CAN THE TRAIN EVER BE STOPPED AGAIN? DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MOLUCCAN COMMUNITY IN THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE AND AFTER THE HIJACKINGS*

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Introduction

April 25, 1985. Shortly after sunrise, shivering people gather around flagpoles near the churches in Moluccan wards of small towns all over the Netherlands. A brief ceremony of prayers, speeches, and singing culminates in raising the flag of a country which today exists only in the hearts of the participants. Immediately after the ceremony, the people board hired buses, climb onto trains, or pile into private cars to begin their annual pilgrimage to the Houtrusthallen exhibition center in The Hague, the political capital of the Netherlands. On this day, they commemorate the 35th Anniversary of the proclamation of independence of the Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, generally referred to as RMS), while simultaneously lamenting their thirty-fourth year of exile in the Netherlands.

The annual gathering has essentially two objectives. The first is to remind the Dutch people, and particularly the Dutch government, of their continuing obligation to aid Moluccans in the establishment of a free homeland, independent of Indonesia, to which the exiles in Holland will then voluntarily repatriate. The second objective is a reaffirmation of those goals commonly referred to as the "RMS ideal" or "RMS ideology"[1] among the exile community itself, and a show of

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1. Little attention has been paid to the form this free republic should take, other than what was outlined in the provisional constitution dating to 1950, which has been printed repeatedly in publications on the RMS written by those close to the Moluccan cause. For a complete reprint, see Bung Penonton, *De Zuidmolukse Republiek* (Amsterdam: Buijten and Schipperheijn, 1977), pp. 246-60. Many Moluccans feel that this is an issue which can be discussed only when the RMS has become a reality, and that it must involve Moluccans living back home. Concerning the relationship a free RMS would maintain with the Netherlands, there has been no public discussion. It appears that a close economic tie but not political dependency,

solidarity both internally and externally.

Over the years, the festivities have become routine: the grand entrance of the RMS exile government is followed by a military flag-raising ceremony and the emotional singing of the national anthem by the thousands in the hall. A speech by RMS President J. A. Manusama is usually followed by orations from a prominent Dutch supporter, and more recently from leaders of other Indonesian independence movements, namely Aceh, Papua (Irian Barat), and Timor Deli (East Timor).

During the speeches, the sweltering hall hums like an active beehive. Only the dignitaries in the front rows remain in their seats. The crowd swarms back and forth, clogging the aisles, huddling in corners, and flocking around food stands. Everywhere people exuberantly greet friends, acquaintances, and relatives. Most of the speeches they have heard before, but if anyone says something new that touches their hearts, they reward him with thunderous applause. This, however, is the time of reunion and social gossip, a gigantic family feast that contributes more to group solidarity and expresses better group vitality than any speech from the podium.

Various traditional dancing and singing groups appearing on stage in the second half of the afternoon reflect the prevailing mood of the crowd, a mixture of melancholy and joy. A sense of loss and despair, overwhelming homesickness for the far-away islands, frustration, but also abundant joy of life, mirth, and the happiness of being among friends can be read on the faces of old and young, in rapid succession or simultaneously.

The annual ritual could seem merely a replica of earlier ceremonies except that the proud and erect President Manusama has become frailer as the years pass by and the girth of the uniformed men on stage has increased ever so slightly. And as time ticks cruelly away, the ranks of the old soldiers are becoming thinner, the hopes of those left behind more faded, and the crowd attending more sparse.

However, in 1985, there was a marked difference. Many more young people were attending than in previous years. Not only did they come to participate in the RMS festivities, but in the morning they marched by the thousands through the streets of The Hague, shouting RMS slogans. The police had sealed off the street on which the Indonesian Embassy is located, but when the demonstrators reached its vicinity they could not suppress their pent-up emotions. Groups of youths broke away from the demonstration and stormed through police lines to vent their anger and frustration in front of the gates of the embassy. Rocks flew across the fence smashing several windows, before the demonstrators finally left peacefully, prodded by their own leaders to rejoin the main formation and eventually disperse in front of the Houtrusthallen.[2]

Over the years more and more youths had stayed away from the reunion, disillusioned with the lack of progress of the RMS struggle. They had lost faith in a RMS leadership perceived as timid and inept, and they had become dispirited by the realization of the fruitlessness of their own often violent attempts in the sixties and seventies to force the hand of the Dutch government and gain interna-

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is deemed desirable. People are even more hazy when discussing the future RMS relationships with Indonesia, but some envision that similar relations to those outlined for the Netherlands can eventually come about.

2. A compliment has to be paid to the hopelessly outnumbered Dutch police. By refraining from using force or calling in reinforcements, they managed to keep tempers sufficiently low to prevent any outbreak of violence.

tional support. Yet, the 35th Anniversary was for many of them sufficiently special to invite their return. Not because they suddenly had found renewed faith in the movement, but, as almost all those I polled stated, they returned to honor their parents and elders.

Although the demonstration and subsequent festivities evoked nostalgic images of their fierce struggles, it was another kind of nostalgia that prevailed. There is growing realization among the young[3] that, with the steady dying away of the members of the first generation, an era of Moluccan exile history is coming to a close. They further realize that their community is changing ever more rapidly. By coming out in force on this occasion to show solidarity and appreciation for their elders' sufferings, they were reaffirming their own links with the past and a continuous commitment to the Moluccan community in the face of these changes and an uncertain future.

In the following discussion, I want to analyze some of the major developments in the Moluccan exile community, particularly among the former members of the so-called KNIL[4] and their families, since the arrival of this group in the Netherlands in 1951, with a special focus on the impact of the notorious hijackings in the mid-1970s. It is my contention that, while the hijackings (and related activities) utterly failed to advance RMS aspirations, the resulting shock effect jolted the Moluccan community out of its sociocultural paralysis, accelerating many already ongoing changes, and, most importantly, forcing the Moluccan community to reevaluate their position in Dutch society and consider new directions parallel to or even beyond the RMS ideal.

Brief History of Moluccans in Holland

Let me being with a brief historical outline. The Moluccas, an island group in the eastern region of the Indonesian archipelago, were once fabled for their spices. In the nineteenth century, the region experienced a drastic economic decline. Dutch interests shifted to Java and other islands. The task of conquering, pacifying, and controlling those areas was in the hands of a colonial army of native and European soldiers led by Dutch officers, the forementioned KNIL.

Not unlike the British use of the Christian Karen in Burma, the Dutch also preferred to recruit from ethnic minorities adhering to Christianity such as the Menadonese and Moluccans, since it was felt that they were the most trustworthy. Of all groups, the Moluccans most justified the trust put into them. Not only were they fierce and daring soldiers—often used as advance troops in trouble spots such as Aceh—but they also developed an unquestioning, if not fanatical loyalty to the Dutch, especially to the House of Orange. Their identification with the Dutch was so complete that they referred to themselves as "Black Dutchmen" (*Belanda Hitam*).[5] Just like average Dutchmen, they came to see those groups in

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3. The term "youth" in Moluccan society is liberally applied to people in the 18-40 age group.

