TRAINING NOT TO FIGHT: HOW MAJOR POWERS USE MULTINATIONAL MILITARY EXERCISES TO MANAGE STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Kyle Wolfley
August 2018
The number of multinational military exercises—that is, military training events between two or more states—has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, many of these training events involve non-allies and serve functions other than deterrence or preparation for war. Why do major powers conduct military exercises with non-allies and why have these training events increased since the end of the Cold War? Training has remained a vital military activity since the advent of war but the purpose of holding exercises has evolved over time. States traditionally use military exercises to deter or prepare for war, yet since the end of the Cold War major powers have increasingly employed training events as a ‘non-war’ means to shape their strategic environments by influencing partners and rivals. I argue that major powers conduct multinational exercises with non-allies in order to reduce strategic uncertainty; moreover, exercises have grown since the end of the Cold War due to an increase in uncertainty wrought by the rise of violent non-state actors, as well as the habitual nature of military cooperation. This dissertation offers a novel understanding of military behavior in the post-Cold War environment in which interstate war is rare but the persistent threat and consequences of terrorism, ethnic war, transnational crime, and natural disasters seems unending. I test my argument with both quantitative and qualitative methods using a new dataset, in-depth interviews, large-N regressions, and illustrative case studies. This dissertation seeks to provide an update to the traditional works in military doctrine by highlighting the important role of shaping operations in the post-Cold War era and how these types of military activities affect international security.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kyle Wolfley grew up in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and began his military career as a cadet at the United States Military Academy, West Point in 2005. Upon graduation with a B.S. in 2009, he commissioned in the US Army as a Second Lieutenant and served as an infantry platoon leader and company executive officer in Germany and Afghanistan from 2010 to 2013. Upon return from deployment, he married Danessa Kinsey in July 2012. From 2013-2016, Kyle served as a battalion and brigade operations officer and commanded two infantry companies as a Captain in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Kyle matriculated as a Ph.D. Student in Cornell’s Department of Government in the fall of 2016 and received his M.A. and Ph.D. in 2018. During his time at Cornell, Danessa gave birth to twins, Kolson and Lydia, in September 2017. Kyle is currently assigned as an instructor at West Point’s Department of Social Sciences.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would, first, like to thank God for all of his many blessings and the numerous opportunities he has provided me throughout my life. My next thanks goes to my dear wife Danessa for supporting me throughout my career, encouraging me through difficult trials, and taking care of me, Kolson, and Lydia during this challenging experience. Completing the Government program on an accelerated timeline would have been impossible without the dedication of my advisor, Matthew Evangelista, who took personal time to review and provide detailed feedback on every paper and dissertation draft over the last two years. I thank Sarah Kreps for also devoting significant personal time to my progress, especially for setting me and my family up for success immediately upon arrival to Ithaca. Steven Ward offered critical feedback that changed the direction of this dissertation on several occasions and Allen Carlson also provided insights that will shape subsequent renditions of this project in the future. Bryce Corrigan spent considerable effort helping me through the quantitative portions of this project, reviewing drafts and meeting with me several times throughout the last two years. I thank Vito D’Orazio for providing the sources for his exercise dataset which informed my own. I experienced quite a learning curve upon entering the program so my IR student peers—Cameron, Nina, and Naomi—were crucial in always helping me understand difficult theories, concepts, and methods. And, finally, thanks to Danessa’s parents, Dennis and Pam Kinsey, for supporting me along the way and my father for teaching me to never give up.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... viii

**Part I: Puzzle, Arguments, and Research Design**

**Chapter 1: Introduction, Puzzle, and Research Design** .............................................. 1

1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 The Puzzle ................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 The Argument, Key Concepts, and Alternative Explanations ................................. 18
1.4 Mixed-Method Research Design ................................................................................. 32
1.5 Contributions and Plan of the Dissertation ................................................................. 39

**Chapter 2: Shaping, Military Doctrine, and the Management of Uncertainty** ............. 43

2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 43
2.2 Military Doctrine and Shaping Operations ................................................................. 44
2.3 The Increase in Strategic Uncertainty after the End of the Cold War ..................... 58
2.4 Non-Traditional Exercises as Habitual Shaping Operations ..................................... 73
2.5 Alternative Explanations ............................................................................................. 76
2.6 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 85

**Chapter 3: Multinational Military Exercises and Strategic Environments** ................. 86

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 86
3.2 A Brief History of Military Exercises ......................................................................... 87
3.3 Multinational Military Exercise Tasks and Types ....................................................... 102
3.4 Determining Exercise Type by Partner Type ............................................................... 114
3.5 Strategic Environments ............................................................................................... 117
3.6 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 122

**Part II: Illustrative Case Studies of Non-Traditional Exercises**

**Chapter 4: Recruitment Exercises** ............................................................................. 125

4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 125
4.2 Recruitment Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty ................................... 126
4.3 The US, NATO, and India Recruit Allies ................................................................... 130
4.4 Case Study: the US and Partnership for Peace: 1994-2000 ...................................... 133
4.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 155

**Chapter 5: Capacity-Building Exercises** .................................................................... 157

5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 157
5.2 Capacity-Building Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty ......................... 158
5.3 The US, UK, France, and Building Partner Capacity ................................................ 166
5.4 Case Study: UK and Sierra Leone: 2000-2016 ........................................................... 167
5.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 188
Chapter 6: Role-Forming Exercises ................................................................. 190
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 190
6.2 Role-Forming Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty ............... 192
6.3 Russia, China, and Regional Security Organizations ......................... 197
6.4 Case Study: Russia and the CSTO: 2003-2012 ..................................... 203
6.5 Summary ......................................................................................... 222

Chapter 7: Trust-Developing Exercises ......................................................... 224
7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 224
7.2 Trust-Developing Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty ......... 225
7.3 Rivals, Exercises, and Confidence and Security Building Measures ........ 230
7.4 Case Study: India and China: 2006-2016 ............................................ 233
7.5 Summary ......................................................................................... 254

Part III: Statistical Tests and Conclusion
Chapter 8: Data and Large-N Regression .................................................... 258
8.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 258
8.2 Data, Indicators, and Variables ......................................................... 259
8.3 Hypotheses and Models ...................................................................... 272
8.4 Results ............................................................................................. 278
8.5 Summary and Discussion ................................................................... 287

Chapter 9: Conclusion: Military Exercises and International Security ........ 290
9.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 290
9.2 Shaping Operations and the Militarization of Foreign Policy ............... 293
9.3 Negative Effects of Shaping Exercises on International Security ......... 298
9.4 Major Power Rivals and the Return of Traditional Exercises ............. 304
9.5 The Future of Multinational Military Exercises ................................ 307

Appendix A: Codebook for Dataset .......................................................... 310
Appendix B: Coalition Partners ................................................................. 312
Appendix C: Statistical Robustness Checks ............................................... 318
Bibliography and Interviews ...................................................................... 345
# LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Number of Land-Based MMEs per Year Involving a Major Power, 1980-2016 ......................3
1.2 Number of Land-Based MMEs Per Year Involving a Major Power, Including Either Only Allies (“Ally”) or at least one Non-Ally (“Non-Ally”), 1980-2016 .................................3
1.3 Categories of MME Type by Purpose and Partner Type......................................................10
1.4 Number of Land-Based MMEs Attended by China, Russia, and India.................................14
1.5 Number of Land-Based MMEs Per Year Involving a Major Power, US as a Participant (“US MMEs”) vs. US not as a participant (“Non-US MMEs”) ..................................................15
1.6 Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Type, Traditional (Deterrence/Rehearsal) vs. Non-Traditional..................................................................................................................18
1.7 Non-Traditional MMEs by Sources of Uncertainty, Partner-Types, and Mechanisms...........29
2.1 “The Conflict Continuum” in JP 3-0 ....................................................................................51
2.2 US Military Shaping in an Operational Context................................................................53
3.1 Total Exercises by Traditional (Deterrence, Rehearsal) and Non-Traditional (Role-Forming, Trust-Developing, Capacity-Building, Recruitment) Functions, 1980-2000 ..................................99
3.2 Shaping MMEs by Western Powers, 1980-2016 .............................................................100
3.3 Shaping MMEs by Eastern Powers, 1980-2016 .............................................................100
3.4 Land-Based MMEs by Region..........................................................................................102
3.5 Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Task...............................................................................107
3.6 Summary of Indicators for MME Type ............................................................................109
3.7 Average Troops Per Exercise, By Year ............................................................................112
3.8 Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Type...............................................................................114
3.9 Major Power Decision Tree for Partner-Type Selection ...................................................117
8.1 Descriptive Statistics..............................................................................................................271
8.2 Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ .......................................................................................................280
9.1 Traditional and Non-Traditional Exercises........................................................................305
C.1 Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ (USA) ..........................................................................................325
C.2 Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ (UK) ............................................................................................328
C.3 Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ (France) .......................................................................................332
C.4 Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ (Germany) ....................................................................................336
C.5 Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ (Russia) .......................................................................................339
LIST OF TABLES

8.1 Results for $H_{1a}$ ........................................................................................................278
8.2 Predictions Table for $H_{1a}$ ......................................................................................279
8.3 Results for $H_2$ (Eastern Powers) .............................................................................281
8.4 Predictions Table for $H_2$ (Eastern Powers) ............................................................282
8.5 Results for $H_2$ (Western Powers) ............................................................................282
8.6 Predictions Table for $H_2$ (Western Powers) ............................................................283
8.7 Results for $H_2$ (USA) ..............................................................................................284
8.8 Results for $H_3$ ..........................................................................................................285
8.9 Predictions Table for $H_3$ ........................................................................................285
8.10 Results for $H_4$ ........................................................................................................286
8.11 Predictions Table for $H_4$ .......................................................................................287
C.1.1 Hypothesis 1 with indicator control variables .......................................................320
C.1.2 Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (Eastern Powers) .......................321
C1.3 Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (Western Powers) .......................321
C.1.4 Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (USA) .........................................322
C.1.5 Hypothesis 3 with indicator control variables .......................................................323
C.1.6 Hypothesis 4 with indicator control variables .......................................................324
C.2.1 Results for $H_{1a}$ (USA) .........................................................................................324
C.2.2 Results for $H_3$ (USA) ........................................................................................286
C.2.4 Results for $H_4$ (USA) ........................................................................................286
C.3.1 Results for $H_{1a}$ (UK) ........................................................................................327
C.3.2 Results for $H_2$ (UK) ............................................................................................329
C.3.3 Results for $H_3$ (UK) ............................................................................................330
C.3.4 Results for $H_4$ (UK) ............................................................................................330
C.4.1 Results for $H_{1a}$ (France) .....................................................................................331
C.4.2 Results for $H_2$ (France) ......................................................................................333
C.4.3 Results for $H_3$ (France) ......................................................................................334
C.4.4 Results for $H_4$ (France) ......................................................................................334
C.5.1 Results for $H_{1a}$ (Germany) ................................................................................335
C.5.2 Results for $H_2$ (Germany) ..................................................................................337
C.5.3 Results for H₄ (Germany) ........................................................................................................337
C.6.1 Results for H₁ (Russia) ........................................................................................................338
C.6.2 Results for H₂ (Russia) ........................................................................................................340
C.6.3 Results for H₃ (Russia) ........................................................................................................340
C.6.4 Results for H₄ (Russia) ........................................................................................................341
C.7.1 Results for H₂ (India) ..........................................................................................................342
C.7.2 Results for H₄ (India) ..........................................................................................................342
C.8.1 Results for H₂ (China) ........................................................................................................343
C.8.2 Results for H₄ (China) ........................................................................................................344
Part I

Puzzle, Arguments, and Research Design
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, PUZZLE, AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Introduction

In 1995, at a remote base in the swamps of Louisiana, a journalist asked an Albanian Army officer about his recent experience training with American soldiers in a multinational exercise. He responded, “America, for us, has been the great enemy of the world…Now America is our best friend.”¹ Three years later, an American non-commissioned officer participating in a different exercise in Uzbekistan remarked, “This is history being made…If you’d told me 10 years ago that we were going to have an exercise in what used to be the Soviet Union, I’d have told you you [sic] were crazy.”² For soldiers who trained to prepare for conflict against their Cold War adversaries, conducting military exercises alongside those same former enemies would be surprising, if not absurd. Yet during these training events, soldiers from previously rival countries fired each other’s weapons, maneuvered together, and simulated evacuating casualties as fellow comrades.

Military training has always been an essential aspect of warfare, yet the purpose of conducting exercises has changed over time, most dramatically over the last century.³ Until the onset of World War II, exercises were largely conducted unilaterally in order to test troop readiness and emerging doctrine. However, after World War II great powers began increasing the number of bi-and multi-lateral exercises, most notably within the major peacetime treaty alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. These exercises were

---

³ Though there are different terms describing military training, I interchangeably use ‘exercise’, ‘maneuver’, or ‘training’ as opposed to other terms used by journalists, such as war games, which implies preparation for war. As described in this chapter, preparation for war serves only one of several functions of military training.
conducted not only to test the readiness of multinational combat units for war, but also to deter the other alliance from attacking. Interestingly, despite the end of superpower rivalry at the conclusion of Cold War hostilities, the number of multinational military exercises (MMEs) involving a major power actually increased substantially from the 1990’s through the 2010’s (see Figure 1.1 below). Moreover, as opposed to the last decade of the Cold War, major powers expanded combined training with unusual exercise partners: non-allies, defense pact signatories that never deploy together, and even rivals (Figure 1.2 below). From 1990 to 2016, these non-allies participated in an average of about 57% of MMEs, compared to only 18% during the 1980’s. Interestingly, although military training is traditionally viewed as a means to prepare for war, this rise in multilateral exercises in the 1990s and 2000s actually coincided with a decrease in war, both interstate and intrastate. Thus, not only did the post-Cold War environment experience as much or more multinational exercises than during the era of great power rivalry, but this increase in training grew as the incidence of war decreased.

---

4 Note- All statistics, graphs, and figures throughout the dissertation are derived from my two original datasets, described in Section 1.4.
Figure 1.1: Number of Land-Based MMEs per Year Involving a Major Power, 1980-2016

Figure 1.2: Number of Land-Based MMEs Per Year Involving a Major Power, Including Either Only Allies ("Ally") or at least one Non-Ally ("Non-Ally"), 1980-2016
Why would major powers conduct MMEs with these types of partners and why have multilateral exercises increased since the end of the Cold War? Major power military training with non-allies is puzzling for several reasons. MMEs are resource-intensive, require extensive international cooperation and planning, and may be considered unattractive to large armies that prefer to operate unilaterally. Conducting training with rivals may draw scrutiny from domestic popular opinion and possibly violate military principles of secrecy and deception. Moreover, the opportunity for a ‘peace dividend’ after the conclusion of superpower rivalry would seem to provide incentives for major powers to reduce their defense budgets and focus resources on domestic issues. Yet all major powers eventually increased multilateral training after the end of the Cold War. Importantly, many of these exercises served purposes beyond what militaries are assumed to be concerned with most; that is, deterrence or preparation for combat. Although major power militaries continued these traditional types of exercises, they also increased training for ‘non-war’ purposes, such as military diplomacy, strategic engagement, and partner capacity-building.

Current theories in the international relations subfield of international security are inadequate in understanding this post-Cold War military behavior. In the current literature, militaries are conventionally understood as a state’s instrument to threaten or use violence. The traditional works on military doctrine, in particular, imagine state militaries as organizations that develop plans and exercise units in order to prepare for large-scale conventional war with other state militaries through the use of offensive and defensive operations. Though a few contemporary research programs have focused on the military use of force and threat of violence during

---

humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency, little scholarly work has explained the uses of the military for non-war cooperative activities. This puzzling increase in cooperative exercises with non-allies calls into question our conception of what purpose militaries serve, how major powers use armies as an instrument of statecraft, and the manner in which militaries view their role in fighting (and preventing) wars.

This dissertation offers a novel understanding of military behavior in the post-Cold War era. In addition to preparation for major combat, militaries have increasingly adopted roles for executing non-warfighting activities such as military diplomacy and security force assistance; these types of actions are also known as ‘shaping operations’. Though attributed to the US military, shaping operations, which include non-war activities such as military diplomacy, strategic engagement, and building partner-capacity, are practiced to varying degrees by all major powers since the end of the Cold War.\(^7\) I argue that due to an increase in strategic uncertainty after the collapse of communist states in the early 1990’s, as well as increase in the reach of transnational terrorism in the 2000’s, major powers expanded the amount and scope of shaping operations to reduce uncertainty in their strategic environments. In other words, in addition to planning and rehearsing the use and threat of force as codified in conventional military doctrine, major power militaries also use cooperative activities to actively shape their environments through prevention and mitigation, which reduces strategic uncertainty. As unpredictability about the source of threats grew, militaries responded by increasing the number of shaping operations to manage this unpredictability.

---

Though shaping operations are comprised of many activities, MMEs serve as a prominent tool for major power militaries to influence their environments: exercises with non-allies are used to secure partners for multilateral missions, prevent the onset of war by strengthening the capacity of weaker militaries, and create friends out of enemies. By decreasing the uncertainty of potential allies and threats, major power militaries hope to reduce the risk of conflict and better provide security for their citizens and partners. The rising employment of shaping operations by major powers challenges the conventional wisdom that the military (and military doctrine) is a means of statecraft uniquely intended to ‘fight and win’ its nation’s wars. Instead, this newer approach imagines the post-Cold War military as a security-provider for its citizens against a wide-range of threats: in addition to other large state militaries, major powers must also confront non-state challenges such as rogue states, terrorists, transnational criminals, natural disasters, and the consequences of ethnic conflict. This updated view holds that militaries are interested in not only waging and achieving victory in war, but also averting or moderating the consequences of war and instability. With this work, I claim that traditional theories of military doctrine would benefit by including shaping operations—which are not only codified in major power strategic documents but also executed regularly before, during, and after conflict in an ambiguous security environment—in order to better understand modern military behavior. As major interstate war has grown increasingly rare, but combat against non-state actors seems endless in the era of “persistent conflict”, an updated understanding of military behavior and doctrine for the post-Cold War environment is required.8

---

1.2. The Puzzle: Why do Major Powers conduct MMEs with Non-Allies?

*Traditional Functions of Military Exercises*

According to US military doctrine, land-based military exercises, in general, are intended to improve mission readiness by training commanders, staffs, and units in simulated wartime operations. All multinational exercises—exercises between two or more states—seek to improve interoperability: that is, the ability for two or more military forces to execute each other’s doctrine, conduct joint planning, and ensure that technologies are compatible. Land-based MMEs vary extensively by number of participating troops and type of training tasks: large-scale conventional maneuver exercises may include over 100,000 troops while small disaster relief training may involve only a few hundred soldiers. Many exercises are conducted on a regular basis (such as annual and biannual), while others are conducted only as single events. MMEs are traditionally viewed as serving one of two functions: rehearsal or deterrence. *Rehearsals* are conducted in order to test whether allies or coalition partners are properly prepared for an upcoming or potential mission, which can include war, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, disaster relief, or other tasks charged to the military. Rehearsals may be used to practice mobilizations for invasions or counterattacks, such as the Russian *Kavkaz-2008* or *Zapad-2013* exercises, while others may prepare militaries and other governmental agencies for humanitarian crises, such as the European Union’s MILEX planning and training.

---

11 In one of the few academic works on military exercises, Blackwill and Legro do not separate MME functions by rehearsal or deterrence but point to both of these functions as objectives in NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises during the Cold War; see Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Ground Force Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/1990): 68-98.
Rehearsals also include exercises intended to test emerging doctrine, as demonstrated by Imperial Germany’s annual *Kriegsspiel* that allowed senior army officers to experiment with different operational concepts at the turn of the twentieth century.\(^\text{12}\)

MMEs to signal *deterrence* are conducted by two or more states that seek to convince an opponent that the costs of attack outweigh the benefits, either through denial or punishment. Military exercises signal deterrence in two ways: (1) by denial through the showcasing of capabilities that would make invasion too costly and (2) by punishment through performing tasks that demonstrate the military’s ability to counterattack across borders as a response to an invasion.\(^\text{13}\) Armies may use exercises to signal both immediate and general deterrence: in times of immediate crisis, a military exercise can send a clear signal of capability and resolve to a specific opponent. For general deterrence, military training can also be used to “maintain a broad military capability” and discourage any opponent from contemplating attack.\(^\text{14}\) Annual exercises ‘Foal Eagle’ and ‘Team Spirit’ between the US and South Korea are examples of maneuvers intended to deter an invasion from North Korea.\(^\text{15}\) Of course, one military exercise can serve both functions of deterrence and rehearsal, as was the case for NATO REFORGER and Warsaw Pact exercises during the Cold War; however, this combination of the two functions is


not necessary, such as exercises in preparation for deployments to an active war zone or peacekeeping mission.

Non-Traditional Functions of Military Exercises

Since the end of the Cold War, major powers have increasingly employed non-traditional, cooperative exercise functions in addition to deterrence and rehearsal. I categorize these non-traditional functions into four types: recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing. Major powers employ recruitment exercises in order to attract potential allies to join a defense pact, support a multilateral coalition, or simply to develop positive military relationships. Major powers use capacity-building exercises to train fragile state militaries to provide their own national and regional security in order to obviate the need for future major power intervention. In role-forming exercises, major powers attempt to influence what role (or function) the partner military serves for its society. For instance, in addition to the traditional mission of national security, a military may fulfill the roles of regime defense, domestic military assistance, or nation-builder; major powers seek to shape which role a partner military assumes. Finally, trust-developing exercises are conducted between major powers rivals that seek to avoid inadvertent war through changing soldiers’ mutual perceptions from hostile to friendly. I conceptualize non-traditional exercises as a prominent form of shaping in which major power militaries seek to influence non-allies through the cooperative, non-war use of force.

---

The Puzzling Phenomenon of Major Power Exercises with Non-allies

Training to rehearse for potential missions or to deter adversaries are commonly conducted by *allies*; that is, permanent, defense-pact signatories (formal alliances) or mission-based (‘ad-hoc’) coalition partners. Training with these types of partners is commonsensical: they allow major powers and partners to practice interoperability and serve the functions of deterrence, rehearsal, or both. However, major powers have increasingly conducted MMEs with *non-allies*, which fall into one of the following categories: (1) partners that are not treaty allies or ad-hoc coalition partners; (2) defense pact signatories that do not actually operate together in missions or attempt to deter an adversary; and (3) rivals. Figure 1.3 below provides a categorization of exercise types by MME purpose and partner type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MME Purpose</th>
<th>Threaten or Rehearse the Use of Force (Traditional)</th>
<th>Shape the Strategic Environment (Non-Traditional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MME Type</td>
<td>Deterrence Rehearsal</td>
<td>Recruitment Capacity-Building Role-Forming Trust-Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Partner Type</td>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>Non-Allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Partner Type</td>
<td>Defense Pact Allies or Coalition Partners</td>
<td>Potential Allies Frail States Transitioning States Rivals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1.3: Categories of MME Type by Purpose and Partner Type*

Exercises with non-allies are puzzling for several reasons. First, MMEs are resource-intensive and involve opportunity costs for training. Scare resources, such as time and funding, that could

---

18 For defense-pact signatories, I use “Type I” formal defense pacts according to the Correlates of War typology; see Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008*, Volume 2, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009). A list of ground-based multilateral coalitions that I apply in my dataset from 1980-2016 is listed in Appendix B.
be contributed to unilateral training are dedicated to coordinating and executing multilateral exercises. Some military officers view small-scale non-traditional exercises as a time and resource distraction from more large-scale, realistic training. Moreover, armies, especially those from major powers, may prefer to train alone and see MMEs as an opportunity-cost burden. Though these material costs may be viewed as necessary evils for training conducted between allies, the fact that major powers would be willing to pay these costs for non-allies is puzzling. Second, MMEs require extensive international cooperation; for example, the typical lifecycle for a multilateral exercise between the US and Asian-Pacific partners is, “a 12- to 18-month process that includes multiple planning conferences, such as a concept development conference, initial planning conference, mid-planning conference, and final planning conference.” Prior to the training event itself, planning international troop movements and logistics requires major coordination within and between militaries, as well as between government officials. Extensive legal documents, such as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), must be written, staffed, and agreed upon by all participants.

Furthermore, what is even more surprising is when current rivals conduct training as partners. Armies traditionally hide information or technology that may be damaging if gained by an opponent: even among allies, militaries are hesitant to expose force structure or equipment that could fall into the hands of enemies. In addition to secrecy, armies practice military deception in

---

19 Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017; Colonel (US Air Force, retired) Sam Gardiner, former NATO staff officer and Chairman of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations at the National War College, phone interview by author, June 9, 2017.


21 Anonymous former US official at NATO familiar with NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, phone interview by author, July 26, 2017.
an attempt to mislead by convincing an opponent the opposite of its intentions. Both secrecy and deception contribute to an army’s ability to ‘surprise’ an opponent and are compromised when adversaries train with one another. Yet major power rivals, such as the US with Russia or India with China, have, to varying degrees, increased their cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Some military officers object to such cooperation, fearing the loss of secret information: Vincent Pouliot interviewed a German colonel who believed that Russia joined NATO naval operations in the Mediterranean “to gain intelligence” on the alliance. Oftentimes, these exercises are not well received by domestic audiences. When the US invited China to the ‘Rim of the Pacific’ (RIMPAC) naval exercise in 2014, Zachary Keck of the The Diplomat titled his article covering the story: “US Welcomes China’s RIMPAC spying”. A US congressman criticized an exercise between the US and Russia on American soil in 1995 and cited the potential for classified information to be leaked as an objection—as well as the financial cost of the training event. Residents in the local area signaled similar concerns with hosting the former Soviets. Thus, these exercises may be troubling for both military officers and domestic publics alike.

---


International Security and Traditional Theories of Military Doctrine

Not only is training with non-allies puzzling from a practical resourcing- and military-perspective, this phenomenon is also challenging to explain with traditional international relations theories. Most structural realist accounts would expect exercises to increase or decrease in response to changes in the structure of the international system.\(^\text{26}\) For instance, as the military capability of a major power’s rival diminishes, a structural realist would anticipate the number of training events with allies or non-allies to also decrease. Yet as shown in Figure 1.1 above, not only did exercises after the end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse not decline, they actually increased substantially throughout the 1990’s. A different realist perspective, such as the one proposed by William C. Wohlforth and Stephen G. Brooks, may explain an increase in US-led MMEs as a result of American primacy since the end of the Cold War: because unipolarity grants the US an environment with few constraints, the US military is able to conduct exercises with partners all over the world to support the goals of its grand strategy.\(^\text{27}\) In a similar vein, several policy and scholarly accounts have raised concern about the creeping dominance of the military in US foreign policy.\(^\text{28}\) However, Figure 1.4 below reveals that exercises have increased for all non-NATO major powers since the early 2000’s, not just the US or its major-power allies.


Moreover, Figure 1.5 reveals that in contrast to US participation in 79% of MMEs in the 1990’s, the US only took part in an average of 66% of exercises from 2000 to 2016.

Figure 1.4: Number of Land-Based MMEs Attended by China, Russia, and India
This increase in non-traditional exercises is most problematic for current theories of military power and doctrine. In the subfields of international security and strategic studies, militaries are conventionally understood as a state’s instrument for threatening or using force. For instance, Stephen Biddle’s conception of military power focuses on military capability with “the mission of controlling territory in mid- to high-intensity continental warfare” through the destruction of enemy forces and seizure of enemy land. David Baldwin differentiates ‘military’ from other forms of statecraft—such as economic or diplomatic—by referring to “influence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons, or force.” Similarly, the traditional works in military doctrine

---

conceptualize militaries as organizations that prepare for large-scale conventional war and
develop doctrines geared toward traditional war-fighting operations: offense, defense, and
deterrence. Scholars diverge on the sources of military doctrine—whether doctrine is derived
from the structure of the international system, organizational pathologies, or the domestic
balance of power—yet there is little disagreement that state militaries develop doctrine during
peacetime to combat other state threats during large-scale war. In this respect, military doctrine
is viewed as a composite of plans and preparations for imagined conventional war when combat
is required; that is, either when civilians order an attack or the military is forced to respond
defensively. Before the onset of war, civilian diplomats attempt to muster allies while militaries
focus on unilaterally preparing their soldiers and equipment for potential conflict. Most of these
arguments draw extensively from organization theory and bureaucratic politics; they expect
major power militaries to prioritize either offensive or defensive conventional doctrines against
other state adversaries in pursuit of greater institutional size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy. This
conception of military doctrine fits within the conventional understanding of military behavior,
which assumes that major powers use militaries as the threat or use of violent force.

Even the more recent security literature on counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and
peacekeeping imagines the role of the military as the threat or use of force, albeit to fulfill other
state interests or fight against different types of actors (non-state). Using the traditional

---


32 For a sampling of the vast literature on the military use of force in counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and peacekeeping, see Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining
framework, we would expect to observe major power-led exercises that are consistently traditional—serving the functions of either deterrence or rehearsal—since militaries have organizational interests in conventional doctrine (or preparation for interventions, counterinsurgency, or peacekeeping). Yet as Figure 1.6 reveals, after the end of Cold War not only did exercises increase, but the amount of non-traditional (shaping) exercises eclipsed traditional (deterrence and rehearsal) exercises from the mid-1990’s to the early 2010’s.

Separate from security studies, a few works discuss the role of how individual officers are socialized through international military education, yet there is little discussion of how military units use a traditional war-fighting activity (training) as a non-warfighting operation to influence their environments. The puzzling increase in non-traditional exercises provides an opportunity to better understand major power military behavior in the post-Cold War environment.


1.3. The Argument, Key Concepts, and Alternative Explanations

The Two-Part Argument

My argument seeks to answer two aspects of the puzzle described above: (1) why do major powers conduct exercises with non-allies and (2) why have these types of exercises increased since the end of the Cold War? The first part of my argument is that major powers usually conduct MMEs with non-allies in order to reduce uncertainty in their strategic environments. The manner in which major powers reduce strategic uncertainty is through shaping operations, which are the non-war use of military force to set the conditions for successful future operations and influence the environment before the onset of hostilities. The tools of shaping operations are
comprised of non-warfighting activities such as military diplomacy, strategic engagement, security assistance, and building partner capacity.\textsuperscript{34} Non-traditional MMEs serve as a major instrument of shaping operations. Major powers use these training events to address an ambiguous security environment: when the type and location of threats are largely unknown, as well as which states will offer military or diplomatic support, shaping MMEs serve as an attempt to influence partners, improve relations between militaries, and strengthen weaker armies to reduce these sources of uncertainty and better provide security for their citizens and partners.

By uncertainty I refer generally to the lack of predictability and transparency perceived by an organization; this lack of predictability leads to a sense of the loss of control over decisions and outcomes.\textsuperscript{35} Uncertainty could also be thought of as the inability to confidently assign probability values to outcomes (or consequences).\textsuperscript{36} With regards to military planning, officers make an assessment of threats to national security interests and determine the best tools to ensure these interests are protected. Yet uncertainty rises when the type and location of threats become unknown, as well as which potential allies will contribute in addressing these threats. As uncertainty increases, military responses need to be adjusted and shaping operations are a tool by which major powers address this strategic unpredictability. This strategic uncertainty is separate from other forms of uncertainty commonly discussed in the traditional works in military


\textsuperscript{35} This broad definition is provided by Gudela Grote in \textit{Management of Uncertainty}; Grote explores other classical and more recent definitions of uncertainty, such as those proposed by Milliken (1987) and Lipshitz and Strauss (1997), yet settles on this definition as it relates to an organization’s sense of lack of control. Gudela Grote, \textit{Management of Uncertainty: Theory and Application in the Design of Systems and Organizations}, (London: Springer, 2009), 11-21.

doctrine. Militaries must also grapple with organizational uncertainty that develops from external institutional interference, inter-service rivalry, and lack of internal unity: unknown budget allocations, civilian intervention, and unstandardized procedures are the main sources of this type of uncertainty. Barry Posen argues that militaries develop offensive doctrines in order to limit this type of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{37} Strategic uncertainty is also separate from what I label technological uncertainty, which is a concern about which weapons, vehicles, and other equipment enemies will adopt and employ in future war. Although military planners must work with government officials and scientists to determine which optimal systems to procure, this process assumes the enemy source (such as the Soviet Union for the US) is known.\textsuperscript{38}

The second aspect of my argument is that non-traditional MMEs have increased since the end of the Cold War due to an increase in non-state threats and the habitual nature of exercise relations. The increase in prominence of non-state threats is a product of two main factors: (1) the collapse of communism in Europe and Asia and (2) the forces of globalization. The rise of new types of threats, such as ethnic war, terrorism, and transnational crime, as well as the consequent problems for military planning, required a response by militaries to develop new means to adequately address these growing international concerns. Non-traditional MMEs, in particular, served as an effective means for major powers to address the uncertainty wrought by non-state threats. Another factor responsible for the rise of MMEs since the end of the Cold War is the habitual nature of multinational exercises. Although major powers usually initiate shaping activities in response to particular crises (such as an outbreak of civil war, terrorist attack, or

\textsuperscript{37} Posen also notes that offensive doctrines allow militaries to impose a designated scenario on an enemy; however, this assumes that the military plans to fight a conventional war against a peer or near-peer adversary, which is usually already known (e.g. interwar planning between the French and German armies). Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 41-47; Barry R. Posen, “Forward: Military Doctrine and The Management of Uncertainty,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2016): 159-160.

escalation between rivals), exercise relations become habitual over time. As previously stated, training is necessary for all militaries to prepare for combat; exercises are conducted on a regular basis to train and test the readiness of units. Many, but not all, MMEs are held on an annual, biannual, or quadrennial basis. As major powers build military relationships with other states, these partnerships sometimes last beyond the initial exercise as major powers view these continuing relationships as positive for national security. Thus, like military training in general, MMEs are inherently ‘sticky’, creating a cumulative effect as military relations continue over time.

*Militaries and Strategic Uncertainty*

Uncertainty presents an acute problem for military planning, both before and during conflict. Militaries attempt to minimize uncertainty through reconnaissance and the collection of intelligence, which provide information about potential enemies and battlefields. Military planners incorporate numerous variables into their plans, including geography, weather, history, civilian considerations, enemy composition, as well as the capabilities of their own forces and allies (among a host of other variables), in order to gain an advantage and reduce unpredictability during battle. Yet war’s inherent uncertainty results in the inability for planners to confidently predict the outbreak, outcome, and consequences of conflict. Even before large-scale conventional war, when planners are confident about which enemy they will be facing and the general direction in which to anticipate attack, a level of uncertainty still remains about how the

---


battle will ensue. For instance, French military planners before World War I were unsure about whether the German army would invade through Belgium or the Alsace-Lorraine; decisions about where to position forces and whether to conduct counteroffensives were tied to this uncertainty.\textsuperscript{41}

Even after battle commences, warfare is in itself an unpredictable and chaotic human endeavor. When armies do engage in war, they are challenged by multiple factors that make the outcomes of fighting unpredictable: imperfect knowledge of an opponent’s actions and will, unreliable intelligence estimates, unforeseen circumstances in weather or geography, misunderstood orders, individual battlefield heroics, and at the most basic level, the pervasive influence of chance. Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz noted that although military leaders attempt to make war an objective “matter of assessing probabilities,” the element of chance makes warfare essentially a gamble: “In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.”\textsuperscript{42} Since the outcomes and consequences of warfare are difficult to predict, militaries are not only unsure about whether they will achieve victory in their own battles, but are also forced to confront the possible negative implications of other wars for their citizens and partners, especially those emanating from civil wars and fragile states.

The problem of strategic uncertainty for military planning becomes even more severe when threats and assistance are unknown. Especially given the unpredictable nature of non-state

\textsuperscript{41} Snyder, \textit{The Ideology of the Offensive}, 41-48.

threats (such as terrorism and transnational crime) as well as expansive potential locations of threats (e.g. failed states, overpopulated cities, impoverished regions), military planners are faced with a complex strategic environment. When militaries are unsure about who is a threat, from where threats will emanate, and who will be an ally against these threats, they are unable to properly plan for contingencies and develop an appropriate conventional doctrine to address this uncertainty. I argue that militaries face strategic uncertainty from two sources: (1) who is a threat and from where does it emanate; (2) who will provide assistance in addressing these threats. Militaries may be uncertain about two aspects of threats: namely, their character and location. First, military planners assess the ‘who’ of threats: whether danger will originate from state conventional (and nuclear) adversaries, non-state insurgents, transnational criminals, or natural disasters. Second, uncertainty may also arise from an inability to predict the location of threats, especially in regards to violent non-state actors, pandemics, or natural disasters. Military planners are concerned about the assistance they receive from others: whether potential allies will contribute to multilateral missions and whether fragile militaries are capable and willing to provide security for themselves. In order to address these two sources of uncertainty in their strategic environments, military planners have begun to implement shaping operations.

My argument holds that shaping exercises have proliferated since the end of the Cold War due to an increase in strategic uncertainty, wrought by the rise in non-state threats. Though the risk of high-intensity, conventional war was high during the Cold War, the source (state actors) and location (Europe) were generally known by strategic planners.43 However, especially since the

43 The assumption that the source and location of potential war during the Cold War was between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe was prevalent in both policy and academic debates in the 1980’s. For an example, see John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, Steven J. Zologa, Malcom Chalmers, and Lutz Unterseher, “Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment and the Tank Gap Data Flap,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989): 128-179.
end of the Cold War, major power militaries have increasingly struggled to predict the source
and location from which threats will emanate. US senior military leaders have emphasized this
growing uncertainty. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the graduating class of
the National Defense University in 2016: “In the environment we are in today, with the
complexity and volatility and variety of challenges we have, how do we assess risk? ... How do
we assess the capabilities or capacities that must exist in the joint force? A part of this is also
how to prepare for the unexpected.” Comparing the current strategic environment to the Cold
War, US Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown noted in a recent interview:

> It's amazing how complex the world has become. I often would joke, 'The last
time I was bored was in the Cold War.' I was a company commander, and I had a
responsibility in an area against the Soviets. You know, they could have come
across but you kind of knew they wouldn't be that crazy. We had learned to fight
outnumbered and win. We had almost 300,000 in Europe. We trained hard, but
there was still time to get bored. I have not been bored since, and I don't think
we'll be bored for another 50 years. The world is just so interconnected and
complex.

This concern about unpredictability is also manifest in most current US military operational
doctrine:

> The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and can change rapidly,
requiring military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with
multinational partners... The strategic environment is fluid, with continually
changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict
precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can
expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.

---


In order to effectively deal with these types of unpredictable and sometimes unknowable threats, major power militaries increased their use of shaping operations, especially non-traditional MMEs. A further description of the rise in strategic uncertainty since the early 1990’s is provided in Chapter 2.

**Major Power Strategic Environments**

I define a major power’s *strategic environment* as the land-geographic sum of its allies, potential allies, and threats; these regions serve as the priority areas in which militaries plan and resource for future or potential operations.\(^{47}\) Strategic environments are determined by a state’s grand strategy, which places emphasis on particular geographic locations and sovereign history; each major power places varying emphasis on either factor. Though the concept of a strategic environment may seem amorphous, I argue that these planning environments are observable through a military’s regional commands, permanent advisory units, and grand strategy. Usually, major power militaries establish regional commands or strategic advisors that are responsible for these regions; they are also mentioned in their strategy documents as comprising an important area for contingency planning. Though major powers are relatively certain that their allies will not be threats and will contribute to operations, they are less sure about whether potential allies will offer help during missions or from which locations threats will become manifest. Strategic environments vary for each major power. The strategic environment of the Western European major powers—the UK, France, and Germany—is comprised of the European continent and these powers’ former colonies; for the Eastern powers of Russia, China, and India, the environment is largely along their borders and within the region; because of American primacy,

\(^{47}\) I distinguish between ‘land’ and other component environments (such as air or sea) because I am focused on land-based exercises, which I argue elsewhere should be conceptualized differently than these other components.
the US strategic environment is global. Major power strategic environments are further explored in Chapter 3.

Shaping MMEs to Reduce Uncertainty

How do major powers reduce strategic uncertainty through exercises? The initiative for shaping exercises usually originates from military officers, defense ministry civilian officials, or as a joint endeavor between planners from both fields. These planners attempt to manage the two sources of strategic uncertainty elucidated above—threat and assistance—through four types of non-traditional MMEs: recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing.

First, major powers use recruitment exercises to prepare partners for alliance membership, enlist the help of other states to assist in multilateral missions, or simply to build friendlier ties. Major powers, especially the US, have incentives to gain the diplomatic or military support of other states for multilateral missions, as long as the time horizon and operational commitment allow.\(^\text{48}\) By gaining the support of other militaries, major powers seek to reduce the uncertainty associated with which states will offer assistance to these types of missions. Moreover, major powers may use recruitment MMEs simply to build friendlier relations with other states and create more certainty about which states are friendly and which are threatening.

Second, militaries use capacity-building training to increase the ability for fragile state militaries to provide security for themselves and prevent the necessity for future major power intervention. These types of exercises attempt to address the uncertainty of both the type and location of threats, especially terrorism, ethnic conflict, and natural disasters. By providing the training and mentorship necessary to carry out their own operations, major power militaries seek to reduce

the uncertainty of threats emanating from fragile regions. Moreover, major powers hope that the capabilities of the partner are increased to the degree that future intervention becomes unnecessary. Thus, major powers ‘delegate’ responsibility to these fragile partners.

Third, major power militaries use role-forming exercises to influence a partner military’s role that it serves for its society. By encouraging certain practices during exercises, such as respect for international law or stability through repression, major power militaries hope to create expectations of military behavior and reduce the uncertainty of the source of threats. By influencing the role these partners serve for their societies, major powers hope that these non-allies will become friendlier to the major power’s interests in the future. Fourth, in order to reduce the risk of unintentional war with rivals, major power militaries conduct trust-developing exercises with one another as a means of removing one potential source of threat from their strategic environment. Though major power rivals view each other with suspicion, if they are not engaged in open hostility they often will attempt to ameliorate tensions and build friendly relations. Major power rivals attempt to prevent the onset of accidental war through joint training by altering their soldiers’ perceptions of one another to be viewed as more ‘human’ than adversarial. As rival soldiers interact along contested borders, on the seas, or in proxy states, major powers hope these individuals or units can de-escalate crises by not assuming the worst of intentions in one another but cooperate to find a mutual solution. The rise of non-state threats such as terrorism provides a suitable excuse for major power rivals to cooperate.

*Exercises by Partner-Type*

In general, major powers choose which type of exercise to conduct based on partner-type: rehearsal and deterrence exercises are conducted with allies, recruitment with potential allies,
trust-developing with rivals, capacity-building with fragile states, and role-forming with transitioning (or consolidating) states. Planners determine which exercise-type is most appropriate by observing a partner’s capability: if partner armies are advanced enough to be useful for multilateral operations, they are recruited; if partner armies are well-established but have endured state transition or continued consolidation, role-forming is most useful; if partners are fragile with a military that needs to be built ‘from the ground up’, capacity-building is necessary. In order to quantify these categories, I develop indices based on state capacity and ability to contribute to multilateral missions. By fragile state I refer to those states that are considered to experience ‘extreme’ or ‘high’ fragility according to the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index; by transitioning state, I refer to states with ‘low’ to ‘serious’ fragility. Militaries in fragile states are usually developed post-war and operate with little-to-no effectiveness (e.g. Afghanistan post-2001); conversely, transitioning militaries are generally previously stable organizations that undergo reform due to a regime transition or attempt to consolidate rule (e.g. former Soviet republics). Figure 1.7 below depicts each MME-type by partner-type, source of uncertainty, and major power mechanism to reduce uncertainty. If a partner is not an ally, the major power may attempt to enlist the cooperation of the state for upcoming or potential missions. If the partner is not a rival or potential ally, the major power chooses an exercise function based on the partner military’s level of development: for relatively functioning and stable forces in transitioning states, major powers seek to shape the roles that the partner militaries serve for their societies. For fragile states with extremely weak armies, major

---

powers need to start ‘from the ground up’ to build their capacity to function as effective military forces. It is important to note that this typology is idealized and allies often participate in non-traditional MMEs to support a major power’s shaping, such as NATO Partnership for Peace exercises that involved many NATO members and a few transitioning partners. A decision tree for partner-type selection is included in Chapter 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Traditional MME-Type</th>
<th>Source of Uncertainty</th>
<th>Common Partner-Type</th>
<th>Mechanism to Shape and Reduce Uncertainty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>Assistance, Threat</td>
<td>Potential Ally</td>
<td>Encourage and prepare partners for alliance membership or multilateral mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-Building</td>
<td>Assistance, Threat</td>
<td>Fragile State</td>
<td>Strengthen partner to provide own security or participate in regional missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role-Forming</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Transitioning/ Consolidating State</td>
<td>Influence character of partner military to be more trustworthy or capable of preventing revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust-Developing</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>Change perceptions from hostile to friendly to prevent escalation of inadvertent war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1.7: Non-Traditional MMEs by Sources of Uncertainty, Partner-Types, and Mechanisms*

**State-Centric Approach to Military Exercises**

My argument assumes a ‘state-centric’ approach to international politics: I presume that states—comprised of central decision-makers such as executive national leaders, militaries, and foreign ministries—act as rational, unitary actors apart from the private interests of bureaucracies and society—that is, legislative bodies and interest groups. This framework assumes that in the realms of foreign policy, security, and defense, government officials that lead major military and
foreign bureaucracies commonly act in pursuance of goals set by national leaders.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, I expect that militaries generally pursue national (as opposed to private, bureaucratic) interests, of which security is a vital state goal. I believe the state-centric approach is appropriate for my argument for two main reasons. First, national security is one of the main functions of all governments and protecting citizens ranks high as a priority of the national interest, regardless of regime-type.\textsuperscript{51} Civilian government officials are concerned about providing security and task the military with the responsibility for protecting the nation. Although military preferences may diverge from their civilian masters’ regarding whether to use force abroad in particular cases (usually humanitarian) or in certain policy decisions\textsuperscript{52}, I argue that in general both civilian government officials and military officers seek to provide security for their citizens (and partners) and develop policies accordingly. Second, the conclusion of the Cold War has resulted in a complex security environment in which civilian leaders and diplomats often rely on military power to address strategic uncertainty—that is, when the source and location of threats, as well as potential allies to meet these challenges, are relatively unknown. As government officials struggle to prevent, anticipate, and react to non-state threats, they both task and assume that the military will implement policies to address these new security problems. Thus, because of my focus on national security and the unique nature of the post-Cold War environment, I argue that a state-centric approach is appropriate for my analysis. However, there are two main challenges to

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
my argument and assumptions, both of which are supported by the traditional works in military doctrine, described below.

Alternative Explanations

In order to support my argument, I test my theory against two alternative explanations that represent the traditional perspective on military doctrine. My approach and the traditional approach contain diverging expectations for military behavior in the post-Cold War environment in two major aspects. First, the traditional works anticipate that major power militaries conduct MMEs to serve the purposes of deterrence or rehearsal in order to fulfill the conventional postures of offense, defense, and deterrence. Even in the post-Cold War environment, major powers need to rehearse for combat missions against non-state threats; accordingly, rehearsals may be conducted to prepare for counterinsurgencies, peacekeeping missions, or humanitarian interventions. The implication of this theory is that the size and composition of exercises are significant enough to serve the purpose of preparing for combined operations or sending a credible deterring signal to a third party. If the traditional view is correct, following the end of the Cold War we would expect to observe that MMEs are primarily (but maybe not wholly) concerned with preparing for or deterring war (or other missions), even with non-allies. Conversely, if major powers use exercises with non-allies as a type of shaping operation instead of the threat or use of force, the traditional view would be undermined.

Second, the traditional view would anticipate that shaping MMEs are simply a more modern attempt by major power militaries to pursue narrow organizational interests. In this view, although national leaders expect militaries to provide national defense and protect citizens, militaries often pursue their own parochial interests that diverge from civilian preferences. In this
light, militaries are imagined as vast bureaucracies that rely on standardized procedures, biased decision-making, and resource-seeking behavior which create military policies that diverge from the national interest. In regards to shaping operations, the traditional literature would expect that militaries pursue these exercises not purely to provide security, but more so to increase organizational size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy. This perspective applies organization theory and bureaucratic politics to the study of military doctrine and there are two implications resulting from this approach. First, if this approach is correct, we would anticipate that shaping operations would provide incentives to diverge from the national interest; in particular, increases in organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy from civilian oversight. Second, this approach expects that civilian decision-makers—national leaders and government ministers—would anticipate this parochial behavior and intervene in military policy to prevent a divergence from the national interest. Thus, we should observe contestation between uniformed soldiers and government civilians about the necessity and value of shaping operations. The alternative explanations and their implications are explored in greater detail in Chapter 2.

1.4 Mixed-Method Research Design: Case Study Process-Tracing and Large-N Regression

In order to determine why major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies, as well as why these exercises increased since the end of the Cold War, my identification strategy is two-fold: case study process-tracing and large-N binomial and multinomial logit regressions. I test my argument against the alternative explanations as well as four other hypotheses using both qualitative and quantitative methods. I use a mixed-method research design due to nature of my argument and the indicators for my hypotheses: in general, I use case studies to illustrate each non-traditional function and determine whether they serve the function of shaping or, instead,
point to the expectations of the alternatives. I also use the process-tracing method to test arguments that rely on indicators that are difficult to quantify in large-N regressions, such as a perceived increase in uncertainty and civil-military competition over resources. On the other hand, I use statistical models to test arguments that are more clearly appropriate for quantification, such as whether partners conducted exercises in a time period or in which region exercises occur.

My unit of analysis throughout the study is the state (expressed as a major power, ally, non-ally, or partner) comprised of central government decision-makers, civilian-led ministries, and militaries; my observations are military exercises between at least two partners. Though the concept of ‘major power’ carries different interpretations, I include as major powers those delineated by the authors of the Correlates of War State System Membership Project, which is essentially a state that has certain capabilities and behaviors reminiscent of a major power (agreed upon by the coders).53 From 1945-2016, these countries include the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan. However, I make two caveats to this list: (1) though Japan may be considered an economic major power, I exclude the country due to its constitutional inability to project military force outside of its borders54; (2) I include India, which, as of the most recent Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) list, had the third highest Composite of National Capabilities (CINC) behind the US and China and the


54 If Japan is constitutionally unable to deploy military power, then the country’s armed forces would not conduct ‘rehearsals’, but only ‘deterrence’ in self-defense. Thus, the case of Japan may be partly biased away from traditional explanations. Moreover, according to my data, Japan has only conducted exercises with the US as a participant, as opposed to the other major power that conducted (at least some) exercises without the US. Japan’s military reliance on the US calls into question its independence in military doctrine.
fourth largest military in 2012.\textsuperscript{55} My universe of cases includes both actual land-based MMEs, as well as the counterfactual ‘no-MMEs’, every year between 1980-2016.\textsuperscript{56}

\textit{Case-Study Process-Tracing}

My case studies are intended to test the first part of my argument—that major powers conduct shaping MMEs in order to reduce strategic uncertainty—against both of the alternative explanations. My argument and the alternatives will be tested in four illustrative case studies: one for each non-traditional function. Although I develop my general theory from US military doctrine and operations, the illustrative case studies explore each exercise function employed by different major powers—specifically, the US, UK, Russia, China, and India. The case studies represent the most well-known and consistent exercise programs for these major powers (with regards to each non-traditional type). I chose these cases not only due to their prominence—statistics are provided in the following paragraph—but also to highlight how shaping exercises are not just unique to one major power (e.g. the US), one region (e.g. the West), or regime-type (e.g. democracy), but all major powers. Each chapter will explain the purpose of the exercise type, describe how these shaping activities reduce strategic uncertainty, and locate the sources of these exercises within major power doctrine or the practices of international organizations.


\textsuperscript{56} By land-based exercise, I exclude computer-simulated, staff, air-defense, air, and naval exercises, as well as international military workshops or seminars. I chose to single-out land-based exercises for several reasons. First, as opposed to computer-simulated and staff exercises, land-based exercises are financially costly and require trade-offs by the participating militaries. Second, though naval or air assets may play a supporting role to land-based exercises, I exclude naval and air training because these types of exercises are sometimes difficult to distinguish between regular joint patrols. Moreover, air and naval exercises are more often conducted than land exercises for practical purposes, such as avoiding collisions in the global commons with other military or commercial vessels.
In each illustrative case study, I process-trace the history, decision-making, and execution of each MME program. In Chapter 4, I analyze the US and NATO’s use of recruitment exercises to enlist the aid of others for multilateral missions and India’s attempts to build friendlier relations with other militaries. Recruitment exercises are illustrated by the US-led field exercises as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program during the 1990’s. According to my dataset, PfP MMEs make up the majority of Western major power recruitment exercises since the end of the Cold War: 66% for the US, 77% for the UK, 39% for France, and 80% for Germany.

Chapter 5 covers American, British, and French attempts to build partner capacity through military training, illustrated by the case of the UK training program in Sierra Leone from 2002-2016. In Chapter 6, I discuss Russian and Chinese use of regional security organizations to conduct role-forming exercises with Central Asian and Transcaucasian partners; these types of MMEs are illustrated by Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises to encourage regime stability in its ‘near abroad’ from 2003-2012. CSTO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) exercises comprise roughly 53% of Russian shaping MMEs, while SCO exercises make up about 44% of Chinese MMEs. Finally, in Chapter 7 I observe trust-developing exercises with a discussion of major power rivals’—such as the US and Russia—attempts to use MMEs as confidence and security-building measures. The illustrative case study involves India and China’s counter-terrorism and disaster relief exercises between 2006-2016.

