each county, I account for these responses. Specifically, I argue that traditional explanatory variables, such as bargaining structure, industry characteristics, and labor legislation do not account for these varying strategies. Rather, my explanation focuses on: (a) differences in how social reproduction is organized in each country and (b) labor's links to political activists. Peruvian workers use their sense of a peasant identity, one rooted in the collective land tenure system, to organize themselves, whereas Chilean workers, a very mobile workforce with no communal access to the land, organize in more traditional working-class unions. Regarding union-activist connections, leftist Chilean organizations helped unions to develop a class-based identity, providing networks that forged collaboration amongst miners at the national level. In contrast, Peruvian miners avoided "doing politics," given the country's recent history of political violence.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Omar Manky grew up in Lima, Peru, and graduated with a B.A in Sociology from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru. He got his MA from the ILR School at Cornell University. His work has been published in the British journal of Industrial Relations, Latin American Perspectives and the Revista Mexicana de Sociología.

A mamá y papá.

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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

This chapter has three goals. First, it provides background information about the global mining industry. Second, it discusses how previous studies have analyzed the ways through which civil society organizes to contest some of the industry's features. Thirdly, it presents the research puzzle, and explains the divergent strategies used by mineworkers in Chile and Peru, presenting the framework I use to analyze them.

The New Mining Industry

Mining has experienced several transformations over the last two decades. This section details them through the lens provided by Silver (2003), who argues that, after the seventies' profitability crisis, capitalism developed four "fixes" to find new sources of profits.

First, the "spatial fix" consisted in the relocation of capital to find new sources of cheap labor. The best example is the manufacturing industry, where many companies moved production from the US and Europe to Latin America and Asia to access a labor force that was not as expensive as in the Global North. In the extractive industries, companies also seek sites with rich natural resource deposits and flexible environmental laws, so companies moved their investments to places like Latin America and Asia. While mining had been, since the beginnings of capitalism, an industry linked to global powers (Brown, 2012), the trend was clearer over the last two decades, when different companies massively invested in the Global South (Bridge, 2004b). For example, today Glencore-Xstrata, BHP Billiton or Vale operate in countries as different as Zambia, Chile and Indonesia.

Second, the “process fix”, is based on technological innovation and changes in the organization of production. The most salient example is that of automation and just-in-time organization (Piore & Sabel, 1984). In the case of mining, there have been technological innovations in the extraction, processing and transportation of minerals. As Dore (2000) argues, modern mining, characterized by the use of open-pits –in contrast to underground mining– needs workers to drive cranes, shovels and dredgers, instead of getting into the earth to obtain the minerals. As a result, mineworkers’ skills increased in the last two decades, creating, in several countries, a labor shortage, which was compensated, in the last cycle of high prices, with better employment conditions and higher salaries (International Labour, 2002).

The other two fixes are the “product” and the “financial” ones. The former consists in the shift of capital towards new products or industries where profits are high (for example, from the textile to auto industry in the early twentieth century). The latter occurs when the excess capital turns to financial outlets, leaving the productive sphere. While these fixes are not directly relevant for my analysis, they do affect some of the industry’s features. For example, it is worth noting that a change in the industry’s ownership structure has occurred. Through a process of mergers and massive acquisitions, few companies have consolidated as the producers of most minerals in the world (Ericsson, 2008; Shapiro, Russell, & Pitt, 2007). Although monopolistic capital was already common in the twentieth century, this tendency became clearer in the last two decades. By 2014, the top ten companies managed between 31 per cent and 52 per cent of the market share of several minerals.

This process has been accompanied by greater coordination between mining companies. This is clear in the case of joint ventures, which have become common in the last decade, forcing companies to share their knowledge in engineering, human resources (HR) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices, thus creating some “convergence” within companies’ strategies (Waring, 2005). The major companies have pushed for even greater coordination through the

creation of international bodies that regulate their actions, such as the International Council of Mining and Metals, created in 2001 (Dashwood, 2012; Sethi, 2005). Finally, it is worth noting that, despite mining's low profitability in comparison to industries in the "new economy", there was a commodity boom in the last fifteen years, which occurred because of the demand of industrializing countries like China or India (Domanski & Heath, 2007, p. 54).

The new mining workplace

All these changes affected the way the industry organized its workforce, as it tried to increase employment and work flexibility. This was accomplished through two major transformations: subcontracting and long distance commuting (LDC). The former is a non-standard employment relation, consisting in the externalization of administrative control and responsibility of the workforce to a third party (Kalleberg, 2000). In mining, it occurs when supplier companies send labor to provide different services for a user company (the one controlling the mine). The trend towards subcontracting in mining started in the nineties in countries as different as Chile (Hernández, Pavez, Rebolledo, & Valdés, 2014) and South Africa (Kenny & Bezuidenhout, 1999), and, despite the lack of studies about it, it is clearly a global phenomenon: BHP-Billiton's directly hired employees declined from 50 per cent in 2001 to 38 per cent in 2014. Similarly, Freeport directly employed 73 per cent of its workforce in 2008, but this dropped to 48 per cent in 2013.

Previous studies have shown that subcontracting creates precarious working conditions affecting miners capacities to organize in labor unions (Kenny & Bezuidenhout, 1999; Leiva Gómez, 2009). This is consistent with studies about the effects of triangular employment relations in general (Stone, 2004; Weil, 2014), but two specificities are worth noting. On the one hand, not all subcontracted mineworkers face labor precarity. In fact, services such as transportation, food services and cleaning contrast to those related to high-skilled occupations, such as explosive

setting or industrial construction (Durán-Palma & López, 2009). (In what follows, I focus on the former group.) On the other hand, despite the enormous challenge subcontracting represents, mineworkers have been able to organize and to improve their working conditions. In the last decade, there have been successful mobilizations in countries as different as South Africa, Chile and Indonesia.

The other work-related transformation is the emergence of LDC, a regime that transports urban workers to the mines, providing them food and lodging at the work site for a fixed number of days, after which they return home (Shrimpton & Storey, 1992). In contrast to the traditional mining town model, workers and their families do not live next to the operations, so the system implies a radical division between spaces of production and of social reproduction. It is not surprising that capital uses its mobility to find the most adequate workforce. Although capital cannot move easily in mining, it has been able to get a suitable workforce by moving it across or even between countries (Peck, 1996). The emergence of flexible spatial arrangements has been the focus of recent investigations that deal with their effects on workers' psychosocial wellbeing (Gent, 2004; Sibbel, 2010) and local development (Arias, Atienza, & Cademartori, 2013; Storey, 2010).

Summing up, today's mining industry is very different from that described in studies conducted in the twentieth century. This has produced a change in scholarly discussions. In Latin America and Africa, descriptions about the imperialist power of American and European companies (Burawoy, 1972; Zapata, 1977) were replaced by discussions about different multinational actors (Lee, 2009; Velásquez, 2012), and transnational regulations (Sagebien, Lindsay, Campbell, Cameron, & Smith, 2008). Instead of discussions about the need of nationalizing the mines (Becker, 1983; Nash, 1993), today's debates focus on how massive investments can positively affect local communities (Aragón & Rud, 2013; Ross, 1999). Regarding the mineworkers, the "isolated mass" argument (Kerr & Siegel, 1964), used to explain labor militancy in places as different as the English collieries (Warwick & Littlejohn, 1992) and the South African compounds (Crush, 1994)

shifted to discussions about the harmful effects of LDC on mining unions (Ellem, 2006; Manky, 2016). Lastly, whereas labor market segmentation between race (Lewis, 1987), gender (Finn, 1998; Klubock, 1998) and nationality (Bergquist, 1986; Burawoy, 1976) were well analyzed in previous studies, few of them dealt with the effects of subcontracting, a phenomenon that has created new challenges for workers' collective action (Leiva Gómez, 2009). This is the broader panorama my research speaks from.

Challenging the industry's dynamics: New actors for the "nueva minería"?

Before discussing the specifics dynamics of subcontracted workers' unions, I shall explain how are they inscribed in a context of mining-related protests, and, more broadly, in the changing nature of protest against neoliberalism. Then I clarify workers' divergent demands, strategies and outcomes they obtained in Chile and Peru.

One of the most common arguments about mining-related protestors is that, as other responses to neoliberalism, they shifted from labor to "new social movements" (Arce, 2014; Bebbington, 2011; Durand, 2012). This statement is not new, as scholars have argued that the transformations of capitalism changed the way civil society organized. The emergence of the "post-industrial society" (Touraine & Duff, 1981) and "informational capitalism" (Castells, 1996) would be linked to changes in the dynamics of collective action, from class and work-related movements to plural identities (De la Garza, 2007; Piore & Safford, 2006). Whereas the "old" social movements would be against the exploitation of the industrial workforce (Touraine & Duff, 1981), the new ones would be less focused on economic struggles than on the defense of their lifestyles (Bauman, 2013; Castells, 1996). As Carroll and Ratner summarize, for this literature—mostly developed in Europe and the US— "movements such as environmentalism, gay/lesbian liberation and feminism are said to occupy the terrain of civil society, in contrast to the increasingly state-centric strategies of labour" (1995, p. 195).

In labor studies, this argument has been partially advanced by Michael Burawoy, who, in his critique of what he calls "optimistic labor studies", argues that it is not clear what the main problem of contemporary capitalism is. Drawing on Polanyi, he suggests that, in today's world, "commodification, rather than exploitation is the central experience" (Burawoy, 2010, p. 301). Therefore, he states that a counter-movement against the free market ideology might not depend solely on labor: "...which is the most salient experience, exploitation, which potentially brings together workers as wage laborers across geographical scale, or commodification which brings together workers, expropriated farmers, people struggling for access to water and electricity?"

Given the evidence about the decline of labor unions in Latin America, this distinction between "old" versus "new" movements' has been explored by several authors. For example, Silva (2012, p. 1) notes that it seems that "free-market reforms […] weakened the point of production—labor unions—as the source of effective nonparty political countermovement to liberal capitalism". Whereas during the twentieth century class divisions provided principles for identity (as "workers"), organization (through unions), and strategies (strikes), the deregulation of free markets, the rise of informality and the change in the organization of work would have disrupted this model (See also Arce, 2008; Auyero & Swistun, 2009; Roberts, 2002). Contrastingly, land and water commodification created movements to defend people's livelihoods by "challenging the structures, discourses and institutions that drive and permit exploitation and dispossession" (Bebbington et al., 2008). The best examples of these new movements, often characterized by their non-institutional strategies and territorial identities, would be the indigenous, urban poor, rural or the environmental ones.

While it is in line with broader interpretations about the decline of labor organizations, this research stream has been limited by its data, which has been based on case studies about the new movements more than on labor's transformations over time. Most studies assume that labor has either disappeared or continued its decline, often ignoring a rich stream of current studies that

discuss the potential for labor revitalization in the region (i.e. Almeyra & Suárez, 2009; Atzeni & Ghigliani, 2007; Nuñez, 2009; Sénen González, 2011; Ayşe Serdar, 2012). Even analyses using quantitative data about protests ignore the changing dynamics of labor organizations. For example, in his study of protests in Peru between 1980 and 2010, Arce found a decline in organized labor strikes, which "made room for new actors and other forms of popular resistance" (Arce, 2015, p. 19) However, this interpretation is based on a dichotomy between strikes and other forms of protests (mobilizations, roadblocks, sit-ins, and takeovers), assuming (incorrectly) that the former are the only ones workers can use (Ghigliani, 2014). Not surprisingly, the recent "Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America" (Almeida & Ulate, 2015) did not have a single chapter on labor, despite the increase in the number of workers' protests in Chile, Argentina and Brazil in the last decade.

These pessimistic views also idealize the "new social movements", forgetting that they can be state-centric as well (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998). Furthermore, these studies see "labor" as an ahistorical actor, comparing a movement that has been struggling for over a century with actors with rather new sets of demands. This reproduces a view that is based solely on the global North experience (Fairbrother, 2008; Seidman, 2011), forgetting that labor unions have multiple identities and that, in the case of Chile, Bolivia or Peru, labor was never fully incorporated into corporatist arrangements, having strong links with civil society.

While the amount of strikes in Chile and Peru declined over the last three decades, labor stoppages increased since 2000. Scholars have analyzed how the labor movement increased the use of new forms of strikes, often adopting more contentious strategies (Manky, 2014; Pérez, Medel, & Velásquez, 2015; Sierralta & González, 2016). These studies, largely ignored by the "social movement" literature, show the importance of challenging the dichotomy between an old, institutional labor movement, and newer, radical actors. The new labor studies in Latin America are actively re-thinking the definition of "work" and labor-related conflicts (De la Garza, 2011; Piva,

2016), analyzing new labor organizations, such as those of unemployed people (Massetti, 2004), and the emerging community unionism strategies (Ayşe Serdar, 2012).

Mining provides a unique context to discuss these issues. Given the transformations it has experienced; a wide range of challenging positions has emerged in an attempt to improve some of its effects. For several authors these new dynamics clearly differ from those of the twentieth century, when labor was the most important actor (Zapata, 2002).

Two of the most salient types of conflict in mining are related to environmental and local development. In the first place, there are increasing problems given the commodification of natural resources (Arce, 2014; Bridge, 2004a). Whereas mining had, historically, effects on people's livelihoods (Helfgott, 2013), the size of the new projects multiplied such effects (Dore, 2000; Liverman & Vilas, 2006). New demands emerged, related to land grabbing (Gil, 2009) and environmental problems such as water contamination (Bebbington & Williams, 2008). The second type of conflicts is centered on the demands for more benefits from mining companies to the localities where they operate. Under the traditional mining town model, local spillovers were common given the use of local workers and the possibility of economic exchange between companies and local businesses (Long & Roberts, 1984). However, the dissemination of LDC had made these exchanges more difficult over time (Aroca & Atienza, 2011; Glave & Kuramoto, 2007). Consequently, local actors started presenting demands to obtain a better share of companies' production.

The characteristics of the strategies used by the new movements have often been contrasted to those of the traditional labor conflicts. This have led scholars to view the characteristics of the current mining protests—such as their ability to link the local and the global, their concern for the environment, or the use of contentious strategies—as novel rather than rooted in history (Paredes, 2016). Simply put, they overlook the important characteristics that have marked labor mining communities throughout much of the twentieth century (Finn, 1998; Klubock, 1998),

making it impossible to analyze in detail the changes and continuities in labor demands. Moreover, a closer look to these conflicts provides an example of the need of a “labor” perspective when analyzing them. In fact, partial evidence has been found on how local actors can use environmental discourse to gain jobs in the industry, exchanging their land for jobs, and how local development demands sometimes include better wages for local workers (Arias et al., 2013; Himley, 2013). Although these dynamics have not been systematically studied, they show the need to move beyond the dichotomy between trade unions and "new movements" in mining studies, and to analyze how labor demands have changed in industry.

The puzzle: Subcontracted Workers’ from a Comparative Perspective

Although the structural reforms weakened mineworkers’ organizations through the nineties (Agacino, González, & Flores, 1998), during the commodity boom experienced in the last decade unions regained some of their bargaining power (Duran-Palma, 2011; Manky, 2011). This was part of a global trend that tried to change the industry’s patterns. In Canada (Brym, Bauer, & McIvor, 2013) and Australia (Ellem, 2003, 2006), directly employed miners organized against the precarization of their labor conditions, whereas in South Africa (Frankel, 2013) and Zambia (Lee, 2009; Negi, 2011), protests emerged from subcontracted workers who mobilized against the exploitation they suffered from multinational corporations. Although the results of these efforts varied in each society, it seems clear that mining workers maintained their capacity to mobilize.

Before discussing the strategies used by subcontracted workers in Chile and Peru, it is worth noting that they occurred in a context in which directly employed miners also shifted their mobilization patterns. They replaced a militant, politically-oriented unionism, based on mobilizations within the mines, with a unionism based on economic demands and on extra-local alliances (Manky, 2016). A number of reasons explain this. First, mining companies improved the working conditions of these workers, combining the raise in salaries with innovative HR practices and alternative dispute resolution programs (Duran-Palma, 2011). Second, LDC arrangements

permitted these workers to develop new sources of income, forcing unions to abandon their contentious strategies (De Laire, 1999; Manky, 2016). Finally, in a commodity boom context, these workers benefited from companies' profits. During my research, it was not unusual to meet workers that had obtained a yearly bonus of $10,000.

Subcontracting became widespread in Chile and Peru in the early nineties, but protests against it became common in the 2000s, when, lacking a strong structural bargaining power, workers started extending their networks across different employers. Despite the employers' opposition, these organizations became common since 2003. Although neither the government nor the national federations these unions belong to have systematic data about it, I mapped at least ten such unions in Peru and twenty-five in Chile. Remarkably, subcontracted workers in Chile and Peru had similar goals and tactics, and in both cases these were different to those of the directly employed workers. First, they presented grievances not only to their direct employers (the suppliers of mining services), but also to the mining companies that benefited from their labor. Their demands included: (a) demanding safe work practices; (b) promoting health insurances for them and their families; and (c) better wages and special bonuses. Secondly, union leaders criticized the labor laws that sustained subcontracting, although the degree of politicization varied across unions and countries. Overall, however, the contrast with directly-employed miners was clear, as the problems subcontracted workers faced were framed as a struggle against the neoliberal model, and not only as bread-and-butter issues (Singh, 2012b). Finally, contract workers relied on direct-action to accomplish their demands (Calderón, 2008). In 2007, for example, workers in Marcona (Perú) and Rancagua (Chile) mobilized to force mining companies to sign "framework agreements" covering all contract workers. These mobilizations included not only work stoppages, but also road blockages and looting of companies' offices. In most cases, the strikes were illegal and they ended up in violent clashes between miners and the police.

The creation of subcontracted workers' organizations is surprising in the context of pro-employer labor legislation. Although there are some studies about the Peruvian case (Croucher & Cotton, 2011; Pinto, 2011), most of the research about contract miners has taken place in Chile, a country with a greater tradition in labor studies (Aravena, 2000). There, discussions largely focused on the state-owned company Codelco, where these organizations first formed (Jornada & Torres, 2009; Leiva & Campos, 2013). These studies have analyzed the dynamics of the collective bargaining process, often emphasizing the sui-generis character of the “framework agreements” mineworkers got (Durán-Palma and López, 2009) and mineworkers’ identity formation (Montecinos, 2014; Singh, 2012a).

In spite of the rich empirical material collected by these studies, two gaps are noticeable. First, they have not explained the dynamics of workers’ strategies. At first, this occurred because scholars were surprised by workers’ mobilizations, so they focused on describing their outcomes (Aravena & Núñez, 2009). Other studies analyzed the structural conditions of subcontracted workers’ mobilizations. From this standpoint, labor exploitation played a key role in explaining workers’ contentious actions (Hughes, 2013; Jornada & Torres, 2009; C. Silva, 2007). Scholars emphasized workers’ grievances to explain collective action, a perspective that, as I show in the next section, presents several limitations (Kelly, 1998).

It is also worth noting the lack of comparative studies. Except for one article (Leiva & Campos, 2013), previous research has focused only on the unions of Codelco, and, within it, they have gotten data from only one site, Rancagua (Echeverría, 2010; Jornada & Torres, 2009; J. Ponce, 2016). While this is understandable given that this was the first site where precarious miners organized, the emergence of a national organization—the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC)—and the creation of private sector organizations that have been usually ignored, demonstrate the limits of this approach. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research comparing unions across different mines and companies, which explains the lack of systematic

research about these workers' mobilizations. Studies focused on the Chilean mineworkers also ignore what miners recently did in other Latin American countries, such as Peru (Manky, 2014), Bolivia (Fornillo, 2009) or Colombia (Cotton & Royle, 2014). The gap is worth noting because in all these cases there was some form of labor mobilization that radically contrasted with what occurred in the nineties and that forced companies to negotiate with those whom a decade ago were not considered their own workers.

One of the arguments behind this research is that it is possible to better understand the reasons for the emergence of these organizations and their dynamics through a comparative analysis. As I will show in the next section, this makes it possible to clearly determine the importance of variables usually ignored by labor studies. In this sense, Peru is an interesting case because despite the similarities mentioned above, the scope and scale of mobilizations there contrasted with what happened in Chile. After more than two years of research, I found three major differences between workers' organizations: (a) the framing they used; (b) their ability to create horizontal and vertical ties with other labor organizations; and (c) the networks they developed with different civil society organizations. In turn, these differences explain the divergent outcomes mineworkers obtained over time.

Regarding the first point, the following chapters (and in particular the second one) show that Peruvian miners did not always use a trade union framework to present their problems. In fact, although Peruvian workers created more than ten unions since 2000, they were a minority compared to more than thirty medium and large operations where unions were not organized. This does not imply that there were no problems in the non-unionized spaces, or that mining companies there were invincible, but it was common that workers preferred to seek the help of their local communities rather than organizing independently, through labor unions. In contrast, workers in Chile organized through a labor-oriented framing. There, not all mines have contract

workers' unions, but these double in number compared to those in Peru, even when there are more mines and unionizable workers in the latter.

Second, even when Peruvian contract miners organized in labor unions, their ability to create networks between these organizations was lower than in the Chilean case. In most cases, mineworkers did not know what kind of strategies their peers in other mines used, focusing only on the local scale. In Chile, channels of articulation were rapidly created. For example, as early as in 2006, Codelco's miners from El Teniente, Los Andes and El Salvador coordinated their strikes to affect the company more efficiently. Alongside this, the vertical articulation between organizations also differed in each case. In Chile, precarious workers created their own organization at the national level, the CTC), in 2007. In Peru, contract miners joined the traditional Peruvian Mining Federation, subordinating their demands to those of workers directly employed by the mining companies.

