

the United States lead the charge for regional cohesion and thereby secure and sustain its leverage? Or will it resist the inevitable and continue to proliferate means for continued North Korean nuclear weapons development while also risking its place at the Asian table in the future?

CONCLUSION

North Korea remains the last vestige of the Cold War era of nuclear power balancing, which has shown itself to be unsustainable and detrimental to international peace and cooperation. The policies of isolation and containment have been tried by past administrations but have ultimately failed to deter further proliferation of weapons in North Korea due to their failure to ensure multilateral action and recognize North Korea's security dilemma. A foreign policy approach of integrative engagement, however, extends conditional diplomatic and economic benefits over immediate denuclearization. Engagement serves as a method of gradually integrating North Korea into the international economy and institutional norms that advances transparency, creates leverage to shape North Korean behavior, and eventually end the balance of terror on the Korean peninsula. But this denuclearization hinges upon the United States' willingness to lead the creation of a cohesive regional force in Asia, which would inevitably challenge its influence and power in the region in the short-run.

AN UNCERTAIN BELONGING

PERMANENT RESIDENCY ID CARDS AND EAST
JERUSALEM'S IDENTITY CRISIS

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INTRODUCTION

Rimaz Kasabreh is Palestinian. Because of her Israeli-issued green identification card, she is considered a legal resident of the West Bank but an illegal immigration within nearby East Jerusalem – the historically Palestinian-controlled half of Jerusalem until its annexation from Jordan following the Six Day War in 1967. During the war, Israel preemptively attacked its Arab neighbors and captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the West Bank (which encompassed East Jerusalem at the time) from Jordan. Although Israel withdrew from the occupied territories following United Nations Resolution 242, it explicitly annexed East Jerusalem into a united capital city. It is in this half of Jerusalem – which had been under Palestinian leadership – where Kasabreh has lived with her family since 1996.

Kasabreh currently lives in East Jerusalem with her three children and husband, all of whom are considered permanent residents and hold special blue identification cards that entitle them to most benefits offered by the Israeli government. Years ago, Kasabreh applied for the same card under Israel's family unification program, but, permanent residency has become almost impossible to obtain through unification claims, especially since the enactment of a restrictive 2003 law, and she has yet to hear back from the authorities. According to a family

lawyer, the Ministry of Interior has stopped processing applications altogether. For now, she remains with her family in East Jerusalem by applying for yearly temporary residency permits – which take months to obtain – and living a highly immobile lifestyle. Because of her liminal and uncertain status, she does not have access to the same Israeli government benefits as East Jerusalem ID holders, including adequate health care, and she cannot apply for a job to help support her family. As a result, she spends most of her time in her family's home, unable to fully integrate into Palestinian society in East Jerusalem.¹

Kasabreh's story is not unique – in fact, she claims that many of her friends are in similar situations, victims of a bureaucratic approach to Palestinian residency rights in East Jerusalem. Even obtaining a permanent residency card does not guarantee the right to live indefinitely in the city. The Israeli government has retracted over 14,000 residencies since 2011 – most from Palestinians who travelled abroad for some period of time.² These restrictions on mobility, however, do not apply to the city's Jewish population.

Prior to the Six Day War, Jerusalem was divided into halves: West Jerusalem, under Israeli control, and East Jerusalem, which was brought under de facto Jordanian control following the 1948 war establishing the state of Israel.³ This divide was formalized in 1949 with the drawing of the 'Green Line' – an armistice line – through

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Jerusalem.⁴ Despite the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the other occupied territories of the Six Day War, Israel moved to informally annex East Jerusalem into a united city. Although the international community has still not recognized the move, East Jerusalem today exists under Israeli municipal jurisdiction and control. A 1980 law passed by the Israeli Parliament declared Jerusalem “the complete and united capital of Israel.”⁵ Currently, an estimated 270,000 Palestinians call East Jerusalem home, although the numbers fluctuate slightly from source to source.⁶ A 2011 report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) included the following from a 1997 publication by the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, B’Tselem:

Permanent residency is the same status granted to foreign citizens who have freely chosen to come to Israel and want to live in the country. Because Israel treats Palestinians like immigrants, they, too, live in their homes at the beneficence of the authorities, and not by right. The authorities maintain this policy although these Palestinians were born in Jerusalem, lived in the city, and have no other home...Viewing East Jerusalem residents as foreigners who entered Israel is perplexing since it was Israel that entered East Jerusalem in 1967.⁷

As the B’Tselem report indicates,

Palestinians in East Jerusalem remain disenfranchised at a legal level by government policies and budget discrimination, despite the permanent residency status most of them hold. Many choose not to accept permanent citizenship to another country such as Jordan, because attaining such citizenship would result in the automatic revocation of their identification cards.⁸ Furthermore, the official policy of identity control in East Jerusalem has serious impacts on the Palestinian psyche, resulting in internal community divisions and psychological hardship. The “nationality” section of the East Jerusalem permanent residency card is left blank – a constant reminder that the cardholder does not belong to a single state, nation, or collective identity.⁹ It is important to note the terminology here: as the United States Institute of Peace defines “nation” and “state,” it is possible to belong to a nation – “a group of people who feel bound by a common language, culture, religion, history, or ethnicity” – without existing in the physical space of a state. The Israeli-issued permanent residency cards, however, do not make this distinction.¹⁰

To understand how the identification cards play such a large role in regulating Palestinian mobility and access to services in East Jerusalem – despite the fact that these Palestinians pay taxes, can technically own property (although the Israeli policies towards housing in East Jerusalem are highly contentious), and supposedly receive full Israeli

taxpayer benefits – it is necessary to understand the role of the barrier wall constructed in 2002.¹¹ The barrier was purportedly erected under security premises by the Israeli Defense Forces in response to the Second Intifada. Effectively physically isolating East Jerusalem, the barrier went far beyond the borders of the 1949 “Green Line” partition between East and West Jerusalem.¹² According to UNOCHA, 142 kilometers of the barrier run through East Jerusalem, with only four kilometers along the Green Line. At its widest point, the barrier extends 14 kilometers into the West Bank.¹³ The barrier allows the Israeli government to regulate Palestinian mobility and spatial relations in ways that had never before been possible, and the ID cards play a large part in determining who can and cannot pass through the barrier wall at its various checkpoints. As Wendy Pullan pointed out an editorial for *Jerusalem Quarterly*, “Far from being neutral, space itself has become [sic] part of the process of political identification and control, and this is now characterizing the city in particular ways to become not just a setting but a perpetrator of further forms of conflict.”¹⁴

This paper aims to explore the history and consequences of East Jerusalem’s identity crisis, as well as discuss its potential ramifications looking forward. Combined with recent security measures, namely the construction of the barrier wall, as well as the introduction of more restrictive legislation

including the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (2003), the status of Palestinians in East Jerusalem has been in decline since the 1967 annexation of the city.¹⁵ In light of this, it is necessary to not only consider the status of East Jerusalem’s Palestinian population and how their ID cards (or lack thereof) impact their own perceptions of Palestinian identity, but also how their plight fits into the realm of international law and humanitarian concerns. This paper seeks to examine the development of Israeli policies of identity control over time, the formal and informal impact of the identification cards, and the moral implications of these policies.

The body of this paper has been divided into four major sections: the first examines the development of collective Palestinian identity prior to 1948, the second expands on the historical context of the identification card policy, the third addresses the logistics of the policy and its effect on spatial relationships in East Jerusalem, and the fourth is concerned with the more theoretical implications of identity versus identification in the shaping of Palestinian identity today. It should also be noted that because the barrier wall in East Jerusalem and ID card policies are so inter-related, this paper will discuss both in detail. Finally, the paper concludes that the Israeli policies of identity control used in East Jerusalem constitute unfair treatment of the region’s Palestinian permanent residents, with negative impacts on both Palestinian agency and Israeli objectives in the

TODAY, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY IS NOT A SINGULAR, STRAIGHTFORWARD NATIONALISM: IT HAS BEEN SHAPED BY ARAB, ISRAELI, AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES THROUGH THE YEARS FOLLOWING 1948

city.