4. *Koninklijke Nederlands Indisch Leger* or Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

5. As Ben van Kaam (*The South Moluccans* [London: Hurst, 1980], p. 4) points out, the Moluccan tendency to refer to themselves as "Black Dutchmen" ". . . generated in the Dutch both irritation ('Who do they think they are?') and satisfaction ('loyal soldiers') in turn."

the Netherlands Indies who rebelled and whom they helped to subjugate as "their enemies."[6]

During the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies in World War II, the Moluccans did not abandon their masters. Many of those who were not captured fought valiantly in the underground and those who were put into the camps shared their meager rations with the Dutch prisoners-of-war, saving many Dutch lives. When Netherlands forces returned after Japan's defeat, most Moluccan soldiers immediately rejoined ranks to fight against the Indonesian independence movement. Their numbers were swelled by many new recruits from the Moluccas.[7]

The transfer of sovereignty late in 1949 and the subsequent dismantling of the federal state in favor of a unitary Republic of Indonesia led to mass confusion and increasing panic not only among Moluccan KNIL soldiers but also among the general population back in the Moluccas. Although there was a sizable pro-Indonesian movement, many Christians carefully put their Dutch flags away in the desperate but vain hope that the Dutch would after all return. Many feared that the Javanese would take revenge for the role the Ambonese played in the colonial empire, and rumors spread that all Christians would be circumcised and forcefully converted to Islam. Federalists like Manusama, a Dutch-educated civil engineer and teacher who was born on Java and only in 1947 set foot for the first time on Ambon, convinced many that only a federal state would assure them some measure of autonomy from Javanese domination.

When the federal bubble burst, the Ambonese panicked--according to all accounts, including their own. They declared their independence on April 25, 1950, claiming as their territory the Central and Southeast Moluccas.[8] This

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6. Hendrik Kraemer, *From Missionfield to Independent Church* (The Hague: Boekencentrum, 1958). Kraemer, a keenly observant missionary, also discusses the feelings of superiority, based on religion, felt by Central Moluccan Christians vis-à-vis their Moslem brethren who, during Kraemer's time (1926), made up roughly one-third and today constitute at least half of the Ambonese population. Yet, despite the large number of Moslems, the fiction remains in Indonesia and elsewhere that the Central Moluccas are Christian islands. Even among young, Dutch-born Moluccans, the impression prevails that Moslems constitute only a tiny minority in their home islands. These misconceptions are due to the fact that it was overwhelmingly Christians who joined the Dutch colonial services outside the Moluccas and to the publicity Christian exiles received during their political actions. Only a tiny minority (an estimated 2 percent) of the exiles is Moslem and they have generally been politically passive. For an analysis of Ambon's Moslems, see Richard Chauvel, "Ambon's Other Half: Some Preliminary Observations on Ambonese Moslem Society and History," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 14, 1 (1980): 40-80.

7. After World War II, 25,000 Moluccan soldiers were in the service of the KNIL. With the transfer of sovereignty (1949), 12,000 of these were demobilized, 6,000 were discharged, and 1,000 entered the Indonesian army (TNI). Circa 2,000 soldiers stationed in the South Moluccas became the core forces of the RMS army and about 4,000 others, stationed mainly on western islands, mostly on Java, refused to be demobilized or discharged anywhere but in the Moluccas or (then still) Dutch New Guinea (Günter Decker, *Republik Maluku Selatan* [Göttingen: Schwarz, 1957], p. 31).

8. The islands claimed by the RMS are identical to those constituting the present-

bubble burst too when the new Indonesian government imposed a blockade and its forces then attacked Ambon, defeating the "rebels" after a few months and only after vehement resistance. A guerrilla movement continued under the leadership of Dr. Christiaan Soumokil on the large island of Seram into the 1960s.[9]

In the meantime, an overwhelming number of Moluccan KNIL soldiers stationed elsewhere in Indonesia, mostly on Java, fearing reprisals from the nationalists, refused either to be demobilized on Republican-controlled territory or to enter the TNI. Instead, they demanded that their discharge take place on Ambon or in western New Guinea (now Irian Jaya), then still under Dutch control. A stalemate developed when President Sukarno, suspecting that the soldiers would reinforce the RMS movement, refused to go along with this demand.

A delegation of KNIL soldiers went to the Netherlands and took their case to court. The judge agreed to their demands, and the Dutch government decided to bring the 4,000 soldiers plus around 8,500 family members "temporarily" to Holland in March and April of 1951.[10] Most people expected that emotions would cool

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day kabupaten Maluku Tengah and Maluku Tenggara, subdivisions of the province Maluku of the Republic of Indonesia.

9. This short summary of the events surrounding the declaration of the RMS is based on Ben vaan Kaam, *The South Moluccans* and Bung Penonton, *De Zuidmolukse Republiek*. A succinct account of post-World War II Moluccan history can be found in Richard Chauvel, "Ambon: Not a Revolution but a Counterrevolution," in *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution*, ed. Audrey R. Kahin (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 237-64.

Soumokil, a former minister of justice and attorney general of the federal State of East Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timur), was involved in the Andy Aziz coup in South Sulawesi and later was one of the chief figures behind the RMS. In 1952, he became president of the RMS emergency government on Seram. Arrested in 1963, he was condemned to death in 1964 but only executed in 1966 by order of Suharto.

Manusama, who had left Seram on a political mission in 1952, arrived via New Guinea in the Netherlands in 1953. Having played at least as important a role in the RMS proclamation as Soumokil, he was of great symbolic value to the RMS movement in the Netherlands and became president of the RMS exile government after Soumokil's death.

10. 76.1 percent of the troops were ethnic Ambonese, i.e., people born in the Central Moluccas (65.5 percent) or born outside the Moluccas but of Ambonese origin. Most of the remaining 23.9 percent came from the southeastern Moluccan islands (e.g., Kei and Tanimbar). No breakdown for the total 12,500 people is available, although it is known that 93 percent of them were Protestant, ±4.5 percent Roman Catholic (mostly from the southeastern Moluccas) and ±2.5 percent Moslems (largely ethnic Ambonese). A number of the soldiers' wives were of non-Moluccan origin (mostly Javanese), who generally had converted to the religion of their husbands. For more details, see Commissie Verwey-Jonker, *Ambonezen in Nederland* (The Hague: Staats-drukkerij- en Uitgevereijbedrijf, 1959).

In the beginning, all the newcomers were generically referred to as "Ambonese," a label resented by people from the Tenggara region who have had longstanding feuds with the Ambonese because of the latter's dominating and condescending attitude based on feelings of cultural superiority. Violent clashes between the two groups in the camp period prompted the Dutch government to place them in separate wards. Relationships have been improving in recent years among the

MOLUCCAN CAMPS AND
WARDS IN THE NETHERLANDS

(as of November 1, 1965)



Explanations

woonoorden = camps

woonwijken = wards (circled numbers)

Woonoorden

1. Wijdemerck
2. Ybenheer
3. Marum
4. Schattenberg
5. Geesbrug
6. Laarbrug
7. Conrad
8. Almère
9. De Biezen
10. Kazerne
11. Singel
12. Utrechtse Straatweg
13. Vaassen
14. Vossenbos
15. Goiflinks
16. De Haar
17. Snodenhoek
18. Klein Baal
19. Overbroek
20. Lingebrug
21. Ijsseloord
22. Lunetten
23. Genapium
24. Oude Molen
25. Donzel
26. Vierlingsbeek
27. Blerick
28. Tungelroy
29. Montfort
30. Op de Loop
31. Rijckholt
32. Middelburg
33. Vliegveld Souburg
34. Vlakwater

De omlijnde cijfers geven de woonwijken aan:

1. Appingedam
2. Delfzijl
3. Hoogkerk
4. Groningen
5. Marum
6. Oosterwolde
7. Hoogezand
8. Assen
9. Almelo
10. Deventer
11. Winterswijk
12. Cuyck
13. Geleen
14. Heer
15. Nijverdal
16. Rijssen
17. Zevenaar
18. Teuge
19. Tiel
20. Leerdam
21. Moordrecht
22. Krimpen aan de Ijssel
23. Waddinxveen
24. Wormerveer
25. Tilburg
26. Souburg
27. Middelburg
28. Koudekerke
29. Barneveld
30. Hoogeveen
31. Eerbeek
32. Doesburg
33. Opheusden
34. Elst
35. Breda
36. Breukelen
37. Hatert
38. Bemmel
39. Helmond
40. Waalwijk
41. Zwolle
42. Apeldoorn
43. Lunteren
44. Culemborg
45. Alphen a/d Rijn

down within a few months and the Moluccans could then return safely to the Moluccas. This, of course, never happened.