My process-tracing method relies on two sources of evidence: (1) state behavior and (2) what military leaders, government officials, and strategic documents say. My evidence draws largely from texts (news reports, operational military doctrine, security strategies, and national security ‘white papers’) and expert interviews. I conducted eleven in-depth, semi-structured interviews
with military officers and government officials from different countries to gather evidence for each case study. For militaries to which I have limited access, such as China or Russia, I interviewed experts and military officers from states in the surrounding region with experience working with those types of military practitioners. I evaluate my argument against the two alternative explanations. Evidence that would support my argument are statements (public and private) and military behaviors that indicate that the purpose of the training events was to reduce strategic uncertainty through shaping operations. Evidence that would undermine my argument are actions and statements that point to other reasons for conducting these MMEs: namely, as opportunities to rehearse for/deter war, or to serve parochial organizational interests.

**Large-N Logit Regressions**

In order to test my arguments statistically, I conduct binomial and multinomial logit regressions with fixed-effects specifications of four hypotheses using a novel dataset of pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data. I developed this dataset by collecting over 1,000 ground-based exercises between at least one major power and another state from 1980 to 2016 and coded each by date, participant states, training tasks, number of troops, MME function, alliance or security organization involved, exercise program, and, if available, when the exercise program began. These categories of information serve as indicators for my variables described below. Each exercise was reported in the news or announced by military public affairs office. I include only land-based MMEs in order to separate actual exercises from workshops, seminars, or computer-simulated exercises; I also exclude air, air defense, and naval exercises, which serve other functions.\(^57\) I borrow most observations from a dataset compiled by Vito D’Orazio, but

\(^{57}\) See footnote 53 for further explanation on my decision to study land-based MMEs exclusively.
code more exercises and re-code some of his observations to reflect training task, number of troops, organization or alliance involved, exercise program history, and function. D’Orazio’s Joint Military Exercise dataset (v. 3) covers the years 1970-2010; my dataset includes the years 1980-2016 because the data before 1980 is not as reliable.\textsuperscript{58} I also created over 40,000 ‘partner-years’ between a major power and every other state in the international system from 1980-2016; this set is applied to the four hypotheses explained below.

For each hypothesis, I use partner-years for each major power and every other state in the international system from 1980-2016. Because I use a TSCS dataset, I include lagged dependent variables, fixed effects, and random effects in various models. My hypotheses test expectations of my theory and are explained below (explanatory, outcome, and control variables for each hypothesis are described in Chapter 8). My first argument anticipates that major powers are more likely to conduct non-traditional (shaping) MMEs with non-allies. Hypothesis 1\textsubscript{a} below tests this assumption:

\textit{H}\textsubscript{1a}(Argument One: General Partner-Type): Major powers are more likely to conduct non-traditional (recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, or trust-developing) exercises than traditional exercises with non-allies.

I also test to determine whether major powers are likely to conduct certain MMEs with certain partners:

\textit{H}\textsubscript{1b}(Argument One: Specific Partner-Type): Certain partners are more likely to participate in certain MME functions: allies conduct deterrence and rehearsal, rivals conduct trust-developing, fragile states conduct capacity-building, transitioning/consolidating states conduct role-forming, and potential allies conduct recruitment exercises.

\textsuperscript{58} Vito D’Orazio’s Dataset (JME Data v. 3) can be accessed at http://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html. D’Orazio’s data was originally collected as part of his dissertation project; see Vito D’Orazio, “International Military Cooperation: From Concepts to Constructs” (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2013).
If major powers conduct traditional MMEs with both allies and non-allies, or if there is no discernible difference between exercise function and partner-choice, my argument would be undermined. Second, because I argue that major power militaries are more likely to conduct shaping MMEs within their strategic environments, I test the following hypothesis:

$H_2$ (Argument One: Strategic Environments): Major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs with non-allies in their ‘strategic environments’ than with other states outside of their strategic environments.

If major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs within their strategic environments—globally for the US, within Europe and former colonies for the Western powers, and along the borders for the Asian powers—my argument would find support. Conversely, if there are no geographic or historical determinants of exercise participants, my theory would be challenged.

I test my second argument using two hypotheses that help inform why shaping MMEs have increased since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, my argument anticipates that MMEs have expanded due to the increase in strategic uncertainty wrought by the rise of non-state threats and because of the habitual nature of exercise relations. The two hypotheses are:

$H_3$ (Argument Two: Increase in Uncertainty): Major powers are more likely to conduct shaping exercises when uncertainty is greater; that is, after the fall of communism (1992-2016) rather than before (1980-1991).

$H_4$ (Argument Two: Habitual Exercise Relations): Major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs with non-allies with which they have conducted MMEs in the past.

These four hypotheses attempt to test the predictions of both parts of my argument by applying the full universe of cases; that is, both MMEs and ‘non-MMEs’ between major powers and every other state in the international system.
1.5. Contributions and Plan of the Dissertation

This study hopes to contribute to the scholarly literature and policy community in several ways. First, this dissertation seeks to provide a supplement to theories of military doctrine for the post-Cold War environment. The dramatic changes in the security environment, the blurring of war and peace in the fight against non-state actors, and the rarity of open conventional warfare between state actors require an updated understanding of the ways in which major powers are active in providing security for their citizens through ‘non-war’ means. By studying the behavior of major power militaries and their partners in both the final decade of and after the end of the Cold War, I highlight the transition from traditional ‘use and threat of force’ to ‘shaping’ activities that has occurred over time.

Second, though warfare is studied extensively, military exercises are under-theorized in the international relations literature. Military exercises, both traditional and non-traditional, offer a useful indicator of modern military behavior. For those few works that discuss multinational training, the focus is usually on deterrence or a vague concept of ‘military cooperation’ that is not problematized. Especially since the early 1990’s, large-scale conventional war has been rare and scholars must look to other military activities to determine military behavior. Thus, my study will contribute to the international security literature by introducing a theory of military exercises and highlight the important role they have played in an era of fewer wars but also persistent low-intensity conflict.

Third, this dissertation offers not only a novel theory of how exercises are used to provide security but also a quantitative measure which provides insights into which type and how often major power militaries employ both traditional and shaping activities. By comparing the relative frequency of traditional and non-traditional exercises, this work hopes to provide empirical
support for the growing relevance of shaping as an emerging tactic for all major power militaries. Moreover, this study offers policymakers and practitioners alike a useful dataset of exercises by partner-type, training task, number of troops, alliance or security organization, program history, and function as well as extensive, in-depth case studies of military exercises. This project attempts to provide a better understanding of why major powers conduct exercises and how they seek to shape their environments.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. Part I includes the introduction, puzzle, research design, key concepts, and theory. Chapter 2 is a detailed explication of my argument; it explores the literature on military doctrine and how traditional theories have addressed military responses to uncertainty. Moreover, the chapter discusses the rise in strategic uncertainty since the end of the Cold War and how major powers increasingly used shaping MMEs to address this unpredictability. Chapter 3 provides a description of key concepts: a brief history of MMEs, trends in ground-based multinational exercises from 1980-2016, the functions of exercises by partner-type, and how strategic environments drive major power decisions to conduct MMEs.

In Part II, I describe the four types of major power MMEs with non-allies and illustrate each through the process-tracing of a case study. In Chapter 4, I depict the first major power exercise function: recruitment. Major powers, such as the US, UK, France, Germany, use recruitment exercises to enlist the help of other militaries to provide support for operations, which helps reduce uncertainty in who provides assistance to multilateral missions. Additionally, major powers, such as India, use recruitment exercises to build friendlier ties with its neighbors, which
provides more certainty over ‘who’ is a threat in the region. Recruitment exercises are illustrated by the US and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program throughout the 1990’s.

In **Chapter 5**, I develop the second type of MME with non-allies: capacity-building. The chapter shows how and why major powers—especially the US, UK, and France—attempt to strengthen the ability for fragile state militaries to provide security for themselves without the need for future major power assistance. This exercise function is illustrated by the UK’s experience with training the local forces in Sierra Leone from 2000-2016.

**Chapter 6** offers a description of the third type of exercises with non-allies: role-forming. The chapter describes why and how major powers, most notably Russia and China, use these types of exercises to influence the function that transitioning/consolidating states serve for their societies, which in turn provides security for the major power. This category of exercise is illustrated by a series of training events conduct by Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) from 2003-2012.

**Chapter 7** covers the final function of military exercises with non-allies: trust-developing. These exercises are conducted by major power rivals, such as the US and Russia, that seek to build confidence, reduce hostilities, and ameliorate the risk of inadvertent war. By transforming relations from hostile to friendly, major powers hope to reduce one source of threat in their environments. This exercise function is illustrated by a case study of training conducted between India and China from 2006-2016.

**Part III** provides my data and statistical tests as well as my conclusions about the impact of military exercises on international security. In **Chapter 8**, I detail my method for gathering, coding, and testing observations in order to provide justification for my argument. With **Chapter 9**, I offer my conclusions about MMEs and international security. I discuss how
shaping interacts with the growing concern about the militarization of foreign policy, three ways in which shaping MMEs negatively affect international security, and the startling return of traditional deterrence exercises since 2010, indicating a possible reoccurrence of Cold War relations between the US and Russia.
CHAPTER 2
SHAPING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain my argument in greater detail through an analysis of military doctrine, strategic uncertainty, and shaping operations. I argue that the traditional works on military doctrine are insufficient in describing military activities since the end of superpower rivalry. Instead, I hold that in addition to preparations for conventional war, major power militaries after the end of the Cold War were forced to respond to a host of other non-state threats. Shaping exercises served as one type of response; the reason why major power militaries conduct MMEs with non-allies is to influence their environments and reduce strategic uncertainty. These types of exercises have expanded since the end of the Cold War due to an increase in uncertainty wrought by the growing prominence of non-state threats (which arose from the remnants of communism and the consequences of globalization). Moreover, the habitual nature of military relations has resulted in a cumulative effect in which both traditional and non-traditional exercises have reached unprecedented levels.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I explain in greater detail the concept of shaping operations, how they situate within the traditional works in military doctrine, and how they are expected to reduce uncertainty. Second, I compare the relative certainty of the last decade of the Cold War to the complex, uncertain threats that proliferated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, I describe how major power militaries reacted to this increase in strategic uncertainty through non-traditional shaping MMEs. Fourth, I discuss why military exercise relations are ‘sticky’ which provides a partial explanation to the rise in MMEs since the end of the Cold War. Fifth, I discuss the two alternative explanations, how they challenge my
argument, and how my argument responds to these alternative perspectives. I then conclude as a transition to the following chapters on key concepts which help guide my case studies and statistical tests.

2.2 Military Doctrine and Shaping Operations

*Traditional Military Doctrine*

In the political science sub-fields of international security and strategic studies, military doctrine has traditionally been viewed as a sub-set of grand strategy that is concerned with the military means employed to achieve political ends. More specifically, military doctrine is conceptualized as a national military’s “principles about how to fight”, which can be assessed along three aspects: type of operations (offense, defense, or deterrence), level of innovation (innovative or stagnant), and degree of integration (well-integrated into political ends, or not).

These principles are derived from strategic-level decisions and plans about how do address future conventional war. Doctrine is necessary because resources are scarce: government officials work with military leaders to prioritize acquisitions, technology, and force structure after an appraisal of potential threats in order to realize political ends.

Military doctrine encompasses military planning all the way from the joint-level—that is, encompassing all component services (generally land, sea, air, and nuclear)—down to small-level unit tactics, yet most of the focus is on national military strategy. The traditional works are generally interested

---


60 Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 7, 13

in national component-level doctrine that is developed in order to prepare for large-scale war; for instance, the British air defense system or German plans for a strategic ‘blitzkrieg’-type penetration during the interwar period. These plans and postures stand ready to be employed under two conditions: once the order is given by government officials, or in response to an attack. Indicators of military doctrine are found in force posture and weapon systems, which are closely monitored by other states in order to anticipate military behavior. Analyses of warfighting doctrine and doctrinal change are often separated into periods of ‘war’ versus periods of ‘peace’ in which the latter environment provides immense obstacles against innovation.

The traditional understanding holds that military officers are narrowly concerned with their parochial interests—such as organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy—and develop military doctrines (often offensive in nature) that emphasize seizing the initiative and denying a conventional enemy its preferred strategy even if this doctrine is inappropriate or counterproductive to civilian-led grand strategy. Military officers’ preoccupation with aggressive doctrines derive from their biased view of international politics, interpreted as a “zero-sum” environment in which “wars are seen as difficult to avoid and almost impossible to keep limited.” Military planners thus favor preemptive and preventive strategies: “Seeing war more likely than it really is, they increase its likelihood by adopting offensive plans and buying offensive forces.” Conversely, civilian government officials are uniquely attuned to cues provided by the international environment, especially changes in the distribution of military

---

62 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 14-22.
63 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 8-39.
64 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 47-50; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive,
65 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 28.
66 Ibid.
capabilities among powers, and work externally with allies and potential allies to meet emerging threats.\textsuperscript{67} When militaries pursue their own interests at the cost of overall grand strategy, civilians must intervene and re-integrate military doctrine, lest they risk policy incoherence or even catastrophic military behavior.\textsuperscript{68} More recent works have challenged these earlier theories by questioning whether material organizational interests (as opposed to organizational culture) drive choice of military doctrine, how militaries are able to innovate despite the organizational disincentives to do so, and how specific doctrines of force employment affect battlefield outcomes.\textsuperscript{69} However, even this newer research imagines the military as a ‘threat and use of force’ instrument through offensive and defense operations, in which militaries apply combat power to either disarm an opponent, seize territory, or protect their own forces and territory through the denial of enemy attacks.

\textit{Shaping Operations}

Shaping operations, in contrast to traditional offensive and defensive tasks, comprise the many \textit{non-warfighting} activities that militaries employ to achieve national objectives. Shaping operations are commonly employed before the onset of conflict as a proactive means to influence other militaries and often as an attempt to prevent war. Common shaping activities include military diplomacy, security cooperation, and forward presence, among others. Military diplomacy is generally viewed as efforts militaries pursue in order to develop relationships with

---

\textsuperscript{67} Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine}, 51-54.


\textsuperscript{69} Kier, \textit{Imagining War}, 14-20; Rosen, \textit{Winning the Next War}; Biddle, \textit{Military Power}. 

46
other militaries and their governments, usually for the ultimate purpose of building partnerships for future operations or preventing conflict among rivals. These interactions include senior officer visits, student exchanges, workshops, seminars, and port visits, among other activities. Military officers view these relationships as necessary to develop before the onset of a crisis in order to ensure that a multilateral response is effective.\(^70\) ‘Strategic engagement’ is another form of military diplomacy which comprises initiatives designed to improve relations and prevent conflict among adversaries.\(^71\) One of the oldest forms of military diplomacy is the use of military attachés, which are liaison officers deployed to the capitals of other nations in order to observe the military developments of other states, provide advice to ambassadors, and work with host militaries. Though the term developed in the nineteenth century, the stationing of military officers for political or diplomatic purposes can be dated back to the Roman empire.\(^72\)

Though there are competing definitions (and overlap with other concepts such as military diplomacy), security cooperation generally refers to military assistance—through funding, equipment, intelligence, and advisors—provided to other militaries. These means of assistance are designed to strengthen the ability of partner militaries to operate in missions, maintain positive military relationships, and, for some major powers, ensure basing access for future operations.\(^73\) Security cooperation between allies was common throughout the twentieth century. In the years prior to the outbreak of World War I, the French Army helped finance Russian rail lines in order to ensure the Russian army was able to mobilize quickly and offset a possible


German attack on France.\footnote{Snyder, \textit{The Ideology of the offensive}, 43.} During the Cold War the US commonly provided funding and weapons to allies in order to ensure they were prepared to defend in the case of Soviet or Chinese attack.\footnote{Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in \textit{The Cambridge History of the Cold War}, Vol. 1, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 85-88.} Both the US and Soviet Union provided funding to allies and non-allied proxies in South America, Africa, and East Asia in order to develop spheres of influence and prevent the ideological expansion of the other superpower.\footnote{Michael E. Latham, “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975,” in \textit{The Cambridge History of the Cold War}, Vol. 2, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 258-280.} Although major powers continue to assist their allies with ‘traditional’ security cooperation, they have significantly increased their use of non-traditional—that is, assistance to non-allies (especially weak and fragile states)—cooperation since the early 1990’s.\footnote{On the difference between traditional and non-traditional security cooperation, see Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress,” \textit{Congressional Research Service}, December 18, 2015, pgs. 7-8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf. On the expansion of shaping since the end of the Cold War, see Cottey and Forster, 3-14; Derek S. Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 4-5.} Post-Cold War security cooperation is commonly manifested in initiatives such as ‘security sector reform’ and ‘building partner-capacity’: the former is usually associated with improving ministerial-level management, policies, and budgeting within various government departments (not just defense), while the latter normally refers to strengthening the ability for partner militaries to provide for their own security or participate effectively in multilateral missions.\footnote{Paul Jackson, “Security Sector Reform and State Building,” \textit{Third World Quarterly}, Vol. 32, No. 10 (2011): 1803-1822; McInnis and Lucas, 5-8.} Weak and failing states are usually the recipient of funds and advisors for these types of programs.

Derek Reveron argues that shaping operations are “different in fundamental ways from warfighting. Shaping is about managing relationships, not command and control; it is about cooperation, not fighting; and it is about partnership, not dominance.” In the case of the US
military, he argues, “To advance American interests, combatant commanders build partners’ capabilities and capacity to generate security, influence nonpartners and potential adversaries, mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism, and enable rapid action when military intervention is required.”79 These types of activities are conceptually separate from the traditional war-fighting utilization of militaries; that is, the use or threat of force employed through deterrence or offensive and defensive operations. Instead, these types of operations apply non-traditional approaches to managing challenges to security by attempting, primarily, to prevent conflict. As former commander of Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, noted about the purpose of shaping operations as proactive influence: “When I assumed command of CENTCOM and had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing them, I chose prevention. If there was any possible approach to making this a less crisis-prone, more secure and stable region, I wanted to try it through shaping operations.”80 Multinational military exercises serve as one common tool major powers employ to achieve the goals of shaping operations.81

US Military Doctrine and Shaping Operations

As opposed to offensive and defensive operations, shaping operations are conducted before the onset of conflict; as opposed to deterrence, shaping operations are continued throughout the duration and after the conclusion of hostilities (in order to prevent future conflict and retain influence in the region). Shaping operations are commonly supervised at the theater-army

---

81 Cottey and Forster, 7; Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 1-5.
(strategic) level of command and are employed continuously in order to maintain influence with other militaries. The US military’s conception of shaping and how these activities are situated within an operational framework is described in the most recent doctrinal manuals for joint operations, multinational operations, and security cooperation: Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, JP 3-16, and JP 3-20 (respectively). JP 3-0, the umbrella operations manual, notes that shaping activities, which include preventive military engagement, security cooperation, and building partner capacity, are expected to be conducted by commanders in order to “help set the conditions for successful theater operations.”

The goal of shaping operations is to “improve perceptions and influence adversaries’ and allies’ behavior” and “develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations,” as well as encourage intelligence-sharing and provide the US military with access to bases in the event of contingency operations. The doctrine notes that shaping initiatives “help advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.”

Because shaping operations often overlap with civilian-led foreign policy, US commanders are encouraged to integrate these activities with their diplomatic counterparts, as well as other government agencies. In all theater operations, to include traditional and shaping, JP 3-0 encourages commanders to work closely with other government agencies: “CCDRs [Combatant Commanders] and subordinated JFCs [Joint Force Commands] must work with DOS [Department of State] regional and functional bureaus, individual country chiefs of mission, and other USG [US Government] departments and agencies to better integrate military operations in

---

83 Ibid., V-9.
84 Ibid., VI-2.
unified action with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.”

This ‘whole of government’ approach is encouraged in order to align military tasks with overall grand strategy. The doctrinal emphasis on conflict prevention, as well as the overlap with civilian foreign policy, is evident in one of the manual’s graphics entitled “The Conflict Continuum” (Figure 2.1 below).

The left side of the figure reveals that the military is tasked with employing military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence simultaneously with civilian diplomacy and in coordination with other US government agencies (“USG”). The DOD’s [Department of Defense] focus is “Cooperation/Prevention/Deterrence” and the ultimate goal of these activities is to “Prevent Conflict”.

![The Conflict Continuum](image)

**Figure 2.1: “The Conflict Continuum” in JP 3-0**

---

85 Ibid., V-7.
86 Figure is located on page VI-2, Ibid.
Figure 2.2 below describes a typical US military’s planning model that incorporates both traditional and shaping operations at different stages of conflict. The model shows how global, theater, and operation-specific shaping activities occur before, during, and after combat in a notional campaign plan. Although traditional combat operations, described in the model as “deter”, “seize the initiative”, and “dominate” activities, are the hallmark of conventional operations, shaping activities are expected to be conducted before the onset of major combat operations and maintained throughout. Moreover, shaping is conceptually distinct from “stabilize” or “enable” activities, which are commonly conceived as operations to restore stability and essential services after the devastation of war, which commonly require the threat or use of force to maintain order. Conversely, shaping is the non-war use of force that underlies these traditional operations.

87 Specific references to deterrence, offensive, and defensive operations are described in Ibid., V-15.
The US military views security cooperation (SC) as an integral aspect of shaping operations, described in *JP 3-16* as “all DOD [Department of Defense] interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN).” The manual notes that geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) “shape their areas of responsibility through SC activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other

---

instruments of national power. The GCC’s SC provides a framework within which combatant commands (CCMDs) engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. *Ideally, SC activities lessen the causes of potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.*\(^{89}\) *JP 3-20* notes the importance of integrating security cooperation into overall grand strategy in order to shape the environment and dampen the risk of war: “SC [Security Cooperation] represents an application of the military instrument of national power in coordination with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) through which the USG shapes the theater and global OEs [Operational Environments] and helps prevent conflicts.”\(^{90}\) Specifically for the American ground component, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno notes in the US Army’s 2014 Operating Concept that the purpose of new Army doctrine is to describe “how future Army forces will prevent conflict, shape the security environments, and win wars while operating as part of our Joint Force and working with multiple partners.”\(^{91}\) The emphasis on the purpose of shaping activities to prevent and mitigate crises is apparent in major contemporary US military doctrinal manuals.

It is important to note that although shaping operations have become a priority in US military activities, the traditional role of the US military remains its core mission. US military manuals emphasize that component services must be prepared for offensive, defense, and deterrent operations which are the primary missions for US forces; yet shaping operations are intended to obviate the need to employ these operations in large-scale war. *JP 3-0* makes this point.

\(^{89}\) Emphasis added. Ibid.


explicitly: “Although the US military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained, large-scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these operations also enable a wide variety of other operations and activities. In particular, opportunities exist prior to large-scale combat to shape the OE [Operating Environment] in order to prevent, or at least mitigate, the effects of war.”\textsuperscript{92} Thus, US forces, traditionally designed for war, can also be employed in the prevention or mitigation of war.

The influence of shaping operations on US military planning is evident throughout both national security and military doctrines since the end of the Cold War. In 1995, the Bill Clinton Administration published \textit{A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement}, which emphasized many non-warfighting roles for the military in addition to the traditional function of “deterring and defeating aggression”: provide a credible overseas presence to deter conflict and underwrite regional stability, contribute to peacekeeping operations, provide advice and training to friendly governments, deliver humanitarian aid, and encourage democracy in post-communist and fragile states.\textsuperscript{93} Though the George W. Bush Administration’s 2002 US National Security Strategy introduced preemptive (or more accurately preventive) war as a means to defend the US against undeterrable threats, the subsequent 2004 National Military strategy emphasized, “that the United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise attack. Achieving this objective includes actions to shape the security environment in ways that enhance and expand multinational partnerships.”\textsuperscript{94} The document noted that security cooperation helps establish “important military interactions, building trust and confidence

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Joint Operations}, US Joint Publication 3-0, V-1.
between the United States and its multinational partners. These relatively small investments often produce results that far exceed their cost.”95 By building capacity and helping partners to ‘help themselves,’ the strategy encouraged security force assistance as a means to manage strategic uncertainty.

Other Major Powers and Shaping Operations

Though the source of the shaping concept is attributed to the US military, these measures have been practiced by all major powers since the end of the Cold War, though they may be referred to by different terms. The British military labels these types of activities ‘Defense Diplomacy’ or ‘Defence Engagement’ in defense reviews and military doctrine. The UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review listed these operations as its third priority: “Defence Diplomacy becomes a Mission in its own right, reflecting the importance to our security of building and maintaining trust and preventing conflict, particularly in Europe. We anticipate continuing and perhaps growing calls for contributions to international peace support and humanitarian operations, some of which could be militarily very demanding.”96 British defense diplomacy includes arms control, outreach programs through the use of short-term training teams, and educating and training transitioning states in democratic accountability. The UK’s most recent doctrine defines Defense Engagement as “the means by which the UK employs Defence assets and activities to achieve influence without the use or threat of force.” Moreover, the manual explains, “By integrating the national instruments of power (diplomatic, economic and military – all

95 Ibid., 12.
underpinned by information) the government seeks to influence, through a range of activities, to prevent conflict, protect its legitimate interests and shape a stable world.”

China’s 2006, 2010, and 2015 Defense White Papers refer to these activities as international and regional ‘Security Cooperation’; the 2015 document listed military and security cooperation as one of the military’s main objectives: “China’s armed forces will continue to develop military-to-military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party.” Moreover, the document states that Chinese forces will, “strive to establish fair and effective collective security mechanisms and military confidence-building measures (CBMs), expand military and security cooperation, and create a security environment favorable to China’s peaceful development.”

India’s 2016 Ministry of Defense Annual Report calls these types of activities ‘Defense Cooperation’, which include military officer staff talks, civic action programs, training teams, and multinational exercises. Although each major power’s responses to uncertainty through shaping MMEs will be explored in the illustrative case studies (Chapters 4-7), the following section describes the global increase in strategic uncertainty since the end of the Cold War that prompted the need for more military shaping operations.

---

2.3 The Increase in Strategic Uncertainty after the End of the Cold War

In order to address strategic uncertainty—that is, when the type and location of threats, as well as which states will help combat these threats, is largely unknown—major powers implement shaping operations. Though the Cold War threatened the possibility for great power war, the general type and location of threats were largely known by the major powers. Thus, military planners addressed this problem by stationing combat units prepared for large-scale conventional attack throughout Europe. Insurgencies and non-state threats from the post-colonial world did pose a problem for military planning, though planners viewed the source of these challenges as emanating from the other major power and thus, more predictable. Conversely, after the end of superpower rivalry, the proliferation of non-state threats emanating from various sources posed an acute problem for military planning: particularly the type and location of threats, as well as which states would aid in confronting these challenges. Thus, major powers were forced to grapple with an increase in strategic uncertainty in the post-Cold War threat environment. This section compares the relative certainty of the last decade of the Cold War with the uncertain strategic environment after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Relative Strategic Certainty of the 1980’s during the Cold War

During the final decade of the Cold War, the US (with its NATO allies) and Soviet Union viewed one other as the primary threats to each other’s security. Both superpowers planned for conventional war in Europe, evidenced by both strategic planning documents as well as the balances of forces that were prepared for an invasion through the Fulda Gap between East and

58
West Germany. This competition between superpowers would also manifest in competing spheres of influence as ‘proxy wars’ between insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Though insurgencies and terrorism represented a different type of threat than conventional state actors, they were often directly or indirectly supported by the two superpowers and remained an important strategic concern for both states actors. The threat posed by each superpower—either through nuclear, conventional, or unconventional force—to one another is evident in both states’ strategy documents and force posture, explored below.

Though the 1980’s brought change to the US-Soviet relationship, as well as emerging threats from non-state actors such as insurgents and terrorists, the US National Security Strategy of 1987 was clear about the main source of threat: “The most significant threat to U.S. security and national interests is the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union.” Not only did Soviet nuclear and conventional forces threaten the US and its allies in Europe and East Asia, but also Soviet influence in the Third World: “The evidence of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the growth of worldwide terrorism is now conclusive. Even though the Soviet Union does not have direct control over most of the terrorist groups, it supplies massive amounts of arms, money, and advisory assistance to revolutionary forces engaged in terrorist activities. The Soviets attempt to disguise such support by using middle men—radical governments such as Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya, which deal directly with radical terrorists and

---


The US also supported non-state actors against the Soviet Union (most notably in Afghanistan), which reveals that both superpowers were interested in undermining each other through both conventional asymmetrical means. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1987), 5-6.


documents focused on the need to counter Soviet support to anti-government forces: in order to
counter the influence of the USSR in the Third World, the 1987 security strategy directed the
military to provide security assistance and encourage fledgling states to provide security for
themselves.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, the US strategy called for its armed forces to employ various means of
military power—direct conventional forces as well as indirect security assistance—to combat the
influence of the Soviet Union all over the globe.

The Soviet Union similarly regarded the US and NATO as its greatest strategic threat. The
USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies drew military plans for an offensive conventional strategy
against NATO in Europe using operational maneuver groups during the 1960’s. By the late
1970’s, the Warsaw Pact grew alarmed at increasing NATO’s strength and feared the alliance’s
annual maneuvers were a potential cover for invasion.\textsuperscript{107} In the 1980’s, the liberalizing policies
of Soviet leader Mikhael Gorbachev brought about a ‘new thinking’ in security relations between
the East and West: by 1987, the Warsaw Pact adopted a conventional defensive doctrine for
Europe which was followed the next year by Gorbachev’s announcement of a unilateral
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact allies.\textsuperscript{108} These measures were designed not
only to provide freedom of choice for Eastern Europe, but also reduce tensions with the greatest
perceived security threat: the US and NATO.

Office, January 1987), 19-34.
\textsuperscript{107} Vojtech Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning,” in \textit{War Plans and Alliances in the
Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West}, eds. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger
190; see also Matthew Evangelista, \textit{Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War}, (Ithaca,
Though the decline of superpower rivalry beginning in 1988 brought new hopes for peace across the globe, the realities of new types of threats quickly dawned on military leaders. In the preface to the first *US National Military Strategy* since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell wrote, “For most of the past 45 years the primary focus of our national military strategy has been containment of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology – we met that challenge successfully.” Despite the triumph of this strategy, however, Powell warns: “Future threats to US interests are inherent in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world.” The new military strategy acknowledges that end of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR reduces the risk of global major power war; however, the loss of the Soviet threat and rise of new types of threats changes how the US plans and structures for operations. Though particular state-threats are identifiable, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, other threats are less apparent: “But the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain. The threat is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected.” The strategic document states that the only certainty the US military is confident about is that it will be expected to deploy: “It is certain that US military forces will be called upon again, but predicting the time, place, and circumstances will be difficult, as graphically demonstrated by recent political and military crises in Liberia, Kuwait, Somalia, Iraq and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and the Philippines.”

---

110 Ibid., 3-4
111 Ibid.
The uncertainty wrought by decline of the Soviet Union and rise of new threats, as well as militaries’ difficulty in grappling with this new ambiguity, was captured in Martin Van Creveld’s *The Transformation of War*, a book that the US Army recommended to its officers for professional development. Published in 1991, Van Creveld argued that because of the advent of nuclear weapons after World War II, large-scale conventional war was replaced by Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), a form of warfare that was largely pushed to the ‘nooks and crannies’ of the international order. Wars that resemble LIC share a set of common characteristics: they are fought in less developed regions of the world, rely on limited technology, and are rarely waged between national armies. Instead, they are fought by guerrillas, terrorists, and bandits, either against states (especially former colonizers) or other non-state actors. Van Creveld argues that future wars will resemble the twentieth-century wars of national liberation and the conflicts waged before the dawn of the Westphalian order in which ethnic, religious, and tribal communities served as the social units that engaged in combat. Due to their societal diversity, he envisioned state fragmentation and ethnic violence not only in the ‘Third World’ of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, but also larger states such as the US, China, and India. This type of war is significantly difficult for modern militaries to wage, for advanced technology, long supply lines, and distinctions between forward and rear battle lines are useless in the face of non-state war. Because of this imagined future of low-intensity warfare and inability for major powers to adequately defeat these threats, Van Creveld believes that militaries are confounded by these new threats: “A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defense departments all over the ‘developed world’—the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance.” Though most of

---

Van Creveld’s predictions were less than prescient—he argued that LIC would “put an end to large-scale military-technological research and development” and “strategy in the classic sense will disappear”—his predictions touched upon a fundamental anxiety experienced by state militaries facing the prospect of war with non-state actors.114

The growing fear about state fragmentation and rise of new threats was also depicted in a popular article by journalist Robert Kaplan. Kaplan’s 1994 piece in The Atlantic titled “The Coming Anarchy” envisioned a world similar to Van Creveld’s, though in addition to terrorists and guerrillas, threats to security would also emanate from natural disasters, overpopulation, immigration, and drug cartels. Kaplan’s travels to the former Yugoslavia and West Africa convinced him that these troubled regions represented the trends of the larger undeveloped world: “the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”115 Kaplan interviews political scientist Thomas Fraser Homer-Dixon about how the growing scarcity of resources will drive overpopulation, massive immigration, and ‘hard regimes’ that will use power over these resources to repress their populations.116 Kaplan also explores Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” as a prediction of future competition in world politics: instead of ideology or economics as the source of future struggles (as was the case in the past), Huntington argued that differences in culture will comprise the fault lines of conflict. Because of differences in civilization, increasing interactions amongst people from different cultures, and the weakening of the nation-state identity, Huntington predicts that “conflicts between groups in different

114 Ibid., 1, 205-207.
civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization.”117 Kaplan’s imagined future encompassed the decline of the nation-state, the re-drawing of fault lines around civilizations instead of national borders, and the growing threat of non-state and environmental destruction. Though his pessimistic view of world politics could have been viewed as unnecessarily alarmist, Kaplan believed that US military officers were concerned: “When I asked Pentagon officials about the nature of war in the twenty-first century, the answer I frequently got was ‘Read Van Creveld.’ The top brass are enamored of this historian not because his writings justify their existence but, rather, the opposite: Van Creveld warns them that huge state military machines like the Pentagon’s are dinosaurs about to go extinct, and that something far more terrible awaits us.”118

The rise of new types of threats expressed by journalists and military historians, as well as major power militaries’ anxiety about the appropriate response, is a function of two main sources: (1) the end of superpower rivalry and (2) the impacts of globalization. Though the end of the Cold War marked the conclusion of the prospect for great power war, the lack of incentives to bolster client states as a buffer against an adversary’s sphere of influence produced significant effects. Kalyvas and Balcells argue that although the number of civil war onsets declined after 1991, the end of the Cold War changed the relationship between the two great powers and their clients: without the need to counter each other’s influence, both the US and Russia limited or withdrew their funding in peripheral regions, causing further state weakness. Additionally, the proliferation of sovereign states from the remnants of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union created more political units with advanced conventional weaponry and

118 Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy.”
motives for conflict against one another or to suppress rebellion. This change in great power-client relationships and the consequences of state dissolution shifted civil wars from Asia and Latin America during the Cold War to Eurasia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East during the 1990’s and 2000’s. Thus, although civil wars in the aggregate declined after 1991, major power militaries (especially the US and Russia) were faced with the prospect of failed states and spillover from ethnic conflict.

Another major source of new threats spawned from the consequences of globalization. Mary Kaldor argues that ‘new wars’—conflicts that are fought by public militaries and private citizens over identity politics and blur conventional war, organized crime, and violations of human rights—arose from the recent impacts of globalization. As opposed to the ‘old wars’ that were fought for national interest or ideology, new wars are waged by groups and individuals over particularistic identity: ethnic, religious, and tribal. Globalization, for Kaldor the “intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural – and the changing character of political authority,” was driven by the dramatic improvements in information technology, communication, and data-processing beginning in the 1980’s. Though the roots of the more recent manifestation of globalization was present in the 1980’s, the interaction of globalization and the dissolution of the Soviet Union accelerated the onset of new wars:

It is often argued that the new wars are a consequence of the end of the Cold War; they reflect a power vacuum which is typical of transition periods in world affairs. It is undoubtedly true that the consequences of the end of the Cold War – the availability of surplus arms, the discrediting of socialist ideologies, the disintegration of totalitarian empires, the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes – contributed in important ways to the new wars. But equally, the end of the Cold War could be viewed as the way in which the Eastern bloc succumbed to the inevitable encroachment of

119 Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion,” 421-423. The authors contest the notion that the end of the Cold War had no impact on civil wars by showing how the technologies of rebellion (guerrilla vs. symmetric non-conventional) as well as the geographic location of rebellion changed. Supporting the first argument, see James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-86.
globalization – the crumbling of the last bastions of territorial autarky, the moment when Eastern Europe was ‘opened up’ to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{120}

She argues that new wars emerge from the loss of political sovereignty and autonomy as well as the disintegration of states; without a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, states with little capacity are challenged to maintain order and provide security for their citizens. One of Kaldor’s main case studies explores the 1990’s ethnic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which serves as the “paradigm case” of her conception of new wars and highlights the change in threats faced by militaries after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{121}

Major power militaries in the mid-1990’s acknowledged the growing importance of terrorism, ethnic conflict, immigration, crime, and resource scarcity as threats to national security. Yet what made these threats particularly troublesome for military planning was the reality that their type (state vs. non-state) and location were largely unknown; that is, although the threat of great power war imposed a shadow over the Cold War, the source and location of that threat was known and relatively certain. In contrast, terrorism, ethnic war, transnational crime, and resource scarcity could arise suddenly and from many parts of the world. Mikkel Rasmussen argues that, “Globalisation means that Western strategy is increasingly focused on managing risks rather than creating enduring security. Following the Cold War, this has meant a gradual recalibrating of doctrines from logic of deterrence to a management logic.”\textsuperscript{122}

As the strategic environment moved from “predictability to unpredictability”, Western strategists were forced to transition away from a reliance on containment against the Soviets when “international security


\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 7, 32-70. Additional works of the impact of globalization and non-state threats on state security are discussed in Jonathan Kirshner ed., \textit{Globalization and National Security} (New York: Routledge, 2006).

was predictable and calculable.” Rather, after the end of the Cold War strategists adopted a ‘meteorologist’ mentality in an attempt to predict and hedge against an unpredictable security environment.123

This increase in strategic uncertainty is present in most major power security and military documents throughout the 1990’s. The William Clinton Administration’s 1995 US National Security Strategy notes, “The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America’s security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half-century – the threat of communist expansion – is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe…Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threats to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.”124 The strategy document continues to emphasize a “complex array of new and old security challenges,” in a “period of great promise but also great uncertainty,”: these threats range from fragile post-communist states, difficulties in transitions to democracy, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, violent extremism, narcotics trafficking, and environmental degradation.125

Despite earlier pressures to exploit the ‘peace dividend’ and reduce the defense budget, the UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review White Paper recognized the impact of new threats in the post-Cold War environment: “For the last two hundred years, the dominant force in international affairs has been the nation state. Most wars have been caused by attempts to create or expand such states. In contrast, over the next twenty years, the risks to international stability seem as likely to come from other factors: ethnic and religious conflict; population and environmental

---

123 Ibid., 95-105.
125 Ibid., 1.
pressures; competition for scarce resources; drugs, terrorism and crime.”  

The review goes on to note that the break-up of states, such as the former Yugoslavia, have the potential to ‘overspill’ and weaken new democracies emerging in Europe. After the breakup of the USSR, Russia faced increasing ethnic conflict and transnational crime along its new territorial borders with its former satellite states. The country’s first official military doctrine since the collapse of the Soviet Union noted the greatest dangers to security emanated from local wars along its borders, the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, illegal armed formations, organized crime, and terrorism, along with traditional threats from “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security.”

The Growing Threat of Transnational Terrorism After 9/11

Though religious terrorism posed a threat to major powers since the 1980’s, the Al Qaeda attacks on US soil in September 2001 showcased the surprising ability for a few individuals to inflict massive destruction on the most powerful country in the world. The ability for transnational terrorists to coordinate actions and carry out operations half-way across the world created a challenge for major power military planning. This ‘globalization of informal violence’ proved that geography was no longer an obstacle for technologically inferior non-state actors to

---


inflict great harm on civilians from distant locations. The attacks made clear that the source and location of threats to the homeland, especially one surrounded by two large oceans and friendly neighbors, became more uncertain. The scale and unpredictable nature of the attacks brought full attention to states’ responsibility to protect their citizens from not only state, but also now amorphous non-state actors, to their citizens. Audrey Cronin argues that the 9/11-era “current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from non-state actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it”. The ability for terrorists to coordinate operations using the internet and cell phones across national borders, gain access to unconventional weapons, and fund their operations using modern financial transactions were made possible by globalization. At the same time, globalization spawned more international contact that both created a greater awareness of societal differences as well as perceived cultural attack against indigenous customs, creating a backlash against perceived Western encroachment. Thus, modern terrorism was both made possible by and served as a reaction to globalization, a challenge Cronin argues, “is perhaps the leading threat to long-term stability in the twenty-first century.”

US strategic documents in the aftermath of 9/11 reflected the growing concern about transnational terrorism and the need to proactively address the security problem internationally. The George W. Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy asserts that “The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated,

---

130 Ibid., 58.
politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”\textsuperscript{131} The document cites efforts to militarily disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but also the need for prevention through military force: against both rogue state actors and transnational terrorists. The emergent doctrine that legitimized preemptive and preventive war was seen as necessary to protect US citizens against an uncertain threat: “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”\textsuperscript{132} The Bush administration’s preventive war against Iraq was putatively an attempt to deal with the uncertainty surrounding Saddam Hussein’s future behavior;\textsuperscript{133} ironically, the use of military force to remove Saddam’s government generated even greater uncertainty by spawning the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and later the Islamic State.

The confluence of various non-state threats, including terrorism as well as ethnic conflict and transnational crime, led US military leaders to believe that uncertainty had pervaded all realms of planning by the early 2010’s. In the preface to the US Army’s 2014 Operating Concept, the Training and Doctrine Commander General David Perkins spells out the uncertainty of the current threat environment: “The environment the Army will operate in is unknown. The enemy is unknown, the location is unknown, and the coalitions involved are unknown. The problem we are focusing on is how to ‘Win in a Complex World’.”\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 15.
The growing threat of non-state actors also became more acute for other major powers. France’s 2008 and 2013 Defense White Papers argue that globalization and state weakness contributed to a growth in non-state threats to French interests, such as civil war, transnational crime, and terrorism, especially from Africa and the Middle East. If states are unable to control their own populations and countries, the 2013 paper argues: “The risks and threats that they are unable to deal with on their territory may quickly spill over and undermine our own security.”

China also increased its efforts to combat domestic and transnational terrorism. What began as a confidence-building measure between China and the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union in the 1990’s transitioned into a regional security organization designed to combat transnational threats: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). After borders were settled by the late 1990’s, the organization was transformed into an international institution designed to combat the ‘three evils’ of separatism, terrorism, and extremism along the member states’ shared borders. China already faced Islamic and separatist movements emanating from the semi-autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, communities that developed substantial transnational support links across Central Asia. SCO members agreed in November 2000 to establish an anti-terrorism body and the organization was formally created in July 2001 (before the Al Qaeda attacks), yet the events of 9/11, as well as US military operations in Central Asia, created new impetus for militarily addressing transnational threats.

China’s 2004 Defense White Paper notes that regarding the contemporary security environment: “Although the international situation as a whole tends to be stable, factors of uncertainty, instability and insecurity are on the increase.” The document explains that in

---


addition to changes in the balance of power between state actors and relative stability between Asian neighbors, China has experienced an increase in ‘non-traditional security issues’:

“Geopolitical, ethnic, religious and other conflicts interact with political and economic contradictions, resulting in frequent outbreak of local wars and armed conflict. International terrorist forces remain rampant.”

Ethnic and religious violence erupted in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009, which resulted in a Chinese military response with counterinsurgent forces.

The increase in strategic uncertainty after the end of the Cold War had a profound impact on major powers’ ability to plan and employ their forces to meet new types of threats. Instead of relatively more certain ‘imagined war’ between NATO and the Warsaw Pact along the fault lines of Europe, military leaders were forced to address ethnic war, transnational crime, humanitarian disasters, and a host of other unfamiliar threats from multiple locations around the world. The growth of strategic uncertainty for each major power will be explored in greater detail in the illustrative case studies (Chapters 4-7). Also, the emergence of non-traditional exercises is discussed in a brief history of military exercises in Chapter 3.

2.4 Non-Traditional Exercises as Habitual Shaping Operations to Reduce Uncertainty

My main argument is that major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies in order to reduce uncertainty in their strategic environments. Non-traditional MMEs—recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing—serve as one type of shaping activity that major powers have increased substantially since the end of the Cold War. The two sources of strategic

---

uncertainty discussed in the introduction—threat (type and location) and assistance—are addressed to varying degrees by each type of shaping MME. Recruitment exercises help major powers reduce uncertainty about the assistance they receive for multilateral missions as well as the source of threat if they are able to build friendly relations with neutral countries; moreover, multilateral partners help combat non-state threats in, for instance, peacekeeping missions. Capacity-building training allows a major power to reduce the unpredictability of the type and location of certain non-state threats by increasing the capabilities of weaker partner militaries. These partners assist the major power by preventing violent non-state actors from either attacking the major power homeland or creating instability in a strategic region. Role-forming exercises are used by major powers to manage the role a partner military serves for its society: a major power may prefer the trustworthiness of a democratic military or the predictability of an army designed to provide stability by protecting the authoritarian regime. Trust-developing MMEs are conducted by major power rivals that wish to reduce the risk of inadvertent war between one another.

Multilateral exercises have increased since the end of the Cold War due to a rise in non-state threats, which create a problem for military planning. However, another important factor about MMEs (and their increase over time) is that they often, but not always, serve as a means for major powers to build habitual military relationships with their partners. Although shaping usually begins as a response to crisis, major powers often continue these relations to maintain consistent influence in their strategic environments. As the brief history of exercises in Chapter 3 reveals, military leaders view training as a necessary preparation for combat and often require constant maneuvers to ensure battle readiness. Soldiers are trained at regular intervals to retain “battle drills”, automatic individual and unit responses to certain combat scenarios, which are
vital in ground units’ ability to effectively respond to enemy maneuvers on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{139}

Commanders often provide guidance to subordinate leaders about the regularity in which they should exercise their units; the US Army’s training regulation lists required training by regularity (e.g. quarterly, semi-annually, annually).\textsuperscript{140}

Militaries often apply this same training methodology to international partners. After an inaugural exercise between two states, successive training events are often conducted on a regular basis, such as annually, biannually, or quadrennially. They usually involve the same partners and often will include the participation of other states in subsequent years. In fact, about 16\% of MMEs from 1990 to 2016 were a continuation of programs that began during the Cold War. The US Military’s most recent doctrine on multinational operations notes the importance of multilateral planning teams, one of which (assigned to the US Pacific Command) built standard procedures for interactions with international partners in order to “promote habits of cooperation” between the US and Asian-Pacific partners.\textsuperscript{141} For instance, what originated as an annual training event between the US and Thailand since 1982, exercise ‘Cobra Gold’ began including Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in different years by 2010. Thus, MMEs often become ‘sticky’ or habitual patterns of cooperation between two militaries; these consistent relationships are viewed by major powers as positive to provide security for their citizens and partners. This institutionalization of habitual exercise relations partly contributes to the proliferation of exercises since 1992; thus, not only were new exercises inducted, but old


ones were retained. The impact of the cumulative effect of new and old exercises will be tested in statistical section in Chapter 8.

2.5 Alternative Explanations

Although shaping operations to reduce strategic uncertainty provides a framework in which to understand post-Cold War military behavior, there may be other reasons why militaries pursue these types of activities. There are two main alternative explanations for this phenomenon, both of which are drawn from the traditional works on military doctrine: (1) major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies in order to serve the traditional functions of rehearsal and deterrence; (2) major powers conduct shaping MMEs because their militaries are pursuing narrow organizational and bureaucratic interests. Each alternative explanation is described in detail, its implications are delineated, and each is initially assessed with regards to shaping operations. The alternatives and their implications will be more thoroughly evaluated in the illustrative case studies (Chapters 4-7) as well as the large-N regression (Chapter 8).

Alternative Explanation One: Traditional Tasks

The traditional works imagine that militaries develop doctrines primarily oriented toward offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations and use exercises to test or threaten the use of violent military force. Applying this perspective, multilateral military exercises may simply serve the conventional functions of rehearsal or deterrence (‘threat or use of force’) as the traditional works on military doctrine argue. Offensive and defensive doctrines require training to ensure militaries are adequately prepared for combat and also to test emerging doctrine; exercises often serve this role. Stephen Rosen notes that although, “Simulating new forms of
warfare will always be full of uncertainties, because there is no reality against which to test the simulation. Yet there may be no better way to think through innovative practices in peacetime” than through military exercises.\textsuperscript{142} Jack Snyder highlights the role that map and field exercises served in allowing the German army to rehearse battle plans before World War I.\textsuperscript{143} Barry Posen argues that exercises provide an opportunity for militaries to test their capabilities in peacetime; however, strategic-level exercises—those involving roughly 90,000 soldiers—are difficult to coordinate and resource.\textsuperscript{144}

Large-scale exercises are also useful for deterrence by signaling capability and resolve to an opponent as NATO REFORGER exercises during the Cold War and US-South Korean MMEs demonstrate in the current environment.\textsuperscript{145} Posen notes that states and alliances often use military exercises as “demonstrative uses of force” to display both the capability and will to fight.\textsuperscript{146} Thus, if two militaries plan to deploy together (even for non-traditional missions such as humanitarian intervention) or seek to signal to an adversary the costs of invasion, these traditional functions would be appropriate. Thus, the expectation for this alternative would be that major power militaries use MMEs for rehearsal or deterrence, regardless of partner-type. The implications of this theory are that MMEs are actually useful for preparation for war (and not just symbolic) or could credibly signal a deterrent threat to a third party. However, as the illustrative cases will show, non-traditional exercises are usually conducted between states that do not plan on operating as a combined force and are commonly targeted at non-state threats.

\textsuperscript{142} Rosen, 68-75, quotation on 75.
\textsuperscript{143} Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 141-147.
\textsuperscript{145} Blackwill and Legro, 69-73.
\textsuperscript{146} Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 63.
Thus, shaping operations follow different logics and purposes than either preparation for missions or conventional deterrence.

**Alternative Explanation Two: Organizational Interests**

As the traditional theories argue, militaries often pursue certain doctrines in order to serve narrow parochial interests: they prefer offensive doctrines which provide increased resources, prestige, and autonomy against their civilian or inter-service counterparts.\(^{147}\) Steven Van Evera argues that a parochial “cult of the offensive” swept early twentieth century military thinking and resulted in ill-advised military policies that led to the disasters of World War I.\(^{148}\) Jack Snyder contends that this ideological preference for the offensive was driven by the militaries’ simplified procedures and motivational biases for greater prestige and resources.\(^{149}\) He also agrees with Van Evera that the lack of civilian oversight led to the inappropriate adoption of aggressive doctrines in the early twentieth century.\(^{150}\) Barry Posen argues that militaries prefer offensive doctrines because these types of operations require increased organizational wealth, size, and autonomy from civilian meddling; that is, sources of organizational uncertainty.

Because of these organizational and bureaucratic preferences for offensive doctrines, civilians are often forced to intervene to re-integrate military policy into grand strategy.\(^{151}\) Elizabeth Kier

---

\(^{147}\) Although Graham Allison separates ‘organizational’ from ‘bureaucratic’ interests in his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I group both types of interests in the same category since the expectations for military behavior for both perspectives are similar. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).


\(^{149}\) Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*, 24-34.


\(^{151}\) Although Posen offers a “balance-of-power” perspective that anticipates some different outcomes than this “organization theory” perspective, his case studies reiterate that militaries prefer offensive operations and doctrines only become defensive after civilian intervention. Even in the case of the French defensive ‘Maginot Line’, the French army only assented to the defense because of the French legislature’s reduction of the length of conscription in 1928, preventing enough trained troops for effective offensive campaigns. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 41-54, 74-78, 116-121, 173, 222-224; Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty” 159-173.
argues that particular organizational cultures drive preferences for offensive or defensive doctrines.¹⁵² Most of the traditional works draw heavily from organization theory; Posen’s and Snyder’s emphasis on standardized procedures, routines, and parochial interests is derived from arguments developed by the ‘Carnegie School’ theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s—Herbert Simon, James March, and Richard Cyert—as well as other more recent management research programs.¹⁵³ In regards to shaping operations, this traditional literature would expect that militaries pursue these exercises not purely to provide security or defend other national interests, but more so to increase organizational size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy. Thus, perhaps shaping MMEs are merely an updated, post-Cold War strand of military parochialism in the face of threats to budgets and autonomy as the traditional theories imply.