Finally, there was a difference with respect to the networks built between contract miners and civil society organizations. Chilean workers, through the CTC, organized activities with national organizations such as political parties and the Catholic Church to get economic and moral support. Behind these alliances a discourse about the nation's development often appeared. For example, in 2013 miners, students and port workers marched across the country demanding the nationalization of copper to guarantee free education. In contrast, the support received by Peruvian workers came mainly from local organizations. Typically, this occurred through "Frentes de Defensa", ad hoc local associations created for brief periods of time to solve specific issues, and peasant communities that demanded better benefits for their members, which included better wages for miners as one among other demands. In this case, the concern was not so much for the development of the country as of the locality.

Whereas Peruvian workers actively challenged mining companies' policies, their protests did not end up in revitalization efforts, in contrast with the Chilean case, where union revitalization

processes did take place. The outcomes mineworkers got from their divergent strategies varied at the firm, industry and institutional levels. First, when Peruvian miners organized, their unions were often short-lived, in contrast to the capacity of Chilean organizations to survive despite experiencing similar anti-union tactics. Second, at the industry level, Chilean unions were able to push companies towards framework agreements beyond the mine-level. One important outcome of mineworkers' mobilizations was the creation of a subcontracting companies' association, AGEMA (Asociación Gremial de Empresas para la Minería y Rubros Asociados), which sits with contract workers' unions to define both collective agreements and daily workplace issues. In contrast to this, the effects of workers' protests in Peru did not force employers' coordination. Even within the same mining company—for example, Buenaventura, which runs more than five mines in Peru— the negotiation between workers and employers occurred at the mine level only.

At the institutional level, workers' mobilizations pushed both Peruvian and Chilean governments to reform some aspects of the labor law, improving the conditions under which companies could use subcontracting (Sanguineti, 2012). Yet the degree of participation of mineworkers in this legislation's outcomes was different. Chilean workers actively discussed the effects of the new laws and attempted to enforce it across the whole country, challenging both state and private actors. At the end, they did not win all their demands, but they were invited to discuss the reforms at the Congress, challenging its application through national mobilizations. In Peru, on the other hand, labor law enforcement varied across the country, and subcontracted workers were not able to coordinate actions that increased their bargaining power nationally. They were represented by the traditional national federation, which not always put their demands upfront.

How is it possible that, despite facing similar structural conditions, miners in Chile and Peru developed different strategies to improve their working conditions? And, what sort of outcomes did those divergent strategies produce? The next section discusses why traditional industrial relations explanations are not enough to understand this puzzle, and develops a framework that,

building on labor revitalization, labor geography and social movements literature, sheds some light on this puzzle.

Traditional Explanations. Peru and Chile in Comparative Perspective

Before presenting the two variables that I used to explain the differences shown above, I will discuss three alternative explanations that have been used to explain the mobilization of contract workers in Chile[1]. These explanations respond to analyses that privilege the national structures where workers act. These explanations focus on (a) the exploitation experienced by these workers, (b) the economic opportunities opened by the recent cycle of high mineral prices, (c) a political context and a labor legislation that do not protect precarious labor. After explaining these variables' failure to explain the difference between Peru and Chile, I detail how these countries' mining industries share a number features that led me to consider different explanations.

The first type of explanations explored by scholars focused on miners' poor working conditions (Abarzúa, 2008; Calderón, 2008). They argued that the miners' effective, direct-action approach resulted from the precarity these workers faced. The exploitative nature of their work pushed miners to look for radical responses.

While exploitation did characterize these workers' lives, it hardly explains the dynamics of their mobilizations. In theoretical terms, the social movements literature has explained this for almost five decades, showing that multiple elements converge to explain collective action (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003). Even when many groups face exploitation and poor working conditions, not all of them decide to mobilize or have the means to do so. In empirical terms, following the "exploitation" argument is hardly useful to understand why some unions developed and not others, even when subcontracted mineworkers faced similar problems in Chile and Peru.

[1] As it was mentioned above, it is in this country where most of the articles and books about contract miners have been published.

Moreover, it was in those large mines that provided better working conditions (in comparison to medium size companies) where workers first organized. Workers' objective conditions matter, but they need to be framed in specific contexts. To control for this variable, in this study I compared cases of mines where both subcontracted and directly employed workers obtained comparable benefits.

A second group of studies emphasizes the importance of the economic contexts in which workers organized. This would partially explain why, although subcontracting began in Chile and Peru in the early nineties, it was only challenged a decade later. These studies noted that directly employed miners obtained historic bonuses owing to the global commodity boom, which in turn made subcontracted workers more determined in their demands (Aravena & Núñez, 2009). Also, these studies noted that labor stoppages were more expensive for companies than before the commodity boom, which gave subcontracted workers more power at the point of production (Zapata, 2012).

The main limitation of this explanation is that it leaves little room for workers' agency. As Frege and Kelly (2004) have noted, structural elements are certainly relevant, but it is also crucial to understand the role of workers' strategies and resources. It is puzzling that although the global economic context similarly affected Chilean workers (Leiva & Campos, 2013), unions started organizing in specific sites like Rancagua, expanding from there to other mines (with varying degrees of success). Similarly, in the case of the Peruvian workers, the companies that employed them also benefited from the commodity boom, but miners chose to develop very different strategies. As I explain later, in this study I controlled for this variable by comparing mines with similar technological characteristics, production levels and economic performance indicators.

Finally, a third group of scholars note the relevance of the legal and political context. On the one hand, J. Ponce (2016) notes that the Chilean labor law leaves no room for contract workers to organize, forcing them to negotiate at the company level only, and placing a number of restrictions

on their ability to strike. Faced with this challenge, workers had to innovate their repertoires of collective action, radicalizing their strategies and developing new mechanisms of articulation. On the other hand, some scholars observed that the timing of the mobilizations coincided with Chilean general elections. As Donoso (2013) argues, "both senatorial candidates and Michelle Bachelet, the presidential contender of the Concertación, addressed the protests and rejected the existence of 'workers of first and second category.'" This social recognition increased support, as different candidates went to Rancagua, the city where the main protests occurred, to cheer on the workers (Duran-Palma, 2011).

While this explanation is more nuanced than the previous ones, it does not allow us to understand the marked contrast between Chile and Peru. In the latter case labor laws are as restrictive as in the former (Villavicencio, 2012), but workers did not develop a critical discourse to change them, nor did they develop novel union strategies. In terms of the political environment, in Peru the first unions were also established in a context of presidential elections, but workers' demands were largely ignored by the candidates (Fernandez Maldonado, 2007). Similarly, during my fieldwork I found Chilean unions that did not do as well as those in El Teniente or Los Bronces mines, despite having tried to organize in similar political contexts.

Summing up, previous accounts are not entirely adequate to understand the contrasting experiences of Chile and Peru. Moreover, both countries share features often highlighted by the labor relations literature. For example, their labor legislation is pro-employer (Cook, 2007), their economies depend on mineral exports (Zapata, 2002), and the technologies and forms of work organization used in the industry are rather similar, as well as the trade union traditions that prevailed there during the 20th century. In what follows, I detail these similarities by discussing how they evolved in the last four decades. This is helpful both to show the inability of these variables to solve the research puzzle and to provide some background for my explanation.

The common trajectories of the mining industry in Chile and Peru

Although Peru and Chile were important mineral exporters even before their independence from Spain (Brown, 2012), they gained their status as world producers in the late nineteenth century, when they went to war to secure the production of nitrate (González Miranda, 2013). After losing the nitrate fields in the Pacific War, Peru's mining production declined, although it did not disappear, as the country also had reserves of gold and silver. In Chile, nitrate production gave the state enough resources to expand through the early twentieth century, and created the material conditions for a strong, leftist labor movement to emerge in camps managed by British companies (Bergquist, 1986).

In the thirties, Chilean and Peruvian exports were affected by the Great Depression. As copper gained relevance in manufacturing and construction, American companies became interested investors and replaced traditional British companies (Brown, 2012). These corporations monopolized the main mining fields, bringing new labor policies to the region. As these companies required a more skilled workforce, they not only trained workers, but also offered them life-long employment to secure their labor power. Companies also used workers' families to secure workers' willingness to stay in the mining camps until their retirement, providing different services—i.e. education, health, and housing— in mining towns (Borges & Torres, 2012).

Through this period, companies used a vertically integrated business model. Although they subcontracted some services, work was mostly organized around large, hierarchical bureaucracies. One of the best examples was the Peruvian "Cerro de Pasco Corporation," a company that by 1965 was the largest private employer in Peru and the country's biggest landowner, since it had taken over peasant lands to get basic supplies for its workers and their families (Helfgott, 2013). As this company used internal labor markets, workers expected to improve their position over the years, receiving constant training in exchange for abandoning the peasant economy (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979). In both Chile and Peru, workers hoped to retire as

miners, and they even demanded jobs for their sons and daughters, developing a strong working-class culture in the camps (Zapata, 2002).

Given the weak industrial development of Chile and Peru—at least when compared to that of countries like Canada or England, or to other Latin American societies, like Brazil or Argentina—mining companies were seen as good employers because of the high salaries they offered (Sulmont & Valcárcel, 1993; Zapata, 1979). This, however, did not mean lack of conflicts within the camps. In fact, given the industry's structural position, mineworkers often used strikes to improve their living conditions (Flores Galindo, 1974; Klubock, 1998). Zapata (1977) argued that miners were among the most active sector of the working class in dependent societies, as their exploitation by international investors and their dependence on the global market's dynamics made them politically conscious. Not surprisingly, one of the main demands of mineworkers' unions between 1950 and 1970 was mines' nationalization. Both Chilean and Peruvian mineworkers opened debates about national development (Goodsell, 1974), the use of mineral resources (Becker, 1983), and the relation between global capital and citizenship (Vergara, 2010).

The "American" period culminated with the nationalization processes occurred in the seventies. In Chile, this was the result of the long lasting negotiations that started in the early fifties. Nationalization occurred under the socialist government of Salvador Allende, between 1970 and 1973. In Peru, while similar criticism about American investments had been part of miners' discourse, it was Juan Velasco Alvarado's military government that nationalized the mines. In both cases, the change in ownership did not mean a radical transformation in the organization of production: mining towns were administered by the state, but they continued to exist, along with lifelong employment practices. Unions also maintained their militant strategies with the new employer. Even during Allende's administration workers mobilized against those policies that affected them, whereas in Peru it was after nationalization that they radicalized the most (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979; Sulmont, 1984).

During the eighties, mineworkers' salaries dropped, given the fall of minerals' global prices. In Chile, the military regime led by Augusto Pinochet, which overcome the "Unidad Popular" in 1973, made most workers' organizations illegal (Campero & Cortázar, 1986). While copper workers were crucial in organizing labor resistance to the dictatorship between 1983 and 1986, they did not take active part in the main mobilizations, which predominantly occurred in shantytowns (Schneider, 1995). Moreover, its main national organization, the Confederation of Copper Workers, was illegal, which cut off any attempt to organize beyond the local level. In Peru, free elections took place between 1980 and 1990, but they occurred in the middle of the country's worst economic crisis, while a radical leftist organization, Shining Path, assassinated union leaders (Canessa, 2011). Although in different contexts, mining unions lost their bargaining power through that decade (Balbi & Parodi, 1984).

Mining was one of the first industries affected by neoliberal reforms. The state used mining investments as a first step towards development, which had positive results during the last fifteen years given the commodity boom. A radical privatization process put state-owned mines on sale, whereas changes in the legislation allowed the massive acquisition of lands for new projects. In Peru, all the state mines were privatized in the early nineties, during the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori. In Chile, Pinochet did not privatize those mines already managed by Codelco, the state-owned company, but he created the institutional structure to attract private investors to new projects (Agacino et al., 1998). From producing 90 per cent of the country's copper in 1990, Codelco produces less than 50 per cent today.

Between 2000 and 2010, both countries experienced massive investments from European, Brazilian and Canadian corporations. In contrast to the twentieth century, the equipment that mineworkers use today requires higher skills, which has led to an improvement of their working conditions (Durán-Palma & López, 2009). This improvement, however, has not been evenly distributed across the workforce. In fact, due to the growth of employment flexibility after the

structural reforms, subcontracting became a widespread mechanism to reduce labor costs. In both places, the percentage of the workforce under subcontracting arrangements rose for around 15 per cent in 1990 to more than 65 per cent in 2013. The development of new production processes therefore created dual labor markets, and today high-skilled workers often work next to non-skilled labor in charge of services such as food, cleaning and transportation (Knobblock & Ramsey, 2013).

The breakdown of the firms´ vertically integrated model produced heterogeneous working arrangements in the industry. Labor economists have shown, based on case studies and national statistics, that subcontracted mineworkers get lower salaries, are employed under worse employment conditions, and suffer more accidents than directly hired workers (Iranzo & Leite, 2006). Along with this shift towards a decentralized model, the development of transportation and exploration technologies allowed companies to get minerals from locations that were too remote four decades ago (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). In these cases, LDC became critical to get a trained workforce without having to build large mining towns. No mining town has been built in Chile or Peru since 1990.

The following table summarizes the changes presented above.

Table 1: Three Stages of Mining in Latin America

	American Imperialism	**Nationalism**	**Neoliberal Extractivism**
Period	1920-1970	1970-1985	1985-today
Country's Economic Model	Export-Oriented	ISI	Export-Oriented
Spatial Configuration	Mining Town	Mining Town	Mining Hotel
Organizational Structure	Integrated	Integrated	Decentralized
Production's nature	Labor Intensive	Labor Intensive	Capital Intensive
Unionization	High	High	Low
Environmental Effects	Medium	Medium	High
Integration to the locality	High	High	Low
Archetypal mines:	Marcona Mining Company (Perú); El Teniente (Chile)	Tintaya (Perú); Codelco – Andina (Chile)	Antamina (Perú); Los Bronces(Chile)

It is important to note that this does not imply that all mining companies behave in the same way, nor that, even if they have similar plans, they can carry them out with the same ease. For example, although all new companies have favored the construction of mining hotels, the traditional mining town model continues to exist in several locations, and the hotel model itself has undergone variations that cannot be explained by the type of mineral exploited, technology used or national legislation. (As I pointed out in the previous section, workers themselves have developed different strategies to challenge business policies.) In the following, I propose two variables that allow a better understanding of the divergent responses of the contracting workers in these countries.

A research agenda

In the previous sections I developed three arguments. First, that recent analyses on the changing dynamics of global mining have oversimplified the reality. Paradoxically, although many authors

acknowledge that contemporary mining is based on using contract workers laboring in poor conditions, they also emphasize that the new employment systems make union organizing difficult (Helfgott, 2013). Second, I argued that the theories about the "replacement" of labor by new social movements often obscure changes in union dynamics. Over the last decade, several organizing efforts from contract workers appeared in Chile and Peru, although they have not been studied systematically. Finally, I noted that these cases are remarkable because the variables used to understand the former are unable to explain the particularities of the latter: They cannot explain the differences between these countries. Moreover, as previous studies have mostly focused on one case only, it is not even clear if the mechanisms used to explain workers' strategies also are valid to other Chilean mining sites.

Before presenting the argument that explains this puzzle, it is important to explain why solving it allows analyzing the dynamics of organizations of precarious workers. Therefore, in what follows I discuss why the Latin American mining industry is a rich area to study. This research analyzes the conditions under which precarious miners can organize to demand and obtain better working conditions. It is worth noting that I do not argue, like Guy Standing (2014), that contract mineworkers are part of the precariat, a section of the working class that would have arisen in the neoliberal context. This view has been criticized for its lack of analytical rigor (Breman, 2013; Wright, 2016), but also for its eurocentrism, as Standing's view on precarity assumes that it is a global condition, forgetting that, in places such as Latin America, precarious working conditions were a rule rather than an exception through most of the twentieth century.

Exploring the dynamics of contract mineworkers' organizations is a valuable strategy to understand what would precarity mean in the Global South. During the last five years, scholars have accounted for the particularities of work and labor dynamics outside Europe and the United States in the neoliberal context (Lee & Kofman, 2012; Munck, 2013; Paret, 2016; Scully, 2016). Although this is a novel debate, there are three important elements that are useful to frame this

research. First, the constitution of labor markets in the Global South has been more problematic and unstable than in Europe, which affected the configuration of working class identities. As Scully notes, resistance to proletarianization has been a common feature in several countries. Even through the twentieth century, "semi-proletarian Southern workers who struggle to maintain access to non-wage income sources display the kind of 'intermittent' and 'instrumental' approach to labor that Standing associates with the contemporary precariate" (Scully, 2016, p. 168). Thus, a significant proportion of workers in Latin America, Africa and Asia have had long histories of complex mixed-livelihoods strategies.

As I noted before, these dynamics of production and social reproduction combined in ways that were more complex than in other industries (such as manufacturing) in Latin America. Until the early 20th century, mineworkers in Chile and Peru depended on the peasant economy, which provided different sources of income to the poorly-paid miners. Later, the mining town model solved companies' need of getting trained workers that were "only" miners, as companies took charge of workers' social reproduction by providing education, health and housing to them and their families. The mining town model, however, was only a temporary solution to the issues of social reproduction, as the industry developed long distance commuting arrangements in the last decade. This new system allows mining companies to get workers from different localities without having to make them move to the mining sites, and gives workers the opportunity of finding new sources of income in their free days. In the case of contract mineworkers, poor working conditions and new spatial mobility dynamics combine in complex forms that I explore in this research. As one hundred years ago, mining is a rich setting to analyze what happens beyond the point of production and how the links between production and social reproduction in the Global South shape workers' organizations.

The second element is that, although in the Global North labor precarity has been associated with business strategies that created flexible employment arrangements, they were the nation states

of Africa and Latin America those that allowed, designed and consolidated precarious working regimes, even before neoliberalism became a global trend (Scully, 2016). For Lee and Koffman (2012), in the Global South the extend of precarization did not only result from a change in business strategies, but also from public policies that tried to attract global investments to achieve national development.

Regarding this point, mining is interesting because of its strategic position for export-oriented economies, as it is crucial for both development policies and political parties. Instead of a change based on foreign companies' strategies only, there were labor and environmental laws the ones that were firstly modified to attract foreign investors. (In Chile, the first company to use subcontracting was Codelco, a state-owned company). Mining is crucial space for understanding the dynamics of precarious politics. Moreover, the politicization of mining unions in Latin America is hardly comparable with that in countries like Canada or Australia. Radical left parties saw in the sector an opportunity to increase its bargaining power in slow-industrializing countries, so they actively supported the industry's unionization. During most of the twentieth century, mining unions had strong links to left parties in Peru, Chile and Bolivia, although this changed in the seventies and eighties, when authoritarian governments, internal conflicts and economic crisis changed the politics of labor. Understanding how this rupture was total or partial and how much can unions benefit from small parties or groups of militant activists becomes key beyond the mining industry. From this standpoint, the mining industry functions as a laboratory to understand the reconfiguration of politics and labor in the Global South.

Finally, the third element is related to how people can contest the model in the Global South, and if the responses developed in the Global North (union revitalization, movements such as Occupy or the 'Indignados'). For scholars, new movements would be insinuating "alternative imaginations of work, rights and life," (Lee & Kofman, 2012), focusing on the improvement of both working conditions, and on the struggle against commodification of social life. In the Global South,

responses have varied, with examples ranging from filing complaints to the state rather than to the direct employers (Agarwala, 2013); the development of self-managed companies (Ruggeri, 2009); and the creation of survival networks that supplement higher-wages demands (Scully, 2012). Under these circumstances, the role of unions would not be as clear as in part of the twentieth century, when they were crucial players in the "national development" of Latin American or African societies.

Thus, given the analytic relevance of the mining industry, it is important to present the two variables I explore in this thesis. Drawing on the union revitalization perspective, I state that unions are not doomed to disappear in the neoliberal era, as they can appropriate new strategies to increase their bargaining power and improve their living conditions (Frege & Kelly, 2004). Far from the pessimism of the 1990s, when the vanishing of trade unionism was predicted (Castells, 1996), this approach argues that unions can renew their repertoires of collective action (Silver, 2003). This research stream maps a series of strategies through which workers could increase their bargaining power, even in adverse contexts. Among other aspects, it has focused on the need for more grassroots participation (Briskin, 2011; Voss, 2010), the creation of coalitions beyond direct employers (Frege & Kelly, 2004), and alliances with local and international civil society organizations (Anner, 2011). Remarkably, all these features broadly resemble some of the innovations that contract workers' organizations made, as I noted above.

The determinants that would make workers interested in and able to create alliances with other actors have been discussed by previous studies. Among other aspects, they highlight the characteristics of the industry (Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie, & Winchester, 2006), national labor laws (Hyman, 2001) and the links between labor and the state (Brookes, 2013). Yet as I noted above, these elements are not enough to explain the differences between Chilean and Peruvian workers' strategies. Drawing on sociology of work and the social movements literature, my explanation instead focuses on: (a) differences in how social reproduction is organized in each

country (the subject of my first chapter) and (b) labor's links to political activists (which I examine in greater detail in my second and third chapters).

On the first point, the sociology of work provides insights into how the characteristics of social reproduction shape the organization of work and the ways in which such structures are contested (Burawoy, 1976; McKay, 2006). Burawoy's (1983) pioneering work shows how capitalist control over the workforce demands that our analyses extend beyond the workplace, as this control is also embedded in the sphere of social reproduction, which defines the conditions in which workers enter the labor market. The work of Jonas (1996) and Peck (1996) advances this argument, pointing out that while Burawoy —like most industrial relations scholars— emphasizes the ways in which the state regulates patterns of social reproduction, it is also crucial to understand the local constitution of labor markets.

It is possible to add, drawing on labor geography, that labor market scales are contingent and politically constructed (Lier, 2007). The way workers are controlled outside the workplace and how they define their ties with actors supporting their social reproduction are not solely defined by capital. This point is crucial for industries that, like mining, are space-fixed, as the decision to produce in certain places is based not so much on the ability to find a suitable workforce as on the richness of the area's natural resources. In this industry, labor control was not only exerted within the mines but also through the administration of spaces such as the "mining town," where companies made sure to have workers under their thumb (Dinius & Vergara, 2011).