Once having arrived in cold, damp Holland, the soldiers were rather unceremoniously discharged and put into camps spread all over the country—such as the former German concentration camps of Schattenberg and Vught.[11] This discharge, in the form of a mimeographed slip of paper, was the single biggest blunder the Dutch made and the primary source of all troubles to come in future years. The Moluccans felt sold out, treated like worthless trash. Even today, many feel that dogs would have been better rewarded for their loyalty.[12] Love and devotion were replaced by disappointment and embitterment. The proud soldiers felt emasculated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage meaning in their lives.[13]

While living in the drafty, ramshackle camps, the dreams of an imminent return to their home islands could be maintained. However, starting in the early 1960s, the Moluccans were moved, group after group, into newly built *wijken*, or wards, often located on what were then the outskirts of small- to middle-sized towns. The solid, drab, stone buildings symbolized permanence and a bleak future in a foreign country, an idea most Moluccans did not accept.

The older generation did not yet give up the belief that the Dutch government would return them to a free Maluku in accordance with a promise they are convinced was made to them.[14] Moluccans view a promise (*janji*) as a very

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young people, who do not share the bitter memories of their elders.

After some years, Moluccans began to refer to themselves as "South Moluccans," a term which is more inclusive and is also a political statement of a commitment to the RMS. The Dutch government has stopped using the term "Ambonese" but also rejected the designation "South Moluccans" because of its sensitivity vis-à-vis Indonesia. Instead, it has adopted, uniformly, the term "Moluccans."

11. See map for the geographical distribution of the former camps and most of the wards mentioned below. After this map was issued by the Dutch government, fifteen more wards were built. All the camps were abolished, with the exception of camp Lunetten in Vught. Once the second largest camp with ca. 2,100 inhabitants, the numbers there have dwindled to a few hundred who have held out mostly for political reasons. The planned dissolution of the camp in 1986 has created a lot of tension among Moluccans nationwide. Many would like to see at least part of it preserved as a historic monument.

12. Since most Moluccans who came to Holland never felt themselves to be Indonesian nationals, they never faced the question of whether or not their role in colonial times was morally correct. Younger people do realize that their elders were tools of Dutch colonialism, but they almost entirely blame the Dutch.

13. The Dutch soon realized their mistake and tried to rectify the situation by offering the soldiers the opportunity to enlist in a civil guard in July 1952. The offer came too late. Nationalism ran high in the camps, and the Moluccans refused even to consider the proposal before some political concessions regarding the RMS were made, and they eventually rejected it altogether (van Kaam, *South Moluccans*, p. 138).

14. The Dutch authorities insist that such a promise was never made. It is, however, conceivable that Dutch officials in Indonesia made statements to that effect to assure a smooth transfer of the KNIL troops to Holland. Whatever may be the truth, older Moluccans firmly believe that such a promise exists.

serious undertaking, making the person who gives it subject to supernatural punishment if his promises are not kept, so they continued to believe the one given by the Dutch would eventually be fulfilled.

The Moluccan Community Prior to the Hijackings

Life in the camps, and also perhaps during the early years of the wards, was extremely public. In the camps, only paper-thin walls separated the families from one another, and doors were never locked. People would go in and out of each other's cramped living quarters without ever knocking on the door.

Hospitality was a matter of course and so was mutual help whenever needed. The Moluccans call this *masohi*. In Java it is known as *gotong-royong*. Virtually everyone was invited to the numerous baptisms, confirmations, weddings, and, of course, funerals, which traditionally have the function of creating unity in an often divisive society. Thus, large feasts were common, but so were large-scale fights--both apparently enjoyed with the same relish. Despite the spartan, harsh living conditions, life in the camps was *ramai*, filled with fun. In a way, it was little different from their former life in the military barracks (*tangsi*) back in Indonesia. It should come as no surprise that in such a situation of open living, social control was very strong, and at times oppressive. Individuals had very little room for personal freedom. All had to conform to established, rigorously enforced rules and norms of *adat* (customary laws and traditions) and the military code of behavior.[15]

Adat was strictly adhered to. Probably more so in the diaspora than back in Indonesia. But it was mostly adat-by-rote, i.e., people followed, and forced their children to follow, customs and rules of whose underlying philosophy the ex-soldiers knew little. Most of them had left their home village (*negeri*) in their teens and twenties, too young to be fully initiated, let alone interested, in the refinements of their own culture. About one-tenth of them had been born outside the Moluccas and so knew even less.

Thus, in many instances, adat had to be reconstructed, piece by piece, from the little everyone remembered. The resulting end product sometimes differed from one to the other region in Holland and was occasionally quite different from the way a certain custom was, and is, handled in the Moluccas.

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15. In numerous interviews Moluccans, both old and young, described camp life with a mix of bittersweet exuberance and sentimentality. They remember political infighting, the bullying by some ex-sergeants, the intense pressure to conform, but when they add up the negative and positive aspects in their memories softened by the passing years, the good times outweigh the bad. The camp, like the *tangsi*, seems some Paradise Lost, a period of intense community feeling sorely missed and never to be recovered. From the beginning, however, there were many who left the camps for reasons of personal ambition or because of conflicts with others and, as time went on, quite a few were forced out for political reasons, as we will see below. For an eyewitness description of the situation in the camps in the first period, see Tamme Wittermans, "Social Organization of Ambonese Refugees in Holland" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1976), pp. 22-66 and passim. A close-up description of the situation in three small camps in one small town (Woerden, South Holland) is given by Nico van Wijk, *Ambon of Belanda?* (Leiden: COMT, 1985).

One such example is *pela*, an intervillage alliance system based on mutual help. In the Central Moluccas intermarriage between members of the allied villages is, with few exceptions, strictly forbidden; a person's village affiliation which determines with whom a person is "pela," is reckoned patrilineally.[16] In the Netherlands, however, Moluccans trace village affiliation bilaterally. This means that young men or women must count not only the pela of their father, but also that of their mother and, by extension, of their grandparents on both sides, and so on--going back anywhere from three to seven generations. Thus, while someone in the Moluccas must take account of only a small fixed number of pela, a Moluccan in Holland can end up with a very large and ever increasing number of pela, limiting his or her marriage choice considerably. Within a few generations, everyone will be pela with everyone else and Moluccans will have to marry exogamously (i.e., with partners from other ethnic groups), if they don't return to the original rules or otherwise alter them.

Up to the mid-1970s, it can be said that, in general, adat and the Moluccan lifestyle as such were accepted as given and only of secondary importance. What dominated collective thought was the RMS ideology. For the group there was only one primary goal: the return to an independent state in the Moluccas.[17] However, almost from the start Moluccans could not agree on a common strategy for achieving this goal. Numerous movements rose and disappeared, with their leaders frequently gaining followers more on the basis of traditional family, village, pela, and island loyalties than by the appeal of particular ideologies. There were various attempts at unification. In December 1962 several factions decided to create a federation called Badan Persekutuan (BP), and when this failed the various groups within BP were dissolved in June 1966 to form a new unitary front called Badan Persatuan Rajat Maluku Selatan (BPRMS). At this same meeting, formation of the Pemerintah Darurat ("Emergency Government") was announced, with J. S. Manusama as president. The exile government was promised the backing of the BPRMS, which could claim support from a majority of Moluccans in the Netherlands.[18]

This did not end factionalist strife. Another challenge was mounted in 1968 when a charismatic and colorful ex-KNIL sergeant, I. J. Tamaela, founded a movement popularly known as "Missie Militer" (later changed to Front Siwa Lima), and the following year declared himself president of a counter-government. Charging Manusama with having failed to further the RMS cause, especially in the international arena, Tamaela did not bother to deal with Dutch authorities but concentrated on the United Nations, setting himself up in the United States. His major

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16. For a full account of the *pela* village alliance system, see Dieter Bartels, "Guarding the Invisible Mountain" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1977).