Specifically, the traditional works in military doctrine argue that militaries prefer offensive doctrines for three reasons. First, offensive doctrines offer greater resources such as organizational size and wealth: due to the complexity of offensive operation, such as the need to transport, maneuver, and supply troops at faraway locations, more resources are required.¹⁵⁴ These resources are usually manifest in the number of troops and equipment, as well as overall wealth of the organization. Second, the offensive spirit offers prestige by inculcating a strong, aggressive ethos and higher morale amongst soldiers and units preparing to fight in combat. Militaries seek to train courageous soldiers to overcome the fear of fighting against devastating firepower or superior forces; this indoctrination of the offensive spirit instills a “higher morale”

¹⁵² Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars, 10-32, 70-80, 120-133.
¹⁵⁴ Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 49; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 24.
among an army’s troops and units, which is expected to produce victory in battle. Moreover, especially after victory in major wars militaries enjoy societal deference and heightened self-image; thus, militaries prefer offensive doctrines designed to decisively defeat adversaries in battle and benefit from national recognition for their prowess. Third, offensive doctrines offer autonomy because civilian policymakers have difficulty in grasping the operational complexities of offensive maneuvers (as opposed to defensive or deterrent postures); by demanding offensive doctrines, military officers attempt to wage war abroad and keep policymakers out of their business. Government officials are aware that militaries seek certain doctrines for institutional reasons; thus, they intervene when military doctrine is disintegrated from grand strategy. As Posen argues: “Organization theory predicts that soldiers and statesmen will have difficulty reconciling policy and military doctrine.” The expectation for this explanation is that shaping MMEs are conducted for parochial reasons and civilians often intervene in order to prevent unsound military policy. The implications of this traditional theory are that militaries would receive organizational and bureaucratic benefits from pursuing shaping operations in the form of increased organizational size (troops and equipment), wealth (budgets), or prestige (a ‘warrior ethos’ and deference for battlefield success). Additionally, because militaries seek autonomy from civilian oversight, we would expect that shaping operations provide militaries freedom to operate independently; government officials would often be forced to change military doctrine since militaries pursue policies against the principles of grand strategy. Although the illustrative

158 Ibid., 52-54, 57, 225-226, quotation on 138.
case studies (Chapters 4-7) evaluate my argument against the alternatives for major MME programs, an initial assessment of each particular organizational goal is provided below.

**Increased Resources**

Though this alternative explanation is persuasive when considering pre-World War II militaries’ conventional doctrines, there are several problems when applying this theory to shaping MMEs in the contemporary environment. First, the traditional works argue that offensive operations offer greater resources because offensive doctrines require more manpower and equipment. Yet shaping MMEs are not intended to practice for offensive operations, usually involve few troops, and do not require extra material resources such as more soldiers and tanks. If major power militaries were solely interested in increasing organizational size, they would seek more troops and equipment; if militaries sought greater wealth, MMEs only comprise a fraction of military budgets and offer few tangible resources.

Consider the US Army, whose budget request for 2015 was roughly $120.5 billion (excluding Overseas Contingency Operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq).\(^{159}\) Conversely, the total cost of all Defense Security Cooperation Activities (DSCA) requested for 2015, which includes funding for Partnership for Peace, Train and Equip Programs, and Partner Capacity Building for all DoD services, was $544 million.\(^{160}\) If we include other major MME programs not covered in the DSCA figures, such as ‘Pacific Pathways’ and the ‘European Reassurance Initiative’, the total cost rises to $619


million.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, shaping exercises comprise roughly .51\% of the total Army budget request; that is, about a half a percent. When compared to total ‘modernization’ (acquisitions and research & development), shaping MMEs are comparable to about 3.08\% of modernization costs; compared to only ground-vehicle modernization, shaping MMEs are only 33.83\% of the cost for additional new vehicles. Moreover, the cost for shaping is only 1.10\% of total personnel costs (including active, reserve, and national guard) while comprising only 1.49\% of the total army operations and maintenance budget.\textsuperscript{162} Thus, if the US Army sought greater wealth and size, it would have been more efficacious to inflate state threats (such as Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) and demand an offensive doctrine—as the traditional works demonstrate—instead of focusing on small-scale shaping MMEs to combat non-state threats.

\textit{Increased Prestige}

The traditional works on military doctrine also assume that militaries seek offensive doctrines to increase prestige in the form of a strong, aggressive ethos among its troops and an improved self-image that results from societal admiration for victory in combat. However, especially in the realm of non-traditional MMEs, there is reason to question whether these types of shaping operations increase such assets for militaries. First, as opposed to offensive doctrines that allow militaries to instill a ‘warrior spirit’ and aggressive initiative in its soldiers, shaping operations are oftentimes viewed by military officers and troops as unnecessary, incompatible with the traditional role of armies, or even counterproductive to the military’s ability to wage large-scale

\textsuperscript{162} Major General Karen E. Dyson and Davis S. Welch, “Army FY 2015 Budget Overview,” 6-10, 13.
Morton Halperin’s seminal work on bureaucratic politics and foreign policy notes that the US Army’s “organizational essence” prefers ground combat to other peripheral roles, such as “Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) missions, air defense, and the special Green Beret, Delta, or counterinsurgency forces”; in other words, shaping activities are considered ‘peripheral’ to the US Army’s core mission. Moreover, since military exercises with non-allies and training programs with fragile states are largely cooperative in nature, these types of MMEs receive little media attention.

Since major powers often use shaping (non-war) activities to make friends out of enemies, recruit for peacekeeping, or delegate security responsibility to others, any societal benefits from battlefield success are also absent. Many of these MMEs involve few troops, mix national soldiers into small international units, and focus more on camaraderie than on preparation for actual missions. Several of my interviews with senior military officers revealed that shaping MMEs (especially NATO’s PfP) were simply a “photo opportunity” or “a waste of time”, serving only political objectives and producing little real training value. Moreover, senior US military officers have recently argued that the focus on counterinsurgency and building capacity during the previous 15 years has atrophied the US Army’s ability to wage “large-scale ground combat” against a peer enemy. Thus, if militaries were interested in building an aggressive...

---

163 Reveron, Exporting Security, 77-89.
166 Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017; Colonel (US Air Force, retired); Sam Gardiner, former NATO staff officer and Chairman of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations at the National War College, phone interview by author, June 9, 2017.
ideology amongst its troops and enjoying the societal benefits of battlefield success, shaping operations would seem to undermine this goal.

*Increased Autonomy and Civil-Military Relations*

Although offensive operations may provide militaries independence from civilian oversight, this does not appear to be the case for shaping operations. Due to the nature of shaping—requiring diplomacy, development, and other non-military approaches to non-state threats—militaries often work closely with government officials, civilian diplomats, aid workers, health experts, as well as a host of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The US military focus on ‘interagency’ cooperation—between agencies and departments such as State, US Agency for Development, Treasury, among others—is prominent throughout most US military manuals. For instance, the current joint operations doctrine encourages combatant commanders to work with other agencies because of the understood overlap in responsibilities: “Because DOS [Department of State] is frequently the major player in these activities, JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] should maintain a working relationship with the DOS regional bureaus in coordination with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions and country teams in their area.”  

Although government officials may protest the encroachment of military activities into civilian-led foreign policy, the complex security environment often requires an interagency approach to international problems in which security, diplomacy, development, and defense are intermingled. Thus, if the US military was intent on maintaining autonomy from civilian oversight, interagency cooperation would not be a means to ensure freedom of action.

---

168 Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0, VI-1.
169 Reveron, Exporting Security, 8, 71-77.
2.6 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to explain in detail my theory of why major powers conduct non-traditional MMEs with non-allies and why these have increased since the end of the Cold War. The chapter began with a description of the US doctrinal understanding shaping operations and how they are used to reduce strategic uncertainty; I also noted that all major powers (not just the US) apply shaping operations in the current security environment. I then argued that strategic uncertainty increased after the end of the Cold War due to the proliferation of non-state threats, which was a product of the collapse of communism and the forces of globalization. Because of the nature of military training, shaping MMEs also become habitual or ‘sticky’ over time, which major powers view positively as a means to continue to combat uncertainty in their strategic environments. I concluded by laying out the expectations of two major alternative explanations, drawn primarily from the traditional works in military doctrine. This explanation of my argument will be followed by a detailed look at my key concepts in the next chapter—in which I distinguish exercise types, partner types, and strategic environments—in order to test my argument against the alternative explanations in the case studies and large-N regressions later in the dissertation.
CHAPTER 3
MULTINATIONAL MILITARY EXERCISES AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS

3.1 Introduction

As preparation for war, military training has been conducted since the earliest recorded battles; yet the type and purpose of exercises has changed throughout history. Unilateral exercises as rehearsals for combat and tests for experimental doctrine were common from ancient China through World War II. The latter half of the twentieth century saw the advent of multinational exercises between the two major peacetime alliances, which served the traditional exercise functions of rehearsal and deterrence through the threat of conventional force. After the end of the Cold War, however, new types of non-traditional MMEs with radically unique functions were intended for different purposes than the multinational training of years past. Although some shaping MMEs did occur during the Cold War, major powers greatly expanded their use thereafter. The purpose of this chapter is to explicate key concepts for the argument and proceeds in five steps. First, I will provide a brief history of military training to highlight the changing purposes behind unilateral and multilateral exercises over time, as well as the emergence of shaping MMEs. Second, I will explore contemporary conceptions of MMEs and explain key concepts integral to understanding this phenomenon: exercise tasks, partners, and functions. Third, I will explain how partner-type has an impact on which exercise a major power chooses to conduct. Fourth, I will describe each major power’s strategic environment through an exploration of regional commands, permanent advisory units, and grand strategy. Finally, I conclude with a short summary of the chapter as preparation for the case studies to follow.
3.2 A Brief History of Military Exercises

Preparing for War

Readiness for combat has always been an integral aspect of warfare, yet the manner in which warriors and soldiers are trained has evolved over time. As war is a violent contest of wills, combatants are required to be prepare for conflict and the inherent danger it presents. At the most basic level, combatants need to be ready to operate their weapons under pressure, stand firm in formations against an oncoming enemy, and execute the orders commanded by their superiors. The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu argued that there were five constant factors in war, one of which is ‘Method and Discipline’. He advises: “If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad”; moreover, “Maneuvering with an army is advantageous, with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.”

Preparing for war in peacetime meant practicing in exercises as realistic as actual battle. After Rome’s victory against the Jewish uprising (AD 66-73), the Roman historian Josephus remarked about Roman soldiers: “They do not sit with folded hands in peace-time only to put them in motion in the hour of need. On the contrary, as though they had been born with weapons in hand, they never have a truce from training, never wait for emergencies to arise. Moreover their peace manoevres [sic] are no less strenuous than veritable warfare…Indeed, it would not be wrong to describe their manoevres as bloodless combats and their combats as sanguinary manoeuvres...” The Roman army was well known for its discipline in battle and future generations of military leaders would re-discover their training methods to adopt to modern

---


warfare. During the Middle Ages, kings and lords mobilized armies for specific wars and filled the ranks with professional knights and paid or indentured men-at-arms. Due to the ad-hoc nature of Medieval military mobilization, knights were expected to train in peacetime during jousting tournaments or melees—originally ‘friendly’ sporting battles that developed into mutually agreed-upon violent conflicts—while commoners were expected to use their weapons effectively and ride horses as part of daily life.172

The Military Revolution Generates Increased Training

As the modern European state took form through the monopolization of force starting in the fifteenth century, state militaries began improving and institutionalizing regular training.173 As new technology was introduced at the dawn of the military revolution in the sixteenth century, military leaders began experimenting with battle formations that would maximize new methods of delivering firepower. In order ensure that soldiers could properly load, operate, and re-load their weapons in formation under fire, troops required, as Geoffrey Parker notes, “…practice. Troops had to be trained to fire, countermarch, load, and manoeuvre all together.”174 Loading and operating muskets to perform volley fire required consistent practice; Dutch military leaders, in particular, began drawing inspiration from the works of ancient Roman military techniques, such as continuous volleys of fire from javelin and sling-shot throwers. An officer on Prince Maurice of Orange’s general staff in the 1590’s revealed that Dutch troops were “almost

---

constantly at their ‘exercises’, forming and reforming ranks, drilling and parading in the manner advocated in Roman times…” As Maurice requested funds for more weapons and training, his cousin was concurrently developing a new method for training soldiers through an ‘illustrated drill manual’. The manual described in detail how infantry weapons were to be manipulated and the document was circulated throughout Europe. Swedish general Gustavus Adolphus implemented more consistent training in the 1620’s, increasing the reloading speed of his troops to the extent that less ranks were required for a continuous volley.175

After his army’s successes during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), Frederick II of Prussia’s rigorous training regimen was emulated by other militaries. During peacetime, he held annual exercises simultaneously in Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Magdeburg, and military reviews in major cities throughout the year.176 His exercises not only trained his soldiers, but also demonstrated his army’s prowess to interested onlookers: “Foreign observers flocked to attend Prussian military review and the annual maneuvers in Silesia.”177 After observing the last exercise under Frederick II, a British Army officer created a training manual based on what he observed at the maneuvers, which later became training doctrine for British forces in 1792.178

During the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte’s army was notorious for its rigorous training. French inspectors would visit maneuvers to ensure soldiers were proficient and sergeants understood drill regulations. Napoleon personally ordered his leaders to plan and execute regular training in the Boulogne camp from 1804-1805: “two days a week to battalion

175 Ibid., 19-23.
drill, three days to division drill and one day to corps maneuvers.”\textsuperscript{179} After observing the Napoleonic wars, the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz concluded, “No general can accustom an army to war. Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing; but even they can give an army an advantage over others whose training is confined to routine, mechanical drill...It is immensely important that no soldier, whatever his rank, should wait for war to expose him to those aspects of active service that amaze and confuse him when he comes across them.” Clausewitz encouraged military planners to develop training exercises that introduced friction and uncertainty in order to “train officers’ judgment, common sense, and resolution” in a simulated combat environment.\textsuperscript{180} Yet even Napoleon’s exercises did not always mimic the chaos of combat: soldiers often complained the training was, “cruel and largely pointless impositions on their lives, endlessly repetitive, and destructive of any enthusiasm they might have had for the cause.” Though French military leaders viewed maneuvers as necessary to maintain morale and readiness, soldiers often thought the training was “tedious and repetitious” and “questioned its usefulness as well.”\textsuperscript{181}

\textit{National Military Exercises to Test Unit Proficiency and Doctrine}

Military exercises were largely performed unilaterally throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as coalitions were created and disbanded temporarily to meet particular crises. Even though the 1879 Austro-German alliance marked the beginning of peacetime coalitions—bound by treaty to come to the aid of another under specific circumstances—military

\textsuperscript{180} Carl von Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 122.
exercises remained largely a national phenomenon. At the turn of the twentieth century, military exercises emerged as not only tests for unit readiness, but also experimental doctrine. Between 1896 and 1905, the Imperial German army conducted annual Kriegsspiel (“war-games”) under the supervision of German Chief of the General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen in order to test doctrinal concepts such as large-scale attacks and defensive operations in a simulated war against France and Russia. These massive maneuvers, along with table-top exercises and ‘staff rides’ (peacetime military officer visits to historical or projected battle sites), served as experiments in which to evaluate emerging doctrine.

After World War I, militaries were reduced in size and coalitions were largely disbanded. However, states still used military exercises to test experimental doctrine being developed in the interwar period. British military theorists J.F.C Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart began promoting the potential of the armored vehicle and their ideas about tank warfare were tested in small British military exercises in the 1920’s and early 1930’s. Interestingly, “the Germans learned the most from these efforts and began their armored forces in 1933 based on much of what they had learned from observing the British experiments,” while the British largely ignored the lessons drawn from their own maneuvers. The French army conducted its own experiments, which emphasized central control and massive firepower, while the Soviet Red Army tested airborne paratrooper concepts in its 1935 and 1936 exercises. The Germans, more than any other army, used the peacetime opportunity to develop simulated war-like scenarios that emphasized small

---

unit decision-making, which was vital in the Wehrmacht’s application of armored tactics in World War II.\(^{185}\)

Though the American army lacked the funding and training for serious war preparation in the 1930’s, the German invasion of Poland in 1939 prompted American military leaders to re-think their training methodology. In 1940, US Army General George Marshall appointed Brigadier General Lesley McNair to test and inspect the proficiency of troops and units. After observing maneuvers in Louisiana and North Carolina in 1941, McNair concluded that although the existing training policies were effective, there were still major problems with soldiers’ discipline and performance. Through the end of 1941, these exercises were largely conducted in order to evaluate the readiness of units, while thereafter larger-scale maneuvers tested contemporary doctrine. In 1942, the US Army General Headquarters established the Desert Training Center in California and Arizona, which provided a more primitive, simulated combat environment for soldiers to live and fight during major exercises.\(^{186}\) For all the major powers, exercises were conducted throughout World War II to test the readiness of units on their way to combat.

The Advent of Traditional Multinational Military Exercises During the Cold War

The establishment of permanent peacetime alliances after World War II marked a significant transition in the evolution of military exercises. From this point on, exercises were conducted not just nationally, but internationally as well. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began conducting regular multinational exercises in the first few years of its existence. The first

\(^{185}\) Ibid.

NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, noted that there were approximately 100 exercises conducted in 1953, including tabletop planning and Command Post Exercises (CPX), but most commonly, ground maneuvers. He explains the purpose of the exercises: “In Allied Command Europe most of the manoeuvres were designed to integrate the forces of countries, unaccustomed to working together, into a co-ordinated fighting machine, and to practise headquarters and staffs in their wartime role.”\(^{187}\) In addition to interoperability, Ismay argued that maneuvers allow the allied militaries to test new doctrine: “international exercises have provided opportunities for these ‘back-room’ studies to be tested out in practice.”\(^{188}\) He provides the examples of Exercises ‘Grand Repulse’ and ‘Monte Carlo’, the latter of which saw the first air-ground NATO maneuvers to test the application of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

As the Cold War rivalry between the superpower blocs intensified, NATO and the Warsaw Pact increased the size and scope of their MMEs; most of these exercises served the functions of rehearsal and deterrence. In 1968, NATO partners conducted the first ‘REFORGER’ (Return of Forces to Germany) exercise in order to test the ability of the US and other partners to reinforce West Germany in the event of a Soviet attack. This annual conventional exercise not only ensured the readiness of reinforcements, but also signaled solidarity to the alliance and deterrence to the Warsaw Pact against the backdrop of US budget constraints and transfers of soldiers to Vietnam. The UK conducted a similar unilateral training event called FULL FLOW to test the reinforcement of the European continent by 57,700 British troops. The REFORGER exercises were held in conjunction with other major NATO maneuvers every fall as part of a program known as ‘Autumn Forge,’ which involved upwards of 250,000 Atlantic troops in the


\(^{188}\) Ibid.
last decade of the Cold War. The US alliance commitment to South Korea following the ceasefire with North Korea in 1953 was maintained in annual exercises between the two armed forces to rehearse for potential conflict and deter northern aggression. In 1976, the two countries consolidated smaller exercises into a large annual ‘Team Spirit’ training event, which hosted roughly 100,000 soldiers in the first few iterations and 200,000 troops by the late 1980’s.

The Warsaw Pact conducted similar large-scale maneuvers with the same objectives. During exercise Buria, the allies conducted their first command post exercise that rehearsed the actions of the Unified Armed Forces for a full-scale conventional and nuclear war, which also ran simultaneously to the Second Berlin Crisis in 1961. Soviet-led exercises throughout the 1960’s were mostly used for rehearsal and deterrence; John Caravelli asserts that the exercises served as: “(1) a tool to increase the military coordination and hence capabilities of the Warsaw Pact allies; (2) a psychological instrument to impress or influence Western perceptions of Soviet-Warsaw Pact capabilities; and (3) a political tool to foster an image both in the West and within the Pact itself of Soviet-NSWP solidarity.” On a few occasions, joint training events served as a ‘cover’ for troop mobilizations and deployments. As democratic revolution threatened the weak Czechoslovak regime in May 1968, the Soviet Union announced that exercises were to take place from June 20 to 30, 1968. After maneuvers ended, the Soviet Union left in place between 6,000 to 24,000 troops in Czechoslovakia throughout July. More maneuvers (Neman and another unnamed exercise) by the Soviet, East German, and Polish troops along the troubled

country’s northern and eastern borders in August “served as the springboard for the invasion of Czechoslovakia commencing late on August 20.”\textsuperscript{193} The Pact would also sometimes use exercises to deter its own member states’ opposition parties during political turmoil, which was evident in Pact maneuvers around Poland in 1980-1981.\textsuperscript{194} Despite a few exercises to control the internal policies of the Warsaw Pact allies, Soviet-led exercises were largely designed to rehearse and deter the threat of NATO.

The US increased multinational exercises beyond NATO and defense pact alliances in the early 1980s. After the Camp David Accords in 1978 and Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in March 1979, the US began stationing infantry troops in Egypt and along the shared border with Israel. In 1980, the US and Egypt conducted its first biannual exercise ‘Bright Star’, intended not only to maintain peace between the two Middle Eastern rivals, but also to showcase American presence against the growing Soviet influence in the region. The exercise simulated a scenario in which a rapid deployment force from Fort Campbell, Kentucky would aid troops in the region from an attacker.\textsuperscript{195} The US also began or intensified annual and biannual exercises with Asian partners in the early 1980’s: exercise ‘Cobra Gold’ with Thailand and ‘Balikatan’ with the Philippines. Though large-scale exercises comprised the majority of training events during the Cold War, the US, UK, and France also held regular smaller exercises with Central American and African partners to combat communist influence or build capacity in former colonies. Beginning in 1983, the US conducted annual exercises with Honduras to combat

\textsuperscript{193} The August 20 invasion was commanded by Soviet Ground Forces Commander-in-chief General I.G. Pavlovski and included somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000 Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian troops. Ibid., 407-412, quotation on 412.

\textsuperscript{194} Blackwill and Legro, 68-98.

communist guerrillas, while France sent troops to Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Togo to strengthen
the local armies of its former colonies.

*The Rise of Non-Traditional Multinational Military Exercises After the Cold War*

As the end of Cold War brought new hopes about the prospects for peace after the conclusion
of great power rivalry, the rapid pace of change also brought new challenges to how militaries
viewed and confronted the international threat environment. Though the threat of large-scale
conventional war still loomed with threats emanating from Iraq to North Korea in the early
1990’s, militaries began preparing for the ‘new threats’ of regional instability, civil war, and
ethnic fragmentation wrought by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist Europe. To
manage the new international environment and confront these growing non-state threats, major
powers began engaging in shaping operations. One activity of shaping operations is what
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster coin “Defence Diplomacy”, borrowing the language from
the 1998 British *Strategic Defence Review* White Paper. The authors argue that as opposed to
the old defense diplomacy of balance-of-power politics, spheres of influence, and pursuit of
narrowly-defined national interests, since the end of the Cold War major power militaries have
engaged in a new form of defense diplomacy which, “involves the peacetime cooperative use of
armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defense ministries) as a tool of foreign and
security policy.” The tools of the new defense diplomacy involve defense sector advice to
emerging post-conflict states, international exchanges between defense officials and military

---

officers, and multinational training. These types of activities are more generally considered ‘military cooperation’ or ‘military assistance’ and the authors acknowledge some of these initiatives were common before the 1990’s: defense attachés served regularly as diplomats in nineteenth century Europe, while the UK’s Imperial Defence College was established in 1922 in order to educate and develop officers from across the empire.

What is different about the post-Cold War defense diplomacy, the authors argue, is the wider range of goals and more numerous partners that major powers seek. First, instead of only using military force to counterbalance enemies, assistance is now being used to “build cooperative relations with former or potential adversaries, and thereby helping to prevent potential conflicts.”

Second, not only are military funding and training efforts geared toward spheres of influence, but also toward promoting democratic reform in transitioning states. Third, militaries are not only teaching transitioning states in conventional battle, but also training others to assume peacekeeping duties abroad. In summary: “It is thus possible to distinguish between old defence diplomacy, with its realpolitik on countering enemies, and new defence diplomacy, with its emphasis on engagement with potential enemies, support for democracy, good governance and human rights, and enabling states to deal with their own security problems.”

As a result of the increasing prevalence of defense diplomacy in the 1990’s, major power-led multinational military exercises followed suit. Militaries not only were prepared to use and threaten force in the traditional sense, but also began engaging in non-warfighting activities such as diplomacy and security force assistance. Thus, not only were major powers engaging in traditional rehearsal and deterrence exercises against potential state threats (such as Iraq, Iran,

---

198 Ibid., 15.
199 Ibid., 5-14, quotation on 8.
and North Korea), but major powers increased the number of non-traditional exercises to build partner capacity, shape partner roles, build trust with adversaries, and recruit states for peacekeeping missions. The US and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program announced in 1994 saw the advent on numerous exercises intended to recruit post-communist allies for multinational missions throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s (explored in Chapter 4). France and the UK invested heavily in strengthening the capacity of former colonies in Africa and the Middle East (Chapter 5). Russia initiated several exercises with former Soviet republics in the 1990s, which coalesced into multiple regular annual exercises with its regional security organization to influence the character of partner militaries (along with China, described in Chapter 6). Moreover, major power rivals began conducting exercises as post-Cold War era confidence and security-building measures (such as China and India in the 2000’s to 2010’s, explored in Chapter 7). This cumulative effect of adding non-traditional to traditional exercises led to a proliferation in ground-based exercises increasing dramatically after 1991 (see Figure 3.1 below). The growth in shaping MMEs for each major power is represented by Figures 3.2 (Western Powers) and 3.3 (Eastern Powers), below.
Figure 3.1: Total Exercises by Traditional (Deterrence, Rehearsal) and Non-Traditional (Role-Forming, Trust-Developing, Capacity-Building, Recruitment) Functions, 1980-2000
Figure 3.2: Shaping MMEs by Western Powers, 1980-2016

Figure 3.3: Shaping MMEs by Eastern Powers, 1980-2016
Trends in MMEs by region are highlighted in Figure 3.4 below. During the last decade of the Cold War, most MMEs took place in Europe, while exercises in Asia and the Americas were also prominent. After the drawdown of Cold War hostilities, European exercises declined until 1994 but rose again after PfP was announced in 1994. The 1990’s also saw a major increase in Middle Eastern exercises (a consequence of deterrence against Iraq and Iran) as well as slight growth in training in Africa by 1997. Asian exercises declined rapidly by 1995, due in large part to agreements between North and South Korea to halt MMEs in pursuit of peace talks. However, exercises in Asia since 1995 have grown almost every year, culminating with by far the most exercises for a single region by 2016. European exercises have also experienced a striking resurgence since 2010, largely due to competing traditional exercises between NATO and Russia. Exercises in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas have largely remained constant since the early 2000’s.
3.3 Multinational Military Exercise Tasks and Types

Current Understandings of Multinational Military Exercises

Though certain high-profile military exercises, such ‘Foal Eagle’ between the US and South Korea and ‘Zapad’ between Russia and Belarus, receive high degrees of interest in the media several times a year, MMEs are generally undertheorized as an independent phenomenon. Moreover, even scholarly references to MMEs are usually tangential to the main argument and are left unproblematicized. Celeste Wallander mentions military exercises as one aspect of integrated military commands, a general asset NATO used to adapt to its new mission after the Cold War, but does not explain their significance in building cooperation.\textsuperscript{200} Daniel Nexon and

Stacie Goddard note that military exercises may be useful for militaries to integrate their mobilizations with other states through a process of ‘binding’, but go no further in explaining how or why this would take place.\(^{201}\) In explaining his method of practice-tracing, Vincent Pouliot provides the example of joint exercises as practices that result in reactions by other states based on their particular context and meaning. He argues, “Between close partners, military exercises will likely produce communications sharing, officer exchanges, and follow-up meetings. When it comes to rivals, however, this practice may generate harsh diplomatic reactions, military deployments, and countermeasures. But whatever its effects, the military exercise, just like any other practice, will surely cause other practices in its wake.”\(^{202}\) Though Pouliot highlights the promise of using practices to analyze military exercises, he provides no theory to illuminate his short example.

Robert Blackwill and Jeffery Legro do explain the political and military purposes of ground exercises conducted by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but emphasize the traditional roles of rehearsal and deterrence which were the most common functions of joint training at the time.\(^{203}\) Vito D’Orazio collected a large sample of land, air, sea, and command-post multinational military exercises from 1970-2010 to develop a dataset that serves as one of several indicators of military cooperation between states. He argues that liberal democracies use military cooperation as both a means to coerce their partners and socialize them to their norms. He finds that greater military cooperation with liberal democracies results in fewer instances of severe repression enacted by governments against political opposition campaigns.\(^{204}\) Though his

\(^{203}\) Blackwill and Legro, 68-98.
findings are important in understanding the impact military cooperation has on partner states’
violent responses to political opposition, MMEs are used only as an indicator and not
problematized themselves. Moreover, as explained in the section below, exercises serve several
functions and may not be intended as forms of socialization or coercion.

Exercise Training Tasks

I develop exercise types based on several indicators, including training tasks. Training tasks
attempt to capture the type of operation in which exercise participants desire to improve their
performance through teaching, repetition, and evaluation. Though many types of tasks can be
involved in an individual exercise, I argue there are five main types of tasks by which ground
forces train: conventional-maneuver, peacekeeping-stability, counterinsurgency-
counterterrorism, humanitarian-disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations. A
single exercise may involve multiple training tasks: for example, an exercise scenario may
envision a conventional forcible entry into a contested area with follow-on stability operations.

Conventional-maneuver tasks generally involve the use of traditional means of combat power
(e.g. infantry, tanks, artillery, aircraft) employed in offensive or defensive operations against a
similarly organized and equipped enemy. Though these exercise ‘enemies’ are usually state
militaries, they may be non-state actors with significant organization and equipment to be able to
confront state forces in open battle. Conventional tasks are conceptually separated from
counterinsurgency-counterterrorism tasks in that the enemies of the latter usually employ hit-
and-run guerrilla tactics and do not desire to meet a conventional force in open battle.

Korean responses to exercise Foal Eagle, see Vito D’Orazio, “War Games: North Korea’s Reaction to US and South
Counterinsurgency operations involve the attempt by a counterinsurgent force not only to provide security and defeat insurgents in small-unit combat, but also achieve political victory by convincing the population that its political authority is more legitimate than the insurgents.\textsuperscript{205} There is often conceptual overlap between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; thus, I include them in the same category.\textsuperscript{206}

*Peacekeeping-stability* tasks include activities that Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis describe as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction that are ultimately intended to end or prevent civil wars.\textsuperscript{207} Specific peacekeeping or peace enforcement military training tasks include separation of belligerents, protection of civilians, convoy security, and distribution of humanitarian aid. Stability tasks include traditionally non-military post-conflict reconstruction—commonly referred to as ‘Phase IV’—efforts such as establishing civil security, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and aiding economic and infrastructure development.\textsuperscript{208} Due to conceptual similarity, I include both tasks in the same category. During *humanitarian-disaster relief* training, militaries practice tasks associated with reducing “human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” following civil conflict or natural disasters.\textsuperscript{209} Non-combatant evacuation operations (also known as ‘NEOs’) require that militaries are prepared to


\textsuperscript{206} For a discussion of the conceptual ambiguity regarding the distinction between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, see Michael J. Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?” *International Affairs* Vol. 86, No. 2 (March 2010): 333-353.

\textsuperscript{207} Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, 1-18. The UN has given mandate to NATO to conduct multilateral peace-keeping missions (such as in Bosnia in 1995) but not to Russia unilaterally or multilaterally with the CSTO, with the exception of allowing UN monitoring post-conflict in Abkhazia and Tajikistan in 1994. See Roy Allison, *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 134-140.


expeditiously rescue civilians (usually government employees) from hostile environments abroad
during times of crisis.\textsuperscript{210}

Figure 3.5 below highlights the changing emphasis on different exercise tasks over time.\textsuperscript{211}
As is apparent in the graph, conventional-maneuver tasks are most common throughout the
1980’s and the post-Cold War era. Peacekeeping-stability tasks were exercised beginning in the
early 1990’s, but dropped after 2000. Counterinsurgency-counterterror tasks grew substantially
after the Al Qaeda attacks on the US in September 2001, eclipsing conventional-maneuver tasks
in a few years during the 2000’s. Humanitarian-disaster relief training tasks have grown slowly
over time. What is most interesting is the dramatic increase in conventional-maneuver exercises
after 2010; the return of conventional exercises and the implications for international security
will be explored in Chapter 9.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} US Department of Defense, \textit{DoD Dictionary of Military Associated Terms}, May 2017,
\item \textsuperscript{211} Note- each exercise may have more than one exercise task; thus, the sum of all training tasks is far greater
than number of training events.
\end{itemize}
Determining Exercise Types

As explained in the introduction, the traditional exercise functions of rehearsal and deterrence seek to prepare to use or threaten military force. Conversely, the non-traditional exercise types—recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing—comprise a form of shaping activity intended to gather assistance from potential allies, transform adversarial relations from hostile to friendly, and reduce the uncertainty of threats by influencing and strengthening the capacity of partners. For conceptual clarity, I argue that each MME serves one exercise function, even though there may be ‘sub-functions’ within each type. For instance, because there is usually major overlap between the functions of deterrence and rehearsal (the only means for a major power to credibly signal capability is by practicing it), I imagine
deterrence exercises as also serving rehearsal functions (but not necessary the other way around, in which an exercise may practice for deployment without the need for deterrence). Moreover, when a major power builds the capacity of a partner state, there is also commonly an attempt to form the role that the partner military serves for its society (such as peacekeeping force or regime defense). Despite this overlap, I code one exercise type for each training event. Each MME type is informed by six indicators: (1) the nature of the defense organization or agreement; (2) the exercise program history; (3) the exercise training tasks; (4) the number of troops participating in the event; (5) the threat (either practiced in the scenario or mentioned in the news report); (6) official statements and news reports covering the event. A summary of the indicators is shown in Figure 3.6 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Defense Agreement/Organization</th>
<th>Exercise Program and History</th>
<th>Training Tasks</th>
<th>Number of Troops</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Official Statements and News Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deterrence</strong></td>
<td>e.g. “REFORGER”</td>
<td>Conventional-Maneuver Only</td>
<td>Significant for deterrence (usually more than 5,000 troops)</td>
<td>External to Partners</td>
<td>“Defend our interests” “Deterrence” “Reassure Allies”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rehearsal</strong></td>
<td>Usually no exercise program; used as preparation for deployment or potential mission</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Approximately the number that would be used during deployment</td>
<td>External to Partners</td>
<td>“Interoperability” “Preparation for deployment” “Test Ability to Work Together”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust-Developing</strong></td>
<td>e.g. “Hand-in-Hand”</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency-Counterterrorism, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian-Disaster Relief</td>
<td>Small, largely symbolic (100-500 troops)</td>
<td>External or Internal to Partners</td>
<td>“Building Trust” “History of Hostility”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity-Building</strong></td>
<td>e.g. “Flintlock, RECAMP”, “BMATT”</td>
<td>Conventional-Maneuver, Counterinsurgency-Counterterrorism, Peacekeeping-Stability</td>
<td>Major power sends small units or limited number of trainers compared to partner military</td>
<td>Internal to Partners or Regional Peacekeeping</td>
<td>“Building Partner Capacity” “Strengthen Ability to Defend Itself” “Upgrading fighting capabilities” “Bolster Foreign Troops” “Special Forces Trainers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role-Forming</strong></td>
<td>e.g. “Interaction”, “Frontier”, “Balance Piston”, “Steppe Eagle”</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency-Counterterrorism, Peacekeeping-Stability</td>
<td>Major power sends small units or limited number of trainers compared to partner military</td>
<td>Internal to Partners</td>
<td>Similar to capacity-building, but partner militaries are more advanced and major power influence more subtle. “Familiarize with new weaponry”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recruitment</strong></td>
<td>e.g. “Partnership for Peace”, “INDRA”, “Yudh Abhyas”</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Small, largely symbolic (100-500 troops)</td>
<td>External to Partners</td>
<td>“Gathering Support” “Build Relationship” “Friendship” “Improve military cooperation”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.6: Summary of Indicators for MME Type
The first indicator provides information about what defense pact, regional organization, or defense relationship surrounds the event. Some organizations may plan and resource the training event (e.g. NATO), while others may be planned and funded by a major power but includes alliance partners (e.g. the US and NATO). Some exercises fulfill formal defense agreements short of alliance pacts, while others serve to realize confidence and security building measures signed by diplomats between geopolitical rivals. In general, deterrence and rehearsal exercises are usually conducted by formal alliances and states with standing defense agreements. Trust-developing exercises are usually conducted by states within a framework of confidence-building. Role-forming training is usually led by a major power in a regional security organization. Major powers usually send trainers to build the capacity of partners in bi- or multi-lateral training programs and recruitment exercises are commonly led by alliances or emerging defense relationships. The second indicator involves exercise program history. Habitual exercises (annual, biannual, or quadrennial) often maintain the same program name, such as ‘REFORGER’ or ‘Cobra Gold’, though this may not be the case. The exercise program’s history, especially year of inauguration and agreements surrounding the beginning of training relations, provides telling information on which type of function the exercise serves. The third indicator, exercise training tasks, also help specify function type in several ways. First, though deterrence is a possible function for conventional-maneuver exercises, I exclude deterrence as a possibility for the other training tasks of counterinsurgency-counterterrorism, peacekeeping-stability, humanitarian-disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations because, in general, training for these operations are not intended to signal a deterrent threat to an enemy.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{212} One could argue that state militaries are capable of deterring insurgents and terrorists, primarily through decapitating unmanned aerial strikes and targeted killings carried out by special operations forces. Though fearing air and ground strikes is a logical deterrent, I have found little evidence of militaries using counterinsurgency exercises (specifically) to signal deterrence and would question whether demonstrations actually deter terrorism.
Capacity-building exercises may encompass conventional-maneuver, counterinsurgency-counterterrorism, or peacekeeping-stability tasks (based on the needs of the partner), while role-forming training usually excludes the first task since the partners are usually more advanced and do not need training in conventional tactics. Trust-developing exercises usually incorporate counterinsurgency-counterterrorism, peacekeeping-stability, and humanitarian relief tasks (but not conventional), while rehearsals and recruitment may include all types of tasks.

The fourth indicator, number of troops involved (if available), helps provide context in how real-world ‘useful’ or merely ‘symbolic’ the exercise is for the partners. Deterrence exercises involve a number of troops effective for signaling (usually at least 5,000, but not always); rehearsals must involve a number of troops that would actually be sufficient for a deployment or the imagined scenario. Trust-developing and recruitment exercises are usually symbolic, incorporating only a few hundred soldiers which would be too few for actual major operations. Major powers usually send trainers or small units (smaller than the partner force) to build the capacity of weaker states; while role-forming exercises usually involve similar number of troops from both the major power and the partner. Figure 3.7 below reveals that average troops per exercise declined from the end of the Cold War until 2015. The ‘spikes’ in certain years, such as 1992 and 1993, are attributed to a few massive exercises: most notably ‘Team Spirit’ between the US and South Korea.

---

The fifth indicator, threat faced by the exercise participants, also influences the function of the exercise. I dichotomize threat by internal and external: I assume internal threats comprise insurgencies, terrorists, or violent ethnic factions within a partner state, while external threats involve conventional threats, insurgencies, terrorists, or violent ethnic factions outside of the partner states. Deterrence and rehearsals are usually associated with external threats that allies or coalition partners must prepare for during training, which may involve deploying for peacekeeping or counterinsurgency in another state. Recruitment exercises are attempts by major powers to enlist the help of capable contributors to prepare against external threats. Trust-developing exercises may be external or internal, depending on the individual exercise (e.g. counterinsurgency at home or peacekeeping abroad). Capacity-building and role-forming
exercises are aimed at combating an internal threat to the partner state. The sixth indicator provides overall context for each exercise. Public statements by government officials and commentary by journalists provide background to what they perceive is the purpose of the training event. For instance, during rehearsals, statements such as ‘preparations for combat’ or ‘interoperability’ will often signal that the intended purpose of the exercise is only to prepare for missions. Capacity-building and role-forming exercises often draw similar language, such as ‘building partner-capacity’ or ‘strengthen the ability’ of the partner to assume greater responsibility for its own security. Public officials emphasize the need to ‘gather support’ for upcoming missions during recruitment exercises. Journalists usually provide context and mention a ‘history of hostility’ among participants in trust-developing maneuvers.

Like exercise tasks, exercise types have varied over time. Figure 3.8 below shows how each function (one per exercise) was emphasized in certain years. Deterrence/rehearsal functions were by far the most prominent during the last decade of the Cold War, dipped in frequency during the 1990’s and 2000’s, but have accelerated since 2010. Pure rehearsals grew throughout the 1990’s but dropped in the 2000’s. Recruitment exercise grew dramatically after 1994, the first year in which NATO’s Partnership for Peace program began. Building partner-capacity training increased in the late 1990’s and maintained frequency through 2010. Role-forming exercises increased substantially since 1996 as NATO sought to shape the post-Cold War environment, and these exercises grew again in the early 2000’s with the advent of the Russian and Chinese-led regional security organizations. Trust-developing exercises are rare and only gained regularity since 2007 (most notably between India and China).
3.4 Determining Exercise Type by Partner Type

In addition to being informed by training task, partners are determined by several criteria: (1) current alliance or coalition membership, (2) history of rivalry, (3) state fragility, and (4) potential (as viewed by the major power) to contribute to current or future operations. Allies are defense-pact allies or current mission-based coalition partners. Rivals are major powers that maintain a history of intense security competition. For my purposes, I consider the US-China, the US-Russia, and India-China as the three major power rivalries since the end of the Cold War. Transitioning/Consolidating States are those countries that experience ‘low’ to ‘serious’ fragility

\[\text{Figure 3.8: Land-Based MMEs by Exercise Type}\]

---

\(^{213}\) For a more detailed explication of the difference between military alliances and ad-hoc coalitions, see Scott Wolford, *The Politics of Military Coalitions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 14-22.
according to the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index; *Fragile States* score ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ fragility on the index.\(^{214}\)

*Potential allies* are the most difficult partner-type to determine, yet enjoy their own category due to the unique nature of their relationship to major powers. Major powers view potential allies as ‘useful contributors’ to ongoing or potential missions, whether as defense-pact allies or coalition partners, and seek recruits based on the strategic environment. I count as potential allies those countries that score higher than ‘low’ fragility on the State Fragility Index and, to the NATO major power US, UK, France, and Germany, the countries that constitute the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (which involves all NATO, neutral, and former-communist Eurasian states). I include the OSCE countries as potential allies—even Russia—because all these countries were invited the NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program beginning in 1994 (see Chapter 4).

In general, major powers conduct the traditional exercise types of rehearsals and deterrence with allies to either prepare for war or prevent war through the threat of force. Conversely, major powers tend to use non-traditional functions with non-allies as a means to reduce uncertainty in their strategic environments. First, in order to recruit allies to join defense pacts or participate as coalition partners in multilateral missions, major powers conduct *recruitment* training with potential allies. These exercises are largely symbolic and are sometimes used to convince partner militaries, as well as their domestic populations, that becoming an ally is important for that partner. Second, major powers employ *capacity-building* exercises to increase

---

the ability for fragile armies to provide security for themselves. Major powers are optimistic that through training, advising, and assisting, weak partners will eventually adopt the requisite capabilities to prevent insurgency and the need for future power intervention. Third, major powers use role-forming exercises with transitioning/consolidating states to encourage a particular function that partner militaries should serve for their societies. For instance, major powers may encourage the roles of ‘democracy defense’ or ‘peacekeeper’ if the major power views liberal democracies as less threatening than other types of regimes. Conversely, major powers may influence a partner military to adopt the role of ‘regime defense’ if the major power views regime stability on its borders as vital to its security. Finally, major powers conduct trust-developing exercises with their rivals as an attempt to prevent war by increasing trust, reducing hostility, and limiting the risk of inadvertent war. These major power rivals hope that through habitual (usually annual) exercises, with different soldiers from rotating units, over time their soldiers will adopt a more positive perception of each other as ‘comrades’ instead of ‘adversaries’ and be better able to manage crises in the future. Below is a decision tree for partner type based on exercise type (Figure 3.9).
3.5 Strategic Environments

Major powers do not conduct exercises with all non-allies; because major powers have an incentive to reduce strategic uncertainty, they select non-allies based on their location within the major power’s strategic environment. Strategic environments are the geographic sum of a state military’s allies, potential allies, and threats. Militaries and their subordinate services (land, sea, and air) use strategic environments to plan for shaping activities and contingency operations; they serve as imagined scenarios for cooperative and competitive engagement with other militaries and non-state threats. Without specified strategic environments, militaries would have difficulty prioritizing resources and allocating troops to different regions of the world. Land-based armies, in particular, derive their strategic environments from two main factors: geography and history. However, each major power varies in the weight associated to geography and history based on its particular grand strategy. Concerning geography, major powers may be
concerned about states and threats along their borders (territorial contiguity) and those within close geographic proximity, while others may be concerned about threats farther away. Major powers may also be concerned about their former colonial subjects or sovereign association (such as republics of the former Soviet Union), while others share little colonial or political history with other states. Ascertaining a major power’s strategic environment is possible by observing three indicators: regional command structure, permanent advisory units, and grand strategy. I group the major powers into three categories based on similar strategic environment types: Western powers, Eastern powers, and the US. Each group will be discussed in detail below.

*Western Strategic Environments: the UK, France, and Germany*

The Western European major powers’ strategic environments consist of Europe and the powers’ former colonies; these are the regions in which they focus their military planning and force structure efforts. The European major powers are allied with other European states in NATO, which began in 1949 but underwent several rounds of enlargement, most recently in 2017 with Montenegro. Additionally, France maintains a defense alliance with former colony Gabon. The European militaries are structured around domestic commands, the NATO alliance and deployments, as well as several permanent advisory units stationed abroad. The UK’s military command structure is primarily focused on the nation-island, while permanent British advisory units are deployed throughout Africa. Ashley Jackson notes that “Britain’s defence presence in Africa relies on four main elements: defence attaches and defence advisors appointed to British embassies and high commissions in African countries; four Regional Conflict Advisers coordinating the work of the ACPP [Africa Conflict Prevention Pool]; the deployment of British
units for short-term visits to African countries to perform training roles and the various works associated with goodwill visits; and the maintenance of British Peace Support Teams, British Military Advisory and Training Teams, and British Defence Advisory Teams (BDAT).”

The four Regional Conflict Advisors are permanently based in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa; other military advisors are stationed in Ghana and Sierra Leone in addition to regular defense attaches. France maintains permanent troop presence in four sovereign territories—Antilles, French Guiana, French Polynesia, and New Caledonia—while it also retains troops in Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and Abu Dhabi. Germany, along with France, contribute forces to Eurocorps, but does not maintain other permanent troops abroad. Many non-NATO European states suffered instability in the 1990s, while former colonial holdings often lack state capacity to address rebellion and transnational terrorism.

The US Strategic Environment

The US currently maintains formal alliances with over sixty countries, all since the aftermath of World War II. US allies are located across the world, including Central and South America (the Organization of American States), Europe (NATO), Oceania (ANZUS), and several are manifest in bilateral defense pacts: Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Korea. The US military is structured to provide presence and support regional deployments world-wide through its system of global combatant commands. The US military maintains six regional joint

---

216 Ibid., 351-376.
commands: US Northern Command, Southern Command, European Command, Central Command, Pacific Command, and the most recently created Africa Command. Each joint command is charged with the responsibility for a major world region: the US homeland, South America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa (respectively). Each of the component services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—also maintains headquarters and presence in each of the joint commands. Moreover, the US grand strategy of primacy (or ‘deep engagement’) requires that the US military is prepared to shape and deploy to all parts of the world. Thus, the US strategic environment and military planning efforts span the entire globe. However, because of US hegemony over the Western hemisphere, the US military is less certain about threats emanating outside of the Americas; thus, shaping operations should be focused primarily outside of the Western Hemisphere.

Eastern Strategic Environments: China, Russia, and India

The Eastern major powers’ strategic environments primarily involve the immediate periphery bordering their territory; these major powers are challenged by vast borders with more territorial contiguous neighbors than anywhere else in the world. China’s environment, in particular, may be considered the most complex in the world: with fourteen land contiguous neighbors across 14,000 miles of shared territorial borders, China’s unique geography creates vulnerabilities that

---


the rising power must address in order to provide security for its people. Russia experiences almost the same territorial complexity as China: the former empire maintains the second largest territorial border stretching almost 14,000 miles which also fourteen land contiguous neighbors (when including the exclave Kaliningrad); India shares nearly 9,000 miles of borders with six other countries. Due to invasions from Europe throughout history, one of the goals of Russia’s grand strategy is to retain hegemony over its near-abroad, especially west toward Central Europe. Russia’s most intimate military relationship resides with bordering Belarus and the major power leads the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional security organization of former Soviet republics founded in 2003. China has only one formal ally—contiguous North Korea—but has led the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) consisting of China, Russia, and Central Asian states since 2001. India has no formal allies but became a member of the SCO in June 2017.

Indicators for Asian strategic environments are primarily derived from their regional commands. Russia, China, and India all have internal regional commands within their own borders and no external regional commands (compared with, for instance, the US global combatant command system). Before 2016, the Chinese military was structured against seven ‘military regions’ inside the country; in December 2015, the Central Chinese Commission announced plans to replace this structure with five ‘theater commands’: Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central theater commands. Each command is responsible for, “responding to security threats from their strategic directions, maintaining peace, deterring wars

---

and winning battles” and conducting training. Russia’s military structure is comprised of four internal military districts: Western, Eastern, Central, and Northern (comprised of the Baltic fleet, Kaliningrad district, and former Leningrad and Moscow districts). Russia rotates military exercises throughout each of the four districts every few years. India’s army is structured along six domestic regional commands: Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, and Southwestern. Though each country maintains a few small overseas bases or ports, the fact that the three Eastern military command structures are internal to their states reveals that their strategic environments mostly comprise the areas surrounding their borders. Because the eastern powers have no ‘allies’, I argue that they are uncertain about the entirety of their strategic environments (the contiguous periphery).

3.6 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to provide a brief history of military exercises, an overview of the current literature on MMEs, and an explication of key concepts such as exercise types and strategic environments. The chapter showed how military exercises developed from unilateral tests of troop readiness and emergent doctrine until World War II, alliance-based rehearsals and deterrence during the Cold War, and multilateral shaping activities in the post-Cold War period. The discussion of current understandings of MMEs in journalism and political science reveal that military training is under-theorized and conceived of only as a vague form of military

---


228 I argue in more detail in Chapter 8 that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is more of a collective-security organization rather than a defense-pact alliance.
cooperation. The section on key concepts explored types of training tasks, determinants of exercise types, and developed an idealized decision tree of exercises by partner type. Finally, the last section provided a framework of strategic environments by major power. The following four chapters provide specific descriptions of each non-traditional exercise type as well as an illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against the alternatives.
Part II
Illustrative Case Studies of Non-Traditional Exercises
CHAPTER 4
RECRUITMENT EXERCISES

4.1 Introduction

During his visit to the first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) military exercise on American soil in August 1995, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili discussed with reporters the importance of these training events for the contemporary European security environment. He told the audience, “We talk about the uncertainties, we talk about the challenges but we also talk about possibilities.” He discussed the goal of the partnership initiative: “It is not about gadgets, it’s about common procedure. These exercises are checking out whether we’re getting closer and closer.”

During the exercise, a Ukrainian Army major told a reporter that he appreciated the US-led training because “some of his platoon members are ‘probably’ headed for ‘peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Croatia’.” As violence in the Balkans was raging, American and NATO government officials and military officers were attempting to address the uncertainty of ethnic war in Europe. The NATO PfP initiative served as a practical means by which the US could attract potential alliance members as well as generate support for future peacekeeping missions. PfP exercises were designed to recruit potential allies.

This chapter explores the first category of non-traditional shaping MMEs: recruitment. Major powers use recruitment exercises to attract potential allies, develop military and diplomatic support for multilateral missions, or simply to build stronger ties between armies. This chapter discusses in detail the purpose of recruitment exercises, the mechanisms militaries use for recruitment, the major powers that commonly conduct these events, and an illustrative case study.

---

230 Ibid.
of one of the most prominent recruitment training programs: NATO’s PfP. The chapter will then apply the illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against the alternative explanations and then conclude by way of a summary.

4.2 Recruitment Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty

The Purpose of Recruitment Exercises

In order to build positive military relations with and enlist the support of other states, major powers often conduct recruitment exercises. Major powers attempt to recruit three types of ‘potential allies’ during recruitment training: states to join as defense pact members in the future, states to participate in multilateral operations, and other states with which major powers simply seek friendlier relations. Recruitment exercises are commonly initiated in response to a particular crisis, but may also be conducted simply to attract alliance membership or create friendlier ties. There are two mechanisms by which major powers attempt to recruit during training: interoperability and relationship-building. Like all military training, interoperability—or the ability for soldiers from different nations or services to operate together through common doctrine and technology—is a key aspect of recruitment. However, a more important role of recruiting is to provide a training event that brings soldiers together, become familiar with one another, and serve as a symbol of positive military relations for those who decide to deploy troops abroad: governments and their publics. As these exercises are largely symbolic, they include few troops—usually about 100 to 500 total—and involve many opportunities for soldiers from different countries to interact on a friendly, personal level. Recruitment training events are usually “scripted” in that there is little battlefield realism to the scenario; instead, they are designed to demonstrate “solidarity” among partners and can be understood as “symbolic flag-
The adherence to strict, unrealistic training scenarios makes these types of exercises seem “non-meaningful” and “unnatural” as compared to large-scale maneuvers.\textsuperscript{232} The audience for recruitment training is mostly the partner countries, which includes the partner government, military, and even their domestic populations. Major powers hope that partner governments—especially central decision-makers, militaries, and legislatures—and their publics will support alliance ascension or multilateral peacekeeping after these training events. This support from partner nations is important to major powers seeking to reduce uncertainty about the source of threats (which states will be a threat?) and support they will receive (who will help?) in their strategic environments.