The shift towards LDC brought important transformations to the spatial mobility of mining workers. Instead of being able to go from their homes to the mine in minutes, it now takes several hours, while their ties with the local environment are severed. This radically transformed the local labor control regime in the industry. Based on previous studies, we could reasonably predict two effects on the mining industry's organizing (Manky, 2017; Tilly, 2000). On the one hand, mining sites marked by low spatial mobility, in which dense networks and solid identities develop around the

community (Kerr & Siegel, 1964; Klubock, 1998) would probably enter into a crisis and all but disappear. On the other hand, as the high-mobility workforce increased—and miners began commuting in from different places—it would prove difficult to organize collective actions (Manky, 2016).

In contrast to these predictions, I will show how both local communities and workers have contested the attempts to create flexible production arrangements in ways that are shaped by the features of the mining site's local area. In Peru, mining occurs in areas close to peasant communities, while in Chile it takes place in less community-centered areas. This difference originates in the geography of each country; essentially, Peru has a larger livestock production area, and thus more widely distributed peasant communities, than Chile.[2] But these geographical differences are reinforced by institutional distinctions, linked to the power local populations have in each place. Peruvian legislation allows peasant communities to own and manage the land collectively, giving them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis external agents such as mining companies. Chilean farmers, by contrast, are forced to negotiate individually and have no major legal protections that permit them to organize against mining corporations. These differences create specific types of control of the labor markets, also shaping divergent workers' strategies.

This difference between Chile and Peru seems to be important, although its implications for labor relations have not been developed by previous studies. Moreover, as far as I know, there are no studies systematically comparing the dynamics of the "nueva minería" in these countries. As I show in my first chapter, through this contrast it is possible to understand why organizations that defend contract mineworkers are more "local" in Peru than in Chile.

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[2] This is a generalization, because there are important differences among the sites. For example, the Toquepala mine (Peru) is more similar, given the weakness of the local communities surrounding it, to Escondida (Chile), than to Antamina, a mine nested in the Peruvian Andes. Also, El Teniente (Chile), is closer to the mining town model of Marcona (Peru) than Los Bronces, a mine located near El Teniente and where the hotel model works successfully.

This variable, however, does not exhaust the explanation. During my fieldwork, I found mines where similar local-control regimes existed, yet workers chose to develop different organizing strategies.

This led me to develop a second explanation, based on the literature on social movements, which states that it is not enough to say that certain groups feel affected to explain their organizational dynamics. In addition to political opportunities—often mentioned in the literature about contract workers in Chile—it is important to understand society's capacity to mobilize different resources (Edwards and Gillham 2013). This draws attention to the importance of external resources to social movements, such as human, material and symbolic resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

In their classic article about union revitalization, Voss and Sherman (2000) found that activists with experience in the civil rights movement supplied informational and human resources crucial in the launching of successful campaigns. Similarly, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) analyzed the influence of communist activists on the American labor unions in the forties, demonstrating that they provided moral resources to sustain workers' participation. Recent studies on union organizers in the US (Milkman & Voss, 2004; Yu, 2014) and Europe (Fitzgerald & Hardy, 2010; McBride, Stirling, & Winter, 2013) also illuminate the role these actors play in aiding precarious workers' organizing campaigns.

In Latin America, political parties traditionally provided unions with organizational resources, which is why, to understand the dynamics of mobilization of contract workers, we must consider the relationship between politics and radical labor movements. Throughout the twentieth century, political parties struggled to network with and influence the labor movement, creating corporatist regimes based on supporting labor in exchange for economic and political benefits (Roberts, 1995).

It is symptomatic that Luis Emilio Recabarren and Jose Carlos Mariátegui were not only the founders of the Communist Party (PC) of Chile and Peru, respectively, but they also encouraged

the creation of the first labor unions in the mining industry (Angell, 1974; Sulmont, 1984). In the mid-twentieth century, leftist militants went to the most important mines in both countries to organize unions, provide legal counseling and recruit militants for their political parties (Sulmont, 1980; Zapata, 1979) Political activists' networks are crucial to understand the dynamics of trade unionism in each country, even though they operated, at different times of the twentieth century, outside the legal system. In both cases the links between unions and political parties were not as stable nor institutional as in Mexico or Argentina, while leftist leaders that did achieve hegemony did not stay in power for long and stable periods (Cook, 2007).

In the 1980s, the links between political organizations—particularly but not only parties—and unions were disrupted. Although in different contexts (one of dictatorship in Chile, and of an armed conflict in Peru), most leftist parties moved away from their organized bases, as it happened with the Chilean Socialist Party and the Peruvian members of the "new left" (Roberts, 1998). Even those organizations with a continuous presence in the labor movement, such as the Chilean Communist Party, declined after the fall of the Soviet Union (J. I. Ponce & Álvarez, 2016).

Despite these parallels, there were also significant differences in each society's ability to resist. Between two fires during the decades of violence, the Peruvian left almost disappeared, while during the 2000s it was unable to recover enough to win elections or to become an important ally for civil society organizations (Arce, 2008). Peru is often a case study used to show the effects of the crisis of political parties (Dargent & Muñoz, 2012). In Chile, on the other hand, the Communist Party, although weakened, continued its work with grassroots organizations during the late nineties (Vallejos, 2011). It is worth noting that it was one of the first Communist Parties created in Latin America and it is still one of the largest one in the region. Also, smaller civil society groups (the "colectivos") resumed the tradition of the Chilean left, working next to labor unions from a militant tradition over the last decade (Roberts, 2016).

Although key, this difference in resource mobilization capacity has not been consistently explored in the literature on trade unionism. Previous studies have looked at how corporatist regimes have relied on support from the labor movement (Etchemendy and Collier 2008, Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006), but we know less about the implications of these links at the micro-organizational level. Based on this discussion, my second chapter draws on the work of Cress and Snow (1996) to show how the Chilean CP provides workers with moral, material, informational, and human resources.

The third chapter continues the analysis of the impacts that party networks have on workers' strategies, although it does so through the analysis of national organizations. The study draws on the work of Heery (2009) who identifies different ways in which unions can react to precarious workers' demands, and links these responses to the ideological views of these organizations (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013). From a constructivist approach, I argue that is necessary to complement the analysis of the union's structural position with a consideration of its inherited traditions. Following Hyman (2001), I argue that there are three ideological orientations that guide the actions of union leadership. The "class" orientation sees trade unionism as a way of challenging the oppression of the capitalist system. It is usually linked to leftist parties and its main tools are its members' militancy and socio-political mobilization. In the "market" orientation, on the other hand, unions have the obligation to fight for improvements in the living conditions of their members and their members only. This orientation favors formal collective bargaining and avoids links with political parties. Finally, in the "society" orientation, unions, in coordination with state and private actors, aim to improve workers' living conditions without developing a critical discourse against the capitalist system. To understand workers' strategies, it is crucial to analyze the links between leaders and political parties and how have they evolved in different forms in each country.

Cases and Methods

To analyze the two variables mentioned above, I conducted three studies, which involved multiple-level comparisons. The first one analyzes how mineworkers' social reproduction dynamics shape the interaction between them and the local communities, and the type of strategies they develop. The other studies focus on how the links between mining unions and political organizations shape union strategies.

Although each chapter explains the cases and research methods used, my argument is based on more than two years of fieldwork in both countries, with continuous stays of up to 3 months in the studied mines. The research began with my master's thesis on the effects of LDC on Peruvian mining unions. In that investigation, I analyzed three mines in Peru, which allowed me to approach different types of unions. Shortly thereafter I began a systematic analysis of the academic literature in Chile and Peru, and in 2015 I traveled to several mines in the former to interview with different mining leaders and contract companies' managers. By the end of that year I had mapped the situation of about eight mines in each country, which formed the basis on which to choose the case studies.

My fieldwork involved more than 100 interviews with workers in both countries and about 40 interviews with academics, businessmen and public officials. Additionally, I review the main national and local newspapers, which allowed me to establish a chronology of labor disputes from the year 2000 onwards. Finally, I also visited the archives of the unions I studied, which allowed me to review meeting minutes and demographic data about their members. I presented the preliminary results of each study to the workers involved, and they helped me to clarify or correct my arguments.

The first study analyzes how the "mining hotel" model's attempt to control workers' organizations has been resisted in different contexts. To do this, I compare Antamina (Peru) and Los Bronces (Chile). These companies have similar technologies, a comparable workforce and are both owned by global multinational corporations from the Global North. Although they do not represent all

mines in Peru and Chile, they do capture some of these countries' singularities such as the relative isolation of productions sites in Chile (much of the mining production occurs in the desert) and Peru's combination of high levels of poverty and strong local organizations surrounding several mines. Although a transformation of the labor grievances occurred in both cases, as well as a change in the strategies workers used, in Antamina this happened through the greater participation of local communities (which replaced labor unions), whereas in Chile a national federation replaced the traditional company-union model.

The other studies show that, in addition to the relevance of local networks, it is crucial to analyze the organizational resources contract miners had access to. To analyze this, I started by focusing on the mine where the mobilizations of contract miners began ("El Teniente"). Although the case has been analyzed by previous studies, my comparative analysis allows a better visualization of its dynamics. Thus, I found that since its inception, the unions in this mine had strong ties to the Communist Party. The range of resources this organization provided radically contrasts with other cases where, in the absence of political suppliers, unions faced greater instability. This also contrasts with the Peruvian case, where all the unions I contacted failed several times before getting a collective bargaining agreement, given their lack of organizational resources.

Finally, the third study continues with this line of analysis, but it takes a national perspective. The study focuses on the mining federations of each country, and analyzes the way in which they integrated or rejected subcontracted mineworkers' organizing attempts. Both in Peru and Chile these federations used to exclusively articulate unions of the directly employed workers, and they rejected the inclusion of contract workers. However, I found that this changed in Peru after communist leaders took control of the federation, beginning a complex process of contract workers' inclusion. In contrast, in Chile the militants of the Communist Party were unable to influence the national federation, and decided therefore to create an autonomous confederation for contract mineworkers.

CHAPTER 2:
ORGANIZING WITHOUT UNIONS: SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND INNOVATIVE LABOR STRATEGIES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN MINING INDUSTRY

Introduction

This article analyzes the emergence of new forms of labor organizing in the global mining industry. It focuses on one of the regions with the highest mineral production, Latin America, and compares the cases of Chile and Peru, two neighboring countries with divergent outcomes vis-à-vis labor organizing. In the first case, contract workers have broken with the traditional unions that once focused on the struggles of the working class at the local level, moving towards a participatory model based on mineworkers' mobilization capacity and on the articulation of their grievances at the national level. In the second case, workers were not interested in building a similarly expansive network, seeing themselves first and foremost as members of local community organizations affected by mining activity. As a result, their collective action takes place largely outside of union channels and takes place mainly at the local level.

The chapter engages with the transformations in the mining industry and, more generally, with the transformations of contemporary capitalism. In this regard, several authors have argued that, given the weakness of the unions and the strength of "new social movements," the end of labor conflicts is nigh (Arce, 2014; Kirsch, 2014). This analysis, however, does not account for the levels of exploitation experienced even in capital-intensive industries such as mining (Helfgott, 2013). My findings show that rather than witnessing a disappearance of labor conflicts, we are seeing a change in the demands and strategies of collective action.

The article also contributes to the literature on labor revitalization, which over the last fifteen years has shown that, even in adverse contexts, these labor organizations can deploy novel strategies

effectively. With few exceptions, these debates did not delve deep into Latin America, therefore the article discusses region-specific concepts such as community unionism and union strategy in that region. As I found that links with the community are not always advantageous for trade union action, I also argue that it is crucial to analyze the way in which the daily lives of workers—including their community ties—affect collective action.

My methodology is comparative and based on evidence from two mines in Peru and Chile. I analyze the strategies that precarious workers used in detail, as well as how these strategies interacted with their daily lives and various spatial dynamics. The results are based on more than six months of fieldwork at each site, as well as on the systematic review of secondary sources.

The article is divided as follows. I first discuss the debates surrounding the topic, after which I explain the case selection and methodology. Next, I present the results of the research. I finish by raising conclusions and future research questions.

Analytical framework

Over the last two decades, a growing number of studies on the changing dynamics of global mining have appeared (Arce, 2014; Bebbington, 2011; Paredes, 2016). Scholars often focus on how technological changes and the flexibility of labor relations have weakened workers' organizations.[3] It has become commonplace to argue that as a result of these phenomena, labor disputes will have soon disappeared as demands about environmental and local development issues increase.

This analysis, however, oversimplifies the reality. Paradoxically, although many authors acknowledge that contemporary mining is based on using contract workers laboring in poor conditions, they also emphasize that the new employment systems make union organizing difficult (Helfgott, 2013). However, the last decade has produced increasing evidence of mine workers’

[3] I have accounted for these transformations in more detail in the introduction of my thesis.

ability to organize novel forms of mobilizations in places such as Peru (Manky, 2014), Chile (Aravena & Núñez, 2009), Zambia (Fraser & Larmer, 2011), and Indonesia (Bellman & Stynes, 2011). In addition to being unable to explain these protests, the “disappearance” argument assumes that environmental and labor demands are unrelated to one another, making it difficult to theorize the potential intersections between mine workers and the communities affected by mining (Alberti, Holgate, & Tapia, 2013; Mills, 2011).

These blind spots, coupled with the literature’s lack of analysis of recent labor conflict dynamics, have led scholars to view the characteristics of the current mining protests—such as their ability to link the local and the global, their concern for the environment, or the use of contentious strategies—as novel rather than rooted in history (Paredes, 2016). Simply put, they overlook the important characteristics that have marked labor mining communities throughout much of the twentieth century (Finn, 1998; Klubock, 1998), making it impossible to analyze in detail the changes and continuities in labor demands.

The union revitalization perspective is useful in correcting this view. First, this approach holds that unions are not doomed to disappear in the neoliberal era, as they can appropriate new strategies to increase their bargaining power and improve their living conditions (Frege & Kelly, 2004). Moreover, several union revitalization authors suggest that it is possible for unions to dialogue with other organizations and expand the range of their demands, including, for example, environmental or local development concerns (Anner, 2011; Frege, Heery, & Turner, 2004).

While different concepts have been used to account for these new strategies, one that is pertinent to the case of mining is "community unionism" (Pocock, Williams, & Skinner, 2012; Wills & Simms, 2004). This term refers to the need for unions to go beyond economic demands and seek allies in local communities, extending their range of petitions to encompass a broad program of "social justice." Given the “localized” nature of mining and the emergence of actors denouncing its effects on the community and the land, the local setting is crucial for weaving alliances between workers

and other movements (Ellem, 2003; Tattersall, 2006). Embracing such a strategy would allow unions to win allies, through whom they could gain social legitimacy, increase membership, and find new resources for their mobilizations (McBride & Greenwood, 2009).

Most studies on community unionism have focused on urban spaces (Turner & Cornfield, 2007). Less has been said about how this strategy could be deployed in what Harvey (2004) calls the “new spaces of accumulation” towards which contemporary capitalism expands. Although Ellem (2003) and Tatterstall (2006) have addressed the community strategies of the Australian mining unions, these are exceptions centered on areas where agriculture and people's livelihoods have not been directly affected by mining’s adverse effects (they often occur in isolated areas), unlike the Global South (Bridge, 2004b; Paredes, 2016).

It is also worth noting that previous studies have not considered the possibility that workers and community organizations do not share the same interests. It is more common to find accounts of successful cooperation—so-called “articulation” between these actors—than nuanced analyses of how these articulations come about. In this regard, Taterstall’s (2008) valuable study delineates the different relations between unions and local communities, from requests for support at critical moments to integration processes. This is useful in thinking through the range of ties that can exist between workers and local actors. However, it is also necessary to consider the possibility that the relationship may not be one of confluence; rather, workers’ organizations could be replaced, or displaced, by different social movements. That previous studies focused on already established labor organizations that approached local communities for support prevents us from analyzing what happens when the local communities are the ones with strong organizational representation and are taking the lead in making labor demands.

The results of my fieldwork are striking because I found that while Chilean workers successfully renewed their strategies without seeking the support of local communities, local community organizations in Peru supplanted trade unions in demanding better working conditions. In one

case, collective action occurred without local support, in the other, with local support that exceeded that of labor unions. These results show the need for analyzing union alliances while accounting for the conditions in which they can be helpful for the accomplishment of labor demands.

The determinants that would make workers interested in and able to create alliances with other actors have been discussed by previous studies. Among other aspects, they highlight the characteristics of the industry (Anner et al., 2006), the ideology of the workers, and the political resources on which they draw (Anner, 2003). However, in this study I found workers who, even when facing similar workplace inequalities, in countries with similar labor regulations (Cook, 2007), and in companies using similar technology, opted for very different organizing strategies.

Other studies in this vein focus on the relationship between workers' daily lives—for example, their spatial mobility patterns and their affective relationship with the sites of production—and their organizational capacity (Tilly, 2000). In this respect, the sociology of work provides insights into how the characteristics of social reproduction shape the organization of work and the ways through which such structures are contested (Burawoy, 1976; McKay, 2006).

Burawoy's (1983) pioneering work shows how capitalist control over the workforce demands that our analyses extend beyond the workplace, as this control is also embedded in the sphere of social reproduction, which shapes the conditions in which workers enter the labor market. Similarly, Harvey (1982) argues that while capital, in the abstract, has greater freedom of movement in the contemporary world, in order to realize its potential surplus value it needs to take root in specific cultural, political, and economic contexts. In these contexts, capitalists face different dynamics of cooperation and resistance from the workers.

The work of Jonas (1996) and Peck (1996) advances this argument, pointing out that while Burawoy —like most labor scholars— emphasizes the ways in which the state regulates the patterns of social reproduction, it is also crucial to understand the local constitution of labor

markets. For Jonas, local labor control regimes refer to "place-specific institutional arrangements that develop to regulate local labor markets" (Neethi, 2012: 1242). His argument starts from the local, but does not consider it in a vacuum. On the contrary, it assumes that the local scale is a social construction based on the intersection with the "national" and the "global" scales. For example, a multinational company's decision as to where it will hire its workers is not only based on the features of the local labor force but also on the mandates the company receives from its parent company and, perhaps, national legislation.

These scholars also point out that labor market scales are contingent and politically constructed (Lier, 2007). The way workers are controlled outside the workplace and how they define their ties with actors supporting their social reproduction are not solely defined by capital. In his discussion of the impacts of globalization on workers, Herod (2001) argues that firms are not the only ones that can spread across the globe to increase their profits; workers too can organize on multiple scales to achieve their goals.

This last point is crucial for industries that, like mining, are space-fixed, as the decision to produce in certain places is based not so much on the ability to find a suitable workforce as on the richness of the area's natural resources. In this industry, labor control was not only exerted within the mines but also through the administration of spaces such as the "mining town," where companies made sure to have workers under their thumb. In these towns, they constructed and supervised educational and entertainment spaces, as well as spaces where they could surveil mining families' social reproduction (Dinius & Vergara, 2011).

This model was abandoned at the end of the twentieth century, when two disintegrating forces appeared in the industry. At the organizational level, the use of service providers intensified. In Chile and Peru, the number of contract workers has increased to more than 60 percent of the workforce. At the spatial level, companies opted for a revised mining hotel model, which consists of hiring workers who do not come from areas in the vicinity of the mines but rather from large

cities that have the educational infrastructure to provide highly qualified personnel to remote sites (Aroca & Atienza, 2011).

This change brought important transformations to the spatial mobility of mining workers. Instead of being able to go from their homes to the mine in minutes, it now took several hours, while their ties with the local community were severed. This shift radically transformed the local labor control regime in the industry. Based on previous studies, we could reasonably predict two effects on the mining industry's organizing (Manky, 2017; Tilly, 2000). On the one hand, mining sites marked by low spatial mobility, in which dense networks and solid identities develop around the community (Kerr & Siegel, 1964; Klubock, 1998) would probably enter into a crisis and all but disappear. On the other hand, as the high-mobility workforce increased—and miners began commuting in from different places—it would prove difficult to organize collective actions.

In contrast to these predictions, I will show how both local communities and workers have contested the attempts to create flexible production arrangements (e.g., service providers and mining hotels) in various ways, depending on the features of the mining site. In Peru, mining occurs in areas close to peasant communities, while in Chile it takes place in areas where local community organizations are not very active. This difference originates in the geography of each country; essentially, Peru has a larger livestock production area, and thus more widely distributed peasant communities, than Chile.[4] These geographical differences are reinforced by institutional distinctions, linked to the power local populations have in each place. Peruvian legislation allows peasant communities to own and manage the land collectively, giving them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis external agents such as mining companies. Chilean farmers, by contrast, are

[4] This is a generalization, because there are important differences among the sites. For example, the Toquepala mine (Peru) is more similar, given the weakness of the local communities surrounding it, to Escondida (Chile), than to Antamina, a mine nested in the Peruvian Andes. Also, El Teniente (Chile), is closer to the mining town model of Marcona (Peru) than Los Bronces, a mine located near El Teniente and where the hotel model works successfully.

forced to negotiate individually and have no major legal protections that permit them to organize against similar actors.

I will argue that these differences create specific types of control of the labor markets. Although similar technologies are used in the mines I analyzed, and labor laws affect them similarly, I show that labor demands are subsumed under the logic of local communities in Peru, while Chilean workers, alienated from local communities, have renewed their organizations by forging alliances on a wider scale.

Research design and methods

I chose two cases that, while not necessarily representative of their respective countries, do reveal two distinct organizing strategies. In Peru, I studied Antamina, and in Chile Los Bronces. These mines are interesting because, despite the similarities of the technologies they employ, their use of the "mining hotel" model, and in the legislation regulating them, their contract workers' strategies were different. There is no union of contract miners in Antamina, while in Los Bronces a supra-local federation was formed to protect these workers.