ROOTS OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

According to Rashid Khalidi, author of *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National Consciousness*, it is often incorrectly argued that “one of the most common tropes in treatments of issues related to Palestine is the idea that Palestinian identity, and with it Palestinian nationalism, are ephemeral and of recent origin.”¹⁶ This idea is supported by scholars like Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, who, in their book *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, slip into the error of attributing the birth of a cohesive Palestinian identity to the Zionist movement.¹⁷ Khalidi posits that it is incorrect to say that Palestinians can only conceive of their own identity in response to Zionism.¹⁸ In late Ottoman Palestine, at the turn of the twentieth century, Jerusalem became a “touchstone of identity” for many Palestinians – a place that all Palestinians identified with, especially on a religious level.¹⁹ During the last few decades of Ottoman rule, the use of the word “Palestine” increased greatly in the press, indicating a shift towards a more nationalistic culture within geographic Palestine.²⁰ In 1921, *Filastin*, one of the most popular papers of the time, explicitly referred to Palestine as a nation state.²¹ A geography textbook commonly used in Palestinian schools, *Jughrafiyyat Suriyya wa Filastin al-Tabi’iyya*, singled out Palestine

as “a separate entity, a unit whose geography required separate treatment.”²² As Khalidi writes, “Clearly, no one who disputes the widespread existence of a Palestinian national consciousness during the Mandate period, can have examined the press or the country’s educational system during this early phase in even a cursory manner.”²³

It is important to recognize the beginnings of a national Palestinian identity prior to the 1948 war, during which Zionist forces gained control of present-day Israel, because of the subsequent impact on how Palestinians view their own sense of belonging to both Jerusalem and the physical space of former Palestine. Today, Palestinian identity is not a singular, straightforward nationalism: it has been shaped by Arab, Israeli, and international forces through the years following 1948, and especially after 1967. It has been created by overlapping issues and different conceptions of identity, all of which will be a common thread throughout this paper. Political and ideological divisions have also been common threads in the Palestinian narrative, making it difficult for a single organized Palestinian movement to take root. Furthermore, to an extent, Palestinian identity has been influenced by more recent spatial fracturing and isolation within the Palestinian community – a situation that has been, largely created by the barrier wall and the East Jerusalem ID card policy.

First, however, it is necessary to

A HUMAN RIGHTS WORKER AT A CLINIC IN BRUQIN, A VILLAGE IN THE WEST BANK, HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IS A FREQUENT CRITICISM OF IDENTITY CONTROL



understand the historical framework in which Israeli identification card policies were born, as well as the logistical impact they have had on Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. To accomplish this, the next section of the paper will explore the background behind the East Jerusalem identification cards, with special attention to how they led to discrimination and unrest within Palestinian communities after 1967.

ANNEXATION AND ISOLATION: EAST JERUSALEM AFTER 1967

Under the UN Partition Plan of 1947, Jerusalem was slated to become an internationally governed area of Palestine.²⁴ However, the Palestinians rejected this proposal, and after the 1948 Israeli War for Independence (known as the Catastrophe, or al-Nakba, throughout the Arab world), the division of Jerusalem was formalized under a 1949 UN Armistice Agreement: a “Green Line” would divide the city into two halves, one Israeli and the other Jordanian-controlled (which is now present-day East Jerusalem).²⁵ Although the Israeli government explicitly did not annex East Jerusalem during this time.²⁶ After the 1967 war, the Jordanian half of the city was declared part of an Israeli-controlled, unified Jerusalem.²⁷

Immediately after occupying East Jerusalem, the Israeli government conducted a census of the area’s population, finding

68,000 Palestinians living there at the time.²⁸ The census was done quickly and without due diligence, but identification cards, indicating permanent residency status for East Jerusalem’s Arab population, were issued on June 26, 1967, two weeks after the conclusion of the war.²⁹ Very few of these Arabs, who had previously held Jordanian citizenship, chose to undergo a universal naturalization process to pursue Israeli citizenship (and, through this, recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel).³⁰ Instead, they chose permanent residency in their own city – a place where many of them had lived for generations, and a city to which many had both personal and familial ties.