The most prominent example of recruitment training is NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in the 1990’s, which sought to build strong military ties with former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states, either to prepare for future NATO membership or to enlist for potential peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Recruitment exercises are far more common in the post-Cold War environment, yet they were also used during the 1980s: the biannual US-Egypt ‘Bright Star’ exercise program was largely an attempt by the US to strengthen ties to Egypt not only to continue to maintain peace with Israel, but also as a counter to Soviet influence in the region. Recruitment differs from other non-traditional exercise functions. Though major powers may seek to influence the role of partner militaries during these events (for instance, to be more democratic), this secondary objective serves the larger goal of recruiting for alliance membership or potential multinational missions. The partner states (‘potential allies’) are usually more militarily advanced than fragile states, which precludes the need to build partner capacity.

\textsuperscript{231} Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017.

\textsuperscript{232} Colonel (US Air Force, retired) Sam Gardiner, former NATO staff officer and Chairman of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations at the National War College, phone interview by author, June 9, 2017.
Moreover, although some training events help build trust between major partners and other states, these type of training events usually do not occur between current rivals with competitive relationships.

Although during the Cold War most exercises were conducted to prepare for or deter war, recruitment exercises were sometimes used to draw states into the superpowers’ spheres of influence. In addition to US involvement in ‘Bright Star’, the Soviet Union also conducted an exercise with Syria in 1981 to maintain tight military relations and naval bases with the non-ally. At the conclusion of superpower hostilities, recruitment exercises were most commonly executed by the US, UK, France, Germany, and India. The US and European powers used recruitment exercises in the 1990’s to prepare former Warsaw Pact and Soviet countries for eventual NATO membership or to practice for peacekeeping missions. France conducts several regular exercises with Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE that began in the mid-1990’s and continued even after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq precluded the need for major conventional deterrence in the region. These exercises allow France to maintain a presence in the Middle East and continue to work with partners to address non-state threats. India also recruits through exercise programs such as the ‘SAMPRITI’ and ‘SHAKTI’ training events “to develop good relations” with Bangladesh and France, respectively. Though not as common, China and Russia have also increased these types of MMEs: both countries conduct ‘Friendship’ training with Pakistan

---

Recruitment and the Management of Uncertainty

Major powers use recruitment training to target both the ‘threat’ and ‘assistance’ sources of uncertainty in their strategic environments. First, major powers recruit to reduce the number of potential threats in their environment: by drawing other states into defense pacts or simply creating positive military relations, major powers hope that these states will not be a source of threat in the future. Not only do alliances provide frameworks for collective defense and habitual working relations, they may also socialize certain practices in partner states. For instance, in order to prepare Eastern European former communist states for eventual NATO membership, one of the goals of NATO’s PfP was to instill democratic practices and transparency at the defense ministerial-level.\(^{236}\) Thus, major powers seek to reduce the number of threatening states by drawing them in to defense-pact alliances or spheres of influence. Second, confronted with ambiguous non-state threats such as terrorism, ethnic conflict, and humanitarian disasters, major powers become uncertain about which states will provide diplomatic, financial, or military support to address these threats. Military training provides the practical ability for different armies to ensure their systems and technology are compatible in the event of joint deployment—that is, interoperability.\(^{237}\) When operational need and time horizons allow, major powers often seek the support of other states for multilateral interventions.\(^{238}\)


\(^{237}\) Wallander, 714-717, 729.

\(^{238}\) Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War; Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force.
Training events allow partner militaries to plan and execute training side-by-side, showcasing solidarity and common purpose among nations. As mentioned above, recruitment could also be used to draw states closer to hedge against other state threats, such as US-led ‘Bright Star’ exercises served against communist influence. Thus, recruitment allows major powers to minimize uncertainty by addressing potential source of threat as well as the support needed to counter these challenges.

4.3 The US, NATO, and India Recruit Potential Allies

_Recruiting in Military Doctrine_

The US, UK, France, Germany, and India use recruitment to reduce the number of threats and enlist the help of others in their strategic environments, which were introduced in Chapter 3. The US grand strategy of deep engagement requires that the US military cooperate with militaries all over the world and is prepared to conduct operations in far-off regions. US military activities to build interoperable forces with partner nations are delineated in the US joint and multinational operations manuals, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and JP 3-16*, respectively. Regarding interoperability, *JP 3-0* notes that one of the main purposes of security cooperation with partner militaries is to “develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations” while *JP 3-16* more specifically explains the need for “rationalization, standardization, and interoperability” of doctrine and equipment between partner forces.\(^\text{239}\)

Regarding the need to build friendly military relations, the US joint manual specifically designed for security cooperation (*JP 3-20*) notes that ambiguous transnational threats “require adaptive

\(^{239}\) *Joint Operations*, VI-3; *Multinational Operations*, I-6 through I-9.
planning to integrate allies and partners as an element of national strategy. SC [Security Cooperation] strengthens the US network of allies and partners that can improve the overall warfighting effectiveness of the Joint Force and enable more effective coalition operations.”

Moreover, in order to begin security cooperation, “An initial step in building a security relationship includes some form of partnership. Also characterized as building partnerships, it involves developing long-term security and defense relationships with selected countries, designated as PNs, around the globe.” Multinational exercises serve as one means to build these types of relationships. The US uses recruitment exercises with countries as geographically disparate as Panama, Albania, South Africa, and India in order to build stronger military relations or encourage these states to join in multilateral operations.

The European powers, especially the British, also have doctrinal concepts that encourage recruitment activities. The UK’s most current Defence Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01) notes that, “Defence engagement activities are built upon developing and maintaining a network of contacts and relationships through all available channels and understanding the broader benefits of (at times) seemingly unrelated activity. This demands proactive investment.” Military training and “overseas joint exercises” are listed as tools to develop these relationships. Moreover, the 2013 British ‘Defense Engagement Strategy’ explains that these types of recruiting activities help build “contributions to and political support for current and future operations involving UK Armed Forces, including through enhanced interoperability, as well as access and basing rights.” The UK is mostly concerned with the European

241 Ibid., II-1.
242 UK Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 61.
continent (through organizations such as NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and former colonies, the latter of which is emphasized in the document: “In a number of regions we can also benefit from our historical relationships, and we recognize the need to continue to invest in those important relationships.” The European powers largely use recruitment to encourage post-communist European states to join NATO or engage in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo.

India has expanded what it labels “Defence Cooperation” since the end of the Cold War and more significantly over the last fifteen years: activities which include military-to-military staff talks, training team deployments, military education exchanges, and MMEs. The 2003 Ministry of Defense Annual Report noted that the rise of non-state threats required the Indian military to seek greater cooperation with foreign militaries: “The emergence of a new and virulent brand of international terrorism, as one of the primary threats to domestic and international security, has brought about a greater convergence in security perceptions among nations and prompted closer security and defence-related contacts, exchanges and cooperation with a widening group of countries.” MMEs serve as one of India’s major cooperative activities: the more recent 2016 review notes that, “Joint Exercises with FFC’s [Friendly Foreign Countries] constitute the most visible component of India’s defence cooperation activities.” Former Chief of the Indian Army General V.P Malik argues that the purpose of what he labels ‘military diplomacy’ is to strengthen diplomatic relations, provide training for the military,

---

244 UK Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 52-53.
develop better understanding of new equipment, and establish a “sphere of influence”.\textsuperscript{249} India’s exercises with Bangladesh and the US, in particular, are geared toward recruitment for friendlier military-to-military relations.

4.4 Case Study: the US and Partnership for Peace, 1994-2000

As expressed above, recruitment exercises are intended to prepare partners for alliance ascension, to court participation for multilateral missions, or simply to develop friendlier ties between militaries. One of the most well-known and expansive recruitment exercise programs is NATO’s PfP developed in the early 1990’s, which served as both a political and military initiative designed to groom partners for NATO membership (through democracy promotion and interoperability), as well as to generate support for potential peacekeeping missions in response to the ethnic wars in the Balkans. The main political goals of PfP was to demonstrate NATO’s commitment to potential members (notably Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) as well as build diplomatic support for possible multilateral operations. Although some US and NATO officials preferred offering NATO membership to former communist states, PfP was viewed as an acceptable compromise to preclude antagonizing a reforming Russia. The specific mechanisms by which the US recruited post-communist (and neutral) European states through military exercises were interoperability and the development of strong military relations. Thus, PfP served as an opportunity to both prepare potential members for ascension as well as recruit help for potential missions.

The following illustrative case study observes the decision-making process that led to the PfP as well as the execution of three MMEs in order to reveal why and how this program allowed the

\textsuperscript{249} Malik, 181.
US, in particular, to reduce uncertainty in its strategic environment. My argument will be evaluated along with the two alternative explanations to reveal whether this program was intended more for traditional rehearsal and organizational interests than a national interest in uncertainty management. Evidence that would support my argument are exercise tasks that support interoperability and relationship-building. Conversely, evidence that would undermine my argument are indications that these exercises were actual rehearsals for deployment or conducted only in order to pursue purely organizational interests.

*Origins of NATO’s Partnership for Peace: Democracy Promotion and Multilateralism*

When US President William Clinton ascended to the oval office in January 1993, his first priority was to deliver on his campaign promise of focusing on the domestic economy. His predecessor, President George H. W. Bush, had presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War hostilities. Despite Clinton’s inheritance of a unipolar international order and understandable desire to focus on the economy, he could not escape America’s unique opportunity to shape a fragile post-communist Eurasia. The collapse of communism and political disintegration of both former Soviet and Yugoslav states resulted in some of the worst European ethnic conflicts in decades. With no existing policy towards the growing crisis in the Balkans and no framework to answer the question of European security, his foreign policy needed an overarching strategy to address these pressing international problems.  

Clinton’s team approached these issues with a faith in democracy promotion and multilateralism. In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993, Clinton

---

declared, “In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.” Speaking to congress in his 1994 State of the Union address, Clinton argued, “Ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other; they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.” The Clinton administration’s belief in democracy promotion as a national security imperative was enshrined in an official 1995 document, A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, which set out three central components of the team’s strategy: 1) maintain a strong defense capability and promote cooperative security measures, 2) open foreign markets and spur global economic growth, 3) encourage democracy abroad. Democracy promotion is clearly at the heart of the strategy: “The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.” The former Soviet Union was specifically stated as a main target of democracy promotion: “Our efforts focus on strengthening democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union.” In line with Clinton’s stated beliefs and the language used in the security strategy, Clinton’s team, especially his first national security advisor, Tony

254 Ibid., 7.
Lake, advocated for the promotion of market-based democracies and an emerging post-communist Europe appeared to be the ideal region to execute the policy.\textsuperscript{255}

In order to realize this objective of enlarging the number of capitalist democracies committed to the liberal order, one tactic the Clinton’s team discussed was NATO enlargement. When the topic of whether to leave, remain in, or expand NATO came to the forefront of policy debates, those in the administration pointed to the fact that the organization was not only intended as an alliance against a great competitor, but also to serve, “as an institution of shared values (promotion of democracy and peaceful relations among its members).”\textsuperscript{256} By recasting NATO as a vehicle to promote the liberal international order, the administration would ensure the organization’s relevance post-Cold War. In fact, this new mission for NATO had deep roots in the organization’s founding. Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the political goal of NATO to support and protect democracies predated the military policy of containment: the Soviet threat, manifested through a totalitarian ideology and aggression toward Eastern Europe, was an assault on the liberal community’s identity established prior to and not dependent on the USSR.\textsuperscript{257} Even at the end of the Cold War, NATO’s task of protecting the liberal democratic order was championed as its vital mission. Only a month before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, NATO produced a strategic concept that reaffirmed the organization’s original mission: “Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 2.  
Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.” NATO’s commitment to democracy, human rights, international law, and UN principles were crucial the organization’s mission before and after the Cold War.

Clinton’s team initially wanted to use prospective NATO membership as an incentive for the emerging Central and Eastern European states to reform their political and economic policies to more closely mirror market-based democracies. Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed that by setting a high bar for inclusion, the US could shape these emerging states into democracies. In an Op-Ed entitled, “NATO Plus,” Warren insisted that these countries would have to show that they adhere to, “the principles of democracy, individual liberty and respect for human rights, the rule of law, the peaceful settlements of disputes, the inviolability of national boundaries.” These democratic benchmarks, later known as the “Perry Principles” after further articulation by then Secretary of Defense William Perry, would serve as the tool for democracy promotion through NATO. However, US policymakers were acutely aware that expanding NATO would cause problems for democratic reform in Russia.

The Clinton administration also sought to develop an international framework to conduct multilateral peacekeeping operations, which key officials believed would help share the burden of stabilizing Europe and also legitimize the use of force. The increasing calls for the deployment of military force came in response to the crisis in the Balkans, which by the summer of 1992 developed into the worst fighting in Europe in forty years. Uproar over Serbian-sponsored ethnic cleansing and fears over possible spill-over into other parts of Europe increased pressure on the administration to ‘do something’. Clinton’s team struggled to respond to the

---

259 Goldgeier, 56.
growing violence: Secretary Christopher called the crisis “the problem from hell,” while the lack of US response was characterized by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Richard Holbrooke as “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.”

The desire to intervene in the ethnic war was most salient in Lake, who told reporters in a 1994 press briefing: “When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every child out there.”

The vexing security problem caused divisions within the administration: Lake encouraged intervention while Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell wanted to limit the use of military force.

The ambiguous nature of ethnic war and difficulty in crafting a response led the Clinton team to look to NATO as a possible solution.

The only existing mechanism the administration possessed for connecting NATO with former Warsaw Pact countries was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), announced at the 1991 Rome Summit as a ministerial body that would promote cooperation among all NATO and Eurasian states. The Rome Summit was also significant in its illustration of new post-Cold War non-state threats and how similar they sounded to the Clinton team’s description: “Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe”

Yet the NACC did not

---

262 Asmus, 22.
guarantee security for non-NATO states, a problem Clinton’s administration considered to rectify by enlarging NATO. When Secretary of State Warren Christopher prepared for his June 1993 NATO meeting in Athens, key officials were pressuring him to give more muscle to NACC or to acquiesce to states pushing for membership, such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Yet the topic of enlarging NATO was met with resistance, especially outside the White House. There were few in Congress even interested in enlargement and the military was not eager to extend formal commitments to defend new, militarily weak members in a possible attack. Moreover, the military and some policy officials feared the move would alarm a fledgling Russia and possibly inhibit security cooperation between the two countries. Russian President Boris Yeltsin opposed expansion and in mid-September 1993 he wrote a letter to Clinton and other NATO leaders arguing that although he understood the sovereign right of states to freely seek their own alliances, “relations between [Russia] and NATO should be several degrees warmer than relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe.”

Given the multiple obstacles and issues associated with NATO enlargement during the early 1990’s, the US had to find a way to encourage democratization and generate support for peacekeeping short of offering membership.

The Need for Multilateral Partners and the Problem of NATO Enlargement

Given the question of NATO expansion still unanswered and the increasing instability in Southern Europe, US Army General John Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), asked his staff in to look into how NATO would respond to conflicts outside its

---

264 Goldgeier, 19-24.
265 Ibid., 4.
266 Ibid., 36.
borders. He noticed there was no command structure for these sorts of operations, which up to this point did not affect the traditional alliance. He then determined that a flexible Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) command was necessary in order to integrate both NATO and non-NATO partners—including former communist states as well as neutrals such as Sweden—in future multilateral missions, which could be “handed off” to other organizations such as the UN or Western European Union. This CJTF would establish a “common set of practices and understanding” between NATO and non-NATO partners. He knew that eventual NATO enlargement was inevitable, yet he also understood the political and military sensitives associated with expansion. He began to envision the possibility of a compromise between these two camps: NATO should develop “patterns of cooperation” with non-NATO militaries that were not “just talk” like the NACC. Though effective in increasing communication between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the NACC was largely deemed ineffective at practical cooperation on the ground.

General Shalikashvili discussed these ideas with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs Charles Freeman Jr., who, with the help of his aides, developed a concept called “Peacekeeping Partnership” that they pitched to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in September 1993. Not only would this program develop a CJTF to solve the problem of joint command for potential out-of-sector peacekeeping missions, the partnership would create stronger military-to-military ties between NATO and post-communist Eurasian states. A month later, to distance the program from the failed Somalia operation that gave peacekeeping a politically divisive name, one of Freeman’s deputies suggested the program be re-named the “Partnership for Peace.”

---

268 Goldgeier, 26-29.
269 Ibid.
Secretary Aspin first discussed the initiative internationally at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Travemuende, Germany in October 1993. His delegation circulated a paper among the NATO staff that de-emphasized NATO enlargement but highlighted the benefits of defense cooperation through PfP: “Rather than forcing a premature consideration of formal membership at the time, the partnership focuses instead on real elements of defense cooperation.” Moreover, “as critical uncertainties about European security are resolved, and nations continue to evolve toward pluralistic, democratic states, then the question of expanded membership in NATO can be addressed.”

Secretary Aspin then told reporters: “What we are proposing is a partnership that will expand interoperability—joint operations—between NATO as an organization and these countries as individual countries. From that, there will certainly be a certain amount of security comfort that will come from that.”

Approaching the Brussels summit in January 1994, the administration decided it was too early to enlarge NATO but was enthusiastic about the PfP initiative, which would expand military-to-military cooperation and exercises without alarming Russia. Though stopping short of enlargement for the time being, Secretary of State Christopher highlighted the benefits of more military-to-military cooperation: “There can be no better way to establish a new and secure Europe than to have soldiers from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new democracies work with NATO to address their most pressing security problems. We believe NATO and our Eastern colleagues should establish joint planning and training, and joint exercises for peace-keeping. Such cooperation can help ensure that all European peace-keeping

---

270 In Asmus, 52.
operations are conducted in accordance with UN and CSCE.”\textsuperscript{272} Clinton formally announced the PfP initiative at the summit, anticipating disappointment from Eastern European leaders desiring immediate NATO membership. When responding to reporters about what he would tell Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic about membership, he rejoined: “I think I’ll be in a position to tell them, number one, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to open the possibility of NATO’s enlargement as well as to give all the former Warsaw Pact countries and other non-NATO nations in Europe the chance to cooperate with us militarily.”\textsuperscript{273} Thus, senior officials in the Clinton administration sought to recruit potential NATO members and multinational partners by increasing military and security cooperation through the PfP program.

\textit{Partnership for Peace Framework and Exercises}

The PfP Framework document, signed in 1994 by 23 non-NATO countries, declares: “In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.”\textsuperscript{274} The program was open to all OSCE members, which included all of Europe and the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{275} Not only was the document signed by former Soviet states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (who also signed a separate collective security


agreement with Russia), historically neutral states such as Switzerland and Ireland also joined later in 1996 and 1999, respectively. The document delineated five main goals for participants: 1) facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; 2) ensure democratic control of armed forces, 3) maintain readiness to contribute to operations under UN mandate, 4) develop cooperative military relations with NATO for joint planning, training, and exercises in the fields of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, 5) develop forces better able to operate with NATO militaries.

The first two tasks, budget transparency and civilian control of the military, were largely addressed through military and security cooperation at the upper echelons of defense ministries. These objectives were also met through military-to-military exchange programs, such as the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, which offered seminars, workshops, and conferences to encourage senior post-communist military officers to adopt democratic reform. The latter three tasks—readiness for UN missions, exercises to train for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and interoperability—were the main focus of exercises. The stated purpose of these MMEs was to, “exercise and simulate common peacekeeping tasks from planning through deployment to improve the ability to work together in actual missions.” The funding for PfP exercises came largely from the US through

---

277 “Partnership for Peace Framework Document”
278 To a lesser extent, MMEs helped encourage democratic civilian control of the military and transparency through exercise planning. For instance, when asked about how the US is encouraging civilian control, the NATO Atlantic Commander, General John Sheehan replied: “The other way has to do with the legal status of the forces that are participating in PFP exercises. For example, if a nation is providing forces for a PFP exercise, oftentimes the decision to send those forces has to be passed by the parliament. The parliament also has to vote on the status of forces agreement for those particular nations.” “Partnership for Peace: An Interview with General John J. Sheehan,” Issues of Democracy, USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1997): 23.
279 Moore, NATO’s New Mission, 18.
the Warsaw Initiative, launched in July 1994. The stated objectives of the initiative were to “(1) facilitate the participation of partner states in exercises and programs with NATO countries; (2) promote the ability of partner forces to operate with NATO, (3) support efforts to increase defense and military cooperation with Partnership partners, and (4) develop strong candidates for membership in NATO.”

The program was not without controversy, however. Some feared that military exercises would dominate the program, providing Eastern European military officers greater clout and preventing the transfer of democratic accountability to civilian leaders. Others feared that increasing military cooperation with former Soviet satellites would re-ignite mistrust between the West and East. In particular, Russian military officers perceived the PfP as a potential security threat and wanted to ensure Russia was provided a special status within the program to prevent loss of control over its region. Despite these concerns, PfP was widely popular among the US, NATO, and former communist countries as a means to develop military cooperation, promote democracy, and address new threats to the volatile region.

The first exercise, “Cooperative Bridge,” was held in Poland in September 1994 and involved 13 countries, six of which were NATO members and the others were former communist states: the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine. During the exercise, US soldiers compared weapons, helicopters, and vehicles with previous enemies from the Warsaw Pact, attempting to understand how the unfamiliar equipment operates for future missions. The MME allowed former adversaries to see each other at a more human level. One

---

US lieutenant claimed his soldiers’ opinion of the Polish Army and the Warsaw Pact in general was low; after the training event, however, “Now they realize they are soldiers who are quite capable and quite human, too.”

He goes on to describe sharing a room with a Polish lieutenant whose wife was pregnant, which to him provided a more personal experience to build trust for future peacekeeping operations. After-hours socializing allowed the soldiers to see each other as friends and overcome the prejudices that Cold War hostilities encouraged. The desire to join NATO was present in some Eastern European soldiers, as one officer put it, “I think every officer in the Czech army would like to be in NATO because we see it as a chance to make our army better.”

The MME did uncover problems of interoperability: not only did soldiers need a cadre of translators to communicate even in person, the former communist militaries’ low defense budgets precluded purchasing enough fuel for the exercise. Moreover, US officers noticed how the command structure of the former Warsaw Pact states reflected the heavily hierarchical Soviet system, which tended to suppress initiative, possessed a weak noncommissioned officer corps, and maintained a sharp distinction between officers and enlisted soldiers. US Army European Commander General David Maddox admitted, “There are clearly approaches or policies that are a result of operating for 45 years under one regime. We have to come to grips with that.”

Yet the training event allowed the US, NATO, and partner militaries to practice for potential UN or NATO peacekeeping operations; for instance, humanitarian assistance was present in soldiers who escorted food convoys to hungry civilians, while a respect for human rights and

---

284 Ibid.
international law was apparent in managing refugees escaping conflict and using checkpoints to
monitor violence against civilians.

The first PfP exercise on US soil, termed “Cooperative Nugget”, took place in August 1995 at
Fort Polk, Louisiana. This exercise included the US, United Kingdom, Canada, and 14 former
communist and Soviet states (including former Soviet republics Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan).
Each country sent 40 soldiers, roughly a platoon-sized element, to the exercise and NATO
planners divided the units into six companies (four commanded by American captains, one by a
British captain, and one a Canadian). A British officer who chaired the NATO military
committee responsible for the exercise said the goal of the exercise was, “to foster co-operation
and understanding among the multinational units, as well as to learn more effective methods of
conducting humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks.” Cooperative Nugget focused primarily on
peacekeeping drills, such as protecting civilians in mock villages from violence while under fire
from snipers and car bombs. The scenario was built around a ceasefire agreement that NATO
was given mandate to enforce between ethnic rivalries in a fictitious country.

When asked about how NATO planners determined which peacekeeping tasks to train and
evaluate at the exercise, the commander of the training center at Fort Polk, Brigadier General
(BG) Michael Sherfield, admitted: “We went to many sources to develop the tasks for
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Right now, NATO does not have a [sic] approved
document for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, so we used the model based partly on the
United Nations and our own Army’s experiences in peacekeeping operations over the last couple

---

of years.” In addition to traditional peacekeeping tasks, an emphasis on democratic practices were apparent in Cooperative Nugget. For instance, the exercise rehearsed interagency support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs): soldiers swapped prisoners under the supervision of the American Red Cross. Additionally, a Slovak platoon provided protection to a dignitary addressing a crowd at a political rally; when he was “shot” by a simulated sniper, the medics addressed his injury and led him to safety. As a means to prepare partner militaries for potential membership, Brigadier General Sherfield noted: “…I would assess it as a success if we’re able to expose the partnership nations to the twin objectives of basic peacekeeping skills and U.S. Army training methodology. This will help them go back and put together their training programs in their own countries as their military forces develop. If we do all that, we will have a truly successful exercise.” Speaking to reporters about the success of the exercise, Marine Major General John Sheehan noted the symbolic importance of joining NATO and former communist states in a joint exercise: “From a political level, (success is) the ability to bring these nations together for the first time in the United States, to enhance interoperability from a political perspective.”

In 1997 and 1998, the US conducted PfP-inspired MMEs in Central Asia with the newly formed Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, known as “CENTRAZBAT”. The unit, comprised of approximately 500 Central Asian soldiers, was established by Kazakhstan,

---

289 “Questions & answers about exercise cooperative nugget,” Interview with Brigadier General Michael Sherfield.
290 Garamone, “Fort Polk hosts Cooperative Nugget.”
291 These exercises were planned by the US Atlantic Command (USACOM), not NATO’s PfP planners, though the exercises were conducted “in the spirit” of PfP. See Michael McCarthy, The Limits of Friendship: US Security Cooperation in Central Asia (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2007), 35-36. “CENTRZBAT” is also known as “CENTRASBAT” in certain translations.
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 1995. These exercises, also entitled “CENTRAZBAT” (’97 and ’98), were conducted with former Soviet republics with the intent of improving the capacity of the joint peacekeeping unit if called upon by the UN to deploy. CENTRAZBAT ’97 was an airborne operation that began at Fort Bragg, NC and ended in separate phases in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In addition to the US and the three signatories of the peacekeeping battalion, Turkey and Russia joined the exercise. For the Central Asian states, this exercise served to help their militaries address ethnic strife and separatism from the remnants of Soviet collapse. Colonel Alexey Riskin of the Kazak military, said the goal of the exercise was to develop a "ready force . . . against aggressors. It will allow us to liquidate any conflict situation in its very beginning, and not allow it to grow into a major conflict."292 Once the airborne troops hit the ground and completed initial objectives, they began practicing peacekeeping tasks such as controlling checkpoints, providing humanitarian assistance, and maintaining separation zones to protect non-combatants affected by civil war. After this first phase, the exercise moved to Uzbekistan and included more soldiers from Latvia and Georgia.

Interestingly, though a small contingent of Russian soldiers joined the training, the Russian Duma officially condemned the MME, claiming: “Under the guise of statements on the peacekeeping nature of such maneuvers, the US Armed Forces are intensively developing new potential theaters of military actions in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s frontiers. It cannot be ruled out that in the course of such long-range troop landings, a possible landing of US Army units on Russian territory is also being developed.”293 Despite this objection by Russia, the US-planned exercise focused on humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians in safe zones under

the mandate of the UN. In 1998, US CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni remarked about the future of PfP exercises like CENTRAZBAT, “I think we’re going to find military organizations—and not just from the United States—becoming more and more involved in peacekeeping,” and, “The role of the military is going to change,” toward peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The region’s concern with Islamic terrorism was most pronounced in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group that sought to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Ferghana Valley and allegedly attempted to assassinate Uzbek President Islam Karimov. As part of the plot, the IMU detonated explosives in the capital of Tashkent in February 1999; the insurgent group also invaded the Batken Valley in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000. These incursions convinced US planners to change the scenario of CENTRAZBAT 2000 to focus on countering insurgency rather than peacekeeping. Given the growing threat from the IMU, one Kazakh reporter asked: “The question arises of what the real significance of the CENTRASBAT exercises is for strengthening security.” Despite this new exercise focus and the threat from the IMU in multiple nations, the CENTRAZBAT was never deployed in any operations. The exercises for 2002 and 2003 were cancelled due to US engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively.

---

295 McCarthy, 60-61.  
297 McCarthy, 68-69.
NATO Partnership Exercises to Recruit Potential Allies

NATO’s PfP exercise program was intended to recruit both potential alliance members and partners for multinational peacekeeping missions; the mechanisms by which major powers sought to achieve these goals were building interoperability between partner forces and developing positive military relations. Recruitment targeted not only the partner militaries themselves but also to convince their governments and publics that participation with NATO was desirable. Democracy promotion was largely encouraged at the diplomatic and defense ministry-level, but to a lesser extent during exercises to prepare certain partners for alliance membership. By recruiting allies and partners, the US and other major powers within NATO hoped to reduce threats—by bringing states into NATO and providing peacekeeping in the Balkans—by enlisting the support of all Eurasian states.

The focus on interoperability is present in the PfP Framework document as well as during the execution of training events, which identified areas in which NATO members and partner countries diverged in technology or doctrine. Interviews with NATO and US officials also revealed the emphasis on interoperability for potential operations. However, the first few exercises, in particular, were largely symbolic:

At the outset, at the very outset, they were, to put it bluntly, public relations exercises and photo-op’s. The first big PfP “exercise” in Poland was, I mean, you lined all the flags up, you had a photo-op, and then people stood around and said ‘oh well that’s the way the magazine goes in your rifle, well this is how the magazine goes in my rifle.’ ‘Is that guy a sergeant? Well no, he’s a [Polish rank] or something else.’ And there was no real substance to them; there were two big ones, one in Poland and one in the Netherlands. It was all sort of acclimating the public to the notion that you could get all these disparate folks in one place at one time and they didn’t perceive each other as enemies. They

---

perceived themselves as doing something in common. That was the early view of exercises.\footnote{Anonymous former US official at NATO familiar with PfP, phone interview by author, July 26, 2017.}  

As the program developed, partner nations would ask NATO to practice certain tasks during training, such as small-unit tactics, to prepare them for potential membership or multilateral missions.\footnote{Ibid.} Preparation for NATO ascension and recruitment for multilateral operations were major objectives. As retired Danish Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, former defense attaché to the Baltic states from 1994-1998 explains: “To a large extent, [the exercises] were meant to prepare these former Soviet and Eastern European armies for ‘PP’ operations: crisis management, peace support operations. So it was a matter of introducing these forces to NATO standards, NATO procedures, so during the 1990’s it was very much an educational purpose.”\footnote{Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017.}  

Moreover, he argues that the political goal of recruitment exercises is to ensure “That a maximum number of states send contributions to mark solidarity in a symbolic way (in NATO events, regional partner states are most welcome), all well turned out as for a formal parade.”\footnote{Ibid.}  

Building personal friendly ties is evident during the MMEs, especially in between exercises in which officers and soldiers have an opportunity to get know one another. Moreover, the focus on building “common practices and understanding” also implies the goal of building closer military relations.  

NATO’s PfP is often viewed as simply a compromise to delay the important question of NATO enlargement. Though PfP did help address the political question of NATO expansion, military cooperation was viewed as a separate aspect intended to develop interoperability and relations in preparation for multilateral deployments. The invitation of all OSCE states,
including Central Asia and the “neutral’s”—Switzerland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden—demonstrated the desire to recruit partners for multilateral peacekeeping, not just prospects for NATO membership. Partner states were given a “menu” of options (e.g. exercise participation, seminar opportunities, defense sector reform), of which they were able to determine their own individual level of involvement. Moreover, Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams, both senior officials in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section, NATO Political Affairs division during early PfP development, argue against the assertion that PfP simply evaded hard questions of NATO expansion. They point out that military cooperation was already underway in the NACC without regard for extending NATO membership to post-communist states. Moreover, though some nations, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, clearly joined the program with future hopes for NATO ascension, other states joined without such ambitions. In 1994, Williams divided PfP member states into three categories: 1) those who want to join NATO quickly (Central Europeans), 2) those who associate with NATO, but want to remain neutral, and 3) those who merely wish to learn from NATO. Two of the three categories describe countries who wish to be a part of the program, but do not wish to join the alliance.

**Alternative Explanations**

As opposed to recruitment, the two alternative explanations suggest different reasons for why these exercises were conducted. First, as the traditional works in military doctrine imply, perhaps PfP MMEs were simply used to rehearse military forces for joint operations. The focus

---

304 Michael Ruhle, and Nicholas Williams, “Partnership for Peace: A Personal View from NATO,” 66-70.
on interoperability implies that these forces imagined that they would one day deploy with one another and need to operate together as a combined unit.\textsuperscript{306} Though ensuring unit technology and doctrine were compatible, there is reason to suspect these training events were pure rehearsals. First, the PfP program was developed in late 1993, two years before NATO forces were deployed to Bosnia after the Dayton accords were signed in Paris in late 1995. Two of the exercises described above took place before NATO announced its first Implementation Force deployment on December 5, 1995.\textsuperscript{307} Thus, military cooperation and exercises took place months or years before NATO and non-NATO militaries understood the number and type of units that would deploy to Bosnia. Moreover, the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRAZBAT) has never deployed for any mission, let alone as a contributor to the NATO mission in Bosnia. The standing peacekeeping unit, “would become more of a showcase unit and exercise rather than one preparing for potential combat or peacekeeping operations.”\textsuperscript{308} The unit would never deploy together for an operation, even though neighboring Tajikistan’s civil war with Islamic militants in 1999 and 2000 would seem to be a suitable scenario. The battalion folded in late 1999, though the name ‘CENTRAZBAT’ was kept as an exercise name for several years thereafter.\textsuperscript{309} Second, as each MME only involved a couple hundred soldiers, the exercises were so small in scale that they could only be described as “educational” or “symbolic”.\textsuperscript{310} That is, if forces wished to rehearse for an actual operation, they would train with a similar-sized

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{306} See Wallander for PfP’s focus on interoperability, pages 714-717, 729.
\textsuperscript{308} McCarthy, \textit{The Limits of Friendship}, 47.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 67-69.
\textsuperscript{310} Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017.
\end{flushright}
force. The initial IFOR size was estimated at 60,000 soldiers; an exercise consisting of several hundred soldiers would seem to be serve as a poor rehearsal.

The second alternative anticipates that militaries will choose certain doctrines to increase organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy. Thus, perhaps the PfP program was merely an attempt by the US military to increases its organizational and bureaucratic resources. Concerning size and wealth, however, not only were PfP exercises small-scale and involving few troops, they were relatively inexpensive: the total cost of PfP exercises and other programs from 1994-2000 was roughly $755 million. For perspective, the total projected US defense budget for fiscal year 2000 alone was approximately $280 billion (in 1999 dollars), with total procurement at $53 billion and Army requests for new weapons and tracked vehicles at $1.4 billion. Thus, PfP funding over seven years is comparable to about 54% of additional weapons and vehicles requested by the US Army in only one year. Funding for the program was considered by the US Congress as “minor ticks someplace in the DoD budget.” Regarding prestige, there is reason to doubt that PfP exercises increased a ‘warrior spirit’ ethos in US or NATO soldiers. As discussed above, most of these exercises were considered symbolic, simply a photo-opportunity for soldiers to be seen side-by-side and share personal experiences. Moreover, since the intent of these MMEs was to recruit for peacekeeping operations, militaries would not enjoy any deference from society for battlefield victory.

Finally, in terms of institutional autonomy and separation from civilian oversight, PfP exercises were closely planned and integrated with not only the larger political goals of the PfP

---

program, but also the grand strategy of enlargement and engagement delineated by the Clinton White House. Understanding that NATO expansion was politically costly, General Shalikashvili worked with a DoD civilian (Charles Freeman) to develop the idea of a CJTF and joint military exercises. This concept was briefed to Secretary of Defense Aspin, who worked with the State Department and White House to prepare Clinton’s announcement of the program in January 1994. The overlap between the military exercise goals and civilian-led foreign policy is significant. After national guard unit were selected to supplement PfP exercises, even state governors and congressional representatives were supportive of the program. Though some US officers may have had private reservations about these exercises, they generally went along with the program, as one of my interviewees noted: “Yes people [military officers] agreed these were necessary. Why? Because the President and Secretary of Defense said ‘we’re gonna do this’. Guys in uniform nod their head, salute, and move out.”314 Thus, if the US military sought freedom from civilian oversight, NATO’s PfP would not be a means to achieve organizational autonomy.

4.5 Summary

This chapter sought to explain the purpose of recruitment exercises, describe the mechanisms by which major powers recruit potential allies, locate the sources of recruitment in US, British, and Indian military doctrine, and offer an illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against the two alternatives. The purpose of recruitment exercises is to attract potential defense alliance members, generate support for multilateral missions, or simply to build stronger military ties. The mechanism by which these goals are achieved are through military interoperability and

relationship-building. The sources of recruitment can be located in current US, British, and Indian doctrinal manuals. The case of one of the most prominent recruitment exercise programs, NATO’s PfP, provided a means by which my argument could be assessed against the alternatives. I argued that because PfP exercises were small, symbolic, inexpensive, and significantly integrated into civilian grand strategy, the alternatives were largely undermined. The following chapter discusses the second type of non-traditional MME: building partner capacity.
CHAPTER 5
CAPACITY-BUILDING EXERCISES

5.1 Introduction

In February 2017, the US Army announced that it was creating six new brigades specifically tailored to one type of mission: advising and assisting foreign militaries. These ‘Security Force Assistance’ brigades would become the first permanent US Army units with dedicated missions toward security cooperation activities. 315 Though critics were quick to point out this mission has long been the domain of special forces, the creation of specialized advisory units signaled the acceptance by the US military of the permanent need for this capability, which was already in high demand for over a decade in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since major combat operations ended in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, and years of counterinsurgency were met with mixed results, the US Army employed a doctrine of ‘Building Partner Capacity’ to manage the insurgencies challenging state control in these post-war, fragile countries. When asked about the situation in Iraq in October 2015, US Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley responded, “Well, that means our job right now, and I think appropriately, is to continue to build partner capacity, to continue to train, advise and assist the Iraqi government. We cannot, and I do not think we should, do it for them because that will not be sustainable over time.” 316

The US Army’s force structure change reflects the growing importance of capacity-building for major powers in the current threat environment. The purpose of this chapter is to explain

---


why major powers conduct capacity-building training and how these activities reduce strategic uncertainty. Major powers use capacity-building exercises to strengthen the ability for other weaker militaries to provide for their own security in the long-term, primarily against insurgents and rebels, or to participate in other multilateral missions. Major powers hope that by delegating this responsibility for security, their own forces will not be required to intervene or serve as peacekeepers in the future. The mechanism by which major powers delegate this security responsibility is through training local forces to become sustainable and professional units, often in the image of the major power military organization. By both combatting non-state threats and also obviating the need to deploy their own forces, major powers seek to reduce another source of uncertainty in their strategic environments. Though the term ‘Building Partner Capacity’ (BPC) is often applied to US military activities, the British and French armies have also extensively engaged in programs designed to reinforce fledgling partners. This chapter will apply an illustrative case study of British military training programs in Sierra Leone from 2000-2016 to evaluate my argument against the two alternative theories.\footnote{BPC training programs are unique among MMEs in the long-term nature of these training efforts as well as the holistic approach to building capacity (involving not only the military but other ministries as well). Thus, I only code BPC MMEs in the dataset which were reported in the news or other scholarly works and contain discrete training events, such as the UK’s \textit{Operation Palliser}, France’s RECAMP exercises in Africa, and certain US exercises in the Philippines.}

\section*{5.2 Capacity-Building Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty}

\textit{The Purpose of Capacity-Building Training}

Major powers use capacity-building exercises to train local forces to provide for their own national or regional security, which precludes the need for major power military support in the future. Capacity-building is usually initiated after the conclusion of interstate or intrastate war
when the threat of insurgency is still present; major powers also train failed states that are continuously struggling to combat rebels or terrorists. Major powers are primarily concerned with supporting states that fail to adequately defeat or contain threats to the major powers’ interests, such as possible terrorist attacks on the homeland, movement of contraband or pandemics across borders, spillover of ethnic violence into allied or partnered territory, or even humanitarian concerns such as regional instability, the breakdown of democratic governance, or the persecution of minorities. The means by which major powers use BPC training to pursue these goals is through the creation of a professional and sustainable force. That is, major powers deploy small or large teams of military trainers and advisors to develop individual soldiers and units to become professional—competent to protect the population and, at least in the case of democracies, deferential to civilian control—and sustainable—able to not only tactically defeat adversaries but also institutionally and logistically support themselves in the future. By training soldiers and units to be both professional and sustainable, major powers hope that these partner forces can protect their own citizens or participate in security cooperation in regional peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Since major power militaries view themselves as professional organizations, the ‘rubric’ for creating and evaluating partner forces is often in their own image. For instance, major powers will often guide partner forces to develop rank structures and organizational hierarchies similar to their own; moreover, they commonly evaluate partner forces based on their own standards for training.

Although the term ‘Building Partner Capacity’ (BPC) has often been applied ambiguously, BPC can be generally understood as military efforts employed for “enhancing the security

---

318 On democratic military professionalism—that is, protection both by and from the military—see Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, 1-15.
capabilities of partners in less capable, weak, and/or failing states” in order to advance national security interests. Though BPC involves many types of activities, my use of the concept is focused specifically on the training, advising, and assisting of partner military forces rather than broader, ministerial attempts to reform entire public institutions, such as Public Sector Reform (PSR) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs. The term BPC was first formally used in the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which highlighted the need for US forces to develop the means to assist fragile states in defeating insurgencies and terrorist cells. The terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 provided the impetus for the US expansion of BPC activities across the world. Although the US consistently employed BPC activities to strengthen weaker Cold War allies against communist influence—Greece and South Korea, for instance—after 9/11 US forces began targeting weak non-allies in regions in which terrorist units could plan and operate without fear of interference from local governments. The 2010 QDR delineated a distinction between traditional security cooperation (conducted with allies) and this newer concept of BPC (with non-allies): “Rather than using ‘traditional’ security cooperation programs exclusively to help its allies, the United States would help weaker states, thereby preventing conflicts stemming from non-state actors from becoming serious or even beginning in the first place. This approach could be seen as using BPC as a state-building tool for partner countries.” Thus, BPC efforts are aimed primarily at strengthening the ability for weak or failing non-allies to combat violent non-state actors and prevent the onset of conflict.

---

322 McInnis and Lucas, 6-7.
Although training local forces was historically the purview of special forces, the need for greater resources for these activities grew after the US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the 2000’s and 2010’s. Though these wars began with conventional military operations to overthrow standing regimes, they persisted as insurgent forces continually challenged US presence. In May 2010, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote an opinion essay in Foreign Affairs entitled “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance.” Gates argues that the contemporary threat environment is far more uncertain than during the Cold War: “The global security environment has changed radically since [the Cold War], and today is more complex, more unpredictable, and even without a superpower adversary, in many ways more dangerous.” Gates was concerned about the threat of non-state actors with the ability to target the US homeland from the sanctuary of weak states; he argued that in the coming decades, “the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security—a city poisoned or reduce to rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.” He notes that organizational strain caused by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required that the US move to a strategy that forced local partners to take up the burden of war and security with US assistance. He continued, “Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole.”

---

324 Ibid., 2.
325 Ibid., 2-4.
US ‘burden’ of security responsibility for other states led him to promote BPC as a viable strategy.

Building Partner Capacity and the Management of Uncertainty

Major powers hope that by enabling local partners, they are able to combat non-state threats through proxies and obviate the need for major power intervention, either directly in a civil war or as a multinational peacekeeping force. Thus, capacity-building exercises help major powers reduce both sources of uncertainty: threats and assistance. As reflected by Secretary Gates, the US views BPC as not only a means to prevent the ability for non-state actors to launch attacks the US homeland or to dampen conflict in general, but also to preclude the necessity for US forces to be deployed in pursuit of these goals. In this sense, BPC can be viewed as a strategy of ‘sponsorship’ in which major powers delegate security responsibility to local armies in order to preclude the need to deploy their own forces. Conceptualized by Dombrowski and Reich, sponsorship strategies allow major powers to “bolster and subsidize allies who share America’s interests and are motivated to implement them.”326 They argue, “Sponsorship strategies have the advantage of conserving both blood and treasure while clearly supporting American friends and allies.” Moreover, “proponents of sponsorship strategies recognise that they are likely to achieve acceptable results at a lower cost and with a great long-term legitimacy to the policy being implemented.”327 The authors cite recent US actions, such as supporting the Iraqi government against ISIS or the Kenyan military against the Lord’s Resistance Army, as prime examples of sponsorship. Though providing trainers and material to troubled states do carry risks, the

327 Ibid., 122-123.
benefits of sponsorship include conservation in blood and treasure, ability to support allies with limited resources, and the retention of exit-strategy options. This concern for delegating security responsibility to partner states is also present in the 2010 QDR: “The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and extends security to areas we cannot reach alone.”

By building the capacity of others to address ‘ambiguous’ threats that belie the traditional war/peace distinction, the US hopes to minimize the requirement to expose its own troops to these types of threats.

5.3 The US, UK, and France Build Partner Capacity

In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, as of 2015, the US Army had military trainers operating in thirteen African countries. Sponsorship communities are not restricted to the US; in fact, France and the UK have been exercising sponsorship in Africa for decades. In the mid-1990’s France’s Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (RECAMP) program trained African soldiers for peacekeeping missions, to which “Some 30 African countries have sent military contingents to participate in these training events.” As of mid-2014, the French army stationed approximately 7,500 soldiers in Senegal, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, and the Central African Republic in addition to the 3,500 troops deployed in 2015-2016 to Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso to fight the growing threat of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel.

---

Some of these troops protect the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa or engage in direct combat, while others serve as trainers for local forces.\footnote{Nathaniel K. Powell, “Battling Instability? The Recurring Logic of French Military Interventions in Africa,” \textit{African Security}, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2017): 47-50.}

The UK has engaged in extensive BPC activities, most notably in Africa after the end of the Cold War. The British have deployed military trainers to Sierra Leone, Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria and have four permanently stationed advisor teams in Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. The British also help staff the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, which trained 2,500 personnel in about 70 courses in its first year (2004).\footnote{Jackson, “British-African Defence and Security Connections,” 362-365.} As one British military officer who served on several training teams remarks: “Ultimately, if you wish to have an influence as a nation, there are different ways of doing it…Training teams—going into a country with a small footprint—and sending what we nowadays might call a Short Term Training Team (or a Training Team) to capacity-build is something which the British military have been involved in for years and continue to be. If you target it right, you get a lot of positive outcomes for an, arguably, small footprint.”\footnote{Lieutenant Colonel (British Royal Marines) Reggie Turner, who served as a liaison officer to the UN for the Royal Marine’s 42 Commando unit during Operation Palliser, Skype interview by author, June 29, 2017.} In 2013, British Chief of the General Staff General Peter Wall explained the benefits of ‘Defence Engagement’: “In concept, upstream engagement and overseas capacity building, if properly targeted and resourced, should deliver benefits to us and they should help our role in global stability by reducing - but probably not removing - the need for us to deploy in future on much more costly intervention and prevention operations.”\footnote{General Sir Peter Wall (British Army), Chief of the General Staff, “Transcript: Defence Engagement: The British Army’s Role in Building Security and Stability Overseas,” Lecture at Chatham House, March 12, 2014, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140312Defence%20Engagement.pdf.} The use of BPC programs by the US, France, and especially the UK provides a
means for these major powers to reduce one source of uncertainty without the need for large-scale intervention and combat.

**Capacity-Building in Military Doctrine**

US BPC activities are supported in the Joint Operations Manual, *JP 3-0*. The doctrine acknowledges that delegating security responsibilities to partners is necessary in order to protect national interests:

Acting alone in the strategic environment, the USG cannot resolve all crises or achieve all national objectives with just US resources. Under an umbrella of security cooperation, DOD supports USG strategic objectives by developing security relationships, building partner capacity and capability, and assuring access with selected PNs [Partner Nations] that enable them to act alongside, in support of, or in lieu of US forces around the globe. These strategic initiatives help advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.\(^{335}\)

The US military Security Cooperation manual, *JP 3-20*, notes that the goal of this type of training is for the partner countries to support US interests: “Building partner capacity requires a long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and when necessary, the employment of that PN [Partner Nation] capacity in support of USG strategic objectives.”\(^{336}\) Some of these interests include accepting security sector reform internally, sharing expenses, supporting efforts to dispose of weapons in neighboring countries, and developing effective counterterror forces. The manual also notes the importance of building sustainable forces over time by drawing a distinction between ‘capability’ and ‘capacity’: “Capability refers to the PN’s

---

\(^{335}\) *Operations*, US Joint Publication 3-0, I-5.

\(^{336}\) *Security Cooperation*, US Joint Publication 3-20, II-2 through II-3.
ability to execute a given task while capacity refers to the PN’s ability to self-sustain and self-replicate a given capability.”

In the UK’s defense doctrine (JDP 0-01), capacity-building is one of the main tasks of ‘Defence Engagement’, viewed as a means to obviate the need to deploy forces in the future: “Early Defence engagement can reduce the likelihood of prolonged instability and reduce military intervention. In addition, conflict prevention activities aim to reduce the possibility of escalation and promote sustainable post-conflict peace. This may reduce, or negate, the need for military intervention to deal with emerging crises, contribute to an understanding of emerging threats, or provide broader humanitarian assistance.” The 2013 French Defense White Paper includes prevention as one of the military’s five core strategies (in addition to protection of the homeland and territories, knowledge/anticipation, deterrence, and intervention). The White Paper argues that prevention is a cost-effective means to avoid intervention and the possibility of prolonging conflict: “[Prevention] is generally less costly and, ultimately, less difficult to consolidate the stability of a country that has not tipped over into civil war, than to restore peace in a country that has experienced it. Furthermore, any external intervention in a situation of open conflict is inevitably exposed to unpredictable developments, including the risk of exacerbating the conflict hat one sought to remedy. France therefore considers it a priority to assist fragile States located in regions likely to affect its security.” Thus, both French and British doctrine emphasize the importance of assisting weak partners in order to prevent the onset of conflict and preclude the requirement to deploy national forces.

---

337 Emphasis added. Ibid., I-2.
338 Emphasis Added. UK Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 61, 69.
5.4 Case Study: UK and Sierra Leone, 2000-2016

As mentioned above, although American BPC efforts are most publicized in the news, the British military has also invested heavily in developing partners—especially its former colonies. The 2000 British intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war is one of the most prominent European-led military interventions in the post-Cold War environment. What is less known is the British army’s commitment to developing the Sierra Leonean forces both before and after major fighting commenced and ended (May 2000 - July 2002). The UK and Sierra Leone share a long colonial history, dating back to 1787 when the capital Freetown was established as a British settlement.\textsuperscript{340} The country served as a port for British anti-slavery naval patrols until the 1860’s and continued to serve as a regional base for the British-led West Africa Regiment (WAR) and West Africa Frontier Forces (WAFF) until independence in 1961.\textsuperscript{341} A military coup in 1967 resulted in decades of political turmoil, culminating in civil war in 1991. When British troops intervened on behalf of the Sierra Leonean government in the country’s civil war in May 2000, the \textit{Economist} noted that the country’s capital symbolized “failure and despair” and manifested “all the continent’s worst characteristics.”\textsuperscript{342} After a decade of intrastate war, as well ranking last on the United Nation’s Human Development Index, Sierra Leone appeared to be on the brink of collapse.\textsuperscript{343}

Yet after British intervention, the end of civil war in 2002, and a 17,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission until 2006, Sierra Leone’s stability began to materialize. In 2012, the

\textsuperscript{341} Crawford Young, \textit{The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective} (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), 81. See also Stewart, 352.
\textsuperscript{343} Stewart, 363.
country conducted its third peaceful democratic transfer of power and, impressively, deployed 850 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Somalia. In the background of this turnaround was the role of the British military trainers, as part of the International Military Advisory & Training Team (IMATT), who still conduct joint military exercises with Sierra Leonean forces under the International Security Assistance Team (ISAT) mission. The following study illustrates a successful case of how a major power used capacity-building training to develop a sustainable, professional local force intended provide for its own security, contribute to regional peacekeeping operations, and to obviate the need for future major power intervention. My explanation of this type of exercise will then be compared to the alternative theories to determine whether these efforts are more concerned with the traditional motivations (rehearsal and organizational interests) rather than developing a sustainable local force. Evidence that would support my theory are government statements and military behavior which indicate that UK-led MMEs were intended to train Sierra Leonean forces in order to obviate the need for future intervention. On the other hand, evidence that would undermine my argument are statements and behaviors that point to the possibility that these training events were intended for rehearsals, deterrence, or parochial military interests.

After decades of patrimonialism and perceived corruption in the Sierra Leonean government, a rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by Liberia under Charles Taylor, crossed into Sierra Leone and began waging an insurgency in March 1991. Instability and dissatisfaction with the government’s response led to military coups in 1992, 1996, and 1997; after the last takeover, the leader of the military junta invited the RUF to join the government to engage in combat against ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) forces, led by Nigeria. The two warring factions signed a ceasefire agreement known as the Lomé Accord in July 1999 to freeze the civil war, whereby ousted president Ahmad Kabbah was restored to power. The agreement also struck a power-sharing arrangement between Kabbah’s government and the RUF, the latter given control of the government’s natural resources as well as immunity from prosecution.346

The Sierra Leonean government under Kabbah maintained a consistent relationship with the British government, which struggled to determine the best way to aid its former colony. The growing instability leading up to the Lomé accord set into motion two initiatives that would come out of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID): the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) and the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). These two programs were joint initiatives planned and executed by military and civilian planners in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), and DfID.347 SILSEP was developed first in June 1999 as a ‘whole-of-

347 Email correspondence with Colonel (British Army, retired) Mike Dent, Military Advisor of the Ministry of Defence Advisory Team (MODAT) and Deputy Commander of IMATT, August 20, 2017.
government’ approach to reforming Sierra Leone’s security sector. During initial planning for this approach to improving security, a military officer within DfID identified the need for military trainers as “key to the sustainable implementation of SILSEP reforms.”

Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, academic-practitioners with practical involvement in Sierra Leone’s reform process, note: “It was the MoD [Ministry of Defence] Advisory Team within SILSEP—Colonel Mike Dent and Robert Foot, a UK civil servant—that identified the need for a British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT).” In June 1999, the MODAT (comprised of one active military officer, one contracted retired officer, and a civil servant) deployed to Freetown to assess the rising instability in the country and to determine the best means for the British to assist the fledgling government. The team determined that the rule of law had broken down, there were only three personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defence, and “In essence there was no proper functioning RSLAF [Republic of Sierra Leonean Armed Forces”]. The MODAT completed a mini Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in October 1999 which determined the need for a complete restructuring of both the Sierra Leonean MoD and armed forces. Concurrently, the British government agreed to send a small number of military trainers and equipment for new SLA recruits under the program Operation Basilica.

After this dire assessment, the MODAT determined the need for more military trainers and advisors. Other UK government officials noticed that not only would the British military advise, assist, and train the Sierra Leonean Army, but would also be engaged in broader institution-
building in the failed state. Due to the greater political role the British military would serve, as well as the potentially negative impression that the UK was unilaterally involved in its former colony, the British MoD and DfID decided to extend the mission to include multinational partners by creating an international advisory team (‘IMATT’). Officials from the British MoD hosted a conference in London in January 2000 to encourage military officers from the Commonwealth to participate in the mission: officers from Australia, Canada, and the US agreed to join. After military officers volunteered to fill command and staff positions for the advisory mission, one senior British officer remarked “we are now stable, let’s think longer term.” In February 2000, the MODAT consolidated a defense white paper and developed an “ORBAT” (Order for Battle) delineating the type of units and appropriate ranks for the SLA based on the findings of the mini-Strategic Defence Review. With the help of additional British Army, Navy, and Air Force advisors, the envisioned ORBAT consisted of land, maritime, and air components as the future organization of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Because Sierra Leone was once a British colony, much of their rank and command structure was already established on the British model. Planners decided to keep a similar structure for the future SLAF but also split the major commands to prevent one command from dominating all soldiers and equipment (and thus, prevent a possible coup).

The situation in Sierra Leone began to deteriorate after infighting within the power-sharing government reached new heights; consequently, the British government considered options about how to support its fledgling former colony. After ECOMOG transitioned authority for peacekeeping to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in early 2000, RUF officers

353 Email correspondence with Colonel (British Army, retired) Mike Dent, Military Advisor of the Ministry of Defence Advisory Team (MODAT) and Deputy Commander of IMATT, August 20, 2017.
refused to demobilize, abducted hundreds of UN peacekeepers, and threatened to take Freetown. The UK government accelerated its involvement by deploying a reconnaissance team on May 6, 2000 under Brigadier David Richards to prepare to evacuate British citizens in a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO); two days later, British army units secured a vital airport and the capital of Freetown. During this mission, known as Operation Palliser, the UK government afforded Brigadier Richards “‘full political and military decision-making powers’ concerning the NEO and any assistance given to UNAMSIL and the local government.” The British military then deployed the 1st Parachute Regiment (1 PARA), an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG from the Royal Marines 42 Commando), and other special units to repel RUF attacks on the capital and bolster the UN peacekeeping presence. When British troops arrived to support the fledgling Sierra Leonean army, they immediately noticed a lack of professionalism in the local soldiers. An intelligence officer from 42 Commando remarked about initial training efforts with Sierra Leonean troops:

The main issue was a lack of confidence and lack of moral authority, and we were obviously trying to build that up at all times. And a lot of it was their authority because of the nature of the operation effectively being sort of an insurgency in which they were dealing with. It was the authority of the government troops in the eyes of the people who they were operating amongst that was at an all-time low. So we were trying to build that up all the time: put them on a pedestal and make sure that they looked the part, they went into those contacts with the local population looking as though they were trained soldiers. And a clear differentiation between the rag-tag appearance of the multitude of rebel groups that were operating around there at the time. Things like that: military discipline, bearing, was at the uppermost of what we were trying to do.

---

354 Ucko, 853. See also Andrew M. Dorman, *Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone* (Farnham: Ashgate 2009), 79.
355 Lieutenant Colonel (British Royal Marines) Andrew Muddiman, who served as an intelligence officer for Royal Marine’s 42 Commando unit during Operation Palliser, Skype interview by author, July 19, 2017.
The increase in Britain’s military involvement raised political questions about the goals of the intervention. By mid-May, the British media decried the lack of clear military objectives. Members of Parliament (MPs) criticized Prime Minister Tony Blair’s administration for getting pulled into a conflict without well-defined tasks for the units on the ground, especially after troops remained in-country following the successful evacuation of British citizens. In response to these calls for clarity and an end-state for British forces, Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon announced to MPs during a House of Commons debate on May 23rd that a “UK-led international military assistance training team” was arriving in Freetown to transition from major combat operations to a more sustainable solution: training and advising local forces. Secretary Hoon argued that, “Creating new, democratically accountable armed forces in Sierra Leone is vital to the long-term restoration of peace and security in that country.” After several politicians focused on British military achievements in Sierra Leone, one MP asked Secretary Hoon, “Is it not our duty not merely to pay tribute in the House to the skill at arms of our forces—the Paras and 42 Commando—but to ensure that their achievement is lasting so that they do not have to go back and do it again?” Secretary Hoon agreed that a lasting solution was necessary to preclude the need for British troops in the future; thus, he responded, “That is why I consciously linked the timetable for withdrawal to the prospect of an effective training team.” The Blair administration believed military training teams were the best hope for long-term stability without the need for future intervention.

Building the Capacity of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces

On June 1st, the British military in Freetown announced that the reconnaissance team ‘identified a requirement’ for more urgent training by a company of between 100 and 150.”

After Operation Palliser came to an end in mid-June 2000 and the UK Chief of Defence Staff, as well as the Foreign Secretary, visited President Kabbah in Freetown, the UK government pledged £21.27 million to re-equip the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and deploy a British infantry battalion to serve as a ‘short-term training team package’. In mid-June, the initial entry force was replaced with 250 officers and soldiers drawn primarily from the 2nd Royal Anglian Regiment as part of a Short-Term Training Team (STTT) led by Brigadier Gordon Hughes. The team led six weeks of training and provided British-issued uniforms and rifles for 1,000 SLA recruits, producing two new battalions for the SLA. Commenting on the training, British Lieutenant Colonel Aladsair Wild remarked, “We did have some Sierra Leonian [sic] instructors turn up drunk and they were swiftly dealt with. Overall, the training has gone far better than one could expect. They are good soldiers. All they need is proper support, equipment and regular rations and payment.”

Asked by a British reporter about being trained by the British, one SLA sergeant was confident in his army’s competence: “We've learnt many things - tactics, fieldcraft. We've learnt how if we fall into an ambush, how to combat it and then how to counterattack. We know how to capture a base, now. We are ready to prove ourselves: we can finish this war in six months because we are now professional British soldiers.”

Despite the expediency of short-term training teams, the British military planned on a long-term need to

---

360 “Army’s Freetown Retraining Role May Last Three Years,” *Birmingham Post*, June 1, 2000, LexisNexis Academic.
361 Ucko, 850-855.
363 Ibid.
develop the SLA and eventually hand-off security responsibility to local forces: “According to the planners at the time, and it started off with the Royal Anglians, it wasn’t the case of ‘we’re going to do a six-month training team and we’re outta here.’ I think there was very much a long-term view. As we set sail to head back to the UK, our thoughts at the time were, ‘Well, they’re going to be there for at least five years.’”

In November 2000, Operation Silkman launched a larger contingent of British commanders and advisors to assist the SLA in Sierra Leone. The British military deployed three training teams as well as a joint brigade headquarters “to command the overall UK effort and to provide high-level operational advice” to the SLA. The British IMATT funded the training program and built training facilities, as well as a mentoring program for SLA soldiers and MoD officials. As UK advisors began aiding the SLA and MoD in restructuring their organizations, British Wing Commander Richard Woodward noted:

I didn’t know what to expect…the only thing that was helpful was that the organisation and the structure [of Sierra Leone’s defense sector] was similar to the UK armed forces, in terms of having a MoD, a Joint Force Command — rank structures, organisation from section, to platoon to companies to platoons. It was very much a British structure.

In order to restore stability during the chaos brought by the civil war, British advisors had shaped a Sierra Leonean military structure that resembled their own. During an interview, the head of the Sierra Leone government’s Governance Reform Secretariat Emmanuel Coker looked back at British support during this period and noted, “the reform that was going on in [the] MoD was

364 Lieutenant Colonel (British Royal Marines) Reggie Turner, who served as a liaison officer to the UN for the Royal Marine’s 42 Commando unit during Operation Palliser, Skype interview by author, June 29, 2017.
dictated by the British – the entire reform process was. The government at the time wanted SSR [security-sector reform], and the British were willing to do it.”

Woodward emphasized the central decision-making role of the British military in rebuilding the Sierra Leonean armed forces during the civil war: “Following David Richards’ intervention we put a military organisation on top of it [IMATT], and threw resources, human and financial, into it, reintegrating the armed forces into society.” At first, British officers essentially took over the SLA, as former IMATT Commander Barry Le Grys notes: “In 2001 the SLA was effectively led by UK officers. While there were some courageous and capable SLA officers at battalion level and below, they were in the minority. UK officers were formally embedded in command positions…Without UK spine, the SLA would have continued to fall into chaos and disrepute.”

Given the need for structure, British military advisors directed changes for the Sierra Leonean government, which was receptive to the support during the chaotic civil war.

*End of Civil War and the Continuation of Military Training*

In January 2002, the British announced an official end to the civil war in Sierra Leone. The SLA was re-named Republic of Sierra Leonean Armed Forces (RSLAF) after officials from UK DfID and MoD helped re-integrate roughly 2,000 fighters from outside the military, bringing the total armed forces to about 12,000. Both joint headquarters (Joint Forces Command and Joint Support Command), the MoD, and the Chief of the Defence Staff were subordinated to the

---

command of the IMATT, “whose objective was to steer initial development and help to build
capacity.”

By March, the British had trained roughly 9,000 SLA soldiers, to include former
rebels, at the Benguema training camp. British trainers applied the UK model for SLA recruits,
as former IMATT commander Colonel Mike Dent recalls: “Basically, the UK took over training
and utilized the UK basic recruit training and infantry training programmes used in the UK
system, but with a reduced course length the maximize throughput.”

The training program
had increased to nine weeks and included instruction not only on tactics, but also on appropriate
behavior for professional soldiers, such as refusing to abduct children to serve as combatants.
Overseeing the training, British Major Peter Hill told reporters: "We don't just train them to be
deadly killers. A critical part of the training is the moral component of being a soldier...By the
time they leave, they will be aware that some actions they have conducted previously are not
acceptable.”

One former RUF fighter admitted this transformation of his understanding of
warfare: “In the jungle, I did not know the difference between soldiers and civilians.” Though
Major Hill’s training team sought to transform the SLA into a force that protected human rights,
he was surprised to see how well the former rebels were able to integrate into the government’s
military: “They get on fine. It is a real asset of these people that they have a capacity to ignore
possible gripes on things that we in the West would consider quite major.”

In March 2002, after a directive from the UK MoD, the IMATT conducted another defense
review in anticipation of an imminent UK military drawdown. The defense review noted that the
UK’s “strategic end state” for IMATT’s presence and planning should be: “A self-sustaining,

371 Peter Albrecht interview with Richard Woodward, UK, August 2013, in Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson,
372 Email correspondence with British Army Colonel (retired) Mike Dent, Military Advisor of the Ministry of
Defence Advisory Team (MODAT) and Deputy Commander of IMATT, August 20, 2017.
374 Ibid.
democratically accountable and affordable armed forces, capable of meeting Sierra Leone’s defense missions and tasks, assisted as necessary by an appropriate regional peace support organization, but without a UK military presence.” The IMATT’s focus on building a sustainable, professional force that could provide its own national and regional security without the need for UK forces was present in the defense review’s ‘end state’.

The leading role by British military and civilian advisors was welcomed by the Sierra Leonean MoD’s director of policy, Al-Hassan Kondeh, yet at the same time, he feared too much involvement at the cost of domestic support by Sierra Leoneans who, “had not been involved or informed about reforms of Sierra Leone’s military structures.” Thus, the British advisors agreed to allow Sierra Leonean officers and officials to lead the effort to develop a sustainable military structure that could, in the future, be run independent of British oversight, published in the 2003 Defence White Paper. Although this review process did not fundamentally alter the structure of the MoD and RSLAF, it was seen as a natural move away from the original British model.

Albrecht and Jackson note:

The UK blueprint that had been its original point of departure had never been fully implemented; it was also inappropriate in terms of the historical and cultural context in Sierra Leone…For example, in Sierra Leone there was no established culture of military and civilians working together, particularly given the historical attitude of the military towards civilians and the documented history of human-rights abuses. For a civilian even to sit next to an officer required a degree of ‘cultural adjustment’, let alone for a civilian to disagree with or give instructions to military personnel.376

One British officer who worked as a member of IMATT in 2003 recognized the pitfalls of this type of approach:

You design an MoD on the basis that you’ve got fifty British officers running it, and then the next week there is going to be four British officers.

376 Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy, and Development in Action, 32.
And you say: what? They haven’t got the capacity for that…So you have to be careful not to take the blueprint that was written in London, change the date and time and reproduce the model. You’ve actually got to design the model for what they require, and we had an MoD where we made exactly that mistake.\(^{377}\)

Kondeh noted some of the frustrations in working with IMATT advisors, who he felt oftentimes disregarded the input by MoD civilians or used intimidating tactics to “prevent officers from making objective contributions that could lead to outcomes unexpected or unwanted by IMATT.”\(^{378}\)

In 2004, the commander of IMATT Brigadier Simon Porter oversaw an initiative to develop a long-term plan to hand-off security and military responsibility to the Sierra Leoneans, called ‘Plan 2010’. This initiative envisioned UK assistance to help the RSLAF to eventually ‘run itself’ and build “the capacity of the force, individually, collectively, intellectually, and physically, to allow it to fulfill the missions and tasks asked of it by the government.”\(^{379}\) Brigadier Porter also viewed increasing progress as an opportunity to turn training over to the RSLAF instead of relying on expensive British short-term training teams. Capacity-building by British mentors became more structured in 2004 with unit-level (platoon- and company-level) training as well as senior-officer schooling. IMATT officers conducted courses for senior RSLAF officers at the IMATT-funded Horton Academy, the ‘equivalent to the UK’s Shrivenham’, that is, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Instruction for younger officers was conducted at the Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC) which was modelled after


Catterick’s Infantry Training Centre and the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, the British officer training school.\textsuperscript{380} The AFTC was designed to “train officers and other service personnel in basic military skills and to generate understanding of concepts such as neutrality and democratic accountability.”\textsuperscript{381} These training centers, built in the image of British military schools and professional standards, were crucial in RSLAF officer and soldier development.

\textit{Building RSLAF Capacity for Peacekeeping}

During and in the immediate period following 2000 civil war, the SLA had been largely incapable, or unwilling, to protect the population against internal or external threats. Thus, “The task following the war was therefore to construct an army that could be effective against any future rebellion, protect the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone and also, perhaps, act as peacekeepers elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{382} British advisors sought to separate the roles and responsibilities of the RSLAF from the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP) by granting a domestic (internal) focus to the latter and a national defense (external) focus to the former. This model of separation of police from military, as well as civilian control over the military, is common to Western democracies but unfamiliar to Sierra Leone. As former IMATT commander Barry Le Grys argues: “While this subordination of military forces to the police in internal security situations is not the norm for an army in West Africa, the SLP and RSLAF have overcome their traditional rivalry; their relationship is much improved.”\textsuperscript{383} In helping the RSLAF define its role vis-à-vis the national police force, the IMATT considered preparing the RSLAF to contribute to regional commands.


\textsuperscript{381}Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, \textit{Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy, and Development in Action}, 76.

\textsuperscript{382}Ibid., 34-35.

\textsuperscript{383}Barry Le Grys, 51.
such as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in addition to UN or African Union peacekeeping missions. However, the IMATT understood the challenges of building a force not only with a national pride and sense of purpose in defending its own people, but now also willing to conduct peacekeeping abroad when it stated in a 2006 report: “Rather like the difficulty of conveying the concept of community policing to the SLP, a shift from conventional to PSO [peace support operations] activities will need much close involvement at the tactical level.”

The British encouraged the RSLAF to adopt a peacekeeping role and in February 2007, the Sierra Leonean government committed to the ESF and signed an agreement with the UN to contribute peacekeeping forces. This ‘external focus’ for the RSLAF was seen by both the British advisors and the Sierra Leonean soldiers as an important step in capacity-building: “Apart from providing the RSLAF with a positively defined role for the foreseeable future, this was also considered to reinforce the UK’s success in transforming Sierra Leone’s armed forces through IMATT…To the RSLAF and IMATT alike, this development was considered an unqualified indication of success and the reflection of an army coming of age.” In fulfilling this role, the RSLAF contributed observers and staff officers to UN peacekeeping missions beginning in 2007 and deployed an entire reconnaissance company to Darfur, Sudan in 2009. Before the RSLAF committed units to UN missions, British advisors ensured the troops met certain standards of readiness. IMATT Commander Hugh Blackman (from August 2008 to February 2011) recalled:

> Over the years, we’d trained infantrymen in core combat skills (attack, defence, patrolling, etc.); also medics, intelligence, Military Police, logisticians, administration and mechanics. All of these were trained and prepared to a standard that we would have considered an appropriate

---


385 Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy, and Development in Action, 78.
‘start-state’ before launching on mission-specific training, i.e., for Darfur specifically.  

As Blackman notes, British military advisors viewed their role in maintaining standards in RSLAF officers and soldiers as vital to their mission. Le Grys noted in 2007: “However, battalion commanders are not confident enough of their standing to wish IMATT farewell yet. They still feel that without IMATT on hand to monitor standards, old habits in the chain of command might overwhelm their good deeds.” In this view, British military advisors feared that RSLAF officers would fail to adopt the standards and habits encouraged by their counterparts and slip back into their pre-transformation routines.

**Reduction of the British Role and Transition from IMATT to ISAT**

In mid-2007, after the first peaceful change of power during a general election since the civil war, the UK government decided to terminate the DfID-funded SILSEP program and transferred some of its responsibilities to IMATT. During this time IMATT began to relinquish some of his executive roles to Sierra Leonean military officers and officials and developed more of an advisory role. IMATT commander Brigadier Powe recalled how he made decisions during the transitional period:

> The focus of funding had switched away from West Africa to East Africa, and the [UK MoD] had to a certain extent lost interest [in the former]. There were bigger fish to fry [in Afghanistan and Iraq]. So we were working it out on our own, based on the resources we had available. We had a standard set of tasks that we were given [set out in Plan 2010]. I had a set of tasks, reasonably open, and after that it was up to me to decide, alongside the head of FCO and DFID [in-country], what the best way to use the resources was.

---


387 Le Grys, 56.

By 2012, IMATT staff numbers went from 90 to 25 and began focusing more on training the RSLAF for peacekeeping operations and training senior leaders at the Horton academy. The rank of the IMATT commander was reduced from brigadier general to colonel, a symbolic signal of British withdrawal that was not well received by the RSLAF and MoD. However, short-term training teams began taking more of a role in training the RSLAF, notably in the form of Brigade Advisory and Support Teams (BASTs).

The British Army published a story about the RSLAF’s progress in April 2011 after a reporter observed training and interviewed British advisors at one of the training camps. The reporter noted: “Dressed in British camouflage and speaking English, the future soldiers at Benguema’s Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC) would not have looked out of place on a UK exercise ground.” Colour Sergeant Mark Beaton highlighted the developing hands-off approach:

We let Sierra Leonean instructors run things on their own and we speak to them at the end of the lesson to advise and mentor…For example rather than simply take over or tell a RSLAF instructor what to do, I might suggest that he projects his voice to the whole group and makes sure he wears his headdress, uniform and webbing correctly while teaching.

The reporter goes on to note how the “the troops train and operate in the same manner as their British tutors” and operate the same machine guns and rifles that the British used before the introduction of newer equipment. By 2011, RSLAF leaders had graduated

---

391 Ibid.
from understanding British tactics to embracing the proper appearance and conduct for professional soldiers, modelled on their British advisors.

In 2013, the British government transitioned authority for security reform from IMATT to an International Security Assistance Team (ISAT). This new team was now led by a civil servant, not a military officer, that exercises a much broader view of security. After receiving an invitation from the RSLAF, the British army conducted its first ‘joint’ exercise alongside Sierra Leonean army units in November 2016. The exercise was conducted at the RSLAF’s Jungle Warfare School, intended in the future to be used for training Sierra Leonean as well as other soldiers. From reports of the exercise, it appears that the British Army began to see the RSLAF as equal partners rather than trainees in need of advice and assistance: “The joint exercise, taking place in the Guma Valley, will improve both militaries in parallel as they will be learning from each other and forging enduring ties.”

Major Ollie Braithwaite, commander of the participating British unit, noted: “This was the first time members of the RSLAF had been integrated into our force on an exercise rather than being taught by us. It was a significant step forward and is a clear demonstration of the strong defence relationship the regiment has with the RSLAF as a result of the military skills training we have been delivering.” One British soldier remarked about the experience: “I really enjoyed it. We learnt a lot from the RSLAF. It was an eye opener to see what they can do with the little equipment they have; quite remarkable really. How they survive off the land is

---

After fifteen years of instruction by British advisors, RSLAF officers and soldiers had finally become the trainers.

Though the RSLAF is still developing as an effective national military and ISAT advisors remain in Freetown to this day, progress has been impressive. In just over a decade, the British military advisory mission in Sierra Leone, in the form of BMATT, IMATT, ISAT, as well as other small training teams, helped the RSLAF develop from an organization in shambles into a force capable of deploying in support of UN operations. Albrecht and Jackson note: “In stark contrast to historical popular perception, by March 2012 the RSLAF had become one of the better-respected organisations in Sierra Leone – a success largely attributed to UK support.” In an analysis of the British military reintegration program, Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs argues:

There can be no doubt as to the importance of IMATT in all aspects of the reform process, from the training provided in the MRP [Military Reintegration Programme] to the strategic placement of advisers high up in the hierarchy of the completely reorganized MoD [Ministry of Defence]. The commitment of the British government to the Sierra Leonean peace process, particularly in the area of security-sector reform, has been both remarkably extensive and unusually long-term.

The British military invested immense resources, both in manpower and treasure, into building the capacity of the Sierra Leonean forces. The means by which the British attempted to build RSLAF capacity were through the training of a sustainable, professional force to obviate the future need for British intervention. As far as sustainability, IMATT advisors consistently noted

394 Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy, and Development in Action, 125.
the importance of building a future force that could provide for its own security and attempted to train and advise with this goal in mind. The number of IMATT advisors diminished as the RSLAF became more competent over time. Professionally, British advisors and trainers often applied their own understanding of military training and organization (the ‘British model’) to advise, assist, and train RSLAF soldiers. For instance, the British military supplied the RSLAF with British uniforms and weapons, created units and command structures modelled after the British Army, trained new recruits based on British practices, and built training centers modelled on three of its own military training centers: the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, the Catterick Infantry Training Centre, and the Defence Academy at Shrivenham. Moreover, RSLAF’s progress was consistently assessed by how it compared to the British army: officers and reporters were satisfied when they observed RSLAF soldiers appearing and maneuvering like British troops. British army advisors also developed Sierra Leonean soldiers to adopt their values: RSLAF soldiers were instructed not only on uniform and appearance, but also on democratic accountability and protection of human rights. Moreover, the training and deployment of RSLAF to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia reveals the changing focus of the military from internal to regional multilateralism, viewed as a positive step toward a well-respected and internationally legitimate force.

Alternative Explanations

Instead of using training exercises as a means to build the capacity of Sierra Leonean forces to provide for their own security, perhaps the British Army harbored other motivations. The traditional literature in military doctrine anticipate that militaries prefer certain types of policies in order to rehearse for war or serve narrow parochial interests. First, perhaps British training
was intended more to rehearse the interoperability between British and RSLAF soldiers for future missions (either during interventions or regional peacekeeping) than as a one-way training event for local forces. Although by 2016 British and Sierra Leonean soldiers began conducting ‘joint’ exercises in which the former was learning tactics from the latter, IMATT planning in the early 2000’s focused on the need to train a local force in order to preclude the need for future British military interventions. Moreover, no British troops would deploy to the UN mission in Somalia until May 2016 and were only announced in September 2015, three years after the British trained RSLAF peacekeepers to participate in the multilateral mission. Thus, the evidence suggests that the UK was more interested in training the RSLAF to defend itself and participate in regional multilateral missions without the need for British troops.

Concerning whether the British military sought this building-capacity program for organizational interests, one would question how much these operations in Sierra Leone helped the military pursue these goals. In terms of organizational size and wealth, not only were small teams of advisors and trainers—merely several hundred troops—deployed for these short-term training missions, the price tag of these programs was relatively inexpensive. For instance, Albrecht and Jackson estimate that between 2005 and 2008, the cost of British military assistance and training through IMATT to the RSLAF was approximately £10 million per year. Conversely, in the fiscal year 2006-2007, the British military budgeted roughly £2.4 billion on equipment procurement and £534 million on science, innovation, and technology.

---


Thus, military training in Sierra Leone is comparable to .5% of equipment spending and 1.8% of research into future technology.

With regards to prestige, although the British military has accumulated years of experience and takes pride in training successful local forces, building partner capacity is a mission in which soldiers train others to fight instead of engaging in combat themselves. After the conclusion of Operation Palliser, British troops served largely as advisors and trainers away from the front lines of fighting, essentially delegating fighting to the RSLAF. Thus, there is little evidence to support the notion that British training efforts in Sierra Leone offered either a strong esprit de corps amongst its soldiers or any public recognition for combat success. Finally, although there is evidence of disagreement and multiple reporting channels between the British IMATT and other UK ministries, in general military policy aligned with civilian-led grand strategy. Not only was the idea for military training a joint initiative between a military officer and a civil servant, the ‘whole-of-government’ security sector reform approach actually brought the military and civilian government officials from the foreign and development offices closer together. If the British army sought independence from political oversight, engaging in interagency reform along with diplomats and development experts in a failed state seems to belie this goal.

5.5 Summary

Building the capacity of weak militaries has emerged as a consistent major power tool to reduce strategic uncertainty without the need to deploy and expose its own troops in combat. This chapter described how major powers strengthen fledgling militaries by developing

professional and sustainable forces that are competent enough to provide security for their own citizens and contribute to peacekeeping in the region. This chapter also explained why major powers view BPC activities as a means to reduce strategic uncertainty; that is, through the development of a local force that is able to combat violent non-state actors in failed states without the need for future major power intervention. Although the term BPC is commonly attributed to the US military, France and the UK also have invested in these types of programs in Africa and the Middle East. Capacity-building exercises were illustrated using the British military’s experience in Sierra Leone from 2000-2016. Apply the case study, my argument was contrasted with the expectations of the traditional works in military doctrine. The following chapter explores the third non-traditional exercise function: role-forming. Similar to capacity-building, major powers employ these types of training events in order to influence the character of partner armies in order to manage the uncertainty associated with unpredictable threats.
CHAPTER 6
ROLE-FORMING EXERCISES

6.1 Introduction

Speaking to journalists about an ongoing Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)-sponsored military exercise called ‘Tsentr’ (“Center”), Russian Chief of the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov told reporters that the training event would test the ability of the organization to react to mass uprisings, “like in North Africa and the Middle East.” The exercise was taking place in September 2011 and the Russian chief of staff was referring to the nascent Arab Spring, which began as a massive protest against authoritarian rule in Tunisia and quickly spread to Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. Long-standing autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt were quickly ousted, while the other rulers were facing imminent threats of overthrow. The CSTO, consisting mostly of authoritarian former Soviet states—Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and formerly, Uzbekistan—felt the pressure of potential revolution: the security organization even publicly announced that its member states agreed to control social media in order to avoid repeats of the Arab revolutions. Referring again to the Arab Spring, General Makarov told reporters that "Russia's military organization has to be prepared for the worst scenarios of the development of the situation" in Central Asia. The possibility of democratic revolution along Russia’s frontiers was

---

402 “CSTO Wants to Monitor the Internet to Prevent a Repeat of Arab Revolutions,” The Moscow News, September 13, 2011, LexisNexis Academic.
unacceptable: Russia, through the CSTO, would ensure its contiguous former republics were capable of resisting rebellion.

This chapter explores the third type of non-traditional MME: role-forming. Major powers use role-forming exercises to influence what type of ‘role’ partner militaries will adopt, such as external defense, regime-support, or expeditionary peacekeeping. Role-forming MMEs are similar to capacity-building programs in that major powers use these exercises to somehow change the character of partner militaries; however, since the partners that participate in these types of training events are more advanced than fragile militaries, major powers hope to encourage certain types of characteristics instead of building armies ‘from the ground up’. The mechanism by which major powers use role-forming to reduce strategic uncertainty is by developing partner forces that better serve the major power’s national interests. For some major powers, encouraging democratic practices increases the probability of more trustworthy partners abroad; for others, regime stability insures against overthrow and volatility in a major power’s region. If major powers are successful, they develop partner militaries that are either more trustworthy in liberal sense or more competent to prevent revolutions that generate regional instability. This chapter further explores the concept of role-forming exercises, how they are expected to reduce strategic uncertainty, and which states and organizations usually employ these types of MMEs. The case of CSTO exercise programs from 2003-2012 provides an illustration of how Russia used role-forming to shape its environment; my argument and the two alternatives will be assessed before moving to a summary as preparation for the final non-traditional MME type in the subsequent chapter.
6.2 Role-Forming Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty

The Purpose of Role-Forming Exercises

Major powers seek partners that are benign or serve their national interests; they often look for opportunities to shape the character of partner regimes to reduce uncertainty in their environments. For instance, democratic states may be viewed as more trustworthy or authoritarian states may be considered more stable. Role-forming MMEs provide a means by which major powers can influence what type of function partner militaries assume for their countries. Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey argue that militaries serve various ‘roles’ or ‘functions’ for their societies: in addition to providing national security, they may also offer an opportunity to inculcate national values in citizens (‘Nation Builder’), uphold the power of a particular set of political or party interests (‘Regime Defense’), offer support to address internal emergencies (‘Domestic Military Assistance’), or provide an instrument to promote values and build relationships abroad (‘Military Diplomacy’). Major powers often encourage partners to adopt one or more of these roles during training. Within the role of national security-provider, major powers may train tasks that focus purely on national defense against an external aggressor; conversely, they sometimes emphasize a broadened definition of security through the training of peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks. Although democracies often encourage democratic practices during training—such as focusing externally (and not internally) on threats, upholding international law, and defending human rights—they may also seek to strengthen an authoritarian regime against an uprising. For instance, during the Cold War the US supported

---

oppressive Central and South American militaries with training and military aid in order to prevent left-wing revolutions.\textsuperscript{405}

As previously mentioned, role-forming exercises differ from capacity-building exercises in that the partner military is often strong enough to operate independently; training events usually focus on more advanced tactics than novice individual weapons-handling or small-unit operations. Moreover, major powers often send more soldiers and units to role-forming MMEs rather than the small contingent of trainers and advisors used for capacity-training; thus, there is greater symmetry between participating major power and partner forces. The targets of these programs are usually transitioning or consolidating states; that is, states that already enjoy a functioning military but are either (1) experiencing a transition away from a particular regime-type or (2) states which are still maturing as a certain regime-type (for simplicity, either democratic or authoritarian). Thus, these types of exercises are initiated by major power military planners or government officials in response to problems associated with state transition or consolidation. As states move from one regime-type to another, military exercises serve as an opportunity to socialize certain norms. For instance, although NATO’s PfP military exercises were primarily geared toward recruitment (for NATO membership and multilateral peacekeeping operations), the explicit teaching of democratic norms—such as transparent budgets and civilian control of the military—took place at the ministerial level and the exercising of democratic practices during military training events served to prepare members for NATO membership and

to encourage post-communist states to adopt acceptable peacekeeping practices. Moreover, as states seek to consolidate their administrative capacity and develop mature regimes, major powers use role-forming MMEs to strengthen central rule. Especially if a certain regime is struggling to resist political or social revolution—for instance democratic or communist—major powers may train that partner military to protect its regime’s challenged grip on power.

Role-Forming and the Management of Uncertainty

Role-forming MMEs primarily target the threat source of uncertainty: that is, whether a partner state will be friendly or adversarial. The mechanism by which major powers affect the character of other state militaries through MMEs is by encouraging certain practices that influence the role in which soldiers serve for the partner society. Major powers hope that through role-forming MMEs, partner states will either be more trustworthy or capable of preventing revolution, thus removing a source of uncertainty in their strategic environments. There are two specific roles that major powers seek to encourage in partner militaries: regime defense and what I label democracy defense. Similar to regime defense, this role requires militaries to embody and defend democratic principles, such as establishing civilian control of the military, respecting political rights internally, and defending international law externally. Democratic major powers promote both types of roles (depending on the nature of threat), while authoritarian powers largely promote regime defense; both role-forming efforts are explored below.

---

406 For NATO PfP socialization at the ministerial level, see Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’.” See Chapter 4 case study for the practice of democratic peacekeeping tactics during training.
First, major powers may shape a partner military to adopt the role of regime defense to protect the ruling party or leadership from internal revolution. Not only do the consequences of revolution include instability, lack of capacity to prevent transnational crime, inability to secure borders, and often massive migration, overthrow may result in the installation of an unfriendly political system in a major power’s environment. If a major power feels threatened by the possibility of overthrow in its neighboring states, it often provides various types of support to ‘consolidate’ rule in the partner country. Thomas Ambrosio argues that Russia actively encourages “authoritarian consolidation”, or the solidification of autocratic rule in order to prevent democratic transition, in the former Soviet Union.407 Nicole Jackson notes that Russia supports autocratic Central Asian regimes by “actively countering democratization efforts, by providing legitimacy and political support, and by diversifying relations. This, in turn, at least in the short term, may increase regime stability and durability.”408 As previously mentioned, the US supported Central American regimes with military aid and training in order to prevent left-wing revolutions throughout the 1980’s. By ensuring that a partner military is able to suppress rebellion, major powers that feel threatened by political revolution—either democratic or communist—often help train and influence partner militaries to defend the ruling regime.

Second, major powers may encourage the role of democracy defense in transitioning partners in order to build more trustworthy states. War between democracies is remarkable rare in world politics. Although there are numerous theories about what causes the democratic peace409, John

Owen argues that liberal states share the idea that self-preservation and freedom from government oppression can only be achieved through peace. Because democracies express the collective interests of freedom-seeking individuals, liberals trust that other democracies share this desire for peace, prosperity, and liberty. Even if illiberal leaders are elected in a democracy, their ability to use force will be constrained through structural checks and balances. Conversely, non-democracies do not share this aspiration for liberty; thus, they often seek conquest and are considered more untrustworthy in the eyes of democracies. If major powers are able to build transitioning armies that protect political rights internally and respect international law externally, then major powers will more easily trust these emerging democracies. That is, as militaries in transition refrain from domestic oppression, avoid coups against their own government, and participate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions, then democratic major powers will become more certain that they pose little threat. John Pevehouse argues that NATO membership helped guide Spain’s transition to democracy after the death of authoritarian leader Francisco Franco. Following an attempted military coup in the emerging democracy in 1981, “the belief surfaced in government circles that entry to NATO would help secure the new democracy as it would modernize the Army through growing international contacts and direct its attention away from domestic politics.” He notes that a training focus on external security helped guide the Spanish military away from internal concerns: “Through joint maneuvers,


modernization, and improvements in military technology, the Spanish military became oriented away from domestic politics."\(^{412}\) The US Clinton Administration strongly believed in the democratic peace and viewed both NATO expansion and the PfP program as means to promote democracy; as shown in Chapter 4, a secondary function of NATO’s PfP exercises was to encourage democratic practices in post-communist European states. More trustworthy partners results in fewer security threats in a democratic major power’s strategic environment.

6.3 Russia, China, and Regional Security Organizations

Although not explicitly stated in national military doctrine, regional security organizations offer major powers an opportunity to influence the role of partner militaries. NATO, for instance, has long provided the US and the European major powers with a means to influence the roles of transitioning states. Despite its Cold War military mission to contain Soviet aggression, NATO’s original political goal was to consolidate and protect the liberal democratic community, enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty: “The Parties to this Treaty… are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”\(^{413}\) NATO’s oft-referenced Article 5 commitment to defend allies in the case of an attack overshadows the other thirteen articles, including commitments to resolve conflicts peacefully (Art. 1), strengthen free institutions (Art. 2), and adhere to UN principles (Arts. 1, 7).\(^ {413}\) Although NATO has not published specific criteria for membership, an internal study in 1995 argued that enlargement would lure post-communist states to adopt democratic reforms, which in turn would provide European

\(^{412}\) Pevehouse, 528-529.

Since the early 2000’s, Russia and China have also leveraged two regional security organizations to shape partner militaries in Central Asia; both institutions are described below.

**Role-Forming in Eurasian Security Organizations**

Two Eurasian security organizations established in the early 2000’s—the CSTO led by Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) initiated by China—have sponsored multiple role-forming exercises almost every year. Although the roots of both organizations are located in diplomatic agreements to create stability and prevent conventional war between Russia, China, and the former Soviet Republics after the collapse of the USSR, the CSTO and SCO in their contemporary forms were both launched largely in response to the growing threat posed by violent non-state actors. Specifically, both security organizations grew and developed out of the fear of both Islamic terrorism and political revolution: religious extremism beginning in the 1990’s and the possibility of Western-sponsored democratic revolution throughout the 2000’s. Militant religious groups, such as Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Chechen rebels threatened to overthrow local governments and establish caliphates throughout China, Russia, and Central Asia. Political uprisings in the form of ‘Color Revolutions’ threatened to replace autocratic regimes with democratic or pro-Western governments. Both types of non-state actors threaten to replace existing regimes or capture territory and secede from national control; China and Russia fear that states along their

---

borders will not be able to defend their regimes or territory, resulting in unfriendly or unstable neighbors. These non-state threats are often expressed as the “three evils” of “terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” codified in the SCO’s June 2001 founding document. Despite these security concerns about transnational threats, both organizations emphasize non-interference in each member’s internal affairs, which creates obstacles for major power military intervention during crises and even complicates efforts to produce joint operations. Both security organizations refrained from military intervention in Kyrgyzstan’s political revolution in 2010 to save the incumbent regime, which was one of their own members. In fact, although government officials and military officers within both the SCO and CSTO consult and exercise regularly, neither security organization has publicly deployed joint units for any military mission—counterterrorism, peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief—either regional or UN-sponsored. Thus, both CSTO and SCO exercises over the last fifteen years have trained forces that rarely (if ever) deploy together for actual operations.

The SCO originated in 1996 when five countries—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—met in Shanghai, China to negotiate their ambiguous shared borders, as well as develop confidence-building measures to reduce military forces and mutual mistrust between members. The breakup of the USSR not only had ramifications for border disputes, but also the capacity for the emergent Central Asian states to exercise sovereignty over their new countries. Tajikistan collapsed into civil war from 1992-1994, with continued instability until 1997; war broke out again in 1998 when a former commander from the Tajik civil war attempted to

---

419 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 138-147.
establish his own government in the northern part of the country. In February 1999, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) detonated a bomb in the capital of Uzbekistan, nearly killing the president; the IMU also declared its intentions of taking control of the government. The IMU then waged an insurgency in the Fergana Valley later that summer with the intention of overthrowing Central Asian governments and establishing an Islamic caliphate stretching from Muslim-majority Chechnya, Russia to Xinjiang, China.\(^{421}\) Against the backdrop of increased terrorism in Central Asia, the “Shanghai Five” (along with Uzbekistan) met again in June 2001 to announce the creation of the SCO as a means to address the growing problem of non-state threats in the region.

The SCO charter was signed in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 2002 and entered force in September 2003. The June 2001 declaration noted that the purpose of the organization was not to serve as a defense alliance, but instead “attaches priority to regional security” in the realms of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, calling for the creating of a regional anti-terrorist structure with a headquarters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.\(^{422}\) Moreover, the group simultaneously released a joint document on the “The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” which further elucidated these threats to regional security, as well proscribed consultative measures in case of a crisis.\(^{423}\) Three days after the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on the US, the organization released a document which expressed empathy for the victims of the attacks, as well as measures to “accelerate the establishment of a regional anti-

\(^{422}\) Shanghai Cooperation Organization. “Declaration on The Establishment of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”
terrorist structure.” The CSTO (explored in detail in the case study below), was also established in 2002 largely in response to growth of non-state threats, accelerated by US operations in Afghanistan.

**SCO and CSTO Military Exercises**

The first SCO and CSTO MMEs took place in 2002 and 2003, respectively. The first SCO exercise—which also happened to be China’s first-ever ground-based multinational exercise—occurred in October 2002 between China and Kyrgyzstan. The event kicked off with little media attention despite the fact that China had long preferred unilateral to multilateral training. Dennis Blasko argues that although, “Little also is known about the national-level decisionmaking [sic] process that led to the reversal of the decades-old policy of not training with foreign militaries,” Chinese officials’ concern about terrorism most likely had a profound influence: “While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, (9/11), probably added impetus to this decision, the Chinese government previously had been concerned about the threat of terrorism and other non-traditional security challenges.” The SCO hosts about one or two major MMEs per year and focuses mainly on transnational terrorism, ensuring partner forces are able to protect their countries’ political and territorial sovereignty. Roughly half of SCO exercises include all members and consist of about 300-1300 troops, while the annual ‘Peace Mission’ exercises are

---


much larger in scale—from 2,000 to 10,000 total soldiers—and have on several occasions involved only Russia and China.

Although Russia conducted intermittent MMEs with CIS states throughout the 1990’s, the first CSTO training events were held in 2003, both of which simulated rapid reaction forces intervening in insurgent takeovers of Central Asian territory. The CSTO conducts multiple MMEs per year, usually focusing on threats of terrorism or separatism (often portrayed to be sponsored by the West), and rotates the location through different member states. Most members are willing to hold exercises on their territory, while others—in particular, Belarus and (former member) Uzbekistan—resist Russian presence in their countries. Exercises “Frontier” and “Interaction” are the most consistent counterterror exercise programs, consisting of troop levels between 600 and 12,000, while “Indestructible Brotherhood” was launched in 2012 as a training event for about 600-700 CSTO peacekeepers. Each training event with former Soviet states provides an opportunity for Russia and China to influence the role that partner militaries serve for their societies; namely, regime-defense. By shaping these partners through regional security organizations, Russia and China hope to eliminate the possibility of unstable or unfriendly governments along their borders.

---

427 Lieutenant Colonel (Royal Netherlands Army, retired) Marcel De Haas, former Professor at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan and current Senior Researcher at the Russian Studies Center, University of Groningen, Skype interview by author, June 29, 2017.
428 De Haas, 401-402.
6.4 Case Study: Russia and the CSTO, 2003-2012

As described above, China and Russia have expanded their use of role-forming MMEs throughout the 2000’s and 2010’s through two regional security organizations. As both institutions attempt to combat violent non-state threats, yet also emphasize non-interference in members’ domestic politics, MMEs serve as an opportunity for Russia and China to influence the roles of Eurasian states without direct military intervention or multilateral deployments. Through training, both China and Russia encourage the role of regime-defense in consolidating post-Soviet states. By strengthening the ability of these partner militaries to defend their regimes, China and Russia hope to reduce the risk of Islamic or democratic revolution along their borders. The case study below illustrates how Russia uses the CSTO as a tool to encourage the role of regime-defense in Caucasian and Central Asian states. My argument about role-shaping will be contrasted with the two alternative explanations drawn from the traditional literature in military doctrine; that is, whether these exercises were conducted instead as preparation for multinational deployment, deterrence against state or non-state actors, or to serve narrow organizational interests. Evidence that would support my argument include statements, documents, and military exercise scenarios which indicate that MMEs are intended to address non-state threats (both from terrorism and political revolution). Conversely, evidence that would challenge my argument are military behaviors and statements indicating that these exercise programs were conducted for rehearsals, deterrence, or organizational interests.

Russia, the Former Soviet Union, and the Origins of the CSTO

From the remnants of the precipitously dissolved USSR in December 1991 arose fifteen newly independent states. Russia, the most powerful country and successor to the Soviet Union, was
now surrounded by troubled nations attempting to secure sovereignty and improve security.

Russia itself was in need of order: by May 1992, the defense ministry and armed forces were not yet established though the Russian Federation was already in existence for five months.\textsuperscript{429} Most of the countries that comprised Russia’s ‘near abroad’ signed an agreement that officially recognized their sovereign equality with Russia and formed a regional organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).\textsuperscript{430} Additionally, nine members of the CIS signed the Collective Security Treaty, known as the “Tashkent Treaty”, between 1992 and 1993 to reaffirm individual sovereignty and ability for each state to develop its own military, while also committing to peaceful resolution of conflicts between members.\textsuperscript{431} The treaty prohibited members from joining other alliances, engaging in treaties counter to the Tashkent agreement, and required that the use of force outside members’ territory be “carried out only in the interests of the [sic] international security according to the UN Charter.”\textsuperscript{432}

Roy Allison argues that Russia continued to exhibit primacy among the CIS in the 1990’s, despite the loss of control with the end of the USSR. For instance, Russian leaders viewed the country’s relationship with CIS members as largely hierarchical; President Boris Yeltsin claimed that Russia should be ‘first among equals’ among the former Soviet Republics.\textsuperscript{433} In addition to security, ethnic Russians also inhabited the former Soviet republics, which provided an “ethno-


\textsuperscript{430} Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia refused to participate, while Ukraine and Turkmenistan became associate member states.


nationalist” justification for Russian interest in its near-abroad. This leadership role was confirmed in Russia’s multiple unilateral interventions—which Russia deemed ‘peacekeeping’—in CIS states’ internal conflicts, such as in Moldova, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and Abkhazia in 1992. Russia’s faith in its own leadership was further supported in its foreign policy concept of December 1992 and Yeltsin’s February 1993 speech when he claimed that international organizations should, “grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR.” Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia viewed a special role for itself in its near-abroad, especially in regards to maintaining stability through unilateral peacekeeping.

Russian regional leadership was deemed even more vital in the shadow of US unipolarity. A senior Russian military officer warned in summer 1992 that growing conflict in the CIS could lead to direct intervention by NATO and the CIS Joint Forces Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Shaposhnikov, claimed that NATO had no right under the CSCE framework to use armed force to settle disputes in the CIS. Suspicions were confirmed when a leaked US State Department draft memo in August 1993 rejected a greater role for Russia to conduct peacekeeping in the CIS and that the US should be ready to support UN operations in the troubled region, even in the face of Russian opposition. Russia struggled to gain UN support for its unilateral peacekeeping missions in the former republics. Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev asked for a UN

---

435 Ted Hopf argues that before or during May 1992, incursions into Moldova and Abkhazia were the result of locally stationed (and stranded) Russian military officers who intervened without direction from Moscow, which lacked a “unitary actor” until May 1992. Regardless, the fact that Soviet officers, and the Russian state after May 1992, intervened highlights the Russian view that it is responsible for stability in the former Soviet region. See Hopf, “Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force.”
436 Russia TV, 28 February 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. See also Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 123.
437 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 124.
mandate for its operations in the CIS, arguing that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter could be interpreted to allow the peacekeeping responsibility to be delegated to a regional organization with external monitors attached. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali largely opposed this idea, yet by 1994 he was willing to allow the CIS to conduct peacekeeping in its own region, but required that the force be comprised of only 20-30% of Russian troops and solely under UN command. Given these restrictions, Moscow declared that its extra-territorial operations were fully legal and did not require a UN mandate. However, Russia finally conceded to UN monitoring in Abkhazia and Tajikistan to oversee ceasefires in mid-to-late 1994.\footnote{Allison, \textit{Russia, the West, and Military Intervention}, 130.} Russia’s concern for stability in its near-abroad was codified in its 2000 national security concept, in which the “outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States” are mentioned as major threats.\footnote{Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko argue that during the 1990’s and early 2000’s, Russia attempted to join the “Western Club” to be accepted as a great power and point to Russia’s desire to join NATO in 1992 as well as other international organizations. Only after the US refused to recognize their great power status, as well as encourage the color revolutions, did Russia turn to other creative strategies to re-assert its status. Though I agree that Russia was interested in joining these organizations in the 1990’s, I argue that Russia still sought primacy in the former Soviet Union without Western interference. See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010): 63-95.} Additionally, Russia’s suspicion of Western meddling is also apparent in the document, which cites NATO’s eastward expansion, the appearance of foreign military bases by Russia’s borders, and the striving of “particular states and intergovernmental organizations” to belittle the international security role of the UN and OSCE as other main threats to the country’s security.\footnote{Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” January 10, 2000, accessed January 9, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768.}
The CSTO Develops from Threats of Terrorism and Western Interests in Central Asia

Russian attempts to maintain stability and primacy in the former Soviet Union were complicated by three factors in the early 2000’s: the threat of Islamic terrorism, US strategic interest in Central Asia, and Western support for democratization through ‘Colored Revolutions’. Islamic terrorism posed threats to Russia and Central Asia throughout the 1990s: Russia brutally repressed Chechen rebels in 1996 and 1999, while the IMU seized territory between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in 1999. Moreover, after the attacks on American soil by Al Qaeda in September 2001, the US responded with NATO operations in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime and eliminate safe havens for Al Qaeda. In order to logistically support missions in the traditionally austere region, the US required access to Central Asia and consequently secured airbases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan during 2001-2002. The US also increased its security cooperation with Uzbekistan when US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Uzbekistani foreign minister Adulaziz Kamilov signed a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework in 2002.\footnote{441} Intensified US involvement in Central Asia ran into existing Russian presence in the region, as Russia not only views these former Soviet republics as a “buffer” against terrorism and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan, but the major power also attempts to retain control of the region.\footnote{442} In 2001, Russia already had roughly 18,000 troops stationed in Tajikistan and in late 2002, developed a joint airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of the joint Kyrgyz-Russian airfield was ostensibly to provide a base to support the recently assembled

\footnote{441}{McCarthy, The Limits of Friendship, 85.}
\footnote{442}{Lieutenant Colonel (Royal Netherlands Army, retired) Marcel De Haas, former Professor at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan and current Senior Researcher at the Russian Studies Center, University of Groningen, Skype interview by author, June 29, 2017.}
Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), one of the first major initiatives to emerge from the newly created Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 443

The CSTO, a security organization that was built on the principles of the Tashkent Treaty, was established in May 2002 by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 444 In addition to guarantees for mutual defense against external aggression, the CSTO’s charter focuses on the threat of violent non-state actors while respecting the sovereignty of each member state. The preamble establishes members’ commitment to “…continue and increase the close and all-round allied relations in foreign policy, military and technical areas, as well as in the sphere of counteraction to the transnational challenges and menaces to the safety of states and peoples.” 445 Article 5 of the charter spells out the organization’s insistence on respecting each participating country’s independence, sovereignty, and equal rights, as well as asserting non-interference in member states. This emphasis on sovereign inviolability was important for the former Soviet republics as they often feared Russian intervention in their internal affairs. 446

In addition to combatting transnational threats, military cooperation within the CSTO allows Russia to maintain a clientelist relationship with former Soviet republics. 447 Former CSTO General Sectary Nikolai Bordyuzha noted in 2012 that the organization’s two initial tasks were: 1) national security from external enemies and 2) the maintenance of peace in member states.

444 The original name for the organization was the Collective Security Organization but was changed to Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2003. Uzbekistan did not become a member of the CSTO until 2006, but again withdrew in 2012.
446 Allison, *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention*, 139-140.
447 Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired) Michael Clemmesen, former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Skype interview by author, June 12, 2017.
Regarding the first task, he argued that member states such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were afraid of spillover Islamic extremism from Afghanistan since the US invasion in 2001. Concerning the second, Bordyuzha states the, “Interests of Russia were confined to a wish not to lose influence in the former Soviet republics using historic, political and economic relations. Really it was planned to create a kind of post-Soviet counterpart of NATO in the best case and to preserve military bases on the territories of the neighboring republics in the worst case.”

The CSTO thus provides Russia with a means to combat transnational threats, maintain a hegemonic or clientelist relationship with parts of the former Soviet Union, while adhering to principles of non-intervention within the organization.