Antamina is an open-pit Peruvian copper mine that began its operations in 2000. It is a joint venture between BHP-Billiton and Glencore-Xstrata, companies that, like Anglo American—the owner of Los Bronces— meet several international standards. These three companies are part of the International Council on Mining and Metals, an association that monitors the behavior of its members in environmental, local development, and labor issues (Sethi, 2005). The average annual production of Antamina between 2001 and 2014 was 360 thousand tons of copper. In addition to this mine, Glencore-Xstrata owns the Tintaya mine in Cuzco.

Although it began operations in the mid-twentieth century, Los Bronces only became one of Chile’s largest mines in 2000. It operates on the site of what used to be the "Disputada" mine, a medium site that the government of Salvador Allende nationalized in 1971. Seven years later, it

was privatized by Augusto Pinochet, who sold it to Exxon. Under the new administration, however, there were no large investments, so production did not increase until Anglo American took over the mine in 2001. Under this multinational's control, Los Bronces doubled its production, from 200 thousand tons of copper in 1999 to 440 in 2015. Los Bronces is Anglo American's main mine in Chile, where it also owns "El Soldado" and shares ownership of "Collahuasi," one of the largest mines in Latin America, with Glencore-Xstrata.

As for the surrounding areas of each site, Ancash, the province where Antamina is located, has a poverty rate of 42 percent. This percentage is similar in the closest district to Antamina, San Marcos, which had a malnutrition rate of 45 percent and an illiteracy rate of 16 percent in 2013, twice the national average (INEI, 2015). The district, consisting of approximately 16,000 people, was traditionally engaged in agriculture and livestock. Even today, 72 percent of the population is rural. As such, there are more conflicts with concerned farmers than in Los Bronces. According to information from the Ombudsman's Office, since 2000 there have been ten major conflicts —involving clashes between the local people and the police— and more than twenty stoppages organized to protest the company's environmental and local development policies (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2015).

Mining production in Los Bronces directly affects the districts of Lo Barnechea, Til-Til, Colina, and Los Andes, but unlike Antamina's surrounding areas, these are residential sites with smaller farmsteads (Secretaría Comunal de Los Barnechea, 2009). In this context, community claims have tended to focus less on the area's development than on specific demands, such as complaints about the company's trucks wearing down the main road. There have been few community organizations seeking to affect Los Bronce's work organization.

In terms of the workforce, at Los Bronces there were 2,130 directly employed workers and about 4,400 contract miners in 2015. Under its hotel model, shifts last for twelve hours, and workers spend ten days at work and ten days back at their homes. There are two unions of directly

employed workers, one for blue-collar and one for white-collar workers. There is also an organization that groups together about fifteen contract workers' unions, the "Federation Contract Workers of Los Bronces." This organization managed to sign a Framework Agreement with Anglo American in 2014, and it was in the process of negotiating a new one in late 2016.

In Antamina, there were 2,500 directly employed workers in 2014, and about 3,500 contract miners. Despite having a similar number of employees to Los Bronces, and having the same work schedule (twelve-hour days, ten days on/ten days off), workers are less organized. There are also two unions: the first created in 2004 and representing about 50 percent of the blue-collar miners; the second created in 2013 and representing white-collar workers. Except for one attempt to organize at Sodexo in 2008, contract miners in Antamina have not unionized. Their failure, or unwillingness, to do so is perhaps explained by the relevance of local communities, which, as I will show, have replaced workers' organizations in presenting labor demands.

I used four methods of data collection. First, I interviewed union leaders and rank-and-file members in Los Bronces, as well as workers and the leaders of the local communities that provided the most workers to Antamina. In total, I conducted forty interviews at both sites. Second, I interviewed twenty members of those communities nearby to the mining sites. Thirdly, I reviewed local newspapers to examine the trajectory of the conflicts within each mine from the beginning of its operation until 2015. This allowed me to see the whole picture regarding the transformations in the labor markets' organization and protests. Finally, I interviewed government officials and the Human Resources and Corporate Social Responsibility departments of both mines to better understand their responses to the workers' demands and strategies.

Results

Antamina: The Production of Strong Local Labor Markets

Antamina has faced several conflicts with a very active local population whose economic activities were affected by the company. The clearest example is that of the peasant communities of Huaripampa and Angoraju Carhuayoc, which the state recognized in the early 1970s but whose histories stretch back to the nineteenth century. These agricultural communities sold part of their lands to Antamina in the late nineties. Huaripampa, with 450 families, sold a third of its land (approximately 5,000 hectares) and Angoraju, with 150 families, sold more than half of its land (approximately 1,000 hectares). Although agriculture is still important in the area that surrounds Antamina, the percentage of people engaged in this activity fell from 44 percent in 1993 to 26 percent in 2007. Conversely, the percentage of the local population working in mining has risen from less than 1 percent to about 20 percent today.

This transformation was experienced not only on an individual but also on the community level. Peasant communities are legally established organizations, made up of local collective actors, created to manage the common property of the residents in a given territory (Diez, 2003). Since land ownership and the practices associated with its use are organized collectively, negotiations with Antamina have occurred on this level, although not without tensions within the communities (Damonte, 2012). Given that the negotiations between the mine and the communities occurred through collective decisions, the demands presented to the company involved economic issues as well as questions about local development and environmental standards (Szablowski, 2002).

Community claims also occurred in San Marcos, the closest town to the mine. Until the 2000s, San Marcos was engaged in trading agricultural products at the regional level, but with the arrival of Antamina, the population expected an economic boost. However, the inhabitants soon criticized the absence of ties between mine and city. Although the mine generated changes in the territory–
–primarily infrastructure projects to accommodate the large machinery passing through—these were not accompanied by local purchasing or local employment policies. As in other contexts in

which the "mining town" model has been abandoned (Arias et al., 2013), the links between mining and local economy have been weak in Antamina.

At the beginning of its operations, Antamina implemented a traditional program vis-à-vis the local population in which the relationship was based exclusively on monetary exchanges (Gil, 2009), as opposed to worker training programs, community outreach, etc. Therefore the company's recruitment policies followed the lead of mining companies in Canada and Australia (House of Representatives of Australia, 2013), whereby skilled workers were hired from outside the locality, and contract companies were permitted do the same.

The population actively opposed these policies. Although the communities had agreed to sell their land in return for jobs, these promises were broken by the company, which could not find sufficient skilled labor in the area. At the beginning of its operation, only 10 percent of workers were local. In response to the protests the community organized starting in 2005, the company began to hire a higher percentage of local workers. While the local labor force does not constitute a majority (30 percent) at the mine, its numbers are significantly higher than at Los Bronces (8 percent).

The protests were even more effective in hiring more local contract miners, because many of them do not require high skills. (They are in charge of transport, maintenance of general equipment, and cleaning.) Today, about 45 percent of these workers live in areas near the mine. Moreover, since the 2005 protests the company has also started asking its suppliers to employ local workers before it grants them a contract with Antamina. An Antamina manager pointed out that "sometimes we have two set of costs, one in which the contractor will bring its people and another one assuming they hire local people. The second is more expensive, but we prefer it because it avoids conflicts with communities."

From my interviews and from examining the company's institutional reports, I found that Antamina's social investment focuses more on creating jobs for local people and on local purchases than on investing in education or infrastructure, as was the case at Los Bronces.

In sum, the strength of the local actors forced the mine to change its human resources policy, which, despite its attempt to impose a pure “mining hotel” logic, led to its hiring a more local workforce. This, however, does not imply a return to the "mining town" model. In fact, workers in Antamina still work atypical schedules, even when they live near the mine. These local workers have essentially become part-time mineworkers who go to the mine only for specific periods.

Los Bronces: Weak Social Ties and the Consolidation of a Mobile Workforce

In contrast to Antamina, Los Bronces operates in a socially weak environment, as its communities do not actively contest the mining company’s policies. This is partly due to the better economic situation of the individuals living near the mine. The closest district to the mine is Lo Barnechea, located three hours by car from Santiago de Chile. This has been an area linked, from its origins in the late-nineteenth century, to mining. Agriculture is not an important economic activity, and Lo Barnechea’s population, just under 100,000 according to the 2012 census, has an income greater than the national average. Poverty levels are less than 2 percent. According to the interviews I collected, many people do not live in this area permanently, as they use their houses as recreation lodges.

A similar situation exists in other areas affected by mining. For example, in the regions near the pipeline used to export the extracted minerals (Til-Til) and the tailings dam (Colina), people have not mobilized against the company. While these are agricultural and pastoral areas, this population, in contrast to Antamina’s, is relatively young and has no strong traditions of communal struggles. In my conversations with people affected by Los Bronces, I found that their grievances were presented in an isolated manner, and their negotiations to get some remediation had been undertaken on the individual level.

Under these conditions, Los Bronces’ social investment addresses issues such as raising the quality of education in its direct-influence zones and providing technical support to small businesses. The demands of the population—presented in the media and elsewhere—are fewer

and more specific than those of Antamina’s. In my conversations with community relations officers who had worked in both Peru and Chile, they stressed that there are more needs in Peru, “because they [the local population] want everything from us, from funding to local companies to employment opportunities for their children. In Chile there are complaints too, but it is easier to handle them, and if we cannot do it, people do not mobilize as much as the Peruvian peasants that think that owning some lands give them all the rights.”

The "Corporation for the Protection and Development of the Farellones’ Highway" illustrates the dynamics mentioned above. This is the strongest of the three civil society organizations that has explicitly demanded concessions from Los Bronces. The Corporation has focus narrowly on regulating the transit of company trucks. As a result of their complaints, Anglo American has restricted times of passing trucks and repaved mine access roads. To achieve its goals, the organization used the networks of its members—upper-middle-class people with vacation homes in the area—and made their case in the media. On the other hand, poorer communities’ residents, such as those in Antamina who desperately require jobs from the company, have been unable to organize despite their needs.

As regards local mobilization, the relationship between the company and its communities is regulated through the “Office of Social Development and Communities.” This is in contrast to the Antamina case, where three offices are responsible for local demands ("Social Management," "Lands and Resettlement," and the "Office of Sustainable Development"). The managers of Los Bronces told me that they are not in charge of topics related to working conditions or employment opportunities, which according to them don’t come up that often, and labor issues are left to the Human Resources Office. Given the population’s characteristics and nature of their concerns, it is not surprising that the company has installed a "mining hotel" model, which allows recruiting both direct and contract workers from a national labor market, without major local criticism.

This strategy has created a mobile and dispersed workforce. None of the leaders I interviewed lived in the region where mineral extraction occurs. In fact, few contract workers live in nearby towns, so within their union, workers do not identify themselves as members of affected communities. The first president of the contract workers' federation, for example, lived in a suburban area of central Chile, and he got the job through an internet posting. After studying to become a chef in Santiago, he decided to go into mining, "not for heroism"—he told me in an interview—"but because I knew that I would earn more money than in a factory." He came to the mine and joined a union shortly thereafter. Similarly, his successor came from the south of Chile and travels about fourteen hours every ten days to get to the mine. He stressed the broader national, or indeed global, view of his organizing work: "Here we are all migrants, or what is the same, we are all workers, we are of the same class beyond your place of origin."

As I show below, workers' diverse backgrounds enabled their organizations to draw on their rich experiences regarding collective action. Some workers were even aware of the importance of the union before getting into the mining industry. For example, a leader of Aramark stated, "I was trained as a unionist at a young age, because my parents worked in the coal mining. So, I brought that with me now, and I think the company's managers know that I always speak about that experience, so they hate to sit me next to other workers on the bus to Santiago." Like this leader, other workers used their previously gained knowledge to organize strikes and create a discourse about the exploitive nature of mining.[5]

Communal Strategies in Antamina

The creation of a national labor market supplied by a foreign workforce was rejected by the population of nearby Antamina, who lobbied for more local workers and community benefits. Over time, this rejection shaped specific ways of expressing labor demands. In contrast to the

[5]. As Bergquist (1986) notes, it was this ability to move from the nitrate fields in the north to the copper mines that consolidated a strong working-class tradition in Chile.

traditional mining unionism, in which demands related to local development were minor elements of collective agreements, labor demands have increasingly been redefined and introduced within broader community demands, as the use of LDC by the suppliers of Antamina have abandoned the model due to local demands.

This strategy differs not only from the Chilean case but also from the strategies used traditionally by Peruvian unions, which have tended to focus on improving wages so its workers could support their families (Manky, 2014). Moreover, differences emerge even among those unions with dense networks in rural economies like Antamina's. Throughout the twentieth century, mining activity, especially in Peru's central highlands, has been bound up with peasant community life. In these cases, unions often included local development demands to improve the education and health services provided to the local communities (Helfgott, 2013), or to claim some kind of environmental remediation (Durand, 2012). While these demands were not more important than those for wage increases, they did appear in collective agreements. Under this model, the Labor Relations Office was crucial, whereas in Antamina today, the Labor Relations Office (or the Human Resources Office) is not in charge of dealing with local communities or contract workers. In fact, it has been replaced by the Community Relations Office, demonstrating the shift in focus to broader community demands.

In Antamina, there is no single actor in charge of representing contract workers. There are no contract workers' unions, and there is not a single community that solely represents these workers. On the contrary, different actors have mobilized, and, as they do not share common demands, this makes it difficult to define a clear path forward. To account for this variety, I thus identify three of these broad "labor" demands made in Antamina, detailing the strategies used and the results achieved. The first two demands, for employment opportunities and support to the community's local businesses, have clearly become more common over the last fifteen years. The third demand category, which involves better working conditions and salaries, is less

common, showing the powerful effects that the local actors broadly affected by mining activities have in this case.

Obtaining jobs in Antamina has been the biggest labor demand presented by the local communities, accounting for around half of social protests against the company. When negotiating the land acquisition program with the communities, Antamina often agreed to employ locals in exchange for their land, as people argued that by selling, they would lose their means of subsistence. Even today, when communities are affected by environmental problems, the agreements between them and the company include specific clauses on the number of people that will be hired as contract workers.

To secure these provisions, however, several local mobilizations were necessary. The first collective agreements were soon abandoned after the managers in charge of the mining operations found this hire-local strategy unsustainable given the low skills of the population. This about-face received criticism from local actors, who forced the company to rethink its recruitment policy through mobilizations that affected the company's production (Gil, 2009). In 2004, the company asked its Office of Community Relations to develop a local employment program. The premise was that each time a subcontractor needed to hire a new employee, a search would be organized in the local area to fill this position. The program was successful, and ten years later the head of the Office told me that "since 2009, we do not even seek through the Human Resource Office…in fact, we just call the community leaders and ask them for workers, which they will send to us." About half of the contract miners I interviewed had got their jobs in this manner. As one of them said: "My community sent me because they knew I needed a job. I did not apply, because it was an arrangement between the company and my community."

This institutional solution has been accompanied by constant negotiations between Antamina and local actors. The latter not only compete with "outsiders"—non-local workers who are seen as enemies who exploit local natural resources—but also among themselves. For example, in 2009,

400 members of the Angoraju community occupied the mine, claiming that a chemical spill had affected them. The company gave $200,000 to the community as part of a mitigation program, but the villagers added jobs into their demands. During an interview, a contract worker dedicated to cleaning roads emphasized the importance of such employment demands: "I got a job at the minimum wage, and it was a boring job, because I only clean some things in the road, but at least I got some income for a while. Besides, a job for me meant that my community improved their situation over other communities that wanted all the jobs for them." During my fieldwork I collected several testimonies of people who denounced the company not only because its actions were dangerous to the ecosystem but also because it was a solid strategy. One worker summed it up by saying that "the people that protest the most are those that get jobs later [...] it is all about accepting some pollution in exchange for a job."

In contrast to Los Bronces where, as I show later, the Confederation of Copper Workers (CTC) deployed a class discourse, the relatively weak Mining Federation of Peru did not use similar language at Antamina and did not provide organizational resources to contract workers.[6] Rather, environmental NGOs such as NATURA or the "Red Muqui" were more influential and deployed an "environmental" discourse (Bebbington et al., 2008). A contract worker who was also a community leader told me that "NGOs showed us that the only way to influence modern capitalism is the environment, because there is much more pressure on dirty companies than on those that exploit us." Thus, the strategic use of an environmental discourse overlaps with demands concerning access to the labor market. It is worth noting that in time, this strategy would create tensions between communities and organizations focused solely on the environment. (In this regard, see Damonte, 2012)

The second demand is that businesses set up by local communities obtain contracts that allow them to earn not only wages but also profits. Communal enterprises are organizations created to

[6] I have discussed this issue in another chapter (See: "United in Struggle")

offer different services to the mines (Diez, 2003). For example, the community of Huaripampa created a company to rent machinery and construction services, while Ango-Raju launched a transportation company. I found about twelve such companies, including some dedicated to labor intermediation services offered to Antamina’s temporary workers and contractors. Communities have used both contentious and peaceful strategies to secure such contracts from Antamina, allowing them to win bids even when they lack big business experience.

To work with these companies, Antamina reduced both its quality standards—which was possible because at issue were non-essential services— and more importantly, its contractor labor standards, in exchange for social peace. As a manager of Antamina told me: "Here people prefer to be exploited by mining than to be a peasant. That is why we allow these companies to work without so many rules. It’s a favor in exchange for harmony.” In my interviews with workers from these companies, I found that they follow a hierarchical labor relations pattern, preventing trade unions from organizing and even suppressing miners’ demands on working conditions. The manager of one of these contracted companies, who also held a position on the peasant community board, told me that "we cannot allow unions, because the law says that we are special firms, as we are all equal within the community. So, if someone has a complaint, he presents it in the assembly, in front of his brothers, not as an enemy of management."

It is important to note that Peruvian law does not prevent the formation of unions in these companies, but the legislation is nonetheless used as an excuse to forbid them. In my interviews with these companies’ employees, they complained about the poor state of their equipment and about wage delays. Moreover, some of the mineworkers I spoke with told me they had no voice in the community assembly, as the community enterprise hired external managers who were only interested in increasing company profits: "We cannot complain because they tell us that ultimately what we save on wages returns to all of us as a community, so we must make the sacrifice."

These companies end up becoming employers that reproduce the attitudes of Antamina regarding the legitimacy of workers' demands.

The third type of demand is more like those traditionally raised by the unions, as rather than seeking to increase local employment, it seeks to improve the situation of contract miners. However, even these more traditional demands differ from those made in the Chilean case, as they have a strong localist orientation. For example, when a group of workers employed by a national company dedicated to cleaning roads demanded higher wages in 2014, they turned to their local communities rather than organizing a union. These community organizations demanded improvements to Antamina's Community Relations Office and, when the company rejected their demand (arguing that contract workers were not their employees), they threatened to organize a local mobilization. Additionally, community leaders provided a way out to Antamina: that the increase was not given to everyone, but only to those workers who lived near the mine. Under pressure from the community, Antamina accepted this distinction, giving a bonus to these local workers.

This action, then, was more a collaboration between local workers and their communities than an organization among workers against capital.[7] The division between local and alien miners, as well as the locals' links with their communities, allowed them to secure higher wages. Local miners saw greater negotiating strength in their communities than in workers' organizations, not only for this specific demand but also for broader concerns. As a pamphlet published by the Huaripampa community indicated: "It is not only about better wages, but about supporting those that, for more than a decade, have lived next to a polluted area."

[7] It is important to note labor divisions within the mines. For example, there are several reports of racial divisions in early-twentieth-century US mines. See, for example (Shifflett, 1995) An important difference in this case, however, is that local groups have greater negotiating tools that are based on territorial power.

As for the alien miners cut out of the negotiation, most lived in widely scattered Peruvian cities, and they were unable to build a strong class discourse. This helps explain why these workers were incapable of forming labor unions. For example, in 2008 a union was created within Sodexo, a company in charge of cleaning the Antamina camp whose employees endured poor working conditions. Although this union attracted approximately forty new members at the beginning, most of them came from cities like Lima, Chiclayo, and Trujillo. Faced with this situation, local workers, who were increasing given the policies described earlier,[8] asked the union leaders to give them a place within the organization. As a union founder recalled: "They thought they had more rights than us because their parents sold their lands to the company. These peasants did not understand that if you sell something it is no longer yours, and that we were all workers." Failing to secure a position on the union's board, local workers criticized the organization and decided to isolate it from other local organizations. As a local employee who was then working for Sodexo told me: "We did want them [foreign workers] to present their claim, but it was unfair to do it without us, because we suffered both exploitation and pollution. So, we just said, 'Look, you can ask [for] this or this, but we must approve it.'"

Summing up, contract workers' local identities created specific forms of protest that departed from those of traditional unionism. Given the demands of local communities, a change in these dynamics seems unlikely. For example, to ensure that everyone has an opportunity to work, communities often require that contract workers should only be given jobs with six-months terms, after which other members of the community would get a chance to earn wages. As Antamina's contractors partially accepted this request, rotating contract workers do not have the time to create strong labor ties. In fact, only two of my interviewees had remained in the same job for more than two years. As one maintenance contract miner told me: "Here we are members of the community

[8] Since 2005, the Office of Local Development in Antamina has been developing a project with Sodexo, creating a training center that sought to educate the local population and integrate it into its workforce. As a result, the number of local workers increased steadily.

[comuneros] more than workers, because we know that we will be here only until our communities send a new person." Such attitudes do not translate into robust traditional labor organizing strategies. In contrast to the traditional "mining town", here labor is unable to become a key player in local dynamics.

Chile: New Union Strategies

In contrast to Peru's Antamina workers, miners in Chile's Los Bronces organized a federation (the "Federation of Contract Workers of Los Bronces") that brought together different unions at the local and national scale. This organization also contrasts with the model proposed by the Chilean labor law, which hinders negotiation beyond the enterprise level, as well as with traditional Chilean mining unions, because it forges networks of workers from different mines.