Ten days after the 1967 war, East Jerusalem was brought under Israeli municipal control. Israelis, eager to visit Jerusalem’s Old City (which had previously fallen under Jordanian jurisdiction), moved into East Jerusalem by the thousands, and the walls and barbed wire separating the two halves of Jerusalem were deconstructed.³¹ During this time, Israel’s Jewish population was overjoyed to have access to some of their most important religious sites again, and tourism rates in the area skyrocketed.³² For a brief while, it seemed that coexistence and integration between the two halves of Jerusalem was very possible. The Israeli government, however, had different plans for unifying the city. In *Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem*, the authors – two former

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Israeli government advisers on Arab affairs and one senior reporter for The Jerusalem Post – posited that there were two major goals for East Jerusalem during this time: increase the Jewish population, and hinder the growth of the Arab population by forcing them to move elsewhere.³³ As the rest of this section will show, the pursuit of these goals led to budget discrimination, neglect of taxpaying Palestinian communities, and, ultimately, a divisive unrest among the Palestinian population that could have easily been avoided by the Israeli government had municipal policies in East Jerusalem been more egalitarian.

At the time, however, Israeli intentions in East Jerusalem appeared positive, especially under the direction of Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek. Kollek said in 1977, “We can only look at the situation realistically: If, at worst, Muslim and Jewish differences prove irreconcilable, we will have to live in tension for a long time. All the more reason to care for the city as much as we can to ensure its welfare and well-being in spite of strains and stress.”³⁴ For Kollek and many others within the Israeli government, fair treatment of both Jewish and Arab communities in the years following 1967 was key to achieving the dream of a unified – and peaceful – Jerusalem. According to a document from the Jerusalem Committee of 1982, “the overriding, undisputed principle underlying Jerusalem’s planning is the realization of her unity ... [by] building up the city in such a

way as to preclude the bi-polar emergence of two national communities and forestall any possibility of re-dividing it along such lines.”³⁵ However, despite the intentions of some members of the government, Israel has always been notorious for its bureaucratic system, and many of Kollek’s major goals for the city were never realized on the budget or municipal level. The Arabs quickly became clear victims of budget discrimination: although legally residing Palestinians constituted 28 percent of Jerusalem’s taxpaying population, they only received between two and twelve percent of the budget through various departments.³⁶

An internal municipality memo from 1986 reiterates the consequences of this budget discrimination. The memo openly acknowledged that, “the level of service given to residents of east Jerusalem is much lower than that given to residents of west Jerusalem.”³⁷ The memo also went on to list the ways in which East Jerusalem’s Palestinian population was disadvantaged: most roads were unpaved without sidewalks or lighting, 60% of East Jerusalem neighborhoods still had no garbage collection, the water system was inadequate, and Arab schools were neglected in the budget, to name a few of the concerns.³⁸ Even today, these issues persist throughout East Jerusalem, exacerbated by increasingly strict government policies and ID card discrimination. For example, some Arab areas of East Jerusalem have not had trash collection since 1967, and

attempts by permanent residents to bring these issues up with the Israeli municipality, are repeatedly denied.³⁹ Although their blue card status technically entitles them to the same treatment as Israeli citizens, especially in municipal issues, East Jerusalem’s Palestinians are almost always treated as second-class citizens.

Predictably, the budget discrimination against permanent residents – compounded with issues like the expropriation of East Jerusalem territory to construct Jewish settlements – led to unrest within the Arab community. As the First Intifada began to tear the city apart in 1987, the Israeli dream of a “united” Jerusalem was quickly eviscerated. The city’s leadership had ignored the first signs of unrest in 1985, and even though they were fully aware of the unfair issues that East Jerusalem’s Arab population faced, nothing was done to remedy them on the ground.⁴⁰ As a result of the police response to the uprisings, the distinction between the treatment of East Jerusalem and the occupied territories became blurred, and polarization between the Arab and Jewish communities became increasingly pronounced.⁴¹ Additionally, blue ID card holders were subjected, at least during the First Intifada (1987-1991), to similar checkpoints and inspections that had typically been reserved for West Bank residents.⁴² Revoking some of the privileges typically associated with the permanent residency card further incensed the Palestinians of East Jerusalem, and, in part, contributed to the reemergence of a collective Palestinian identity.