Currently, the CSTO is comprised of four types of collective forces: regional group commands, peacekeepers, Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (for Central Asia), and the Collective Prompt Reaction Forces. Regional groups are joint commands signed through bilateral treaties and broken down into three regions: Eastern Europe (Belarus and Russia), Caucasus (Armenia and Russia), and Central Asia (not yet signed, though responsibility is delegated to the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces). ‘Collective Rapid Deployment Forces for Central Asia’ were created in 2001 to address scenarios similar to the IMU’s infiltration into Batken, Kyrgyzstan and are comprised of about 4,000 soldiers, special forces, and police units. ‘Collective Rapid Deployment Forces’ were developed in 2009, are comprised of about 20,000 military and special forces, and conducted exercises in 2009 and 2011. Some of the tasks

---

assigned to the rapid deployment forces are settling local and boundary conflicts, prevent drug trafficking, and countering terrorism.449

The CSTO and Threats of Democratic Revolution

Beginning in 2003, the most salient threat to autocratic leadership that emerged in the former Soviet Union was democratic revolution. The region had seen three regimes overthrown by democracy supporters in ‘Color Revolutions’ by 2005: the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). In the aftermath of the revolutions, the newly elected Ukrainian and Georgian presidents were unambiguously pro-West, while the Kyrgyzstani government would continue to be plagued with internal strife and draw closer to Moscow. Despite the lack of direct military involvement by either the US or Russia during the political turmoil, Russia under President Vladimir Putin believed that these revolutions were fomented by the West, particularly the US, presenting a direct threat to Russian interests.450 One Russian official believed, “The ‘revolutions’ themselves are a combination of peaceful and violent methods designed to topple regimes disagreeable to the United States” and “…Washington maintains that ‘color revolutions’ cost less than the toppling of regimes through military intervention,” citing the US overthrow of the Iraq’s Saddam Hussein autocratic government in 2003 as an example. For this official, US diplomats stationed inside the country and organizations such as the Soros Foundations develop and fund


networks of opposition leaders to plan an overthrow of the existing regime.\textsuperscript{451} Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov asserted that Russia would react harshly “to exports of revolution to the CIS states, no matter [where] and what colour- pink, blue, you name it.”\textsuperscript{452} Russia’s suspicions of US efforts to promote democratization were confirmed when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Belarusian opposition leaders in April 2005 and urged them to oppose the autocratic government. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to the visit: “We think the democratic process, the process of reform cannot be imposed from outside.”\textsuperscript{453}

Even during the 1990’s, former Soviet states within the CSTO felt the force of democratic revolution and attempted used their security forces to quell rebellion. As early as 1996, Armenia’s presidential election faced demonstrations from protestors who claimed that the election was rigged. The military and police suppressed the protests by sealing off the capital, shutting down the offices of opposition parties, and arresting 250 opposition leaders. After the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections were also alleged to be marred with intimidation, media bias, and ballot-box stuffing, thousands of protestors mobilized in the streets to oppose the unfair elections. Armenian security forces (including the military) quelled the protest movement and arrested hundreds of opposition leaders.\textsuperscript{454} The protests were re-ignited in 2004 when opposition forces organized demonstrations of over 25,000, seeking to re-produce the results of Georgia’s Rose Revolution. During this protest, security forces were able to prevent

demonstrators from entering the capital, ransacked opposition headquarters, and arrested hundreds of activists across the country.\footnote{Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, \textit{Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 211-212.} In May 2005, the Uzbek government used security and military forces to violently repress protests in Andijan, Uzbekistan. Thousands of demonstrators gathered in Bobur square to protest the unfair detention and trial of 23 businessmen accused of being Islamic extremists; however, a group of armed opposition supporters stormed military and police barracks, stole weapons, freed the businessmen, and took hostages in government offices. The protestors hoped that President Islam Karimov would address the perceived injustice and calm tensions; instead, he sent police, as well as military troops, who fired on the protestors. Human Rights Watch claims that the military sealed off streets, prevented people from leaving, and, in cooperation with internal security forces, killed hundreds in the massacre.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, “Bullets Were Falling Like Rain: The Andijan Massacre, May, 13, 2005,” accessed January 16, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/06/06/bullets-were-falling-rain/andijan-massacre-may-13-2005.}

In the wake of the Orange Revolution and in preparation for Belarus’ 2006 presidential election, President Alexander Lukashenko began taking pre-emptive measures against democratization efforts. In addition to arresting opposition leaders for organizing protests, the regime began amending laws to allow security forces to fight demonstrators with firearms or “in other cases determined by the president.”\footnote{Vitali Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus,” \textit{Journal of Democracy}, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2005): 94.} After an uprising in Osh, Kyrgyzstan in 2011, the Kyrgyz Defense Minister Abibilla Kadayberdiyev was asked about the Kyrgyz constitution’s ban on the military’s involvement in internal conflicts. Kadayberdiyev responded:

\begin{quote}
Indeed, Article 14 of the constitution bans the use of armed forces for internal political goals. But Article 18 of the constitutional law on emergency situations says that ‘military units can be used for handling the aftermath of emergency situations and ensuring citizens’ security…Article 22 of the same law defines
\end{quote}
what extraordinary measures can be taken in case of an emergency and says that military units can be used to ensure public order and protect various facilities.  

He goes on to note, “And I disagree with statements that during the June unrest the army failed. On the contrary it played a big role in stabilizing the situation. The military patrolled the streets and manned check points around the clock for five months.”

Throughout the decades since Soviet collapse, CSTO member leaders needed the ability to counter democratic revolution; security forces, including the military, often served as the best option.

As the CSTO evolved against the backdrop of democratic revolutions throughout the former Soviet space in the mid-2000’s, Russian officials began formulating policies to counteract these non-state threats. In 2006, during President Vladimir Putin’s second term, Russian officials began promoting a concept known as “sovereign democracy”, an idea that resonated with post-Soviet authoritarian leaders who feared foreign meddling in their internal affairs. The term “sovereign democracy” was first used publicly by Vladislov Surkov, deputy chief of the Russian presidential administration, at a speech in June 2006. He later spoke to American reporters to clarify the term and downplayed its significance: “And we want to be a free nation among other free nations and to cooperate with them proceeding from fair principles, we don't want to be managed from abroad. That's it.” As opposed to “managed democracy”, in which a state is directed by an external regime, Russia promoted sovereign democracy: an attempt to implement policies independent of foreign interference.  

459 Ibid.
Fearing the consequences of democratic revolution in its near-abroad for its influence in the CIS, let alone the possibility of revolution inside its own borders, Russia began taking concrete steps toward preventing western interference and democratic revolt. Allison argues that Central Asian leaders engaged in opposition to democratic reform through a regional system of ‘protective integration’ with Russia and fellow authoritarian states. Regime security, he argues, is the top priority for these leaders and the only way to prevent mutual suspicion of external sponsoring of domestic overthrow is to commit to a regional security organization with Russia and former Soviet republics. When Russia was concerned about the increasing westernization of neighboring states, it sometimes intervened militarily (as in the case of non-CSTO members Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014). However, given the Putin administration’s public faith in “sovereign democracy”, as well as the statutory assurances of non-interference in fellow CSTO states, Russia needed a means to prevent democratic revolution short of intervention. The CSTO, as a security organization, would serve as Russia’s instrument to oppose democratization by bolstering autocratic regimes in the former Soviet Union.

**CSTO Military Exercises to Consolidate Authoritarian Rule**

One practical means by which Russia is able to support CSTO member states to consolidate rule is through role-forming MMEs. Exercises “Frontier” and “Indestructible Brotherhood” were designed to train CSTO soldiers how to combat the threat of violent non-state actors; the former trained counterterrorism tasks while the latter emphasized peacekeeping. The exercises were developed around scenarios in which an insurgent group—either politically or religiously

---

motivated and sometimes funded by an outside source—would attempt to overthrow the regime or seize territory and create a secessionist government. Individual CSTO member units and collective reaction forces would then practice intervention to expel the terrorists from sovereign territory. Sometimes CSTO planners designed the exercise adversary to be explicitly an extremist Islamic insurgent group; however, the same exercise ‘enemy’ also resembled the armed democratic protestors that seized government buildings during Color Revolutions. Below are explorations of three of these MMEs: two Frontier and one Indestructible Brotherhood training events.

In March 2005, the CSTO planned to conduct an anti-terror exercise in Kyrgyzstan known as “Rubezh”, or in English, “Frontier”. However, following democratic protests against alleged unfair parliamentary elections and the seizure of public buildings by the opposition during the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the exercises were urgently moved to Tajikistan in order to avoid the impression of intervention by external actors. During the revolution, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev was ousted by armed insurgents, who captured government buildings unopposed by weak state security forces. The CSTO exercise was moved to early April, one week after the initial stages of the democratic revolt, and involved roughly 1,000 troops from all CSTO states. The scenario of the training event was strikingly similar to the situation in Kyrgyzstan: one group, wearing blue shirts, was tasked with attempting to overthrow the local government due to discontent with the previous election, while the other team, wearing red

---


shirts, protected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regime. Erica Marat argues, “The implication of this division into red and blue camps during the drills emphasizes the blue team’s ties with destructive foreign powers, be they terrorist organizations… or international NGOs, as in Kyrgyzstan’s regime change.”

“Rubezh 2006”, this time held in Aktau, Kazakhstan along the Caspian coastline, exercised a similar scenario to its 2005 predecessor, though this exercise involved more troops (over 2,500) and integrated the recently created Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participated in this exercise, while Armenia and Belarus did not (Uzbekistan sent observers). The exercise was divided into three phases, the last of which involved joint maneuvers with land, air, and naval forces. Also joining the training were elements from Kyrgyzstan’s special forces unit, known as the “scorpion brigade,” a unit that is alleged to have taken part in countering protests in the 2005 Tulip Revolution. The tactical portion of this iteration also focused on terrorists objecting to the results of an election and attempting to overthrow the government, though the adversary to the regime was an Islamic

---


466 The Collective Rapid Deployment Forces would conduct their first anti-terror MME in October 2009, called “Collaboration” or “Interaction” 09. The exercise consisted of a computer-based staff rehearsal followed by large tactical operations conducted by the rapid forces, consisting of Russian paratroopers, Russian OMON (special purpose police), Kazakh paratroopers, SWAT teams, Kazakhstan Ministry of Internal Affairs, an Armenia motorized company, and Kyrgyz “Scorpion” special forces. “Maneuvers 1,500 by 300 Clicks Wide,” Defense and Security (Moscow), September 2, 2009, LexisNexis Academic. “Russian Capital Hosts Regional Security Organization’s Command-Staff Drill,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, September 2, 2009, LexisNexis Academic.


movement striving to establish a caliphate. One news story reported that a goal of the exercise was to practice, “a joint operation for stabilization of the situation in the aforementioned region of Kazakhstan.” The scenario again incorporated “red” (CSTO members) vs. “blue” (armed Islamic terrorists) combat, but included a third “brown” team which represented: “countries that wish to exploit the situation so as to strengthen their influence in this part of the world.”

Another story, entitled, “The ‘Red’ Will Suppress the Mutiny of the ‘Blue’; Russia and its Allies Learn to Defend Central Asian Regimes,” reported the Russian Defense Ministry’s confirmation that “the scenario of the exercise is based on a conflict in Central Asia.” The reporters go on to speculate that the “brown” team was, “not ODKB [CSTO] members in which it is easy to guess Afghanistan and the contingent of NATO and US forces staying there.” Russian TV showed images of the exercise and an anchor reported, “The Blues are operating with the clear sympathy of, and secret assistance from, the Browns - the countries interested in destabilizing the situation in the region.” The plan also called for a simulated mobilization of larger multinational military units in the case of external actors seeking to intervene militarily.

The concern about Islamic terrorism was ostensibly to address the Andijan massacre in May 2005, when Uzbek soldiers fired on a crowd of protestors who supported 23 men on trial accused of being Islamic extremists. By construing the MME scenario as a fight against Islamic

---

469 Ibid.
terrorism (as in Andijan), CSTO planners painted Uzbekistan’s actions as “anti-terror” as opposed to repressive against democratic demonstrators.\textsuperscript{475} However, given the exercise scenario’s focus on combating the ability of external supporters to influence the conflict or conduct independent attacks, Islamic terrorism seemed a lesser concern than the threat posed by democratization backed by the US. Moreover, during the exercise there was speculation that the maneuvers were conducted to prepare for Tajikistan’s upcoming presidential election in November 2006 or potential instability created by Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional reform efforts.\textsuperscript{476} Regardless, it is clear that in both Frontier exercises, Russia, through the CSTO, hoped to train former Soviet militaries to fulfill the role of regime defense.

In addition to annual \textit{Rubezh} exercises, the CSTO conducted “Nerushimoye Bratstvo” (“Indestructible Brotherhood”) MMEs to train its standing peacekeeping force. In the first of such exercises conducted in October 2012, also held in Kazakhstan, the training involved all member states of the CSTO. According to official statements, the exercise was intended to prepare for the conduct of peacekeeping operations within the CSTO region, as well as possible operations with a mandate from the UN. One news report suggested that peacekeepers may be used in scenarios similar to the ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, even though the CSTO denied this request and provided no forces. The report also cautions that CSTO states cannot rule out “the probability of appearance of big-scale uncontrolled conflicts similar to those that have happened recently in some Arab countries.”\textsuperscript{477} Familiar peacekeeping tasks such as separating conflicting parties, escorting humanitarian cargoes, and guarding vital facilities were

\textsuperscript{475} Marat, \textit{The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence}, 94.
present in the plan. However, there was a larger focus on protecting vital facilities and “preventing mass disorders”.\textsuperscript{478} Journalist Joshua Kucera reports that, “According to the scenario, a crisis situation arises connected with the activity of international extremists and terrorist organizations and conflict between ethnic groups living in the country.”\textsuperscript{479} The concern about revolution, whether democratic or Islamic, was seen in other CSTO exercises as well. Though not historically a peacekeeping-style or anti-terror exercise, the CSTO’s “Center” exercise in 2011 was created to address situations similar to the Arab Spring revolutions. As mentioned in the introduction, Russian General Makarov told journalists that the Center exercise tests the ability of the CSTO to react to mass uprisings similar to those taking place during the in the Middle East. MMEs such as Center and Indestructible Brotherhood were geared toward managing protests and revolts after autocratic Arab regimes began falling to democratic revolutions in 2011 and 2012.

\textit{Alternative Explanations}

Were the CSTO exercises explored above intended as a means for Russia to influence the role of regime defense for Central Asian states, or were other motivations driving these training events? The traditional works in military doctrine expect that major powers focus of offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations; moreover, they explain most military behavior as products of narrow organizational interests. Role-forming exercises, in general, do appear to support the first explanation concerning traditional operations: perhaps Russia used CSTO MMEs as an opportunity to practice rehearsal for operations or deterrence. The exercises do include major

\textsuperscript{478} Ibid.


219
units (battalions and brigades), involve heavy equipment—such as tanks, artillery, and air support—and the tactical tasks seem appropriate for real-world operations. Rehearsal for multilateral missions, however, seems implausible: despite limited cooperation to counter narcotics and arms trafficking (in cooperation with the US and European Union), the CSTO has never deployed military units for any operation internal or external to the security organization despite several notable opportunities. As previously noted, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution in 2005 and uprising in 2010 were appropriate scenarios for the use of CSTO force: one of the organization’s own members was twice threatened by overthrow, officially requested CSTO support in 2010, but was denied any military assistance. Moreover, the CSTO has also resisted opportunities for peacekeeping in the region, such as in eastern Ukraine after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Given the statutory emphasis on respect for member sovereignty, actual CSTO military operations are difficult to execute and justify. Concerning deterrence, although these exercises may be able showcase capabilities against potential terrorists or protestors, each exercise is held at most once a year and are rotated through different member states annually or biannually. Thus, if deterrence was the main driver, the CSTO would most likely plan more training events in the same area to serve as a credible deterrent signal.

The second traditional theory predicts that militaries pursue parochial interests in order to increase organizational size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy. Concerning organizational resources, these exercises did consist of units and equipment (roughly 2,000 - 3,000 total soldiers

481 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 143-145.
482 When asked about whether the CSTO would deploy its peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in August 2014, CSTO General Secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha responded, “For their (peacekeepers) use, outside the region of collective security, the CSTO would definitely have to get a mandate from the UN Security Council.” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, August 30, 2014, LexisNexis Academic.
from all participating members) above the level of ‘symbolic’-type MMEs such as those used for recruitment; moreover, these MMEs took place against the backdrop of civilian-led efforts to reduce the number of soldiers in the Russian military.\textsuperscript{483} However, there is reason to question whether CSTO MMEs provide the Russian military with more resources. As opposed to smaller-scale MMEs, Russia conducts several massive unilateral ‘snap’ (unannounced) exercises multiple times a year that test unit readiness and fitness; these training events involve anywhere between 7,000 to 160,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{484} The scale of the planning, logistics, and execution of these exercises vastly outweighs those of CSTO-sponsored MMEs\textsuperscript{485}; thus, if the Russian military sought more resources, large-scale unilateral snap exercises to identify shortfalls in equipment and training would be more appropriate than smaller MMEs with Central Asian partners.

Moreover, there is little reason to believe the Russian military’s wealth was in threat during the 2000’s and early 2010’s, given President Vladimir Putin’s support for the defense establishment even when the Russian economy was struggling and other government agencies’ budgets were reduced.\textsuperscript{486}

Regarding prestige, although these training events involve simulated combat, the fact that the training never leads to actual deployments calls into question the usefulness of CSTO MMEs as a source of societal deference for battlefield success. In fact, Russia’s most recent military interventions, in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, were unilateral; Russia’s participation


\textsuperscript{486} Ian Brzezinski, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO policy and Advisor to the Ukrainian National Security Council and Foreign Ministry, phone interview by author, September 19, 2017.
and performance in combat has had little to do with multilateralism. Moreover, if Russian military officers were concerned about building a warrior ethos in its soldiers, large-scale conventional exercises would be more appropriate. Finally, there is little reason to believe that CSTO exercises provide the Russian military with greater autonomy from civilian oversight. The CSTO is both a political and security organization. All member presidents agreed to upgrade the Tashkent Treaty into a security organization in May 2002; the first chairman of the organization’s Council of Heads of State was Russian President Vladimir Putin. The organization regularly hosts meetings with its collective civilian Parliamentary Assembly and between member presidents. Furthermore, military exercises are often attended by civilian leaders and in 2012, CSTO planners even invited staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross to observe its maneuvers. Given the overlap of civilian and military interests in the collective security institution, the notion that CSTO MMEs provides the Russian military with greater autonomy is questionable.

6.5 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to elucidate the goals and mechanisms of role-forming multinational exercises. Major powers use these types of MMEs to influence the ‘role’ or ‘function’ that partner militaries serve for their societies. Two specific military roles are most encouraged: democracy defense and regime defense. Major powers hope that by training partner

---

487 See Allison, *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention*, 150-169.
militaries to be ‘democracy defenders’—and thus more trustworthy in liberal sense—or ‘regime defenders’—more stable and competent to prevent overthrow—these partners will be more benign to the powers’ national interests. MMEs provide an opportunity for major powers to train certain tasks that better enable transitioning or consolidating states to serve these roles. By shaping these partners, major powers seek to eliminate sources of threats in their strategic environments. This chapter also highlighted the role of regional security organizations, such as NATO, SCO, and CSTO, as opportunities for role-shaping MMEs. The study of Russian-CSTO relations and exercises provided an illustration of how major powers use role-forming MMEs to shape their environments. The two alternative explanations were also assessed against my argument. The following chapter describes the final non-traditional MME function: trust-developing between rivals.
CHAPTER 7
TRUST-DEVELOPING EXERCISES

7.1 Introduction

After China announced that its military would participate for the first time in the world’s largest maritime exercise—the US-led “Rim of the Pacific 2014” (RIMPAC ’14)—the Washington Post published a story with a title that appropriately gauged the tensions surrounding the historic event: “U.S. Prepares for Awkward Military Engagement with China in Hawaii.”

The US invitation to China surprised many, especially after the country’s unilateral establishment of a controversial air defense identification zone over the East China Sea. Within the year preceding the RIMPAC exercise, other controversies involving China rattled the region: Asian leaders argued over a close encounter in which Chinese jets almost collided with Japanese aircraft, while Vietnamese leaders condemned the building of Chinese oil rigs near the disputed Paracel islands. Despite these tense disagreements between Asian leaders, both American and Chinese military officers publicly professed their hope that the joint training would lead to increased trust, transparency, and open communication between rivals. In the exercise’s opening ceremony, US Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris noted, “Mutual trust and open lines of communication are critical, but are very challenging to build. That's why multilateral exercises like RIMPAC are so important.”

Chinese leaders signaled similar encouragement. Why would major power rivals be willing to cooperatively conduct maneuvers and expose their force structure, technology, and doctrine to their adversaries?

---


This chapter explores the final category of non-traditional shaping MME: trust-developing. These types of exercises are designed to reduce tensions between major power rivals; the two means by which training achieves this goal are by transitioning the ‘threat’ to a common third-party and building camaraderie between otherwise hostile soldiers. By changing perceptions of soldier attitudes towards each other, major powers expect that their troops are able to overcome the assumption that all military behavior from a rival is hostile; by not assuming the worst, officers and soldiers may be able to manage small crises and prevent escalation into open war. Major powers hope that by ameliorating the threat of inadvertent war with a rival, they can reduce one source of uncertainty in their strategic environments. Thus, trust-developing training targets the threat source of strategic uncertainty. The chapter will proceed in four parts. First, I explore in greater detail the purpose of trust-developing exercises and how they are expected to reduce uncertainty. Second, I discuss how major power rivals approach military exercises as a means to reduce mistrust: either by agreeing to limit their scope or conducting cooperative training events as partners. Third, I provide an illustrative case study of a prominent trust-developing military relationship between India and China between 2006 and 2016. I then assess the two alternatives and conclude with a summary as a transition to the statistical chapter to follow.

7.2 Trust-Developing Exercises and the Management of Uncertainty

The Purpose of Trust-Developing Exercises

The purpose of trust-developing MMEs is to reduce tensions between major power rivals and prevent the onset of inadvertent war. Major power rivals sometimes initiate trust-developing exercises after de-escalating a former crisis both powers wish to avoid in the future. Other times,
the decision to conduct MMEs is concurrent with other diplomatic agreements to forge closer ties between competitive powers. The means by which major powers attempt to build trust during MMEs is through two mechanisms: demonstrating a focus on third-party (usually non-state) threats and creating opportunities for soldiers from rival armies to view each other as comrades (and thus, more human). First, by emphasizing a common interest in defeating a third-party threat—such as terrorism or transnational crime—major powers seek to demonstrate to each other that they both share a mutual concern in combating an enemy that is beyond their rivalry. Since all military exercise scenarios require an ‘enemy’ to fight, planners create a third-party adversary, such as insurgents or even natural disasters, that is focus of the soldiers’ training. Second, by providing opportunities for rival soldiers to view each other as fellow troops, major powers hope that as these soldiers advance throughout their careers, they will develop a more benign view of their rivals’ intentions.

Both of these mechanisms are intended to change perceptions between rival militaries to prevent future small crises from conflagrating into open conflict. For instance, when rival troops come in contact in the ocean, along a border, or in the skies, these soldiers may better understand each other’s complex environment and need for security and, thus, not assume these military actions are necessarily hostile. Instead, this military behavior would be viewed as largely defensive in nature, allowing lower-level units to reduce the risk of large-scale war. For example, when surface ships pass each other in the ocean, a crisis may ensue if actions appear threatening. If troops and their superiors automatically assume the rival action is hostile, the crisis may escalate; troops and their superiors may decide to conduct threatening maneuvers, mass more units, or even fire weapons as a warning to their rivals. Military leaders fear that this scenario is possible especially in the South China Sea, where both China and the US—along with
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—conduct consistent patrols. Rivals that share a border (or whose allies share a border) also experience troop interactions that may result in stand-offs, as is common between China and India. Even if two rivals do not share a common border (such as the US and Russia), trust-developing MMEs are seen as an opportunity to reveal that both powers are primarily concerned with protecting their nations as opposed to expansionist ambitions. As more units and soldiers are exposed to rival troops during training exercises over time, the number of soldiers that experience these human-to-human contacts increases. Major powers hope that if a crisis occurs between units at the small-unit (platoon, company) level, the soldiers, or their superiors, are able to de-escalate the crisis because they better understand each other as humans who desire to provide security for their country. During diplomatic or military crises, officers hope the crisis can be de-escalated through an understanding of each other’s security concerns.

Trust-developing exercises are most likely to occur within a strategic rivalry that is absent of open hostility, either directly between military forces or their proxies. These types of rivalries lie below the threshold of violence but their existence generates suspicion and mistrust between competitive powers. Strategic competitive rivals such as India and China in the post-Cold War environment are the most salient example of this type of rivalry. Both China and India compete for security along their ambiguous (un-demarcated) border and often experience non-violent stand-offs between small military units. Although post-Cold War US-Russian relations before 2014 could be considered in this category, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in Ukraine was considered open hostility toward US interests in Europe. In response, the US cut off all military

---

cooperation with Russia to signal its dissatisfaction, increasing the rivalry to a level in which no cooperative activities were possible. Because of ongoing combat operations and violence in Jammu and Kashmir, India and Pakistan are also considered to be in open hostility. Thus, we would not expect rivals engaged in open or proxy violence to conduct cooperative trust-developing exercises. Moreover, trust-developing exercises are not expected to alter the fundamental international politics between major powers: if one state decides that war is necessary, no trust-developing training will overcome these fundamental conflicting interests. Nevertheless, the fact that major power rivals, who otherwise would attempt to conceal sensitive technology and doctrine from each other, believe that military cooperation could somehow reduce mistrust is significant and in need of explanation.

_Rivals and the Management of Uncertainty_

Major power rivals engaged in open hostility often assume their adversary seeks opportunities for aggression, assign probabilities to locations in which they expect attack, and deploy units appropriately. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, during the Cold War NATO and the Warsaw Pact stationed units along opposing sides of Germany and other European states in anticipation of invasion. Although no violence occurred between NATO and Warsaw Pact units in Europe, Soviet invasions of Eastern Europe, major ideological disparities, and military support to combative proxies in Africa, Asia, and Central America forced planners to assume their

---


adversaries harbored aggressive intentions.\textsuperscript{496} Even more recently in 2016, NATO deployed four multinational battlegroups (approximately 4,500 soldiers total) to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to serve as a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against the Baltics.\textsuperscript{497} Russia’s 2014 invasion and continuing support to proxies in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine increased US assumptions that Russia was prepared for aggression against the Eastern flank of NATO.\textsuperscript{498}

If major power rivals are engaged in competitive behavior that lies below the level of open hostility, however, opportunities for cooperation exist. Although these rivals may not inherently assume aggressive intentions by the other, however, the risk of inadvertent war is always present. That is, even if major powers do not presume their rivals will conduct offensive operations in pursuit of aggressive foreign policy goals, uncertainty about intentions remains and the addition of security measures by one may reduce the security of the other.\textsuperscript{499} For instance, especially along shared borders or in the open commons (air and sea), misunderstanding about intentions could lead to a security dilemma in which actions originally intended to increase security are viewed as hostile. Small-unit patrols to ensure other state militaries or non-state actors are refraining from infringing on home territory could be viewed as offensive operations by another. Especially if these soldiers and officers view the other as an “enemy” (and assume the worst of intentions), crisis escalation is likely to ensue. In order to address this uncertainty, rivals seek opportunities to allow soldiers to view each other on a more personal-level. These experiences

are expected to reveal that troops are simply human, desiring to defend their country against security threats. Major powers hope that over time, as these soldiers advance throughout their careers, they are able to prevent small crises from escalating into open conflict. If troops view each other as human and largely security-seeking in nature, small crises generated by misunderstanding may be possible to manage and de-escalate. By preventing the onset of inadvertent war, major powers hope to reduce the source of one type of threat in their strategic environment.

7.3 Rivals, Exercises, and Confidence and Security Building Measures

The Restriction of Traditional Exercise Functions

Rivals have traditionally sought to decrease mistrust with their opponents through the building of security regimes, which are understood as, “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.” During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw pact diplomats developed one type of security regime known as Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). CSBMs, in general, are agreements designed to help states overcome psychological and political barriers of mutual distrust and suspicion in order to realize a shared goal. Large-scale conventional military exercises were located as a source of mistrust that needed to be restrained, since traditional exercise functions—those use to rehearse for or deter war—often appear threatening to an


opponent. For instance, if one state (or alliance) conducts an exercise intended to deter a rival, that exercise may appear to be a rehearsal for invasion, especially a surprise attack. Thus, the opponent may conduct an exercise in response that is intended to signal deterrence but may be perceived by the alliance as a counter-rehearsal, initiating a spiral of mistrust.\textsuperscript{502} Janice Gross Stein argues that limited security regimes are one type of ‘strategy of reassurance’ intended to reduce the probability of war by providing reliable information, clarifying intentions, minimizing uncertainty, and reducing the likelihood of miscalculation.\textsuperscript{503}

At two international conferences during the Cold War, diplomats from NATO and the Warsaw Pact negotiated two agreements to provide transparency and reassurance by restraining the ability for one alliance to use a military exercise as a launching pad for surprise attack. At the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, both alliances committed to announcing military exercises involving 25,000 or more troops 21 days in advance and inviting observers from the other alliance to view the training in person. At Stockholm in 1986, the two superpowers agreed to more restrictive CSBMs: exercise notification extended to 42 days in advance for maneuvers involving 13,000 or more troops, the two competing alliances were required to release annual training calendars and two-year forecasts, and each alliance was required to accept at least one ‘challenge inspection’ by the other each year.\textsuperscript{504} Though the CSBMs did not reduce either sides’ military capabilities (as would arms control agreements), the measures were intended to reduce uncertainty by creating obstacles for surprise attack and


\textit{Cooperative Exercises to Limit Mistrust}

In addition to limiting the potential for major exercises to be used as a cover for surprise attack, major powers have increasingly sought opportunities to reduce mistrust through cooperative training events. The rise in prominence of non-state threats, such as ethnic war and terrorism, has provided an opportunity for rivals to conduct partnered MMEs that focus efforts on combating these third-party threats. Since the end of the Cold War, the two former rivals US and Russia attempted to improve military relations through MMEs beginning in the mid-1990’s. In 1994, Russia hosted US Army soldiers for the first time at a military base near the Ural Mountains. The exercises were small in scale, focused on peacekeeping tasks, and were generally symbolic (not an actual rehearsal) to signal a turn to a cooperative relationship between the two countries. In the run up to the exercise, however, anti-Western sentiment from ultranationalists in the Russian parliament grew to such an extent that US Senators proposed moving the exercise to the US as a means to ‘rescue’ the joint training event.\footnote{Joseph Albright, “Joint U.S.-Russian Maneuvers May Be Moved to State Of Georgia Nunn Seeks To Rescue Exercises After Attack By Ultranationalists,” \textit{The Atlanta Journal and Constitution}, June 1, 1994, LexisNexis Academic.} Despite the protests, the exercise was still held in Russia in October 1994 and was repeated again in 1995 at Fort Riley, Kansas, which marked the first time that Russian soldiers were invited to train in the US. The only public objection to this exercise came from a local US Congressman, who
bemoaned the price tag of the exercise at $1.2 million of taxpayer money.\textsuperscript{507} The two militaries continued small-scale cooperation in European multinational exercises throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s and repeated a bilateral training event in May 2012. This exercise, focused mainly on counterterrorism, was also small in scale: only 22 Russian paratroopers attended the training held in Fort Carson, Colorado. A public affairs officer for the US Army unit hosting the training acknowledged some public backlash against the exercise, commenting that “Conspiracy theorists are alive and well,” but, “This is the shake-hands, get-to-know-you kind of thing. What this is not is a massive counterterrorism exercise.”\textsuperscript{508} Military exercises between the US and Russia ended in 2014, when the US canceled all plans for military cooperation after Russia invaded the Ukrainian province of Crimea.\textsuperscript{509}

\textbf{7.4. Illustrative Case Study: Indo-Chinese Military MMEs, 2006-2016}

Though trust-developing exercises are rare (there are only a few contemporary major power strategic rivalries), they are important in understanding opportunities for rivals to prevent the incidence of accidental war. One of the most prominent trust-developing exercise programs is ‘Hand-in-Hand’ between India and China. These two major powers fought a short war over their shared border in 1962 and tensions rose again in 1967 and 1987. There is no agreed upon boundary between the countries, referred to as the ‘Line of Actual Control’ (LAC) in bilateral documents, which has resulted in each side claiming hundreds of border incursions by the

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
other. From 2006 to 2016, these states conducted eight ground-based cooperative MMEs, six of which were part of the ‘Hand-in-Hand’ program, two between border guards along the LAC. Indo-Chinese military relations and each cooperative MME will be used to illustrate my argument about why and how major power rivals are able to reduce mistrust and one source of threat in their strategic environments. The alternative explanations will also be evaluated against my argument. Evidence that would support my argument are statements (both public and from interviews) which indicate that the purpose of these training events was to reduce mistrust between rivals through soldier-to-soldier interactions and exercise scenarios dedicated to defeating non-state threats. Evidence that would undermine my argument are indicators that point to the alternative explanations; that is, that these training events were rehearsals for combined missions or they were simply a means for the Indian and Chinese armies to increase their organizational size, wealth, prestige, or autonomy from civilian control.

*Indo-Chinese Relations during the Cold War*

India and China—the two largest countries by population with large and fast-growing economies—are emerging as major powers in world politics. The relationship between the two nuclear powers has experienced periods of cooperation but also intense competition, especially since the Sino-Indian War of 1962. In a 2014 Pew Research Center poll, only 30-31% of Indians and Chinese held favorable views of each other, while 72 percent of Indians were concerned about a territorial dispute with China. The two countries’ shared border spans the vast

---


Himalayan mountains and comprise over 130,000 square kilometers of disputed territory, primarily involving Ladakh in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the east. This immense border presents both rising powers with an intense security dilemma.\textsuperscript{512} India claims land within borders drawn primarily by British colonists—known as the McMahon Line—while China asserts that it owns territory far south of this ‘obsolete’ colonial boundary. Moreover, Tibet, a largely autonomous region until Chinese occupation in 1950, serves as a point of contention among the two powers. Though officially annexed by China in 1951, Tibet holds strong cultural and economic ties to India, which, since 1959, has hosted the religious leader Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile. Tensions came to a head in 1962 when a “\textit{multidimensional} security dilemma coalesced in the eastern Himalayas”: both states sent troops to a deteriorating situation along the border after the Chinese repressed a rebellion in Tibet. In October of 1962, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded and defeated the Indian army at Arunachal (formerly the Northeast Frontier Agency, or NEFA) and Ladakh within a month.\textsuperscript{513} After peace negotiations failed in November, China ordered a unilateral ceasefire in December and withdrew 20 kilometers behind the LAC—the \textit{de facto} territory occupied by both armies at the time. A decade-long diplomatic freeze ensued over differing interpretations of the boundary.\textsuperscript{514} Though both states offered diplomatic overtures over the next forty years, progress was disrupted by border stand-offs in 1967 and 1987.

Indo-Chinese Confidence-Building Measures since the End of the Cold War

After a number of smaller crises were settled during the Cold War, India and China signed an agreement in 1993 as a commitment to preventing military incursions over the 1962 LAC. Despite the ostensible goodwill, the document did not settle the border question and disagreements about the actual shape of the border remained.\footnote{“Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control,” \textit{United Nations Peacemaker Online}, September 7, 1993, \url{http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN\%20IN\_930907\_Agreement\%20on\%20India-China\%20Border\%20Areas.pdf}. See also Rup Narayan Das, \textit{India-China Relations: A New Paradigm}, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Monograph Series, No. 19 (May 2013): 43-44.} In 1996, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from the use of military force against each other in a shared confidence-building document, even though the agreement recognized there was still no acceptable settlement to the ‘boundary question’. The agreement included provisions to limit exercises along the LAC to 15,000 troops and required advanced notice of exercises involving more than 5,000 soldiers.\footnote{“Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,” First Published May 1, 1997, \textit{China Report}, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1997): 241-247.} Despite the progress on CSBMs to improve relations on the border, India’s second nuclear test in May 1998 drew sharp condemnation from the Chinese government, especially after Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes claimed, “China is potential threat number one,” in the same month as the test.\footnote{“Global Outrage as India Says: We Can Build a Bomb; Desert Test Sparks Fears of Asian Arms Race,” \textit{Daily Mail}, May 12, 1998, LexisNexis Academic. See also Rollie Lal, \textit{Understanding India and China: Security Implications for the United States and the World} (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 135-136.}

Two confidence-building agreements in the 2000’s signaled a turn away from traditional restraints on military exercises toward using training to build relationships. The 2003 \textit{Declaration on Principles for Relations} attempted to transition from restrictions on purely military activities to an acknowledgement of more common political and economic interests,
such as the shared goals of promoting trade, protecting the environment, eliminating poverty, and strengthening the UN. Both states also committed to working together toward countering terrorism, a growing threat after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US and December 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament. Indian and Chinese government officials announced that 2006 would mark a “Year of Friendship” in which the two sides would attempt new ways to forge closer ties and find a solution to the border dispute. In May 2006, the defense ministers of both countries signed a *Memorandum of Understanding* that served as the first formal agreement between the two rivals to institutionalize multinational military exercises. The document committed both countries to hold military officer exchanges, annual defense dialogues, and joint military training in the fields of “search and rescue, anti-piracy, counterterrorism, and other areas of mutual interest.”

*The Planning and Execution of Indo-Chinese Bilateral Exercises*


---


each side and focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism; these exercises were intended to be conducted annually but were interrupted between 2009-2012 through a series of crises between the two countries. Though the decision to hold exercises is made by political leaders, the actual planning is conducted months in advance by Indian and Chinese military officers; the execution of tasks is conducted at the lowest tactical levels (junior officer, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers). In general, the military attaché teams from both countries meet together to choose the specific location and determine the training tasks, with the host country ultimately responsible for the general format and sequence. The planners (usually mid-grade officers) discuss possible objectives, such as hostage-rescue or counterterrorism, and choose an agreed-upon scenario. Multiple phases are planned into the exercise, such as familiarization of equipment (e.g. weapons or helicopters), discussion of each other’s doctrine, and execution of tasks in units mixed with soldiers from both countries.522 In the case of India, military officers coordinate with their Chinese counterparts, keeping Ministry of Defense and Ministry of External Affairs officials abreast of developments. One of my interviewees noted this military-to-military interaction is known as “military diplomacy”.523 Different units are chosen for each exercise based on operational requirements, which provides various units throughout both armies with exposure to their rival counterparts.

During training, soldiers from different countries maneuver together in basic tactics, which “don’t need language” because they are considered standard to all armies.524 Additionally, since China and India do not share a common conventional enemy, planners create a third-party threat

523 Lieutenant General (Indian Army, retired) J.S. Bajwa, former Director General of the Infantry, phone interview by author, June 21, 2017.
524 Ibid.
that consists of insurgency and terrorism in their ‘Hand-in-Hand’ scenarios; as Former Indian Director General of the Infantry, Lieutenant General JS Bajwa notes,

> When you are doing military exercises for conventional operations, then you have to identify an enemy. China and India don’t have a common enemy, so there is no point in having exercises in conventional operations, because we are not going to be fighting together against an enemy; however, we wanted to continue to have military-to-military cooperation, more to understand their military and not to take the Chinese as some ‘ten-foot-tall soldiers’.  

In between training events, soldiers are encouraged “to live together, eat together, play games together” for several weeks in order to develop relationships and build camaraderie, though relationships are only maintained throughout the duration of exercises. During these interactions, officers hope that soldiers learn that the other side is “represented by human beings” and not “animals”, which is a common myth that soldiers acquire throughout their careers. Senior military officers believe personal contact with rival soldiers is viewed as a means to dispel these myths. LTG Bajwa argues that since Indian units are deployed along the LAC, military cooperation such as exercises ensure that the situation “doesn’t flare up” and both countries can “avoid hostilities”; he notes, “When two armies have been operating in this sense, like this, generally you do not intend to become very hostile and there is an element of restraint on both sides, particularly along the Line of Actual Control.”

The two countries conducted their first MME in the Chinese city of Kunming, a town near Arunachal Pradesh, in December 2007. The exercise named “Hand-in-Hand 2007” involved 100 troops from both countries and focused on counterterrorism to provide opportunities for the

---

525 Ibid.  
527 Lieutenant General (Indian Army, retired) J.S. Bajwa, former Director General of the Infantry, phone interview by author, June 21, 2017.
armies to share lessons learned from past experience.\textsuperscript{528} An anonymous Indian defense official noted: “This indicates that India's growing military ties with the US will not affect the process of confidence building with China - we can achieve a lot together…It’s time to bury the ghosts of 1962.”\textsuperscript{529} Despite the exercise’s military focus on counter-terrorism, military officers encouraged their troops to socialize and get to know one another: in between training, the soldiers would conduct trust-building activities and play sports such as tug-of-war, basketball, martial arts, and yoga. The soldiers would also intermix to dine and live side-by-side in the same building, learn phrases in each other’s languages, and enjoy sightseeing in their off-time together. One reporter remarked about the exercise:

> Although some military and diplomatic observers said that the joint training is more symbolic than substantial, many acknowledged that the point is not the scale of the joint training or what specific anti-terrorism skills are involved. The point is that the soldiers on both sides are moving toward each other in a friendly way.\textsuperscript{530}

The two armies repeated the counter-terror exercise in December 2008, this time held for the first time on Indian soil in the Belgaum District in Karnataka. The exercise opened with a ceremony that displayed performances of Chinese tai chi and Indian martial arts, as well as remarks by the Chinese officer in charge who explained that the aim of the exercise was to develop friendship, promote mutual understanding, and build trust.\textsuperscript{531} Retired Indian Army Major General Dipankar Banerjee argues that these exercises are conducted so that, “soldiers get to know each other, build trust and confidence in one another,” by providing a “human face” that “removes a sense of

\textsuperscript{528} “India, China to Hold First-Ever Army Exercises in December,” \textit{BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific}, November 21, 2007, LexisNexis Academic.


enmity and remoteness”. Moreover, he notes that these exercises are intended to humanize and prevent soldiers from “demonizing” one another. 532 About 137 Chinese PLA troops joined a similar number of Indian infantry soldiers to conduct attacks against a simulated enemy assisted by helicopters, supervised by a joint command post occupied by officers from both countries. 533 Despite the success of these two exercises, the relationship became strained once again in 2009 when border incursions resumed and China protested the official visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh in November 2009. 534 Additionally, India cancelled military officer exchanges in August 2010 after China refused to grant a visa to a Kashmir-stationed Indian general. 535 Though it is unclear whether exercises were cancelled or never planned in the first place, no joint training occurred between 2009 and 2013.

Tensions culminated in a crisis in April 2013—known as the ‘Depsang incident’—when a Chinese army platoon established an outpost in Ladakh (located in Jammu and Kashmir), ten kilometers into an area occupied and claimed by India. 536 The Indian army responded by moving a platoon of its own to about 500 meters from the Chinese position, waving flags to signal to the Chinese troops that they were intruding on Indian territory. During the standoff, the Indian media reported that China had engaged in over 600 incursions into Indian territory since 2010 and that meetings by high ranking military officials were going nowhere. 537 A group of Indian

---

534 “India Keen on Joint Exercise with China- Air Force Chief,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 10, 2009, LexisNexis Academic. See also “India Says No Army Exercise with China Scheduled This Year,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, September 24, 2009, LexisNexis Academic.
537 “600 Border Violations by China Along Line of Actual Control since 2010,” April 24, 2013, LexisNexis Academic.
students at Jammu University protested the Chinese intrusion, carrying banners and shouting anti-Chinese rhetoric. 538 The three-week standoff did not escalate to war, but both countries’ foreign ministers were forced to intervene and agreed to remove troops from the contested area. 539

India and China Re-Start Joint Exercises in 2013

Despite the numerous attempts to build confidence through high-level agreements since 1988, as well as two MMEs in 2007 and 2008, the two nuclear major powers still engaged in a military stand-off that took three weeks to resolve. The ambiguous LAC and unwillingness by the two governments to clearly delineate boundaries is often cited as the cause of strained relations. Given the systematic disagreement over the shape of the border that dates back to 1962, as well as the fact that the two countries are some of the largest and most powerful in the world, the Sino-Indian relationship appeared bleak. However, in 2013 the two rivals made substantial progress toward cooperation. First, in July 2013 India and China agreed to establish Border Meeting Points (BMPs) along the LAC in order for local army commanders to meet in times of crises. The Indian Defence minister highlighted the practical role for local soldiers in diffusing cross-border tensions concurrently with high-level diplomatic talks: “The special representative-level talks will continue. But everybody knows it will take time. You cannot wait for it to solve immediate border problems.”540

539 “Face-off in Ladakh Area Ends; India, China Withdraw Soldiers,” New India Express, May 6, 2013, LexisNexis Academic.
In October 2013, Chinese and Indian national leaders signed the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), which reiterated each side’s commitment to the non-use of force, proposed meetings and a hotline between local military officers across the border, committed the countries to re-start joint military exercises, and promised to combat non-state threats such as arms smuggling, natural disasters, and infectious disease.\textsuperscript{541} The agreement was both lauded and derided by Chinese and Indian analysts, some arguing the measures were useless, others that represented India’s weak surrender to China.\textsuperscript{542} Commenting on the resolution of 2013 Depsang incident, one retired Indian army officer who worked on Chinese relations during his military career noted: “on most occasions, such incursions into each other's territory are settled at the local level and there is a mechanism of making announcements over microphone whenever such incursions are noticed.” He continued that if these minor disputes cannot be settled by army units locally, sometimes they are handled at general/flag officer meetings or the diplomatic level.\textsuperscript{543}

The first MME since 2008 took place in China’s Sichuan province in November 2013, though the decision to hold the exercise resulted from meetings between Indian and Chinese military officials several months before the official signing of the BDCA.\textsuperscript{544} During Indian Defence Minister AK Antony’s visit to China in early July, the two sides agreed to re-start the exercises as a means to prevent a ‘Depsang-like’ incident from occurring in the future.\textsuperscript{545} The exercise

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{542} “Managing the Border,” \textit{Indian Express}, October 24, 2013.
\textsuperscript{543} “Settling Border Disputes with China to Take Time,” \textit{Assam Tribune}, September 21, 2014, LexisNexis Academic.
\textsuperscript{545} Rajat Pandit, “India, China to Hold Military Exercises from November 4 After Five Years,” \textit{The Times of India}, August 24, 2013, LexisNexis Academic.
\end{flushleft}
‘Hand-in-Hand 2013’ involved 144 soldiers from both countries and incorporated similar tactical training to the exercises in 2007 and 2008. This exercise included a focus on interoperability, with soldiers from both sides learning hand signals and each other’s doctrines on hostage rescue and detainee operations. To facilitate socialization, the officers organized troops into “mixed companies” which ensured interaction amongst unfamiliar soldiers (despite the language barrier). Indian Lieutenant General Ainil Jumar Ahuja told reporters: “This understanding at the level of the troops, at the level of the commanding officers, the company commanders, and the interaction that we have had at the level of generals, will definitely promote better understanding and a better appreciation of each other’s concerns…”

In February 2014, military officers and government officials from India and China agreed to conduct the fourth iteration of ‘Hand-in-Hand’ in November 2014, this time at the Aundh military camp in Pune, India. The exercise again focused on counter-terrorism, with 139 soldiers from each country practicing rappelling from helicopters, establishing a cordon and search, and attacking insurgent positions. Military officers shared a joint command post to track the training and improve interoperability. Senior officers from both countries emphasized the importance of cooperating to defeat terrorism in all its forms. Additionally, Chinese PLA Lieutenant General Shi Xiangyuan remarked about the exercise:

The demonstration by both sides shows how similar our nations and our civilizations are. This is the most convincing evidence that China and India have great similarities and we are among the oldest civilizations of the world. The joint

---

training is a very important step towards a more conducive and complementary atmosphere between the two great armies.\textsuperscript{550}

Despite the officer’s remarks, not too far from the exercise location a stand-off between the PLA and Indian border guards was underway. A few months prior to the start of the exercise, the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) reported that over 1,000 Chinese troops crossed the LAC in Ladakh; in Arunachal Pradesh, Indian Jawan border guards prevented Chinese troops from building roads through Indian-claimed land.\textsuperscript{551} According to a reporter covering the exercise, an anonymous Indian army officer said, “We knew the exact situation at the LAC and we are aware of the BSF intelligence report as well. However, we have received special instructions from seniors regarding this exercise. Hence, we are ignoring these recent developments and are taking special care of the guests.”\textsuperscript{552} From the officer’s comments, it appears that although the two countries were once again claiming border incursions by the other, senior military officers wanted the exercises to continue.

In September 2015, senior Chinese and Indian army officers met at a BMP in Chushul, Ladakh along the LAC to discuss border incursions. According to a news report, the Chinese officers were asked about a watch tower that had allegedly been built 1.5 kilometers into Indian territory. Military officers from both sides resolved the issue and agreed to cease defense construction along the border.\textsuperscript{553} A few weeks later, Chinese military officers invited the Indian army to participate in another iteration of ‘Hand-in-Hand’ at the Kunming Military Academy in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[550] “China, India Are Two Bodies with One Spirit,” \textit{The Times of India}, November 18, 2014, LexisNexis Academic.
\end{footnotes}
Yunnan Province, China in October 2015. One news agency reported an anonymous source as noting: "The fact that Burtse standoff in Ladakh sector between the two countries was resolved in less than a week by the two Armies without any intervention by the [sic] Governments of the two countries early this month was an indicative of improving relations, which could further go up after 12 days long joint military exercises."\(^{554}\)

The opening ceremony of ‘Hand-in-Hand 2015’ involved performances from both nations, including demonstrations of traditional dance and martial arts. The Indian army selected its Naga army regiment to participate, including army officers from different states across the country, including Jammu and Kashmir along the LAC. In addition to counter-terrorism tactics, the two armies also trained on tasks involving humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The exercise planners included events for the soldiers in between training, such as physical competitions, martial arts, mountain climbing, and tug-of-war organized into mixed-country teams.\(^{555}\) According to a news report, Chinese Lieutenant General Zhou Xiaozhou asserted that, “the joint exercise will play [sic] important role in deepening mutual cooperation and forging a closer development partnership.”\(^{556}\) An Indian military officer told reporters that the nations shared a common challenge in terrorism and may be forced to operate together in the future; for instance, as part of a UN-led force.\(^{557}\)

In November 2016, China and India conducted their sixth iteration of ‘Hand-in-Hand’, again held in Pune, India. A month before the beginning of the exercise, tensions rose when China

---

\(^{554}\) “India-China Armies to Hold Joint Drill,” *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, September 27, 2015, LexisNexis Academic.


blocked India’s effort to obtain membership in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) and India’s attempt to declare a Jaish-e-Mohammed chief a terrorist by the UN. Despite these tensions, the exercise went according to plan, with about 170 troops from each country participating. A reporter covering the exercise for India Today observed, “This exercise has seen [the soldiers] coming closer than ever before. We’ve seen that different companies have Indian elements as well as Chinese operating together, so they’re not essentially operating as two different armies, they’re in fact operating as one composite force.” An Indian colonel he interviewed noted, “there has been interaction at all levels: from soldier-to-soldier, from NCOs-to-NCOs, and officers to officers.” After the end of the training day, soldiers from both sides enjoyed “laughter and camaraderie” together, practicing phrases in each other’s languages. One Indian battalion was proud to report it underwent three months of training in Chinese prior to the start of the exercise.

In addition to the ‘Hand-in-Hand’ exercise, the two countries held two humanitarian aid and disaster relief training events in 2016 alongside the LAC, involving the actual border guards that patrolled along the un-demarcated boundary. The first iteration in February 2016 was held in Ladakh (in Jammu and Kashmir) near the Chushul BMP and involved only 30 troops from both sides. An Indian Defense spokesman told reporters the humanitarian relief exercise, “is part of the ongoing initiatives being taken by India and China to ensure greater interaction between troops stationed along the Line of Actual Control, and thereby ensure peace and tranquility on

---

558 “India, China to Hold Joint Military Exercises,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, October 14, 2016, LexisNexis Academic.
the border.”560 In October, a sequel to the February exercise was again conducted with border troops in Chandigarh, Ladakh. This exercise simulated an earthquake along the LAC that required rescue operations and medical assistance by both sets of troops.561

At the beginning of this chapter, I offered two trust-building mechanisms that military officers use to build trust with their counterparts. Using the first mechanism of creating a third-party threat, in each exercise military planners and commanders from both sides developed scenarios that involved counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or humanitarian disasters as mutual threats to both countries. This common military practice of developing enemies and scenarios in training events was implemented as a means to remove the focus of hostility off of each other and onto another separate objective. This transition of the hostile threat from each other to a third party allowed the two armies plan and train against a common enemy. The second mechanism involved the use of training to develop habits of cooperation among rival soldiers to view each other as comrades instead of foes. The interviews revealed that soldiers often demonize their adversaries through stories told by fellow soldiers; thus, planners mix soldiers in units to operate shoulder-to-soldier in intense physical training in order to build the camaraderie essential to military readiness. Through these exercises, planners seek to expose soldiers to their rival counterparts to see each other as humans and not as animals or mythical creatures. Moreover, officers hope that through annual exercises with different units across both armies, more soldiers will gain exposure to their rivals and see them as friends rather than foes.

561 “Joint Indo-China Army Exercise Held,” The Times of India, October 21, 2016, LexisNexis Academic.