The first organizing attempts in Los Bronces began in 2011. Workers created an organization that aimed to represent workers from three companies, Trandem (earthmoving), G4S (security), and Sodexo (food and cleaning), and to directly negotiate with Anglo America. The company rejected this proposal, arguing that there was no employment relationship between it and the contract workers. Moreover, Anglo American did not renew the new contracts with Trandem and G4S, which allow it to fire the organization's main leaders.

Despite its failure, the organization had deep structural foundations. In contrast to other Chilean mines, where political parties provided key organizational resources to precarious workers,[9] Los Bronces' federation emerged from below, as three of its unions already existed and sought ways to scale up their struggles.

The Sodexo union, for example, was founded in 2000, and despite its weakness had by 2011 negotiated three collective agreements with Sodexo's subsidiary in Los Bronces, representing about 200 people. Although the organization initially depended on experienced leaders who had

[9] I have discussed this case in the Chapter 3.

been there since the nineties, younger workers criticized their approach, which for them was too moderate, and in 2008 created a second union with approximately 140 members. These young workers came from different parts of the country, which made them conscious of the importance of increasing member participation. As one of its leaders noted: "We went to the dining hall and we raised our voice for all the workers to hear us, because we knew that this was a mining town no more. We were not neighbors. We were not friends. So it was vital for us to count on their support." In contrast to the division between local and commuting workers I found in Antamina, Chilean workers felt "equally exploited and foreign, so our organization was a response from the working class to the company."

While the federation was defeated in 2011, the leaders of the Sodexo union successfully negotiated a collective agreement in 2013. To do so, they organized strikes and roadblocks that affected Anglo American’s production. The strike lasted seven days, and it was organized by men and women tasked with cleaning hotel bedrooms and serving food. Although these activities were not central to the company’s production, having no clean rooms or food did affect the mining camp. As one worker mentioned: "We discovered that we were also crucial. We are also mineworkers, because without food, who can work?" The union also blocked access to the mine for two days, which forced Anglo American’s Public Relations Office to ask Sodexo to negotiate with the union. A deal was signed in October 2013.

Sodexo’s successful collective agreement caught the attention of other contract workers, who reached out to the union to ask about its strategies. The other two unions that existed in Los Bronces were very weak and had only focused on negotiations at the firm level. Unlike in classic mining unionism, the coordination between workers did not arise from inhabiting the same territory but rather from relationships developed through riding the bus together from Santiago to the mine.

While these links were not very solid, they were supported by the CTC, a national organization that helped Sodexo’s leaders coordinate meetings with other contract workers. The organization

offered its offices in Santiago as a meeting place, and it even provided an office to the Sodexo union's main leader. Moreover, the CTC offered a role model, that of the "territorial federation," which had been successfully used at the El Teniente and Andina mines in 2006 (Nuñez, 2009). The model consisted in organizing workers of different companies that provided services to Anglo American to create a territorial federation, then, later, to a national organization. It thus broke with traditional mining union models, as it was based on a structure that actively promoted the participation of workers from different companies, regardless of whether or not they were unionized.

This model not only differs from Antamina's in terms of the organizational structure that workers developed but also in the discourse used. In Los Bronces, the framing process is based on the idea of the existence of "second-class workers" and organizers criticized the inequalities that exist in Chile. During my interviews, several workers justified their mobilizations by emphasizing their "class dignity." For example, they argued that Anglo American "is very used to exploit[ing] people because of its experience in South Africa, but [they] do not realize that we are Chilean citizens, and dignified workers." Similarly, another miner pointed out that the company and its service suppliers are "stealing the main resources of the country without respecting the rights of its citizens." Notably, none of the leaders or workers I interviewed in Antamina stated that the foreign origin of capital was a problem.

As a result of this class perspective, a more inclusive model arose in the Chilean case. When a contract company had no unions, the leaders of Sodexo approached its workers and explained to them the importance of having one. They took advantage of the diverse experiences of the union members to expand using tailored approaches to forge connections. As one worker told me: "I was in charge of talking to the workers of the South, because I know how to reach their heart. Our common history was a bridge to the union."

In late 2013, after such outreach efforts, the Federation of Los Bronces was launched. On January 8, 2014, more than 600 contract workers organized their first meeting to discuss their main demands. They focused mostly on economic issues, such as increasing wages and receiving a bonus when the price of copper rose. But they also included broader demands, such as improving their health insurance. The contrast with Antamina, where only some of these demands were raised—and then usually in combination with community demands that went beyond the workplace—is clear.

Anglo American's response to the contract miners' demands was the same as in 2011. The company rejected it and asked its service providers to deal with it. However, workers began protesting and demonstrating in March, following the model used by the Sodexo union. While only three unions joined these formal struggles, dozens of contract workers from different companies supported the mobilizations. As one leader told me: "They brought tires to burn, and taught us which road curves to block. They wanted to affect a company that had exploited them over more than a decade."

Apart from affecting the company with barricades, the federation upscaled its struggles. It called national media outlets to argue for the importance of the conflict. Also, ten days into the strike, the federation coordinated new stoppages in other mines owned by Anglo American. This crisis forced Anglo American to sit down and negotiate a national framework agreement for the first time.

In contrast to Antamina's workers, the workers at Los Bronces did not seek allies at the local level. In this respect, they reproduced what most directly employed workers do under the LDC model (Manky, 2016). Local demands, focused, for example, on improving the company's environmental standards, did not necessarily concern them. For example, when local families affected by the noise and dust that the trucks created protested, contract workers' unions did not issue any statement. A union leader read about it in a newspaper, but said that "we did not know what was

going on, because we only take a bus to come to this locality." And when the Federation organized its barricades in 2014, it didn't seek local support but merely informed residents a few days prior so as not to "affect their daily lives." As a union leader admitted: "We did not expect to get much out of the community, because they had money. They are managers of large companies in Santiago. Class solidarity works that way. "

In Los Bronces, the workers' high mobility, combined with the weak civil society organizations at the local level, made it difficult to create local coalitions. In contrast to Antamina, where contract workers' complaints are less prevalent than those made by local communities, in Los Bronces workers built a strong working class identity. It is striking that in this case precarious workers criticized the privileged status of directly employed miners. As one worker told me: "The plant buses have heating and TV, while ours have holes in the windows so they are always freezing." In Antamina, divisions between direct and contract workers also exist, but they are bound up with other divisions between local and alien workers.

Summing up, Los Bronces' workers' demands were exclusively labor-related and organizing there took non-traditional forms. The federation successfully signed the first collective bargaining agreement for contract workers in the private mining industry. This included a closing bonus of approximately $1,600 for each worker; a safety incentive; and the creation of a tripartite committee to discuss future workplace conflicts. Moreover, the company agreed to provide health and dental insurance for all its workers and their families, including the workers' partners, regardless of their sexual identity. In a country where gay marriage was illegal, this was a significant victory that arose from the demands of one of the federation's leaders, a LGBT activist from Santiago whose wider social networks allowed for broader, more innovative demands.

Conclusions

This article has analyzed two divergent forms of labor organizing. In the case of Peru's Antamina mine, the role traditionally played by labor unions is now filled by strong community organizations

that have subsumed labor demands within local development demands. Consequently, grievances related to securing jobs and work organization have been met, but miners and workers from different contract companies, including local ones, still face exploitative situations. In Chile, the contract workers' federation maintained some continuity with the traditional Chilean unionism in its class discourse, but contract miners innovated by establishing nationwide networks and developing a discourse that broke with the corporatism that characterized large mining unions. These innovations allowed workers to obtain important victories, such as the signing of a collective agreement that covered all of Anglo American's contract miners.

This study contributes to the literature of union revitalization, mining, and trade unions in Latin America. First, in contrast to authors who argue that creating coalitions between unions and communities is necessary, I argued that it is crucial to analyze the particular nature of such networks. The cases of Peru and Chile are notable because they illustrate ruptures from the traditional mining unionism and because they do not follow the most effective model as prescribed by the union revitalization literature. In neither of these cases does an alliance between unions and communities occur: In Antamina, the community replaced the unions, and in Los Bronces, the union largely ignored the surrounding community's problems. Future studies could engage with this perspective to analyze the impacts of social reproduction in different aspects of union revitalization.

Second, the findings presented in this article show that it is essential to revisit the links between socio-environmental and labor demands, particularly in the mining industry. While previous studies have emphasized how the former have supplanted the latter, I found that this has not happened in Chile and only to a certain extent in Peru, where the situation is more complex. Future studies should continue discussing the many ways these demands, and the actors behind them, interact in different scenarios, and how the strategies of business, communities, and unions emerge from those relations. Finally, this study presented new insights into a classic theme in

Latin American labor studies: how strategic export industries create the conditions for unique proletarianization processes. While current labor studies emphasize their supposed state of crisis, my results show the myriad ways that various organizations contest the outcomes of labor market processes.

CHAPTER 3:
POLITICAL RESOURCES AND PRECARIOUS WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHILEAN CONTRACT MINEWORKERS' UNIONS

Introduction

In 2007, after five weeks of national strikes, Chilean subcontracted mineworkers successfully negotiated their first national framework agreement. This victory was important for several reasons. First, it was won in a country where collective bargaining has traditionally taken place at the firm level. Second, it was the result of more than a decade of mineworkers' efforts to organize across the country with no support from the traditional mining federation, state officials, or international actors. Third, the contentious protests that led to the agreement were surprising in a society where, only ten years earlier, many had proclaimed the labor movement dead.

Scholars have emphasized three keys to the success of these mobilizations: first, the miners' poor working conditions and consequent desire to improve their livelihoods (Leiva & Campos, 2013); second, the economic context, as the global rising prices of minerals increased workers' structural bargaining power (Hernández et al., 2014); and finally, the political context, as the 2006 presidential election provided an opportunity to have their demands heard by a broader audience (Durán-Palma & López, 2009).

Even though these elements are all important, I contend here that it is essential to complement them with a perspective that considers the workers' resources. Drawing on the social movement literature, I argue that it is not enough to understand grievances; rather, one must also study the ability to mobilize the resources that make it possible to sustain protests and organizations over time (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Especially in the case of precarious workers, who, given their unstable employment situation often have less material and human resources than workers

under traditional employment arrangements, analyzing the ways in which they access these limited, socially embedded resources is critical (Agarwala, 2013; Edwards & Gillham, 2013). Although the importance of resource access has already been introduced in labor studies (Ganz, 2000; Lévesque & Murray, 2010), it has not been consistently applied to contexts outside of the global North. The case of the Chilean mineworkers is interesting because it illuminates the role played by political activists, particularly those from the Communist Party (CP), in aiding organizations of precarious workers.

This article draws on one year of extensive fieldwork conducted at several mining sites in Chile. Although I focus on the most successful organizing effort—that of the workers in the Siteco, a union that ultimately formed the Confederation of Copper Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre, CTC)—I also rely on my knowledge of other mines where, although precarious employment existed, workers' collective efforts failed. These shadow cases complement my analysis, illuminating the value of a "resource mobilization" approach.

The article has four sections. The first one surveys the literature about precarious workers' organizations and subcontracted miners. In the second section I explain my research design and methods. The third one shows my results, after which I present the study's conclusions.

Context and framework

Chile was one of the first countries that underwent neoliberal restructuring. After Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratic government of Salvador Allende in 1973, he pushed through drastic economic and labor reforms. His 1978 Labor Code instituted collective bargaining at the company level, allowed for the subcontracting of core activities, and limited workers' right to strike. During the dictatorship, national labor confederations were illegal, and repression against union leaders was common (Araya, 2015). Whereas repression stopped after Chile's return to democracy in 1990, the Concertación—a coalition of center-left parties—did not make major changes to labor

legislation (Cook, 2007). Thus, despite the country's economic growth, income inequality has increased since 1990, and more than 50% of the workforce is employed under atypical arrangements today (Narbona, Páez, & Tonelli, 2011; Sehnbruch, 2006). The unionization rate declined from 34% in 1973 to 18.1% in 1991, and to 14% in 2015. Today, collective bargaining covers only about 8% of the workforce.

One of the industries these changes affected most was mining, the sector in which the Chilean working class had first started consolidating its political and economic power. Regimes, aware of the miners' economic relevance, tried to influence workers' actions to obtain legitimacy with varying levels of success (Barrera, 1978). Organized mineworkers were key agents in national politics throughout the twentieth century (Bergquist, 1986), although their organizational challenges have only grown. Miners were one of the first groups that organized demonstrations against the dictatorship in the early eighties (Araya, 2015). However, the economic crisis and state repression limited such efforts. Additionally, in 1983 Codelco, the state owned company that managed Chile's major mines, shifted towards an intensive use of subcontractors, undermining workers' bargaining power (Hernández et al., 2014). Whereas subcontracted workers made up less than 5 percent of the mining workforce in the 1970s, by 1991, that percentage had risen to 20 percent, and to over 60 percent by 2014 (Hernández et al., 2014).

Previous studies have documented the precarious working conditions of these increasingly numerous subcontracted miners. They have less formal education, inferior social benefits, and lower wages than the directly employed workers (Carrasco & Vega, 2011). Even when they perform jobs similar to those of the "core workers," they endure worse working conditions (Fundación Chile, 2011). Furthermore, subcontracted mineworkers experience all the challenges that precarity involves for collective action: they have short-term contracts, labor law does not defend their right to unionize, and they lack the material or informational resources to emulate the organizational dynamics the directly employed mineworkers have traditionally used.

Despite these difficulties, subcontracted mineworkers successfully formed a national organization that has negotiated six national framework agreements since 2007[10] (Vejar, 2014). These successes resulted from the organizing efforts that took place between 2003 and 2006 under the leadership of a local union, Siteco (later the CTC). Though the CTC did not join the traditional federation of directly employed mineworkers, previous studies have shown that it was one of the most successful examples of labor revitalization in Latin America (Aravena & Núñez, 2009).

To explain why, scholars first focused on subcontracted miners' poor working conditions (Abarzúa, 2008; Calderón, 2008). They argued that the miners' effective, direct-action approach resulted from the precarity they faced: the exploitative nature of their work pushed them to look for radical responses. However, while exploitation certainly edged precarious miners towards radical mobilization, it hardly explains the specific strategies they used, as social movement scholars have noted (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003).

A second group of studies emphasized the importance of the economic and political contexts in which workers organized. For the economic context, they noted that directly employed miners obtained historic bonuses owing to the global commodity boom, which in turn made subcontracted workers more determined in their demands. Also, labor stoppages were more expensive for companies than before the commodity boom, which gave subcontracted workers more power at the point of production (Zapata, 2012). As for the political context, scholars observed that the timing of the mobilizations coincided with Chilean general elections. As Donoso (2013) argues, "both senatorial candidates and Michelle Bachelet, the presidential contender of the Concertación, addressed the protests and rejected the existence of 'workers of first and second

[10] The framework agreements are collective contracts between national unions and mining companies that contributed to a substantial improvement in the quality of life of mining workers. Among other aspects, they increased workers 'wages, developed standards on health and safety at work, and improved workers' access to health insurance.

category.'" This social recognition increased support, as different candidates went to Rancagua, the city where the main protests occurred, to cheer on the workers (Duran-Palma, 2011).

One limitation of the explanations summarized above is that they focus on variables that leave little room for workers' agency. As Frege and Kelly (2004) have noted, institutional elements are important, but it is also crucial to understand the role of workers' strategies and resources. It is puzzling that although similar economic and political factors affected workers in most Chilean mines (Leiva & Campos, 2013), unions started organizing in specific sites like Rancagua, and expanding from there to other mines (with varying degrees of success).

The social movement literature is helpful in such cases, as it argues that the success of a mobilization depends not only on external structures, but also on the organization's ability to access different resources (Edwards & Gillham, 2013). From this standpoint, grievances are not sufficient to account for social action, as what also matters is how these grievances are "defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations." (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1215). The social movement literature emphasizes the ability of certain groups to frame issues in a way that encourages people to join a union, participate in certain types of demonstrations, and commit to sustained collective efforts. This framing is even more important for precarious workers, as they often lack the collective voice mechanisms, institutional protections, and economic means that traditional unions use to satisfy their demands (Kalleberg, 2011).

Cress and Snow (1996) argue that social movements require four resources to survive over time: moral, material, informational, and human (Table 1). While their study is based on homeless organizations, recent scholarship has used their approach to analyze the importance of resources in developing successful labor strategies (Martin, 2008; Van Dyke & Dixon, 2013).

Table 2: Social Movements' Resources

(Based on Cress and Snow 1996)

Type	Description	Example
Moral	Endorsements, by external actors, of the aims and actions of the movement.	Support statements or direct participation in strikes.
Material	Tangible goods and services mobilized by the movement.	Provision of supplies, meeting space arrangements, employment, or money to the union leaders.
Informational	Knowledge capital pertinent to the organization's maintenance and mobilization.	Strategic and technical support about strikes, labor laws, and contacts to other civil society organizations.
Human	People who donate resources time and energy to the movement.	Contacts to bystander population, provision of leaders or advisors.

In the case of precarious workers' organizations, there are three potential resource providers. First, the literature on transnational networks shows how precarious workers can benefit from their contacts with consumers, global unions, or NGOs around the world (Bronfenbrenner, 2007; Cumbers, Nativel, & Routledge, 2008). In this line, Cotton and Royle (2014) discuss the importance of global educational programs for the successful organizing of coal miners in Colombia, while Ellem (2006) highlights the role of global agreements for Australian mining unions. Chilean workers, however, had no major connections to global actors, and their strategies were in fact quite domestic (Duran-Palma, 2011).

A second provider of organizational resources are national federations (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). In countries where labor unions are strong, their ability to collaborate with precarious workers organizing campaigns is crucial, as evident in the case of COSATU in South Africa (Magaziner & Jacobs, 2013). However, in Chile the traditional federation of mineworkers did not develop a plan to organize precarious workers, and it actually opposed these workers' radical tactics, constantly challenging their attempts to get a national framework agreement (Vejar, 2014).

Finally, a third group of studies has focused on political activists. In their classic article about union revitalization, Voss and Sherman (2000) found that activists with experience in the civil rights movement supplied informational and human resources crucial in the launching of successful campaigns. Similarly, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) analyzed the influence of communist activists on the American labor unions in the forties, demonstrating that they provided moral resources to sustain workers' participation. Similarly, recent studies on union organizers in the US (Milkman & Voss, 2004; Yu, 2014) and Europe (Fitzgerald & Hardy, 2010; McBride et al., 2013) illuminate the role these actors play in aiding precarious workers' organizing campaigns.

This last "activist" perspective helps us to understand the case of the Chilean mineworkers, but it also sheds light on broader dynamics of precarious workers' mobilization. Historically in Chile and Peru, militants from leftist parties were the actors advocating for and organizing labor unions, in contrast to the US example, where it was the comparatively conservative AFL/CIO (Collier & Collier, 2002).

To understand the mobilization dynamics, we must first consider Chile's complicated history and the relationship between politics and radical labor movements. Throughout the twentieth century, Chilean political parties struggled to network with and influence the labor movement, developing regimes that based their power on supporting labor in exchange for economic and political benefits (Roberts, 1995).

In the years before Pinochet, neither the Socialist nor the Communist Party gained complete control over mining unions, but when either was in power, each provided these organizations with political advisors and direct access to the government (Roberts, 1998). After Pinochet made unions illegal and hundreds of militants fled the country, underground activism continued, permitting radical groups to organize several mobilizations that precipitated the dictatorship's crisis (Araya, 2015; Montecinos, 2014). However, after democratization, two major parties, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, started breaking their ties with labor unions and focused

on maintaining Pinochet's neoliberal model (Drake, 2003). Moreover, the Socialist Party consolidated its influence on the mineworkers' federation, forcing it to accept a corporatist arrangement in exchange for abandoning its militant tradition (Hernández et al., 2014).

Meanwhile, the Communist Party remained outside the political system, and in the 1990s faced a crisis with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the late nineties, however, the Communists made efforts to organize labor and other social movements in order to regain their political influence in new forms (J. I. Ponce & Álvarez, 2016). As I will show, the subcontractor miners' union, CTC, is an often-overlooked consequence of such efforts; indeed, the CTC's very existence demonstrates how important political activists can be in organizing precarious labor.

Methods

In what follows, I analyze one of the most successful subcontracted workers' organizing campaigns in Latin America. While previous studies have given a rich account of the context in which this campaign occurred, here I emphasize the importance of the resources provided by political activists. For comparison, I also consider shadow cases from other Chilean mining sites, where campaigns were waged that were not as successful as those of the CTC in terms of their organizing ability and the collective agreements they signed. Table 2 details the sites and number of interviews I gathered through my fieldwork, which occurred between 2014 and 2016.

Table 3: Information about the Unions and Interviews Conducted

Union	Number of Interviews	Year(s) conducted	Archival work?	Locality (Region)
CTC-Siteco	20	2014-2016	Yes	Rancagua (O'Higgins)
SINATRACCH	7	2016	No	Rancagua (O'Higgins)
Collahuasi	8	2015	No	Collahuasi (Tarapacá)
Anglo-American	10	2015-2016	Yes	Los Bronces (Santiago)

In contrast to previous studies of the CTC, I not only focus on its formal creation in 2007 but also trace its longer history: its beginnings in the 1970s, the creation of its predecessor, the Siteco, in the 1980s, and finally its evolution up to 2014. Inspired by the work of Ganz (2000) on agriculture unions in California, I take this broader view because it allows me to give an account of the organization's continuities and transformations and compare its strategies to those of other organizations over time.

During my fieldwork, I confronted two main challenges. First, given the often temporary nature of their employment, it was difficult to locate key union leaders, who for different reasons had renounced the union and left the mine. Second, those who were still involved in union leadership often created a heroic account of the organization, omitting mention of any internal tensions and the necessity of securing support from external actors. I tried to control these problems through an analysis of all the news published about the CTC in the main national newspapers between 1995 and 2015. I triangulated this information with what I gathered directly from my informants to obtain a more complete view of the organization.