As authors Chesin, Hutman, and Melamed pointed out in *Separate and Unequal*, “Kollek could not help but say ‘I told you so’ to Israel’s national leaders. According to the mayor’s thinking, the uprisings that broke out in Jerusalem as part of the intifada were the direct result of the failure of the government to invest more money in improving living conditions in East Jerusalem.”⁴³ For Kollek, uniting the two halves of Jerusalem was as simple as treating the entire city’s population fairly in both budget allocations and responding to concerns from Palestinian residents. On the ground, however, these goals were never initiated,

which culminated in violent unrest and a re-dividing of Jerusalem along much more hostile and polarized lines. This is the Jerusalem that exists today, and East Jerusalem’s permanent residents continue to be disenfranchised despite their blue card status. The identification cards issued by the Israeli government have only deprived the Palestinians of agency and their ability to define their identity for themselves. Instead, they are trapped in a legal limbo – without citizenship in any country and the desire to remain in their home city, they are often the victims of policies made far beyond their control. The next section will discuss the socio-spatial implications and consequences of these policies.

THE EFFECT OF IDENTIFICATION
CARDS ON SPATIAL RELATIONS

In a 1969 study of the self-imposed labels of Israeli Arabs entitled “Some observations of the national identity of the Israeli Arabs,” academics Peres and Yuval-Davis asked respondents to rank the labels that they most identified with.⁴⁴ The study was conducted before the 1967 war, and a follow up was conducted afterwards. Before the war, the researchers found that Arabs, on average, ranked their identity preferences as follows: Israeli, Israeli-Arab, Arab, Palestinian, and Muslim/Christian. After the war, the rankings shifted: Arab, Muslim/Christian, Israeli-Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli.⁴⁵

The results of this study emphasize the profound effects of the 1967 war on the Arab population of East Jerusalem, especially in the years following the city’s annexation. Teddy Kollek, in his desire to unify two populations, saw such shifting identity preferences as a threat to unified Jerusalem. He said, “The Christians are not the problem. We can come to agreement with them. The central problem is the Muslim Arabs, and Muslim Arab nationalism. That is the major problem we face.”⁴⁶ However, as this section will discuss, the policies that the Israeli government imposed on East Jerusalem’s Palestinians isolated them physically, singling out their identity rather than including them in the fabric of the city and fulfilling Israeli

legal obligations towards the city's permanent residents.

In 2002, following the beginnings of the Second Intifada (2002-2005), Israel approved the construction of a barrier wall in order to deter suicide bombers from entering the West Bank.⁴⁷ The barrier created a spatial divide between the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and heavily impacted future ID card policies; the type of identification card carried determined who could enter or exit through the barrier wall, at which checkpoints, and how difficult this process would be for them. Although the barrier essentially re-drew the boundaries of Jerusalem and physically annexed most of East Jerusalem, it also had a significant effect on many Palestinian communities. Some West Bank communities (not in possession of permanent residency) were included on the "Jerusalem" side of the barrier, while large, peripheral Palestinian communities were physically annexed to the "West Bank" side of the wall.⁴⁸ At some points, as in the case of Abu Dis, the barrier wall even ran through Palestinian towns.⁴⁹ Recent estimates suggest that about 25 percent of East Jerusalem's permanent residents are cut off by the barrier.⁵⁰

Since the construction of the barrier, identification cards have become an even more critical component of Palestinian daily life, impacting economic status, ability to obtain jobs, and family unification – as in the case of Rimaz Kasabreh, the West Bank Palestinian who must live illegally in East Jerusalem in order to stay with her husband and two children. The following case study from the 2011 UNOCHA report (found on pages 74-75) further illustrates the central role that the barrier wall plays in the everyday decision-making processes of Palestinian families.

Kifaya al Khatib has eleven children, and has been living in her current home since the 1970s. Originally in the West Bank, part of her village – including her family's house – was "annexed" into East Jerusalem when the barrier wall was constructed. Because she does not possess the blue Jerusalem ID, she

cannot travel throughout the city, cannot drive there, cannot take any form of transportation, and must travel through a checkpoint in the barrier in order to enter the West Bank and purchase groceries – a basic necessity that she is not allowed to buy within Jerusalem. Activities that most would see as mundane, such as buying food, have become a long and arduous process for the al Khatib family, and all grocery bags must be inspected at the barrier checkpoint by IDF security patrols. Kifaya is only permitted to bring in food for her own family's consumption, and cannot bring most meats, dairy, or eggs into Jerusalem – items which were previously staples of her family's diet. Additionally, Kifaya has been unable to acquire the permanent residency that would make living on the "Jerusalem" side of the barrier easier.⁵¹