17. In the earliest years the establishment of a Moluccan Protestant Church (Geredja Indjil Maluku), independent of the Dutch Reformed Church whose beliefs are shared by Moluccans, also played an important role. This church was always closely tied to the RMS struggle.

18. The chairman of the Badan Persekutuan was Dominee S. Metiary, a former army chaplain. He was also elected chairman of the BPRMS, a function he still holds. It seems that Metiary is the most important power broker in the organization, while Manusama, one of the original engineers of the RMS in Ambon and thus a symbol of the struggle, has been able to remain aloof from internal strife. For details on the foundation of the PB and BPRMS, see Penonton, *Zuidmolukse Republiek*, pp. 143-47 and 153-54.

coup was when he gained recognition for his movement from the African state of Benin (formerly Dahomey), offering new hope to many Moluccans who likewise were disillusioned by the stagnation of the RMS struggle. Violent clashes broke out in many Moluccan communities between the followers of Manusama and Tamaela in the first years of the "Missie" movement. The movement lost much of its impetus in the seventies and has shown little activity since the death of its prophet in Benin in 1978, but many of its original followers still bear the mental scars of the fierce persecutions they suffered from the Manusama forces and retain their hostility toward that group.

As can be seen, much energy has been spent in bitter internal struggles between RMS'ers and those suspected of disloyalty, as well as between the various factions and splinter groups supporting the RMS. It was in connection with these struggles that social control was most oppressive. Deviants were often threatened with death, physical harm, or branded as traitors and ostracized. Inside the camps and wards, opposition was not tolerated.

During this all-encompassing struggle for and within the RMS, the various leaders largely neglected either to prepare their people for an eventual return to their homeland or to cope with life in Holland, even if only temporarily. Until the hijacking period, there was hardly any discussion about the viability of adat, about adjusting to the Dutch situation, or about taking advantage of educational and economical opportunities which might be useful in either Holland or the Moluccas. Instead, there was only one single vision and one single-minded pursuit which was acceptable--that of the RMS.

And during these years there was very little economic progress. Moluccans initially did find employment in the postwar boom period of the early 1950s but mostly as unskilled or semiskilled laborers in factories or shipyards. Their children, usually having a poor command of Dutch, were, more often than not, funneled into technical schools (boys) and home economics schools (girls). Career choices were largely left to the often paternalistic Dutch teachers, partly because the parents could not communicate with the school officials and partly because the traditional idea still prevailed that "*guru*" (teachers) have elevated status and their decisions must not be questioned. There were, of course, exceptions, but only around 1970 did a small number of young Moluccans begin to enter universities.

Economic and social advance was further hindered by the physical and psychological isolation of the Moluccans in their camps and wards. Almost all of the camps were located outside small towns and cities. Most of the new wards built especially for Moluccans were also situated on what were then the edges of towns, usually as self-contained compounds physically separating Dutch and Moluccan inhabitants. But isolation was also self-imposed. Contacts with the Dutch were shunned. After work or school, Moluccans would retreat into the security of their living quarters where all their social life took place. Increasingly, they were left stranded at the margins of society, and, gradually, the other ethnic minorities, all but one of which arrived much later in the Netherlands, passed them in terms of economic advancement and generally in their functional integration into Dutch society.

To summarize, prior to the unrest of the late 1960s and the subsequent hijackings, the Moluccan community was culturally at a standstill, stymied in its development towards emancipation and economic advancement. Rigid clinging to the RMS ideology was largely responsible for the apparent stagnation. Nevertheless, under the surface crucial changes were occurring which, in the long run would radically alter the self-image and identity of Moluccans, as well as the

social web of the community. Many of these creeping social changes were intensified and became more visible after the hijackings and therefore will be discussed in this context below.

At the time of the hijackings the Moluccan population in Holland had tripled to an estimated 35-40,000 people. These figures include a few thousand Moluccans who were either former members of the Dutch Navy or Moluccans who had been working for the Dutch in New Guinea and had chosen to come to Holland in 1962--the year western New Guinea (West Irian) was transferred to Indonesia.[19] The rest of the increase was due to a population explosion among the former KNIL exiles, who still placed a strong cultural value on large families and had virtually no knowledge about prevention methods.

The Hijackings and Their Aftermath

During the mid-1960s, segments of Moluccan youth became increasingly restless. This restlessness must be seen in the context of the international youth revolts, the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, the general antiestablishment feelings, and the various liberation movements,[20] particularly, the Black Power movement in the United States. The Black Panthers made an especially strong impression, not only ideologically, but also on the young Moluccans' dress and hairstyles. Despite these outside influences the roots of unrest must be sought within the Moluccan community.

One internal source for the ferment may have been the sudden transition from the sheltered, self-contained life in the camps to much more impersonal housing developments next to the Dutch. Moreover, people from the large camps were dispersed among several, sometimes distant, housing projects which separated relatives and disrupted friendships. Children from the large camps who had been going to Moluccan schools now suddenly found themselves a minority in Dutch schools, ill-equipped to follow the curriculum and to interact with their Dutch peers.[21]

In the midst of the new upheaval and uncertainty, the youths saw the futile bickering among the leaders and the total lack of progress in the RMS struggle. Their parents still felt the shock of their traumatic arrival, a trauma that had been magnified as, year after year, their hopes of return became dimmer and

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19. Both these groups are financially much better off than the KNIL group. The Navy members have relatively high pensions, and the generally better-educated people from New Guinea found good paying jobs with relative ease. Large numbers of both groups sympathized with the RMS, but were rejected by the KNIL group as being not truly Moluccan. There are concentrations of one or other group in some cities, but they all live spread out rather than in wards.

20. The unrest and the spread of ideologies was facilitated, unwittingly, by the Dutch railways, which issued a very inexpensive youth ticket which allowed its holders to travel anywhere in Holland for a week. This made it possible, for the first time, for Moluccan youth to meet in large numbers at rock concerts or by visiting each other's wards.

21. The youths involved in the hijackings grew up in Camp Schattenberg, a totally self-contained camp located in an isolated woody region in Drenthe Province, miles away from the surrounding villages.

dimmer. The young watched the older generation suffer, increasingly more disillusioned and ever more disappointed over what seemed to them the treason committed by the Dutch. The old soldiers and their wives felt disappointment, not hatred. Even today, listening to them relate their autobiographies, I rarely find hatred—only despair and tears of disappointment rolling down their cheeks.

Hatred, without doubt, burned in the hearts of many of their sons and daughters, who were angered at their parents' treatment at the hands of the Dutch. The young people felt it was their responsibility to restore their parents' honor, if not to avenge them. Yet, most felt equally powerless and hopeless. They, too, dreamed of the paradisiacal islands far away, described to them in tropical lushness by their parents while, simultaneously, they were being attracted to the luxuries of Western life. They were caught, betwixt and between, belonging neither here nor there.

Much less patient than their parents, and with a great deal less trust in the honorable intentions of the Dutch government or the effectiveness of their own leadership, feeling alienated, uprooted, and powerless, Moluccan youths became increasingly radicalized. Observing the success of liberation and antiestablishment movements, they began to adopt the same patterns of dissent and violence, escalating their methods as did terrorist groups elsewhere, to force both the Netherlands and Indonesia to listen to their demands for the establishment of a free RMS. The first major action occurred on the nights of July 26 and 27, 1966. In retribution for the execution of RMS President Soumokil, militant youths set light to the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague.