Results

To show how political activisits, particularly those of the Communist Party, were crucial to the CTC's succesful campaigns, I focus on four of the organization's key features: (a) rank-and-file union organizing, (b) contentious collective action, (c) extended national networking, and (d) expertise in successfully framing labor issues.

A. Rank-and-file union organizing

Subcontracted mineworkers started organizing in the early eighties when, during the Pinochet dictatorship, construction workers at El Teniente mine in Rancagua joined the Sinami union. This union had been created almost a decade before and, although it had been banned by the Pinochet regime, the Communist Party's youth contingent managed to preserve the organization, its

members working (illegally) as full-time union organizers to build a social base to challenge the dictatorship (Dietz, 2013; Vallejos, 2011). According to Danilo Jorquera, then a young leader in his mid-twenties, the Party sent him to recruit miners: "Stopping this mine was crucial to destabilize the regime, and I came from far away knowing that we had a cell of militants I could work with."

In addition to providing a cadre of union leaders, the Communist Party provided basic organizational resources, with its underground networks developing strategic actions that neither the government nor employers controlled. It also made material resources available, giving workers access to meeting spaces in safe houses and sustaining the union leaders' livelihoods. After participating in a national strike in 1985, for example, Jorquera lost his job in Rancagua, but the CP gave him a monthly wage so he could keep working for the union.

Sinami's ability to organize subcontracted workers and even to obtain some improvements in their working conditions soon attracted the interest of less skilled workers at the El Teniente mine, such as those in charge of the dining halls, office cleaning, and equipment maintenance. These types of workers had increased after Pinochet implemented the Labor Code of 1979, and as they were not unionized, the Communist leaders decided to organize them too. However, not only were their skills different from those of the construction workers, but they also had different demands because they lived in Rancagua with their families given the permanent nature of their jobs. Thus, in 1988 Sinami's leaders created a new union, Siteco, which would organize all El Teniente's subcontractors. Its first leaders were the same who had led Sinami up until then, which shows the strong influence the Communists had on precarious worker organizing.

Siteco emulated Sinami's strategies, continuing to rely on the CP's underground networks to recruit new members and organize contentious mobilizations. With the return to democracy in 1990, however, these methods faced new challenges. Whereas maintaining a secret and hierarchical structure was useful throughout the repressive years of Pinochet's rule, these tactics

could not be justified under a democratic regime. The organization struggled to adapt. A study conducted in the late nineties found that Siteco's performance had been "weak and erratic." Precarious workers' commitment to the organization flagged, and during disputes only a handful of leaders negotiated, often with no members participating (Agacino et al., 1998).

Meanwhile, the subcontracted workers faced other challenges. The democratic regime did not change the Labor Code (Cook, 2007), and the government signed a corporatist agreement with the directly employed mineworkers. The traditional Federation of Copper Workers, consented to shift towards a peaceful business unionism in exchange for better working conditions and higher salaries. This organization had no interest in organizing subcontracted miners, focusing exclusively on its membership's demands.

It was only in the early 2000s, in a context of increasing copper prices and growing discontent towards the government (Drake, Frank, & Winn, 2004), that Siteco changed its organizing approach. This shift was the result of a change in leadership, as younger actors like Jorge Peña brought new resources to the organization. Peña was a communist militant who had joined the party when he was twenty years old. Two years later, he got a job in a subcontracting company and joined Siteco shortly thereafter. In contrast to older leaders, who were not permitted to set foot at the mine site since the nineties, he went to El Teniente every day and engaged workers in informal conversations about union politics: "My comrades and I were part of the Party, but we wanted to renew its union work, because it was too hierarchical." While the effort to renew union strategies through rank-and-file participation was an idea developed by the younger communist militants in Siteco, they were able to pursue them only because some of the national CP's leaders had also started –discussing the party's strategies towards a "social unionism." (J. I. Ponce & Álvarez, 2016).

As a result of this increased organizational energy, assemblies attracted more participants, with attendance rising from an average of 70 people in 2001 to 120 in 2002, and to 250 in 2003.

Meanwhile, stakeholders like Peña made major efforts to convince workers about the necessity of banding together with all of Codelco's subcontracting companies during negotiations. But they needed help first. As he told me in an interview, "The idea always came up in our meetings, but it only happened after we called some external advisors, who gave us the tools that helped us convince people that this was possible." In contrast to the directly employed miners, who could operate "within the system," precarious workers, given their lack of legal protections, required advisors to move their demands forward.

Peña and his friends also started discussing organizing a massive stoppage. In late 2003, nearly one thousand miners led by Siteco occupied the mine and demanded a 15% wage increase. The tactic was unsuccessful; in addition to several workers being injured during the struggle, subcontracting companies fired Peña and other leaders. As with the "underground" activities carried out by the CP in the eighties, however, they managed to keep leading Siteco because the CP allocated a small stipend for them in exchange for administrative service.

During this period, another young leftist militant, Andrés Leal from the Humanist Party, had started organizing his coworkers in another subcontracting company in Rancagua. Although he did not participate in the 2003 mobilizations, his background as a social organizer helped him to convince his coworkers to organize: "They were disgruntled when I came here, but they had no idea about what a union was, so my work consisted of teaching them." After the union was launched, Leal contacted Siteco to try and work together (Montecinos, 2014). Manuel Ahumada, another communist militant, deployed the same strategy, first organizing a union in the subcontracting company he worked for, then seeking broader alliances. Ten years later would become the head of the CTC.

This coordination between different leaders with political experience was helpful in advancing a new union approach. Peña and Leal began a reading group about the history of the Chilean labor movement. They invited all union members to attend and tried to "re-socializing people, showing

them that it is not boring to talk about politics." Additionally, they organized soccer games and gatherings to talk "without the formalities of a union assembly." Over time, these formal and informal gatherings helped increase workers' participation, which was crucial in reforming the union's hierarchical structure. In 2005, workers decided that the assembly had to approve any major decision. As Leal stated: "We tried to break with the dictatorship tradition, going back to the Party's origins, when it practiced direct democracy on a daily basis." While this idea originated in the assemblies, it should be noted that the union also received advice from external experts that taught courses on political economy and organizational dynamics.

Thus, the CP provided key resources in the effort to reach new union members during different periods of Siteco's history. It also supplied the union's leaders with resources and allowed them to maintain their organizing role even after they had left, or been dismissed from, their jobs. Siteco's successful use of political resources stands in contrast to several other cases. For example, in the mid-eighties, Sinami sent people to organize subcontracted workers in other mines at home and abroad, for example to Chuquicamata in Chile or to mines in El Salvador. In contrast to the organizing efforts at Rancagua, however, these initiatives failed. When I talked with the former leaders from Sinami, they explained that there were not enough militants willing to support workers' protests there. A similar failure occurred more recently in the private sector. In 2010 workers in Collahuasi—one of Chile's largest copper mines— organized a strike demanding better working conditions (Leiva & Campos, 2013). Although they obtained the moral support of several unions in the region, the leaders did not have experience in organizing demonstrations, so the government repressed the movement easily. As one leader told me: "There were thousands of workers supporting us, but once we saw the army arriving to the camp, nobody wanted to fight them back." While repression was also common in Rancagua, their leaders used their political experience and activist networks to build collective resistance.

B. Contentious Collective Action

Between 2003 and 2006 Siteco's membership increased from fewer than 2000 to more than 6000 (Bascopé & Krüger, 2008). New strategies, characterized by a contentious approach (i.e., embracing strikes and demonstrations), accompanied this growth. As one union member mentioned, "after so much organizing, we were finally strong enough to block the roads, but we also developed a strategic approach to strikes." (See also Aravena & Núñez, 2009). In 2005, after two years of intense recruiting, a new strike was organized. It lasted for more than 20 days and it was successful, as all the subcontracted workers obtained a historical bonus and Codelco's compromise of creating negotiation tables to improve working conditions at El Teniente (Donoso, 2013).

A key resource through this strike, which became even more important in 2006 and 2007, was community support. Whereas the directly employed workers' unions had stopped organizing demonstrations, subcontracted leaders were conscious about the resources they needed to sustain a strike. As one leader noted: "After the 2003 disaster we met with our advisors, and they explained to us that it was important to win the support of Rancagua's people, because they could give us food, money loans, and moral support to keep resisting with our families." Thus, workers reached out to other unions and civil society organizations to explain their grievances and hopefully win support.

Notably, they secured the support of one of Rancagua's direct workers' unions. The "Sindicato 8" let workers use their meeting hall and organized some activities to fund the mobilizations. These links between subcontracted workers and this directly employed workers' union were based on their leaders' common militancy. As Jorquera, the Communist Party member and labor organizer, noted: "I knew some key leaders because we were militants in the same cell of the Communist Party. We had been talking about politics since the nineties, so it was easy to get them on board." At the same time, the Communist Party's advisors recommended that workers approach the Catholic Church for support, a recommendation based on their positive experience with the

institution throughout the dictatorship, which it had opposed (Vallejos, 2011).The move paid off, as Rancagua's bishop explicitly condemned the precarious working conditions miners faced (Donoso, 2013).

Apart from community support, informational resources were also crucial in determining when, how, and where to organize strategic stoppages. Whereas workers had a practical knowledge of the times when the company transported the minerals and of the production process' critical sites, they knew less about how to impede the company's functioning effectively and methodically. With a segmented workforce, strikes could not follow the traditional pattern and wouldn't necessarily be effective: "Under the Chilean labor law, you can only strike if you have a problem with the firm that hired you, but there were hundreds of such companies working for Codelco. Stopping one, or even ten of them, was useless if you did not combine it with other methods." Under these circumstances, precarious miners needed some basic organization, which experienced leaders provided. As one rank-and-file worker noted: "The Communists knew how to affect Codelco beyond the point of production, because that's what they did during the eighties…political strikes in the shanty towns trained them." Thus, militants provided the experience that subcontracted workers lacked.

When we compare the Rancagua case with other mines, the importance of the knowledge provided by activists becomes clear. In Collahuasi, for example, workers destroyed part of the company's equipment and blocked its main roads in 2010 (the company lost about 43 million dollars after three days of mobilizations). These tactics demonstrate a firm commitment to a confrontational approach; however, the workers did not know how to block the highways effectively, or how to fight back the police once they arrived, making it difficult to sustain the mobilization. Additionally, these subcontracted workers did not have access to the moral and material support of civil society. As one participant mentioned: "We thought that we could face the company by ourselves, but soon it was clear that we needed some sort of external support if

we wanted to last for more than one week. But nobody came to help us, because we are not like most direct workers' unions, who have money to hire experts." In Rancagua, workers combined their contentious tactics with valuable know-how that enabled them to be successful.

C. Upscaling Dynamics

Another crucial tactic for organizers was so-called "upscaling dynamics," consisting in the union's ability to go beyond the local scale. Siteco started networking with other subcontracted workers' organizations. New leaders like Peña and Leal advocated to push the older leadership aside and argue for contentious action, and higher-ups began to push for new relationships with other unions. The CP's leadership convinced Jorquera to abandon his work in Rancagua and draw on his vast experience to travel around the country to organize new precarious workers' unions in other Coldeco mines. In some cases, such as the Los Andres mine, subcontracted workers' federations already existed, but Jorquera encouraged them to start coordinating their actions. The political ties between Jorquera and these leaders, all of whom were militants of the Communist Party, made this possible. The Party offered precarious workers not only experience and knowledge but also venues in which to meet and share their common projects.

Thus, while Peña and Leal mobilized workers at the local scale, Jorquera used the Party's networks to begin building a national organization that represented all subcontracted mineworkers. As he recalled of his 2005 outreach effort: "I went to Los Andres, to El Salvador, and to other mines, and I tried to talk to everyone there, but the more open places were those where communist leaders helped me to contact people." Despite their precarious condition, therefore, political affiliation allowed workers to organize in short time.

Jorquera also tried to organize unions in northern Chile. While these efforts were not always successful—leaders faced several anti-union tactics from the mining companies—there were more than ten organizations interested in joining the network by 2006. As a result, these organizations created a national committee, which, in its first assembly, gathered more than fifty

union leaders from all over the country. Almost half of them were communist and, not surprisingly, they elected Jorquera, Siteco's historical leader, as their organization's president.

In 2007, the committee's leaders formalized the organization by creating the CTC. When Jorquera eventually left to work in Rancagua's local government, another communist leader, Cristian Cuevas, whose father had been a coal miner, took charge of the organization. He insisted that the CTC was autonomous, but nonetheless acknowledged how vital the CP had been during the 2007 strike, which was the CTC's longest and most successful. First, Cristian Cuevas enlisted the support of the Communist Party to train national union leaders. Reached with the CP's help, experts on the copper industry and collective bargaining met weekly with the workers to improve their negotiation skills. As Leal noted, these experts "empowered us," introducing them to "one of the guys that taught us used to be Codelco's president during Allende's administration. We met very smart people willing to help us." In addition to the morale boost, these experts were crucial in developing specific strike tactics in terms of timing, duration, community involvement, and negotiation (Hughes, 2013).

Summing up, Siteco's capacity to establish networks with different groups of subcontracted workers cannot be explained without considering the political linkages between leaders. The case of the Federation of Anglo-American Mineworkers, created in 2009, illuminates how important these linkages are. In that company, the first group of leaders did not want to contact the CTC because they felt the organization was "too political." However, inspired by the Framework Agreement that the CTC secured in 2007 (Aravena & Núñez, 2009), the Anglo-American Mineworkers attempted to procure a similar one. Their attempt was unsuccessful, and the company shortly fired most of the effort's leaders. Anglo-American leaders did visit other mines owned by their multinational parent to try and create a national organization. But coordination was difficult given the distrust that the contract miners felt towards external workers. It was only in 2011, when a new leadership approached the CTC to obtain assistance, that the Anglo-American

workers managed to expand beyond the local level. The network of activists provided by the CTC's political links in different localities proved invaluable.

D. Re-framing mining unions actions

Finally, being part of a network of political militants gave leaders the resources to build a narrative about the organization and thus frame their demands in successful ways. Take, for example, the CTC's decision to reactivate an old name in choosing theirs. Chilean copper miners first created the "Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre" in 1951, which represented only directly employed workers. While this original CTC always maintained its independence from political organizations—it even organized strikes during Allende's administration— its leaders had political links to the Socialist and Communist Parties. The organization actively resisted Pinochet's regime, but after the dictatorship, the directly employed mineworkers' leaders abandoned the name and its radical tradition, as the organization shifted towards corporatist arrangements.

In this context, one leader of the contract workers told me that "claiming the legacy of the CTC was symbolic. We wanted to show that we, the precarious workers, were the true heirs of the combative Chilean." Leaders like Peña or Cuevas, trained in the Communist Party, were creating a new organization that was trying to negotiate on the national scale, but they were also building a discourse about the exploitative nature of mining and the inequalities they suffered daily (Singh, 2010). They demanded a national collective agreement, as well as a new labor code, the nationalization of the copper industry, and the end of subcontracting. As Cuevas summarized it: "We wanted to fight not only at the company level, but also politically, because if this was the first country where neoliberalism imposed its rules, it could be the first one to overcome its problems as well."

The Communist Party powerfully shaped the organization's discourse, leading to growing tensions as union dynamics changed. After the CTC's 2007 victories, Codelco shifted from firing union leaders to forcing its provider companies to accept unionization, as long as the unions did

not join the CTC. The strategy was effective: it offered contract workers some economic improvements without having to invest their time in union activities or to risk their jobs in contentious actions. Moreover, workers competed for leadership in the new unions, vying for key positions with the entrenched Communists. These workers often criticized the movement's politicization. As one worker from Rancagua, a former Siteco member told me: "For some of us, the Communist Party was too important and did not let us develop an autonomous unionism."

Nonetheless, the honed messaging provided by the CP remained a potent organizing force. Consider the SINATRACCH, an organization created in 2008 that was supposed to compete with the CTC. The organization, however, was unable so increase its membership, despite the support it received from the Codelco to delegitimize CTC's work. One of the most common criticisms I heard through my fieldwork was that SINATRACCH was unable to provide an attractive discourse: "They talked like the regular mineworkers, who have all the tools to get a nice negotiation without changing the entire society. But how can that convince the precarious workers?" Even SINATRACCH's leaders admitted that "the Communists were wrong, but they had a big apparatus to create powerful images about their political myths. Where we had nice talk about better collective agreements, they had old revolutionary songs in the background. How do you compete with that?"

Discussion and Conclusion

This article examined Chilean copper workers' organizations, one of the most successful precarious workers' movements in Latin America. In contrast to studies focused on the particularities of the copper industry or on miners' poor working conditions (Leiva & Campos, 2013; Nuñez, 2009), I explained the importance of analyzing the resources they mobilized. Since precarious workers do not enjoy the levels of legal protection that traditional miners do, and as they do not enjoy the benefit of institutionalized collective action structures, understanding the dynamics through which they access an array of organizational resources was key.

Previous studies that focused on the resources used by labor in Latin America have highlighted the relevance of global unions (Anner, 2011; Murillo & Schrank, 2005) and international civil society organizations (Anner & Evans, 2004; Von Bülow, 2009) in providing such resources. My research on the Chilean case has demonstrated the crucial role played by a political party in providing key resources to contract mineworkers. The Communist Party's militants and union leaders led a successful organizing campaign, developed an innovative contentious approach, pushed for the creation of national networks (overcoming the organizational fragmentation typical of precarious work), and developed a radical (and attractive) discourse for the union members.

These findings stress the need for theorizing the link between precarious workers and politics, as this relationship does not seem to follow the same pattern as that of traditional workers (Agarwala, 2013). In Chile, as in other Latin American countries, parties and unions were linked through governments that exchanged favors for votes (Collier & Collier, 2002). However, in times when precarious workers' organizations are unable to win their demands by simply pledging political support and must instead rely on their capacity to mobilize, their success depends on the ability of leftist organizations to work outside of institutional channels.

CHAPTER 4:
UNITED IN THE STRUGGLE? UNION ORIENTATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL TIES BETWEEN REGULAR AND PRECARIOUS WORKERS

Introduction

Several studies have analyzed how unions have historically responded to neoliberal reforms. We know less however, about how these organizations have reacted to the demands made by the increasing number of precarious workers whose very jobs emerged from these reforms. The dynamics between traditional and precarious (or atypical) workers have rarely been explored by political and labor sociologists. This article attempts to fill this gap in the literature by comparing the mining industries in Chile and Peru, both characterized by the strength of their unions throughout the twentieth century and by the substantial increase in the subcontracted labor force over the last two decades.

Mining is a key sector for the Peruvian and Chilean economies and has a higher level of unionization than the national average in both countries. Since 1990, subcontracting arrangements have been increasing, representing more than 60 percent of the sector's workforce today. These Peruvian and Chilean contract workers began to organize in 2000, although with significant differences in each country. In Peru, they organized through the Peruvian Mining Federation (FMP), an organization representing plant and contract workers that had been in existence for over forty years. Their acceptance was not a given, only becoming possible after the FMP modified its strategy from excluding contract workers to including them, albeit in a subordinate role. In Chile, the Confederation of Copper Workers (CTC), an autonomous national organization of contract mineworkers, arose in response to the persistently exclusionary character of the traditional Copper Workers' Federation (FTC).

Differences aside, tensions around the representation of precarious workers arose in both cases. There were disputes over leadership in Peru, where contract miners rejected the scant power they had within the FMP, and in Chile, where the CTC was criticized for not entertaining the competing viewpoints of various leaders. In both cases, criticism eventually led to the creation of organizations that competed to better represent contract workers.

The article explores the dynamics of precarious workers' organizations in two similar environments. Peru and Chile have similar labor laws, but there were differences in how

contract and direct workers interacted. And yet despite this divergence, similar conflicts over union leadership occurred in both countries. Previous studies have shown that traditional unions have excluded precarious workers. In this article I draw on that scholarship to asses when unions are more likely to integrate them. To do so, it is necessary to move away from perspectives that assume that unions are organizations that react automatically and predictably to the economic or political environment. Drawing on the literature on union revitalization, I argue that it is vital to understand how union leaders' ideological orientations define the way they interpret reality and outline their action plans. The study is based on more than a year of fieldwork in which I conducted interviews with leaders of the mining federations in both countries and attended over twenty union meetings at different mining sites.

The article is divided into four sections. The first provides an analytical context, and the second presents the research cases and methods. The third section traces the experiences of each country, discussing the role played by political identities. Finally, the conclusions of the study are presented.

Analytical Framework

One of the better-known effects of neoliberal reforms has been the dualization of labor markets (Kalleberg, 2011): the division between workers enjoying stable jobs, good pay and working conditions, and protection from the variability in labor demand; and "flexible" workers who occupy precarious, unstable, and poorly protected jobs (Berger & Piore, 1980). Additionally, there is a large informal sector in Latin America (Biles, 2009), although large-scale mining has historically been a regulated industry in which workers have traditionally benefited from better-than-average working conditions. In the mining industry, dualization nonetheless occurred through subcontracting (Zapata, 2002): In Chile and Peru, subcontracted workers went from representing about 15 percent of the labor force to more than 60 percent between 1990 and 2000 (Fundación Chile, 2011; Manky, 2014).

Subcontracting is a non-standard employment relationship consisting of outsourcing administrative control of the workforce to a third party (Kalleberg, 2011). In mining, subcontracting entails service providers sending their workers to a mine under employment conditions different than those of the directly employed miners. In addition to having lower wages, inferior health and safety controls, and greater labor turnover, subcontracting, previous research has shown, makes collective action and bargaining processes difficult (Barrientos, 2013), seeing as how the employment relationship between contractors and the mining company does not technically exist under labor law.