Our life has changed drastically as a result of the Wall. Even though we live on the Jerusalem side, we are not allowed to be in Jerusalem itself, because we don't have Jerusalem ID cards to reside here or permits to enter the city. The only place I'm officially allowed to be is my home itself and the stretch of road leading to the checkpoint. I can't even visit my neighbours ... I have been fighting for 20 years to get a Jerusalem ID to reside in Jerusalem. While my neighbours in the same situation received one, I was refused, the reason being that my house is built without a permit. Even though we don't have a building permit, through our lawyer we managed to avoid getting a demolition order. However, when we built an extension for my son's family, it was demolished.⁵²

Spatially, the construction of the barrier, combined with the identification card policy, has made daily living a nearly impossible process for many Palestinian families, especially those from the West Bank who have now been relocated to the "Jerusalem" side of the wall. As Kifaya said, "If I think about my future my biggest hope is to be able to feel relaxed and to move freely.

ANY WAY IT IS EXAMINED, THE FORMATION OF AN OVERALL PALESTINIAN IDENTITY IS A WEIGHTY AND COMPLEX ISSUE

The way it is now, we feel like we're living in a cage."⁵³

With the Second Intifada, restrictive policies – like those the al Khatib family faces today – only increased. Although the barrier was constructed under the premise of legitimate security concerns for the Israeli state, its function today has far exceeded its original purpose of protecting the inhabitants of Jerusalem from terrorist threats. Not only do the borders of the barrier still stretch kilometers beyond the 1947 Green Line, but they also act as a physical regulation of identity for those not privileged enough to hold Israeli citizenship. These individuals are not terrorists, and many hold deep personal ties to the city of Jerusalem. Often, they are people like Kifaya: rendered immobile because they do not have the proper identification that will allow them to move freely within their own village, and subject to ID card and permit checks on a daily basis. These policies go far beyond the scope of preventing terrorist actions, especially for Palestinians that have inhabited their homes in the West Bank or East Jerusalem for decades, if not generations.

Beyond the barrier wall, there are several other measures in place that have come to define spatial relations between Palestinian communities and Jewish communities in East Jerusalem. The most potent example of these is the system of road networks that runs through the city. As a report from the Journal of Palestine Studies summarized, "in

effect, Israelis and Palestinians use a parallel road system."⁵⁴ Those possessing Israeli citizenship – and a government-issued license plate indicating this status – are permitted to drive on the bypass road, which is a separate transportation system from the one available to Palestinians.⁵⁵ The bypass road consists of a secure system of roads, which are regularly patrolled by the IDF, are well lit, and are well maintained by the municipal authorities.⁵⁶ The Palestinians, however, travel along a separate system that links Palestinian villages to one another. Because the road system is poorly maintained and subject to a series of obstacles by the IDF – one report counts 85 checkpoints and 460 roadblocks–travelling across East Jerusalem takes significantly longer.⁵⁷ As Wendy Pullan noted, "What used to be a five minute trip across Abu Dis to the university, or a fifteen minute drive from Jerusalem, is now, for those with the proper permissions, a journey of at least 45 minutes involving Israeli military checkpoints."⁵⁸

The road system and barrier wall are perhaps the two most obvious examples of how Palestinian mobility in physical space has become severely restricted in East Jerusalem. It is important to note that these systems of mobility rely heavily on identification – whether through blue cards or green cards (issued by the Palestinian Authority to most West Bank residents) or military permits for checkpoints and roads, East Jerusalem's Palestinians are

constantly forced to prove their identity. Not only does this make daily life difficult for many residents (both permanent and illegal), it also perpetuates a system wherein Palestinian agency is controlled by a higher authority: in many situations, even blue ID card holders have little say in their own self-definition. As this paper will discuss next, the identification and mobility restriction policies that the Israeli government operates in East Jerusalem have a profound effect on Palestinian identity, self-determination, and psychological independence.