Another act of violence occurred a few years later on August 31, 1970, when Moluccan youths occupied the Indonesian Embassy on the eve of President Suharto's visit to the Netherlands—the first visit by an Indonesian Head-of-State to the country of the former colonizers. In the wake of this so-called "Wassenaar Incident" (*Peristiwa Wassenaar*), one Dutch policeman was left dead.[22]

The next incidents occurred in 1975. Vietnam had defeated and expelled the US forces and the PLO terrorists had been staging spectacular hijackings and kidnappings. A plan to kidnap Queen Juliana was foiled in the spring of that year. But in December, young Moluccan extremists hijacked a train near Assen (in the northern part of Holland) where the largest concentration of Moluccans is settled. Only two days later, another group seized the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam. Four people died before the two groups surrendered to the authorities. Two years later, Moluccans again made headlines in the world press. In May 1977, two different groups (again from the north) occupied an elementary school and hijacked yet another train, taking a total of 105 children and 59 adults hostage. Twenty days later, Dutch troops recaptured the train and school. Six terrorists and two hostages were dead.[23]

The four train hijackings and hostage-taking actions in 1975 and 1977 were the desperate deeds of small groups of young people—a total of twenty-six men

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22. For a personal account of the "Wassenaar Incident" by one of the protagonists, see Tete Siahaya, *Wassenaar '70: Zuid Molukkers slaan terug* (Amsterdam: De Dezige Bij, 1972).

23. The actions in 1975 and 1977 are recorded in Ralph Barker, *Not Here, But in Another Place, A True Story of Captors and Hostages* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). See also A. P. Schmid and J. de Graaf, *Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (Leiden: COMT, 1980), pp. 262-315.

and one woman--who had simply reached the end of the line in their despair. They were friends who acted more or less spontaneously, not conspirators with long-term goals, and they had no apparent connections to international terrorist organizations. While they captured the front page headlines of the world press and sent shockwaves throughout Holland, they did not stand alone. Rather they dared to put into action what many other young Moluccans felt at the time.

Quite predictably, the actions were a complete failure as far as attaining their political goals is concerned. Also quite predictably, the actions did not gain sympathy for the Moluccan cause but rather triggered a considerable backlash among the Dutch population, aggravating rather than alleviating the position of the Moluccans in Holland.[24]

The actions did, however, have the result that the Dutch government began to pay a lot more attention to the Moluccans than previously. Money was lavishly spent on projects benefiting Moluccans, and a Moluccan Advisory Council[25] was created which is supposed to have some input in governmental decisions concerning Moluccans. Perhaps the Dutch were able to buy time, but the political problem remained unsolved.

The actions also had the effect of drawing the Moluccan community in Holland closer together than ever before. This happened in two ways. On one hand, widespread abuse by Dutch civilians and indiscriminate actions by the police against younger Moluccans (including non-involved Southeast Moluccans and Ambonese Moslems) countrywide, made those Moluccans living outside the wards and better integrated into the Dutch system suddenly aware of their vulnerability as a racial minority. Those who had long ago left the wards all felt a new and greater solidarity with those inside them, with many returning to the wards or deciding to settle close to them, where they felt more secure.

On the other hand, while most Moluccans did not condone the violence, they did accept collective guilt, and with it, felt a deep appreciation for the sacrifice

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24. The immediate repercussions ranged from Dutch civilians cursing Moluccans on the streets to police harassing young Moluccans or anybody who faintly resembled them, including many Dutch-Indonesians. A more long-term effect resulted from stereotyping Moluccans as violence-prone, leading to widespread discrimination, particularly on the labor market. For an analysis of the positive and negative effects of the actions on the Moluccan community and on Dutch society, see André Köbben, "De gijzelingsakties van Zuikmolukkers en hun effekten op do samenleving," *Transaktie* 8, 2 (1979): 147-54. Professor Köbben concludes that the overall effects were negative but admits that this statement is a value judgment. I agree with him that in the short run (the article was written only two years after the last actions) the effects were indeed detrimental, but I also believe strongly, based on the post-hijacking developments outlined on the following pages, that, in the long run, the positive effects will outweigh the negative. May this also stand as a "value judgment."

25. Inspraakorgaan Welzijn Molukkers (IWM). Although members of the IWM frequently complain that the government often makes decisions concerning Moluccans without waiting for their advice, the organization has been quite successful as a watchdog agency and able to generate sufficient pressure to make the government modify or back off from policy decisions considered detrimental to Moluccan interests.

The success of the IWM may be one of the reasons behind recent attempts by the Dutch government to abolish it and create an advisory board for all minorities, in which, based on numerical considerations alone, Moluccans would have much less power.

the youngsters had made for their people (*bangsa*). The community, usually split into innumerable factions based on social divisions and regional affiliations, as well as religious and political groupings, became unified at the funeral of the hijackers who had been killed by the Dutch troops in retaking the train in the 1977 hijacking. The funeral was attended by 17,000 mourners. If the hijackers' intention was to revive a Moluccan consciousness, they certainly succeeded, and this heightened awareness of being Moluccan has continued until today.

But these dramatic events had other unintended outcomes which, in my judgment, were much more crucial, because of their implications for the future development of the Moluccan community in Holland—outcomes which are, ironically, in many ways contrary to the young idealists' aims. I want to emphasize that I do not see the hijackings as the direct cause of these developments and again stress that some of them had already begun before. Rather, I see the hijackings as a catharsis (and a catalyst) in the sense that they had a purging effect which forced Moluccans to look at themselves and their ideals and to reevaluate their position in the Netherlands.

Before describing these effects, a few words should be said about other immigrant groups who now make their home in the Netherlands. The Dutch-Indonesian people born in Indonesia of Eurasian origin who arrived at about the same time as the Moluccans, integrated with such speed into Dutch society that the authorities like to present them as their "show case" of successful adaptation; so successful indeed that the government no longer even considers them a minority.[26] Successive waves of immigrants from Surinam, the Netherlands-Antilles, and the Mediterranean regions all came to the Netherlands voluntarily and, while facing problems of culture shock and discrimination, made conscious efforts to integrate at least structurally.[27] This is even true to some extent for those segments of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands who are not part of the KNIL contingent.

The KNIL Moluccans have faced some, if not most, of the problems encountered by the above groups and have employed, or perhaps will be employing in the future, similar or identical strategies to find solutions. What makes the case of the KNIL Moluccans unique is that they have been the only ethnic minority which steadfastly claimed to be in Holland against their will and stubbornly resisted, as a group, even structural integration—let alone psychological integration, i.e., voluntary assimilation. The main differences between them and other immigrant groups, therefore, lay not so much in the types of problems or strategies but in the divergent processes of adaptation themselves.

The hijackings clearly shocked many Moluccans into a realization of the hopelessness of attaining the RMS and the small prospect of a collective return to the Moluccas in the near future. More or less consciously, they had probably been aware much earlier that they might have to stay in Holland for a long period of time, or perhaps permanently. However, any person who voiced such

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26. They are, for example, deleted in a report to the government by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Rinus Penninx, *Ethnic Minorities* [The Hague: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 1979]). In recent years, however, there seems to be a growing ethnic consciousness developing among young Indonesian-Dutch which could create unexpected problems for the Dutch government. The "assimilation process" of the Indonesian-Dutch is described by Hans van Amersfoort, *Immigration and Formation of Minority Groups* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 81-96.