This power imbalance is especially stark in countries where there is no legislation on settling agreements beyond the firm level, as in the cases of Chile and Peru (Hernández et al., 2014).

Despite these limitations, precarious workers can, as recent studies have shown, improve their working conditions, although there is no clear blueprint for going forward (Frege & Kelly, 2004). Worker mobilization varies depending on the institutional arrangements of each industry and society. For example, Agarwala (2013) shows that Indian construction workers pressed the state through their territorial networks to improve working conditions, acting apart from the traditional trade unions that represented a minority of workers in the country. In contrast, in places where unions have been important actors, such as Europe, national organizations have proven to be valuable allies to precarious workers hoping to regain their lost power after the neoliberal reforms (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011).

As for Latin America, although national federations never had the bargaining power of their European counterparts, some of them were crucial political actors throughout the twentieth century (Collier & Collier, 2002). Mining unions are a case in point. Although they represented only a minority of the workforce, the economic relevance of the mining industry and the unions' mobilization capacity made them key players in the political life of Chile and Peru (Sulmont, 1980; Zapata, 1979). This state of affairs changed during the 1990s, when unions were affected by reforms that permitted the massive use of subcontracting and subsequently lost members and mobilization capacity (Manky, 2014).

Depending on what concessions the ruling government offered, Latin American unions reacted to liberalization reforms by either rejecting them or, more often, accepting them partially to protect their core members (Murillo, 2001). Previous studies have emphasized that, notwithstanding their position on organizing subcontracted employees, unions often opted not to do so (Palacios, 2010; Vejar, 2014). Indeed, some authors have argued that certain organizations left behind precarious workers for political and practical reasons; those that managed to protect the interests of their core members tended to coordinate with the government or private companies, who were generally opposed to contract workers' unions (Canessa, 1995; Murillo, 2001). As demonstrated in the literature on the dualization of labor markets in Europe, unions, scholars assume, accept labor flexibilization in exchange for maintaining their members' working conditions (Hassel, 2014; Palier & Thelen, 2010). Thus, labor unions would not represent precarious workers because their interests were not aligned. However, in the long term, by excluding

a growing percentage of the labor force, this approach would eventually create a crisis in the trade union movement (Castells, 1996).

This interpretation of the union responses towards subcontracted workers has been criticized by the trade union revitalization literature, which champions the strategic capacity of unions to increase their bargaining power as they see fit (Frege & Kelly, 2004). Just as employers can choose different organizational arrangements to deal with the workforce, labor can choose to include or exclude atypical workers (Elbert, 2011; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011).

Drawing on this perspective, Heery (2009) identifies three ways in which unions can react to precarious workers' demands. The first is the logic of "exclusion," under which plant workers reject the organization of contract workers, arguing that doing so would legitimize this business strategy or antagonize the government or corporate leadership. The second response is "subordination," which consists of accepting the legitimacy of the demands of contract workers but not treating them as equals within labor organizations. Finally, the "inclusion" strategy recognizes that subcontracting is a problem and tries to curb its effects by organizing precarious workers through innovative strategies that seek to increase not only the unionization rate but also the workers' participation.

There are, in turn, three often-mentioned factors influencing which strategy the unions adopt. The first concerns the economic strength of these organizations; unions with greater bargaining power do not feel compelled to organize precarious workers if they can maintain their profits (Fantasia & Voss, 2004). The Argentine oil industry is an example of unions negotiating neoliberal reforms while being strong enough to ignore precarious workers' demands (Terra, 2008). Those unions with fewer resources, however, are compelled to recruit new members to retain or regain their bargaining power. Take the service sector in the United States, where the unions' many limitations have led them to organize traditionally excluded workers (Voss & Sherman, 2000).

Although the context in which unions act is relevant, this emphasis on their economic position has recently been criticized. Scholars contend that such an approach ignores the fact that unions are organizations that not only benefit their members but also have a long, complicated history of competing for political and symbolic resources (Benassi & Dorigatti, 2015; Murillo, 2001). In other words, although the union's structural position demands that we economically contextualize their strategies, this contextualization does not explain how these organizations identify and construct their interests over time.

The second factor influencing union strategy is the system of union-government alliances (Levitsky & Mainwaring, 2006). Party ties, so it is said, define union responses to the emergence of precarious workers. This argument focuses on the political strength of the union in question. Those organizations with connections to the government would be more open to ignoring precarious workers, whereas those lacking such access seek to gain political relevance precisely by organizing such workers. A sector with a corporatist tradition, such as the Argentine communications industry, is an example of the former case (Senén González & Del Bono, 2013). This same industry in Peru exemplifies the second case, as a traditional union with little governmental access supported organizing previously excluded contract workers in order to pressure its employer on a new front (Canessa, 2013).

Unlike the purely economic perspective, this political one provides a better understanding of the conditions in which organizations in the same industry develop different strategies. However, while focusing on the political resources opens up a new dimension, this approach is insufficient to explain why organizations with corporatist ties would radicalize. For example, Murillo (2001) found that even in countries with corporatist traditions, unions opted for divergent strategies depending on the level of internal and external competition. In her analysis, unions can strategically choose to break with their allies in government, approaching precarious workers as an opportunity to gain legitimacy with a wider population and earn social capital.

Finally, the third perspective argues that although a union's economic position and its links to the government influence its strategies, these strategies are mediated by the organization's identity (Frege & Kelly, 2004; Gahan & Pekarek, 2013). From this constructivist approach, the previous explanations are valuable but incomplete, as it is necessary to complement the analysis of the union’s structural position with a consideration of its inherited character. As Bourdieu points out, position does not itself explain the strategies of individuals or collective actors, thus it is also necessary to understand their dispositions, those patterns through which they interpret reality (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992)

Following Hyman (2001), I argue that there are three such ideological orientations that guide the actions of union leadership. The "class" orientation sees trade unionism as a way of challenging the oppression of the capitalist system. It is usually linked to leftist parties and its main tools are its members’ militancy and socio-political mobilization. In the "market" orientation, on the other hand, unions have the obligation to fight for improvements in the living conditions of their members and their members only. This orientation favors formal collective bargaining and avoids links with political parties.

Finally, in the "society" orientation, unions, in coordination with state and private actors, aim to improve workers' living conditions without developing a critical discourse against the capitalist system.

Unions can of course have more than one orientation, but this typology is useful for understanding the competitive politics and internal union conflicts Murillo (2001) has called attention to. Motivated by different ideological imperatives, unions often decry one another's strategies. It is thus common to hear arguments against politicization in labor movements, or about the "selfishness" displayed by corporatist strategies (Gutiérrez Crocco, 2016; Véjar, 2012). Think, for example, of the bitter divisions within the AFL-CIO in the United States (Fantasia & Voss, 2004) or the emergence of the CTA in Argentina (Ayse Serdar, 2009). A union's ideological orientation in large part defines the politics of alliance or competition with other organizations. Consider, for example, the ideological fragmentation between unions linked to different political parties that prevailed in several Latin American countries throughout the twentieth century (Collier & Collier, 2002).

Summing up, this article is based on three premises. First, in contrast to studies that assume that unions are passive in the face of the dualization of labor markets—and that subcontracting always isolates these organizations—it argues that unions can develop different strategies. Second, these strategies can be typified by their exclusion, subordination, and inclusion of subcontracted workers and their demands. Although this typology does not exhaust the possibilities, it does provide a guide with which to understand how traditional workers' unions and precarious workers interact. Finally, this paper argues that to understand a union's strategy, it is necessary to consider its ideological orientations, which define its politics of internal and external competition. In what follows, I explore and expand these ideas based on the dynamics of the mining industry in Chile and Peru.

Cases and methods

This article compares the mining unions of two countries, Chile and Peru. This industry presents a laboratory in which to analyze the responses of traditional unions to the demands of contract workers.

Mining has one of the best-organized union traditions, although these unions faced drastic challenges during the last twenty years as subcontracting has become ubiquitous. Because the economic development of Chile and Peru relies on their respective mineral resources, the bargaining power of mineworkers in each country has increased in a similar fashion during the last decade. Both countries have flexible labor laws, which

tends to benefit companies over trade unions (Cook, 2007; Uriarte & Colotuzzo, 2009). Moreover, in contrast to Argentina or Brazil, collective bargaining occurs at the enterprise level; as a result, the national federations, rather than being active participants in the collective bargaining process, occupy a similar position as that of advisors, lobbyists, and organizers. At the political level, trade unions in both countries have operated under democratic regimes that have tolerated them but, over the last fifteen years, generally excluded them from the decision-making process (Drake et al., 2004; Manky, 2014). In short, across the two cases it possible to control variables such as industry features, economic power of unions, and national legislation.

My analysis covers the period from 1990 to 2015. I compare the trajectories of the two most important federations in each country—the FMP and FTC—and their responses to contract workers' demands. In the Chilean case, I also follow the trajectory of the CTC, which emerged in response the FTC's exclusion policy towards subcontracted workers. The FMP and FTC were among the most powerful labor organizations between the 1950s and 1970s (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979; Sulmont, 1993), and they suffered major defeats in the 1980s amid major political conflicts and economic crises (Araya, 2015; Manky, 2011). The 1990s would bring about the consolidation of a development model that favored labor flexibility; subcontracting gained acceptance, rising from 20 percent of the mining labor force in 1990 to more than 60 percent by the end of 2005 (Hernández et al., 2014; Manky, 2014).

I conducted interviews with union leaders and rank-and-file members of the three organizations between 2011 and 2014. I interviewed more than twenty national leaders and approximately fifty leaders from different firm-level unions in each country. They gave me their perspectives on the work accomplished by each federation over the last fifteen years. I also did archive work, which involved reviewing national and local newspapers to track the history of each organization. Finally, to learn about the broader context of each federation, I talked to a dozen state and corporate representatives. In examining the collected data, I considered the evolution of each organization over time while also analyzing them from a comparative standpoint.

Results

Peru: From exclusion to subordination

In April 2007, more than twenty years after its last national strike, the FMP organized a work stoppage that paralyzed fifteen mines across the country. Having recovered from the weakened state it found itself in during the 1990s, the organization had doubled its

number of associated unions and actively incorporated contract workers for the first time in its history. The strike lasted about five days and was a success, as the government increased retirement pensions and passed legislation to provide better occupational safety and health conditions. However, although they played a key role during the mobilizations, contract miners did not achieve a substantive improvement in their working conditions, and they did not obtain greater power within the FMP. In what follows, I explain the dynamics behind FMP's decision to move from excluding contracted workers to including them in a subordinated position.

Although mining unions began to organize around the 1930s, government repression prevented their consolidation until the late 1960s. Only then did they hold their first congress, at which they created a national federation (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979). Activist leaders from different leftist parties led the process, and they advocated for a syndicalism connected to national politics. This class orientation allowed the federation to overcome the heterogeneity of its members. In a nutshell, rich and powerful unions worked alongside smaller, medium-sized unions within the federation. The federation offered advice to both groups, although the latter needed more guidance. The scheme worked because the larger unions funded the federation's expenses in exchange for the smaller unions' political support during national mobilizations (Sulmont, 1980).

While politicization thus strengthened the organization, it also gave rise to tensions. In 1973, a division between the Communist Party wing and the "new left" arose. Although both had a leftist orientation, the latter were more radical and caused a schism. It was only a decade later, when mineral prices began to plummet, that mining leaders managed to reunify the organization in an attempt to weather the country's economic and political crisis. It was during this period that Saúl Cantoral was elected president of the federation. A miner from the Marcona base, he led the organization during its two most important strikes, both taking place in 1988 and orchestrated to obtain an industry-level collective bargaining agreement. Although he was not member of any political party, Cantoral had informal links with left-wing organizations, thereby maintaining the federation's class orientation. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful, because the government took a hardline stance.

Cantoral was tragically caught up in the Peruvian civil wars of the late 1980s, assassinated by a paramilitary force. Cantoral's death marked the beginning of a crisis in the FMP. The conflict had trapped leftist unions between a rock and a hard place, the "Shining Path" terrorist group and the repressive state (Canessa, 2011). Moreover, with the victory of Alberto Fujimori in 1990, radical neoliberal reforms began, including the privatization of all mines and the flexibilization of labor legislation, which resulted, among

other things, in a restriction of the right to strike and increased subcontracting. The number of unionized mineworkers declined from 70,000 in 1990 to fewer than 20,000 in 2000.

Weakened, the FMP was unable to oppose the government (Manky, 2011). In 1992, Freddy Flores was elected head of an organization in which there were no longer cadres associated with leftist parties. Most of the militant leaders had been dismissed by their employers or threatened by the government or the Shining Path. The rest, as in other sectors of the economy, had abandoned their jobs to seek opportunities as self-employed workers in different industries (Parodi, 1986). The union, in response, decided to adopt a “market” orientation, prioritizing defending unionized workers’ rights over other issues of national importance, such as the violation of human rights or the increasing precariousness of work.

Although a spate of new mining companies had begun operations in the 1990s, the federation was unable to reverse its deteriorating situation and attract new members. Moreover, it adopted an “exclusion” strategy regarding contract workers. While the FMP maintained its radical discourse and criticized subcontracting generally, no mention of subcontractors was made in its publications. As one leader told me, "We thought that first we had to improve the situation of the traditional unions and then fight subcontracting…. In this scheme, there was no possibility of incorporating contract workers, because it would have meant to give legitimacy to the system."

The federation’s inability to revise its strategy to combat the emergence of new employment arrangements led to the breakdown of the previous coordination model. The plant miners, whether at large or medium-size mines, became a privileged minority within a growing pool of contract miners deprived of their basic labor rights.

The FMP did begin to alter its market orientation, however, in 2003. The key factor was the election of a new president, Luis Castillo, a worker who had belonged to the Communist Party since he was has a twenty-year-old in the late eighties. He was the first communist leader in the federation since the 1980s and openly stated that "being a communist involved not only negotiating bread and water, but also thinking about every exploited miner. We can’t call ourselves leftist if we only asked for better wages.” Through his administration, the federation reemphasized class identity. Castillo was the first leader who promoted organizing mining contractors instead of focusing solely on ending subcontracting. For the first time, pamphlets addressed the problems these workers faced. Interestingly, this shift occurred not as a direct consequence of changing economic or political contexts but as a result of internal organizational dynamics. After

almost disappearing in the 1990s, the Communist Party had regained key positions within the national federations of the mining industry and others.

The ideological orientation of the new leadership made it more flexible in handling internal conflicts, such as the dispute at the Marcona mine. At Marcona, contract miners had organized autonomously and, after two strikes in 2003, negotiated a collective agreement with the mining company (Manky, 2017). The strike, however, included attacks against the mining company's equipment, which resulted in disputes with the direct workers' union, which feared that production and, consequently, its members' jobs, would be affected. The FMP, with financial support from the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions (ICEM), sent two representatives to Marcona to solve the conflict. One federation's representative stated that "at first, we thought it was a matter of going and supporting our members. But then we saw that the contractors were brave fighters, and we realized that others could replicate their experience and seek to compete with us." Castillo then decided to develop an organizing campaign for contract miners.

To incorporate the new workers, the federation commissioned two leaders to visit several mines across the country, organizing workers from several subcontracting companies in order to negotiate directly with the mining company. One leader described this approach as "an industry union operating at the local level." Castillo personally invited these new organizations to join the federation, demonstrating how important he felt the precarious workers were to his cause. Given how widespread subcontracting was, these efforts soon paid off: FMP membership increased from fewer than 40 unions in 2004 to 78 in mid-2007. Nearly all the new members were contract workers' unions.

While nowhere near as powerful as it had been in the 1970s, the federation was strengthened by the inclusionary process. The new unions increased the organization's income, which allowed it to move from a small, rented office and buy an entire floor in a Lima office building in 2010. Moreover, in 2007 the federation organized one of the most important strikes of the decade. This action was supported by contract workers from the mines of Casapalca, Marcona, and Uchucchacua, which, through their mobilizations, accomplished something that the direct workers' unions could not: fully stopping the mining companies' operations.

Though this 2007 strike constituted a major victory for the regular workers' unions and directly employed workers' rights, the situation did not improve substantially for contract miners. As one of them noted, despite their support of the strike, their primary demand—to secure similar rights to those of the directly employed miners—went unmet (See also

Uriarte & Colotuzzo, 2009). As one worker who participated in the strike told me: "Eventually we feel used, because we gave them our strength to stop the country's production but got nothing in exchange."

The exclusionary logic had shifted to a logic of subordination in which subcontracted workers were not granted access to organization resources. Early support for the contracted workers was more personal than institutional, as some members of the FMP assisted them with money. However, the federation did not have a clear plan to respond to their demands. Moreover, while Castillo innovated the organizing strategy by which contract workers would be included, they were not organically integrated into the federation's structure. For example, while the decision-making power of a union within the federation depended on its size, the largest such unions, which represented contract workers, were sidelined by federation leaders. Consequently, these unions had fewer opportunities to express their concerns and demands at the national level.

This subordination strategy created tensions within the federation. As I mentioned, Marcona's contract workers initially received support from the FMP. However, the local leaders I spoke to stated that the direct workers' union constantly received more help, which increased resentment and led subcontracted workers to seek resources elsewhere. "In 2004" one Marcona worker told me "we agreed to accept the support of ICEM's rival, the International Federation of Metalworkers (IFM)." (ICEM, as stated earlier, was a union that supported the FMP.) Identity played a crucial role in this switch; the IFM was a social-democratic global federation, in contrast to the ICEM, which was linked to leftist parties. IFM's aim was to weaken the FMP by creating an autonomous federation of contract miners. With its support, Marcona leaders launched an association of subcontracted workers and visited different camps to organize new unions.

The competition forced the FMP to bring contract workers into the fold. Eventually, given its more extensive network of mineworkers, the FMP was more successful than the fledgling organization promoted by the IFM. And yet the FMP continued to hold these new members at arm's length. In response to Marcona's workers' attempts to seek autonomy, for example, the federation stopped providing logistical support to them. One contract worker told me that "the federation worked as a triangle with no base, just going up and down, but it did not encourage us to create links among precarious workers and our organizations." The idea of a "baseless triangle" illustrates the federation's logic of subordination and its consequences. During my interviews with leaders of the FMP, they mentioned that it was inadvisable to give too much power to the precarious miners, given their "lack of political experience," and because "we were not sure whether they were

consistent with the federation's ideals." Therefore, the FMP did not create formal spaces where contract workers' unions could share their demands.

Beyond the Marcona experience, the FMP continued experiencing tensions over its strategy of subordinating contract workers' demands. In 2011, for example, a group of miners created a parallel federation dedicated exclusively to representing contract miners. The political and economic context did influence their decision, but once again ideological orientations were crucial.

Fidel Reginaldo, the leader of this new organization, had since 2005 held management positions at FMP, where he had led the organizing campaigns of contract workers' unions. His success, however, resulted in a growing wariness on the part of FMP's leaders, who saw Reginaldo as an upstart with no political experience. As one FMP member noted: "He did not care about politics, or about social change. He only wanted to get higher wages for contract workers." Reginaldo's apolitical streak hurt his chances of advancement. As Reginaldo explained in an interview, "seven of the ten most important positions in the federation were members of the Communist Party," but he refused to join. This perhaps explains why when contract workers nominated Reginaldo for a powerful position in the FMP in 2009, the organization's leaders not only opposed him but reduced their support of those unions backing him. He subsequently left the organization, and three years later those same unions asked him to launch an autonomous federation for contract workers only. By mid-2016, this organization, under Reginaldo's leadership, had brought together twelve of the thirty contract workers' unions in Peru.

Summing up, FMP shifted from an exclusionary stance towards contract workers to a policy of subordination. Not solely a response to economic or political changes, this policy reflected a transformation in the organization' ideological orientation as new leaders linked to the Communist Party arrived and brought with them a "class" perspective. However, tensions arose, as contract workers complained that their demands were lost amid the broader struggles waged by the FMP.

Chile: Inclusion as a response to exclusion

As in Peru, a national organization, the Copper Workers Confederation (CTC), represented Chilean mineworkers throughout most of the twentieth century. However, in contrast to the Peruvian case, only large companies' unions were part of the CTC. Traditionally, the organization's leaders came from mining sites managed by multinational corporations. However, after Salvador Allende's government nationalized these sites in the 1970s, the CTC's leaders came from Codelco, the state-owned copper

company. The organization advised company-level unions and advanced its agenda, when necessary, through national demonstrations. Embracing leftist rhetoric, the CTC emphasized class differences and the continuous exploitation of workers. As with the Peruvian case, political parties had great influence over the CTC and fought to get their members placed in the organization's highest positions.

This political model encountered a crisis in 1973, as Pinochet's dictatorship not only assassinated key militants from the Communist and Socialist parties, but also made these organizations and labor unions illegal. Although firm-level unions were legalized again in the late-1970s, national organizations such as the CTC were still outlawed. Additionally, an economic crisis in the early 1980s compounded the political one and affected mineworkers' bargaining power. As for political parties, although they were illegal, leftist coalitions maintained informal networks with mining unions, which helped them to carry out "underground" actions and organize a growing group of contract workers in mines like El Teniente.[11]

After the dictatorship, the *Concertación* coalition eventually came to power in the nineties. It approached the most important unions and federations in a conciliatory effort to reach agreements that would hopefully sustain the democratic system (Carnes, 2014). For the government, it was crucial to avoid the radical class orientation that had guided the actions of large unions in the past to prevent any attempt by the military to reassume control in the interest of maintaining order.

In the case of the mining industry, obtaining the support of historical leaders who militated in the Socialist Party—which was part of the Concertación—was crucial. Specifically, the government offered the CTC two seats on Codelco's board. By integrating workers into the company's management, the CTC shifted away from its antagonistic class orientation and agreed to collaborate with management on a plan to revise the company's labor policies. In 1992 the CTC, now representing fewer than twenty unions, changed its name to "Federation of Copper Workers" (FTC).