DEVELOPING IMPACTS ON PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

As Rashid Khalidi wrote in *Palestinian Identity*, “unlike most of the other peoples in the Middle East, the Palestinians have never achieved any form of national independence in their homeland.”⁵⁹ Although Palestinian national identity began to take root during the early 19th century, with more frequent references to the nation state of Palestine in the press, a fully present nationality never came to fruition. Today, collective Palestinian identity has almost entirely been shaped as a response to external forces: the British Mandate of Palestine, the Zionist settlers, the modern day policies of the State of Israel, and the treatment of Palestinians by surrounding Arab countries and the international community. Any way it is examined, the formation of an overall Palestinian identity is a weighty and complex issue – and far too nuanced to tackle in the span of a paper.

However, it is worthwhile to discuss the potential ramifications of the East Jerusalem identity cards on the Palestinian psyche as it pertains to those Palestinians currently residing within the walls of the city. Ramzi Suleiman’s essay, “On Marginal People: The Case of the Palestinians in Israel” explores the psychological consequences of state-imposed marginality on the country’s Palestinian population. Suleiman’s argument is two-pronged: first, that the Palestinian minority is a marginalized group within Israel;

and second, that “the practices of the State and Jewish public towards the Palestinian minority, are strategies and practices of power and domination.”⁶⁰

Indeed, Suleiman’s assertions are supported by the case of the permanent residents of East Jerusalem, as well as those Palestinians who live illegally within the city’s boundaries. As Wendy Pullan wrote in *Jerusalem Quarterly*, the Palestinians and the Israelis have two very separate experiences in Jerusalem: those of “boundedness” and “mobility,” respectively.⁶¹ Because Israelis are free to travel throughout Jerusalem and have access to secure bypass roads, “the distance becomes compressed and made comfortable, and in doing so, the political boundaries of space recede.”⁶² In other words, citizens of Israel are not made constantly aware of their own identities through time-consuming and humiliating government checkpoints. Their identity is not contested in the way that it is for East Jerusalem’s Arab population.

“It is at these borders and barriers that the six million Palestinians are singled out for ‘special treatment,’ and are forcefully reminded of their identity: of who they are, and why they are different from others,” Khalidi wrote, describing the lengthy process of entering and exiting Israel as a legally stateless Palestinian.⁶³ This paper argues that it is this constant process of being forced to prove one’s identity and sense of belonging that has had the most substantial impact on Palestinian self-identity under Israeli rule. This is especially relevant in East Jerusalem, where blue ID cards are coveted by Palestinians but have simultaneously become a reminder of the holder’s uncertain status within the state. Furthermore, permanent residents know that their status can be revoked at any moment, and they must be able to prove, through a comprehensive paper trail, that their “centre of life” remains in East Jerusalem.⁶⁴ This policy of proving a “centre of life” has been in place since 1988, after the beginning of the First Intifada.⁶⁵ Between 1989 and 2012, 11,331 residencies were revoked, according to Israeli human rights organization HaMoked, which

THE WALL OF SEPARATION NEAR TULKAREM, PALESTINE



uses data supplied by the Israeli Ministry of Interior.⁶⁶ Finally, under 2003’s Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) 6753-2003, spouses of permanent residents without blue card status are required to continually apply for temporary residency at ministry offices.⁶⁷ Often, when they arrive at these offices, they are again reminded of their marginal status. They will be told that working hours are over, or that they must speak Hebrew to communicate, even though Arabic is Israel’s second official language.⁶⁸ This law has been consistently renewed.

CONCLUSION

As this paper seeks to show, Palestinians residing within East Jerusalem have been repeatedly marginalized in Israeli society, most tangibly through the state’s permanent residency card policy. The use of the Jerusalem blue ID card is also closely linked to access for many other privileges within the city, including geo-spatial factors like the barrier wall and parallel road system that runs through Jerusalem. Palestinians are deprived of participating in the culture of Jerusalem and are prevented from partaking in the normal life of the city due to their physical location and restricted modes of access. This has negative consequences for Palestinian collective identity, as Palestinian communities are often isolated from one another, especially with the

construction of the barrier wall. Additionally, the creation of a hierarchy of access through identification cards could lead to future tension among Palestinians. There are also negative effects for the Israeli government, which will find itself in a constant cycle of quelling intifadas if it continues to respond to uprisings with increasingly harsh regulations, such as the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law and further budget discrimination, deprivation of services to Arabs in municipality offices, and poor resources for Palestinian schools and youth programs.