27. Their social position is outlined in Penninx, *Ethnic Minorities*, pp. 47-151.

thoughts would inevitably be labeled a "traitor." Now, it is possible to discuss not only the chances of permanent stay in the Netherlands but even the political and social problems a mass return would create.

For the first time, Moluccans are considering the possibility of rejection by the people back home, who would not only lose their regular subsidiary income in form of money sent from their relations in Holland but also would have to share already scarce resources, particularly land. Young Moluccans also worry aloud that their life styles are radically different, and that the people living in the islands would resent any attempts to have "Western ways" of doing things forced upon them, and certainly would resist being bossed around in the political arena.

It has also become an open topic for discussion whether or not they could adjust to life in the Moluccas. While many still emphatically claim that they can easily forsake Western luxury and keep themselves busy with working to develop their homeland, others are not so sure that they could even adjust to the sanitary conditions there. It has become possible now to state openly one's decision not to return to the Moluccas, even in the event of the realization of the RMS. This breaking of the taboo against discussing these issues publicly has been leading to an acceleration in the speed of change but also to a greater control over the direction this change—or changes—will take.

One decisive change has occurred in the political sphere. The RMS ideal, still strong among the older people who are slowly dying away, has been put on the back burner by many in the middle generation (ca. 25-45 years of age) and is definitely secondary for most of the youngest generation. Individual happiness and well-being, here and now, are considered of first importance. It is certainly too early to write the obituary for the RMS but, for the moment, it has lost much of its glamor. In Bovensmilde, home of the hijackers and former RMS bastion, young leaders now openly state that the prosperity of Moluccans in Holland must be their first concern.

One incident, occurring on the sidelines during the actions, might have contributed as much to the decline of the RMS ideal, as the failure of the actions by itself. It was a statement by RMS President Manusama in which he disowned the hijackers "as being his children."[28] The peers of the hijackers, and many other Moluccans, never forgave him—not for condemning the actions, but for failing to take responsibility for all his people, even if they were wrong. The result has been a considerable loss of prestige and respect not only for Manusama himself, but also for the RMS political organization, the Badan Persatuan. Then, and now, the BP dominates many of the ward councils. But its leaders have since lost much of their previous control over the people, a development which, in turn, has facilitated the growth of greater individual freedom in the wards.

Identity Search and Westernization

The issue most directly confronting the Moluccans in the wake of the hijackings was that of identity: "Who are we Moluccans? What constitutes Moluccanness? What is our position in Holland?"

These became the central questions, initiating a sometimes painful reevaluation of the Moluccan society in Holland, its relationship to the Moluccas and to

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28. Some Moluccans argue that the hijackings were as much directed against Manusama and the Badan Persatuan as against the Dutch government.

the colonial past. The search for identity has touched almost every aspect of Moluccan culture and society, including history, adat, language, education, family and social relationships, and religion. Of course, there were, and are, no single approaches and solutions. Different persons and groups tried to follow different roads. But, I believe some general trends can be discerned which I want to discuss below. As we will see, some of the developments pull towards separatism, while others push towards greater integration into Dutch society. In this sense Moluccans are still betwixt and between.

History and Adat

There has been a great interest in historical and anthropological works on the Moluccas. Everything written on Moluccans is indiscriminately bought, or photocopied, and collected. This reading has led to an awareness of colonial history, especially about the not-always-praiseworthy activities of the Dutch. The former "comrades-in-arms" are now often vilified, but the peculiar role Moluccans played during the colonial period is still largely skirted. Ethnographies are used to create myths about the precolonial, unspoiled Moluccan, a kind of noble savage, the "Alifuru."[29] This quest for one's roots creates not only ethnic pride; there is also the danger that the newly acquired knowledge about the past will help increase the already strong anti-Dutch feelings.

Adat as practiced by the Moluccans in Holland has also come under close scrutiny. The young people are no longer satisfied when their parents tell them that they have to follow a certain custom because it is adat, or because it always has been done that way. They want to know its origin and its function and have become quite critical of certain customs and folkways. More and more, traditional adat loses its function as an all-encompassing way of life. Rather, it becomes a convenient identity marker vis-à-vis the Dutch.

Even the earlier-mentioned pela alliances have come under attack, despite pela's almost sacred status as the most uniquely Moluccan institution. The youth find the many marriage restrictions a nuisance, especially since their elders have been unable to explain the meaning of pela to them in a way that justifies in their eyes making sacrifices for it.

Yet, at the same time as the search and research of adat has intensified, and as many youngsters are also visiting the Moluccas to find their roots, there has been developing a growing social distance vis-à-vis their "home villages" in the Moluccas, which once were the central reference points in terms of identity.[30] For example, at meetings of village associations, the so-called *kumpulan*,[31] more

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29. "Alifuru" is the collective term for the inland tribes of Seram. During colonial times the term also connoted "savage"--in the negative sense of the word. The Alifuru was despised not only by the Dutch but by the population of Ambon-Lease as well. The symbolic reversal from negative to positive has, independently, also occurred in the Central Moluccas.

30. Regardless of where Moluccans are born, they almost always refer to the village of clan origin as the "home." Only recently have young Moluccans in Holland stopped this convention, referring first to the Dutch towns in which their ward is located.

31. A *kumpulan* is an organization of people from a certain village or island. The purpose is to hold the group together, uphold adat, help with projects of the

and more young people complain about the large amounts of money collected and sent to the home village to finance various projects, claiming that the money could be put to better use by supporting youth activities of the village organization in Holland.

Language and Education

The issue of language is central for the Moluccans. When they arrived in Holland most of them spoke Ambon-Malay, a regional variant of Malay enriched in the tangsi with words and expressions derived from Indonesian and Javanese. In contrast to what has occurred in the Moluccas themselves, where the modern vocabulary of Ambon-Malay has been expanding by the incorporation of Indonesian terms, the soldiers' version spoken in Holland remained relatively static. Since Indonesian terms were rejected for political reasons, vocabulary gaps have been partially filled by Dutch loanwords. In this form Ambonese Malay has continued to be used as the preferred means of communication among the Indonesian-born older generation of Moluccans. The younger generations, especially the first Dutch-born generation, being exposed to Malay at home and Dutch at school or work, developed their own creole, a seemingly random mix of Malay and Dutch, referred to as "Malayu Sini." Largely incomprehensible to the older generation, this "pidgin" created a communications gap between the generations. It has also had the effect of crippling the younger people's knowledge of Dutch, severely hampering their educational advancement and their employment chances.

Young parents now are more conscious about the future of their children and are making efforts to have them learn good Dutch at the expense of Malay. Some even go so far as to send their children not to the neighborhood schools traditionally attended by Moluccan children, but to all-Dutch schools. This means, in some cases, choosing schools without religious affiliation (*openbare scholen*) rather than the Protestant schools traditionally preferred by the strongly religious Moluccans. This is done to prevent the children from speaking Malay with their agemates and also to prevent peer pressure in the choice of a secondary education, thus trying to break the traditional pattern of children choosing to go to schools selected by most of their friends--which often means trade schools instead of high schools.[32]

A reverse trend can be detected among the children of those Moluccans who left the camps early on their own initiative, determined to succeed in Dutch society or, at least, give their offspring the best possible head start. In their families, Dutch was spoken exclusively at home to assure that children would be fluent in this language.[33] This was true also for youngsters from the New Guinea

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home village, and contribute labor and money for funerals of members. They usually have one general meeting a year and also stage dancing events, sport tournaments, lotteries, etc.

32. The number of youths entering universities is still very low and the numbers of graduates even lower. Consistent with the ongoing identity search, "Indonesian Studies" has become a popular field. More young people have been seeking degrees in the field of "Social Work" in their stated desire to work for the progress of "their own people." Programs in this field are taught in the Netherlands in special schools, the so-called Social Academies (*Sociaale Academies*).