248
The Effectiveness of Trust-Developing MMEs

Some commentators question the usefulness of these exercises and whether they are effective in reducing tensions during crises along the border. Major standoffs along the LAC—such as the 2013 Depsang incident and, more recently, a crisis in the disputed region of Doklam in June 2017—cast doubt on the ability of military cooperation to change perceptions about a rival’s intentions. Yet, in addition to my interviews, other senior military officers from both sides of the rivalry agree that these trust-developing exercises are having a positive impact on Indo-Chinese relations. As one retired Indian general argues: “There can be no doubt that military CBMs have resulted in graduated and reciprocated reduction of tensions along the LAC with practically no incidents of cross-border firing in recent times. This has resulted in lowering of tensions despite periodic reports of intrusions and patrols straying across the Line of Actual Control.”

Chinese Senior Colonel Wang Guifang argues in addition to increasing trust at higher diplomatic levels and developing mechanisms to prevent crises at the border, India and China should deepen military cooperation: “Joint military exercises at the tactical level of the army mark a good start, and should develop in the future.”

Despite the tensions that arise during border crises—which sometimes result in soldiers throwing rocks at each other—both armies are eventually able to peacefully resolve every dispute. Indian Army General K.T. Parnaik, Chief of Northern Command, noted that the

Depasang incident was settled between military units on the border along with higher-level diplomacy: “There was a simultaneous effort on the ground, at the tactical level by our formations, as well as the dialogue between the two countries at the foreign office level.”

General Parnaik noted that because there is no mutually-agreed upon border, both armies patrol what they believe to be their territory and sometimes come in contact. When these standoffs take place, soldiers and leaders attempt to de-escalate at their level: “The entire process is peaceful. Whenever there is a face-off, we show manners to each other. We convince each other to de-escalate the situation. They go to their side and we return to our side.”

After the incident, Chinese PLA officers claimed that the incursion was an “accidental incident” and should not be considered an act of aggression or even a crisis; Chinese Major General Chen Zhou, head of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences noted, “Emergent incidents, if not addressed in a proper way can increase to a crisis, conflict or even war but these incidents themselves cannot be depicted as war. Since the end of the Cold War, China and India have made efforts to prevent such accidental incidents with a lot of measure of confidence building.”

Another 16-day standoff in 2014 ended through negotiations between Chinese and Indian senior military officers who agreed to withdraw their troops and take further measures—such as disassembling observation towers—to reduce mistrust. Given the ambiguous LAC, the fact that the two bordering major powers have not fought a war since 1962 or exchanged gunfire in decades is remarkable; CSBMS such as military exercises appear to be having an impact. However, until Indian and Chinese

---

565 “India Army Officer Says No Compromise Was Made to End Border ‘Standoff’ with China,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, June 17, 2013, LexisNexis Academic.
566 Ibid.
government officials agree on a clearly demarcated border, standoffs and crises are likely to continue.

**Alternative Explanations**

Though official statements, news reports, and interviews with senior military officers highlight the emphasis on building trust to reduce the risk of inadvertent war, are there other motivations underlying these efforts that the traditional works in military doctrine would anticipate? First, the traditional approach would expect that major powers conduct exercises for rehearsal or deterrence. In the post-Cold War environment, one could imagine major powers (even rivals) cooperating to address natural disasters and terrorism, which are problems for both India and China—especially in Ladakh for the former and Xinjiang for the latter. After all, the exercise training tasks were devoted to counterterrorism and disaster response and military officers frequently commented on the need to develop joint doctrine to address these types of threats. One of my interviewees noted that the secondary objective of these exercises is to prepare for actual operations, such as the military response by the US and India to the 2004 tsunami that struck multiple Southeast Asian countries. However, there is reason to suspect that readiness for future missions was more important than building trust between soldiers for several reasons. First, though India and China sent responders to Nepal’s earthquake in 2015, I found no evidence that the two countries have conducted any joint operations to combat terrorism since the BDCA was signed in 2006. Some Indian defense analysts doubt the usefulness of counterterrorism training between the two countries, especially since, “None of the terrorist groups that threaten

---

570 Ibid.
India operate from China or vice-versa.”

Moreover, if Indian and Chinese military leaders were preparing for possible UN peacekeeping missions (as some officers implied), then traditional peacekeeping tasks such as separating belligerents, protecting citizens, and creating safe zones would be more appropriate than attacking insurgent positions, which would violate principles of impartiality and neutrality that are critical to UN peacekeeping missions.

Second, the number of troops participating in the exercises are generally too small to be of any real operational value. As a reporter for the *India Times* noted, “Though largely symbolic with just around 100 to 150 soldiers from each side undertaking the counter-terror drills, the exercise is seen as a major confidence-building measure between the world’s largest and second-largest armies ranged against each other along the 4,057km LAC.”

Another news agency reported in July 2014:

According to military experts, such joint trainings are more symbolic than substantial. The counter-terrorism drills are nowhere near as comprehensive as a full-fledged exercise between two armies. The larger objective is to expand confidence and trust between two militaries, which are often grappling with tensions along the border.

If the two armies were genuinely preparing for potential operations to combat terrorism, the exercises would have been larger in scale and refrain from mixing soldiers at the lowest tactical level (given the language barrier, operating a small unit with different languages would be nearly impossible). Third, the consistent focus on cultural exchange, friendly competition, and after-

---

hours socializing point to the exercises’ value in soldier-to-soldier trust-building interactions, not on tactical preparedness.

The second alternative explanation would expect that these exercises were simply opportunities for the Indian and Chinese armies to increase their organizational resources and independence. As with most small-scale MMEs, however, these exercises are generally inexpensive and viewed as a low-cost means to build confidence between rivals, as Indian Major General (retired) Depankar Banerjee explains: “So both governments, the public as such, in India particularly, see these exercises as a good thing, and want to see them continued. They don’t cost a lot of money. The military can get do some training, they help develop relations, build confidence, avoid tensions; they are altogether welcome. That is the general attitude both among the people and between the governments as well.” Moreover, as these exercises are intended to build goodwill between otherwise adversarial soldiers, a concern for prestige through the development of an aggressive offensive spirit also seems inappropriate.

Finally, concerning the armies’ desire to increase autonomy from civilian oversight, we would expect to observe that military actions are disintegrated from civilian foreign policy or there exists some level of contestation between government officials and the military about the value and necessity of these programs. However, these shaping activities are fully integrated with both governments’ foreign policy toward one another. In fact, civilian leaders from both countries agreed to these exercises and codified the initiatives into the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding and again in the 2013 BDCA, both during visits by either the Indian prime

---

minister or Chinese premier. Though the Chinese defense minister is also a military officer, the Chinese foreign ministry also supported the 2003 agreement. In the case of India, my interviews reveal that the coordination for these exercises was a combination of civilian and military efforts; for China, the central control of the PLA by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implies that any major international initiative by the military would be supported by the party leadership. As Major General Banerjee explains, “Generally both governments support this and is seen as a good-will gesture cooperation attempts between potentially hostile neighbors. And so these are therefore well-liked by the respective governments.” Lieutenant Bajwa agrees: “to take partake in joint exercises between two countries the respective governments take a considered decision to do so. The level and scope of these exercises is also approved by the Government.” Thus, it appears that these shaping operations are supported by civilian officials and military leaders alike.

7.5. Summary

When rivals who compete below the threshold of open violence seek to reduce the chance of inadvertent war, trust-developing exercises offer a means by which to achieve this goal. This chapter described the purpose of trust-developing exercises, explained why and how major

580 Lieutenant General (Indian Army, retired) J.S. Bajwa, former Director General of the Infantry, email correspondence with author, August 8, 2017.
powers employ them to reduce strategic uncertainty, and provided an illustrative case study to evaluate my argument against the alternative theories. Major power rivals agree to conduct trust-developing training events in order to reduce mistrust and the potential for accidental war. The two mechanisms by which these types of MMEs pursue these objectives are by demonstrating that third-party threats are the focus of each other’s military efforts and that soldiers from these competitive states seek security instead of aggression. Major powers hope that as more soldiers from various units experience training and friendly opportunities with rival troops, they will develop a better understanding of each other’s security concerns and view each other as more ‘human’. When a crisis does ensue, major powers hope their low-level troops and officers can work through the problem and develop a solution.

The case of Indo-Chinese military relations from 2006 to 2016 was used to illustrate trust-developing exercises. The interviews revealed that Indian soldiers often develop a ‘myth’ that Chinese soldiers harbor inherently aggressive intentions; this demonization impacts their views of Chinese troops throughout their careers. By forcing Indian and Chinese soldiers to fraternize and train as comrades to fight against non-state threats during ‘Hand-in-Hand’ MMEs, planners hope that these soldiers will develop more benign views of their rivals over time. If troops do not presume that soldiers from the other country are fundamentally hostile, they may be able to resolve crises along the LAC before the misunderstanding escalates to open, violent conflict. The alternative expectations from the traditional works in military doctrine were also considered; however, as there have been no actual combined operations between India and China against terrorists, the exercise function of rehearsal does not seem to fit. Moreover, as these training events are inexpensive, unrealistic, and supported by each government’s foreign policy, the expectations of organization theory are also undermined. Trust-developing represented the final
type of non-traditional MME intended to shape the environment by reducing one source of threat. The following chapter tests the predictions of my argument as well as one of the alternatives in the full universe of major power MMEs from 1980 to 2016.
Part III
Statistical Tests and Conclusion
CHAPTER 8
DATA AND LARGE-N REGRESSION

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapters provided illustrative case studies of the four non-traditional exercise types. The purpose of these studies was to provide partial tests of my two arguments: why major powers conduct exercises with non-allies and why these exercises have increased since the end of the Cold War. The case studies evaluated whether major non-traditional MME programs were intended to reduce strategic uncertainty or for other purposes; they also revealed that these programs were initiated as a response to the uncertainty driven by the rise in violent non-state actors (except the trust-developing case, which was intended to reduce the risk of inadvertent war between major power rivals). This chapter provides the second part of my mixed-method research design: statistical models. These quantitative tests are intended to assess several predictions of my argument. These tests include binomial and multinomial logit regressions with specifications for random- and conditional fixed-effects using a Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) dataset that I generated from the EUGene software, developed by Scott Bennett and Allan Stam.581 This dataset is comprised of over 40,000 ‘partner-years’ (dyads) between each major power and every other state in the international system from 1980 to 2016. I created these partner-years from another dataset that I developed using over 1,000 MMEs from news reports, military public affairs offices, and another dataset compiled by Vito D’Orazio.582

I use statistical models to test four hypotheses that represent my two arguments: two hypotheses for each argument. For the first argument, I test whether non-allied partners are more

likely to conduct shaping or traditional exercises and whether major powers are more likely to train with non-allies within their strategic environment (or not). Regarding the second argument, I test whether the uncertainty of the post-Cold War environment is correlated with an increase in the likelihood of conducting shaping MMEs, as well as whether exercise relations become ‘sticky’ or habitual over time. This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explain in detail how I developed my two datasets and describe my indicators, variables, and coding methodology for my research design. Second, I describe my hypotheses and models for each of the three groups of major powers: the US, the Western Powers, and the Eastern Powers. Third, I discuss the results. Finally, I summarize the findings of the statistical tests in order to fully evaluate my argument and discuss implications in the following chapter—the conclusion.

8.2 Data, Indicators, and Variables

Describing the Two Datasets

The first dataset I compiled includes 1,024 land-based multinational military exercises involving at least one major power from 1980-2016. Each MME includes a specific identifier, exercise year, exercise name, location, exercise tasks, start and end dates, length of training event (in days), approximate number of troops involved, relevant defense agreement or alliance, exercise program/series, exercise program start date, exercise function, region in which exercise took place, and state participants. I compiled most of my observations from a dataset developed by Vito D’Orazio—whose set includes all MMEs (not just with major powers)—from 1970-2010, but added additional exercises, as well as more specific information regarding each exercise (namely, exercise task, number of troops, defense agreement/alliance, exercise program and start date, as well as function).
I used news reports (e.g. New York Times, Associated Press, or Xinhua General News) and military public affairs official statements to determine the observations for each exercise. Though most news report were published during or after the training event, a few noted that exercises were planned for a future date. I only included exercises in which I was reasonably confident the event took place, such as a regularly scheduled annual event. I include only land-based exercises, which I conceptualize as units of soldiers maneuvering on the ground ‘in the field’. This definition does not include seminars, workshops, or military officer exchanges, which are not field exercises. Land-based exercises include amphibious (‘beach landing’) training, but exclude strictly computer-simulated, command and staff, naval, air, and air-defense exercises (although these may play a supporting role in ground maneuvers). The reason I excluded these other types of exercises is two-fold. First, I argue that land-based exercises are more ‘costly’ than computer-based or staff exercises, which are often attended over the internet from a participating country’s home location. The ease of entry to these types of exercises not only makes determining each participant country more difficult, but also questions whether there are any costs (economic or political) or trade-offs for attendance. Without the financial and domestic costs of physically sending troops abroad, computer-assisted military training between partners seems less puzzling. Second, I exclude naval or air exercises because not only do they serve other functions, they are often difficult to separate from standard patrols; for instance, joint naval activity in the Pacific Ocean between the US and India could be considered both an operation and an exercise. Conversely, land exercises are usually (but not always) easier to separate from warfare. Moreover, air and naval exercises are often conducted in the ‘global commons’; thus, interoperability and coordination to prevent collisions seem to play a greater role in what functions these training events serve. Exercises must also be truly multinational,
meaning participation by at least two countries and not just the use of foreign land by one country; for instance, the UK often borrows Kenyan training areas to conduct unilateral maneuvers. There is one exception, however: on a few occasions the Soviet Union would conduct a major exercise on its own territory without the participation of other national forces. I include these training events due to the federal nature of the Soviet Union (which separated into 15 separate states after its collapse) as well as the immensity of the exercises.

The second dataset includes over 40,000 partner-years (dyads) of each major power and every other state in the international system from 1980-2016. These partner-years are directed-dyads that include a major power and a partner (such as China-Bangladesh); two major powers may also comprise a dyad, though I only direct one way (e.g. US-UK, but not the reverse). Although the use of dyads in political science has come under recent scrutiny, I argue that my use of ‘partner-years’ is valid for two reasons.\(^{583}\) First, because I only include directed dyads between seven major powers and the other states in the international system, I avoid issues concerned with interdependence between states commonly found in regular dyad datasets. In other words, the variation is largely with the partner, not the entire major power-partner dyad. Although I group all major powers together for most of my tests in this chapter, Appendix C provides robustness checks for each individual major power. Second, although splitting multilateral events into bilateral events could be problematic, I argue that MMEs are different from other major multinational events, such as wars or treaties. That is, I believe there is little difference between bilateral and multilateral exercises: an exercise between the US and Ghana or one between the US, Ghana, and other Asian and European partners are largely similar. If there is a

difference, the variation is captured in the MME function, which is included in one of the models. Moreover, these exercises are not as costly as war or treaties: militaries look forward to opportunities to send troops for training, even among rival countries. More importantly, without the use of partner-years, I would be consciously selecting on the dependent variable (MMEs that actually occur) and unable to observe the variation between partners that are chosen for exercises and those that are not; thus, I would not be able to capture the counterfactual ‘non-MME’ and would consequently lose leverage over my argument. Therefore, I argue that partner-years are the most optimal method for exploiting variation in MME partners and functions.

In order to be included as a partner, a state’s military must comprise at least 1,000 troops, which I argue is the least amount of total national troops possible for a state to be considered a potential exercise-partner. Less than 1,000 national troops would call into question a state’s ability to manage military tasks both at home and send soldiers to international exercises. Each partner-year includes standard dyad information, which I generated using the EUgene software: country codes, country abbreviations, partners’ regions, whether the partners are located in the same region, land contiguity, and distance between capitals (in miles). However, I also individually coded each partner’s ‘fragility’, type of partner, whether the partners were allies, whether the partners shared colonial or sovereign history, whether an MME between the partners occurred in the year, what function the MME served, and the number of MMEs between the dyad-partners. These partners-years allow me to explore which partners major powers choose to exercise with in any given year, which is useful in understanding whether non-allies within a major power’s ‘strategic environment’ are chosen over others. Each indicator and variable is explained below.

---

584 I gleaned troop-level data from the Correlates of War Project, "National Military Capabilities, v5.0."
Indicators

There are several indicators that inform my variables; a comprehensive codebook is listed in Appendix A. In the first dataset, for exercise name I used the title provided in the report; because regular exercises within a program often contain a time-designator (such as ’01 for 2001), I wrote the entire year in order to avoid confusion with exercises listed in a sequence (such as ‘-02 for the second exercise to take place within a program). I coded exercise tasks (conventional-maneuver, peacekeeping-stability, counterinsurgency-counterterror, humanitarian-disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operation) based on several indicators: 1) specific language of news reports, (2) simulated enemy, (3) types of equipment used (infantry soldiers, planes, armored tanks, etc.), (4) and political context. Conventional exercises describe traditional military operations and usually include heavy equipment, such as artillery and armored vehicles. Counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism usually listed a “terrorist” or “guerrilla threat”, or “special operations”, unless force is so large it would not make sense to fight terrorism (e.g. Russian exercises). Peacekeeping, disaster-relief, and noncombatant evacuation tasks are usually specified in the report. Exercise dates were recorded as accurately as possible; if a report clearly stated the start date but only included that the training was a ‘two-week exercise’, I added fourteen training days to determine the end date. Number of Troops were included only if specified in the report; I also did not include troop numbers if the report only indicated the contribution for one participant.

Defense Agreement/Alliance indicate which alliance, security organization, or defense agreement was involved with the exercise. Though funding may derive from one participant state (such as the US) as opposed to the exercise organization (e.g. NATO), I include the

A more detailed account of how the indicators inform the variables is available in Chapter 2.
organization because it gives meaning and context to the exercise relationship. *Exercise program* indicates whether the training is part of a larger exercise relationship (such as annual ‘Cobra Gold’ exercises), though militaries sometimes use various names for exercise programs; for instance, those NATO exercises that serve to deter Russia under the European Reassurance Initiative. However, even within an annual training program, I include individual exercises only if they fulfill the ‘land-based’ criteria above; for instance, an amphibious exercise may have been maritime-only in past years, while originally land-based field exercises may have evolved into computer-based exercises in later years. There are six *regions* in which an exercise may take place: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/Middle East, Asia, and Oceania. This regional coding follows the *Correlates of War* Codebook for Intrastate Wars (version 4.0), with the exception of adding North Africa to the Middle East.\(^{586}\) Rarely, exercises will extend over multiple regions (such as Russian-led exercises into both Europe and Asia) and are coded as including both regions. *Participants* include those state militaries that provided soldiers to conduct maneuvers in the exercise; if the report specified, I excluded ‘observers’ or ‘monitors’ that did not directly take part in the training event.

For the second dataset, I coded other variables in addition to those included with the EUGene software.\(^{587}\) The variable *allies* is determined by whether the partners constitute ‘allies’ according to my definition described in Chapter 1: formal defense pact alliance or coalition partners. Partners are considered allies if they are both signatories to a “Type I Defense Pact” delineated by Douglas Gibler’s coding for the *Correlates of War* project; however, these defense pacts must be exercised as an active alliance either through deployments or deterrence against


\(^{587}\) Note- the only exception is ‘regions’. Because I use six regions (to include Oceania) in the first dataset but only five in the second (without Oceania), I include states within Oceania in the Asian region.
another state.\textsuperscript{588} Thus, I do not consider the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to be an alliance, despite the formal defense-pact document signed by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1992 (and again in 2003). I argue the CSTO represents more of a security organization intended to regulate member behavior and respond to non-state threats, since there have been no CSTO deployments since its inception and the Central Asian states are of little use for deterrence against NATO.\textsuperscript{589} However, I include Belarus as a defense-ally of Russia due to its strong military capabilities and additional defense agreements with Russia. I also exclude the Organization of American States (OAS) and the US-Pakistan alliance after 1991, despite the Type I Defense Pact coding by Gibler: these military relationships have not conducted any major deployments and has not been useful for deterrence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, I include the US alliance with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines as useful for deterrence against China or North Korea since 1991.

Coalition partners that contribute troops to a major-power led multinational mission are also included as allies; thus, general UN-missions without a major power-lead are not included as ‘coalition partners’. A list of coalition partners per multinational mission is listed in Appendix B.

\textit{Partner Type} is determined by (1) whether the partners are allies, (2) whether partners are rivals, and if not in the category of the first two: (3) level of state fragility. I coded state \textit{fragility} using the Center for Systemic Peace’s \textit{State Fragility Index} from 1995 to 2015, all the years available from the organization. Because there was no data for 2016, I used each state’s fragility


\textsuperscript{589} Regarding the CSTO as a collective security organization intended to regulate behavior among member states and jointly respond to non-state threats (rather than collective defense against an external state threat), see Gregory Gleason and Marat E. Shaihutdinov, “Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia,” \textit{International Studies Perspectives} Vol. 6 (2005): 274-284.
score from 2015 for the following year. To include an indicator for state fragility for the years before 1995 (the years in which scores are not available), I used GNI per capita as a proxy, provided by the World Bank. Rivals represent states with a history of intense security competition and are viewed as substantial threats to each other’s security. To define rivals, I use those major powers delineated as ‘strategic rivals’ by William R. Thompson. He determines rivalries based on qualitative measures of state leaders’ perceptions of state threats and defines strategic rivals as: “The actors in question must regard each other as (a) competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) enemies.” However, as his list only covers the international system until 1999, I extend and add to his list in order to cover the years through 2016. Specifically, I include China and Russia as US rivals (and vice-versa) from 2014-2016; in March 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine (and the US cancelled military exercises), while China became more assertive in the East and South China seas. Both China and Russia were included as current or potential threats in the US 2015 National Security Strategy, with stronger language than in years past. The following rivalries include only the dates for which I am concerned (1980-2016). For the US, strategic rivals are China (2014-2016), Russia (1980-1989, 2014-2016) and Cuba (1980-2015); for Russia, rivals are China (1980-1989), the US (1980-1989, 2014-2016), Georgia (2008-2016), and Ukraine, Latvia,


*Fragile states* are those countries that are considered to have ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ fragility based on the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index. Specifically, fragile states received a score of 16-25 between the years 1995-2016; from 1980-1994, I assumed $1,000 (in 2016 US dollars) or below represented a ‘fragile’ state, based on the 1995 conversion of Papua New Guinea, the highest GNI per capita with state fragility score of 16.

*Transitioning/consolidating states* are those which were considered to have ‘serious’, ‘moderate’, or ‘low fragility’, receiving a fragility score of 3-15; for the years before 1995, I assume these states’ GNI per capita was between $1,001 and $3,180, which was based on Poland’s state fragility score of 3 in 1995. *Potential allies* have fragility scores between 0 and 2, or GNI/capita of $3,181 and above. For the NATO major powers, I also include as potential allies those states within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1994-2000, as those states were all invited to join NATO’s PfP program and assist in peacekeeping starting in 1994. For all categories, if neither the fragility score nor the GNI per capita data were available, I assumed the ‘closest’ status: either in the previous or next years. If there was no closest year, I used GNI per capita. For states that were later unified or split (such as Yemen and Czechoslovakia), I used the former part of country in which the data was available in to determine partner type. *Exercise Type* details what function the exercise served. If there were more than one MME between a dyad in a given year, I listed the function that was most common (for instance, two rehearsals and one building-capacity would be coded as ‘rehearsal’).
If there were equal number of different exercise functions, I chose the function that worked against my theory. For instance, if a non-ally conducts one deterrence and one recruitment exercise in a given year, I chose ‘deterrence’ because it works against my argument that non-allies mostly conduct non-traditional exercise functions. For coding purposes, I included ‘role-forming’ and ‘building capacity’ in the same category because they are often difficult to distinguish in news reports. MME Frequency lists the number of exercises between a dyad partnership in the given year. Below are descriptions of dependent, explanatory, and control variables. Descriptive statistics are provided in Figure 8.1.

**Dependent Variables**

Below is a list of the dependent variables; Shaping MME and MME Type serve as outcomes for both parts of my first hypothesis, while MME is the dependent variable for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.

1. **Shaping MME (H₁a):** whether the partner-dyad conducted a non-traditional (‘shaping’) exercise or a traditional exercise in a given year (“1” if the exercise function is non-traditional, “0” if traditional).

2. **MME Type (H₁a):** what function the exercise served (“1” for deterrence/rehearsal, “2” for rehearsal, “3” for trust-developing, “4” for role-forming/capacity-building, “5” for recruitment).

3. **MME (H₂, H₃, and H₄):** a binary (“dummy”) variable describing whether the dyad conducted an MME during the year (“1” if yes, “0” if no).
**Explanatory Variables**

Below are the explanatory variables; *Non-ally* and *Partner Type* represent my argument for Hypothesis 1, the geographic variables (*Same Region*) and *Colonial/Sovereign History* are tested in Hypothesis 2, *Post-Cold War* is used to explain my argument to be tested in Hypothesis 3, and *Past MME* is intended to test my argument in Hypothesis 4.

1. *Non- Ally (H1b)*: whether the major power’s partner was a non-ally or ally (“1” for non-ally, “0” for ally).

2. *Partner Type (H1b)*: type of partner with whom the major power conducted an MME (“1” for ally, “2” for rival, “3” for fragile state, “4” for transitioning/consolidating state, “5” for potential ally).

3. *Geographic Variables: Same Region and Contiguity (H2)*: *Same region* is whether the major power is located in the same region as the partner, or not (“1” if same region, “0” if not). *Contiguity* is whether the partners shared a territorial border, or not (“1” if shared border, “0” if not).

4. *Colonial/Sovereign History (H2)*: partners may have once been a colony of a major power or formerly under the sovereign rule of the major power (such as the Soviet republics). Using the *Correlates of War Project’s* typology, any state that was coded as a ‘colony’, ‘mandated to’, ‘protectorate’ or ‘part of’ a major power in the past is considered to have former colonial or sovereign history with the major power. This variable reveals whether the partners shared colonial history, or not (“1” if shared history, “0” if not).

---


6. *Past MME (H₄):* whether the partner-dyad conducted an MME in the past, or not (“1” if yes, “0” if no), with the following timeframes: *Past MME, 1 Year* (previous year), *Past MME, 2 Years* (two years ago), *Past MME, 4 Years* (four years ago).
### Figure 8.1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>obs.</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>std. dev.</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MME</td>
<td>40,708</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether dyad conducted an MME (1), or not (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MME Type</td>
<td>3,610</td>
<td>3.126</td>
<td>1.750</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>MME Function (deterrence/rehearsal (1), rehearsal (2), trust-developing (3), capacity-building, role-forming (4), recruitment (5))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping Exercise</td>
<td>3,610</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether the function of the exercise was shaping (1), or traditional (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory/Control Variables</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ally Partner Type</td>
<td>40,708</td>
<td>.873</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether a non-ally (1), or ally (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region Contiguity</td>
<td>40,708</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Type of Partner (ally, rival, fragile state, transitioning/consolidating state, potential ally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial/Sovereign History</td>
<td>40,708</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether located in same region, or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>40,708</td>
<td>.727</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether territorially bordering, or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>39,465</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether former colony or political sub-unit, or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>38,224</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether partner-year is during post-Cold War (1992-2016), or before (1980-1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>35,743</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Whether the partner-dyad conducted an MME in the past year (1), or not (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether the partner-dyad conducted an MME two years ago (1), or not (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether the partner-dyad conducted an MME four years ago (1), or not (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3 Hypotheses and Models

In order to statistically test my arguments, I develop four hypotheses: two for each argument. My models are binomial and multinomial logit regressions which use Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to estimate the coefficients and marginal predictions to interpret the results. My base models for each hypothesis are standard logit regressions with robust (dyad-clustered) standard errors; in order to account for temporal dependence, I also include a lagged dependent variable in the second model. In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity both within and between units (dyads) in the TSCS data, I also include models that apply random effects and conditional fixed effects specifications (for those models that incorporate time-variant variables). In order to interpret the results of each model that includes random effects, I employ the ‘SPost’ Stata commands developed by Long and Freese in order to create predictions tables.

---

595 I use Stata version 14.1 to develop and estimate my models. StataCorp, *Stata Statistical Software: Release 14* (College Station: StataCorp LP, 2015).

596 The use of lagged dependent variables in dynamic models (such as time-series) is controversial: some argue that lagged DVs create bias, while others argue that omitting lagged DVs does the same. To mitigate these concerns, I include lagged DVs as a control in nested models (hypotheses 1-3), so the reader can observe the impact both of the inclusion or exclusion of lagged MMEs on the explanatory variables. When I use lagged MMEs as the explanatory variables (hypothesis 4), they are the only variables included, which mitigates the concern of lagged DVs impacting other explanatory variables. On the costs and benefits of including lagged DVs, see Luke Keele and Nathan J. Kelly, “Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Inns and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables,” *Political Analysis*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 186-205. For a more recent discussion, see Allan Dafoe, “Nonparametric Identification of Causal Effect Under Temporal Dependence,” *Sociological Methods and Research*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2018): 136-168.


598 I only apply postestimation with random effects models and not fixed effects models because Stata’s ‘margins’ command for fixed effects assumes the fixed effect is zero, which is not a true assumption for my models. See StataCorp. *Stata 14 Base Reference Manual* at https://www.stata.com/manuals14/xtxtlogit.pdf. MPost commands are provided by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata* (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2014).
My first hypothesis is split into two parts (a and b) and tests one part of my first argument: whether major powers non-allies are more likely to conduct non-traditional (‘shaping’) exercises with non-allies than allies. I also determine which type of partner is more likely to conduct which type of exercise. Because my argument rests on the assumption that major powers conduct shaping exercises with non-allies in order to reduce uncertainty, observing no difference between the types of exercises in which non-allies participate would undermine my argument.

Part A of my first hypothesis is as follows:

\( H_{1a} \) (Argument One: General Partner-Type): With non-allies, major powers are more likely to conduct non-traditional (recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, or trust-developing) than traditional exercises.

In other words, I would expect that non-allies are more likely to conduct shaping MMEs than traditional MMEs (rehearsal and deterrence). Moreover, although allies sometimes participate in shaping MMEs, I would expect that non-allies are more likely to conduct these exercises than allies. To test \( H_{1a} \), I conduct logit regressions with binary outcomes: my dependent variable is \( Shaping \ MME \) and my explanatory variable is \( Non-Ally \). I also apply both random and fixed effects to my model. The conditional fixed effects model for \( H_{1a} \) is mathematically expressed as:

\[
\ln \frac{Pr(y_{it}=m | x_{it})}{Pr(y_{it}=b | x_{it})} = \alpha_{it} + x_{it} \beta_{m|b} + u_{it}
\]

Where:

\( y_{it} = Shaping \ MME \) for unit “i” and time “t” (either shaping “1” or traditional “0”); \( x_{it} = Non-Ally \) for unit “i” and time “t” (non-ally “1” or ally “0”); \( \alpha_{it} = \) within-unit time-invariant effect; \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) units (partner-dyads), \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) years; \( u_{it} = \) error term.

The second part of the hypothesis (\( H_{1b} \)) tests a finer-grained argument: that certain partners conduct certain types of exercises. A decision tree for partner-selection based on MME function
is depicted as Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3. In general, I expect allies to conduct deterrence and rehearsal exercises, rivals to conduct trust-developing, fragile states to conduct capacity-building, transitioning/consolidating states to conduct role-forming, and potential allies to conduct recruitment. Hypothesis 1b is as follows:

\( H_{1b} \) (Argument One: Specific Partner-Type): Certain partners are more likely to participate in certain MME functions: allies conduct deterrence and rehearsal, rivals conduct trust-developing, fragile states conduct capacity-building, transitioning/consolidating states conduct role-forming, and potential allies conduct recruitment exercises.

In order to test \( H_{1b} \), I use a multinomial logit model using clustered partners (though not clustered by year, since I observe multinomial properties and marginal effects). My dependent variable is MME Function and my explanatory variable is Partner-Type. My model for \( H_{1b} \) is mathematically expressed as:

\[
\ln \frac{\Pr(y_{it} = m | x_{it})}{\Pr(y_{it} = b | x_{it})} = \alpha_{it} + x_{it} \beta_{mb} + u_{it}
\]

Where:

\( y_{it} = \text{MME Type} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (deterrence/rehearsal “1”, rehearsal “2”, trust-developing “3”, role-forming/capacity-building “4”, recruitment “5”); \( x_{it} = \text{Partner Type} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (allies “1”, rivals “2”, fragile state “3”, transitioning/consolidating state “4”, potential ally “5”); \( \alpha_{it} = \) within-unit time-invariant effect; \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) units (partner-dyads), \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) years; \( u_{it} = \) error term.

My second hypothesis tests whether major powers are more likely to conduct exercises with non-allies within their strategic environment; or conversely, major powers do not discern between partners within and outside of their strategic environments. If major powers do not
discern between non-allies within and outside of their strategic environments, my argument about shaping operations would be challenged. My second hypothesis is:

\( H_2 \) (Argument One: Strategic Environments): Major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs with non-allies in their 'strategic environments' than with other states outside of their strategic environments.

In order to test this hypothesis, I apply a binomial conditional logit regression model for each major power. My dependent variable is MME and my explanatory variables are Same Region, Colonial/Sovereign History, and Contiguity. I also control for Lag MME to ensure past exercises do not significantly alter the results. I condition on Non-Ally since I am interested in non-allied exercises. My most inclusive fixed effects model for testing \( H_2 \) is mathematically expressed as:

\[
\ln \frac{\text{Pr}(y_{it}=m|x_{it})}{\text{Pr}(y_{it}=b|x_{it})} = \alpha_{it} + x_{1it} \beta_{1,m} + x_{2it} \beta_{2,m} + x_{3it} \beta_{3,m} + u_{it}
\]

Where:

\( y_{it} = \text{MME} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (MME “1” or not “0”); \( x_{1it} = \text{Same Region} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (same region “1” or not “0”); \( x_{2it} = \text{Colonial/Sovereign History} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (former sovereign unit “1” or not “0”); \( x_{3it} = \text{Contiguity} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (contiguous “1” or not “0”); \( \alpha_{it} = \text{within-unit time-invariant effect} \); \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) units (partner-dyads), \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) years; \( u_{it} = \text{error term} \).

My third hypothesis tests the first part of my second argument: that shaping exercises have increased due to the uncertainty wrought by the post-Cold War rise in non-state threats. Specifically, my hypothesis is as follows:

\( H_3 \) (Argument Two: Increase in Uncertainty): Major powers are more likely to conduct shaping exercises when uncertainty is greater; that is, after the fall of communism (1992-2016) rather than before (1980-1991).
In order to test this hypothesis, I create a binary variable for the post-Cold War Era (“1” if year is between 1992-2016, “0” if between 1980 and 1991). Thus, my dependent variable is *Shaping MME* and my explanatory variable is *Post-Cold War*; I also condition on *Non-Ally*. I chose the year 1991 because I argue that uncertainty rose after the fall of communism in Europe, which mainly occurred for both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1991. Though using a time period as an explanatory variable may be a less than ideal measure of uncertainty, I argue that it is better than alternate measures, such as number of terrorist incidents or civil wars. These measures are vulnerable to problems of endogeneity since militaries actively combat these threats while simultaneously attempting to prevent future ones. That is, because militaries use force against non-state threats (while simultaneously conducting non-traditional MMEs to manage the uncertainty of other threats), cause and effects are difficult to determine using political science metrics. Moreover, a military’s sense of ‘uncertainty’ does not have to conform to reality: even though a military actively combats threats using force, it can never be perfectly certain that no threats remain and, thus, may continue to increase the number of exercises in subsequent years. In other words, major powers can never be ‘sure’ they are ‘complete’ with non-state threats. My model is formally annotated as:

\[
\ln \frac{Pr(y_{it}=1 | x_{it})}{Pr(y_{it}=0 | x_{it})} = \alpha_{it} + x_{it} \beta_{m|b} + u_{it}
\]

Where:

- \(y_{it} = Shaping \ MME\) for unit “i” and time “t” (either shaping “1” or traditional “0”); \(x_{it} = Post-Cold \ War\) (1992-2016 “1”, or before “0”); \(\alpha_{it} = within-unit \ time-invariant \ effect; i = 1,\ldots,n \ units\) (partner-dyads), \(t = 1,\ldots,T \ years; u_{it} = error \ term.\)
My final hypothesis determines whether there is anything ‘sticky’ or habitual about military exercise relations between a major power and a partner, which is important to my theory because I argue that habitual military relations are partly responsible for the rise in MMEs since the end of the Cold War. In order to test this proposition, I employ a binomial logit regression model: my explanatory variable—MME Lag—is a lagged variable that captures whether a partner-dyad conducted an MME in the previous year, or not. I use a lagged variable to understand whether an MME in the past year helps predict MMEs (me dependent variable) in the future. As in the other models, I also condition on Non-Ally and apply year, region, and partner fixed-effects specifications. My hypothesis reads:

\[ H_4 (Argument Two: Habitual Exercise Relations): Major powers are more likely to conduct MMEs with non-allies with which they have conducted MMEs in the past. \]

The results of this hypothesis will help me determine whether habitual exercise relations are partly responsible for the increase in MMEs since the end of the Cold War.

\[
\ln \frac{\Pr(y_{it} = m | x_{it})}{\Pr(y_{it} = b | x_{it})} = \alpha_{it} + x_{1it} \beta_{m|b} + x_{2it} \beta_{2,m|b} + x_{3it} \beta_{3,m|b} + u_{it}
\]

Where:

\( y_{it} = \text{MME} \) for unit “i” and time “t” (MME “1” or not “0”); \( x_{1it} = \text{Past MME, 1 Year} \) (yes “1” or no “0”); \( x_{2it} = \text{Past MME, 2 Years} \) (yes “1” or no “0”); \( x_{3it} = \text{Past MME, 4 Years} \) (yes “1” or no “0”); \( \alpha_{it} = \text{within-unit time-invariant effect} \); \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) units (partner-dyads), \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) years; \( u_{it} = \text{error term} \).
8.4 Results

Hypothesis 1 (Parts A and B): Non-Allies and Shaping Exercises

Table 8.1 displays the results of the impact of partner-type on choice of exercise-type (shaping vs. traditional). Model 1 is the base model, Model 2 includes a lagged dependent variable, Model 3 applies random effects, and Model 4 applies fixed effects. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is lowest in Model 3, which informs me that it is the strongest of the four models, though the number of observations is lower than the others due to the dropped cases when there was no previous dyad-year. In each of the models, non-allies are still far more likely to conduct shaping MMEs than traditional MMEs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base Model</td>
<td>w/ Lagged DV</td>
<td>w/ Random Effects</td>
<td>w/ Fixed Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ally</td>
<td>1.785*** (0.22)</td>
<td>1.139*** (0.24)</td>
<td>2.222*** (0.16)</td>
<td>1.160*** (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.740*** (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.168* (0.07)</td>
<td>-1.643*** (0.10)</td>
<td>0.134 (0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>2508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>4362</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>3906</td>
<td>2382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.1: Results for H1a with Robustness Checks

Because the interpretation of coefficients is difficult with logit regressions, I interpret estimates using marginal predictions postestimation techniques.\(^{599}\) Table 8.2 below shows a predictions table that interprets Models 2 and 3 above, which reveals that non-allies have between a 27% and

\(^{599}\) On the difficulty in interpreting logit results by observing the coefficients, see Long and Freese, 133-184.
32% greater probability of conducting shaping MMEs than allies. Moreover, since the probability of non-allies conducting shaping MMEs is between 72% and 85%, this implies that non-allies are only 15% to 28% likely to conduct a traditional MME.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Ally</th>
<th>Probability of Conducting Shaping MME (Model 2)</th>
<th>Probability of Conducting Shaping MME (Model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>0.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8.2: Predictions Table for $H_{1a}$*

Figure 8.2 below provides a margins plot for the probability of conducting each function for each partner type. The figure reveals that allies are most likely to conduct deterrence/rehearsal exercises, followed closely by recruitment. Interestingly, rivals are most likely to conduct deterrence and recruitment training since trust-developing exercises are extremely rare. Fragile states are most likely to conduct role-forming/capacity-building exercises, followed by recruitment. Transitioning/consolidating states are most likely to conduct role-forming/capacity-building, as well as recruitment exercises. Potential allies are most likely to conduct role-forming/capacity-building, followed by recruitment exercises. The figure provides positive results for my predictions, except for two cases: I would expect rivals to conduct more trust-developing exercises and potential allies to conduct more recruitment exercises. However, trust-developing exercises are rare (the US has only conducted six land-based trust-developing

---

600 Note- the model used for this margins plot does not include time-dependence because Stata’s xtlogit command does not estimate non-binary dependent variables; see “xtlogit” in StataCorp, *Stata 14 Base Reference Manual*. Instead, I use the “mlogit” command similar to Allison’s use in *Fixed Effects Regression Models*, 44-46.
exercises), and sometimes potential allies also help the US role-form and build the capacity of other states. Moreover, sometimes rivals are included in large rehearsal exercises as a means to develop trust, though this is not the main purpose of the exercise. Regardless, there is a clear indication that non-allies conduct more non-traditional exercises than deterrence or rehearsals.

Figure 8.2: Margins Plot for H_{1b}

**Hypothesis 2: Non-Allies and Strategic Environments**

I expect that major powers choose non-allied partners based on their location within each of the major power groups’ strategic environments. Eastern powers (China, India, and Russia) generally train within their region, along their borders, and, especially for Russia, with former Soviet republics. Western powers (Germany, France, and the UK) conduct exercises in Europe and with their former colonies. Due to the US grand strategy of primacy, American training
takes place all over the globe. Table 8.3 below lists the results of my binomial models for each grouping of major powers. Model 5 tests the power of the explanatory variable (Same Region) against the probability of conducting an MME. Model 6 includes sovereign and colonial history, Model 7 includes territorial contiguity, and Model 8 includes all geographic and historical variables, including a control for last year’s MME. Model 9 includes all covariates (except the lagged DV) as well as random effects specifications. Regarding, first, the Eastern powers shown in Table 8.3 below, it appears that being in the same region and part of the sovereign history of a major power greatly increases the likelihood of conducting an MME. A non-allied partner’s location on the border was also significantly positive (Model 7) but is better explained by sovereign history (Model 8). The predictions table reveals that being in the same region and part of the sovereign history of one of the Eastern powers increases the likelihood of conducting an MME by between 6% and 12%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>1.764***</td>
<td>1.199*</td>
<td>1.239*</td>
<td>0.958***</td>
<td>2.650***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>2.271**</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.419***</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.267***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.415*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.043***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.560***</td>
<td>-4.631***</td>
<td>-4.583***</td>
<td>-5.102***</td>
<td>-7.258***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R^2</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17378</td>
<td>17378</td>
<td>17378</td>
<td>16862</td>
<td>17378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3021</td>
<td>2824</td>
<td>2946</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td>2206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 8.3: Results for H2 (Eastern Powers)
Concerning the European powers, Table 8.5 provides support for the argument that these powers are concerned about uncertainty in Europe and within their former colonies. They are less concerned about exercises along their borders (given the few borders), but exercises with former colonies is a priority. The predictions table (8.6) shows that being within Europe and a former colony increases the probability of non-allied participation by between 8% and 12% (driven largely by Cyprus and Ireland with the UK).

Table 8.5: Predictions Table for H2 (Eastern Powers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probability of Conducting MME (Model 8)</th>
<th>Probability of Conducting MME (Model 9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.5: Results for H2 (Western Powers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5 Same Region</th>
<th>Model 6 w/ Sovereign History</th>
<th>Model 7 w/ Contiguity</th>
<th>Model 8 w/ All</th>
<th>Model 9 w/ Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>1.007***</td>
<td>1.137***</td>
<td>1.039***</td>
<td>1.095***</td>
<td>1.463***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>0.579**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.463**</td>
<td>0.765***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-1.085</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.776</td>
<td>-0.864</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.788***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>13430</td>
<td>13430</td>
<td>13430</td>
<td>12952</td>
<td>13430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>4587</td>
<td>4565</td>
<td>4594</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>4191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
For the US, Table 8.7 shows that US is more likely to conduct MMEs with non-allies that are located outside of the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, because of limited colonial and sovereign history—the US shares colonial history with the UK but the two states are allies and, thus, not included in the model—US exercises cannot be predicted by political history. However, none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant in the random effects model (Model 9), which informs us that both geography and sovereign history are poor predictors of US exercise choices. Because of US grand strategy, this makes sense: American army units are responsible for shaping all over the world so selecting a particular geographic area is not possible. Because the predictors are not significant, I do not include a predictions table.
### Table 8.7: Results for H₂ (USA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Model 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 6</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 7</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 8</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>w/ Sovereign History</td>
<td>w/ Contiguity</td>
<td>w/ All</td>
<td>w/ Random Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>-0.508*</td>
<td>-0.508*</td>
<td>-0.492*</td>
<td>-0.506*</td>
<td>-0.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.541**</td>
<td>-0.341*</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(1.89)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.627***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.145***</td>
<td>-2.145***</td>
<td>-2.145***</td>
<td>-2.651***</td>
<td>-2.768***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4387</td>
<td>4387</td>
<td>4387</td>
<td>4258</td>
<td>4387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2833</td>
<td>2833</td>
<td>2833</td>
<td>2361</td>
<td>2444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

**Hypothesis 3: Shaping Exercises and Post-Cold War Uncertainty**

The first part of my argument assumes that major powers have expanded shaping MMEs due to an increase in strategic uncertainty associated with the rise of non-state actors after the end of the Cold War. If there is no difference in likelihood of conducting shaping MMEs during the Cold War or after, then my argument would be weakened. The results of my models are displayed in Table 8.8 below. Models 10-13 estimate the probability of conducting a shaping exercise after the end of the Cold War. Model 10 is the base model, Model 11 includes a lagged DV, Model 12 applies random effects, and Model 13 applies fixed effects. All models reveal that shaping exercises are more likely to take place after the end of the Cold War. The predictions table (8.9) uses margins to provide predictions of Models 11 and 12, revealing that...
partners have between a 50% and 65% greater probability of conducting a shaping exercise following the end of the Cold War (i.e. collapse of the Soviet Union) than before.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 11 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 12 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 13 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>3.880*** (0.40)</td>
<td>3.100*** (0.54)</td>
<td>5.021*** (0.39)</td>
<td>4.571*** (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.651*** (0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.176*** (0.41)</td>
<td>-4.281*** (0.54)</td>
<td>-3.307*** (0.37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>2508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>4204</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>3636</td>
<td>2091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Table 8.8: Results for H₃

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
<th>Probability of Conducting Shaping MME (Model 11)</th>
<th>Probability of Conducting Shaping MME (Model 12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>.651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.9: Predictions Table for H₃

Hypothesis 4: Habitual Exercise Relations

To test part of my second argument, I evaluate whether non-allies are more likely to conduct MMEs with major powers if they have also conducted joint exercises in the past. Table 8.10 below reveals that conducting MMEs in the past is a significant predictor of exercises in the future. Model 14 tests only an MME in the past year, Model 12 tests MMEs in the past year, two
years prior, and four years prior, Model 13 includes the same variables using random effects, and Model 14 includes the variables with fixed effects.\textsuperscript{601} The predictions table (8.11) shows that the probability of non-allied participation in an MME increases by 86% if the non-ally has conducted exercises in the past year, two years prior, and four years prior. Thus, the results support the argument that exercise relations are ‘sticky’ or habitual over time.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Model 14 & Model 15 & Model 16 & Model 17 \\
 & Past MME (1 Year) & Past MMEs (1, 2, and 4 Years) & w/ Random Effects & w/ Fixed Effects \\
\hline
Past MME, 1 Year & 3.479*** & 2.427*** & 1.771*** & 1.153*** \\
 & (0.13) & (0.10) & (0.10) & (0.08) \\
Past MME, 2 Years & 1.807*** & 1.255*** & 0.763*** & \\
 & (0.10) & (0.10) & (0.09) & \\
Past MME, 4 Years & 1.666*** & 1.064*** & 0.594*** & \\
 & (0.13) & (0.11) & (0.10) & \\
Constant & -3.718*** & -3.843*** & -4.310*** & \\
 & (0.06) & (0.05) & (0.08) & \\
Pseudo-R\textsuperscript{2} & 0.188 & 0.260 & 0.075 & \\
N & 34072 & 30714 & 30714 & 10548 \\
BIC & 9048 & 7862 & 7744 & 4964 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Results for H\textsubscript{4}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{601} As opposed to the other hypotheses, I include random and fixed effects models with lagged dependent variables in Hypothesis 4 since the only variables used are lags; thus, there will be no effect of lagged variables on non-lagged variables. The reader can compare the results of the base models with the random and fixed effects models in Table 8.10; however, I only conduct postestimation with the base model in Table 8.11 in order to avoid concerns with the impact of lagged variables on the coefficients of other variables.
One-Year Lag MME | Two-Year Lag MME | Four-Year Lag MME | Probability of Conducting MME (Model 15)
---|---|---|---
0 | 0 | 0 | .021
0 | 0 | 1 | .102
0 | 1 | 0 | .116
0 | 1 | 1 | .409
1 | 0 | 0 | .195
1 | 0 | 1 | .562
1 | 1 | 0 | .597
1 | 1 | 1 | .887

*Table 8.11: Predictions Table for $H_4$*

### 8.7 Summary and Discussion

The intent of this chapter was to test my arguments using large-N regression analysis of major powers and all other states in the international system from 1980-2016. These tests were designed to supplement my illustrative case studies by applying my argument to the entire ‘universe of cases’, which exploits variation through counterfactual reasoning. I developed four hypotheses, two for each main argument, and tested whether my predictions were supported or undermined. In terms of my first argument—that major powers conduct MMEs with non-allies in order to reduce strategic uncertainty—I tested two propositions: that non-allies were more likely to conduct shaping MMEs than traditional exercises and that major powers chose non-allied partners based on their location within a strategic environment. If major powers conducted just as many shaping MMEs with both allies and non-allies, or major powers did not discriminate between non-allies within or outside of their environments, my argument would be undermined. However, my theory is confirmed by the positive results of the tests: it appears that non-allies are far more likely to conduct shaping MMEs and largely select non-allies based on their location.
within a strategic environment. For China, India, and Russia, non-allies their same region (Asia for China and India, Europe for Russia), along the border, and formerly part of the Soviet Union were more likely to conduct exercises. For France, Germany, and the UK, non-allies within Europe and former colonies were also more likely to engage in joint training. For the US, though there is a slight negative correlation between being in the same region and probability of joint training, the results were not significant, which reveals that because of US deep engagement, geographic and political history indicators are poor predictors of partner-choice.

My second argument contends that shaping MMEs have increased due to an increase in uncertainty wrought by the rise of non-state actors after the end of the Cold War. This rise was a consequence of the collapse of communism and transnational effects of globalization. Moreover, because military training is habitual in general, I argue that major power militaries extend this repetitive behavior to multinational training with non-allies. I developed two hypotheses to test this argument, proposing that the post-Cold War period would be a significant predictor of increased shaping MMEs and that exercises become sticky over time. The tests revealed support for my argument: both the uncertain post-Cold War environment and previous exercises were significant predictors of exercises with non-allies. Thus, it appears that MMEs have increased due to the effects of an uncertain strategic environment as well as the cumulative effect of sticky military relations over time.

If major powers seek to reduce strategic uncertainty through shaping exercises and these activities cumulatively add up over time, what are the implications for international security? Is shaping a positive means by which major powers can effectively prevent the negative effects of violent non-state actors, or could this type of military operation be a source of competition for influence? The following chapter provides my conclusion as well as the implications of shaping
MMEs for international security, which I argue could be both a source of stability and instability based on how major powers manage these types of operations.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION: MILITARY EXERCISES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

9.1 Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation was to explain why major powers conduct military exercises with non-allies and why multinational exercises have increased since the end of the Cold War. Given the incentives against military cooperation—MMEs require resources, coordination, and distractions away from unilateral training—major power military cooperation with non-allies is puzzling. Even more striking is training with rival or fragile armies in which technology and doctrine are exposed to untrustworthy partners; moreover, cooperation with adversaries has the potential to elicit negative responses from domestic constituents. Yet major power MMEs with non-allies is not only common but increases globally almost every year since the conclusion of superpower rivalry, which is strange given the opportunity for major powers to enjoy a ‘peace dividend’ and focus on domestic issues in an American-led unipolar international system. I argued that these two puzzles are explained by an increase in strategic uncertainty driven by the rise of non-state threats since the end of the Cold War; moreover, military cooperation between military partners develops into habitual relations that last over time. Two sources of uncertainty—the character and location of threats, as well as the form of assistance to combat these threats—pose challenges for military planning. Major powers use non-traditional MMEs—which serve as a form of shaping operations—to reduce both sources of uncertainty in their strategic environments. This interaction between strategic uncertainty and sticky military relations over time has created a cumulative effect in which the number of MMEs has grown into unprecedented levels.
What is interesting about the rise of shaping MMEs is the inability of the extant literature in international security to explain this post-Cold War military behavior. The traditional works in military doctrine, which were developed through analyses of Cold War and pre-World War II militaries, assume that major powers prepare for large-scale conventional war through the planning and practicing of offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations. Moreover, they assume that military behavior is best explained by parochial interests, drawing on the classic works in organization theory. However, non-traditional MMEs are a form of shaping, not ‘traditional’ (offensive, defensive, or deterrent) operations; moreover, most of the institutional benefits militaries receive from pursuing narrow organizational interests—such as greater wealth, resources, prestige, and autonomy—are not afforded by shaping exercises. Moreover, as the incidence of interstate war has decreased, yet the persistent threat of violent non-state actors has increased, an understanding of ‘what militaries do’ requires the observer to look for other indicators besides large-scale wars and plans for conventional war. Thus, a new framework for understanding post-Cold War military behavior was necessary.