In “On Marginal People,” Suleiman summarized the effects of Israel’s formally imposed marginality: “...marginality is not caused by belonging to numerous groups, but by an uncertain belonging. In its successful attempt to transcend the Diaspora and create sovereignty for Jews, Zionism has created a new kind of marginality for the indigenous Palestinian minority.”⁶⁹ Although pinpointing Zionism as the sole cause of the Palestinian identity crisis in East Jerusalem today would be misleading, Suleiman makes his point by describing the case of the Palestinians as an “uncertain belonging.” Through physical barriers and spatial isolation, as well as unnecessarily strict family unification policies, daily life as a Palestinian in East Jerusalem is made more difficult by the Israeli bureaucracy. However, what is most significant about the Palestinian permanent residents of East

Jerusalem is how the access that they have been granted by Israeli government is so closely tied to an identification card – a card which can easily be revoked if they cannot prove through documentation that their identity, literally their “center of life,” lies within the city of Jerusalem.

As a result, the identity of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is inextricably intertwined with the Israeli legal system and their precarious status as residents within the city they call home. Living in Jerusalem should not mean that they should have their identity constantly pointed out to them, or that they should be unable to move outside of the city lest they lose their residency (a policy that does not apply to permanent residents from abroad).⁷⁰ By limiting the ability of Palestinians within East Jerusalem to live full and normal lives – without fear that their ID cards, with their blank “nationality” sections, will be revoked – the Israeli government is not only putting itself in a morally questionable position, but also endangering future prospects for peace. Unless the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are awarded the full permanent residency rights that they deserve as Israeli taxpayers, they will continue to be marginalized within their own city and disenfranchised politically and socio-spatially. And if this continues, then Teddy Kollek’s vision of a truly unified Jerusalem – one that is not only physically united, but also culturally and religiously egalitarian – may never become a reality.

MUSLIMS IN MOSCOW

CAITLIN TOTO
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In the ultimate years of the Soviet Union, as the liberalizations introduced by perestroika and glasnost took full effect, the nationalistic convictions of historically discriminated territories within the Russian and Central Asian region began to replace the ideologies of the USSR. Although the global community first applauded nationalism as an important force that debilitated the Soviet Union, social developments over the past twenty years have exposed the polarizing effects of the regions’ diverse ideologies. These vast ethnic differences have caused a number of conflicts on the outskirts of Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union, such as violence in Chechnya, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh; however, this now-prevalent cultural chasm is becoming troublesome in the heart of the Federation, where a rising “outsider” Muslim population has clashed with a rejuvenation of Russian nationalism. Russia shares a turbulent history with Islam dating back to the Mongol invasion of Moscow in the thirteenth century.¹ Since then, an inherent intolerance for Muslims has been embedded within the foundation of the country’s national identity. The recent influx of Muslims, precipitated by stagnant development in the Caucasus and Central Asia, have highlighted and reinforced the ideal that Muslims pose as an inferior, yet dangerous “other” in Muscovite society. Paradoxically, Moscow’s economy has become increasingly

dependent upon an “outsider” workforce that many of its citizens hold a prejudice against; thus, the Russian government must soon find a way to alleviate the bitter animosity between Muslims and ethnic Russians within Moscow, as a permanent change in the capital’s demography is inevitable.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE “OTHER”

The role of the “other” is not an unfamiliar aspect in Russian society, and much of this enmity towards outsiders is depicted in the political strategy of the Soviet Union. The USSR held a prejudice in favor of Russian culture, and instead of appreciating the ingrained diversity of their vast empire, the government marginalized its peripheral territories. The Soviet Union had claimed that its ideologies rose above nationalist convictions; however, the government and elites only represented a portion of the population—ethnic Russians. Shireen Hunter, in her work *Islam in Russia* explains, “Ethnic Russians were assigned a civilizing role of the ‘elder brother’ toward the Non-European populations of the Soviet Union...Most official business was conducted in Russian and few high ranking or members of the intelligentsia in non-Native republics were fluent in their native language.”² The dichotomy between ethnic Russians and minorities was omnipresent in Soviet society. The USSR claimed their “Sovietization”