33. Compared with Americans, the Dutch are much more language-conscious, and

and Navy groups whose generally better-educated parents either have a good command of Dutch or even have Dutch as their first language. Before the hijackings, all these youngsters had little or no contact with KNIL-Moluccans, but the actions (and the resulting discrimination by the Dutch) have raised their consciousness of being Moluccan and have drawn them closer to the KNIL groups where they have found increasing acceptance by their peers.

Among them in recent years, there has been a conscious attempt to save Ambonese Malay and to have it taught in the schools. A small but growing minority even pleads for Indonesian as the language to be taught. Some youngsters who grew up outside the wards are now angry at their parents' decision to speak only Dutch at home to assure that their children would learn proper Dutch and thus succeed in Holland. Quite a few of these young people have learned, or are trying to learn, Malay on their own--which is their passport into the larger Moluccan community where they seek to belong and become fully accepted.

Family and Social Interaction

As far as the family itself is concerned, there have been changes too over the past thirty years. One which occurred rather quietly was the drastic reduction in the size of the Moluccan family. The Indonesian-born group valued large families, and ten or more children were common. In contrast, the Dutch-born families average only two to three children--just as their Dutch counterparts. One result of the smaller family size has been the stabilization of the size of the Moluccan community.

There has been a steadily increasing number of intermarriages with the Dutch. Among the small educated elite of the first generation (only a handful of whom, incidentally, ever lived in camps or wards), marrying a Dutch woman was fairly common, perhaps also because it was a sign of status. A few of the unmarried soldiers who arrived in Holland in 1951 also chose Dutch wives--partially at least because there were insufficient Moluccan women--but most of them were able to find Moluccan wives often from among the daughters of their older comrades.[34]

Among the Dutch-born Moluccans, however, intermarriage with the Dutch has become almost customary, not only among men, but also equally among women. In the beginning, with their older children, first generation parents put up a strong resistance, but they lost the battle. Nowadays, in some communities, the rate of intermarriage is as high as 60 percent. Even in the most conservative wards I

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social class and social mobility are more closely linked to a person's proper command of the language.

34. Hilde Verwey-Jonker was the chairperson of a commission conducting a comprehensive study of the situation of Moluccans in the late 1950s, resulting in a now classic report, *Ambonezen in Nederland.* In a recent interview in *Marinjo* (March 1985), Verwey-Jonker expressed her surprise at the relatively low occurrence of mixed marriages in light of the large number of bachelors (over 1,000) among the KNIL troops and the shortage of single women. Since actual figures are unavailable, it is difficult to ascertain both how great the shortage of women was and how large a percentage of the bachelors married non-Moluccans. I believe that the shortage was actually not very great since the daughters of many of the older soldiers reached a marriageable age within their first two or three years in Holland. There was probably little competition from adult sons, since Moluccan men tend to marry late.

would estimate that at least one-third of the youths marry Dutch partners.[35] In most cases this involves the Dutch partner being drawn into the Moluccan community, rather than the Moluccan becoming more integrated into Dutch society. Attracted by the coziness and tightness of the Moluccan family, the Dutch partners often act more Moluccan than their spouses. They frequently learn Malay, dress according to adat at festivities, follow Moluccan etiquette, become engulfed in the family network, and, in quite a few cases I studied, are more knowledgeable about Moluccan history and culture than their Moluccan family. One can even observe Dutch women accusing the Moluccan sisters-in-law of being less Moluccan than they are, or admonishing them to act more Moluccan!

For Moluccans, marriage with a Dutch partner represents getting the best of two worlds, being able to continue their participation in Moluccan social life while, at least within their own partnership, not being restricted by traditional conventions and role models and being allowed to live a freer Western-style life. While Moluccan in-laws (including the partner's brothers and sisters) would have expected frequent visits and demanded various favors, cordial relationships and infrequent visits may suffice with Dutch in-laws. Moluccan men also find marrying a Dutch girl attractive because she is often more willing to enter the more traditional role of "submissive" wife and homemaker than are modern Moluccan girls. Dutch wives also seem less concerned about the husbands' fiscal responsibility, career chances, and economic obligations. On the other side, Moluccan girls state that they prefer Dutch men because they accept women more readily as equal partners, are more open-minded, have broader interests, and are less promiscuous and economically more responsible.

There have been changes too in the field of child rearing. The Indonesian-born generation brought up their children with strict, sometimes harsh discipline. The "victims" of this upbringing often explain, laughingly and not without appreciation, that they were raised "military style." The parents' authority was unquestioned, with orders never explained and a child never allowed to ask for a reason. Any transgressions of the rules were severely, often corporally, punished. Despite apparently appreciating the strict upbringing they received, these very people have almost totally broken the pattern with their own children. They raise them with great permissiveness and gentleness, following more the Dutch style of child raising but without permitting its anarchy.

Hitting a child has become a rarity. If corporal punishment is inflicted, it is usually not in anger but after giving the child an explanation. Children are allowed to voice their own opinions; house rules and punishments are discussed and, generally, a child is allowed much more privacy and personal space. To be sure, some "Moluccan traits" are being instilled, for example filial piety, respect for older people, and family allegiance, but even these are enforced less strictly. Again, radical changes are inherent in this development.

In recent years, too, the traditional hierarchical system among siblings, in which older children can order younger ones around and in which the oldest brother, the *bung*, plays the authoritative role of surrogate father, is being seriously challenged by the younger Dutch-born siblings of both sexes.

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35. One has also to raise the question of whether or not the high rate of Dutch intermarriage not only with Moluccans, but also with Dutch-Indonesians and to a lesser degree with other ethnic minorities, is not really a Dutch phenomenon. Whatever the case, intermarriage requires acceptance from both sides and, quite obviously, the Moluccans have demonstrated their willingness.

The extreme closeness of the family is still intact, as is the long dependency of children on the parents. But as people insist on ever greater privacy and individual freedom, the family structure will also loosen. Of course, the whole family structure as it is known today will disappear in the next generation, because of the smallness of the young families and the egalitarian upbringing of the children.

For the first time, old age has become a problem within the Moluccan community. Traditionally, one son, daughter, or grandchild was designated to stay home and take care of the parents when they became old and frail. This is still the custom in a majority of Moluccan families. However, there are a slowly increasing number of cases where parents, especially a widow or widower, are moved into an old-age home. This is still a highly emotional issue, and attempts are being made to find a "Moluccan solution," i.e., to build special housing for the elderly within, or in the vicinity, of the wards. More than anything else, this development shows that the traditional family system is falling apart and is being replaced by a more Western structure.

Although intermarriage with the Dutch is now widely accepted, intermarriage with other ethnic or racial groups is not. These groups, including Dutch Indonesians, are considered to be of lower social status.[36] Perhaps surprisingly, the problem of the children of mixed marriages being "half-bloods"[37] has not yet become a topic of debate in the Moluccan community. Most are being raised as Moluccans but it remains to be seen where they will fit in when they reach adulthood.

Individualization

Individual choice and decision making is being more and more stressed by young people, although many Moluccans still proudly point to their collective ways of thinking and acting. Aside from the fact that traditional built-in conflict in Moluccan society between community conformity and individual expression still exists, the trend towards individualization has become very strong and irreversible.