In order to better understand this phenomenon, I developed a typology of non-traditional exercise types—recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-developing—and compared these types of shaping MMEs to traditional exercises—rehearsal and deterrence—in the introduction. I then elucidated my argument in Chapter 2 by describing the increase in strategic uncertainty from the last decade of the Cold War to the post-Cold War environment, revealed in journalism, scholarly works, as well as major power strategic documents and national doctrine. After providing a brief history of military exercises and describing key concepts such as exercise types and strategic environments in Chapter 3, I provided four illustrative case studies in Chapters 4 through 7 which assessed my argument against the two alternative
explanations. Chapter 4 explored recruitment exercises through the case of the US-led NATO Partnership for Peace program in the 1990’s. Chapter 5 focused on capacity-building training by observing the UK experience in Sierra Leone from 2000 to 2016. Chapter 6 described role-forming exercises by examining the case of Russian-led CSTO MMEs from 2003 to 2012. Chapter 7 explored trust-developing exercises between rivals through an analysis of Indo-Chinese MMEs from 2006 through 2016. Chapter 8 leveraged binomial and multinomial logistic regressions to test four hypotheses using two datasets comprised of over 1,000 MMEs from 1980 to 2016.

With this foundation of the causes and growth of non-traditional MMEs throughout the dissertation, I now turn to broader issues associated with multinational training events. This concluding chapter seeks to describe the potential impacts of military exercises on international security. Three aspects of MMEs and their influence on world politics are noteworthy. First, there is a growing concern that civilian-led foreign policy has been ‘militarized’ in recent years; shaping MMEs seem to be an indicator of this trend. Second, although shaping operations appear to increase security through cooperative military relations against non-state threats, there are three possible negative scenarios in which shaping decreases security: blowback, misperception of exercise-function, and major power proxy competition. Third, the last five years has experienced a tremendous growth in traditional (deterrence/rehearsal) MMEs; this ‘return’ of traditional operations between major power rivals point to the possibility of a reoccurrence of Cold War relations. Each issue is explored below.
9.2 Shaping Operations and the Militarization of Foreign Policy

Two Perspectives on the Militarization of US Foreign Policy

Especially since the George W. Bush administration’s military actions in the wake of 9/11, there has been a growing sense that American foreign policy is being ‘militarized’—that is, when foreign policy is either dictated by military officers in uniform or by decision-makers that favor the use of force over other instruments of national power.602 Or, as Rachel Maddow puts it, “Our military and weapons prowess is a fantastic and perfectly weighted hammer, but that doesn’t make every international problem a nail.”603 These works are generally concerned about two aspects of US foreign policy: (1) that war is favored over other alternatives of statecraft or (2) that the US military is being increasingly used for tasks that were commonly carried out by other (civilian) departments or agencies, such as Department of State, the US Agency for International Development, or the Department of Justice. One indicator of this problem is the asymmetry between departments’ funding and resources. In the US, the budget of the Defense Department vastly outweighs that of the State Department: former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used to complain that there were more musicians in military bands than US Foreign Service Officers abroad.604 Moreover, since the end of the Cold War US military power has been used for various non-traditional purposes: not only to win wars but also to provide humanitarian aid in conflict regions, enforce peacekeeping agreements, restore stability after hurricanes, contain Ebola in

Africa, and even encourage agricultural development in Africa and the Middle East. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”605 Many observers view both this dependence on combat power and the growing use of militaries to carry out Missions Other Than War (MOOTW) as a sign that foreign policy is being militarized to a dangerous level.

One of the most prominent voices of the first type of militarization is Andrew Bacevich, who argued in *The New American Militarism* that the American people—not just presidents or military officers but also local politicians, journalists, religious leaders, and intellectuals—have become enamored of American military strength and its ability to achieve the ends of American foreign policy. He locates the source of this over-reliance and fascination with military power to the 1970’s, when military officers and emerging neo-conservatives sought to reinvigorate military power after the frustrations and humiliations of the Vietnam War. This militarization is manifest in immense budgets, capabilities beyond mere territorial defense, permanent troop presence abroad, but most importantly, a ‘normalization’ of war through the excessive reliance on the use of force in a post-Cold War age of superior access to battlefield information, precision technology, and ‘low-cost’ war. Bacevich notes:

> That even apart from fighting wars and pursuing terrorists, U.S. forces are constantly prowling around the globe—training, exercising, planning, and posturing—elicits no more notice (and in some cases less) from the average American than the presence of a cop on a city street corner. Even before the Pentagon officially assigned itself the mission of ‘shaping’ the international environment, members of the political elite, liberals and conservatives alike, had reached a common understanding that scattering U.S. troops around the globe to restrain, inspire, influence, persuade, or cajole paid dividends.”606

---


Despite this passing remark about the use of the US military for non-war purposes, he focuses mainly on the over-reliance on the violent use of force, reaching its apogee in the 2003 invasion of Iraq largely to secure oil for the US homeland.\textsuperscript{607}

The second type of militarization is typified by Rosa Brooks’ \textit{How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything}, in which a former US defense official observes the growing tendency of the US government to rely on the military for non-military tasks, such as teaching law to Afghan officials or running health clinics in Malaysia. Brooks argues that this expansion resulted from the current ambiguous security environment in which the traditional distinction between war and peace has been blurred: “As the lines we have drawn between ‘war’ and ‘nonwar’ grow indistinct, the role and mission of the U.S. military have grown similarly hazy. Today, as the military struggles to respond to novel threats from novel quarters, its once seemingly straightforward raison d’être —defending America from armed attack by foreign states—is no longer clear-cut.”\textsuperscript{608} Brooks importantly asks, “And what is the military for, in a world in which future threats are as likely to come from computer hackers, terrorists, and other nonstate actors as from armies of foreign states?”\textsuperscript{609} Brooks notes that despite growing prosperity and life expectancy across the world, the global increase in interconnectedness, transportation, reach of technology, and climate change has produced an environment in which the next catastrophic event is unpredictable.\textsuperscript{610} Thus, for Brooks, the assumption of non-military tasks by soldiers is largely a response to this new uncertain environment.

\textsuperscript{607} Ibid., Chapters 6 and 7.
\textsuperscript{609} Original emphasis. Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{610} Ibid., 261-267.
Although non-traditional exercises are largely comprised of military-to-military cooperation, these shaping operations have the potential to supplant civilian efforts with military power in the manner described by Brooks, especially in terms of diplomacy and capacity-building. Civilian government officials are often suspicious of military-led foreign policy and view shaping as a threat to their role in diplomacy and development. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest US Combatant Command and one of the most persistent executers of shaping operations, is often viewed as a significant infringement on civilian control of foreign policy by civil servants in the State Department and US Agency for Development. Recruitment exercises, in particular, are conducted to enlist the support of partners for multilateral missions, often the domain of civilian diplomacy. US-planned and resourced ‘Cobra Gold’ exercises in Thailand usually involves civic action projects, such as medical visits to local families and even the construction of schools, carried out by soldiers. Exercises such as NATO’s Cooperative Nugget, explored in Chapter 4, sought to convince the governments and civilian populations of partner states the benefits of military cooperation. ‘Building capacity’ often requires military leaders to develop not only armies but also other public departments and agencies. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, then-Major General David Petraeus’ unit in Mosul was faced with a city in shambles and little civilian support. Fred Kaplan notes that despite initial concerns about the army’s role in development, “there was no local government, so the 101st Airborne would have to create one.” Especially during ongoing civil war or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the military is often granted powers to reshape entire governments; the case of Sierra Leone in

---

611 Reveron, Exporting Security, 72-77.
Chapter 5 revealed how Brigadier Richards was granted “‘full political and military decision-making powers” to assist the fledgling Sierra Leonean government and the UN force on the ground. As recruitment and capacity-building is carried out by the military, civilians may consequently see their roles and budgets diminish.

The debate about the origins and scope of the militarization of US foreign policy largely misses one of the contributions from this dissertation; that is, that the growing use of shaping operations is not unique to the US or other Western ‘nation-building’ powers. Although the US has by far hosted the most shaping MMEs, the fact that all major powers have also increased non-traditional exercises should alert the observer to a trend that transcends concerns about US military responsibilities. I argued and showed that in a response to strategic uncertainty driven by the growth of non-state threats, all major powers increased the number of exercises with non-allies since the end of the Cold War. This phenomenon is not just unique to one particular region or regime-type: both Western and Eastern powers regularly conduct role-forming and recruitment, while India and China cooperate almost every year to reduce the risk of inadvertent war. Grand strategies may also differ: US primacy is comprised of global shaping operations while Eastern powers mainly attempt to influence partners along their borders. Thus, although American militarism may be a consequence of societal obsession with military power or unequal allotment of budgets, the literature on militarized foreign policy should be aware of the ubiquity of this phenomenon.

---

614 Ucko, 853. See also Andrew M., Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone, 79.
9.3 Negative Effects of Shaping Exercises on International Security

In *Sources of Military Doctrine*, Barry Posen argued that “Military doctrines are important because they affect the quality of life in the international political system and the security of the states that hold them.” The traditional works in military doctrine argue that defensive doctrines encourage stability while offensive doctrines increase the risk of interstate war. What do we make of shaping operations? At first glance, non-traditional MMEs appear to enhance international security because of the cooperative, non-war nature of these programs. Trust-developing between enemies, capacity-building to strengthen fragile states against insurgents, and recruitment to garner support for peacekeeping all seem to imply a net gain in security for international relations. However, shaping exercise programs have the potential to produce insecurity in three respects: blowback, exercise misperception, and major power proxy competition. Blowback results from negative unintended consequences from major power military actions abroad. Exercise misperception occurs when a major power believes that instead of addressing violent non-state threats (or even deterring an adversary), another major power is exercising as a rehearsal for war. The gravest problem is major power proxy competition, in which militaries use MMEs to compete for spheres of influence or to change the character of partner militaries. As the incidence of conventional interstate war has receded, shaping MMEs offer an opportunity for major powers to undermine each other globally while remaining below the threshold of open violence. Each of these problems is explored below.

---

Blowback

Shaping exercise have the potential to elicit blowback; that is, when a state’s foreign policy results in negative unintended consequences against that state. First used by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to describe the potential adverse impacts of overthrowing Iran’s leader in 1953—which the Iranian revolution in 1979 largely justified these fears—the term is often used to describe how a major power’s military assistance may turn against it in the future. Chalmers Johnson argues that US military support to the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980’s, as well as the stationing of thousands of American troops in Saudi Arabia throughout the 1990’s, resulted in the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda.\(^\text{616}\) Two types of shaping MMEs—capacity-building and role-forming—have the potential to provoke negative unintended consequences. Capacity-building, in particular, could result in two undesirable scenarios. First, major powers may supply weapons to state or non-state actors that could end up in the hands of the enemies in which the major power seeks to combat. After a decade of training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Army, US advisors in Baghdad watched as Iraqi soldiers laid down their arms and withdrew from their bases as the emerging Islamic State (IS) swept across western Iraq in 2014. Iraqi soldiers left weapons, vehicles, and uniforms behind as insurgents seized five army bases and an airport.\(^\text{617}\) Especially when supplying disorganized non-state actors, equipment accountability is often lacking during these transfers and weapons are either lost or intentionally given to adversaries. For instance, a CIA-funded program beginning in 2013 to train Syrian rebels against the Syrian


regime resulted in the loss of weapons—such as anti-take missiles—that were then employed by the IS against the US and its partners.\textsuperscript{618}

Second, major powers may train and supply both state and non-state actors that behave counter to major powers interests. These trained forces sometimes refuse to conduct operations, commit abuses against their own people, or even elect to fight against the major power. As noted above, Iraqi soldiers withdrew from installations and lost massive territory in 2014, which then allowed IS to establish a headquarters in Mosul for its global operations. Sometimes major powers assist militaries that commit abuses against non-combatants; for instance, US-trained Tajik special forces fired on Pamiri civilians, as well as committed other abuses, during a 2013 raid in Khorog, Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{619} Some of the weapons used by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan were supplied by the US government in the 1980s. Even state actors sometimes turn on major powers: Afghan security forces have killed NATO troops in several “Green-on-Blue” attacks since military training began in 2002.\textsuperscript{620} During the Iran-Iraq War, the US provided intelligence and permitted the sale of weapons to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who then fought the US in 1990 during the Persian Gulf War.\textsuperscript{621} When employing shaping MMEs, major powers need to anticipate the possible adverse consequence of training and supplying both state and non-state actors.


Exercise Misperception

One problem that plagues both traditional and non-traditional MMEs is the possibility that an exercise function may be misperceived; states may believe that an opponent’s exercises are serving purposes other than those intended. Robert Jervis highlighted the problem of misperception in world politics: states may over- or underestimate an adversary’s hostility and consequently respond in different ways. \(^{622}\) Exercises intended for deterrence may be perceived to be preparations for war; conversely, those which are intended to rehearse or serve as a cover for war may go unchecked. In the first scenario, exercises intended for deterrence may automatically be assumed to be rehearsals, just as defensive weapons could be viewed as providing an offensive advantage (such as forward-deployed air defense systems). \(^{623}\) North Korea reportedly perceives semi-annual US-South Korean exercises—viewed by the alliance as defensive in nature—as preparation for invasion and often demands that the US cancel these training events. \(^{624}\) This misperception in exercise function sometimes leads to crises. US President Ronald Reagan experienced first-hand the possibility of military training sending the wrong signal when he participated in NATO’s Able Archer exercise in 1983. The event was designed to simulate a major conflict between the alliances to such an extent that the president himself rehearsed making a decision on using nuclear weapons. The Soviet high command, naturally, was frightened by this exercise and feared it may be a front for a possible surprise attack. President Reagan noted, “many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as

---

\(^{622}\) Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Chapter 3.


potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike.”

As President Reagan realized, military exercises could result in a security dilemma and severe miscalculation.

In the second scenario, some exercises may be used as a cover for war and go largely unchecked. As explained in Chapter 2, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czech Republic in 1968 was preceded by a military exercise along Czech-Polish border. More recently, the Russian Kavkaz exercise held near the Georgian border in July 2008 consisted of 8,000 Russian troops with the purpose of practicing an “operation of peace enforcement”; maneuvers ended on August 2nd, but Russian units remained and some entered South Ossetia a few days later to support Russian ‘peacekeepers’ already in the country. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine also involved units that recently completed an exercise along the border. The Russian-Belarusian 2017 exercise Zapad was feared to be another cover for an invasion of the Baltics: the US Army European Commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, warned his NATO allies that the maneuvers could be a Russian “Trojan Horse”. Large-scale maneuvers, in particular, are almost impossible to distinguish between rehearsals or deterrence—oftentimes they implicitly serve both purposes—which creates a major quandary for foreign policy and international relations. Even non-traditional exercises may be interpreted to be hostile: Chapter 4 noted that the Russian Duma condemned US airborne operations into a Partnership for Peace exercise near the Russian border, viewing these operations as practice for a future invasion. Fortunately, major powers often refrain from overreacting beyond rhetoric when faced with an opponent’s

---


exercise; moreover, covers for invasion are rare in world politics. However, the problem of exercise misperception, by both under- and overestimating an opponent’s hostility, is a long-standing problem for international security.

*Major Power Proxy Competition*

The most important negative impact of shaping MMEs is when major powers employ them to undermine one another. Although shaping MMEs are largely geared toward combatting non-state actors (save trust-developing MMEs), major powers may view non-traditional exercises as an opportunity to bolster a state or non-state actor against their rivals. Major powers may employ recruitment and role-forming exercises, in particular, to compete for power and influence at the expense of each other. Sometimes this competition is unintentional: although the US views its promotion of democracy as non-threatening, other major powers may interpret these actions as diminishing their own security. Conversely, Russia and China may view regime stability on its periphery as vital for national security, but Western powers perceive these actions as a restriction on political freedoms.

At other times, however, the competition is explicit. During the Cold War NATO and the Soviet Union armed and trained militaries in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia to extend their spheres of influence under the shadow of superpower rivalry. Today, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia comprise the centerpiece of an emerging US-Russian proxy competition. Russia supports the Syrian regime with training and firepower while the US
arms and trains the armed opposition.\textsuperscript{629} Not only does the US conduct multiple exercises with non-NATO Ukraine every year, after Russia’s support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine beginning in 2014 the US considered sending anti-tank weapons to support Ukrainian forces.\textsuperscript{630} Both Western and Russian analysts accuse each other of instigating ‘hybrid war’ by supporting third party actors to undermine one another;\textsuperscript{631} shaping exercises are often the preferred tactic to train partners and delegate warfighting to others while remaining out of direct conflict. Central Asia is emerging as the apex of non-traditional exercise programs between almost all the major powers. Since the mid-2000’s, the US, Russia, and China have conducted separate annual exercises in the region: the US (and UK) host Steppe Eagle, while Russia and China lead CSTO and SCO training. Competition over spheres of influence through the use of shaping exercises may result in miscalculation and the escalation of crises between major powers.

9.4 Major Power Rivals and the Return of Traditional Exercises

As this dissertation has shown, shaping MMEs have increased considerably since the end of the Cold War and appear to continue on an upward trajectory. As noted in the previous section, shaping operations sometimes produce insecurity through blowback, exercise misperception, and proxy competition. An even more alarming development for international security, however, is the recent return of traditional multinational exercises, used unambiguously for rehearsal and/or deterrence. As revealed in Figure 1.6 (reproduced as Figure 9.1 below), rehearsal and deterrence


exercises have experienced a major comeback since 2010. The bulk of these types of MMEs come from NATO conventional exercises to deter potential Russian aggression in the Baltics as part of the Atlantic Resolve and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) programs. According to my dataset, traditional MMEs grew from 9 in 2010 to 33 in 2016: that is, by a factor of 3.6. In 2014, the same year in which Russia invaded and annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea, traditional MMEs eclipsed non-traditional for two years straight for the first time since 1994.

In June 2016, NATO conducted its largest exercise in Eastern Europe since the Cold War. The exercise, *Anakonda 2016*, consisted of over 30,000 troops from 24 different countries, including non-allies such as Ukraine, Georgia, and even Kosovo. Although deemed a “joint defense operation on a large scale” by the US Army, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told other reporters in response to the event, “We will invoke Russia’s sovereign right to
guarantee its security with measures proportionate to current risks.” Shortly after the exercise, NATO announced that 5,000 troops from the US, Britain, and Germany would be stationed in Poland and the Baltics to deter possible Russian aggression. Recent Russian exercises, including the 2013 and 2017 iterations of Zapad, are alleged to consist of over 100,000 troops, drawing concerns about an ‘exercise gap’ between NATO and Russia. In an interview with Reuters in August 2017, a senior US exercise planner noted that by fiscal year 2020, the US military plans to conduct exercises “that involved forces from all nine U.S. combatant commands” and increase troop levels to over 40,000.

The return of traditional exercises is concurrent with changes to major power military doctrine, particularly within the US. In October 2017, the US Army released its new operations manual—*FM 3-0*—in order to re-emphasize large-scale conventional war after almost two decades of counterinsurgency and other non-traditional operations. Announcing the changes, the commander of the US Army Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General Mike Lundy, noted that when the previous edition of the operational doctrine was rescinded in 2011: “the world was a different place. The likelihood of large-scale ground combat against an enemy with peer capabilities seemed remote.” He argues that now, in 2017, “The strategic environment has changed significantly since then”: aggressive actions by ‘peer adversaries’ such as Russia and China have made major power war more likely and the US Army must return to a focus on

---


633 Ian J. Brzezinski and Nicholas Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap.”


massive maneuvers and higher-echelon operations. However, the senior officer notes that the US Army must also maintain its ability to shape the environment while simultaneously preparing for major power war: the manual retains the “shape” and “prevent” phases before large-scale combat. General Lundy notes the vast array of enemies and scenarios the US Army must be prepared for: “Army forces do not have the luxury of focusing solely on large-scale land combat at the expense of other missions the Nation requires them to do, but at the same time, they cannot afford to be unprepared for those kinds of operations in an increasingly unstable world.” The Army officer’s assessment highlights the need for US forces to be ready for any type of threat, state or non-state, major power or not.

9.5. The Future of Multinational Exercises

The trends described above offer a pessimistic picture of the impact of major power MMEs in the future. Despite the use of non-traditional MMEs to combat non-state threats and cooperate with rivals over the last 25 years, not only have recent shaping exercises been used for major power proxy competition, but traditional deterrence exercises are making a comeback to levels not seen since the Cold War. These trends imply that not only will major powers continue to grapple with insurgents, transnational criminals, the consequences of ethnic war, and natural disasters, but the prospect of major power war seems to loom larger every year. Thus, major powers will most likely increase their use of both traditional and non-traditional exercises to combat violent non-state actors and compete with one another. Major power-led exercises appear to be reflecting this need to address both state and non-state threats; MMEs are currently

---

636 Ibid.
637 Ibid., 21.
growing in size and scope in addition to quantity. Furthermore, the stickiness of military cooperation implies that major powers will continue to build overlapping relationships with partners that could cause more insecurity among other major powers.

This dissertation serves as a cautionary note to both political and military leaders. Military-to-military cooperation provides immense benefits for international security: trust-developing exercises help prevent inadvertent war, capacity-building training ensures partner armies can provide security for their own citizens, and recruitment gathers nations together to provide peacekeeping in troubled regions. However, these same exercises sometimes result in negative unintended consequences, are likely to be misperceived, and can leveraged to reduce the security of other major powers. Moreover, the increase in deterrence exercises indicates that major power competition, especially between the US and Russia, is on the rise; the risk of misperception will likely increase as a result. As the number of MMEs continues to rise, political and military leaders should be clear about what type of exercises they are conducting, aware of how they are interpreted by others, and, despite the incentives against doing so, attempt at all possible to be transparent about intentions. The OSCE’s 2011 Vienna Protocols require that states declare exercises involving more than 13,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, 500 armored vehicles, or 250 pieces of artillery; yet militaries are sometimes able to avoid this obligation by manipulating the training event. For Zapad 2017, Russia insisted that only 12,700 troops were taking part in the exercise, which obviated the requirement for Russia to invite OSCE observers to monitor the exercise.638

Therefore, in the face of this proliferation of MMEs, both traditional and non-traditional, national leaders have the option of using training to increase or decrease international security; that is, decision-makers can choose whether to use MMEs for war or for peace. Major powers may seek war and use exercises as a cover, or they can use training to create stability. They can either use MMEs to cooperate and reduce the risk of conflict, or compete and raise the specter of war. They can choose to communicate and clarify intentions, or assume the worst and act accordingly. Military leaders and planners should aid national decision-makers in better understanding the purposes and consequences of multinational exercises. Although civilian-led diplomacy should guide considerations for the use of force, military officers should also seek to build cooperative relations with their rivals in order to understand each other’s security requirements. Though armies must prepare for large-scale war in order to protect their populations, they can also be leveraged to build cooperative relations with other militaries. Hopefully, this understanding will result in a net benefit to international security and, quite possibly, prevent war.
## A.2 Partner-Year Dataset (Part 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>cc ode1/2</th>
<th>abbrev1/2</th>
<th>lregion</th>
<th>region1/2</th>
<th>sameregion</th>
<th>distance</th>
<th>partnerfragility</th>
<th>ally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Detailed Name</strong></td>
<td>Country Code</td>
<td>Country Abbreviation</td>
<td>Dyad Relevant Region</td>
<td>Region of state 1/2</td>
<td>Whether states are in same region</td>
<td>Distance between capitals</td>
<td>Partner’s Fragility</td>
<td>Partners as allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace, World Bank</td>
<td>See Chpt. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>2- USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1- Europe</td>
<td>1- Europe</td>
<td>0 – No</td>
<td>Distance in miles</td>
<td>Fragility Index: 1-25</td>
<td>0- non-allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200- UK</td>
<td>UKG</td>
<td>2- Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td>2- Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td>1 - Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>GNI Per Capita: in 2015 US Dollars</td>
<td>1- allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>220 - France</td>
<td>FRN</td>
<td>3- SS Africa</td>
<td>3- SS Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>365 - Russia</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>4- Asia</td>
<td>4- Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>710- China</td>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>5- Americas</td>
<td>5- Americas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>750 India</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See COW for others</td>
<td>See COW for others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A.2 Partner-Year Dataset (Part 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Type</th>
<th>Contiguity</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>colony_unit</th>
<th>armstrade</th>
<th>mme</th>
<th>mmetype</th>
<th>mmefreq</th>
<th>mmeno</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner Type</td>
<td>Territorial Contiguity</td>
<td><strong>Detailed Name</strong></td>
<td>Colonial or sovereign history</td>
<td>Ground-based arms trade</td>
<td>Exercise in a given year</td>
<td>MME Type</td>
<td>MME frequency in a given year</td>
<td>MME unique identifiers from ‘MME dataset’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Chpt. 8</td>
<td>Eugene/COW</td>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
<td>COW</td>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>See Chpt. 8</td>
<td>See Chpt. 8</td>
<td>See Chpt. 8</td>
<td>MME Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1- Ally</td>
<td>0- No</td>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
<td>0 – No</td>
<td>0- No</td>
<td>0- No</td>
<td>1- Deterrence/Rehearsal</td>
<td># of MMEs</td>
<td>1 – 1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Rival</td>
<td>1- Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1- Yes</td>
<td>1- Yes</td>
<td>1- Yes</td>
<td>2- Rehearsal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Fragile State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3- Trust-Developing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- Transitioning/Consolidating State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4- Role-Forming/Building-Partner Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- Potential Ally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5- Recruitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX B
### MILITARY COALITION PARTICIPATION FROM 1980-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War/Coalition Name</th>
<th>Date Start</th>
<th>Date End</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Non-Allied Coalition Partner 1</th>
<th>Partner 2</th>
<th>Partner 3</th>
<th>Partner 4</th>
<th>Partner 5</th>
<th>Partner 6</th>
<th>Partner 7</th>
<th>Partner 8</th>
<th>Partner 9</th>
<th>Partner 10</th>
<th>Partner 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Table B.1. Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 1)*
| Partner 12 | Sweden | Tunisia | Malaysia | Lithuania |
|Partner 13 | Argentina | UAE | Morocco | Malaysia (left 1998) |
|Partner 14 | Senegal | Zimbabwe | Poland | Morocco |
|Partner 15 | Bahrain | Romania | Poland (member MAR 1999) |
|Partner 16 | Czechoslovakia | Russia | Romania |
|Partner 17 | Sweden | Russia |
|Partner 18 | Ukraine | Slovenia |
|Partner 19 | Sweden |
|Partner 20 | Ukraine |
|Partner 21 | |
|Partner 22 | |
|Partner 23 | |
|Partner 24 | |
|Partner 25 | |
|Partner 26 | |
|Partner 27 | |
|Partner 28 | |
|Partner 29 | |
|Partner 30 | |

*Table B.1. Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 2)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Start</td>
<td>Date End</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xx/xx/1999</td>
<td>3/xx/2003</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bescht, 95. NATO Online-“KFOR Troop Contributions”</td>
<td>NATO Online-“Operations and Missions: Past and Present.”</td>
<td>NATO Online-“ISAF Troop Contributing Nations.”</td>
<td>McGinnis- “Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA, UK, France, Germany</td>
<td>USA, UK, France, Germany</td>
<td>USA, UK, France, Germany</td>
<td>USA, UK</td>
<td>USA, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Powers</td>
<td>Non-Allied Coalition Partner 1</td>
<td>Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 1)</td>
<td>Partner 1</td>
<td>Partner 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Australia (2003, JUN 2005-JUL 2009)</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 5</td>
<td>Bulgaria (member MAR 2004)</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Bosnia (JUN 2005-NOV 2008)</td>
<td>Qatar (Training Grounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 7</td>
<td>Estonia (member MAR 2004)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 8</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>UAE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table B.2. Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 1)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner 10</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>El Salvador (AUG 2003 - JAN 2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner 11</td>
<td>Jordan (left before 2012)</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Estonia (JUN 2003 - FEB 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 12</td>
<td>Latvia (member MAR 2004)</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Georgia (AUG 2003 - AUG 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 14</td>
<td>Moldova (began 2014)</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 15</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 17</td>
<td>Russia (left JUL 2003)</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Kazakhstan (SEP 2003 - OCT 2008) KAZBAT!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 19</td>
<td>Slovenia (member MAR 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania (AUG 2003 - JUL 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 20</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Macedonia (JUN 2003 - DEC 2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 21</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>moldova (SEP 2008 - DEC 2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 22</td>
<td>UAE (left in 2001)</td>
<td>Mongolia (SEP 2003 - SEP 2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 23</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines (July 2003 - July 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea (APR 2003 - DEC 2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table B.2. Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 2)*
| Partner 31 | | | Romania (JUL 2003 - JUL 2009) |
| Partner 32 | | | Slovakia (8 JUN 2003 - FEB 2007) |
| Partner 33 | | | Spain (MAR 2003 - APRIL 2004) |
| Partner 34 | | | Thailand (SEP 2003 - SEP 2004) |
| Partner 35 | | | Tonga (JUN - DEC 2004, AUG - NOV 2008) |
| Partner 36 | | | Ukraine (MAR 2003 - DEC 2005) |

*Table B.2. Major Power-Led Coalitions (Part 3)*
Notes for Appendix B:

1. I only included multilateral, major power-led military coalitions. Moreover, I only included partners that contributed ground troops to the operation (when the information was available). If a major alliance was involved in an operation (e.g. NATO), I only included the ‘non-ally’ partners.

2. I did not include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)-HOA, OEF-TS, or OEF-Caribbean because it is unclear which countries are coalition contributors or just allow staging for US. See “Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget: Justification for Component Contingency Operations the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund (OCOTF),” Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/FY2014_Presidents_Budget_ContingencyOperations-Base_Budget.pdf.
APPENDIX C
STATISTICAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

This appendix provides robustness checks for the statistical tests provided in Chapter 8. Section 1 applies robustness checks to the same four hypotheses for all major powers by including region, partner, and year “dummy” (binary) indicator control variables to the random effects models, while including year dummy indicators to the partner-year fixed effects models. The purpose of including these indicator dummies in addition to the already-included random and fixed effects is to ensure no particular region, partner, or year significantly influences the original results. Section 2 applies the same hypotheses but conditions on each major power in order to determine whether there are any major changes to the original pooled tests. Deviations from the pooled results are discussed with each individual major power hypothesis.

One major theme emerges when splitting the pooled models into individual major powers: fixed effects specifications appear to underestimate (or drastically alter) the results for two explanatory variables: Non-Ally and Post-Cold War. These two variables are ‘slowly’ or ‘rarely’ changing variables that pose problems for fixed effects models, which ignore time-invariant variables in order to observe within-unit (for my data, partner-year) variation. For instance, being in the status of ‘ally’ may change once or twice (joining an alliance/coalition and then leaving it), while a change in the status of the Cold War only happened once (in 1991). Thus, I place more confidence in the random effects specifications than the fixed effects for individual powers for hypotheses 1 and 3 (although I report the fixed effects models for transparency).

Each major power will be assessed along each of the four hypotheses, moving from west to east: USA, UK, France, Germany, Russia, India, China.

1. Region, Partner, and Year Dummy Indicator Control Variables

1.1. Table C.1.1 below provides a coefficients table for the robustness checks for Hypothesis 1. Year, region, and partner dummy indicator variables are included in the base and random effects models (1, 2, and 3) to observe whether any particular year, region, or country had a significant impact on the results. Being a non-ally is still a significant indicator of participation in a shaping MME despite these controls in the random effects models. Only year indicator controls are included for the fixed effects models (4 and 5) since region and partner are already dropped because they are time-invariant. Although non-ally becomes insignificant when adding indicators for each year to the fixed effects models, as discussed in the introduction there is reason to question the usefulness of fixed effects for rarely changing variables such as the explanatory variable, Non-Ally. Because being an ally or non-ally changes slowly or not at all, the random effects model is more appropriate for these tests than fixed effects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Base Model with Year, Region, Partner Controls</th>
<th>Model 2 Model 1 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 3 Model 1 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 4 Model 1 with Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ally</td>
<td>1.981*** (0.43)</td>
<td>1.457*** (0.38)</td>
<td>1.889*** (0.25)</td>
<td>0.550 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>1.687*** (0.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.336*** (1.48)</td>
<td>-5.083*** (0.85)</td>
<td>-6.565** (2.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2734</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>2734</td>
<td>2508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3013</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>3053</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.1.1: Hypothesis 1 with indicator control variables

1.2. Hypothesis 2 tested whether major powers were more likely to conduct MMEs within or outside their strategic environments. Since region is already included as the explanatory variable, I only add year indicator dummies to each model. Results for the three groups of major powers are listed in Tables C.1.2, C.1.3, and C.1.4. The only change from the tests provided in Chapter 8 are with the US: when adding an indicator for year, it appears the US is more likely to conduct MMEs with partners outside of this region. The coefficients are higher (but in the same negative direction) than the original model, yet the new results are significant to the .05-level. Thus, by adding year as a control, it appears that being outside of the Western Hemisphere is a stronger predictor of participation in US-led exercises than the original model anticipated. However, the US grand strategy of primacy is largely oriented outside of the Western Hemisphere; therefore, the results largely support my argument.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base Model w/ Year Indicator</td>
<td>w/ Year Indicator and Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>1.002*** (0.31)</td>
<td>3.073*** (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>1.531** (0.48)</td>
<td>2.764*** (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.614 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.876 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>3.926*** (0.32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.473*** (1.02)</td>
<td>-7.302*** (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R$^2$</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11930</td>
<td>11950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1816</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Table C.1.2: Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (Eastern Powers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base Model w/ Year Indicator</td>
<td>w/ Year Indicator and Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>1.450*** (0.20)</td>
<td>2.452*** (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>0.629*** (0.18)</td>
<td>1.096*** (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.329 (0.94)</td>
<td>-0.405 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.431*** (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.031*** (0.58)</td>
<td>-7.180*** (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R$^2$</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12677</td>
<td>13153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3893</td>
<td>3803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Table C.1.3: Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (Western Powers)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5 Base Model w/ Year Indicator Control</th>
<th>Model 6 w/ Year Indicator and Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>-0.622** (0.20)</td>
<td>-1.176** (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>0.000 (.00)</td>
<td>0.000 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.531** (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.214 (2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.687*** (0.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.160*** (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4258</td>
<td>4387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2399</td>
<td>2360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Table C.1.4: Hypothesis 2 with indicator control variables (USA)

1.3. Hypothesis 3 tested whether shaping exercises are more likely during or after the end of the Cold War. I include region and partner indicator dummies to ensure no particular partner or region is influential; however, I do not include year indicators as my explanatory variable (*Post-Cold War*) is a cluster of years, which would mean that including year indicators as a control would introduce post-treatment bias. The original results remain robust, shown in Table C.1.5 below.
Table C.1.5: Hypothesis 3 with indicator control variables

1.4. Hypothesis 4 tested whether there was anything ‘sticky’ or habitual about exercise relations. I included region, partner, and year indicator controls for the random effects model and year controls for the fixed effects model in testing whether an exercise in the previous year predicts the likelihood of conducting an MME in the current year. Table C.1.6. below reveals that the original results remain robust.\textsuperscript{640}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Model 7 & Model 8 & Model 9 \\
 & w/ Region and Partner Controls and Lag & w/ Region and Partner Controls and REs & w/ Region and Partner Controls and FEs \\
\hline
Post-Cold War & 3.614*** & 5.366*** & 4.571*** \\
 & (0.73) & (0.59) & (0.51) \\
Lagged DV & 1.935*** \\
 & (0.16) \\
Constant & -5.114*** & -5.598*** \\
 & (0.74) & (0.67) \\
Pseudo-R\textsuperscript{2} & 0.309 & 0.133 \\
N & 1640 & 2918 & 2508 \\
BIC & 1946 & 3644 & 2091 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

*\textit{p}<0.05,**\textit{p}<0.01,***\textit{p}<0.001

\textsuperscript{640} I used a standard logit model instead of a time-dependent logit model for the estimation of coefficients using region and partner indicator control variables (Model 11) because using a time-dependent model (i.e. random effects) included too many indicator variables for Stata to calculate.
### Table C.1.6: Hypothesis 4 with indicator control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>w/ Partner, Region, and Year Indicator Controls</td>
<td>w/ Partner, Region, and Year Indicator Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>2.335*** (0.15)</td>
<td>1.697*** (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>1.396*** (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>1.319*** (0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.703*** (0.87)</td>
<td>-5.327*** (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>27660</td>
<td>24068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>8957</td>
<td>8071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

**2. Original Models by Major Power**

**2.1. The United States.**

**2.1.1. Hypothesis 1A.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 2 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 3 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 4 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Allies</td>
<td>1.750*** (0.47)</td>
<td>0.972* (0.42)</td>
<td>2.747*** (0.31)</td>
<td>2.149*** (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.997*** (0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.281* (0.13)</td>
<td>-1.815*** (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.299 (0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>1443</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

**Table C.2.1: Results for H1a (USA)**
2.1.2. Hypothesis 1B. Note- results insignificant for “rival” partners.

![Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs](image)

**Figure C.1: Margins Plot for $H_{1b}$ (USA)**

2.1.3. Hypothesis 2: These results are the same as Table 8.7 in Chapter 8.

2.1.4. Hypothesis 3. The results in Table C.2.2 reveal that the results are significant across all models for the US.
### Table C.2.2: Results for $H_3 (USA)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base Model</strong></td>
<td><strong>w/ Lagged DV</strong></td>
<td><strong>w/ Random Effects</strong></td>
<td><strong>w/ Fixed Effects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>3.632***</td>
<td>2.898***</td>
<td>4.725***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.751***</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.011***</td>
<td>-4.187***</td>
<td>-3.197***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R$^2$</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>1319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

2.1.5. Hypothesis 4. The results are similar to those reported in Chapter 8, though four-year lag MME loses significance in the final model. However, previous year MMEs (the year prior and two years prior) are significant predictors of future MMEs.

### Table C.2.3: Results for $H_4 (USA)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past MME</strong></td>
<td><strong>Past MMEs</strong></td>
<td><strong>w/ Random Effects</strong></td>
<td><strong>w/ Fixed Effects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>2.632***</td>
<td>1.790***</td>
<td>1.541***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>1.716***</td>
<td>1.511***</td>
<td>1.047***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>0.888***</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
<td>0.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.721***</td>
<td>-2.953***</td>
<td>-2.996***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R$^2$</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4258</td>
<td>3871</td>
<td>3871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2362</td>
<td>2045</td>
<td>2045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
2.2. The United Kingdom

2.2.1. Hypothesis 1A. Although the random effects model still holds significant for $H_{1A}$, when applying a lagged DV (last year’s shaping) and fixed effects, the models lose significance. I attribute the first inconsistency to the fact that previous partners better explain future MMEs than choice of partner-type (which supports the ‘stickiness’ hypothesis); I attribute the second problem to slowly or rarely changing explanatory variables in fixed effects models (explained in the introduction). That is, the explanatory variable Non-Allies is nearly a time-invariant variable: although from one year to the next the status of an ally can change—for instance, as members join NATO or a country joins a coalition—most non-allies remain non-allies and vice-versa. Thus, fixed effects, which ignore time-invariant variables in order to assess variation within partner-dyads, may produce inefficient inferences that underestimate rarely-changing variables (as opposed to models applying only random effects). In any case, there is still a positive relationship between non-ally and shaping MME, which informs us that non-allies are more likely to conduct shaping MMEs than allies, although allies and coalition partners also participate to help in these exercises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 2 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 3 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 4 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Allies</td>
<td>1.017***</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>1.283***</td>
<td>1.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.687***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>-1.509***</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.3.1: Results for $H_{1a}$ (UK)
2.2.2. Hypothesis 1B. Note- results for rivals and potential allies are not significant.

![Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs](image)

*Figure C.2: Margins Plot for H_{1b}(UK)*

2.2.3. Hypothesis 2. Same region is the best predictor for exercise-partner; although there is a positive association between former colonies and MMEs, these results are not significant when *Same Region* is included.
2.2.4. Hypothesis 3. Although the post-cold war period is a significant predictor of conducting shaping MMEs, the coefficient goes to zero when adding in MMEs from the previous year. This makes sense considering the British only conducted three shaping MMEs during the Cold War (and 268 thereafter); thus, sticky exercise relations are a better predictor than the post-Cold War environment by itself. Also, like the explanatory variable Non-Ally, Post-Cold War is a rarely-changing variable (changes only once in 1991) that is underestimated by the fixed effects model which usually drops time-invariant variables. Therefore, a random effects model is more appropriate.
### Table C.3.3: Results for H₃(UK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 11 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 12 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 13 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>4.011*** (1.02)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>5.037*** (0.89)</td>
<td>37.710 (17966441.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.509*** (0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.536*** (1.03)</td>
<td>-1.216*** (0.16)</td>
<td>-3.895*** (0.86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

### Table C.3.4: Results for H₄(UK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 14 Past MME (1 Year)</th>
<th>Model 15 Past MMEs (1, 2, and 4 Years)</th>
<th>Model 16 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 17 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>2.773*** (0.24)</td>
<td>2.085*** (0.17)</td>
<td>1.817*** (0.25)</td>
<td>1.030*** (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>1.831*** (0.19)</td>
<td>1.625*** (0.26)</td>
<td>0.958*** (0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>1.287*** (0.31)</td>
<td>1.054*** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.425*** (0.12)</td>
<td>-3.553*** (0.11)</td>
<td>-3.646*** (0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4718</td>
<td>4225</td>
<td>4225</td>
<td>2130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

2.2.5. Hypothesis 4
2.3. **France**

2.3.1. **Hypothesis 1A.** Although non-allies are significantly more likely to conduct shaping MMEs with France than allies, the fixed effects models show the opposite conclusion. However, as discussed in the introduction, fixed effects models are inefficient in estimating slowly or rarely changing variables such as status as ally or non-ally; thus, we should be more confident in the random effects model (Model 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 2 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 3 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 4 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ally</td>
<td>1.287*** (0.34)</td>
<td>0.852** (0.32)</td>
<td>1.269*** (0.32)</td>
<td>-1.343* (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.907*** (0.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.114 (0.13)</td>
<td>-1.822*** (0.24)</td>
<td>0.309 (0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

*Table C.4.1: Results for $H_{1a}$ (France)*
2.3.2. Hypothesis 1B. Note- results for potential allies and rivals are not significant.

![Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs](image)

*Figure C.3: Margins Plot for H₁b (France)*
2.3.3. Hypothesis 2. The results show that France is more likely to conduct MMEs with partners from Europe and former colonies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5 Same Region</th>
<th>Model 6 w/ Sovereign History</th>
<th>Model 7 w/ Contiguity</th>
<th>Model 8 w/ All</th>
<th>Model 9 w/ Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>0.895**</td>
<td>1.128**</td>
<td>0.935**</td>
<td>0.993***</td>
<td>1.064**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>0.860**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.657**</td>
<td>1.104**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.535***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.053***</td>
<td>-3.286***</td>
<td>-3.053***</td>
<td>-3.521***</td>
<td>-4.093***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4995</td>
<td>4995</td>
<td>4975</td>
<td>4810</td>
<td>4975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>1838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Table C.4.2: Results for H₂(France)

2.3.4. Hypothesis 3. Like the UK, France conducted few shaping exercises during the Cold War; thus, the previous year’s exercise removes all the explanatory power of the post-Cold War environment when a lagged DV is included as a covariate. Regardless, the post-Cold War remains a significant predictor by itself.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Model</td>
<td>w/ Lagged DV</td>
<td>w/ Random Effects</td>
<td>w/ Fixed Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>3.493***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.367***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>2.848***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.944***</td>
<td>-1.480***</td>
<td>-2.991**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.4.3: Results for H₃ (France)

2.3.5. Hypothesis 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past MME</td>
<td>Past MMEs</td>
<td>w/ Random Effects</td>
<td>w/ Fixed Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 Year)</td>
<td>(1, 2, and 4 Years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>2.677***</td>
<td>2.101***</td>
<td>1.695***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>1.295***</td>
<td>0.873***</td>
<td>0.453*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>1.380***</td>
<td>0.906***</td>
<td>0.458*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.246***</td>
<td>-3.332***</td>
<td>-3.555***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4829</td>
<td>4334</td>
<td>4334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>1648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.4.4: Results for H₄ (France)
2.4. Germany

2.4.1. Hypothesis 1A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 2 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 3 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 4 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ally</td>
<td>2.293*** (0.43)</td>
<td>1.457* (0.57)</td>
<td>2.406*** (0.42)</td>
<td>2.432* (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.241*** (0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.071 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.918*** (0.18)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.5.1: Results for H₁₀ (Germany)
2.4.2. Hypothesis 1B. Note- results for rivals are not significant.

![Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs](image)

*Figure C.4: Margins Plot for H_{1b} (Germany)*

2.4.3. Hypothesis 2. Germany exercises most with European states and did not exercise with any former colonies (according to the dataset).
2.4.4. Hypothesis 3. Because Germany was not considered a major power during the Cold War, there is no variation in the explanatory variable Post-Cold War.

2.4.5. Hypothesis 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same Region w/ Sovereign History</td>
<td>w/ Contiguity</td>
<td>w/ All</td>
<td>w/ Random Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>1.671*** (0.31)</td>
<td>1.628*** (0.31)</td>
<td>1.664*** (0.32)</td>
<td>1.497*** (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.107 (0.80)</td>
<td>0.797 (0.89)</td>
<td>0.185 (1.24)</td>
<td>0.185 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>3.297*** (0.32)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.911*** (0.19)</td>
<td>-3.868*** (0.19)</td>
<td>-3.911*** (0.19)</td>
<td>-4.165*** (0.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.5.2: Results for H2 (Germany)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Past MME w/ Random Effects</td>
<td>(1 Year)</td>
<td>(1, 2, and 4 Years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>3.432*** (0.31)</td>
<td>3.306*** (0.42)</td>
<td>3.306*** (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>0.325 (0.54)</td>
<td>0.325 (0.42)</td>
<td>-0.056 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>2.827*** (0.42)</td>
<td>2.827*** (0.43)</td>
<td>1.316** (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.963*** (0.16)</td>
<td>-4.054*** (0.16)</td>
<td>-4.053*** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.5.3: Results for H4 (Germany)
2.5. **Russia**

2.5.1. **Hypothesis 1A.** Similar to other major powers, the results remain robust and the coefficients are similar except for the fixed effects model, which suffers from the slowly-changing explanatory variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Base Model</th>
<th>Model 2 w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 3 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 4 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ally</td>
<td>3.402*** (0.81)</td>
<td>2.642** (0.86)</td>
<td>2.719*** (0.77)</td>
<td>1.468 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.105*** (1.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.150 (0.44)</td>
<td>-3.126** (0.98)</td>
<td>1.865* (0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

*Table C.6.1: Results for H\(_1\) (Russia)*

2.5.2. **Hypothesis 1B.**
2.5.3. Hypothesis 2. Most of Russia’s exercises with non-allies involve CSTO members; that is, former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Thus, sovereign history better explains its selection of exercise partners than region (note-Russia is considered to be located in Europe).

*Figure C.5: Margins Plot for $H_{lb}(Russia)$*
### Table C.6.2: Results for H2 (Russia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5: Same Region</th>
<th>Model 6: w/ Sovereign History</th>
<th>Model 7: w/ Contiguity</th>
<th>Model 8: w/ All</th>
<th>Model 9: w/ Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>0.944 (0.49)</td>
<td>-0.684 (0.80)</td>
<td>0.423 (0.85)</td>
<td>0.198 (0.50)</td>
<td>1.264 (0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>3.780*** (0.73)</td>
<td>2.313*** (0.62)</td>
<td>4.555*** (0.98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>1.668 (1.08)</td>
<td>-0.203 (0.88)</td>
<td>-1.403 (1.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.076*** (0.54)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.738*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-6.787*** (0.57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5495</td>
<td>5495</td>
<td>5495</td>
<td>5330</td>
<td>5495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

2.5.4. **Hypothesis 3.** The results hold for the random effects models, but experience drastically different results in the fixed effects model. However, as discussed in the introduction, we should have more confidence in Models 11 and 12 due to the rarely-changing explanatory variable.

### Table C.6.3: Results for H3 (Russia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10: Base Model</th>
<th>Model 11: w/ Lagged DV</th>
<th>Model 12: w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 13: w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>7.044*** (1.24)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.00)</td>
<td>8.781*** (2.04)</td>
<td>1.475e+29 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.813*** (0.73)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.738*** (1.10)</td>
<td>1.099* (0.49)</td>
<td>-4.332** (1.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.712</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
2.5.5. Hypothesis 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past MME, 1 Year</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past MME (1 Year)</td>
<td>5.012***</td>
<td>3.057***</td>
<td>2.018***</td>
<td>1.152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>2.545***</td>
<td>1.815***</td>
<td>1.099***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>2.059***</td>
<td>1.498***</td>
<td>0.852**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.397***</td>
<td>-4.630***</td>
<td>-5.498***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5330</td>
<td>4836</td>
<td>4836</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.6.4: Results for H₄(Russia)

2.6. India

2.6.1. Hypothesis 1A. Because India has no allies, there is no variation in the explanatory variable.

2.6.2. Hypothesis 1B. Because India conducts few exercises and most are recruitment, the results for the margins plot are mostly insignificant.
2.6.3. Hypothesis 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Same Region</th>
<th>w/ Sovereign History</th>
<th>w/ Contiguity</th>
<th>w/ All</th>
<th>w/ Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>2.637***</td>
<td>2.663***</td>
<td>2.567***</td>
<td>2.047***</td>
<td>3.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>-0.365</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>3.464***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.433***</td>
<td>-5.433***</td>
<td>-5.433***</td>
<td>-5.514***</td>
<td>-6.556***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5923</td>
<td>5923</td>
<td>5923</td>
<td>5748</td>
<td>5923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.7.1: Results for H₂ (India)

2.6.4. Hypothesis 3. Because India has only conducted MMEs after the end of the Cold War, there is no variation in the explanatory variable.

2.6.5. Hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Past MME (1 Year)</th>
<th>Past MMEs (1, 2, and 4 Years)</th>
<th>w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>4.377***</td>
<td>3.761***</td>
<td>2.926***</td>
<td>1.946***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>2.155**</td>
<td>1.389*</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.721***</td>
<td>-4.670***</td>
<td>-5.361***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5748</td>
<td>5223</td>
<td>5223</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table C.7.2: Results for H₄ (India)
2.7. China

2.7.1. Hypothesis 1A. Because China has only one ally (North Korea) but has never (to my knowledge) conducted a major exercise with the ally, there is no variation for the first hypothesis.

2.7.2. Hypothesis 1B. Because China conducts so few exercises with so few partners, analyzing MME function by partner type does not reveal any significant results.

2.7.3. Hypothesis 2. The random effects model reveals that China is more likely to conduct MMEs with partners in Asia and those along its borders, but not those sharing colonial history.

### Table C.8.1: Results for $H_2$ (China)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>w/ Sovereign History</td>
<td>w/ Contiguity</td>
<td>w/ All</td>
<td>w/ Random Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>2.783***</td>
<td>2.804***</td>
<td>1.466</td>
<td>1.493</td>
<td>2.791***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony/ Sovereign Unit</td>
<td>-0.373</td>
<td>-0.478</td>
<td>-0.799</td>
<td>-0.478</td>
<td>-0.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.255</td>
<td>1.816*</td>
<td>2.142***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.930***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.596***</td>
<td>-5.596***</td>
<td>-5.657***</td>
<td>-5.774***</td>
<td>-7.290***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5960</td>
<td>5960</td>
<td>5960</td>
<td>5784</td>
<td>5960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

2.7.4. Hypothesis 3. Because China has only conducted MMEs since the end of the Cold War, there is no variation for the explanatory variable.
2.7.5. Hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16 w/ Random Effects</th>
<th>Model 17 w/ Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 1 Year</td>
<td>4.339***</td>
<td>2.753***</td>
<td>1.567***</td>
<td>0.991**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 2 Years</td>
<td>1.978**</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past MME, 4 Years</td>
<td>4.163***</td>
<td>2.773***</td>
<td>2.070***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.710***</td>
<td>-4.839***</td>
<td>-6.102***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5784</td>
<td>5256</td>
<td>5256</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

*Table C.8.2: Results for H₄(China)*
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Blasko, Dennis J. “Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 5–6 (September 18, 2016): 685–708.


States Army Center of Military History, 2011.


Dorman, Andrew M. *Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*. 349


Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.


Jackson, Nicole J. “The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-Liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia’s Influence on Central Asian Regimes.”


Kaplan, Robert D. “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and


“Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of India and


Clemmesen, Michael, Brigadier General (Danish Army, retired), former Defence Attaché to the Baltics and Commandant of the Baltic Defence College. Skype interview by author. June 12, 2017.

De Haas, Marcel, Lieutenant Colonel (Royal Netherlands Army, retired), former Professor at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan and current Senior Researcher at the Russian Studies Center, University of Groningen. Skype interview by author. June 29, 2017.

Dent, Mike, Colonel (British Army, retired), Military Advisor of the Ministry of Defence Advisory Team (MODAT) and Deputy Commander of IMATT. Email correspondence with author. August 20, 2017.


Turner, Reggie, Lieutenant Colonel (British Royal Marines), served as a liaison officer to the UN for the Royal Marine’s 42 Commando unit during Operation Palliser. Skype interview by author. June 29, 2017.