Therefore, unlike the Peruvian case, the Chilean federation had unfettered access to the government and, given its role within Codelco's management structure, enjoyed an improved economic situation during the nineties. Moreover, as international investors flocked to Chile before they turned to Peru, the former's mining sector was bigger and was gaining more subcontracted workers, so its federation potentially had more room to grow. Yet just like in Peru, the federation adopted a market-orientated approach,

[11] I have discussed this my second paper.

concentrating on its core constituency, the directly employed workers, rather than reaching out to growing number of contract workers.

Throughout the 1990s, the FTC's market orientation focused on the benefits of its members, ignoring the negative impact of Codelco's policies on contract workers. As its Peruvian counterpart had done, the FTC closed in on itself. The organization was also affected by outsourcing, but its ability to negotiate beneficial agreements for the directly employed miners, coupled with the post-dictatorship ideological change that granted the FTC political power, made it possible to ignore other demands (Agacino et al., 1998; Duran-Palma, 2011). As a result, there were no efforts made to organize precarious workers in Codelco.

Given the FTC's exclusionary strategy, the contract miners organized autonomously. In contrast to Peru, where these organizing efforts were undertaken by leaders with no political linkages, Chilean miners had the support of the Communist Party. The CP, which was a minority in the FTC (where the Socialist Party was more influential), had organized SITECO, the first contract mineworkers' union in the late eighties (Duran-Palma, 2011). While it had been unsuccessful in negotiating collective bargaining agreements, the union continued organizing workers in one of Codelco's main mines, El Teniente, throughout the nineties (Agacino et al., 1998).

In 2004, the organizing work paid off, as new contract workers' unions were formed in El Teniente and Andina, two Codelco mines (Nuñez, 2009). Contract workers had been criticizing the work of the FTC at these sites for over a decade, as they were unable to find economic or political support in this organization. With the help of the Communist Party militants, however, they launched a national organization in 2006 (Fernandez & Benerra, 2012), establishing links between local federations sustained by the common ideological orientation of their leaders. As one worker summarized: "It was in the party meetings where we learned about folks in other mines, because there was no other way to meet them. We could not afford expensive trips, and the traditional federation was not there for us." Identity dynamics (what my interviewees called a "class solidarity") was crucial. Notably, although the FTC did not support contract workers' demands, directly employed workers' unions such as the "Number 8" of El Teniente, where a communist identity prevailed, provided contract workers a meeting hall and some funds to support their demonstrations.

Chilean contract miners had thus launched an organization with an inclusive orientation (Vejar, 2014). The organization's first strikes occurred in 2005. In contrast to the "baseless triangle" of the Peruvian FMP, its structure encouraged participation from

miners from different parts of Chile. In 2007, it formally named itself the "new" CTC, an explicit rebuke of the FTC’s shift away from leftist politics. (The FTC’s original name, we recall, was the CTC.) As one of its early leaders explained, "The name was not casual, we wanted to prove that we were the legitimate heirs of the radical struggles of the Chilean miner." Most leaders in the new CTC were communist and constantly pushed the organization towards a “class” orientation.

The same year it was established, the CTC earned one of its most important victories, a national “Framework Agreement” that improved the working conditions of all Codelco’s contract miners (Flores, 2014). In the process, miners had used contentious tactics, such as blocking roads and burning the buses that carried workers inside the mine. While successful in halting the company’s production, these actions also led to a greater estrangement between the FTC and the CTC. As a leader of the former argued, "For me, the new organization was violent, radical and it harmed the nation’s production." Contract workers, on the other hand, regarded the directly employed workers as "a labor aristocracy that did not care for the problems of everyone and that only wanted to get better salaries, and not a real change for everyone" (See also Echeverría, 2010).

In contrast to the FTC, the CTC intended to bring together not only Codelco workers but also contractors from the private mining industry. These efforts resulted in a new “Framework Agreements” with Codelco as well as agreement with Anglo American, a multinational company that operates four mines in Chile. Since 2011, workers responsible for cleaning and running the dining hall of one such camp, employed by Sodexo, had been trying to organize a federation, inspired by the CTC’s work. The repressive Anglo American firm had consistently resisted, but in 2013, with the support of the CTC and its inclusive philosophy, a new contract workers’ federation was launched.

Despite such efforts to foster an inclusive perspective, the CTC, as with the Peruvian FMP, was not immune from discontent and splintering. In 2007, several member unions in the CTC left because they considered it to be a "highly politicized" organization. As one former CTC leader explained of his decision to leave: "We were not radical, and we were excluded because we fought for the workers and not for the revolution. We decided to create our own organization, just for workers, no parties."

The disputes predominantly arose from the CTC’s class orientation: its leaders embraced a broader message while its member organizations focused solely on the specific needs of their workers. The new organizations of contract workers were quick to sign agreements with Codelco, sometimes even before the CTC could negotiate ones that

included more benefits and benefitted more workers. For the CTC's leaders, the signing of other agreements "caused further radicalization, because it was a betrayal to the whole movement. They did not see the broader picture, the need of challenging the government to show the power of the working class" (See also Donoso, 2013).

On the one hand, instead of betting on the depoliticization of the federation's discourse, the Communists forcefully criticized the Chilean economic system and devised a strategy based on developing broad alliances with popular movements and other organizations. For example, in 2013 it organized a national strike along with port workers and college students to force the government to fund public education by nationalizing the copper industry. On the other hand, the other contract miners' organizations adopted a market orientation, focusing solely on the demands of their members in, say, El Teniente, and eschewing broader alliances.

In 2008, a new schism arose, although this one was not based on critiques from "non-politicized" union leaders but rather from workers who felt that the organization had betrayed its principles and veered too far from its class orientation. After Codelco management ignored several points agreed upon in the "Framework Agreement," leaders in El Teniente (members of the SITECO union) demanded new national demonstrations from the CTC (Flores, 2014). However, the national leadership negotiated an institutional settlement, which meant abandoning street protests. For SITECO, this was a betrayal, and thus its leader, Jorge Peña, resigned from the Communist Party and removed his organization from the CTC. He accused his former party of having "in cahoots with the Coalición to achieve positions as senators in exchange for ceasing to fight for a new society."

At the national level, other union leaders criticized the Communist Party when in 2009 it joined the 'Nueva Mayoría'—a center-left alliance of traditional parties—to secure a place in the Chilean Parliament. "In 2012 I broke with the Party where I fought for almost 15 years," one of the CTC's founders stated, "because it was getting very close to the government. I wanted to continue with the union work, but a few weeks later the CTC's entire communist leadership came after me." Other leftist leaders similarly felt that the Communist Party abandoned the CTC's class orientation in order to procure institutional power. Things reached a boiling point during the 2015 "Framework Agreement" negotiations, when a protesting worker was killed by the police at the "El Salvador" mine. Challengers of the organization's communist leadership noted that "after this murder, the president of the CTC, a member of a party that is part of the current government, did not make a call for more mobilizations and a radical response to the police and to Codelco's administration."

A new organization created in 2016, the “Frente Nelson Quichillao”—named to honor the dead worker at “El Salvador”—was meant to steer the CTC back to its more radical class orientation. In addition to having the support of Siteco and other leftist groups not aligned with the Communists, it also won the backing of the federation of Anglo American’s contract workers. As one of its leaders explained the motivation behind forming the organization: "For us, the CTC had settled a terrible agreement with the government, and although that gave us some access to power, it also meant leaving behind our class tradition.” The quote exemplifies the importance of ideological orientations in defining union strategies, revealing how they contextualize ruptures that cannot necessarily be explained by economics alone.

Summing up, unlike the Peruvian case, the Chilean national federation, the FTC, did not change its exclusionary approach towards contract workers, in part because it was more market-oriented than class-oriented. Its main leaders throughout the 1990s, members of the Socialist Party, moderated their discourse and developed a market orientation. The Chilean Communist Party, however, eventually organized an autonomous federation with a more inclusive, class-conscious character. As in Peru, the new organization also faced leadership disputes that further splintered the organizations. One group left because it felt the organization had become over-politicized, while others promoted a more radical class unionism that criticized institutional compromises. In both cases, ideological orientations more than the economic or political contexts shaped the nature of internal union conflicts.

Conclusion

This article compared the strategies adopted by Peruvian and Chilean national federations to combat increased outsourcing in the mining industry. In Peru, the organization initially adopted an exclusionary approach, then shifted towards one in which the demands of contract workers were subordinated. In Chile, the federation’s continuing exclusion generated an autonomous response supported by the Communist Party that eventually resulted in a new national organization. Despite the differences in these strategies, similar tensions emerged over the representation of miners, in both cases resulting in the formation of parallel organizations.

The political and economic contexts do not fully explain the evolution of these federations. This is especially clear in the case of the FMP, which changed to a more inclusionary strategy during a period in which it was gaining, not losing, bargaining power (Manky, 2014). The FTC, on the other hand, has persevered in excluding contract

workers even though its ties to the government were weakened during the Piñera government in 2010 (Singh, 2012b).

To understand these developments, it is crucial to analyze the unions' ideological orientations. Specifically, I found that federations with a more pronounced class orientation were more open to incorporating contract workers. In Peru, it was only when a new cadre of leaders came to power in 2003 that the FMP opted for a more active work with contract workers; the country's democratization and economic growth were less influential. Similarly, in Chile, Communist Party militants pushed for the autonomous organization of contract workers after the FTC refused to organize precarious miners.

Considering unions' ideological orientations also provides insights into the tensions that emerge from organizing precarious workers. In Peru, the federation was unable to integrate contract workers' claims effectively. The class orientation of its leaders made it difficult for alternative voices to be heard. The experience in Marcona is a case in point. When contract miners failed to win leadership positions in the FMP (in part because they did not have any political experience), they responded by accusing the Communists of over-politicizing the organization. Similarly, Chilean Communist leaders, who had managed to organize hundreds of workers between 2000 and 2008, faced serious problems when the Party shifted toward a more moderate position.

This article makes three contributions to the field. First, it is one of the first analyses of traditional workers' responses to precarious workers' organizations. Despite the widespread use of subcontracting in Latin America, few studies have gone beyond analyzing the relations between unions and traditional actors like the state and employers. In contrast, I emphasized the need to explore the ties between different working class groups. Instead of prescribing the necessity for these groups to join together—a common practice in most activists' groups—I argued that it's critical to analyze the potential base for successful networking. It is worth noting, however, that subcontracting is only one type of precarity; future studies should examine other forms such as independent, informal, or part-time employment.

Second, drawing on previous studies, I showed the importance of going beyond approaches that see unions as passive victims in the face of labor market flexibilization. Moreover, I argued that to understand unions' strategic capacities, studying the economic and political context is insufficient; we must also identify their ideological orientations, which define their internal and external political actions. Drawing on this framework, future research could be more systematic, analyzing the evolution of different

ideological orientations and their impact on union revitalization in Latin America (Anner, 2003).

Finally, at the methodological level I demonstrated the usefulness of viewing trade unions' orientations from a comparative perspective. Although some studies in Argentina (Senén González & Del Bono, 2013) and Chile (Gutiérrez Crocco, 2016) have detailed the emergence of a powerful market orientation, few scholars have compared its evolution across the region. The comparison between Chile and Peru shows that, despite the different paths each country has taken, there are striking similarities in terms of the tensions between class and market orientations. Future research could use similarly matched case studies to examine these dynamics in other sectors where the dualization of labor markets has become common too, as in education and manufacturing.

CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSIONS

Over the last decade, the debates about labor unions have ceased to focus on whether or not these would vanish, to move on to the conditions under which they could regain their bargaining power. This study was framed in this context, and sought to analyze the conditions under which precarious workers can mobilize to obtain improvements in their living conditions. To do this, I focused on mining, one of the industries where Latin American workers faced major changes. From their precarious organizations at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the stabilization of their unions in the 1970s, mining workers were always key players in the economic development and political life of countries like Chile and Peru.

Under what conditions can these continue in their struggle in a context of organizational and spatial changes? In what follows I revisit my argument, proposing some of their main conclusions. First, I discuss the argument's boundaries regarding the mining industry in Chile and Peru: To what extent are these results generalizable? Can they illuminate trade union dynamics beyond the specific cases I have studied? Afterwards, I focus on the analytical contributions of this study. I explain how my results help to better understand the dynamics of the mining industry, labor studies, and labor politics in Latin America.

Beyond the case-studies

As I pointed out in the first chapter, the unions I studied do not represent the totality of existing labor organizations in Chile and Peru. I selected these cases after visiting several mining sites, based on my interest in exploring the two main variables of this study (the links that unions had with local communities and political parties). However, the mechanisms explored in this research may illuminate what happens in other mines too.

How does the dynamics of workers' social reproduction affect labor strategies? It is possible to think of a typology based on three mechanisms. First, the mining town, where workers and their families build a strong local community that often contests the company's attempts to manage the daily activities inside and outside the workplace. This is the "classic" model studied by Klubock (1998) and Finn (1998), which has not disappeared completely, as it persists in cities such as Marcona, Peru (Manky, 2013) and Rancagua, Chile (Chapter 3). Similarly, in mining sites such as Uchucchacua and Casapalca, in Peru, and El Salvador in Chile, solidarity provides several resources for labor's local mobilizations. It is not surprising that some of the strongest contract mineworkers' unions in Peru and Chile have been developed in these sites.

The development of LDC arrangements replaced this model with the "hotel" logic. Under this system, workers come from distant places, and the bonds of local solidarity with their families and local communities are broken. Despite this, miners have managed to withstand through unions that have gone beyond the local scale. In addition to the workers' organizations in Los Bronces studied in this thesis, it is possible to mention those of Collahuasi (Leiva & Campos, 2013) in Chile, as well as the directly employed workers' unions in Toquepala and Antamina (Manky, 2016). Finally, a third case, more common in Peru than in Chile given these countries' demographic and geographical differences, occurs when resistance from the local population forces companies to hire local labor, even though the company does not assume responsibility for managing a mining town. The centrality remains, then, in the local environment, although with dynamics that differ from those of the mining town: Local communities become more powerful than labor unions, especially in places with strong peasant traditions. In addition to the case of the contract workers at Antamina, those in Barrick (Himley, 2013) and several mines in the central highlands (Helfgott, 2013) seem to have experienced similar dynamics.

Although future studies should corroborate the explanatory power of this typology, secondary information and my fieldwork experience makes me think that it allows to explain how the

relationship between mining, unions and local communities help explaining the dynamics of labor conflicts.

Regarding my second variable (the links between political organizations and trade union organizations at local and national level) it is harder to find variation within the national level, given the widespread crisis of the party system in Peru. However, it is clear that in Chile those unions farthest from the centers where the Communist Party was traditionally stronger, such as Chuquicamata and, further north, Escondida, have been those where it has been most difficult to create solid trade union organizations. In the Peruvian case, the PC has been more limited at the local level, although it has a presence in the leadership of some unions in the central Andes. (Remarkably, those have been the most supportive unions for the contract workers). Considering this variable would allow one to analyze the local history of different settlements in their relations with different political organizations. The approach is not new in the case of Latin American mining (Bergquist, 1986; Nash, 1993), but if it was used from a labor relations perspective, it helps comparing what kind of ideological, cultural and material resources workers obtain in different mining camps.

Mining Studies

My study shows that there is no such a thing as a single pattern of conflicts in the mining industry, but a broad set of potential demands that are shaped by different institutional mechanisms at both the national and the local levels. In this sense, my work allows to re-visit current discussions on the mining industry, proposing that it is necessary to map the concrete contexts in which labor conflicts are articulated to, hidden by, or highlight those related to environmental or local development issues.

While previous studies emphasized that environmental grievances have replaced labor ones, I found that this has not happened in Chile, and it only occurred to a certain extent in Peru. This departs from previous views on the extractive industries. Take, for example, the work of Paredes

(2016, p. 1047), who notes that mining conflicts have “glocalized”, as they resemble “an archipelago of dynamic conflicts without the prospect of convergence. Each island in the archipelago is connected individually to transnational actors, mining enterprises, the central state, and transnational activism networks but each is also greatly disconnected from one another.” Drawing on previous studies (Bebbington, 2011; Kirsch, 2014), this author argues that this would be the effect of changes in the industry and in the dynamics of transnational activism networks, which would discourage the formation of national platforms with broader demands.

However, while these elements are certainly relevant, it is worth noting that they hardly explain the divergence between the way social movements frame labor conflicts in Chile and Peru, and the scale of the articulations they build. Institutional differences at multiple level are an important element that mining studies have often overlooked.

Beyond these countries, it is possible to use a framework that integrates the analysis of labor, local development and environmental demands. On the one hand, there are studies on how LDC arrangements have negatively affected trade unions’ power in countries such as Australia (Ellem, 2015) or Canada (Gibson & Klinck, 2005) (where the system started). My findings in Peru and Chile, however, show that it is possible for workers to coordinate their actions on new scales to maintain their bargaining. This indicates that there is some degree of path-dependency, and that some labor unions can find new ways of reproducing their militant traditions even under the current conditions, as it has happened in Chile.

On the other hand, my research in Latin America might be useful to illuminate some of the tensions that emerge when the local communities become as powerful as labor unions. It would be interesting to compare the situation described in Peru with that of other sites, with different national institutions. For example, recent studies have also reported on the efforts of African miners to develop a community-unionism type of strategy. As in Peru, local communities there

are usually strong, given their shared history with and against colonialism (Alexander, 2013; Fraser & Larmer, 2011; Rajak, 2016).

Labor Studies

This research focused on a key resource for labor organizations, their ability to integrate networks of different civil society actors to promote their own agenda (Lévesque & Murray, 2010), which is based on the ability of unions Several concepts have been used to emphasize this resource, such as "community unionism", "social movement unionism" and "coalition-building unionism". In general, these concepts suggest "that unions embedded in thick networks with strong ties can potentially leverage greater power" (Lévesque & Murray, 2010, p. 339).

My research, however, shows that it is key to analyze the context under which such coalitions emerge, as ties with different groups are not always the most appropriate form of pursuing labor's goals. The cases of Peru and Chile are notable because they do not follow the most effective model as prescribed by the union revitalization literature. In neither of these cases does an alliance between unions and local communities occur: In Antamina, the community replaced labor unions, and in Los Bronces the union largely ignored the surrounding community's demands. Future studies could engage with this perspective to analyze the impacts of social reproduction in different aspects of union revitalization.

While the results of my research on the ties between unions and local communities are counterintuitive, the findings on the links between unions and political parties are no less remarkable. Previous studies about the resources used by precarious workers have highlighted the relevance of global unions (Anner, 2011; Murillo & Schrank, 2005) and international civil society organizations (Anner & Evans, 2004; Von Bülow, 2009) in providing such resources. My research on Chile shows the crucial role played by a political party in providing resources to contract mineworkers. Although this is not new, my comparative study discussed the tensions

that emerge from the links between political actors and labor unions in a context of a changing political culture.

These results may be useful in analyzing the challenges facing union revitalization processes in Latin America. They dialogue, for example, Gutierrez Crocco's (2016) research about how different trade union identities in Chile have made it possible to build organizations that, despite their limitations, are unable to unite. Also, my findings on the relevance of local linkages can go beyond mining to problematize the relationship between informality and trade unionism in other contexts. Consider, for example, what happened to the "piquetero" organizations in Argentina over the last decade (Iglesias, 2015; Svampa & Pereyra, 2009), or the complex tensions between Bolivian trade unions and indigenous organizations (Haarstad, 2010; Spronk & Webber, 2007).

Latin American Studies

Finally, this study makes two contributions to Latin American studies. First, it goes back to a classic theme in the region's labor studies: how do strategic export industries create the conditions for proletarianization processes? This is clear in the Peruvian case, where, in contrast to the processes of proletarianization of the early twentieth century, when mining companies used different mechanisms to force peasants to become miners, today there are the peasants who organize to force mining companies to hire them. The Andean region has passed, as Helffgot (2013) points out, from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. Under these circumstances, local communities use different strategies to claim their inclusion in labor markets, and become crucial actors in their regulation.

From this standpoint, it is possible to analyze the situation of workers in other industries linked to the exploitation of nature, where local communities' livelihoods are affected. For example, a growing number of investigations have taken an interest in large-scale agro-exports, which usually leave landless peasants (Baletti, 2016; Selwyn, 2012). Although this research has been usually developed by geographers, labor studies would have much to say about them, given their rich

tradition in studies on agricultural work, social reproduction, and work organization (Burawoy, 1976; Ganz, 2000). Similarly, the increasing exploitation of forests and oil in the South American Amazon deserves more attention, offering a fruitful comparison with the mining industry.

Secondly, my research findings stress the need for theorizing precarious workers' politics, as this relationship does not seem to follow the same pattern as that of traditional workers (Agarwala, 2013). In Chile, as other Latin American countries, parties and unions were tied through relations of exchange of favors for votes (Collier & Collier, 2002). Despite the widespread use of subcontracting in Latin America, few studies have gone beyond analyzing the relations between unions and traditional actors like the state (often at the national rather than at the local level) and employers. In contrast, I have emphasized the need to explore the ties between different working class groups, and between them and political actors.

It would be important to analyze what happened with the relationship between political parties and trade unions outside of those cases in which the former was part of the government. For example, this is the case of the Argentine CTA and the "piqueteros" organizations, which, although formally independent from political parties, had a leftist orientation with strong ties to political activists (Massetti, 2004).

In summary, through the studies presented above, I argued that the idea of the "vanishing" of labor problems in the mining industry ignores important elements. On the one hand, Chilean workers have been able to organize themselves at a national level, presenting their demands in a novel way. On the other hand, the Peruvian workers, although without unions, presented labor demands in combination with other demands. From the analysis of the different strategies of workers at home society, I showed that it is necessary to analyze how it is that precarious workers can increase their bargaining power.

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