The first step occurred when people moved from the camps to the wards. In the wards, they still lived in close physical proximity but the change in architectural design led to greater social distance. The "long-house syndrome" of the camps was being replaced by the "my home is my castle" philosophy which fitted the change in architecture from barracks to separate self-contained units. In the new houses all doors faced outside and neighbors were separated by thick walls. Spur-of-the-moment visits have decreased, door bells are rung, and life inside the

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36. Going back to colonial times, Moluccans felt themselves engaged in status competition with "Indos," as Moluccans refer to Dutch-Indonesians. Moluccans generally look down upon these "Indos" and, in the past, few social contacts existed between the two groups. Among young people, a more tolerant attitude is developing, although the feelings of most of them can be best described as ambiguous. Intermarriage is on the rise but is still numerically insignificant, especially if compared with Dutch-Moluccan marriages. Intermarriage with other Indonesian groups is virtually unheard of since the Moluccans' arrival in Holland, but it used to be fairly common for KNIL soldiers to marry Javanese women.

37. Moluccans use the Dutch term "*half-bloedjes*" when referring to children of mixed marriages.

house has become more hidden from public view. Without exception, people who remember camp life nostalgically tell how they miss the coziness and closeness, but they all have become more private.

The second change happened when increasing numbers of young married couples had to find residence outside the wards, which were full and, in accordance with Dutch policy, not expanded. In the mixed neighborhoods outside the wards, privacy became even greater and social control from the wards almost impossible to enforce. Like their Dutch neighbors, Moluccans living outside the wards do not appreciate unexpected visits but expect their friends to phone first. In this setting, they were able to develop an individual lifestyle free from social pressure. Even alternate "Western" life styles like cohabitation became common, sometimes grudgingly tolerated, but often still fiercely resisted by their elders.

Those who moved on to the big cities became even more individualized and independent, with the anonymity of the city and its distance from the wards contributing to their independence. However, the ties with family and friends have remained very strong. The frequent cross visits allow the migrants to keep in touch with the community. They draw new strength from being Moluccan when visiting the wards, but they also bring with them new ideas and fashions, exposing the wards to the outside world.

The continued strong need for community feeling can be seen in the case of Lelystad, a brand new drawing-board city on the Flevo-polder, recently reclaimed from the sea. Independent of one another, about fifty Moluccan families settled in different parts of the town. Yet, they found each other, recently organized a cultural day, and now are in the process of establishing a community foundation.

Secularization

Hand-in-hand with increasing individualization came secularization. Long after Dutch young people fled the churches, Moluccan youths faithfully attended church. Virtually every child was baptized and just about everyone underwent confirmation (*sidi*). The latter ritual makes a person not only a full-fledged member of the church but is also a kind of initiation into adulthood. Thus, a person should not marry before he or she has been confirmed.

In recent years, church attendance among young people has been dropping and even the numbers of baptisms and confirmations are slowly declining. For those who stay away, Christianity has stopped being adat, i.e., they don't feel compelled to go to church just because the community expects it or because it is proper Moluccan behavior.

Some have stopped believing, others have chosen alternate faiths, and in a few extreme cases, people have rejected Christianity because they see it as a white religion which has been used as a tool of colonial oppression. Among the adherents of this theory, there are even some who have "returned" to what they believe is the indigenous religion of pre-Christian times.

The conservative church leadership, which has proven itself largely incapable of changing with the times, must, of course, take much of the blame when even many of those youths who still believe in Christianity have stopped attending services. Most services are held in High Malay, which is comparable to Church Latin, and, at best, only partially comprehensible even to the older generation. For the young people sleep on Sunday morning, after a long night at the disco, has become more desirable than attending a ritual which is, in their eyes, meaningless.

Furthermore, the church--or better the churches, since there have constantly been schisms based on family feuds rather than dogma--do not address themselves to the social problems, such as drug addiction, which concern young people. Church leaders have also been trying to uphold the traditional lifestyle, going so far as to ban people who live together outside matrimony from participating in the Eucharist.

Summary

Since the hijackings there have been two major developments: one, a strong resurgence of Moluccan identity, including a reevaluation and reinterpretation of traditional values and customs; two, a greater willingness to accept permanent residence in the Netherlands with a resulting better adaptation to life in Dutch society.

These two developments are not necessarily in contradiction. If they continue along their current lines, the result will probably be that Moluccans will survive as a distinct ethnic group with a partially separate culture expressed through a distinct lifestyle, while at the same time they become functionally integrated into Dutch society.

Separatist Counterforces

There are also strong counterforces to a development along the above lines. One of them is the strong fatalism among a sizable group of Moluccans, particularly among the young, who fear not only that because of their skin color they will never be fully accepted, but also that they have no chance for advancement in Dutch society. The statistics, which seem to support these fears, further contribute to their sense of fatalism. High youth unemployment, for example, is a severe problem in overall Dutch society but it reaches 80 percent in some Moluccan wards. The number of drug addicts, too, is four times the national average. The sense of hopelessness felt by many Moluccan youngsters with regard to their situation clearly influences the continuously high school-dropout rate amongst them.

Another counterforce is reverse racism. The search for identity has led in some instances (especially in big cities like Amsterdam, where such identity is hardest to maintain) to the concept of the "Super-Moluccan," a Moluccan *Übermensch*, superior to others in every aspect.

Hatred for the Dutch keeps simmering below the surface, ready to boil over at any moment--even among members of Dutch-born generations. Teenagers, outwardly "Dutch" in their behavior, suddenly became consumed with hatred for the Hollanders when they spoke about Dutch treatment of their parents. Moluccans married to Dutch partners, some for over twenty years, often have expressed the same deeply rooted resentments and dislikes, often right in front of their partners. I know of one extreme case, where the Moluccan father tried to forbid his very light-skinned, half-Dutch daughter from marrying a Netherlander, merely because he was Dutch.

Continued self-imposed isolation seems to be another factor working against integration. Many wards remain islands of separatism in a Dutch sea, and many Moluccans living in Dutch neighborhoods have little or no contact with their white neighbors. True friendships and regular interaction with Dutch acquaintances are still exceptional--even for a large number of mixed couples.

Finally, the great divisiveness within the Moluccan community and the lack of leadership have made concerted actions towards emancipation very arduous. Traditionally, disagreements between leaders have led to splits into ever smaller factions. Now most charismatic leaders of the first generation have either died or faded from the scene. In the general atmosphere of political exhaustion prevailing since the hijackings, no new leaders of stature have emerged. The competent managers and technocrats running the aforementioned Moluccan Advisory Council have only partially filled the gap. Consequently, although they have been working for advances in the long-neglected socioeconomic arena, and although they can show some successes through pressure they have brought to bear on the Dutch government, they are largely Manusama supporters, and thus have not been able to get backing from other important factions.

A new political style seems to be emerging among those below thirty-five years of age. They are willing to discuss problems calmly and rationally and to listen to diverging viewpoints. They also have new concerns. Rather than entering national politics, they work at the local level, trying to improve the lot of the inhabitants of the wards instead of fighting the Dutch government. This trend goes hand-in-hand with the Dutch policy of decentralization. The danger here is that while local advances may be possible, emancipation of the Moluccan community as a whole may be stagnating.

Conclusion

Can the train ever be stopped again? Looking at the developments since the hijackings, I believe the answer is an emphatic "No!" The Moluccan train is running firmly on its Dutch tracks toward an as yet unknown destination. But the destination is still within the Netherlands.

Many young Moluccans have realized this, although they often state that they never will feel quite at home in Holland. The numbers of those who openly admit that they would not return to the Moluccas, even if an RMS were established, are growing steadily. Realistic enough to acknowledge that they have become too Westernized to adjust to life in the Moluccas, they are also realistic enough to know that they would not be welcome there. Only sentimental ties will remain in the future.

However, if we question whether new violence, like the hijackings, could happen again, then I am not as optimistic as some Dutch government experts who believe that this would be impossible. Flare-ups of violence, such as the most recent one in January of 1984 in the large ward of Capelle aan den IJssel bear witness to the volatility of the situation. The political problem still remains and as long as there is no peaceful solution, the explosive situation will not disappear.